FROM 


MAN  ASS  AS  TO  APPOMATTOX 


MEMOIRS    OF    THE    CIVIL  WAE    IN 
AMERICA 


BY 

JAMES    LONGSTKEET, 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  CONFEDERATE  ARMY 


ILLUSTRATED    WITH  PLATES,   MAPS,   PORTRAITS,   AND  ENGRAVINGS 
SPECIALLY  PREPARED  FOR    THIS   WORK 


PHILADELPHIA 

J.   B.    LIPPINCOTT    COMPANY 
1896 


COPYRIGHT,  1895, 

BY 
J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 


All  Rights  reserved. 


ELECTROTYPED  AND  PRINTED  BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY,  PHILADELPHIA,  U.S.A. 


THIS  WORK  IS  RESPECTFULLY  DEDICATED 

TO  THE 

OFFICERS  AND  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  FIRST  CORPS  OF  THE  ARMY 
OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA 

TO   THE    LIVING    AND    THE    DEAD 

Hn  fnlemot£  of 

THEIR   BRAVE    DEEDS,    THEIR    TOILS,    THEIR    TRIBULATIONS, 
AND    THEIR    TRIUMPHS 


PREFACE. 


IMMEDIATELY  after  the  surrender  of  the  Confederate 
armies  engaged  in  the  war  between  the  States,  General 
Lee  undertook  to  write  of  the  campaigns  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  while  under  his  command,  and  asked 
such  assistance  as  I  could  give  in  supplying  reports,  de 
spatches,  and  letters  of  his,  the  originals  of  which  had  been 
lost  or  destroyed.  Under  the  impression  that  they  could 
not  be  put  to  better  use,  such  as  were  then  in  hand  were 
packed  and  sent  him.  He  gave  up  the  work,  and  after  a 
few  years  his  death  made  it  impossible  that  the  world 
should  ever  receive  the  complete  story  of  the  Confederate 
campaigns  in  Virginia  from  the  noble  mind  that  pro 
jected  and  controlled  them. 

Possibly,  had  I  not  expected  our  commander  to  write 
the  history  of  those  campaigns,  I  should  have  written  it 
myself  a  decade  or  so  earlier  than  I  have  done.  But, 
personally,  I  am  not  sorry  that  I  write  of  the  war  thirty 
years  after  its  close,  instead  of  ten  or  twenty. 

While  I  am  so  constituted,  temperamentally,  that  I 
could  view  then  almost  exactly  as  I  do  now  the  great 
struggle  in  which  I  bore  a  part,  I  do  not  know  that  others, 
in  any  considerable  number,  might  have  so  regarded  it  at 
the  earlier  periods  to  which  I  refer. 

I  believe  that  now,  more  fully  than  then,  the  public  is 
ready  to  receive,  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  written,  the 
story  which  I  present. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  philosophize  upon  the  war,  but 
I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  my  profound  thankful- 


VI  PREFACE. 

ness  that  Providence  has  spared  me  to  such  time  as  I  can 
see  the  asperities  of  the  great  conflict  softened,  its  passions 
entering  upon  the  sleep  of  oblivion,  only  its  nobler — if 
less  immediate — results  springing  into  virile  and  vast  life. 
I  believe  there  is  to-day,  because  of  the  war,  a  broader  and 
deeper  patriotism  in  all  Americans  ;  that  patriotism  throbs 
the  heart  and  pulses  the  being  as  ardently  of  the  South 
Carolinian  as  of  the  Massachusetts  Puritan ;  that  the  Lib 
erty  Bell,  even  now,  as  I  write,  on  its  Southern  pilgrimage, 
will  be  as  reverently  received  and  as  devotedly  loved  in 
Atlanta  and  Charleston  as  in  Philadelphia  and  Boston. 
And  to  stimulate  and  evolve  this  noble  sentiment  all  the 
more,  what  we  need  is  the  resumption  of  fraternity,  the 
hearty  restoration  and  cordial  cultivation  of  neighborly, 
brotherly  relations,  faith  in  Jehovah,  and  respect  for 
each  other ;  and  God  grant  that  the  happy  vision  that  de 
lighted  the  soul  of  the  sweet  singer  of  Israel  may  rest 
like  a  benediction  upon  the  North  and  the  South,  upon 
the  Blue  and  the  Gray. 

The  spirit  in  which  this  work  has  been  conceived,  and 
in  which  I  have  conscientiously  labored  to  carry  it  out,  is 
one  of  sincerity  and  fairness.  As  an  actor  in,  and  an  eye 
witness  of,  the  events  of  1861-65,  I  have  endeavored  to 
perform  my  humble  share  of  duty  in  passing  the  mate 
rials  of  history  to  those  who  may  give  them  place  in  the 
records  of  the  nation, — not  of  the  South  nor  of  the  North, 
— but  in  the  history  of  the  United  Nation.  It  is  with 
such  magnified  view  of  the  responsibility  of  saying  the 
truth  that  I  have  written. 

I  yield  to  no  one  as  a  champion  of  the  Southern  soldier 
wherever  he  may  have  fought  and  in  whatever  army,  and 
I  do  not  think  I  shall  be  charged  more  now  than  in 
war-time  with  "  underestimating  the  enemy."  Honor  to 
all !  If  I  speak  with  some  particularity  of  the  First 
Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  it  must  be 
ascribed  in  part  to  the  affection  of  a  commander,  and  in 


PREFACE.  Vll 

part  to  my  desire  to  relieve  its  brave  officers  and  men  in 
the  ranks  from  unjust  aspersions.  After  General  Lee's 
death,  various  writers  on  the  Southern  cause  combined  with 
one  accord  to  hold  the  First  Corps  and  its  commander 
responsible  for  all  adversity  that  befell  the  army.  I 
being  under  the  political  ban,  and  the  political  passions 
and  prejudices  of  the  times  running  high,  they  had  no 
difficulty  in  spreading  their  misrepresentations  South  and 
North  until  some  people,  through  their  mere  reiteration, 
came  to  accept  them  as  facts.  I  simply  present  the  facts 
concerning  the  First  Corps  in  all  fulness  and  fairness, 
attested  by  indisputable  authorities,  that  the  public  may 
judge  between  it  and  its  detractors. 

In  the  accounts  of  battles  and  movements,  the  official 
War  Records  supply  in  a  measure  the  place  of  lost  papers, 
and  afford  a  great  mass  of  most  trustworthy  statistics.  I 
am  under  obligations  to  General  E.  P.  Alexander,  Gen 
eral  G.  M.  Sorrel,  Colonel  Osman  Latrobe,  Colonel  J.  W. 
Fairfax,  Colonel  T.  J.  Goree,  Colonel  Erasmus  Taylor, 
and  Colonel  J.  C.  Haskell  for  many  interesting  sugges 
tions. 

To  Major  George  B.  Davis  and  Mr.  L.  J.  Perry,  of  the 
War  Records  office,  I  am  under  obligations  for  invaluable 
assistance ;  as  also  to  Mr.  Alfred  Matthews,  of  Philadel 
phia,  for  material  aid  in  revising  the  manuscript  of  these 
memoirs. 

THE  AUTHOR. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE  ANTE-BELLUM  LIFE  OF  THE  AUTHOR. 

PAGE 

Birth — Ancestry — School-Boy  Days — Appointment  as  Cadet  at  the 
United  States  Military  Academy— Graduates  of  Historic  Classes 
—Assignment  as  Brevet  Lieutenant — Gay  Life  of  Garrison  at 
Jefferson  Barracks— Lieutenant  Grant's  Courtship— Annexation 
of  Texas— Army  of  Observation— Army  of  Occupation— Camp 
Life  in  Texas— March  to  the  Rio  Grande— Mexican  War  ....  13 

CHAPTER    II. 

FROM  NEW  MEXICO  TO  MANASSAS. 

The  War-Cloud— The  Journey  Northward— Appointed  Brigadier- 
General — Report  to  General  Beauregard— Assigned  to  Com 
mand  at  the  Scene  of  the  First  Conflict— Personnel  of  the 
Confronting  Forces — Description  of  the  Field  of  Manassas,  or 
Bull  Run— Beauregard  and  McDowell  of  the  same  West  Point 
dass_Battle  of  Blackburn's  Ford—  Early 's  Mistake— Under 
Fire  of  Friend  and  Foe 29 

CHAPTER    III. 

BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS,  OR  BULL  RUN. 

Commanders  on  both  Sides  generally  Veterans  of  the  Mexican 
War— General  Irvin  McDowell's  Preconceived  Plan — Johnston 
reinforces  Beauregard  and  approves  his  Plans— General  Bernard 
E.  Bee— Analysis  of  the  Fight— Superb  Work  of  the  Federal 
Artillery— Christening  of  "Stonewall  Jackson"— McDowell's 
Gallant  Effort  to  recover  Lost  Power— Before  he  was  shorn 
of  his  Artillery  he  was  the  Samson  of  the  Field— The  Rout- 
Criticism  of  McDowell— Tyler's  Reconnoissance— Ability  of  the 
Commanding  Generals  tested 42 

CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  CONFEDERATES  HOVERING  AROUND  WASHINGTON. 

An  Early  War-Time  Amenity — The  Author  invited  to  dine  with 
the  Enemy— "  Stove-pipe  Batteries"— J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  the  Fa 
mous  Cavalryman— His  Bold  Dash  on  the  Federals  at  Lewins- 
ville— Major-General  G.  W.  Smith  associated  with  Johnston 
and  Beauregard  in  a  Council— Longstreet  promoted  Major- 
General—Fierce  Struggle  at  Ball's  Bluff— Dranesville  a  Success 


X  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

for  the  Union  Arms — McClellaii  given  the  Sobriquet  of  "The 
Young  Napoleon" 59 

CHAPTER    V. 

BOUND   ABOUT  RICHMOND. 

The  Defences  of  the  Confederate  Capital — Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Centreville— Aggressive  Action — Council  with  the 
President  and  Secretary  of  War— Mr.  Davis's  High  Opinion  of 
McClellan — Operations  on  the  Peninsula — Engagements  about 
Yorktown  and  Williamsburg— Severe  Toil  added  to  the  Soldiers' 
Usual  Labors  by  a  Saturated  Soil 64 

CHAPTER    VI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF   WILLIAMSBURG. 

The  Attack  on  Fort  Magruder — Hancock  occupies  Two  Redoubts — 
The  Slaughter  in  Early's  Brigade— The  Fifth  North  Carolina 
Regiment  and  Twenty-Fourth  Virginia  mercilessly  exposed— 
A  Hard-Fought  Engagement— A  Confederate  Victory— Mc 
Clellan  not  on  the  Field  the  Greater  Part  of  the  Day— Han 
cock  called  "The  Superb"  by  McClellau— Johnston  pays  High 
Tribute  to  Longstreet 72 

CHAPTER   VII. 

SEVEN   PINES,    OR  FAIR  OAKS. 

A  New  Line  of  Defence — Positions  of  the  Confronting  Armies — 
Fitz-John  Porter— Terrific  Storm  on  the  Eve  of  Battle— Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Orders  to  Longstreet,  Smith,  and  Huger— Lack 
of  Co-operation  on  the  Confederate  Side,  and  Ensuing  Confu 
sion—Fatalities  among  Confederate  Officers— Kearny's  Action 
—Serious  Wounding  of  General  Johnston  at  the  Close  of  the 
Battle — Summary  and  Analysis  of  Losses 81 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

SEQUELAE  OF  SEVEN  PINES. 

The  Forces  under  Command  of  G.  W.  Smith  after  Johnston  was 
wounded— The  Battle  of  the  1st— Longstreet  requests  Reinforce 
ments  and  a  Diversion— Council  held— McLaws  alone  sustains 
Longstreet's  Opposition  to  retiring— Severe  Fighting— Pickett's 
Brave  Stand— General  Lee  assigned  to  Command— He  orders 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Army— Criticism  of  General  Smith— Con 
federates  should  not  have  lost  the  Battle— Key es's  Corroboration  103 

CHAPTER    IX. 

ROBERT   E.   LEE  IN   COMMAND. 

The  Great  General's  Assignment  not  at  first  assuring  to  the  Army- 
Able  as  an  Engineer  but  limited  as  to  Field  Service— He  makes 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGE 

the  Acquaintance  of  his  Lieutenants — Calls  a  Council— Gains 
Confidence  by  saying  Nothing— "A  Little  Humor  now  and 
then" — Lee  Plans  a  Simultaneous  Attack  on  McClellan's  Front 
and  Rear — J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  Daring  Reconnoissance  around  the 
Union  Army 112 

CHAPTER    X. 

FIGHTING  ALONG  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 

Retreat — Lee's  Bold  Initiative — Lee  and  his  Lieutenants  planning 
Battle — The  Confederates'  Loss  at  Mechanicsville — Gaines's 
Mill— A.  P.  Hill's  Fight— Longstreet's  Reserve  Division  put 
in — McClellan's  Change  of  Base — Savage  Station — Longstreet 
engages  McClellan's  Main  Force  at  Frayser's  Farm  (or  Glen- 
dale)— President  Davis  on  the  Field — Testimony  of  Federal 
Generals — Fierce  Bayonet  Charges — "Greek  meets  Greek" — 
Capture  of  General  McCall— McClellan's  Masterly  Retreat  .  .  120 

CHAPTER    XL 

BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 

Last  Stand  in  the  Great  Retreat — Strength  of  McClellan's  Position 
— The  Confederates  make  Poor  Use  of  their  Artillery — A  Mis 
take  and  Defeat  for  Lee's  Army — The  Campaign  as  a  Whole  a 
Great  Success,  but  it  should  have  been  far  greater — McClellan's 
Retreat  showed  him  well  equipped  in  the  Science  of  War — Re 
view  of  the  Campaign— Jackson's  and  Magruder's  Misunder 
standing — Moral  Effect  of  the  Gunboats  on  the  James  River — 
"  There  should  be  a  Gunboat  in  Every  Family" 141 

CHAPTER    XII. 

HALLECK   AND   POPE   IN   FEDERAL   COMMAND. 

Centres  of  Activity  gravitate  towards  Orange  and  Culpeper  Coun 
ties — Pope's  Unsoldierly  Preliminary  Orders— Jackson's  and 
Pope's  Encounter  at  Cedar  Mountain— Confidence  in  and  Es 
teem  for  General  Lee — The  Confederate  Commander's  Plans 
for  cutting  off  Pope  miscarry — Capture  of  Captain  Fitzhugh 
with  Important  Orders — Longstreet  puts  General  Toombs 
under  Arrest— General  Pope  withdraws 153 

CHAPTER    XIII. 

MAKING  READY  FOR  MANASSAS  AGAIN. 

General  Lee  modifies  his  Order  of  March — Continuous  Skirmish 
ing — Cavalry  Commander  Stuart  gets  into  General  Pope's 
Head-quarters  and  captures  his  Personal  Equipment — His 
Uniform  Coat  and  Hat  shown  along  the  Confederate  Lines — 
Jackson's  Superb  Flank  Movement  —  Confederates  capture 
Trains,  Supplies,  Munitions,  and  Prisoners — Hooker  and 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Ewell  at  Bristoe  Station— Jackson  first  on  the  Old  Field  of  Bull 
Run— Longstreet's  Command  joins  passing  Thoroughfare  Gap 
— Pope  practically  throws  Responsibility  for  Aggressive  Action 
on  McDowell — Preliminary  Fighting — General  Pope  surprised 
by  Jackson — Pope's  Orders  to  Fitz-John  Porter 163 

CHAPTER   XIV. 

SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MAN  ASS  AS   (BULL  RUN). 

Battle  opened  by  the  Federals  on  Jackson's  Right,  followed  by 
Kearny — Longstreet's  Reconnoissauce — Stuart,  the  Cavalry 
Leader,  sleeps  on  the  Field  of  Battle— Pope  thought  at  the 
Close  of  the  29th  that  the  Confederates  were  retreating — Second 
Day — Fitz-John  Porter  struck  in  Flank — Longstreet  takes  a 
Hand  in  the  Fight  late  in  the  Day — Lee, under  Fire — The 
Federal  Retreat  to  Centreville — That  Point  turned — Pope  again 
dislodged — "Stonewall"  Jackson's  Appearance  and  Peculiari 
ties — Killing  of  "  Fighting  Phil"  Kearny — Losses — Review  of 
the  Campaign 180 

CHAPTER   XV. 

THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN. 

General  Lee  continues  Aggressive  Work — From  Foraged  Fields  of 
Virginia  into  a  Bounteous  Land— Longstreet  objected  to  the 
Movement  on  Harper's  Ferry— Lee  thinks  the  Occasion  Timely 
for  Proposal  of  Peace  and  Independence — Confederates  sing 
ing  through  the  Streets  of  Fredericktown — McClellan's  Move 
ments—Cautious  Marches— Lee's  Lost  Order  handed  to  the 
Federal  Chief  at  Frederick 199 

CHAPTER    XVI. 
"THE  LOST  ORDER"— SOUTH  MOUNTAIN. 

How  the  Federals  found  the  Despatch — With  every  Advantage 
McClellau  "made  haste  slowly" — Lee  turns  back  to  meet 
him  at  South  Mountain — Longstreet  preferred  that  the  Stand 
should  be  made  at  Sharpsburg — The  Battle  at  the  Pass — Many 
killed — General  Garland  of  the  Confederate  and  General  Reno 
of  the  Union  Side — A  Future  President  among  the  Wounded — 
Estimate  of  Forces  engaged 212 

CHAPTER    XVII. 

PRELIMINARIES  OF  THE  GREAT  BATTLE. 

Confederates  retreat  from  South  Mountain — Federals  follow  and 
harass  them— Franklin  and  Cobb  at  Crampton's  Pass— A  Spir 
ited  Action — Fighting  around  Harper's  Ferry— Its  Capitula 
tion — The  Confederates  take  Eleven  Thousand  Prisoners — 
Jackson  rejoins  Lee— Description  of  the  Field  of  Antietam — 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

PAGE 

McClellan  posts  his  Corps— Lee's  Lines  advantageously  placed 
—Hooker's  Advance  on  the  Eve  of  Battle  should  have  been 
resisted 227 

CHAPTER    XVIII. 

BATTLE  OF  SHABPSBUBG,   OB  ANTIETAM. 

Bloodiest  Single  Day  of  the  War— Comparison  of  Casualties- 
Hooker  opens  the  Fight  against  Jackson's  Centre — Many  Offi 
cers  among  the  Fallen  early  in  the  Day— McLaws  and  Walker 
in  time  to  meet  Sumner's  Advance  under  Sedgwick — Around 
Dunker  Chapel— Richardson's  Splendid  Advance  against  the 
Confederate  Centre  the  Signal  of  the  Bursting  of  another  Storm 
— Longstreet's  and  D.  H.  Hill's  Troops  stood  before  it— Fall 
of  General  G.  B.  Anderson— General  Richardson  mortally 
wounded — Aggressive  Spirit  of  his  Command  broken — Won 
derful  Cannon-shot— General  D.  H.  Hill's  Third  Horse  killed 
under  him 239 

CHAPTER    XIX. 

BATTLE  OF  SHABPSBUBG,   OB   ANTIETAM   (CONTINUED). 

Closing  Events  of  the  Great  Struggle— Burnside  crosses  the  Bridge 
he  made  famous — Toombs  made  Gallant  Defence,  but  was  out 
numbered  and  dislodged— The  Confederate  Brigades  from  Har 
per's  Ferry  under  A.  P.  Hill  in  Time  for  the  Final  Crisis— 
Burnside's  Advance  arrested  by  them — The  Battle  against 
Burnside  "appeared  to  spring  from  the  Earth"— "  Lee's  old 
War  Horse"— The  Killing  of  a  Kinsman  at  the  Bridge  seriously 
affects  General  D.  R.  Jones— The  Sharp  Fight  at  Shepherds- 
town— Confederates  retreat— Casualties  of  the  Battle— Confed 
erate  Losses  in  the  Campaign — Neither  McClellan's  Plan  nor 
Execution  was  strong 256 

CHAPTER    XX. 

BEVIEW  OF  THE  MABYLAND   CAMPAIGN. 

Confederate  Expectations— General  Lee's  Salutatory  to  the  People 
of  Maryland— The  "  Lost  Despatch"— McClellan's  Movements 
—Turn  in  the  Tide  of  War— A  Miracle  great  as  the  throwing 
down  of  the  Walls  of  Jericho— In  Contempt  of  the  Enemy  the 
Confederate  Army  was  dispersed— Harper's  Ferry  a  "  Man- 
Trap"—  It  diverted  the  Army  from  the  Main  Issue— Lee  and 
McClellan  compared  and  contrasted— Tribute  to  the  Confed 
erate  Private  Soldier 279 

CHAPTER    XXI. 

BEOBGANIZATION  AND  BEST  FOB  BOTH  ABMIES. 

The  Confederates  appoint  Seven  Lieutenant-Generals— The  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  organized  in  Corps — General  McClellan 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

relieved,  and  General  Burn  side  appointed  Commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac— A  Lift  for  the  South— McClellan  was 
growing— Burnside's  "Three  Grand  Divisions"— The  Campaign 
of  the  Rappahannock— Getting  Beady  for  Fredericksburg — 
Longstreet  occupies  Fredericksburg — The  Town  called  to  sur 
render  by  General  Sumner— Exodus  of  the  Inhabitants  under 
a  Threat  to  shell  the  Town 290 

CHAPTER    XXII. 

BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Description  of  the  Field — Marye's  Heights — Position  of  the  Troops 
of  Longstreet's  Command — General  Jackson  called  down  from 
Orange  Court-House,  and  Preparations  made  for  a  Determined 
Stand— Signal  Guns  at  Three  o'Clock  in  the  Morning  announce 
the  Long-Expected  Battle— Burnside's  Bridge-Builders  thrice 
driven  back  from  their  Work— The  Crossing  finally  made  by 
Boats— Federals  under  Hot  Fire  enter  Fredericksburg — How 
they  obtained  their  Foothold  on  the  West  Bank  of  the  Rappa 
hannock— Gallant  Officers  and  Men— Ninety-seven  killed  or 
wounded  in  the  Space  of  Fifty  Yards — General  Burnside's  Plan 
of  Battle— Strength  of  the  Contending  Forces 297 

CHAPTER    XXIII. 

BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG   (CONTINUED). 

The  Battle-field  veiled  by  a  Heavy  Fog— Terrific  Fighting  of  the 
13th  of  December— Forlorn  Hope  of  the  Federals— General 
Meade's  Division  of  Franklin's  Command  makes  the  First 
Advance — General  French  leads  against  the  Confederate  Left — 
Hancock  follows— General  Cobb  killed— The  Sunken  Road  and 
Stone  Wall  below  Marye's  Hill — Desperate  Advances  and  De 
termined  Repulses— Humphreys's  Heroic  Assault— The  Stone 
Wall  "a  Sheet  of  Flame"— General  Jackson  loses  his  Oppor 
tunity  to  advance — The  Charge  of  Meade's  Divisions  com 
pared  with  that  of  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and  Trimble's  Columns 
at  Gettysburg— Forty  Per  Cent,  killed  in  charging  Lines  here, 
and  Sixty  Per  Cent,  at  Gettysburg— Total  Losses — Peace  to  be 
declared  because  Gold  had  gone  to  200— Organization  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia 306 

CHAPTER    XXIV. 

PREPARING  FOR  THE  SPRING  OF   763. 

Burnside's  Abortive  Moves — The  "  Mud  March" — General  Hooker 
supersedes  Burnside — The  Confederates  strengthen  their  Posi 
tion  for  the  Winter— Longstreet  ordered  to  Petersburg — Secre 
tary  of  War  Seddon  and  the  Author  talk  of  General  Grant  and 
the  Confederate  Situation  on  the  Mississippi  and  in  the  West — 
Longstreet  makes  a  Radical  Proposition  for  Confederate  Con- 


CONTENTS.  XV 

PAGE 

centration  in  Tennessee,  thus  to  compel  Grant  to  abandon 
Vicksburg— The  Skilful  Use  of  Interior  Lines  the  Only  Way  of 
equalizing  the  Contest — Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  Lee's  Bril 
liant  Achievement — Criticism — Death  of  "Stonewall"  Jackson 
— The  Resolve  to  march  Northward — The  Army  reorganized 
in  Three  Corps — Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill  appointed  Lieutenant- 
Generals  322 

CHAPTER    XXV. 

INVASION  OF   PENNSYLVANIA. 

Plan  of  the  Confederate  March  North— General  Lee  hoped  to  draw 
Troops  from  the  South  and  develop  Important  Results  North 
of  the  Potomac— He  wanted  Beauregard  sent  to  support  the 
Movement — The  Authorities  in  Richmond  failed  to  compre 
hend — The  Value  of  the  "Interior  Lines"  not  appreciated — 
Spirited  Cavalry  Fight  at  Brandy  Station  between  Stuart's  and 
Pleasonton's  Commands — Engagement  of  Ewell  and  Milroy  at 
Winchester — The  Question  of  Authority  for  the  Cavalry  Move 
ments — Lieutenant-Colonel  Fremantle  of  the  Coldstream 
Guards,  British  Army,  as  a  Guest  and  Observer — The  Confed 
erate  Advance  reaches  Pennsylvania  Soil — General  Lee  issues 
Orders  for  a  March  on  Harrisburg— Municipal  Authorities  of 
York  and  Gettysburg  surrender  to  General  John  B.  Gordon  .  .  334 

CHAPTER    XXVI. 

GETTYSBURG — FIRST   DAY. 

Information  of  Federal  Force  and  Positions  brought  by  the  Scout 
Harrison — General  Lee  declines  to  credit  it — General  Long- 
street  suggests  a  Change  of  Direction  in  Conformance  with 
the  Revelation — General  Meade  had  succeeded  Hooker  in  Com 
mand  Five  Days  before  Battle — Positions  on  the  Eve  of  the  First 
Day — Confederate  Cavalry  "  not  in  sight" — "The  Eyes  of  the 
Army"  sadly  needed — A  Description  of  the  Famous  Battle 
field — Generals  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill  engage  the  Federals — 
Death  of  General  John  F.  Reynolds— The  Fight  on  Seminary 
Ridge — General  Hancock  in  Federal  Command  on  the  Field — 
Concerning  the  Absent  Cavalry  and  Information  given  by  the 
Scout— Conditions  at  the  Close  of  the  First  Day's  Fight  ....  346 

CHAPTER    XXVII. 

GETTYSBURG— SECOND   DAY. 

The  Confederate  Commander  reviews  the  Field  and  decides  on 
Plan  of  Battle — Positions  on  the  Morning  of  July  2 — Night 
March  of  the  Federal  Sixth  Corps — It  was  excelled  by  Law's 
Brigade  of  Confederates — The  Battle  was  opened  after  Mid 
day — General  Hood  appeals  for  Permission  to  turn  the  Federal 
Left — Failure  to  make  the  Flanking  Movement  by  the  Confed- 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

erate  Right  was  a  Serious  Mistake — Hood,  in  his  usual  Gallant 
Style,  led  his  Troops  forward  among  the  Rocks — Desperate 
Charges  against  an  Earnest  Adversary — Hood  wounded — Gen 
eral  Law  succeeds  him  in  command  of  the  Division—"  Little 
Round  Top"  an  Important  Point— "The  Citadel  of  the  Field" 
— It  was  a  Fight  of  Seventeen  Thousand  Confederates  against 
twice  their  Number — Quiet  along  the  Lines  of  other  Confeder 
ate  Commands — "  A  Man  on  the  Left  who  didn't  care  to  make 
the  Battle  win" — Evidence  against  the  Alleged  Order  for 
"  Battle  at  Sunrise" — The  u  Order"  to  Ewell  was  Discretionary 
—Lee  had  lost  his  Balance 362 

CHAPTER    XXVIII. 

GETTYSBURG — THIRD  DAY. 

The  Stroke  of  Arms  that  shook  the  Continent — Longstreet  opposed 
the  Attack  as  planned  and  made— The  Confederate  Column  of 
Assault — It  was  weak  in  Numbers  but  strong  in  Spirit — Tre 
mendous  Artillery  Combat  begins  the  Day's  Fighting — Charge 
of  Generals  Pickett,  Trimble,  and  Pettigrew — Armistead  falls 
by  the  Side  of  the  Federal  Guns — The  Federal  Cavalry  Charge 
of  General  Farnsworth — The  Commander  falls  with  Five  Mor 
tal  Wounds — Could  the  Assaulting  Column  have  been  safely 
augmented  from  Longstreet's  Right  ?— Testimony  as  to  that 
Point — Where  rested  the  Responsibility  for  Disaster? — Criti 
cism  of  the  Battle  as  a  Whole — Cemetery  Hill  stronger  than 
Marye's  Hill  at  Fredericksburg — Controverted  Points— Casual 
ties  of  the  Three  Days'  Fight— Organization  of  the  Forces 
engaged , 385 

CHAPTER    XXIX. 

THE  WAVE  ROLLS  BACK. 

Confederates  retreat  from  Gettysburg — The  Federals  pursue — Cross 
ing  the  Potomac  under  Difficulties — Kilpatrick's  Cavalry  Dash 
on  Pettigrew's  Command — General  Lee  thought  to  rest  his 
Army  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  but  Meade  followed  too  fast — 
Engagements  that  harassed  the  Retreat — General  Lee  wished 
to  be  relieved  of  Command,  but  President  Davis  would  not 
consent  to  the  Appointment  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston  or  General 
Beauregard 426 

CHAPTER    XXX. 

LONGSTREET  MOVES  TO  GEORGIA. 

The  Author  reverts  to  the  Perils  and  Opportunities  in  the  West — 
Proposes  to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  reinforce  against  Rosecrans 
from  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — Makes  Plan  known  to 
General  Lee— The  Move  finally  effected— Difficulties  of  Trans 
portation—A  Roundabout  Route— General  Longstreet  nar- 


CONTENTS.  XV11 

PAGE 

rowly  escapes  capture  when  seeking  Bragg's  Head-quarters — 
General  Bragg  assigns  Longstreet  to  Command  of  the  Left- 
Instructions  for  the  Battle  of  Chickamauga — The  Armies  in 
Position—Federals  in  Command  of  Generals  Rosecrans,  Critten- 
den,  McCook,  and  George  H.  Thomas 433 

CHAPTER    XXXI. 

BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA. 

Tactical  Features— The  Battle  opened  by  Direct  Attack  on  the 
Federals  in  the  Early  Morning  of  September  20— Repeated 
and  Determined  Front  Assaults— Brigadiers  Helm  killed  and 
Adams  wounded— The  Union  Commands  lay  behind  Defences 
—Hood's  Brigades  surged  through  the  Forest  against  the 
Covered  Infantry  and  Artillery— Hood  wounded— Longstreet 
suggests  a  Plan  for  Progressive  Action— Halting  Tactics  at 
High*Tide  of  Success— The  Confederate  Left  fought  a  Separate 
Battle— General  Thomas  retreats— First  Confederate  Victory 
in  the  West,  and  one  of  the  Bloodiest  Battles  of  the  War- 
Forces  engaged — Losses 445 

CHAPTER   XXXII. 

FAILURE  TO   FOLLOW  SUCCESS. 

Longstreet  differs  with  General  Bragg  as  to  Movements  of  Pur 
suit—The  Confederates  on  Lookout  Mountain— Federals  gain 
Comfortable  Positions  around  it — Superior  Officers  of  Bragg's 
Command  call  for  his  Removal — Bragg  seeks  Scapegoats— Pres 
ident  Davis  visits  the  Army— Tests  the  Temper  of  the  Officers 
towards  Bragg— He  offers  the  Command  to  Longstreet— He 
declines — His  Reasons — General  Bragg  ignores  Signal-Service 
Reports  and  is  surprised— General  Joe  Hooker's  Advance- 
Night  Attack  on  Lookout  Mountain — Colonel  Bratton's  Clever 
Work— Review  of  the  Western  Movement  and  Combination 
—It  should  have  been  effected  in  May  instead  of  September 
—Inference  as  to  Results  had  the  First  Proposition  been 
promptly  acted  upon 461 

CHAPTER    XXXIII. 

THE  EAST  TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN. 

General  Bragg's  Infatuation— General  Grant  in  Command  of  the 
Federal  Forces— Longstreet  ordered  into  East  Tennessee— His 
Plans  for  the  Campaign — Poorly  supported  by  his  Superior — 
Foraging  for  Daily  Rations— General  Burnside's  Forces— Ad 
vance  upon  Knoxville— Affairs  at  Lenoir's  and  Campbell's 
Stations— Engagement  near  Knoxville  an  Artillery  Combat- 
Reprehensible  Conduct  of  Officers— Allegement  that  One  was 
actuated  by  Jealousy— Federals  retire  behind  their  Works- 
Laying  the  Confederate  Lines  about  Knoxville 480 


XV111  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    XXXIV. 

BESIEGING   KNOXVILLE. 

PAGE 

Closing  on  the  Enemy's  Lines— A  Gallant  Dash — The  Federal  Po 
sitions — Fort  London,  later  called  Fort  Sanders — Assault  of  the 
Fort  carefully  planned— General  McLaws  advises  Delay — The 
Order  reiterated  and  emphasized — Gallant  Effort  by  the  Bri 
gades  of  Generals  Wofford,  Humphreys,  and  Bryan  at  the 
Appointed  Time — A  Recall  ordered,  because  carrying  the 
Works  was  reported  impossible— General  Longstreet  is  ordered 
by  the  President  to  General  Bragg's  Relief— Losses  during  the 
Assault  and  the  Campaign 497 

CHAPTER    XXXV. 

CUT  OFF   FROM   EAST   AND   WEST. 

Impracticability  of  joining  General  Bragg — Wintering  in  East  Ten 
nessee — General  Longstreet  given  Discretionary  Authority  over 
the  Department  by  President  Davis — Short  Rations — Minor 
Movements  of  Hide-and-Seek  in  the  Mountains — Longstreet's 
Position  was  of  Strategic  Importance — That  Fact  fully  appre 
ciated  by  President  Lincoln,  Secretary  Stanton,  and  Generals 
Halleck  and  Grant — "  Drive  Longstreet  out  of  East  Tennessee 
and  keep  him  out" — Generals  Robertson  and  McLaws — The 
Charges  against  them  and  Action  taken — Honorable  Mention 
for  Courage  and  Endurance — The  Army  finally  fares  sumptu 
ously  on  the  Fat  Lands  of  the  French  Broad 509 

CHAPTER    XXXVI. 

STRATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  FIELD. 

Longstreet  again  considers  Relief  from  Service — General  Grant  at 
Knoxville — Shoeless  Soldiers  leave  Bloody  Trails  on  Frozen 
Roads — A  Confederate  Advance— Affair  at  Dandridge — Fed 
erals  retreat — Succession  of  Small  Engagements— General 
Grant  urges  General  Foster's  Army  to  the  Offensive— General 
Foster  relieved— General  Schofield  in  Command  of  Federals — 
General  Grant's  Orders — General  Halleck's  Estimate  of  East 
Tennessee  as  a  Strategic  Field — Affair  of  Cavalry— Advance 
towards  Knoxville — Longstreet's  Command  called  back  to  De 
fensive  for  Want  of  Cavalry 524 

CHAPTER    XXXVII. 

LAST    DAYS    IN    TENNESSEE. 

Longstreet's  Army  at  Bull's  Gap — U.  S.  Grant  made  Lieutenant- 
General—Richmond  Authorities  awake  to  the  Gravity  of  the 
Situation— Longstreet's  Proposition  for  Campaign — Approved 
by  General  Lee — Richmond  Authorities  fail  to  adopt  it— General 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

PAGE 

Bragg's  Plan — A  Memorable  and  Unpleasant  Council  at  the 
Capital— Orders  from  President  Davis— The  Case  of  General 
Law — Longstreet  ordered  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — 
Resolutions  of  Thanks  from  Confederate  Congress 542 

CHAPTER    XXXVIII. 

BATTLE  OF    THE  WILDERNESS. 

Campaign  of  1864— General  Grant  in  the  Field— Strength  of  the 
Armies — Their  Positions— Description  of  the  Wilderness — The 
Battle  opened— A  Brisk  Day's  Fighting— Longstreet's  Com 
mand  faces  Hancock's  on  the  Morning  of  the  Second  Day — 
An  Effective  Flank  Movement— General  Wadsworth  mortally 
wounded — General  Jenkins  falls  under  Fire  of  Friends,  and 
Longstreet  is  seriously  wounded— Carried  from  the  Field  on  a 
Litter— Tribute  to  General  Jenkins— Criticism  and  Contro 
versy  551 

CHAPTER    XXXIX. 

AGAIN  IN  FRONT  OF  RICHMOND. 

Longstreet  absent  on  Leave,  nursing  his  Wounds — Hears  of  the 
Death  of  Cavalry  Leader  J.  E.  B.  Stuart— Returns  to  Virginia — 
Assigned  to  Command  on  the  North  Side  of  James  River — Af 
fair  on  the  Williamsburg  Road — Lee's  Apprehension  of  Grant's 
March  into  Richmond — Closing  Scenes  of  the  Campaign  of 
1864  about  the  Confederate  Capital— General  Benjamin  F.  But 
ler's  Move  against  Fort  Fisher — Remote  Effects  on  the  Situa 
tion  in  Virginia 572 

CHAPTER    XL. 

TALK  OF  PEACE. 

Second  Federal  Move  against  Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington  Harbor 
—Confederate  Disaffection— Act  of  Congress  appointing  a  Su 
preme  Commander  of  the  Armies — Montgomery  Blair's  Peace 
Conference— Longstreet  has  a  Meeting  with  General  Ord,  Com 
mander  of  the  Army  of  the  James — Military  Convention  pro 
posed — Correspondence  between  General  Grant  and  General 
Lee— Longstreet's  Suggestions  for  Measures  in  the  Critical 
Juncture  near  the  Close  of  the  War 582 

CHAPTER    XLI. 

BATTLE  OF   FIVE   FORKS. 

Various  Affairs  of  the  Closing  Campaign— The  Massing  of  Grant's 
Forces— Sortie  against  Fort  Steadman— Captured  but  quickly 
retaken — General  Grant's  Move  around  the  Confederate  Right 
— General  Lee  anticipates  with  Aggressive  Work — Sheridan 


XX  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

makes  Battle  with  his  Whole  Force  at  Five  Forks — Desperate 
Situation  of  the  Confederates — Disparity  of  Numbers — Splendid 
Stand  and  Battle  of  Generals  Pickett  and  Ransom— Colonel 
Pegram  mortally  wounded — W.  H.  F.  Lee,  the  "  Noble  Son  of 
a  Noble  Sire"— Corse's  Division— Pickett's  Generalship— Cas 
ualties  590 

CHAPTER    XLII. 

PETERSBURG. 

The  Fierce  Concerted  Assault  by  the  Federals— Death  of  A.  P. 
Hill — General  Lee  announces  to  Richmond  Authorities  that  he 
must  retreat— Reception  of  the  News  by  President  Davis  at 
Church  Service — Federals  take  Forts  Gregg  and  Whitworth — 
The  Retreat  harassed  by  Continuous  Fighting — Longstreet 
saves  High  Bridge,  a  Vital  Point — Ewell  and  Others  compelled 
to  surrender — General  Mahone's  Account  of  Interesting  Scenes 
— Magnitude  of  the  Disaster — "Is  the  Army  dissolving?"- 
General  Reed  mortally  wounded — Panic  occurs,  but  Order  is 
restored — General  Gregg  arid  Part  of  his  Cavalry  Command 
captured  by  Rosser  and  Mumford G03 

CHAPTER    XLIII. 

APPOMATTOX. 

Some  of  General  Lee's  Officers  say  to  him  that  "Further  Resist 
ance  is  Hopeless" — Longstreet  does  not  approve — General 
Grant  calls  for  Surrender—"  Not  yet"— The  Confederate  Chief 
tain  asks  Terms— His  Response  to  his  Officers  as  represented 
by  General  Pendleton — Correspondence  of  Generals  Lee  and 
Grant— Morning  of  April  9— General  Lee  rides  to  meet  the 
Federal  Commander,  while  Longstreet  forms  the  Last  Line  of 
Battle — Longstreet  endeavors  to  recall  his  Chief,  hearing  of  a 
Break  where  the  Confederate  Troops  could  pass — Custer  de 
mands  Surrender  of  Longstreet— Reminded  of  Irregularity, 
and  that  he  was  "  in  the  Enemy's  Lines"— Meeting  with  Gen 
eral  Grant— Capitulation— Last  Scenes 618 

CHAPTER    XLIV. 

POST-BELLUM   PENDANT. 

Old  Friends  and  their  Kindness— General  Grant— His  Character 
istic  Letter  of  Introduction  to  President  Johnson— In  Business 
in  New  Orleans— Political  Unfriendliness— Cause  of  Criticism 
of  Military  Career — Appointed  Surveyor  of  Customs — The  Old 
Nurse 632 

APPENDIX. 
Letters  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee  and  General  Longstreet 639 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 

General  James  Longstreet  (1895) Frontispiece. 

Colonel  John  B.  Kichardson 37 

Colonel  T.  J.  Goree 47 

General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart 60 

General  R.  E.  Lee 112 

General  Thomas  J.  Jackson 166 

Battle  at  Thoroughfare  Gap 174 

Defeat  of  the  Federal  Troops  by  Longstreet's  Corps  (Second  Manassas)    .    .  188 

General  Lafayette  McLaws 231 

Colonel  John  W.  Fairfax 250 

The  Battle  of  Antietam  (Burnside's  Bridge) 263 

General  James  Longstreet  (1862) 290 

The  Battle  of  Fredericksburg  (from  the  Battery  on  Lee's  Hill) 308 

Colonel  Osmun  Latrobe 316 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Arthur  Lyon  Fremantle 343 

The  Confederate  Scout  Harrison 346 

Gettysburg  (Second  Day's  Battle) 374 

General  E.  P.  Alexander 388 

General  George  E.  Pickett 392 

William  Blake 408 

Retreat    from    Gettysburg   (Accident    during    the    Night-Crossing    of   the 

Potomac  on  a  Pontoon  Bridge) 430 

Colonel  R.  J.  Moses 451 

Battle  of  Chickamauga  (Confederates  flanking  the  Union  Forces) 454 

The  Assault  on  Fort  Sanders,  Knoxville 506 

General  G.  M.  Sorrel 518 

The  Wounding  of  General  Longstreet  (Battle  of  the  Wilderness)     ....  564 

Colonel  Erasmus  Taylor 572 

General  Charles  W.  Field 577 

The  Last  Line  of  Battle  (Appomattox) 624 

Fac-simile  of  Letter  from  General  R.  E.  Lee 638 


LIST  OP  MAPS. 


PAGE 

First  Battle  of  Bull  Run 42 

Battle  of  Seven  Pines 96 

Battle  of  Mechanicsville 124 

Battle  of  Malvern  Hill 142 

Second  Battle  of  Bull  Kun  (Opening) 186 

Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run  (Nightfall) 19f> 

Battle  of  Sharpsburg 24G 

Battle  of  Fredericksburg 2 

Strategic  Map  of  the  Theatre  of  War,  May,  1863 328 

Battle  of  Gettysburg 3G2 

Position  of  Confederate  First  Corps,  Gettysburg,  Third  Day 399 

Battle  of  Chickamauga 44G 

Confederates  around  Chattanooga 4G2 

Siege  of  Knoxville 49B 

Battle  of  the  Wilderness 556 

Battle  of  Five  Forks Gul 


xxii 


FROM 

MANASSAS  TO  APPOMATTOX 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE    OF    THE    AUTHOR. 

Birth — Ancestry— School-Boy  Days — Appointment  as  Cadet  at  the 
United  States  Military  Academy— Graduates  of  Historic  Classes — 
Assignment  as  Brevet  Lieutenant — Gay  Life  of  Garrison  at  Jefferson 
Barracks — Lieutenant  Grant's  Courtship — Annexation  of  Texas — 
Army  of  Observation — Army  of  Occupation — Camp  Life  in  Texas — 
March  to  the  Bio  Grande— Mexican  War. 

I  WAS  born  in  Edgefield  District,  South  Carolina,  on 
the  8th  of  January,  1821.  On  the  paternal  side  the 
family  was  from  New  Jersey ;  on  my  mother's  side,  from 
Maryland.  My  earliest  recollections  were  of  the  Georgia 
side  of  Savannah  River,  and  my  school-days  were  passed 
there,  but  the  appointment  to  West  Point  Academy  was 
from  North  Alabama.  My  father,  James  Longstreet,  the 
oldest  child  of  William  Longstreet  and  Hannah  Fitzran- 
dolph,  was  born  in  New  Jersey.  Other  children  of  the 
marriage,  Rebecca,  Gilbert,  Augustus  B.,  and  William, 
were  born  in  Augusta,  Georgia,  the  adopted  home. 
Richard  Longstreet,  who  came  to  America  in  1657  and 
settled  in  Monmouth  County,  New  Jersey,  was  the  pro 
genitor  of  the  name  on  this  continent.  It  is  difficult  to 
determine  whether  the  name  sprang  from  France,  Ger 
many,  or  Holland.  On  the  maternal  side,  Grandfather 
Marshall  Dent  was  first  cousin  of  John  Marshall,  of  the 
Supreme  Court.  That  branch  claimed  to  trace  their  line 

13 


14  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

back  to  the  Conqueror.  Marshall  Dent  married  a  Ma- 
gruder,  when  they  migrated  to  Augusta,  Georgia.  Father 
married  the  eldest  daughter,  Mary  Ann. 

Grandfather  William  Longstreet  first  applied  steam  as 
a  motive  power,  in  1787,  to  a  small  boat  on  the  Savannah 
River  at  Augusta,  and  spent  all  of  his  private  means 
upon  that  idea,  asked  aid  of  his  friends  in  Augusta  and 
elsewhere,  had  no  encouragement,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
ridicule  of  his  proposition  to  move  a  boat  without  a 
pulling  or  other  external  power,  and  especially  did  they 
ridicule  the  thought  of  expensive  steam-boilers  to  be 
made  of  iron.  To  obviate  costly  outlay  for  this  item,  he 
built  boilers  of  heavy  oak  timbers  and  strong  iron  bands, 
but  the  Augusta  marines  were  incredulous,  as  the  follow 
ing  from  the  city  papers  of  the  times  will  indicate : 

1  c  Can  you  row  the  boat  ashore, 

Billy  boy,  Billy  boy  ; 
Can  you  row  the  boat  ashore, 

Gentle  Billy  ? 

Can  you  row  the  boat  ashore, 
Without  paddle  or  an  oar, 

Billyboy?" 

Full  of  confidence,  the  inventor  thought  to  appeal  to 
the  governor,  and  his  letter  is  still  preserved  in  the  State 

archives : 

"AUGUSTA,  GEORGIA,  September  26,  1790. 

"SiR, — I  make  no  doubt  but  you  have  often  heard  of  my  steam 
boat,  and  as  often  heard  it  laughed  at,  but  in  this  I  have  only 
shared  the  fate  of  other  projectors,  for  it  has  uniformly  been  the 
custom  of  every  country  to  ridicule  the  greatest  inventions  until 
they  had  proved  their  utility.  In  not  reducing  my  scheme  to 
active  use  it  has  been  unfortunate  for  me,  I  confess,  and  perhaps 
the  people  in  general  5  but,  until  very  lately,  I  did  not  think  that 
artists  or  material  could  be  had  in  the  place  sufficient.  However, 
necessity,  that  grand  mother  of  invention,  has  furnished  me  with 
an  idea  of  perfecting  my  plan  almost  entirely  of  wooden  material, 
and  by  such  workmen  as  may  be  had  here  ;  and,  from  a  thorough 
confidence  of  its  success,  I  have  presumed  to  ask  your  assistance 


THE   ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE   OF    THE    AUTHOR.  15 

and  patronage.  Should  it  succeed  agreeably  to  my  expectations, 
I  hope  I  shall  discover  that  sense  of  duty  which  such  favors 
always  merit  5  and  should  it  not  succeed,  your  reward  must  lay 
with  other  unlucky  adventures. 

"For  me  to  mention  all  of  the  advantages  arising  from  such 
a  machine  would  be  tedious,  and,  indeed,  quite  unnecessary. 
Therefore  I  have  taken  the  liberty  to  state,  in  this  plain  and 
humble  manner,  my  wish  and  opinion,  which  I  hope  you  will  ex 
cuse,  and  I  shall  remain,  either  with  or  without  your  approbation, 
"Your  Excellency's  most  obedient  and  humble  servant, 

"WM.  LONGSTREET. 

"GOVERNOR  TELFAIR." 

He  failed  to  secure  the  necessary  aid,  and  the  discovery 
passed  into  the  possession  of  certain  New  Yorkers,  who 
found  the  means  for  practicable  application,  and  now 
steam  is  the  goddess  that  enlightens  the  world. 

My  father  was  a  planter.  From  my  early  boyhood  he 
conceived  that  he  would  send  me  to  West  Point  for  army 
service,  but  in  my  twelfth  year  he  passed  away  during 
the  cholera  epidemic  at  Augusta.  Mother  moved  to  North 
Alabama  with  her  children,  whence  in  my  sixteenth  year 
I  made  application  through  a  kinsman,  Congressman 
Reuben  Chapman,  for  appointment  as  cadet,  received  the 
coveted  favor,  and  entered  with  the  class  that  was  admitted 
in  1838. 

As  cadet  I  had  more  interest  in  the  school  of  the  soldier, 
horsemanship,  sword  exercise,  and  the  outside  game  of 
foot-ball  than  in  the  academic  courses.  The  studies  were 
successfully  passed,  however,  until  the  third  year,  when  I 
failed  in  mechanics.  When  I  came  to  the  problem  of  the 
pulleys,  it  seemed  to  my  mind  that  a  soldier  could  not  find 
use  for  such  appliances,  and  the  pulleys  were  passed  by. 
At  the  January  examination  I  was  called  to  the  blackboard 
and  given  the  problem  of  the  pulleys.  The  drawing  from 
memory  of  recitation  of  classmates  was  good  enough,  but 
the  demonstration  failed  to  satisfy  the  sages  of  the  Aca 
demic  Board.  It  was  the  custom,  however,  to  give  those 


16  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

who  failed  in  the  general  examination  a  second  hearing, 
after  all  of  the  classes  were  examined.  This  gave  me  two 
days  to  "  cram"  mechanics,  and  particularly  on  pulleys. 
But  the  professors  were  too  wily  to  introduce  them  a  second 
time,  and  took  me  through  a  searching  examination  of  the 
six  months'  course.  The  bridge  was  safely  passed,  how 
ever,  and  mechanics  left  behind.  At  the  June  examina 
tion,  the  end  of  the  academic  year,  I  was  called  to  demon 
strate  the  pulleys.  The  professor  thought  that  I  had  for 
gotten  my  old  friend  the  enemy,  but  I  smiled,  for  he  had 
become  dear  to  me, — in  waking  hours  and  in  dreams, — and 
the  cadet  passed  easily  enough  for  a  maximum  mark. 

The  cadets  had  their  small  joys  and  sometimes  little 
troubles.  On  one  occasion  a  cadet  officer  reported  me  for 
disobedience  of  orders.  As  the  report  was  not  true,  I 
denied  it  and  sent  up  witnesses  of  the  occasion.  Dick 
Garnett,  who  fell  in  the  assault  of  the  3d,  at  Gettysburg, 
was  one  witness,  and  Cadet  Baker,  so  handsome  and  lova 
ble  that  he  was  called  Betsy,  was  the  other.  Upon  over 
looking  the  records  I  found  the  report  still  there,  and 
went  to  ask  the  superintendent  if  other  evidence  was 
necessary  to  show  that  the  report  was  not  true.  He  was 
satisfied  of  that,  but  said  that  the  officer  complained  that  I 
1  smiled  contemptuously.  As  that  could  only  be  rated  as 
a  single  demerit,  I  asked  the  benefit  of  the  smile  ;  but 
the  report  stands  to  this  day,  Disobedience  of  orders  and 
three  demerits.  The  cadet  had  his  revenge,  however,  for 
the  superintendent  was  afterwards  known  as  The  Punster. 

There  were  sixty-two  graduating  members  of  the  class 
of  1842,  my  number  being  sixty.  I  was  assigned  to  the 
Fourth  United  States  Infantry  as  brevet  lieutenant,  and 
found  my  company  with  seven  others  of  the  regiment  at 
Jefferson  Barracks,  Missouri,  in  the  autumn  of  1842. 

Of  the  class  graduating  the  year  that  we  entered  were 
G.  T.  Beauregard  and  Irvin  McDowell,  who,  twenty-three 
years  later,  commanded  the  hostile  armies  on  the  plains 


THE   ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE   OF    THE    AUTHOR.  17 

of  Manassas,  in  Virginia.  Braxton  Bragg  and  W.  J. 
Hardee  were  of  the  same  class. 

The  head  man  of  the  next  class  (1839)  was  I.  I.  Ste 
vens,  who  resigned  from  the  army,  and,  after  being  the 
first  governor  of  Washington  Territory,  returned  to  mili 
tary  service,  and  fell  on  the  sanguinary  field  of  Chantilly 
on  the  1st  of  September,  1862.  Next  on  the  class  roll 
was  Henry  Wager  Halleck,  who  was  commander-in-chief 
of  the  United  States  armies  from  July,  1862,  to  March, 
1864.  W.  T.  Sherman  and  George  H.  Thomas,  of  the 
Union  army,  and  R.  S.  Ewell,  of  the  Confederate  army, 
were  of  the  same  class  (1840).  The  class  of  1841  had 
the  largest  list  of  officers  killed  in  action.  Irons,  Ayers, 
Ernst,  Gantt,  Morris,  and  Burbank  were  killed  in  the 
Mexican  War.  N.  Lyon,  R.  S.  Garnett,  J.  F.  Reynolds, 
R.  B.  Garnett,  A.  W.  Whipple,  J.  M.  Jones,  I.  B.  Richard 
son,  and  J.  P.  Garesche  fell  on  the  fields  of  the  late  war. 

Of  the  class  of  1842  few  were  killed  in  action,  but 
several  rose  to  distinguished  positions, — Newton,  Eustis, 
Rosecrans,  Lovell,  Van  Dorn,  Pope,  Sykes,  G.  W.  Smith, 
M.  L.  Smith,  R.  H.  Anderson,  L.  McLaws,  D.  H.  Hill, 
A.  P.  Stewart,  B.  S.  Alexander,  N.  J.  T.  Dana,  and 
others. 

But  the  class  next  after  us  (1843)  was  destined  to  fur 
nish  the  man  who  was  to  eclipse  all, — to  rise  to  the  rank 
of  general,  an  office  made  by  Congress  to  honor  his  ser 
vices  ;  who  became  President  of  the  United  States,  and 
for  a  second  term ;  who  received  the  salutations  of  all 
the  powers  of  the  world  in  his  travels  as  a  private  citizen 
around  the  earth ;  of  noble,  generous  heart,  a  lovable 
character,  a  valued  friend, — Ulysses  S.  Grant. 

I  was  fortunate  in  the  assignment  to  Jefferson  Barracks, 
for  in  those  days  the  young  officers  were  usually  sent  off 
among  the  Indians  or  as  near  the  borders  as  they  could 
find  habitable  places.  In  the  autumn  of  1842  I  reported 

to  the  company  commander,  Captain  Bradford  R.  Alden, 

2 


18  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

a  most  exemplary  man,  who  proved  a  lasting,  valued 
friend.  Eight  companies  of  the  Third  Infantry  were 
added  to  the  garrison  during  the  spring  of  1843,  which 
made  garrison  life  and  society  gay  for  the  young  people 
and  interesting  for  the  older  classes.  All  of  the  troops 
were  recently  from  service  in  the  swamps  and  Everglades 
of  Florida,  well  prepared  to  enjoy  the  change  from  the 
war-dance  of  the  braves  to  the  hospitable  city  of  St. 
Louis ;  and  the  graceful  step  of  its  charming  belles  be 
came  a  joy  forever. 

Of  the  class  of  1843,  Ulysses  S.  Grant  joined  the 
Fourth  Regiment  as  brevet  lieutenant,  and  I  had  the 
pleasure  to  ride  with  him  on  our  first  visit  to  Mr.  Fred 
erick  Dent's  home,  a  few  miles  from  the  garrison,  where 
we  first  met  Miss  Julia  Dent,  the  charming  woman  who, 
five  years  later,  became  Mrs.  Grant.  Miss  Dent  was  a 
frequent  visitor  at  the  garrison  balls  and  hops,  where 
Lieutenant  Hoskins,  who  was  something  of  a  tease,  would 
inquire  of  her  if  she  could  tell  where  he  might  find  "  the 
small  lieutenant  with  the  large  epaulettes." 

In  May,  1844,  all  of  our  pleasures  were  broken  by  orders 
sending  both  regiments  to  Louisiana,  near  Fort  Jessup, 
where  with  other  troops  we  were  organized  as  "  The  Army 
of  Observation,"  under  General  Zachary  Taylor. 

In  March,  1845,  I  was  assigned  as  lieutenant  in  the 
Eighth  Regiment,  and  joined  my  company  at  St.  Augus 
tine,  Florida.  The  soldier's  life  of  those  days  was  not 
encouraging  to  those  of  active  aspirations ;  but  influences 
were  then  at  work  that  were  beginning  to  brighten  the 
horizon  a  little.  The  new  republic  of  Texas  was  seeking 
annexation  with  the  United  States,  which  would  endanger 
the  peace  between  them  and  the  republic  of  Mexico. 
Annexation  of  Texas  became  the  supreme  question  of  the 
canvass  of  1844.  James  K.  Polk  was  the  nominee  of  the 
Democratic  and  annexation  party,  and  Henry  Clay  was 
on  the  other  side  as  the  Whig  nominee.  Polk  was  elected, 


THE    ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE   OF    THE    AUTHOR.  19 

and  his  party  prepared  to  signalize  its  triumph  by  an 
nexation  as  soon  as  it  came  into  power ;  but  in  the  last 
days  of  President  Tyler's  administration,  through  skilful 
management  of  Secretary  of  State  John  C.  Calhoun,  joint 
resolutions  of  annexation  were  passed  by  both  houses  of 
Congress,  subject  to  concurrence  of  the  Congress  of  the 
new  republic.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  resolutions 
that  added  to  the  territory  of  the  United  States  more  than 
the  New  England  and  Middle  States  combined,  and  which 
eventually  led  to  extension  to  the  Pacific  coast  and  hun 
dreds  of  miles  north,  only  passed  the  lower  house  by 
twenty-two  majority,  and  the  Senate  by  a  majority  of  two. 

When  the  resolution  was  passed,  the  minister  from 
Mexico  to  our  government,  General  Almonte,  demanded 
his  passports,  and  diplomatic  relations  between  the  gov 
ernments  ceased.  On  July  4,  1845,  the  Texas  Congress 
accepted  and  ratified  the  resolutions  of  annexation  by 
unanimous  vote,  and  Texas  was  a  State  of  the  Union. 

General  Taylor's  little  army  of  observation  was  ordered 
to  Corpus  Christi,  Texas,  and  became  "The  Army  of 
Occupation."  All  other  available  forces  were  ordered  to 
join  him,  including  General  Worth  and  his  forces  in 
Florida.  At  the  time  there  were  in  the  line  of  the  army 
eight  regiments  of  infantry,  four  of  artillery,  and  two  of 
dragoons,  stationed  along  the  northern  frontier  from  Fort 
Kent  in  the  northeast  of  Maine  to  the  west  end  of  Lake 
Superior,  and  along  the  western  frontier  from  Fort 
Snelling  to  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  southward  to  Fort 
Jessup  in  Louisiana. 

By  the  middle  of  October,  1846,  three  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  sixty  men  of  all  arms  had  concentrated  at 
Corpus  Christi.  Seven  companies  of  the  Second  Dragoons 
had  marched  from  Fort  Jessup  to  San  Patricio  on  the 
Nueces  River,  about  twenty-eight  miles  up  from  Corpus 
Christi ;  the  other  three  companies  were  halted  at  San 
Antonio,  Texas.  Near  our  camps  were  extensive  plains 


20  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

well  adapted  to  military  manoeuvres,  which  were  put  to 
prompt  use  for  drill  and  professional  instruction.  There 
were  many  advantages  too  in  the  way  of  amusement,  game 
on  the  wild  prairies  and  fish  in  the  broad  gulf  were  plen 
tiful,  and  there  was  the  salt  water  for  bathing.  On  one 
occasion  during  the  winter  a  violent  north  wind  forced 
the  waters  over  the  beach,  in  some  places  far  enough  to 
disturb  our  camps,  and  when  they  receded,  quantities  of 
fish  were  found  in  the  little  puddles  left  behind,  and 
turtles  more  than  enough  to  supply  the  army. 

The  officers  built  a  theatre,  depending  upon  their  own 
efforts  to  reimburse  them.  As  there  was  no  one  outside 
the  army  except  two  rancheros  within  a  hundred  miles, 
our  dramatic  company  was  organized  from  among  the 
officers,  who  took  both  male  and  female  characters.  In 
farce  and  comedy  we  did  well  enough,  and  soon  collected 
funds  to  pay  for  the  building  and  incidental  expenses. 
The  house  was  filled  every  night.  General  Worth  always 
encouraging  us,  General  Taylor  sometimes,  and  General 
Twiggs  occasionally,  we  found  ourselves  in  funds  suffi 
cient  to  send  over  to  New  Orleans  for  costumes,  and  con 
cluded  to  try  tragedy.  The  "  Moor  of  Venice"  was  chosen, 
Lieutenant  Theoderic  Porter  *  to  be  the  Moor,  and  Lieu 
tenant  U.  S.  Grant  to  be  the  daughter  of  Brabantio. 
But  after  rehearsal  Porter  protested  that  male  heroines 
could  not  support  the  character  nor  give  sentiment  to  the 
hero,  so  we  sent  over  to  New  Orleans  and  secured  Mrs. 
Hart,  who  was  popular  with  the  garrisons  in  Florida. 
Then  all  went  well,  and  life  through  the  winter  was  gay. 

Formal  diplomatic  relations  between  the  republics  were 
suspended,  but  quasi  negotiations  were  continued,  seek 
ing  a  course  by  which  war  might  be  averted.  The  au 
thorities  of  Mexico  were  not  averse  to  the  settlement 
according  to  the  claims  of  Texas, — the  Rio  Grande  fron- 

*  Brother  of  the  rear-admiral. 


THE   ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE    OF   THE   AUTHOR.  21 

tier, — but  the  political  affairs  ,of  the  country  were  such 
that  they  could  not  agree.  Excitement  in  the  United 
States  increased  as  the  suspense  continued.  But  the  au 
thorities,  having  confidence  in  their  negotiations  or  wishing 
to  precipitate  matters,  ordered  General  Taylor  to  march 
across  to  the  Bio  Grande  at  Matamoras  in  the  spring  of 
1846.  The  execution  of  the  order  precipitated  war. 

The  move  from  Corpus  Christi  to  the  Bio  Grande  made 
necessary  a  change  of  base  from  St.  Joseph's  Island  to 
Point  Isabel  and  Brazos  Santiago,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Bio  Grande.  Supplies  were  sent  by  sea,  under  charge  of 
Major  Munroe,  with  a  siege  train  and  field  battery,  and 
the  army  took  up  its  march  on  the  9th  of  March,  1846, 
the  advance  under  General  Twiggs,  consisting  of  the  dra 
goons  and  Binggold's  field  battery.  The  army  was  well 
instructed,  under  good  discipline,  and  fully  prepared  for 
field  work,  the  weather  was  fine,  and  the  firm  turf  of  the 
undulating  prairies  made  the  march  easy.  Wild  horses 
and  cattle,  and  deer  and  antelope,  were  often  seen  in  the 
distance  as  they  scampered  away  to  hide  themselves.  On 
the  19th  the  head  of  the  column  approached  Arroyo  Colo 
rado,  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  from  Corpus  Christi. 
The  arroyo  was  about  three  feet  deep,  of  salt  water. 
Mexican  lancers  were  on  the  southern  side,  and  gave 
notice  that  they  had  orders  to  resist  our  further  advance. 
On  the  21st  the  army  was  up  and  deployed  along  the 
high  banks  of  the  arroyo,  the  field  batteries  in  position. 
General  Worth  was  ordered  to  make  the  crossing,  and  rode 
at  the  head  of  the  column.  We  looked  with  confidence 
for  a  fight  and  the  flow  of  blood  down  the  salt  water  before 
we  could  cross,  but  the  Mexicans  had  no  artillery,  and 
could  not  expose  their  cavalry  to  the  fire  of  our  batteries ; 
they  made  their  formal  protest,  however,  that  the  crossing 
would  be  regarded  as  a  declaration  of  war. 

On  the  24th  of  March  the  column  reached  the  road  lead 
ing  from  Point  Isabel  to  Matamoras.  General  Taylor  or- 


22  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

dered  Worth  to  march  the  greater  part  of  the  army  towards 
Matamoras  and  halt  at  the  first  good  camping-ground, 
and  rode  towards  Point  Isabel  to  meet  the  detachment  or 
dered  there  under  Major  Munroe.  He  found  them  already 
landed,  and  the  Mexicans  fired  their  little  hamlets  and 
fled.  After  ordering  construction  of  protection  for  his 
supplies  and  defensive  works  for  the  troops,  General  Tay 
lor  returned  to  the  army,  and  rode  with  General  Worth 
towards  the  Rio  Grande.  As  the  army  approached  the 
river  the  Mexicans  on  the  Matamoras  side  made  some  dis 
play  of  forces,  manned  their  works  on  that  side,  and  pre 
pared  to  resist  us,  under  the  impression  that  we  would 
cross  at  once.  General  Worth  was  sent  over,  and  was  met 
by  General  La  Vega,  on  the  part  of  General  Mejia,  com 
manding  on  that  side.  He  was  told  that  Mexico  had  not 
declared  war,  that  the  American  consul  was  in  the  ex 
ercise  of  his  functions ;  but  Worth's  request  to  see  the 
consul  was  refused,  which  was  denounced  as  a  belligerent 
act,  and  he  cautioned  General  La  Vega  against  passing 
Mexicans  to  the  north  side  of  the  river. 

Camps  were  pitched  in  range  of  the  Mexican  works 
about  Matamoras,  grounds  staked  for  constructing  de 
fensive  works,  and  large  details  put  out  to  work  on  them. 
The  Mexican  forces  at  this  time  were  three  thousand,  and 
they  were  soon  joined  by  two  thousand  more. 

Political  affairs  with  them  were  confused.  President 
Herrera  was  thought  to  favor  the  claims  of  Texas  to  the 
Rio  Grande  border.  General  Paredes  made  pronuncia- 
mento,  overthrew  the  president's  government,  and  had 
authority  as  war  president.  He  sent  General  Ampudia 
to  the  frontier  to  take  charge,  but  the  appointment  was 
not  satisfactory  on  the  border,  and  General  Arista  was 
assigned.  There  was  discord  over  there  between  the  au 
thorities  and  the  generals,  while  General  Taylor  was  too 
far  from  his  government  to  be  bothered.  His  army  was 
all  that  he  could  wish,  except  in  numbers. 


THE   ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE    OF    THE   AUTHOK.  23 

Marauding  parties  came  over  occasionally  and  made 
trouble  about  the  ranches  on  the  American  side.  One 
party  killed  Colonel  Cross,  our  chief  quartermaster,  on 
the  10th  of  April.  Scouting  parties  were  sent  out  to  look 
for  the  intruders.  Lieutenant  Theoderic  Porter,  in  com 
mand  of  one  party,  and  one  of  his  men  were  caught  in 
ambush  and  killed.  Captain  Walker,  of  the  Texan  Ran 
gers,  while  out  on  a  scout  lost  his  camp  guard  of  five  men, 
surprised  and  killed,  and  later  Captains  Thornton  and 
Hardee,  of  the  dragoons,  were  met  at  Rancho  Carricitos 
by  a  large  cavalry  force  and  some  infantry  under  Gen 
eral  Torrijon,  who  took  captive  or  killed  the  entire  party. 
Captains  Thornton  and  Hardee  and  Lieutenant  Kane 
were  made  prisoners.  The  other  commissioned  officer  of 
the  command,  George  T.  Mason,  of  my  class,  refused  to 
surrender  ;  being  a  superior  swordsman,  he  tried  to  cut  his 
way  out,  and  was  killed.  This  affair  was  taken  as  open 
war,  and  General  Taylor  called  on  the  governors  of  Texas 
and  Louisiana — under  his  authority  from  Washington — 
for  volunteers  of  infantry  and  cavalry. 

The  capture  of  Thornton  and  Hardee  created  great  ex 
citement  with  the  people  at  home.  Farming's  massacre 
and  the  Alamo  at  San  Antonio  Avere  remembered,  and  it 
was  reported  of  General  Ampudia,  who  on  a  recent  occa 
sion  had  captured  a  general  in  Yucatan,  that  he  boiled 
his  head  in  oil.  So  it  was  thought  he  would  give  no 
quarter ;  but  in  a  day  or  two  we  heard  from  the  officers 
that  they  received  great  kindness  from  their  captors,  and 
that  General  Ampudia  had  ordered  that  his  government 
should  allow  them  their  full  pay  and  every  liberty  con 
sistent  with  their  safe-keeping.  They  declined,  however, 
to  accept  pay,  and  were  held  as  the  guests  of  Generals 
Arista  and  Ampudia. 

On  the  1st  of  May  our  tents  were  struck,  wagons  parked, 
assembly  sounded,  and  the  troops  were  under  arms  at  three 
A.M.,  marched  at  four  o'clock,  and  bivouacked  within  ten 


24  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

miles  of  Point  Isabel.  No  one  was  advised  of  the  cause 
of  movements,  but  all  knew  that  our  general  understood 
his  business.  He  had  been  informed  that  General  Arista, 
with  his  movable  forces,  had  marched  to  Rancho  de  Lon- 
goreno,  some  leagues  below  us  on  the  river,  intending  to 
cross  and  cut  us  off  from  the  base  at  Point  Isabel.  Major 
Jacob  Brown  was  left  in  charge  of  the  works  opposite 
Matamoras  with  the  Seventh  Regiment  of  Infantry, 
Captain  Sands's  company  of  artillery,  and  Bragg's  field 
battery. 

By  some  accident  provision  was  not  made  complete  for 
Arista  to  make  prompt  crossing  of  the  river,  and  that 
gave  General  Taylor  time  to  reach  his  base,  reinforce  it, 
and  draw  sufficient  supplies.  Advised  of  our  move  by 
General  Mejia,  at  Matamoras,  General  Arista  was  thrown 
into  doubt  as  to  whether  our  move  was  intended  for  Mata 
moras,  and  sent  back  part  of  his  forces  for  its  defence. 
Finding,  however,  that  Taylor  had  gone  to  Point  Isabel, 
Arista  crossed  the  river  and  put  his  line  athwart  our 
return  march  at  Palo  Alto.  To  hasten  Taylor's  return, 
he  ordered  General  Mejia,  at  Matamoras,  to  open  his  bat 
teries  on  our  troops  at  Fort  Brown,  and  make  serious 
demonstrations  against  them. 

General  Taylor  started  on  his  return  on  the  7th  of  May. 
We  had  heard  the  artillery-fire  upon  comrades  left  at  the 
forts,  and  were  anxiously  looking  for  the  order.  It  was 
received  with  cheers,  and  a  good  march  was  made,  but  the 
night  was  awful.  The  mosquitoes  seemed  as  thick  as  the 
blades  of  grass  on  the  prairie,  and  swarmed  and  buzzed  in 
clouds,  and  packs  of  half-famished  wolves  prowled  and 
howled  about  us.  There  was  no  need  for  the  sound  of 
reveille.  The  wolves  and  mosquitoes,  and  perhaps  some 
solemn  thoughts,  kept  us  on  the  qui  vive.  Arista's  army 
was  known  to  be  in  line  of  battle  only  a  few  miles  off. 
About  one  o'clock  we  halted  to  fill  the  canteens,  and 
marched  to  meet  the  enemy.  The  columns  were  deployed, 


THE    ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE    OF    THE    AUTHOK.  25 

— Fifth  Infantry  on  the  right,  Ringgold's  battery,  Third 
Infantry,  a  two-gun  battery  of  eighteen-pounders,  the 
Fourth  Infantry,  battalion  of  artillery  acting  as  infantry, 
Duncan's  field  battery  and  Eighth  Infantry,  Captains 
Charles  May  and  Croghan  Ker,  with  squadrons  of 
dragoons,  looking  to  the  trains ;  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Infantry,  the  Third  Brigade,  under  Colonel  John  Gar 
land.  That  brigade,  with  the  Fifth  Regiment,  the  heavy 
guns,  and  Einggold's,  were  of  the  right  wing,  General 
Twiggs  commanding.  Other  forces  of  the  left  were  under 
Colonel  William  G.  Belknap,  Eighth  Infantry,  and  Dun 
can's  Battery. 

As  the  lines  deployed,  Lieutenant  J.  E.  Blake,  of  the 
Topographical  Engineers,  dashed  forward  alone,  made 
a  close  inspection  of  the  enemy's  line  with  such  light 
ning  speed  that  his  work  was  accomplished  before  the 
enemy  could  comprehend  his  purpose,  rode  back  and 
reported  to  the  commanding  general.  He  was  one  of  the 
heroes  of  the  day,  but  his  laurels  were  enjoyed  only  a 
few  hours.  As  he  took  his  pistol  off  at  night  he  threw 
it  upon  the  ground,  and  an  accidental  explosion  of  one 
of  the  charges  gave  him  a  mortal  wound. 

The  line  advanced  until  the  puff  of  smoke  from  one 
of  the  enemy's  guns  rose,  and  the  ball  bounded  over  the 
prairie,  passed  over  our  heads,  and  wounded  a  teamster 
far  in  our  rear.  Our  infantry  was  ordered  down  and 
our  artillery  into  practice.  It  was  an  artillery  combat 
more  than  a  battle,  and  held  until  night.  The  Mexican 
cavalry  made  a  charge  against  the  Fifth  Regiment,  and 
finding  our  front  of  square  too  strong  repeated  on  another 
front,  but  were  repulsed.  Presently  the  grass  took  fire, 
and  the  winds  so  far  favored  us  as  to  sweep  the  smoke 
in  the  enemy's  faces,  and  when  it  passed  we  found  the 
Mexican  line  had  been  drawn  back  a  little.  May's 
squadron  was  sent  there,  and  General  Taylor  advanced 
the  right  of  his  line,  but  night  closed  in  before  decisive 


26  FBOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

work  could  be  done.  The  armies  were  near  enough 
during  the  night  to  hear  the  moans  of  the  wounded. 
Major  Ringgold  was  mortally  wounded,  also  Captain  John 
Page,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry,  but  less  than  fifty  of  our 
troops  were  lost. 

Early  the  next  morning  a  few  of  the  Mexican  troops 
could  be  seen,  but  when  the  sun  rose  to  light  the  field  it 
was  found  vacant.  A  careful  reconnoissance  revealed  that 
the  enemy  was  in  retreat,  and  the  dragoons  reported  them 
in  march  towards  our  comrades  at  Fort  Brown. 

General  Taylor  remained  on  the  field  a  few  hours  to 
have  the  killed  and  wounded  of  both  sides  cared  for,  but 
sent  the  dragoons,  light  infantry,  and  Ringgold's  battery 
in  pursuit,  the  latter  under  Lieutenant  Randolph  Ridgely. 
The  light  infantry  was  of  two  battalions,  under  Captain 
George  A.  McCall  and  Captain  C.  F.  Smith.  The  route 
of  march  was  through  a  dense  chaparral  on  both  sides  of 
the  road,  the  infantry  finding  their  way  as  best  they  could 
through  the  chaparral,  the  dragoons  and  Texas  Rangers 
moving  on  the  road,  and  far  off  from  our  flanks, 
wherever  they  could  find  ways  of  passage.  The  company 
to  which  I  was  attached  was  of  Smith's  battalion,  on  the 
right  of  the  road.  After  a  considerable  march  the  bat 
talion  came  to  the  body  of  a  young  Mexican  woman.  She 
had  ceased  to  breathe,  but  blood  heat  was  still  in  her  body, 
and  her  expression  life-like.  A  profusion  of  black  hair 
covered  her  shoulders  and  person,  the  only  covering  to 
her  waist.  This  sad  spectacle,  so  unlike  our  thoughts 
of  battle,  unnerved  us  a  little,  but  the  crush  through  the 
thorny  bushes  soon  brought  us  back  to  thoughts  of  heavy 
work,  and  then  came  reports  of  several  guns  and  of  grape- 
shot  flying  over  our  heads  and  tearing  through  the  wood. 
A  reconnoissance  found  General  Arista's  army  on  the  south 
bank  of  a  stream,  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  which  at  this 
season  had  dried  into  lagoons  with  intervening  passes. 
The  road  crossed  at  a  wide  gap  between  two  extensive 


THE   ANTE-BELLUM    LIFE   OF    THE   AUTHOR.  27 

lagoons.  The  most  of  the  enemy's  artillery  was  near  the 
road,  the  infantry  behind  the  lagoons,  with  improvised 
breast  defences  of  pack-saddles  and  other  articles  that 
could  be  found  to  stop  musket-balls.  The  lagoons  were 
about  a  hundred  feet  wide  and  from  two  to  three  feet  deep. 

The  position  was  so  strong  that  General  Arista  thought 
it  would  not  be  attacked.  He  left  General  La  Vega  in 
command  at  the  road,  and  made  his  head-quarters  some 
distance  in  rear,  holding  his  cavalry  in  hand  to  look  for 
any  flank  move,  unpacked  his  mule-train,  and  turned  the 
animals  out  to  graze.  General  Taylor  received  reports  of 
our  adventures  and  reconnoissance  when  he  rode  up,  de 
ployed  his  army  for  battle,  and  ordered  it  forward.  In 
the  dense  chaparral  it  was  not  possible  to  hold  the  regi 
ments  to  their  lines,  and  in  places  the  companies  were 
obliged  to  break  files  to  get  along.  All  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  opened,  and  soon  his  musketry.  The  lines  closed 
in  to  short  work,  even  to  bayonet  work  at  places.  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Mclntosh  had  a  bayonet  thrust  through 
his  mouth  and  neck.*  Lieutenant  R.  M.  Cochran,  Fourth 
Regiment,  and  T.  L.  Chadbourne,  of  the  Eighth,  were 
killed  ;  C.  R.  Gates  and  C.  D.  Jordan,  of  the  Eighth,  were 
severely  wounded.  The  latter,  a  classmate,  was  over 
powered  and  about  to  be  slaughtered  when  rescued  by 
Lieutenant  George  Lincoln,  of  the  Eighth,  who  slew  with 
his  sword  one  of  the  assailants. 

Finding  the  enemy's  strong  fight,  in  defence,  by  his 
artillery,  General  Taylor  ordered  Captain  May  to  charge 
and  capture  the  principal  battery.  The  squadron  was 
of  his  own  and  S.  P.  Graham's  troops.  The  road  was 
only  wide  enough  to  form  the  dragoons  in  column  of 
fours.  When  in  the  act  of  springing  to  their  work, 
Rldgely  called,  "  Hold  on,  Charlie,  till  I  draw  their  fire," 
and  loosed  his  six  guns  upon  the  battery  at  the  road. 

*  He  had  a  similar  wound  in  the  war  of  1812. 


28  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  return  was  prompt,  but  General  Taylor,  not  noting 
the  cause  of  delay,  repeated  the  order.  Ridgely's  work, 
however,  was  done,  and  May's  spurs  pressing  his  horses 
had  them  on  the  leap  before  the  order  reached  his  ears. 
In  a  minute  he  was  at  the  guns  sabring  the  gunners,  and 
wheeling  right  and  left  got  possession  of  the  batteries. 
General  La  Vega  was  found  at  one  of  his  batteries  trying 
to  defend  it  with  his  sword  against  one  of  May's  dragoons, 
but  was  forced  to  get  in  between  the  wheels  of  his  guns 
to  avoid  the  horse's  heels  as  they  pressed  him,  when  his 
rank  was  recognized  and  he  was  called  to  surrender. 

As  May  made  his  dash  the  infantry  on  our  right  was 
wading  the  lagoon.  A  pause  was  made  to  dip  our  cups 
for  water,  which  gave  a  moment  for  other  thoughts  ;  mine 
went  back  to  her  whom  I  had  left  behind.  I  drew  her 
daguerreotype  from  my  breast-pocket,  had  a  glint  of  her 
charming  smile,  and  with  quickened  spirit  mounted  the 
bank  in  time  to  send  some  of  the  mixed  infantry  troops 
to  relieve  May  of  his  charge  of  the  captive  knight. 

As  a  dragoon  and  soldier  May  was  splendid.  He  stood 
six  feet  four  without  boots,  wore  his  beard  full  and  flow 
ing,  his  dark-brown  locks  falling  well  over  his  shoulders. 
His  appearance  as  he  sat  on  his  black  horse  Tom,  his 
heavy  sabre  over  General  La  Vega,  was  grand  and  pictu 
resque.  He  was  amiable  of  disposition,  lovable  and  genial 
in  character. 

Not  so  grand  of  stature,  or  beard,  or  flowing  locks,  Ran 
dolph  Ridgely  was  as  accomplished  a  soldier  and  as 
charming  a  companion, — a  fitting  counterpart  in  spirit 
and  dash. 

I  have  gone  thus  far  into  the  Mexican  War  for  the 
opportunity  to  mention  two  valued  friends,  whose  memory 
returning  refreshes  itself.  Many  gallant,  courageous 
deeds  have  since  been  witnessed,  but  none  more  interesting 
than  Ridgely's  call  for  the  privilege  to  draw  upon  himself 
the  fire  that  was  waiting  for  May. 


CHAPTER  II. 

FKOM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS. 

The  War-Cloud — The  Journey  Northward— Appointed  Brigadier-Gen 
eral—Report  to  General  Beauregard — Assigned  to  Command  at  the 
Scene  of  the  First  Conflict— Personnel  of  the  Confronting  Forces- 
Description  of  the  Field  of  Manassas,  or  Bull  Run— Beauregard  and 
McDowell  of  the  same  West  Point  Class— Battle  of  Blackburn's 
Ford— Early's  Mistake— Under  Fire  of  Friend  and  Foe. 

I  WAS  stationed  at  Albuquerque,  New  Mexico,  as  pay 
master  in  the  United  States  army  when  the  war-cloud 
appeared  in  the  East.  Officers  of  the  Northern  and 
Southern  States  were  anxious  to  see  the  portending  storm 
pass  by  or  disperse,  and  on  many  occasions  we,  too,  were 
assured,  by  those  who  claimed  to  look  into  the  future,  that 
the  statesman  would  yet  show  himself  equal  to  the  occa 
sion,  and  restore  confidence  among  the  people.  Our  mails 
were  due  semi-monthly,  but  during  winter  seasons  we 
were  glad  to  have  them  once  a  month,  and  occasionally 
had  to  be  content  with  once  in  six  weeks.  When  mail- 
day  came  the  officers  usually  assembled  on  the  flat  roof  of 
the  quartermaster's  office  to  look  for  the  dust  that  in  that 
arid  climate  announced  the  coming  mail-wagon  when  five 
or  ten  miles  away ;  but  affairs  continued  to  grow  gloomy, 
and  eventually  came  information  of  the  attack  upon  and 
capture  of  Fort  Sumter  by  the  Confederate  forces,  which 
put  down  speculation  and  drew  the  long-dreaded  line. 

A  number  of  officers  of  the  post  called  to  persuade  me 
to  remain  in  the  Union  service.  Captain  Gibbs,  of  the 
Mounted  Rifles,  was  the  principal  talker,  and  after  a  long 
but  pleasant  discussion,  I  asked  him  what  course  he  would 
pursue  if  his  State  should  pass  ordinances  of  secession 
and  call  him  to  its  defence.  He  confessed  that  he  would 
obey  the  call. 

29 


30  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

It  was  a  sad  day  when  we  took  leave  of  lifetime  com 
rades  and  gave  up  a  service  of  twenty  years.  Neither 
Union  officers  nor  their  families  made  efforts  to  conceal 
feelings  of  deepest  regret.  When  we  drove  out  from  the 
post,  a  number  of  officers  rode  with  us,  which  only  made 
the  last  farewell  more  trying. 

Passing  Fort  Craig,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  we  pitched  our  camp  for  the  night.  A  sergeant 
of  the  Mounted  Rifle  Regiment  came  over  to  see  me,  and 
stated  that  he  was  from  Virginia,  and  thought  that  he 
could  go  with  us  to  his  native  State,  and  at  the  same  time 
asked  that  several  other  soldiers  who  wished  to  return  to 
their  States  might  go  as  my  escort.  I  explained  that 
private  soldiers  could  not  go  without  authority  from  the 
War  Department ;  that  it  was  different  with  commissioned 
officers,  in  that  the  latter  could  resign  their  commissions, 
and  when  the  resignations  were  accepted  they  were  inde 
pendent  of  military  authority,  and  could,  as  other  citizens, 
take  such  action  as  they  might  choose,  but  that  he  and  his 
comrades  had  enlisted  for  a  specified  term  of  years,  and 
by  their  oaths  were  bound  to  the  term  of  enlistment ;  that 
I  could  not  entertain  the  proposition. 

We  stayed  overnight  at  Fort  Fillmore,  in  pleasant 
meeting  with  old  comrades,  saddened  by  the  reflection 
that  it  was  the  last,  and  a  prelude  to  occurrences  that 
must  compel  the  ignoring  of  former  friendships  with  the 
acceptance  of  opposing  service. 

Speaking  of  the  impending  struggle,  I  was  asked  as  to 
the  length  of  the  war,  and  said,  "  At  least  three  years,  and 
if  it  holds  for  five  you  may  begin  to  look  for  a  dictator," 
at  which  Lieutenant  Ryan,  of  the  Seventh  Infantry, 
said,  "  If  we  are  to  have  a  dictator,  I  hope  that  you  may 
be  the  man." 

My  mind  was  relieved  by  information  that  my  resigna 
tion  was  accepted,  to  take  effect  on  the  1st  of  June.  In 
our  travel  next  day  we  crossed  the  line  into  the  State  of 


FROM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS.  31 

Texas.  From  the  gloomy  forebodings  of  old  friends,  it 
seemed  at  El  Paso  that  we  had  entered  into  a  different 
world.  All  was  enthusiasm  and  excitement,  and  songs  of 
"  Dixie  and  the  South"  were  borne  upon  the  balmy  air. 
But  the  Texas  girl  did  not  ascend  to  a  state  of  incan 
descent  charm  until  the  sound  of  the  first  notes  of  "  The 
Bonny  Blue  Flag"  reached  her  ear.  Then  her  feet  rose 
in  gleeful  springs,  her  limbs  danced,  her  hands  patted, 
her  eyes  glowed,  her  lips  moved,  though  she  did  not  care 
to  speak,  or  listen  to  any  one.  She  seemed  lifted  in  the 
air,  thrilled  and  afloat,  holding  to  the  "  Single  Star"  in 
joyful  hope  of  Southern  rights. 

Friends  at  El  Paso  persuaded  me  to  leave  my  family  with 
them  to  go  by  a  train  that  was  to  start  in  a  few  days  for  San 
Antonio,  and  to  take  the  faster  route  by  stage  for  myself. 

Our  travelling  companions  were  two  young  men,  return 
ing  to  their  Northern  homes.  The  ride  of  our  party  of 
four  (including  the  driver)  through  the  Indian  country 
was  attended  with  some  risk,  and  required  vigilance,  to  be 
assured  against  surprise.  The  constant  watchfulness  and 
possible  danger  over  a  five-hundred-miles  travel  drew  us 
near  together,  and  in  closer  communion  as  to  our  identity 
and  future  movements,  and  suggested  to  the  young  men 
that  it  would  be  best  to  put  themselves  under  my  care, 
trusting  that  I  would  see  them  safely  through  the  Confed 
erate  lines.  They  were  of  the  laboring  class,  and  had 
gone  South  to  find  employment.  They  were  advised  to 
be  careful,  and  talk  but  little  when  among  strangers. 
Nothing  occurred  to  cause  apprehension  until  we  reached 
Richmond,  Texas,  where,  at  supper,  I  asked  for  a  glass  of 
milk,  and  was  told  there  was  none. 

"What!"  said  one  of  my  companions,  "haven't  the 
keows  come  up  ?" 

Signal  was  telegraphed  under  the  table  to  be  on  guard. 
The  nom  de  plume  of  the  Texas  bovine  escaped  attention, 
and  it  passed  as  an  enjoyable  lapsus  linguce. 


32  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

At  Galveston  we  took  a  small  inland  sailing-craft,  but 
were  a  little  apprehensive,  as  United  States  ships  were 
reported  cruising  outside  in  search  of  all  vessels  not  flying 
the  Stars  and  Stripes.  Our  vessel,  however,  was  only 
boarded  once,  and  that  by  a  large  Spanish  mackerel  that 
made  a  misleap,  fell  amidships,  and  served  our  little  com 
pany  with  a  pleasant  dinner.  Aboard  this  little  vessel  I 
first  met  T.  J.  Goree,  an  intelligent,  clever  Texan,  who 
afterwards  joined  me  at  Richmond,  and  served  in  faithful 
duty  as  my  aide-de-camp  from  Bull  Run  to  Appomattox 
Court-House. 

At  New  Orleans,  my  companions  found  safe-conduct  to 
their  Northern  lines,  and  I  journeyed  on  to  Richmond. 
Relatives  along  the  route,  who  heard  of  my  approach,  met 
me  at  the  stations,  though  none  suggested  a  stop  over 
night,  or  for  the  next  train,  but  after  affectionate  saluta 
tions  waved  me  on  to  join  "  Jeff  Davis,  for  Dixie  and  for 
Southern  rights." 

At  every  station  old  men,  women,  and  children  assem 
bled,  clapping  hands  and  waving  handkerchiefs  to  cheer 
the  passengers  on  to  Richmond.  On  crossing  the  Vir 
ginia  line,  the  feeling  seemed  to  culminate.  The  windows 
and  doors  of  every  farm-house  and  hamlet  were  occupied, 
and  from  them  came  hearty  salutations  that  cheered  us 
on  to  Richmond.  The  spirit  electrified  the  air,  and  the 
laborers  of  the  fields,  white  and  black,  stopped  their 
ploughs  to  lift  their  hats  and  wave  us  on  to  speedy  travel. 
At  stations  where  meals  were  served,  the  proprietors,  in 
response  to  offers  to  settle,  said,  "  Meals  for  those  going 
on  to  join  Jeff  Davis  are  paid." 

On  the  29th  of  June,  1861,  I  reported  at  the  Wai- 
Department  at  Richmond,  and  asked  to  be  assigned  for 
service  in  the  pay  department,  in  which  I  had  recently 
served  (for  when  I  left  the  line  service,  under  appointment 
as  paymaster,  I  had  given  up  all  aspirations  of  military 
honor,  and  thought  to  settle  down  into  more  peaceful 


FKOM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS.  33 

pursuits).  On  the  1st  of  July  I  received  notice  of  my 
appointment  as  brigadier-general,  with  orders  to  report  at 
Manassas  Junction,  to  General  Beauregard. 

I  reported  on  the  2d,  and  was  assigned  to  command 
of  the  First,  Eleventh,  and  Seventeenth  Regiments  of 
Virginia  Volunteers,  to  be  organized  as  a  brigade.  The 

regiments  were  commanded  respectively  by  Colonels 

Moore,  Samuel  Garland,  and  M.  D.  Corse,  all  active, 
energetic,  and  intelligent  officers,  anxious  to  acquire  skill 
in  the  new  service  in  which  they  found  themselves.  Lieu 
tenant  Frank  Armstead  was  assigned  to  duty  at  brigade 
head-quarters,  as  acting  assistant  adjutant-general,  and 
Lieutenant  Peyton  T.  Manning  as  aide-de-camp.  Dr. 
J.  S.  D.  Cullen,  surgeon  of  the  First  Virginia  Regiment, 
became  medical  director.  The  regiments  were  stationed 
at  Manassas  Junction. 

On  the  6th  they  were  marched  out,  formed  as  a  brigade, 
and  put  through  the  first  lessons  in  evolutions  of  the  line, 
and  from  that  day  to  McDowell's  advance  had  other 
opportunities  to  learn  more  of  the  drill  and  of  each 
other.  General  Beauregard  had  previously  settled  upon 
the  stream  of  Bull  Run  as  his  defensive-aggressive  line, 
and  assigned  his  forces  accordingly.  A  brigade  under 
Brigadier-General  R.  S.  Ewell  was  posted  at  Union  Mills 
Ford,  on  the  right  of  the  Confederate  lines ;  one  under 
Brigadier-General  D.  R.  Jones  at  McLean's  Ford ;  Briga 
dier-General  Bonham's  brigade  was  placed  on  outpost 
duty  at  Fairfax  Court-House  with  orders  to  retire,  at  the 
enemy's  approach,  to  Mitchell's  Ford,  and  Brigadier- 
General  P.  St.  George  Cocke  was  to  hold  the  fords  be 
tween  Mitchell's  and  the  Stone  Bridge,  the  latter  point  to 
be  defended  by  a  regiment  and  a  battalion  of  infantry, 
and  a  battery,  under  Brigadier-General  K  G.  Evans. 

Between  Mitchell's  and  McLean's  Fords,  and  about 
half  a  mile  from  each,  is  Blackburn's  Ford.  The  guard 
at  that  point  was  assigned  to  my  command, — the  Fourth 


34  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Brigade, — which  was  ordered  to  be  ready,  at  a  moment's 
warning,  to  march  to  position,  and  prepare  for  battle.  In 
the  mean  time  I  was  to  study  the  ground  and  familiarize 
myself  with  the  surroundings  and  avenues  of  approach 
and  retreat.  Bull  Run  rises  from  the  foot-hills  of  the 
Blue  Ridge  and  flows  southeast  through  deeps  and  shal 
lows  into  the  Potomac,  about  forty  miles  south  of  Alex 
andria.  The  swell  of  the  tide-waters  up  to  Union  Mills 
gives  it  the  depth  and  volume  of  water  of  a  river.  Black 
burn's  Ford  is  in  a  great  bend  of  the  river,  the  north 
bank  holding  the  concave  of  the  turn.  On  the  convex 
side  was  a  strip  of  alluvial  soil  about  seventy  feet  wide, 
covered  by  large  forest-trees  and  some  tangled  under 
growth.  Outside  and  extending  some  three  hundred 
yards  from  the  edge  of  the  woodland  was  an  arable  field 
upon  a  pretty  ascending  plain,  beyond  which  was  a  second 
growth  of  pine  and  oak.  On  the  north  bank  stood  a 
bluff  of  fifteen  feet,  overhanging  the  south  side  and 
ascending  towards  the  heights  of  Centreville.  Below 
Blackburn's  Ford  the  bluff  extended,  in  more  or  less 
ragged  features,  far  down  to  the  southeast.  Just  above 
my  position  the  bluff  graded  down  in  even  decline  to 
Mitchell's  Ford,  the  position  assigned  for  Bonham's  bri 
gade,  the  latter  being  on  the  concave  of  the  river,  six 
hundred  yards  retired  from  my  left  and  at  the  crossing  of 
the  direct  road  between  Centreville  and  Manassas  Junc 
tion.  At  the  Junction  well-constructed  battery  epaule- 
ments  were  prepared  for  defence. 

The  bluff  of  the  north  bank  was  first  designated  as  my 
most  suitable  ground,  and  I  was  ordered  to  open  the  front, 
lay  out  and  construct  trenches,  to  be  concealed  by  green 
pine-boughs.  The  regiments  were  from  Richmond,  Lynch- 
burg,  and  Alexandria, — more  familiar  with  the  amenities 
of  city  life  than  with  the  axe,  pick,  spade,  or  shovel. 
They  managed,  however,  to  bring  down  as  many  as  half 
a  dozen  spreading  second-growth  pines  in  the  course  of 


FKOM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS.  35 

two  days'  work,  when  General  Beauregard  concluded  that 
the  advanced  position  of  the  brigade  would  mar  his  gen 
eral  plan,  and  ordered  the  line  to  be  taken  along  the 
river  bank  of  the  south  side,  under  the  woodland,  and 
close  under  the  bluff,  a  position  only  approvable  as  tem 
porary  under  accepted  rules  of  warfare,  but  this  proved 
a  favorable  exception  between  the  raw  forces  of  the  con 
tending  armies.  In  addition  to  the  two  brigades  on 
my  right,  the  Sixth  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Jubal  A. 
Early,  was  posted  (with  artillery)  near  the  fords.  As 
proximate  but  separate  commands,  stood  General  Theo. 
Holmes,  thirty  miles  off  to  the  right,  with  a  brigade,  a 
battery,  and  cavalry,  at  and  about  Acquia  Creek,  and 
General  J.  E.  Johnston,  sixty  miles  away,  over  the  Blue 
Ridge  Mountains.  Holmes's  should  have  been  an  out 
post,  but  he  had  ranked  Beauregard  in  the  old  service, 
and  as  a  point  of  etiquette  was  given  a  separate  command. 
Johnston's  command  should  have  been  an  outlying  con 
tingent,  but  he  had  been  assigned  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  when,  because  threatened  with  immediate  inva 
sion,  it  was  of  first  importance.  Beauregard  was  subse 
quently  assigned  to  Manassas  Junction,  which,  under  later 
developments,  became  the  strategic  point.  As  Johnston 
was  his  senior,  another  delicate  question  arose,  that  was 
not  solved  until  the  tramp  of  McDowell's  army  was  heard 
on  the  Warrenton  Turnpike. 

The  armies  preparing  for  the  first  grand  conflict  were 
commanded  by  West  Point  graduates,  both  of  the  class  of 
1838, — Beauregard  and  McDowell.  The  latter  had  been 
assigned  to  command  of  the  Federal  forces  at  Washing 
ton,  south  of  the  Potomac,  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  1861. 
The  former  had  assumed  command  of  the  Confederates  at 
Manassas  Junction  about  the  1st  of  June. 

McDowell  marched  on  the  afternoon  of  the  16th  of 
July  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  five  divisions  of  infantry, 
supplemented  by  nine  field  batteries  of  the  regular  service, 


36  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

one  of  volunteers,  besides  two  guns  operating  separately, 
and  seven  companies  of  regular  cavalry.  In  his  in 
fantry  columns  were  eight  companies  of  regulars  and  a 
battalion  of  marines,  an  aggregate  of  thirty-five  thousand 
men. 

Beauregard  stood  behind  Bull  Run  with  seven  brigades, 
including  Holmes,  who  joined  on  the  19th,  twenty-nine 
guns,  fourteen  hundred  cavalry, — an  aggregate  of  twenty- 
one  thousand  nine  hundred  men,  all  volunteers.  To  this 
should  be  added,  for  the  battle  of  the  21st,  reinforcements 
aggregating  eight  thousand  five  hundred  men,  under  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  making  the  sum  of  the  aggregate,  thirty 
thousand  four  hundred. 

The  line  behind  Bull  Run  was  the  best  between  Wash 
ington  and  the  Rapidan  for  strategy,  tactics,  and  army 
supplies. 

General  Beauregard  gave  minute  instructions  to  his 
brigade  commanders  of  his  position  and  general  plan, 
which  in  itself  was  admirable.  Bonham  was  to  retire 
from  Fairfax  Court-House,  as  the  enemy  advanced,  and 
take  his  place  behind  Mitchell's  Ford  on  the  Centreville 
and  Manassas  Junction  road.  It  was  proposed  that  he 
should  engage  his  rear-guard  so  as  to  try  to  bring  on  the 
battle  against  him,  as  he  approached  his  crossing  of  Bull 
Run,  when  the  brigades  along  the  Run  on  his  right 
should  cross,  wheel  to  the  left  and  attack  on  the  enemy's 
left  and  rear. 

We  had  occasional  glimpses  behind  the  lines  about 
Washington,  through  parties  who  managed  to  evade  the 
eyes  of  guards  and  sentinels,  which  told  of  McDowell's 
work  since  May,  and  heard  on  the  10th  of  July  that  he 
was  ready  to  march.  Most  of  us  knew  him  and  of  his 
attainments,  as  well  as  of  those  of  Beauregard,  to  the 
credit  of  the  latter,  so  that  on  that  point  we  were  quite 
satisfied.  But  the  backing  of  an  organized  government, 
and  an  army  led  by  the  foremost  American  war-chief,  that 


£h**QJR 


Captain  Washington  Artillery  of  New  Orleans;  whose  battery  fired  the  first  gun 
July,  1861 ,  aud  claims  the  last  gun  at  Appomattox. 


FKOM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS.  37 

consummate  strategist,  tactician,  and  organizer,  General 
Scott,  together  with  the  splendid  equipment  of  the  field 
batteries,  and  the  presence  of  the  force  of  regulars  of 
infantry,  gave  serious  apprehension. 

On  the  16th  of  July  notice  came  that  the  advance  of 
McDowell's  army  was  under  definite  orders  for  the  next 
day.  My  brigade  was  at  once  ordered  into  position  at 
Blackburn's  Ford,  and  all  others  were  ordered  on  the  alert. 
Cocke's  detachments  were  recalled  from  the  fords  between 
Mitchell's  and  Stone  Bridge,  and  Evans  was  left  to  hold  the 
bridge.  Bonham  withdrew  from  Fairfax  Court-House  as 
McDowell  advanced.  He  retired  behind  the  Kun  at 
Mitchell's  Ford,  his  vedettes  following  after  exchanging 
shots  with  the  enemy's  advance  on  the  18th.  Early  that 
morning  a  section  of  the  Washington  Artillery  was  posted 
on  a  rear  line  behind  Blackburn's  Ford,  and  trailed  across 
towards  the  left,  so  as  to  flank  fire  against  the  direct 
advance  upon  Bonham  at  Mitchell's  Ford. 

At  eight  o'clock  A.M.   on  the  18th,  McDowell's  army 
concentrated  about  Centreville,  his  immediate  objective 
being  Manassas  Junction.     From  Centreville  the  Warren- 
ton  Turnpike  bears  off  a  little  south  of  west,  crossing  Bull 
Kun  at  Stone  Bridge  (four  miles).     The  Manassas  Junc 
tion  road  due  south  crosses  at  Mitchell's   Ford    (three 
miles).     Other  farm  roads  turned  to  the  fords  above  and 
below  Mitchell's.    His  orders  to  General  Tyler,  command 
ing  the  advance  division,  were  to  look  well  to  the  roads 
on  the  direct  route  to  Manassas  Junction  and  via  the  Stone 
Bridge,  to  impress  an  advance  upon  the  former,  but  to 
have  care  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.     At  the 
same  time  he  rode  towards  his  left  to  know  of  the  feasi 
bility  of  a  turning  move  around  the  Confederates'  right. 
There  were  three  moves  by  which  it  was  supposed  he  could 
destroy  the  Confederates, — first,  by  turning  their  right ; 
second,  by  direct  and  forcible  march  to  the  Junction ; 
third,  by  turning  their  left.     McDowell's  orders   to   his 


38  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

leading  divisions  indicated  that  he  had  settled  down  to  a 
choice  as  to  the  two  opposite  flanking  moves ;  but  to  jus 
tify  either  he  must  first  test  the  feasibility  of  the  direct 
route.  The  ride  to  his  left  disclosed  rough  ground,  rocky 
heights  cut  by  streamlets,  and  covered  by  heavy  forest 
tangle,  as  formidable  to  military  manoeuvres  of  raw  troops 
as  armed  battlements.  According  to  preconceived  plans, 
this  eliminated  the  question  of  the  flanking  move  by  the 
Confederate  right. 

Under  the  instructions,  as  General  Tyler  construed 
them,  he  followed  the  Confederates  to  the  heights  of  Cen- 
treville,  overlooking  the  valley  of  Bull  Run,  with  a 
squadron  of  cavalry  and  two  companies  of  infantry. 
From  the  heights  to  the  Run,  a  mile  away,  the  field  was 
open,  and  partially  disclosed  the  Confederate  position  on 
his  right.  On  the  left  the  view  was  limited  by  a  sparse 
growth  of  spreading  pines.  On  the  right  was  Mitchell's 
Ford,  on  the  left  Blackburn's.  To  have  a  better  knowl 
edge  of  the  latter,  he  called  up  a  brigade  of  infantry  under 
General  Richardson,  Ayres's  battery  of  six  field-guns,  and 
two  twenty-pound  rifle  guns  under  Benjamin.  The  artil 
lery  was  brought  into  action  by  the  twenty-pound  rifle 
guns,  the  first  shot  aimed  at  the  section  of  the  Washing 
ton  Artillery  six-pounders  in  rear  of  Blackburn's  Ford, 
showing  superior  marksmanship,  the  ball  striking  close 
beside  the  guns,  and  throwing  the  dust  over  the  caissons 
and  gunners. 

It  was  noticed  that  the  enemy  was  far  beyond  our 
range,  his  position  commanding,  as  well  as  his  metal,  so  I 
ordered  the  guns  withdrawn  to  a  place  of  safety,  till  a 
fairer  opportunity  was  offered  them.  The  guns  were  lim 
bered  and  off  before  a  second  shot  reached  them.  Artillery 
practice  of  thirty  minutes  was  followed  by  an  advance  of 
infantry.  The  march  was  made  quite  up  to  the  bluff  over 
looking  the  ford,  when  both  sides  opened  fire. 

The  first  pouring-down  volleys  were  most  startling  to 


FROM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS.  39 

the  new  troops.  Part  of  my  line  broke  and  started  at  a 
run.  To  stop  the  alarm  I  rode  with  sabre  in  hand  for  the 
leading  files,  determined  to  give  them  all  that  was  in  the 
sword  and  my  horse's  heels,  or  stop  the  break.  They 
seemed  to  see  as  much  danger  in  their  rear  as  in  front,  and 
soon  turned  and  marched  back  to  their  places,  to  the  evi 
dent  surprise  of  the  enemy.  Heavy  firing  was  renewed 
in  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  when  the  Federals  retired. 
After  about  twenty  minutes  a  second  advance  was  made  to 
the  top  of  the  bluff,  when  another  rousing  fusillade  fol 
lowed,  and  continued  about  as  long  as  the  first,  with  like 
result.  I  reinforced  the  front  line  with  part  of  my  reserve, 
and,  thinking  to  follow  up  my  next  success,  called  for  one 
of  the  regiments  of  the  reserve  brigade. 

Colonel  Hays,  of  the  Seventh  Louisiana  Regiment,  was 
sent,  but  was  not  in  time  for  the  next  attack.  He  was  in 
position  for  the  fourth,  and  did  his  share  in  that  fight. 
After  the  fourth  repulse  I  ordered  the  advance,  and  called 
for  the  balance  of  the  reserve  brigade.  The  Fourth  Bri 
gade,  in  their  drills  in  evolution,  had  not  progressed  as  far 
as  the  passage  of  defiles.  The  pass  at  the  ford  was  narrow, 
unused,  and  boggy.  The  lagoons  above  and  below  were 
deep,  so  that  the  crossing  was  intricate  and  slow.  Colonel 
Early  came  in  with  his  other  regiments,  formed  his  line 
behind  my  front,  and  was  asked  to  hurry  his  troops  to  the 
front  line,  lest  the  next  attack  should  catch  him  behind 
us,  when  his  raw  men  would  be  sure  to  fire  on  the  line  in 
front  of  them.  He  failed  to  comprehend,  however,  and 
delayed  till  the  next  attack,  when  his  men  promptly  re 
turned  fire  at  anything  and  everything  before  them.  I 
thought  to  stop  the  fire  by  riding  in  front  of  his  line,  but 
found  it  necessary  to  dismount  and  lie  under  it  till  the 
loads  were  discharged.  With  the  Federals  on  the  bluff 
pouring  down  their  fire,  and  Early's  tremendous  fire  in 
our  rear,  soldiers  and  officers  became  mixed  and  a  little 
confused.  Part  of  my  men  got  across  the  Run  and  partially 


40  FROM    MANASSAS    TO   APPOMATTOX. 

up  the  bluff  of  the  enemy's  side  ;  a  body  of  the  Union  sol 
diers  were  met  at  the  crest,  where  shots  were  exchanged, 
but  passing  the  Run,  encountering  the  enemy  in  front,  and 
receiving  fire  from  our  friends  in  rear  were  not  reassuring, 
even  in  handling  veterans.  The  recall  was  ordered  as  the 
few  of  the  enemy's  most  advanced  parties  joined  issue 
with  Captain  Marye  of  my  advance.  Federal  prisoners 
were  brought  in  with  marks  of  burnt  powder  on  their 
faces,  and  Captain  Marye  and  some  of  his  men  of  the 
Seventeenth,  who  brought  them  in,  had  their  faces  and 
clothing  soiled  by  like  marks.  At  the  first  moment  of 
this  confusion  it  seemed  that  a  vigorous  pressure  by  the 
enemy  would  force  us  back  to  the  farther  edge  of  the  open 
field,  and,  to  reach  that  stronger  ground,  preparations 
were  considered,  but  with  the  aid  of  Colonels  Garland  and 
Corse  order  was  restored,  the  Federals  were  driven  off,  and 
the  troops  better  distributed.  This  was  the  last  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  infantry,  and  was  followed  by  the  Federal 
batteries  throwing  shot  and  shell  through  the  trees  above 
our  heads.  As  we  were  under  the  bluff,  the  fire  was  not 
annoying,  except  occasionally  when  some  of  the  branches 
of  the  trees  were  torn  off  and  dropped  among  us.  One 
shot  passed  far  over,  and  dropped  in  the  house  in  which 
General  Beauregard  was  about  to  sit  down  to  his  dinner. 
The  interruption  so  annoyed  him  that  he  sent  us  four  six- 
pound  and  three  rifle  guns  of  the  Washington  Artillery, 
under  Captain  Eshleman,  to  return  fire  and  avenge  the 
loss  of  his  dinner.  The  guns  had  good  cover  under  the 
bluff,  by  pushing  them  as  close  up  as  would  admit  of 
effective  fire  over  it ;  but  under  tactical  formation  the 
limbers  and  caissons  were  so  far  in  rear  as  to  bring  them 
under  destructive  fire.  The  men,  thinking  it  unsoldier- 
like  to  flinch,  or  complain  of  their  exposure,  worked  away 
very  courageously  till  the  limbers  and  caissons  were 
ordered  forward,  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  guns,  to  safer 
cover.  The  combat  lasted  about  an  hour,  when  the  Fed- 


FROM    NEW    MEXICO    TO    MANASSAS.  41 

erals  withdrew  to  their  ground  about  Centreville,  to  the 
delight  of  the  Confederates.  After  this  lively  affair  the 
report  came  of  a  threatened  advance  off  to  our  right. 
General  Beauregard  recalled  Early's  command  to  its  posi 
tion  in  that  quarter.  He  was  ordered  to  march  to  the 
right,  under  the  bluff,  so  that  his  men  could  not  come 
within  range  of  the  batteries,  but  he  chose  to  march  back 
on  the  road  leading  directly  to  the  rear,  when  the  dust  of 
his  columns  drew  fire  of  a  battery,  arid  several  damaging 
shots  were  thrown  among  his  troops.  The  Confederate 
losses  were  sixty-eight ;  Federal,  eighty-three.  The  effect 
of  this  little  affair  was  encouraging  to  the  Confederates, 
and  as  damaging  to  the  Federals.  By  the  double  action 
of  success  and  failure  the  Confederate  infantry  felt  them 
selves  christened  veterans.  The  Washington  Artillery 
was  equally  proud  of  its  even  combat  against  the  famed 
batteries  of  United  States  regulars. 

McDowell  was  disposed  to  ignore  this  fight  as  unwar 
ranted  under  his  instructions,  and  not  a  necessary  adjunct 
of  his  plans.  His  course  and  that  of  the  officers  about 
him  reduced  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  division  com 
mander  to  its  minimum,  and  had  some  influence  upon  the 
troops  of  the  division.  For  battle  at  this  time  McDowell 
had  37,300*  men  and  forty-nine  guns.  Beauregard  had 
20,500  f  men  and  twenty-nine  guns. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  ii.  p.  309.  Less  two  regiments  and  one 
cavalry  troop. 

f  General  Beauregard  claims  that  he  was  not  so  strong,  but  estimates 
seem  to  warrant  the  number  given. 


CHAPTER    III. 

BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS,   OR    BULL    RUN. 

Commanders  on  both  Sides  generally  Veterans  of  the  Mexican  War — 
General  Irvin  McDowell's  Preconceived  Plan — Johnston  reinforces 
Beauregard  and  approves  his  Plans — General  Bernard  E.  Bee — Anal 
ysis  of  the  Fight — Superb  Work  of  the  Federal  Artillery — Christening 
of  "Stonewall  Jackson" — McDowell's  Gallant  Effort  to  recover  Lost 
Power— Before  he  was  shorn  of  his  Artillery  he  was  the  Samson  of 
the  Field — The  Rout— Criticism  of  McDowell — Tyler's  Beconnoissance 
— Ability  of  the  Commanding  Generals  tested. 

BEFORE  treating  of  future  operations,  I  should  note  the 
situation  of  the  Confederate  contingents  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  and  at  Acquia  Creek.  The  latter  was  ordered  up 
to  reinforce  Beauregard  as  soon  as  the  advance  from  Wash 
ington  took  definite  shape,  and  arrived  as  a  supporting 
brigade  to  his  right  on  the  19th  of  July.  At  the  same  time 
orders  were  sent  authorizing  Johnston's  withdrawal  from 
the  Valley,  to  join  with  Beauregard  for  the  approaching 
conflict.  The  use  of  these  contingents  was  duly  consid 
ered  by  both  sides  some  days  before  the  campaign  was  put 
on  foot. 

Opposing  Johnston  in  the  Valley  was  General  Robert 
Patterson,  of  Philadelphia,  a  veteran  of  the  war  of  1812 
and  of  the  Mexican  War,  especially  distinguished  in  the 
latter  by  the  prestige  of  the  former  service.  Johnston 
was  a  veteran  of  the  Mexican  War,  who  had  won  distinc 
tion  by  progressive  service  and  was  well  equipped  in  the 
science  of  war.  Beauregard  and  McDowell  were  also 
veterans  of  the  Mexican  War,  of  staff  service,  and  dis 
tinguished  for  intelligent  action  and  attainments,  both 
remarkable  for  physical  as  well  as  mental  power. 

Between  Johnston  and  Beauregard  the  Blue  Ridge 
stretched  out  from  the  Potomac  southwest  far  below  the 

42 


Smiley 
Suri 


i          o   w    «| 


IforjJ, 


Shaded  li^es  near  Centrecille  indicate  sites  ofBii 

on  the  niyht  of  July  20th,  1S01. 

Heavy  lines  denote  the  position  of  the  Forces  on  the  n\xt 
day  at  the  commencement  of  the  engagement  at  Sud 


BATTLE   OF    MANASSAS,    OK    BULL    KUN.  43 

southern  line  of  Virginia,  cut  occasionally  by  narrow 
passes,  quite  defensible  by  small  bodies  of  infantry  and 
artillery.  Patterson  was  ordered  to  hold  Johnston  in  the 
Valley,  while  McDowell  should  direct  his  strength  against 
Beauregard.  McDowell  seems  to  have  accepted  that  order 
as  not  only  possible,  but  sure  of  success,  while  the  Con 
federates  viewed  the  question  from  the  other  side,  in  a 
reverse  light,  and,  as  will  presently  appear,  with  better 
judgment. 

So  far  as  it  is  possible  to  project  a  battle  before  reaching 
the  field,  it  seems  that  McDowell  had  concluded  upon  the 
move  finally  made  before  setting  out  on  his  march  from 
Washington.  It  was  to  give  him  an  open  field,  with 
superior  numbers  and  appointments,  and  when  successful 
was  to  give  him  the  approach  to  the  base  line  of  his  ad 
versary  with  fine  prospects  of  cutting  off  retreat.  His 
ride  to  view  the  approaches  of  the  Confederate  right  on 
the  morning  of  the  18th  was  made  to  confirm  his  precon 
ceived  plan.  The  reconnoissance  made  by  Tyler  on  the 
same  morning  reinforced  his  judgment,  so  that  the  stra 
tegic  part  of  the  campaign  was  concluded  on  that  morn 
ing,  except  as  to  the  means  to  be  adopted  to  secrete  or 
mislead  in  his  movement  as  long  as  possible,  leaving, 
we  may  say,  the  result  to  tactical  operations.  But  tactics 
is  time,  and  more  decisive  of  results  than  strategy  when 
wisely  adjusted. 

Johnston  was  sixty  miles  away  from  Beauregard,  but 
the  delay  of  three  days,  for  McDowell's  march  via  Sudley 
Springs,  so  reduced  the  distance  in  time  and  space  as  to 
make  the  consolidation  easy  under  well-organized  trans 
portation  facilities.  Holmes's  brigade  and  six-gun  battery 
were  posted  in  rear  of  Ewell's  brigade. 

General  McDowell's  order  for  battle  on  the  21st  of 
July  was  issued  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  directing  his 
First  Division  to  march  by  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  and 
make  a  diversion  against  the  crossing  of  Bull  Run  at  the 


44  FROM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Stone  Bridge,  while  the  Second  and  Third  Divisions,  fol 
lowing  on  the  turnpike,  were  to  file  to  the  right,  along 
the  farm  road,  about  half-way  between  Centreville  and 
the  bridge,  cross  Bull  Run  at  Sudley  Springs,  and  bear 
down  against  the  Confederate  rear  and  left ;  the  First 
Division,  under  Tyler,  to  march  at  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  to  be  closely  followed  by  the  others  under  Hun 
ter  and  Heintzelman  ;  the  turning  divisions,  after  crossing, 
to  march  down,  clear  the  bridge,  and  lift  Tyler  over  the 
Run,  bringing  the  three  into  compact  battle  order. 

General  Johnston  came  in  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
on  the  20th  with  the  brigades  of  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Jack 
son.  The  brigades  were  assigned  by  Beauregard,  the 
former  two  in  reserve  near  the  right  of  Blackburn's  Ford, 
the  latter  near  its  left. 

Beauregard's  order  for  battle,  approved  by  General 
Johnston,  was  issued  at  five  A.M.  on  the  21st, — the  brigades 
at  Union  Mills  Ford  to  cross  and  march  by  the  road  lead 
ing  towards  Centreville,  and  in  rear  of  the  Federal  re 
serve  at  that  point ;  the  brigades  at  McLean's  Ford  to 
follow  the  move  of  those  on  their  right,  and  march  on  a 
converging  road  towards  Centreville ;  those  at  and  near 
Blackburn's  to  march  in  co-operative  action  with  the 
brigades  on  the  right ;  the  reserve  brigades  and  troops  at 
Mitchell's  Ford  to  be  used  as  emergency  called,  but  in  the 
absence  of  special  orders  to  seek  the  most  active  point  of 
battle. 

This  order  was  only  preliminary,  coupled  with  the  con 
dition  that  the  troops  were  to  be  held  ready  to  move,  but 
to  wait  for  the  special  order  for  action.  The  brigade  at 
Blackburn's  Ford  had  been  reinforced  by  the  Fifth  North 
Carolina  and  Twenty-fourth  Virginia  Regiments,  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Jones  and  Colonel  Kemper.  I  crossed 
the  Run  under  the  five  o'clock  order,  adjusted  the  regi 
ments  to  position  for  favorable  action,  and  gave  instruc 
tions  for  their  movements  on  the  opening  of  the  battle. 


BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS,    OR   BULL   RUN.  45 

While  waiting  for  the  order  to  attack,  a  clever  recon- 
noissance  was  made  by  Colonels  Terry  and  Lubbock, 
Texans,  on  the  brigade  staff,  which  disclosed  the  march  of 
the  heavy  columns  of  the  Federals  towards  our  left. 
Their  report  was  sent  promptly  to  head-quarters,  and  after 
a  short  delay  the  brigade  was  ordered  back  to  its  position 
behind  the  Run. 

Tyler's  division  moved  early  on  the  21st  towards  the 
Stone  Bridge.  The  march  was  not  rapid,  but  timely. 
His  first  shells  went  tearing  through  the  elements  over 
the  heads  of  the  Confederates  before  six  o'clock.  The 
Second  and  Third  Divisions  followed  his  column  till  its 
rear  cleared  the  road  leading  up  to  the  ford  at  Sudley 
Springs,  when  they  filed  off  on  that  route.  McDowell 
was  with  them,  and  saw  them  file  off  on  their  course,  and 
followed  their  march.  His  Fifth  Division  and  Richard 
son's  brigade  of  the  First  were  left  in  reserve  at  Centre- 
ville,  and  the  Fourth  Division  was  left  in  a  position  rear 
ward  of  them.  The  march  of  the  columns  over  the  single 
track  of  the  farm  road  leading  up  to  Sudley  Springs  was 
not  only  fatiguing,  but  so  prolonged  the  diversion  of 
Tyler's  division  at  the  bridge  as  to  expose  its  real  intent, 
and  cause  his  adversary  to  look  elsewhere  for  the  impor 
tant  work.  Viewing  the  zone  of  operations  as  far  as  cov 
ered  by  the  eye,  Evans  discovered  a  column  of  dust  rising 
above  the  forest  in  the  vicinity  of  Sudley  Springs.  This, 
with  the  busy  delay  of  Tyler  in  front  of  the  bridge,  ex 
posed  the  plans,  and  told  of  another  quarter  for  the  ap 
proaching  battle ;  when  Evans,  leaving  four  companies  of 
infantry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery  to  defend  the  bridge, 
moved  with  the  rest  of  his  command  to  meet  the  ap 
proaching  columns  off  his  left.  Bearing  in  mind  his  care 
of  the  bridge,  it  was  necessary  to  occupy  grounds  north 
of  the  pike.  The  position  chosen  was  the  plateau  near 
the  Matthews  House,  about  a  thousand  yards  north  of  the 
pike,  and  about  the  same  distance  from  Bull  Run,  com- 


46  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

manding  the  road  by  which  the  turning  divisions  of  the 
enemy  were  to  approach.  His  artillery  (two  six-pound 
guns)  was  posted  to  his  right  and  left,  somewhat  retired. 
Meanwhile,  Tyler's  batteries  maintained  their  position  at 
and  below  the  Stone  Bridge,  as  did  those  near  the  lower 
fords.  McDowell's  column  crossed  at  Sudley's  Ford  at 
nine  o'clock,  and  approached  Evans  a  few  minutes  before 
ten.  The  leading  division  under  Hunter,  finding  Evans's 
command  across  its  route,  advanced  the  Second  Rhode 
Island  Regiment  and  battery  of  six  guns  of  Burnside's 
brigade  to  open  the  way.  Evans's  infantry  and  artillery 
met  the  advance,  and  after  a  severe  fight  drove  it  back  * 
to  the  line  of  woodland,  when  Burnside,  reinforced  by  his 
other  three  regiments,  with  them  advanced  eight  guns. 
This  attack  was  much  more  formidable,  and  pressed  an 
hour  or  more  before  our  forces  retired  to  the  woodland. 
The  fight,  though  slackened,  continued,  while  the  brigade 
under  Porter  advanced  to  Burnside's  support. 

Waiting  some  time  to  witness  the  opening  of  his  aggres 
sive  fight  towards  Centreville,  Beauregard  found  at  last 
that  his  battle  order  had  miscarried.  While  yet  in  doubt 
as  to  the  cause  of  delay,  his  attention  was  drawn  to  the 
fight  opened  by  McDowell  against  Evans.  This  affair, 
increasing  in  volume,  drew  him  away  from  his  original 
point  and  object  of  observation.  He  reconsidered  the 
order  to  attack  at  Centreville,  and  rode  for  the  field  just 
opening  to  severe  work.  The  brigades  of  Bee  and  Bar- 
tow, — commanded  by  Bee, — and  Jackson's,  had  been 
drawn  towards  the  left,  the  former  two  near  Cocke's  posi 
tion,  and  Jackson  from  the  right  to  the  left  of  Mitchell's 
Ford.  They  were  to  await  orders,  but  were  instructed, 
and  intrusted,  in  the  absence  of  orders,  to  seek  the  place 
where  the  fight  was  thickest.  About  twelve  o'clock  that 
splendid  soldier,  Bernard  E.  Bee,  under  orders  to  find  the 

*  In  that  attack  the  division  commander,  Colonel  David  Hunter, 
was  wounded. 


Captain  and  Aide-de-Camp. 


BATTLE   OF    MANASSAS,    OR   BULL    RUN.  47 

point  of  danger,  construed  it  as  calling  him  to  Evans's 
support,  and  marched,  without  other  notice  than  the  noise 
of  increasing  battle,  with  his  own  and  Bartow's  brigades 
and  Imboden's  battery.  The  move  against  the  enemy's 
reserve  at  Centreville  suspended,  Colonels  Terry  and  Lub- 
bock,  volunteer  aides,  crossed  the  Run  to  make  another 
reconnoissance  of  the  positions  about  Centreville.  Cap 
tain  Goree,  of  Texas,  and  Captain  Sorrel,  of  Georgia, 
had  also  joined  the  brigade  staff.  As  Bee  approached 
Evans  he  formed  line  upon  the  plateau  at  the  Henry 
House,  suggesting  to  Evans  to  withdraw  to  that  as  a  better 
field  than  the  advance  ground  held  by  the  latter  ;  but  in 
deference  to  Evans's  care  for  the  bridge,  which  involved 
care  for  the  turnpike,  Bee  yielded,  and  ordered  his  troops 
to  join  Evans's  advance.  Imboden's  artillery,  however, 
failed  to  respond,  remaining  on  the  Henry  plateau ; 
leaving  Bee  and  Evans  with  two  six-pounder  smooth 
bore  guns  to  combat  the  enemy's  formidable  batteries  of 
eight  to  twelve  guns  of  superior  metal,  as  well  as  the  ac 
cumulating  superior  infantry  forces,  Imboden's  battery 
making  a  show  of  practice  with  six-pounders  at  great 
range.  The  infantry  crossed  Young's  Branch  under 
severe  fire,  and  were  posted  on  the  line  of  Evans's  battle. 
Burnside  was  reinforced  by  Porter's  brigade,  and  after 
wards  by  a  part  of  Heintzelman's  division.  Ricketts's 
battery,  and  subsequently  the  battery  under  Griffin, 
pressed  their  fight  with  renewed  vigor.  The  batteries, 
particularly  active  and  aggressive,  poured  incessant  fire 
upon  the  Confederate  ranks,  who  had  no  artillery  to  en 
gage  against  them  except  Imboden's,  far  off  to  the  rear, 
and  the  section  of  Latham's  howitzers.  The  efforts  of  the 
Federal  infantry  were  cleverly  met  and  resisted,  but  the 
havoc  of  those  splendid  batteries  was  too  severe,  par 
ticularly  Griffin's,  that  had  an  oblique  fire  upon  the 
Confederates.  It  was  the  fire  of  this  battery  that  first 
disturbed  our  ranks  on  their  left,  and  the  increasing 


48  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

pounding  of  that  and  Ricketts's  eventually  unsettled  the 
line.  At  this  juncture  two  brigades  of  Tyler's  division, 
with  General  W.  T.  Sherman  and  General  Keyes,  crossed 
the  Run  at  a  ford  some  distance  above  the  bridge  and 
approached  the  Confederate  right,  making  more  unsettled 
their  position.  At  the  same  time  the  attacking  artillery 
and  infantry  followed  up  their  opportunity  in  admirable 
style,  pushed  the  Confederates  back,  and  pursued  down  to 
the  valley  of  Young's  Branch. 

At  one  P.M.,  Colonels  Terry  and  Lubbock  returned 
from  their  reconnoissance  of  the  ground  in  front  of  Cen- 
treville,  with  a  diagram  showing  points  of  the  Union  lines 
and  troops  there  posted.  I  sent  it  up  to  head-quarters, 
suggesting  that  the  brigades  at  the  lower  fords  be  put 
across  the  Run,  and  advance  against  the  reserves  as  de 
signed  by  the  order  of  the  morning.  Colonel  Terry  re 
turned  with  the  suggestion  approved,  and  we  communi 
cated  the  same  to  the  brigades  at  McLean's  and  Union 
Mills  Fords,  commanded  by  officers  of  senior  dates  to 
myself.  The  brigades  were  prepared,  however,  for  concert 
of  action.  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans  made  valorous  efforts, 
while  withdrawing  from  their  struggle  on  the  Matthews 
plateau,  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  their  lines,  and  with 
some  success,  when  General  Wade  Hampton  came  with 
his  brigade  to  their  aid,  checked  the  progress  of  pursuit, 
and  helped  to  lift  their  broken  ranks  to  the  plateau  at 
the  Henry  House.  The  fight  assumed  proportions  which 
called  for  the  care  of  both  General  Johnston  and  General 
Beauregard,  who,  with  the  movements  of  their  right  too 
late  to  relieve  the  pressure  of  the  left,  found  it  necessary 
to  draw  their  forces  to  the  point  at  which  the  battle  had 
been  forced  by  the  enemy.  At  the  same  time  the  reserve 
brigades  of  their  right  were  called  to  the  left.  General 
Thomas  J.  Jackson  also  moved  to  that  quarter,  and 
reached  the  rear  crest  of  the  plateau  at  the  Henry  House 
while  yet  Bee,  Bartow,  Evans,  and  Hampton  were  climb- 


OR    BULL    RUN.  49 

ing  to  the  forward  crest.  Quick  to  note  a  proper  ground, 
Jackson  deployed  on  the  crest  at  the  height,  leaving  the 
open  of  the  plateau  in  front.  He  was  in  time  to  secure  the 
Imboden  battery  before  it  got  off  the  field,  and  put  it  into 
action.  Stanard's  battery,  Pendleton's,  and  Pelham's, 
and  part  of  the  Washington  Artillery  were  up  in  time  to 
aid  Jackson  in  his  new  formation  and  relieve  our  dis 
comfited  troops  rallying  on  his  flank.  As  they  rose  on 
the  forward  crest,  Bee  saw,  on  the  farther  side,  Jackson's 
line,  serene  as  if  in  repose,  affording  a  haven  so  promising 
of  cover  that  he  gave  the  christening  of  "  Stonewall"  for 
the  immortal  Jackson. 

"  There,"  said  he,  "  is  Jackson,  standing  like  a  stone 
wall." 

General  Johnston  and  General  Beauregard  reached  the 
field,  and  busied  themselves  in  getting  the  troops  together 
and  in  lines  of  defence.  Other  reinforcements  were  or 
dered  from  the  right,  including  the  reserve  brigades  at 
McLean's  and  Union  Mills  Fords,  and  a  number  of  bat 
teries.  Bee  and  Evans  reformed  their  lines  upon  Jack 
son's.  After  permitting  Burnside's  brigade  to  retire  for 
rest,  McDowell  pushed  his  battle  by  his  strong  artillery 
arm,  advancing  against  and  turning  the  Confederate  left, 
only  giving  some  little  time  to  select  positions  for  his  bat 
teries  to  plunge  more  effective  fire  into  the  Confederate 
ranks.  This  time,  so  necessary  for  McDowell's  renewal, 
was  as  important  to  the  Confederates  in  getting  their 
reinforcements  of  infantry  and  artillery  in  position,  and 
proved  of  even  greater  value  in  lengthening  out  the  fight, 
so  as  to  give  Kirby  Smith  and  Elzey,  just  off  the  train 
from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  time  to  appear  at  the  last 
moment. 

After  arranging  the  new  position  of  the  troops  about 
Jackson,  General  Johnston  rode  back  to  the  Lewis  House, 
where  he  could  better  comprehend  the  entire  field,  leaving 
Beauregard  in  charge  of  the  troops  engaged  on  his  left. 


50  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

McDowell  gave  especial  care  to  preparing  his  batteries 
for  renewal  against  the  Confederate  left.  He  massed 
Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries,  and  made  their  practice 
grand.  So  well  executed  was  it  that  the  Confederate  left 
was  again  in  peril,  and,  seeing  reinforcements  approaching 
towards  their  rear,  General  Johnston  sent  orders  to  the 
brigades  at  the  lower  fords  revoking  authority  given  them 
to  advance  against  Centreville,  and  ordering  their  return 
to  the  south  side,  and  the  brigade  at  Union  Mills  was 
ordered  to  reinforce  the  Confederate  left.  The  brigade  at 
Blackburn's  Ford  received  the  recall  order  in  ample  time, 
but  that  at  McLean's, — Jones's, — being  a  little  farther 
away,  became  partially  engaged  before  the  recall  reached 
it.  The  brigades  resumed  their  former  position,  however, 
without  serious  trouble. 

With  this  order  came  a  message  to  me,  saying  that  the 
Federals  were  pressing  severely  on  our  left,  and  to  the 
limit  of  its  tension,  that  reinforcements  were  in  sight, 
approaching  their  right,  which  might  prove  too  heavy  for 
our  brave  men,  and  force  us  back,  for  which  emergency 
our  brigades  should  be  held  ready  to  cover  retreat.  These 
anxious  moments  were  soon  relieved  by  the  approach  of 
General  Kirby  Smith's  command,  that  had  been  mistaken 
as  reinforcements  for  the  enemy.  General  Smith  was 
wounded,  but  was  succeeded  in  command  by  the  gallant 
Elzey,  who  by  a  well-timed  attack  approached  the  rear  of 
the  massed  batteries.  At  the  same  time  a  brave  charge  on 
the  part  of  Beauregard,  in  co-operation  with  this  fortunate 
attack  of  Smith  and  Elzey,  captured  the  greater  part  of 
the  batteries  and  turned  some  of  the  guns  upon  the  brave 
men  who  had  handled  them  so  well. 

McDowell  made  a  gallant  effort  to  recover  his  lost 
power,  riding  with  his  troops  and  urging  them  to  brave 
efforts,  but  our  convex  line,  that  he  was  just  now  pressing 
back  upon  itself,  was  changed.  Though  attenuated,  it 
had  become  concave  by  reinforcement,  and  in  elliptical 


BATTLE   OF    MANASSAS,    OR   BULL    KUN.  51 

curve  was  delivering  a  concentrated  fire  upon  its  adver 
sary.  Before  the  loss  of  his  artillery  he  was  the  Samson 
of  the  field ;  now  he  was  not  only  shorn  of  his  power,  but 
some  of  his  mighty  strength  was  transferred  to  his  adver 
sary,  leaving  him  in  desperate  plight  and  exposed  to  blows 
increasing  in  force  and  effectiveness.  Although  his  re 
newed  efforts  were  brave,  his  men  seemed  to  have  given 
confidence  over  to  despair.  Still  a  show  of  battle  was 
made  until  General  Johnston  directed  the  brigades  of 
Holmes  and  Early  to  good  positions  for  attack,  when  fight 
was  abandoned  and  flight  ensued. 

The  regulars  under  Sykes  maintained  order,  and  with 
the  regular  cavalry  covered  the  confused  retreat.  The 
Confederates  in  the  field  and  approaching  at  the  moment 
were  ordered  in  pursuit.  At  the  same  time  another  order 
was  sent  the  brigades  at  the  lower  fords,  explaining  that 
the  reinforcements,  supposed  to  be  Federals,  proved  to  be 
Confederates,  and  that  the  former  were  not  only  forced 
back,  but  were  then  in  full  retreat,  directing  our  brigades 
to  cross  again  and  strike  the  retreating  line  on  the  turn 
pike.  All  of  D.  R.  Jones's  brigade  that  had  crossed  at 
McLean's  Ford  under  the  former  order  had  not  yet 
returned  to  its  position  under  the  order  to  that  effect,  and 
Ewell  had  gone  from  Union  Mills  Ford  to  the  battle 
on  the  extreme  left,  so  that  neither  of  them  came  in  posi 
tion  ready  to  take  part  in  the  pursuit.  Those  at  Mitchell's 
and  Blackburn's  Fords  advanced,  the  former,  under  Gen 
eral  Bonham,  with  orders  to  strike  at  Cub  Run,  the  latter 
at  Centreville.  Finding  some  obstruction  to  his  march, 
General  Bonham  kept  the  Centreville  road,  and  joined 
the  brigade  from  Blackburn's,  taking  the  lead  as  the 
ranking  officer. 

Through  the  abandoned  camps  of  the  Federals  we  found 
their  pots  and  kettles  over  the  fire,  with  food  cooking; 
quarters  of  beef  hanging  on  the  trees,  and  wagons  by  the 
roadside  loaded,  some  with  bread  and  general  provisions, 


52  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

others  with  ammunition.  When  within  artillery  range 
of  the  retreating  column  passing  through  Centreville,  the 
infantry  was  deployed  on  the  sides  of  the  road,  under 
cover  of  the  forest,  so  as  to  give  room  for  the  batteries 
ordered  into  action  in  the  open,  Bonham's  brigade  on  the 
left,  the  other  on  the  right. 

As  the  guns  were  about  to  open,  there  came  a  message 
that  the  enemy,  instead  of  being  in  precipitate  retreat, 
was  marching  around  to  attack  the  Confederate  right. 
With  this  report  came  orders,  or  reports  of  orders,  for  the 
brigades  to  return  to  their  positions  behind  the  Run.  I 
denounced  the  report  as  absurd,  claimed  to  know  a  retreat, 
such  as  was  before  me,  and  ordered  that  the  batteries  open 
fire,  when  Major  Whiting,  of  General  Johnston's  staff, 
rising  in  his  stirrups,  said, — 

"  In  the  name  of  General  Johnston,  I  order  that  the 
batteries  shall  not  open." 

I  inquired,  "  Did  General  Johnston  send  you  to  com 
municate  that  order  ?" 

Whiting  replied,  "  No ;  but  I  take  the  responsibility  to 
give  it." 

I  claimed  the  privilege  of  responsibility  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  and  when  in  the  act  of  renewing  the  order  to 
fire,  General  Bonham  rode  to  my  side  and  asked  that  the 
batteries  should  not  open.  As  the  ranking  officer  present, 
this  settled  the  question.  By  that  time,  too,  it  was  near 
night.  Colonel  G.  W.  Lay,  of  Johnston's  staff,  supported 
my  views,  notwithstanding  the  protest  of  Major  W'hiting. 

Soon  there  came  an  order  for  the  brigades  to  withdraw 
and  return  to  their  positions  behind  the  Run.  General 
Bonham  marched  his  brigade  back,  but,  thinking  that 
there  was  a  mistake  somewhere,  I  remained  in  position 
until  the  order  was  renewed,  about  ten  o'clock.  My  bri 
gade  crossed  and  recrossed  the  Run  six  times  during  the 
day  and  night. 

It  was  afterwards  found  that  some  excitable  person,  see- 


BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS,  OK  BULL  RUN.        53 

ing  Jones's  brigade  recrossing  the  Run,  from  its  advance, 
under  previous  orders,  took  them  for  Federal  troops  cross 
ing  at  McLean's  Ford,  and,  rushing  to  head-quarters  at  the 
Junction,  reported  that  the  Federals  were  crossing  below 
and  preparing  for  attack  against  our  right.  And  upon 
this  report  one  of  the  staff-officers  sent  orders,  in  the 
names  of  the  Confederate  chiefs,  revoking  the  orders  for 
pursuit. 

From  the  effective  service  of  the  two  guns  of  Latham's 
battery,  at  short  range,  against  the  odds  brought  against 
them,  the  inference  seems  fair  that  the  Imboden  battery, 
had  it  moved  under  Bee's  orders,  could  have  so  strength 
ened  the  position  on  the  Matthews  plateau  as  to  hold  it  and 
give  time  for  them  to  retire  and  meet  General  Jackson  on 
the  Henry  plateau.  Glorious  Victory  spread  her  generous 
wings  alike  over  heroes  and  delinquents. 

The  losses  of  the  Confederates  in  all  arms  were  1982. 
Federal  losses  in  all  arms,  3333*  officers  and  soldiers, 
twenty-five  cannon.f 

On  the  22d  the  cavalry  troop  of  Captain  Whitehead 
was  sent  forward  with  Colonel  Terry,  volunteer  aide,  on  a 
ride  of  observation.  They  picked  up  a  number  of  pris 
oners,  and  Colonel  Terry  cut  the  lanyards  of  the  Federal 
flag  over  the  court-house  at  Fairfax  by  a  shot  from  his 
six-shooter,  and  sent  the  bunting  to  head-quarters. 

The  plan  of  the  Union  campaign  was  that  their  army  in 
the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  under  General  Patterson, 
should  stand  so  surely  against  the  Confederates  in  that 
field,  under  General  Johnston,  as  to  prevent  the  with 
drawal  of  the  latter  through  the  Blue  Ridge,  which  goes 
to  show  that  the  concentration  was  considered,  and  thought 
possible,  and  that  McDowell  was,  therefore,  under  some 
pressure  to  act  in  time  to  gain  his  battle  before  Johnston 
could  have  time  for  his  swoop  from  the  mountains.  At 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  ii.  pp.  351,  387,  405,  426. 
t  Ibid.,  328. 


54  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Centre ville  on  the  18th,  McDowell  was  within  five  miles 
of  his  immediate  objective, — Manassas  Junction, — by  the 
route  of  Tyler's  reconnoissance.  The  Sudley  Ford  route 
involved  a  march  of  twenty  miles  and  drew  him  nearer 
the  reach  of  Johnston's  forces.  So,  if  Tyler's  recon 
noissance  proved  the  route  by  Blackburn's  Ford  practica 
ble,  it  was  imperative  on  McDowell  to  adopt  it.  If  it  was 
proved  impracticable,  the  route  by  Sudley's  Ford  was 
necessary  and  justified  the  delay.  But  it  has  been  claimed 
that  the  Union  commander  did  not  intend  to  have  the 
reconnoissance,  and  that  he  could  have  made  his  move  a 
success  by  that  route  if  he  had  adopted  it ;  which,  if  true, 
would  put  him  in  a  more  awkward  position  than  his  defeat. 
He  was  right  in  his  conclusion  that  the  Confederates  were 
prepared  for  him  on  that  route,  but  it  would  have  been  a 
grave  error  to  leave  the  shorter,  more  direct  line  for  the 
circuitous  route  without  first  so  testing  the  former  as  to 
know  if  it  were  practicable,  knowing  as  he  did  that  the 
Confederate  left  was  in  the  air,  because  of  leaven  looked 
for  from  over  the  Blue  Ridge.  After  the  trial  of  General 
Tyler  on  the  18th,  and  finding  the  route  closed  against  him, 
he  should  have  given  credit  to  the  division  commander 
and  his  troops  for  their  courageous  work,  but  instead 
he  disparaged  their  efforts  and  put  them  under  criticism. 
The  experiment  and  subsequent  events  go  to  show  that 
the  route  was  not  practicable  except  for  seasoned  troops. 

McDowell's  first  mistake  was  his  display,  and  march 
for  a  grand  military  picnic.  The  leading  proverb  im 
pressed  upon  the  minds  of  young  soldiers  of  the  line  by 
old  commanders  is,  "  Never  despise  your  enemy."  So 
important  a  part  of  the  soldier's  creed  is  it,  that  it  is 
enjoined  upon  subalterns  pursuing  marauding  parties  of 
half  a  dozen  of  the  aborigines.  His  over-confidence  led 
him  to  treat  with  levity  the  reconnoissance  of  General 
Tyler  on  the  18th,  as  not  called  for  under  his  orders,  nor 
necessary  to  justify  his  plans,  although  they  involved  a 


BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS,    OR    BULL    RUN.  55 

delay  of  three  days,  and  a  circuitous  march  around  the 
Confederate  left.  Then,  he  put  upon  his  division  com 
mander  the  odium  of  error  and  uncalled-for  exposure  of 
the  troops.  This  broke  the  confidence  between  them,  and 
worked  more  or  less  evil  through  the  ranks  in  the  after- 
part  of  the  campaign.  Had  he  recognized  the  importance 
of  the  service,  and  encouraged  the  conduct  of  the  division 
commander,  he  would  have  drawn  the  hearts  of  his  officers 
and  soldiers  towards  him,  and  toned  up  the  war  spirit  and 
morale  of  his  men.  Tyler  was  right  in  principle,  in  the 
construction  of  duty,  under  the  orders,  and  in  his  more 
comprehensive  view  of  the  military  zodiac.  In  no  other 
way  than  by  testing  the  strength  along  the  direct  route 
could  McDowell  justify  delay,  when  time  was  power, 
and  a  long  march  with  raw  troops  in  July  weather  was 
pending. 

The  delay  gave  Beauregard  greater  confidence  in  his 
preconceived  plan,  and  brought  out  his  order  of  the  21st 
for  advance  towards  McDowell's  reserve  at  Centreville, 
but  this  miscarried,  and  turned  to  advantage  for  the  plans 
of  the  latter. 

Had  a  prompt,  energetic  general  been  in  command 
when,  on  the  20th,  his  order  of  battle  was  settled  upon, 
the  division  under  Tyler  would  have  been  deployed  in 
front  of  Stone  Bridge,  as  soon  after  nightfall  as  darkness 
could  veil  the  march,  and  the  divisions  under  Hunter  and 
Heintzelman  following  would  have  been  stretched  along 
the  lateral  road  in  bivouac,  so  as  to  be  prepared  to  cross 
Sudley's  Ford  and  put  in  a  good  day's  work  on  the  mor 
row.  Had  General  Tyler's  action  of  the  18th  received 
proper  recognition,  he  would  have  been  confident  instead 
of  doubting  in  his  service.  McDowell's  army  posted  as 
it  should  have  been,  a  march  at  daylight  would  have 
brought  the  columns  to  the  Henry  House  before  seven 
o'clock,  dislodged  Evans,  busied  by  Tyler's  display  at  the 
bridge,  without  a  chance  to  fight,  and  brought  the  three 


56  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

divisions,  reunited  in  gallant  style,  along  the  turnpike 
with  little  burning  of  powder.  Thus  prepared  and  organ 
ized,  the  compact  battle-order  of  twenty  thousand  men 
would  have  been  a  fearful  array  against  Beauregard's 
fragmentary  left,  and  by  the  events  as  they  passed,  would 
have  assured  McDowell  of  victory  hours  before  Kirby 
Smith  and  Elzey,  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  came 
upon  the  field. 

Beauregard's  mistake  was  in  failing  to  ride  promptly 
after  his  five-o'clock  order,  and  handling  his  columns 
while  in  action.  As  events  actually  occurred,  he  would 
have  been  in  overwhelming  numbers  against  McDowell's 
reserve  and  supply  depot.  His  adversary  so  taken  by 
surprise,  his  raw  troops  would  not  have  been  difficult  to 
conquer. 

As  the  experience  of  both  commanders  was  limited  to 
staff  service,  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  failed  to  appre 
ciate  the  importance  of  prompt  and  vigorous  manoeuvre 
in  the  hour  of  battle.  Beauregard  gave  indications  of 
a  comprehensive  military  mind  and  reserve  powers  that 
might,  with  experience  and  thorough  encouragement 
from  the  superior  authorities,  have  developed  him  into 
eminence  as  a  field-marshal.  His  adversary  seemed  un 
toward,  not  adapted  to  military  organization  or  combina 
tions.  Most  of  his  men  got  back  to  Washington  under 
the  sheltering  wings  of  the  small  bands  of  regulars. 

The  mistake  of  supposing  Kirby  Smith's  and  Elzey's 
approaching  troops  to  be  Union  reinforcements  for  Mc 
Dowell's  right  was  caused  by  the  resemblance,  at  a  dis 
tance,  of  the  original  Confederate  flag  to  the  colors  of 
Federal  regiments.  This  mishap  caused  the  Confederates 
to  cast  about  for  a  new  ensign,  brought  out  our  battle-flag, 
led  to  its  adoption  by  General  Beauregard,  and  afterwards 
by  higher  authority  as  the  union  shield  of  the  Confederate 
national  flag. 

The  supplies  of  subsistence,   ammunition,  and  forage 


BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS,    OR    BULL    RUN.  57 

passed  as  we  marched  through  the  enemy's  camps  towards 
Centreville  seemed  ample  to  carry  the  Confederate  army 
on  to  Washington.  Had  the  fight  been  continued  to  that 
point,  the  troops,  in  their  high  hopes,  would  have  marched 
in  terrible  effectiveness  against  the  demoralized  Federals. 
Gaining  confidence  and  vigor  in  their  march,  they  could 
well  have  reached  the  capital  with  the  ranks  of  McDow 
ell's  men.  The  brigade  at  Blackburn's  Ford  (five  regi 
ments),  those  at  McLean's  and  Mitchell's  Fords,  all  quite 
fresh,  could  have  been  reinforced  by  all  the  cavalry  and 
most  of  the  artillery,  comparatively  fresh,  and  later  by 
the  brigades  of  Holmes,  Ewell,  and  Early.  This  favor 
able  aspect  for  fruitful  results  was  all  sacrificed  through 
the  assumed  authority  of  staff-officers  who,  upon  false  re 
ports,  gave  countermand  to  the  orders  of  their  chiefs. 

On  the  21st  a  regiment  and  battery  were  discharged 
from  the  Union  army,  reducing  its  aggregate  to  about 
34,000.  The  Confederates  had  31,860.  McDowell  crossed 
Bull  Run  with  18,500  of  his  men,  and  engaged  in  battle 
18,053  Confederates. 

There  seem  to  be  no  data  from  which  the  precise 
figures  can  be  had.  These  estimates,  though  not  strictly 
accurate,  are  justified  by  returns  so  far  as  they  have  been 
officially  rendered. 

The  CONFEDERATE  ARMY  in  this  battle  was  organized 
as  follows : 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  (AFTERWARDS  FIRST  CORPS),  under  Brig.- 
Gen.  G.  T.  Beauregard  :— Infantry :  First  Brigade,  under  Brig.-Gen. 
M.  S.  Bonham,  llth  N.  C.,  2d,  3d,  7th,  and  8th  S.  C.  ;  Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  R.  S.  Ewell,  5th  and  6th  Ala.,  6th  La.  ;  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  D.  R.  Jones,  17th  and  18th  Miss.,  5th  S.  C.  ;  Fourth  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  James  Longstreet,  5th  N.  C.,  1st,  llth,  and  17th  Va. ;  Fifth 
Brigade,  Col.  P.  St.  George  Cocke,  1st  La.  Battn.,  8th  Va.  (seven  com 
panies),  18th,  19th,  28th,  and  49th  Va.  (latter,  three  companies)  ;  Sixth 
Brigade,  Col.  J.  A.  Early,  13th  Miss.,  4th  S.  C.,  7th  and  24th  Va.  ; 
Troops  not  brigaded:  7th  and  8th  La.,  Hampton  Legion,  S.  C.,  30th 
Va.  (cav.),  Harrison's  Battn.  (cav.) ;  Independent  companies :  10th 
Cav.,  Washington  (La.)  Cav.;  Artillery:  Kemper's,  Latham's,  Lou- 
doun,  and  Shield's  batteries,  Camp  Pickens  companies. 


58  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ARMY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH  (JOHNSTON'S  DIVISION),  Brig.-Gen. 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  -.—First  Brigade,  Col.  T.  J.  Jackson,  2d,  4th,  5th, 
and  27th  Va.,  Peudleton's  Batt.  ;  Second  Brigade,  Col.  F.  S.  Bartow, 
7th,  8th,  and  9th  Ga.,  Duncan's  and  Pope's  Ky.  Battns.,  Alburti's  Batt. ; 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Barnard  E.  Bee,  4th  Ala.,  2d  and  llth  Miss., 
1st  Term.,  Imboden's  Batt.  ;  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  A.  Elzey,  1st  Md. 
Battn.,  3d  Tenn.,  10th  and  13th  Va.,  Grane's  Batt.;  Not  brigaded: 
1st  Va.  Cav.,  33d  Va.  Inf. 

The  FEDERAL  ARMY,  commanded  by  Brigadier-General 
Irvin  McDowell,  was  organized  as  follows : 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  Tyler -.—First  Brigade,  Col.  E. 
D.  Keyes,  2d  Me.,  1st,  2d,  and  3d  Conn.  ;  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
R.  C.  Schenck,  2d  N.  Y.,  1st  and  2d  Ohio,  Batt.  E,  2d  U.  S.  Art. ;  Third 
Brigade,  Col.  W.  T.  Sherman,  13th,  69th,  and  79th  N.  Y.,  2d  Wis., 
Batt.  E,  3d  U.  S.  Art.;  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  I.  B.  Richardson,  1st 
Mass.,  12th  N.  Y.,  2d  and  3d  Mich.,  Batt.  G,  1st  U.  S.  Art.,  Batt.  M, 
2d  U.  S.  Art. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  (1)  Col.  David  Hunter  (wounded)  ;  (2)  Col.  Andrew 
Porter  -.—First  Brigade,  Col.  Andrew  Porter,  8th  (militia),  14th,  and 
27th  N.  Y.,  Battn.  U.  S.  Inf.,  Battn.  U.  S.  Marines,  Battn.  U.  S.  Cav., 
Batt.  D,  5th  U.  S.  Art. ;  Second  Brigade,  Col.  A.  E.  Burnside,  2d  N.  H., 
lstand2dR.  L,  71st  N.  Y. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Col.  S.  P.  Heintzelman  (wounded)  '.—First  Brigade, 
Col.  W.  B.  Franklin,  5th  and  llth  Mass.,  1st  Minn.,  Batt.  I,  1st  U.  S. 
Art.  ;  Second  Brigade,  Col.  O.  B.  Wilcox  (wounded  and  captured),  llth 
N.  Y.  (Fire  Zouaves),  38th  N.  Y.,  1st  and  4th  Mich.,  Batt.  D,  2d  U.  S. 
Art.  ;  Third  Brigade,  Col.  O.  O.  Howard,  3d,  4th,  and  5th  Me.,  2d  Vt. 

FOURTPI  (RESERVE)  DIVISION,*  Brig.-Gen.  Theodore  Runyon,  1st, 
2d,  3d,  and  4th  N.  J.  (three  months),  1st,  2d,  and  3d  N.  J.,  41st  N.  Y. 
(three  years). 

FIFTH  DIVISION,  Col.  Dixon  S.  Miles  '.—First  Brigade,}  Col.  Louis 
Blanker,  8th  N.  Y.  (Vols.),  29th  and  39th  N.  Y.,  27th  Penn.,  Batt.  A, 
2d  U.  S.  Art.,  Rookwood's  N.  Y.  Batt.  ;  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Thomas 
A.  Davies,  16th,  18th,  31st,  and  32d  N.  Y.,  Batt.  G,  2d  U.  S.  Art. 

*  Not  engaged. 

f  In  reserve  at  Centreville  and  not  in  battle  proper. 


CHAPTEE  IV. 

THE   CONFEDERATES    HOVERING    AROUND    WASHINGTON. 

An  Early  War-Time  Amenity— The  Author  invited  to  dine  with  the 
Enemy— "  Stove-pipe  Batteries"— J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  the  Famous  Cav 
alryman — His  Bold  Dash  on  the  Federals  at  Lewinsville — Major- 
General  G.  W.  Smith  associated  with  Johnston  and  Beauregard  in  a 
Council — Longstreet  promoted  Major-General— Fierce  Struggle  at 
Ball's  Bluff—  Dranesville  a  Success  for  the  Union  Arms — McClellan 
given  the  Sobriquet  of  "  The  Young  Napoleon." 

AFTER  General  McDowell  reached  Washington  my 
brigade  was  thrown  forward,  first  to  Centreville,  then  to 
Fairfax  Court-House,  and  later  still  to  Falls  Church  and 
Munson's  and  Mason's  Hills ;  the  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  constituting  part  of  the  command. 

We  were  provokingly  near  Washington,  with  orders 
not  to  attempt  to  advance  even  to  Alexandria.  Well- 
chosen  and  fortified  positions,  with  soldiers  to  man  them, 
soon  guarded  all  approaches  to  the  capital.  We  had  fre 
quent  little  brushes  with  parties  pushed  out  to  reconnoitre. 
Nevertheless,  we  were  neither  so  busy  nor  so  hostile  as  to 
prevent  the  reception  of  a  cordial  invitation  to  a  dinner 
party  on  the  other  side,  to  be  given  to  me  at  the  head 
quarters  of  General  Richardson.  He  was  disappointed 
when  I  refused  to  accept  this  amenity,  and  advised  him  to 
be  more  careful  lest  the  politicians  should  have  him  ar 
rested  for  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy.  He  was 
my  singularly  devoted  friend  and  admirer  before  the  war, 
and  had  not  ceased  to  be  conscious  of  old-time  ties. 

The  service  at  Falls  Church,  Munson's  and  Mason's 
Hills  was  first  by  my  brigade  of  infantry,  a  battery,  and 
Stuart's  cavalry.  During  that  service  the  infantry  and 
batteries  were  relieved  every  few  days,  but  the  cavalry 
was  kept  at  the  front  with  me.  As  the  authorities  allowed 

59 


60  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

me  but  one  battery,  and  that  was  needed  from  time  to 
time  to  strike  out  at  anything  and  everything  that  came 
outside  the  fortified  lines,  we  collected  a  number  of  old 
wagon-wheels  and  mounted  on  them  stove-pipes  of  differ 
ent  calibre,  till  we  had  formidable-looking  batteries,  some 
large  enough  of  calibre  to  threaten  Alexandria,  and  even 
the  National  Capitol  and  Executive  Mansion.  It  is  need 
less  to  add  that  Munson's  Hill  was  so  safe  as  not  to  disturb 
our  profound  slumbers.  This  was  before  the  Federals 
began  to  realize  all  of  their  advantages  by  floating  balloons 
above  our  heads. 

One  of  the  most  conspicuous  and  successful  of  our 
affairs  occurred  on  the  llth  of  September.  A  brigade  of 
the  enemy's  infantry,  with  eight  pieces  of  artillery  and  a 
detachment  of  cavalry,  escorting  a  reconnoitring  party, 
advanced  to  Lewinsville.  If  they  had  secured  and  forti 
fied  a  position  there  they  would  have  greatly  annoyed  us. 
Colonel  Stuart,  who  from  the  start  had  manifested  those 
qualities  of  daring  courage,  tempered  by  sagacity,  which 
so  admirably  fitted  him  for  outpost  service,  had  his  pickets 
so  far  to  the  front  that  he  was  promptly  informed  of  the 
presence  of  the  enemy.  He  was  ordered,  with  about 
eight  hundred  infantry,  a  section  of  Rosser's  battery,  and 
Captain  Patrick's  troop  of  cavalry,  to  give  battle,  and  so 
adroitly  approached  the  enemy  as  to  surprise  him,  and  by 
a  bold  dash  drove  him  off  in  confusion,  with  some  loss. 

We  had  a  number  of  small  affairs  which  served  to  sea 
son  the  troops  and  teach  the  importance  of  discipline  and 
vigilance.  It  was  while  at  Falls  Church  that  Major- 
General  G.  W.  Smith  reported  for  duty  with  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,  and  was  associated  with  General 
Johnston  and  General  Beauregard,  the  three  forming  a 
council  for  the  general  direction  of  the  operations  of  the 
army.  General  McClellan  had  by  this  time  been  ap 
pointed  to  superior  command  on  the  Federal  side. 

Despairing  of  receiving  reinforcement  to  enable  him  to 


GENERAL  J.    E.    B.  STUART 


CONFEDERATES    HOVERING   AROUND    WASHINGTON.       61 

assume  the  offensive,  General  Johnston  regarded  it  as 
hazardous  to  hold  longer  the  advanced  post  of  Munson's 
and  Mason's  Hills,  drew  the  troops  back  to  and  near  Fair 
fax  Court-House,  and  later,  about  the  19th  of  October, 
still  farther  to  Centreville,  and  prepared  for  winter  quar 
ters  by  strengthening  his  positions  and  constructing  huts, 
the  line  extending  to  Union  Mills  on  the  right.  These 
points  were  regarded  as  stronger  in  themselves  and  less 
liable  to  be  turned  than  the  positions  at  and  in  advance 
of  Fairfax  Court-House.  We  expected  that  McClellan 
would  advance  against  us,  but  were  not  disturbed.  I  was 
promoted  major-general,  which  relieved  me  of  the  out 
post  service,  to  which  Colonel  Stuart  was  assigned. 

The  autumn  and  early  winter  were  not  permitted  to 
pass  without  some  stirring  incidents  in  our  front.  Soon 
after  the  battle  of  July  21,  Colonel  Eppa  Hunton  was 
ordered  to  reoccupy  Leesburg  with  his  regiment,  the 
Eighth  Virginia.  Later,  the  Thirteenth,  Seventeenth, 
and  Eighteenth  Mississippi  Eegiments  were  sent  to  the 
same  vicinity,  and  with  the  regiment  already  there  and  a 
battery  constituted  the  Seventh  Brigade,  Brigadier-General 
N.  G.  Evans  commanding.  To  cover  a  reconnoissance 
and  an  expedition  to  gather  supplies  made  by  General 
McCall's  division  to  Dranesville,  General  McClellan  or 
dered  General  C.  P.  Stone,  commanding  at  Poolesville, 
Maryland,  to  make  a  demonstration  in  force  against  Lees- 
burg,  and,  if  practicable,  to  dislodge  the  Confederates  at 
that  place.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  21st  of  October 
four  of  General  Stone's  regiments  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Edwards's  Ferry,  and  about  the  same  time  five  other  regi 
ments,  under  the  immediate  command  of  Colonel  Baker, 
late  United  States  Senator  from  Oregon,  crossed  the  river 
above  at  Ball's  Bluff.  Leaving  Colonel  Barksdale  with 
his  Thirteenth  Mississippi,  with  six  pieces  of  artillery  as 
a  reserve,  to  hold  in  check  the  force  that  had  crossed 
at  Edwards's  Ferry,  Evans  with  his  main  force  assailed 


62  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  force  under  Colonel  Baker,  and  after  a  long  and  fierce 
struggle,  under  a  heavy  fire  of  batteries  on  both  sides  of 
the  river,  drove  them  down  the  bluff  to  the  river,  many 
surrendering,  others  plunging  into  the  river  to  recross, 
overcrowding  and  sinking  the  boats  that  had  brought  them 
over ;  some  drowning  in  the  Potomac. 

Two  months  later,  December  20,  there  was  an  affair  at 
Dranesville  which  for  us  was  by  no  means  so  satisfactory 
as  Evans's  at  Leesburg  and  Ball's  Bluff.  It  was  known 
that  food  for  men  and  horses  could  be  found  in  the 
vicinity  of  Dranesville.  All  of  the  available  wagons  of 
the  army  were  sent  to  gather  and  bring  it  in,  and  Colo 
nel  Stuart,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  his  cavalry, 
the  Sumter  Flying  Artillery  (Captain  A.  S.  Cutts),  arid 
four  regiments  of  infantry  detailed  from  different  brigades, 
was  charged  with  the  command  of  the  foraging  party. 
The  infantry  regiments  were  the  Eleventh  Virginia,  Colo 
nel  Samuel  Garland ;  Tenth  Alabama,  Colonel  Forney ; 
Sixth  South  Carolina,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Secrest;  and 
First  Kentucky,  Colonel  Thomas  Taylor;  the  cavalry, 
Ransom's  and  Bradford's. 

General  McCall,  commanding  the  nearest  Union  di 
vision,  happened  just  then  to  want  those  supplies,  or,  as 
seems  more  probable,  had  information  through  a  spy  of 
Stuart's  expedition. 

He  took  measures  to  gather  the  supplies,  or  surprise 
and  perhaps  capture  or  destroy  Stuart's  party.  However 
that  may  be,  when  Stuart  reached  the  vicinity  of  Dranes 
ville  he  found  himself  in  the  presence  of  General  Ord, 
who  had  under  him  his  own  brigade  of  five  regiments  of 
infantry,  Easton's  battery,  two  twenty-four-pound  how 
itzers  and  two  twelve-pound  guns,  and  two  squadrons  of 
cavalry.  Finding  that  he  was  anticipated,  and  that  his 
only  way  of  saving  the  train  was  to  order  it  back  to 
Centreville  in  all  haste,  Stuart  decided  to  attack,  in 
order  to  give  it  time  to  get  to  a  place  of  safety,  and 


CONFEDERATES    HOVERING    AROUND    WASHINGTON.       63 

despatched  a  detachment  of  cavalry  on  the  turnpike  to 
wards  Leesburg  to  warn  the  wagons  to  hasten  back  to 
Centreville,  the  cavalry  to  march  between  them  and  the 
enemy.  He  ordered  his  artillery  and  infantry  to  hasten  to 
the  front,  and  as  soon  as  they  came  up  assailed  the  enemy 
vigorously,  continuing  the  engagement  until  he  judged 
that  his  wagon-train  had  passed  beyond  danger ;  then 
he  extricated  his  infantry  and  artillery  from  the  contest, 
with  a  much  heavier  loss  than  he  had  inflicted  on  the 
enemy,  leaving  the  killed  and  some  of  the  wounded.  It 
was  the  first  success  that  had  attended  the  Union  arms  in 
that  quarter,  and  was  magnified  and  enjoyed  on  that  side. 
This  action  advanced  McClellan  considerably  in  popular 
estimation  and  led  to  the  bestowal  upon  him,  by  some 
enthusiast,  of  the  sobriquet  "  the  Young  Napoleon." 

During  the  autumn  and  early  winter  the  weather  had 
been  unusually  fine.  The  roads  and  fields  in  that  section 
were  generally  firm  and  in  fine  condition  for  marching 
and  manoeuvring  armies.  With  the  beginning  of  the 
new  year  winter  set  in  with  rain  and  snow,  alternate 
freezing  and  thawing,  until  the  roads  and  fields  became 
seas  of  red  mud. 

As  no  effort  of  general  advance  was  made  during  the 
season  of  firm  roads,  we  had  little  apprehension  of  trouble 
after  the  winter  rains  came  to  make  them  too  heavy  for 
artillery  service. 


CHAPTEK   V. 

ROUND    ABOUT    RICHMOND. 

The  Defences  of  the  Confederate  Capital — Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  at  Centre vi lie— Aggressive  Action— Council  with  the  President 
and  Secretary  of  War— Mr.  Davis's  High  Opinion  of  McClellan — 
Operations  on  the  Peninsula — Engagements  about  Yorktown  and 
Williamsburg— Severe  Toil  added  to  the  Soldiers'  Usual  Labors  by 
a  Saturated  Soil. 

APROPOS  of  the  attack  upon  Richmond,  apprehended 
in  the  winter  of  1861-62,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
there  were  four  routes  supposed  to  be  practicable  for  the 
advance  of  the  enemy  : 

1.  The  original  route  by  Manassas  Junction  and  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad. 

2.  By  crossing  the  Potomac  near  Potomac  Creek,  thence 
by  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond. 

3.  By  land, — the  shortest, — to  go  down  the  Potomac  to 
the  Lower  Rappahannock,  landing  at  or  near  Urbana,  and 
thence  march  for  the  Confederate  capital. 

4.  By  transports  to  Fortress  Monroe,   thence  by  the 
Peninsula,  between  the  James  and  York  Rivers. 

General  McClellan 's  long  delay  to  march  against  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  when  he  was  so  near  and  accessible  at  Cen- 
treville,  indicated  that  he  had  no  serious  thought  of 
advancing  by  that  route.  To  prepare  to  meet  him  on 
either  of  the  other  routes,  a  line  behind  the  Rapidan  was 
the  chosen  position. 

General  Beauregard  had  been  relieved  of  duty  in  Vir 
ginia  and  ordered  West  with  General  A.  S.  Johnston. 

The  withdrawal  from  Centreville  was  delayed  some 
weeks,  waiting  for  roads  that  could  be  travelled,  but  was 
started  on  the  9th  of  March,  1862,  and  on  the  llth  the 
troops  were  south  of  the  Rappahannock. 

64 


BOUND    ABOUT    RICHMOND.  65 

General  Whiting's  command  from  Occoquan  joined 
General  Holmes  at  Fredericksburg.  Generals  Ewell  and 
Early  crossed  by  the  railroad  bridge  and  took  positions 
near  it.  General  G.  W.  Smith's  division  and  mine 
marched  by  the  turnpike  to  near  Culpeper  Court-House. 
General  Stuart,  with  the  cavalry,  remained  on  Bull  Run 
until  the  10th,  then  withdrew  to  Warrenton  Junction. 

During  the  last  week  of  March  our  scouts  on  the  Poto 
mac  reported  a  large  number  of  steamers,  loaded  with 
troops,  carrying,  it  was  estimated,  about  one  hundred  and 
forty  thousand  men,  passing  down  and  out  of  the  Poto 
mac,  destined,  it  was  supposed,  for  Fortress  Monroe,  or 
possibly  for  the  coast  of  North  Carolina.  We  were  not 
left  long  in  doubt.  By  the  4th  of  April,  McClellan  had 
concentrated  three  corps  d'armee  between  Fortress  Monroe 
and  Newport  News,  on  the  James  River.  The  Confed 
erate  left  crossed  the  Rapidan,  and  from  Orange  Court- 
House  made  connection  with  the  troops  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock  at  Fredericksburg.  About  the  1st  of  April,  Generals 
Johnston  and  G.  W.  Smith  were  called  to  Richmond  for 
conference  with  the  War  Department,  leaving  me  in  com 
mand.  On  the  3d  I  wrote  General  Jackson,  in  the  Shen- 
andoah  Valley,  proposing  to  join  him  with  sufficient  rein 
forcements  to  strike  the  Federal  force  in  front  of  him  a 
sudden,  severe  blow,  and  thus  compel  a  change  in  the 
movements  of  McClellan's  army.  I  explained  that  the 
responsibility  of  the  move  could  not  be  taken  unless  I 
Was  with  the  detachment  to  give  it  vigor  and  action  to 
meet  my  views,  or  give  time  to  get  back  behind  the  Rap 
idan  in  case  the  authorities  discovered  the  move  and 
ordered  its  recall. 

I  had  been  left  in  command  on  the  Rapidan,  but  was 
not  authorized  to  assume  command  of  the  Valley  district. 
As  the  commander  of  the  district  did  not  care  to  have  an 
officer  there  of  higher  rank,  the  subject  was  discontinued. 

General  Johnston,  assigned  to  the  Department  of  the 


66  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Peninsula  and  Norfolk,  made  an  inspection  of  his  new 
lines,  and  on  his  return  recommended  that  they  should  be 
abandoned.  Meanwhile,  his  army  had  been  ordered  to 
Richmond.  He  was  invited  to  meet  the  President  to 
discuss  military  affairs,  and  asked  General  G.  W.  Smith 
and  myself  to  go  with  him.  The  Secretary  of  War  and 
General  R.  E.  Lee  were  with  the  President  when  we  met. 

It  was  the  first  time  that  I  had  been  called  to  such  august 
presence,  to  deliberate  on  momentous  matters,  so  I  had 
nothing  to  say  till  called  on.  The  views  intended  to  be 
offered  were  prefaced  by  saying  that  I  knew  General 
McClellan  ;  that  he  was  a  military  engineer,  and  would 
move  his  army  by  careful  measurement  and  preparation  ; 
that  he  would  not  be  ready  to  advance  before  the  1st  of 
May.  The  President  interrupted,  and  spoke  of  McClel- 
lan's  high  attainments  and  capacity  in  a  style  indicating 
that  he  did  not  care  to  hear  any  one  talk  who  did  not 
have  the  same  appreciation  of  our  great  adversary. 
McClellan  had  been  a  special  favorite  with  Mr.  Davis 
when  he  was  Secretary  of  War  in  the  Pierce  administra 
tion,  and  he  seemed  to  take  such  reflections  upon  his 
favorites  as  somewhat  personal.  From  the  hasty  inter 
ruption  I  concluded  that  my  opinion  had  only  been  asked 
through  polite  recognition  of  my  presence,  not  that  it  was 
wanted,  and  said  no  more.  My  intention  was  to  suggest 
that  we  leave  Magruder  to  look  after  McClellan,  and 
march,  as  proposed  to  Jackson  a  few  days  before,  through 
the  Valley  of  Virginia,  cross  the  Potomac,  threaten  Wash 
ington,  and  call  McClellan  to  his  own  capital. 

At  the  time  of  McClellan's  landing  on  the  peninsula, 
the  Confederate  army  on  that  line  was  commanded  by 
Major-General  J.  Bankhead  Magruder,  and  consisted  of 
eleven  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  The  defensive  line 
was  pitched  behind  the  Warwick  River,  a  sluggish  stream 
that  rises  about  a  mile  south  of  Yorktown,  and  flows 
south  to  its  confluence  with  James  River.  The  Warwick 


ROUND    ABOUT    RICHMOND.  67 

was  dammed  at  different  points,  thus  flooding  the  inter 
vening  low  lands  as  far  as  Lee's  Mills,  where  the  river 
spreads  into  marsh  lands.  The  dams  were  defended  by 
batteries  and  rifle-trenches.  The  left  rested  at  Yorktown, 
which  was  fortified  by  continuous  earthworks,  strong 
water  and  land  batteries,  and  rifle-trenches  reaching  to 
the  right,  connecting  with  those  behind  the  Warwick. 
Yorktown  is  on  the  right  bank  of  York  Kiver,  which 
narrows  at  that  point,  with  Gloucester  Point  on  the 
opposite  bank.  This  point  was  also  fortified,  and  held 
by  a  strong  garrison.  On  the  south  side  of  the  James, 
General  Huger  held  Norfolk,  near  its  mouth,  fortified 
and  garrisoned  by  about  ten  thousand  men,  while  the 
James  River  floated  the  Confederate  vessels  "  Virginia" 
("Merrimac"),  "Yorktown,"  " Jamestown,"  and  " Tea 


ser." 


McClellan's  army,  embarked  from  Alexandria  and 
moved  by  transports  to  the  vicinity  of  Fortress  Monroe, 
as  first  collected,  numbered  one  hundred  and  eight  thou 
sand  of  all  arms,  including  the  garrison  at  Fortress 
Monroe. 

Magruder  was  speedily  reinforced  by  a  detachment 
from  Huger's  army,  and  afterwards  by  Early's  brigade 
of  Johnston's  army,  and  after  a  few  days  by  the  balance 
of  Johnston's  army,  the  divisions  of  G.  W.  Smith,  D. 
H.  Hill,  and  Longstreet,  with  Stuart's  cavalry,  General 
Johnston  in  command. 

General  McClellan  advanced  towards  the  Confederate 
line  and  made  some  efforts  at  the  dams,  but  it  was  gen 
erally  understood  that  his  plan  was  to  break  the  position 
by  regular  approaches.  After  allowing  due  time  for  the 
completion  of  his  battering  arrangements,  Johnston  aban 
doned  his  line  the  night  of  May  3  and  marched  back 
towards  Richmond,  ordering  a  corresponding  move  by  the 
troops  at  Norfolk ;  but  the  Confederate  authorities  inter 
fered  in  favor  of  Norfolk,  giving  that  garrison  time  to 


68  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

withdraw  its  army  supplies.  The  divisions  of  G.  W. 
Smith  and  D.  H.  Hill  were  ordered  by  the  Yorktown 
and  Williamsburg  road,  Magruder's  and  Longstreet's  by 
the  Hampton  and  Lee's  Mill  road,  Stuart's  cavalry  to 
cover  both  routes. 

Anticipating  this  move  as  the  possible  result  of  opera 
tions  against  his  lower  line,  General  Magruder  had  con 
structed  a  series  of  earthworks  about  two  miles  in  front 
of  Williamsburg.  The  main  work,  Fort  Magruder,  was 
a  bastion.  On  either  side  redoubts  were  thrown  up  reach 
ing  out  towards  the  James  and  York  Rivers.  The  penin 
sula  is  about  eight  miles  wide  at  that  point.  College 
Creek  on  the  right  flows  into  James  River,  and  Queen's 
Creek  on  the  left  into  the  York,  both  giving  some  de 
fensive  strength,  except  at  mill-dams,  which  were  passable 
by  vehicles.  The  redoubts  on  the  left  of  Fort  Magruder 
commanded  the  dam  in  Queen's  Creek  at  Sanders's  Pond, 
but  the  dam  in  College  Creek  was  beyond  protection  from 
the  redoubts. 

The  four  redoubts  on  the  right  of  Fort  Magruder  had 
commanding  positions  of  the  fort. 

Finding  the  entire  line  of  intrenchments  at  Yorktown 
empty  on  the  morning  of  May  4,  McClellan  ordered  pur 
suit  by  his  cavalry  under  its  chief,  General  Stoneman, 
with  four  batteries  of  horse  artillery,  supported  by 
Hooker's  division  on  the  Yorktown  road  and  W.  F. 
Smith's  on  the  Hampton  road. 

They  were  followed  on  the  Hampton  road  by  Gen 
eral  Heintzelman  (Kearny's  division),  Third  Corps,  and 
Couch's  and  Casey's  divisions  of  Keyes's  (Fourth)  Corps, 
Sumner's  (Second)  Corps  on  the  Yorktown  road.  Near- 
ing  Williamsburg,  the  roads  converge  and  come  together 
in  range  of  field  batteries  at  Fort  Magruder.  About 
eight  miles  out  from  Yorktown,  on  the  Hampton  road, 
Stuart,  hearing  of  severe  cavalry  fight  by  the  part  of  his 
command  on  the  Yorktown  road,  thought  to  ride  across 


ROUND    ABOUT    RICHMOND.  69 

to  the  enemy's  rear  and  confuse  his  operations,  but  pres 
ently  found  a  part  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  a  battery 
under  General  Emory  marching  in  his  rear  by  a  cross 
road  from  the  Yorktown  road.  He  formed  and  charged 
in  column  of  fours,  gaining  temporary  success,  but  fell 
upon  the  enemy's  battery,  and  found  Benson  prompt  in 
getting  into  action,  and  in  turn,  with  dismounted  troopers, 
drove  him  back,  cutting  his  line  of  retreat  and  forcing 
him  off  to  the  beach  road  along  the  James  River.  The 
march  of  Emory's  cavalry  across  to  the  Hampton  road 
misled  Hooker's  division  to  the  same  march,  and  that  di 
vision,  crowding  the  highway,  caused  Smith's  division  to 
diverge  by  a  cross-road,  which  led  it  over  into  the  York- 
town  road.  These  misleadings  delayed  the  advance  on 
both  roads.  Emory  followed  Stuart  until  the  latter  in 
turn  came  upon  strong  grounds,  where  pursuit  became 
isolated  and  hazardous. 

The  removal  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  from  the 
Hampton  road  left  Hooker's  march  free  of  molestation. 
But  not  advised  of  the  opportunity,  he  took  the  precau 
tions  usual  on  such  occasions.  His  early  approach,  how 
ever,  hurried  the  movements  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
on  the  Yorktown  road,  and  let  the  enemy  in  upon  us  on 
that  road  before  we  were  advised  of  his  approach. 

General  Johnston  rode  near  the  rear  of  his  army  to 
receive  despatches  from  his  cavalry  commander.  General 
Stuart  wrote  and  sent  them,  but  his  couriers  found  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  the  way  and  returned  to  him.  The 
cavalry  fight  on  the  Yorktown  road  was  also  damaging  to 
the  Confederates,  and  not  reported  to  the  commanding 
general. 

About  four  P.M.,  General  Cook's  cavalry  and  the  horse 
artillery  under  Gibson  debouched  from  the  woodlands  on 
the  Yorktown  road  and  began  to  examine  the  open  ground 
in  front  of  the  Confederate  field-works.  General  Johns 
ton,  who  was  at  the  rear,  hurried  Semmes's  brigade  of 


70  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

McLaws's  division  into  the  nearest  redoubts,  and  ordered 
McLaws  to  call  back  another  brigade.  Kershaw  was 
ordered,  and  Manly's  battery.  The  battery  had  to  go  at 
a  run  to  be  sure  of  their  cover  in  the  redoubts.  Another 
battery  was  ordered  by  McLaws,  who  rode  and  took  com 
mand.  When  Kershaw  got  to  the  fort,  part  of  his  men 
were  deployed  in  the  wood  beyond,  to  his  left. 

Meanwhile,  the  Federal  cavalry  was  advancing,  Gib 
son's  horse  artillery  and  Manly's  Confederate  battery  were 
in  severe  combat,  the  latter  having  the  benefit  of  gun- 
proof  parapets.  Observing  the  approach  of  cavalry  near 
his  left,  McLaws  ordered  two  of  Manly's  guns  into  Fort 
Magruder,  which,  with  the  assistance  of  Kershaw's  infan 
try,  drove  off  that  column.  Some  cavalry,  riding  near  the 
left  redoubt  with  little  concern,  were  first  taken  for  Con 
federates,  but  the  next  moment  were  identified  as  Federals, 
when  the  artillery  was  turned  upon  them,  and,  with  the 
Confederate  cavalry,  pushed  them  quite  away.  When  the 
left  redoubt,  commanding  the  dam  at  Sanders's  Pond,  was 
occupied  by  a  part  of  Kershaw's  men,  McCarthy's  battery 
came  into  action,  and,  with  the  assistance  of  others,  gave 
Gibson's  battery,  in  the  open,  serious  trouble.  McLaws 
ordered  an  advance  of  part  of  Semmes's  brigade,  led  by 
Colonel  Cummings.  This,  with  the  severe  artillery  fire 
from  the  redoubts  and  guns  afield,  cleared  the  open,  leav 
ing  one  of  Gibson's  guns  in  the  mud,  which  was  secured 
by  McCarthy's  men  as  a  trophy  of  the  day's  work.  Ten 
horses  had  been  sent  back  to  haul  the  piece  off,  but  the 
mud  was  too  heavy  for  them.  Stuart,  with  the  troopers 
of  his  immediate  following  and  his  section  of  horse  artil 
lery,  crossed  College  Creek  near  James  River,  and  came 
in  after  the  action  at  the  redoubts.  Emory  abandoned 
the  pursuit  as  not  feasible,  and  bivouacked  on  the  route. 
Cavalry  rencounters  of  the  day  were  reported,  in  which 
both  sides  claimed  success.  Stuart  reported  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Wickham  and  four  men  wounded.  Of  the  other 


ROUND    ABOUT    RICHMOND.  71 

side,  Cooke  reported  thirty -five  killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing.  Gibson  reported  one  officer  and  four  men  wounded, 
and  one  gun  abandoned.  Emory  reported  two  killed  and 
four  wounded,  and  Sanders  one  officer  wounded.  But 
most  of  the  Federal  losses  were  in  the  encounters  at  the 
redoubts  with  the  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  enemy's  cavalry  reported  the  redoubt  on  the  Con 
federate  left  unoccupied,  and  Hancock's  brigade  (Smith's 
division)  was  ordered  forward  to  take  it,  but  the  woods 
through  which  he  marched  were  tangled  and  swampy,  and 
delayed  him  until  night  brought  him  to  bivouac.  Mean 
while,  the  Confederates  who  drove  the  cavalry  from  its 
reconnoissance  had  occupied  the  redoubt. 

The  corps  commanders  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and 
Keyes  and  the  cavalry  leader  Stoneman  were  together 
that  night  in  conference.  The  highways,  over  flats  but 
little  above  tide- water,  were  saturated  by  the  spring  rains, 
cut  into  deep  ruts  by  the  haul  of  heavy  trains,  and  pud 
dled  by  the  tramp  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  wood 
and  fallow  lands  were  bogs,  with  occasional  quicksands, 
adding  severest  labor  to  the  usual  toils  of  battle.  So  no 
plans  were  formed,  further  than  to  feel  the  way  forward 
when  there  was  light  to  see. 

The  enemy  got  some  of  our  men  who  were  worn  out 
by  the  fatigue  of  the  siege  and  the  heavy  march  of  the 
night  and  day. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    WILLIAMSBUKG. 

The  Attack  on  Fort  Magruder — Hancock  occupies  two  Redoubts — The 
Slaughter  in  Early 's  Brigade— The  Fifth  North  Carolina  Regiment 
and  Twenty-Fourth  Virginia  mercilessly  exposed — A  Hard-Fought 
Engagement— A  Confederate  Victory — McClellan  not  on  the  Field 
the  Greater  Part  of  the  Day— Hancock  called  "The  Superb"  by 
McClellan — Johnston  pays  High  Tribute  to  Longstreet. 

BEFORE  quitting  his  trenches  at  Yorktown,  Johnston 
anticipated  a  move  of  part  of  McClellan 's  army  by  trans 
ports  to  the  head  of  York  River,  to  cut  his  line  of  march 
towards  Richmond,  and  conceived  it  important  to  have  a 
strong  force  at  that  point  in  time  to  meet  and  check  the 
move.  To  that  end  he  ordered  Magruder  to  march  at  two 
A.M.  on  the  5th  of  May  with  D.  R.  Jones's  and  McLaws's 
divisions,  to  be  followed  by  the  divisions  of  G.  W.  Smith 
and  D.  H.  Hill ;  Longstreet's  division  to  cover  the  move 
ment  of  his  trains  and  defend  Stuart's  cavalry  in  case  of 
severe  pressure.  Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  I  was 
ordered  to  send  a  brigade  to  the  redoubts  to  relieve 
McLaws's  division.  The  brigades  being  small,  I  sent  two, 
R.  H.  Anderson's  and  Pryor's,  with  Macon's  battery, 
under  Lieutenant  Clopton,  two  guns  under  Captain  Gar- 
rett,  and  two  under  Captain  McCarthy,  to  report  to  Gen 
eral  Anderson,  the  senior  brigadier.  At  the  time  it  was 
thought  that  the  army  would  be  on  the  march  by  daylight 
in  the  morning,  and  that  the  rear-guard  would  closely 
follow ;  but  after  nightfall  a  down-pour  of  rain  came, 
flooding  thoroughfares  and  by-ways,  woodlands  and  fields, 
so  that  parts  of  our  trains  were  stalled  on  the  ground, 
where  they  stood  during  the  night.  It  was  dark  when 
Anderson  joined  McLaws,  who  had  drawn  his  men  to 
gether  in  readiness  to  join  the  advance  march.  Antici- 

72 


THE    BATTLE    OF   WILLIAMSBURG.  73 

pating  an  early  march  himself,  Anderson  occupied  Fort 
Magruder  and  advanced  his  pickets  so  as  to  cover  with 
their  fire  the  junction  of  the  Yorktown  and  Hampton 
roads.  Heavy  clouds  and  darkness  settling  down  upon 
him,  he  made  no  effort  at  a  critical  survey  of  the  sur 
roundings  ;  while  the  steady  rain  through  the  night  gave 
signs  of  serious  delay  in  the  movements  of  the  army,  but 
he  little  thought  that  by  the  delay  he  could  be  called 
into  battle.  In  the  morning  when  time  grew  heavier  he 
was  advised  to  call  in  the  brigades  near  him,  in  case  he 
should  need  them,  and  instructions  were  sent  them  to 
answer  his  call. 

At  daylight  he  occupied  the  redoubts  on  the  right  of 
Fort  Magruder,  and  two  of  those  on  the  left.  Two  others 
farther  on  the  left  were  not  seen  through  the  rain,  and  no 
one  had  been  left  to  tell  him  of  them  or  of  the  grounds. 
The  field  in  his  front  and  far  off  on  his  right  was  open. 
That  in  the  immediate  front  had  been  opened  by  felling 
trees.  On  his  left  were  woodland  and  the  swarnpy  creek. 
General  Hooker's  division  of  the  Third  Corps  came  to  the 
open  on  the  Hampton  road  at  seven  A.M.  of  the  5th,  and 
engaged  by  regiments, — the  First  Massachusetts  on  his 
left,  preceded  by  a  battalion  of  skirmishers ;  the  Second 
New  Hampshire  on  the  right,  in  the  same  order ;  Han 
cock's  brigade  of  W.  F.  Smith's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  threatening  on  the  Yorktown  road ;  supported  by 
part  of  Davidson's  brigade  and  artillery.  After  the  ad 
vance  of  his  infantry  in  the  slashes,  General  Hooker,  with 
the  Eleventh  Massachusetts  and  Thirty-sixth  Pennsyl 
vania  Regiments  of  Grover's  brigade,  cleared  the  way  for 
communication  with  the  troops  on  the  Yorktown  road, 
and  ordered  Webber's  six-gun  battery  into  action  towards 
the  front  of  the  fallen  timber.  As  it  burst  from  the  wood 
our  infantry  and  every  gun  in  reach  opened  upon  it  a  fire 
so  destructive  that  it  was  unmanned  before  it  came  into 
practice.  Volunteers  to  man  the  battery  were  called,  and 


74  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

with  the  assistance  of  men  of  Osborn's  battery  the  guns 
were  opened.  BramhalPs  battery  was  advanced  and  put 
into  action  on  the  right  of  Webber's,  when  the  two  poured 
an  unceasing  fire  against  our  troops  about  the  fort  and 
redoubts.  It  was  not  very  destructive,  however,  and  they 
thought  to  reserve  their  ammunition. 

The  Fifth  New  Jersey  Regiment,  of  Patterson's  brigade, 
was  added  to  the  guard  of  the  batteries,  and  the  Sixth, 
Seventh,  and  Eighth  were  deployed  on  the  left  in  the 
woodland.  Anderson  called  up  Wilcox's  brigade,  and 
ordered  it  to  his  right,  reinforced  it  by  the  men  of  Pryor's 
brigade  not  needed  at  the  forts,  and  presently  called  for 
the  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill  and  Pickett,  to  further  support 
his  right. 

From  the  swelling  noise  of  battle  I  concluded  that  it 
would  be  well  to  ride  to  the  front,  and  ordered  the  remain 
ing  brigade  (Colston's)  and  the  batteries  of  Dearing  and 
Stribling  to  follow.  Stuart  sent  his  horse  artillery  under 
Pelham  into  the  action  on  the  open  field. 

Viewing  the  ground  on  the  left,  I  thought  it  not  so  well 
protected  as  Anderson  conceived,  and  sent  to  D.  H.  Hill, 
who  was  but  little  advanced  on  his  march,  for  one  of  his 
brigades.  Early's  was  sent,  to  whose  brigade  were  tem 
porarily  attached  the  Florida  regiment  and  a  Mississippi 
battalion.  Anderson  had  left  the  fort,  and  was  busy 
handling  the  brigades  engaged  in  the  woods  on  the  right. 
Colston's  was  put  in  with  the  other  brigades  under  Ander 
son,  who  afterwards  called  for  another  regiment.  The 
Florida  regiment  and  the  Mississippi  battalion  were  sent. 
Early,  with  his  brigade,  was  posted  on  the  field  in  rear  of 
our  left. 

When  it  became  evident  that  the  fight  was  for  the  day, 
D.  H.  Hill  was  asked  to  return  with  the  balance  of  his 
division.  Meanwhile,  Hooker  was  bracing  the  fight  on 
his  left.  Emory  reported  to  him  with  his  cavalry  and 
light  battery,  but  as  his  fight  was  in  the  wood,  Emory  was 


THE    BATTLE   OF   WILLIAMSBURG.  75 

asked  to  reconnoitre  on  his  extreme  left.  The  fight  grow 
ing  in  the  wood,  Grover  drew  off  part  of  his  brigade  to 
reinforce  against  it.  The  Seventy-second  and  Seventeenth 
New  York  Eegiments  of  Taylor's  brigade  were  also  sent ; 
then  the  Seventy-third  and  Seventy-fourth  New  York 
Eegiments  of  the  same  brigade;  but  the  Confederates 
gained  ground  gradually.  They  were,  however,  getting 
short  of  ammunition.  While  holding  their  line,  some  of 
the  regiments  were  permitted  to  retire  a  little  to  fill  their 
cartridge-boxes  from  those  of  the  fallen  of  the  enemy  and 
of  their  comrades.  This  move  was  misconstrued  into  an 
order  to  withdraw,  and  the  line  fell  back  a  little.  But  the 
mistake  was  rectified,  and  the  ground  that  had  been 
abandoned  was  recovered. 

Hooker  ordered  the  Eleventh  Massachusetts  and 
Twenty-sixth  Pennsylvania  Kegiments  to  the  support  of 
the  batteries,  and  the  Second  New  Hampshire  Regiment 
to  his  left.  Anderson,  drawing  his  troops  together  near 
the  batteries,  made  a  concentrated  move  upon  them,  and 
cleared  them  of  the  gunners,  securing  four  of  Webber's 
guns  and  forty  horses.  Just  then  he  was  reinforced  by 
Colston's  brigade,  the  Florida  regiment,  and  the  Missis 
sippi  battalion.  General  Stuart  taking  it  that  the  enemy 
was  badly  broken  and  in  retreat,  rode  up  with  his  cavalry, 
insisting  upon  a  charge  and  pursuit.  As  he  did  not 
recognize  authority  except  of  the  commander-in-chief,  he 
was  only  cautioned  that  the  break  was  only  of  the  enemy's 
front,  that  he  would  find  reinforcements  coming  up,  and 
this  he  began  to  realize  by  the  clearer  ring  of  their  muskets. 
He  speedily  encountered  them,  but  in  time  to  get-away 
before  meeting  serious  trouble.  About  three  o'clock 
Kearny's  division  arrived,  and  only  a  few  minutes  later 
D.  H.  Hill's,  of  the  Confederates.  On  the  approach  of 
Kearny's  leading  brigades,  one  regiment  was  detached 
from  Berry's  to  reinforce  Emory's  Cavalry  detachment  on 
their  left.  The  other  regiments  were  deployed,  the  Fifth 


76  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Michigan  on  the  left  of  the  road,  the  Thirty-seventh  New 
York  on  its  left,  along  the  road,  one  company  of  the  New 
York  regiment  from  left  to  rear.  Six  companies  of  the 
Michigan  regiment  were  broken  off  to  the  rear  of  its  right 
as  reserve,  leaving  its  forward  battalion  partly  across  the 
road,  while  that  in  rear  had  two  companies  on  the  right 
and  two  on  the  left  of  the  road.  Two  regiments  of  Bir- 
ney's  brigade  were  deployed,  the  Thirty-eighth  on  the 
right  of,  and  the  Fortieth  across,  the  road,  to  relieve  some 
of  Hooker's  regiments.  Then  Peck's  brigade  of  Couch's 
division  came,  and  was  put  in  on  the  right,  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Second  Pennsylvania  and  the  Fifty-fifth  New 
York  on  the  left,  the  Sixty-second  New  York  in  the  wood, 
the  Ninety-third  Pennsylvania  on  the  left,  and  after  a 
little  the  Ninety-eighth  Pennsylvania. 

Before  the  reinforcements  arrived  for  Hooker's  relief, 
Anderson  had  established  his  advance  line  of  skirmishers, 
so  as  to  cover  with  their  fire  Webber's  guns  that  were 
abandoned.  The  Federal  reinforcing  columns  drove  back 
his  advance  line,  when,  in  turn,  he  reinforced,  recovered 
the  ground,  and  met  General  Peck,  who  led  the  last  rein 
forcing  brigade.  This  advance  was  so  firm  that  General 
Peck  found  it  necessary  to  put  in  his  last  regiment,  the 
Ninety-eighth  Pennsylvania,  but  neither  our  force  nor  our 
condition  of  march  could  warrant  further  aggressive  work 
of  our  right.  General  Couch,  left  in  command  on  the 
Federal  left,  posted  his  troops  for  the  night, — General 
Devens  with  the  Seventh  Massachusetts  Regiment  and 
Second  Rhode  Island,  General  Palmer  with  two,  and 
General  Keim  with  three  other  regiments,  supporting 
General  Peck.  General  Peck's  ammunition  being  ex 
hausted,  his  brigade  was  relieved  by  six  of  the  new  regi 
ments,  and  reported  that  "  Every  preparation  was  made  to 
resist  a  night  attack."  *  On  the  Confederate  side,  General 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  521. 


THE    BATTLE   OF    WILLIAMSBURG.  77 

Anderson  reported  his  position  safe  to  hold  until  the  time 
to  withdraw  for  the  march.  About  noon,  General  Han 
cock,  in  command  of  his  own  and  Davidson's  brigades  in 
front  of  our  left,  started  with  three  of  his  own  regiments 
and  two  of  Davidson's  and  the  six-gun  battery  under 
Lieutenant  Carson  in  search  of  the  unoccupied  redoubts 
in  that  quarter.  He  approached  by  the  dam  at  Sanders's 
Pond,  passed  the  dam,  and  occupied  one  of  the  redoubts, 
leaving  three  companies  to  guard  a  road  crossing  on  the 
right  of  his  line  of  march.  He  put  three  companies  of 
infantry  in  the  redoubt  and  advanced  his  regiments  and 
battery  to  the  field  in  front.  He  then  found  another 
redoubt  not  occupied,  and  posted  three  other  companies  in 
it.  He  was  reinforced  by  a  four-gun  battery  under  Cap 
tain  Wheeler,  which  he  posted  in  rear  of  his  line  of  battle 
and  awaited  developments.  When  the  last  engagement 
on  our  right  had  calmed  down  to  exchange  of  desultory 
shots,  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  waiting  to  know  if  Ander 
son  would  need  further  support.  Meanwhile,  some  of  his 
officers  had  made  a  reconnoissance  in  front  of  his  ground, 
and  reported  a  route  by  which  favorable  attack  could  be 
made  upon  the  Federals  at  the  redoubt  under  Hancock. 

General  Johnston  had  arrived  at  my  head-quarters,  near 
Fort  Magruder,  when  General  Hill  sent  to  report  the 
reconnoissance,  and  to  ask  that  he  be  allowed  to  make  a 
move  against  Hancock,  by  Early's  brigade.  General 
Johnston  received  the  message,  and  referred  the  officer  to 
me.  I  ordered  that  the  move  should  not  be  made,  ex 
plaining  that  we  were  only  fighting  for  time  to  draw  off 
our  trains,  that  aggressive  battle  was  necessary  on  our 
right  in  order  to  keep  the  enemy  back  in  the  woodland 
from  the  open,  where,  by  his  superior  artillery  and  num 
bers,  he  might  deploy  beyond  our  limits,  and  turn  us  out 
of  position ;  that  on  our  left  there  was  no  cause  for  appre 
hension  of  such  action,  and  we  could  not  risk  being  drawn 
into  serious  delay  by  starting  new  work  so  late  in  the 


78  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

day.  Very  soon  General  Hill  rode  over  to  report  of  the 
opportunity  :  that  he  thought  he  could  get  through  before 
night,  and  would  not  be  likely  to  involve  delay  of  our 
night  march.  General  Johnston  referred  him  to  me.  I 
said, — 

"  The  brigade  you  propose  to  use  is  not  in  safe  hands.  If  you 
will  go  with  it,  and  see  that  the  troops  are  properly  handled,  you 
can  make  the  attack,  but  don't  involve  us  so  as  to  delay  the 
march  after  night." 

In  a  letter  from  General  Hill,  after  the  war,  he  wrote 
of  the  fight  by  this  brigade, — 

"I  cannot  think  of  it,  till  this  day,  without  horror.  The 
slaughter  of  the  Fifth  North  Carolina  Eegiment  was  one  of  the 
most  awful  things  I  ever  saw,  and  it  was  caused  by  a  blunder. 
At  your  request,  I  think,  I  followed  Early's  brigade,  following 
the  right  wing." 

General  Hill  was  in  advance  of  the  brigade  with  the 
Fifth  and  Twenty-third  North  Carolina  Regiments,  Gen 
eral  Early  in  rear  with  the  Twenty-fourth  and  Thirty- 
eighth  Virginia  Regiments.  General  Hill  ordered  the 
advance  regiments  to  halt  after  crossing  a  streamlet  and 
get  under  cover  of  the  wood  till  the  brigade  could  form ; 
but  General  Early,  not  waiting  for  orders  or  the  brigade, 
rode  to  the  front  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Virginia,  and 
with  it  made  the  attack.  The  gallant  McRae,  of  the 
Fifth  North  Carolina,  seeing  the  Twenty-fourth  Virginia 
hotly  engaged,  dashed  forward,  nolens  volens,  to  its  relief. 
The  other  regiments,  seeing  the  confusion  of  movements 
and  of  orders,  failed  to  go  forward.  Part  of  my  troops, 
on  Early's  right,  seeing  that  a  fight  was  open  on  that  part 
of  the  field,  started  without  orders  to  go  to  his  relief,  but 
found  the  fight  lost  before  they  were  engaged.  After  the 
brigade  was  collected  on  its  first  position,  General  Johns 
ton  rode  to  his  head-quarters.  At  dark  the  Confederates 


THE   BATTLE   OF    WILLIAMSBURG.  79 

were  withdrawn  and  took  up  the  line  of  march,  the  divi 
sion  of  D.  H.  Hill  taking  the  rear  of  the  column,  Rains's 
brigade  the  rear  of  the  division.  On  his  march,  General 
Rains  found,  in  a  broken-down  ammunition-wagon,  several 
loaded  shells,  four  of  them  with  sensitive  fuse  primers, 
which  he  placed  near  some  fallen  trees,  cut  down  as  ob 
structions.  He  afterwards  heard  that  some  of  them  were 
tramped  upon  by  the  Federal  cavalry  and  exploded. 

The  pursuit  was  not  active,  hardly  annoying.  The 
roads  were  cut  into  deep  mud  by  the  trains,  and  the  side 
ways*  by  troops  far  out  on  either  side,  making  puddles 
ankle-deep  in  all  directions,  so  that  the  march  was  slow 
and  trying,  but  giving  almost  absolute  safe-conduct  against 
pursuit,  and  our  men  were  allowed  to  spread  their  ranks 
in  search  of  ground  strong  enough  to  bear  them. 

My  estimate,  made  on  the  field,  of  the  troops  engaged 
was,  Confederate,  9000;  Union,  12,000.  The  casualties 
of  the  engagement  were,  Confederate,  1565  aggregate ;  * 
Federal,  2288  aggregate.f 

General  McClellan  was  at  Yorktown  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  day  to  see  Franklin's,  Sedgwick's,  and  Rich 
ardson's  divisions  aboard  the  transports  for  his  proposed 
flanking  and  rear  move  up  York  River,  but  upon  re 
ceiving  reports  that  the  engagement  at  Williamsburg  was 
growing  serious  and  not  satisfactory,  he  rode  to  the  battle, 
and  called  the  divisions  of  Sedgwick  and  Richardson  to 
follow  him. 

The  object  of  the  battle  was  to  gain  time  to  haul  our 
trains  to  places  of  safety.  The  effect,  besides,  was  to  call 
two  of  the  divisions  from  their  flanking  move  to  support 
the  battle,  and  this  so  crippled  that  expedition  that  it 
gave  us  no  serious  trouble.  The  trophies  of  the  battle 
were  with  the  Confederates,  and  they  claim  the  honor  to 
inscribe  Williamsburg  upon  their  battle-flags. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  568. 
t  Ibid.  p.  450. 


80  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  success  of  General  Hancock  in  holding  his  position 
in  and  about  the  forts  with  five  regiments  and  two  bat 
teries  against  the  assault  of  the  Fifth  North  Carolina  and 
Twenty-fourth  Virginia  Regiments  was  given  heroic  pro 
portions  by  his  chief,  who  christened  him  "  The  Superb/' 
to  relieve,  it  is  supposed,  by  the  picturesque  figure  on  his 
right,  the  discomfiture  of  his  left.  But,  reading  between 
the  lines,  the  highest  compliment  was  for  the  two  Con 
federate  regiments. 

In  his  official  account,  General  Johnston  said, — 

1 '  The  action  gradually  increased  in  magnitude  until  about  three 
o'clock,  when  General  Longstreet,  commanding  the  rear,  re 
quested  that  a  part  of  Major-General  Hill's  troops  might  be  sent  to 
his  aid.  Upon  this  I  rode  upon  the  field,  but  found  myself  com 
pelled  to  be  a  spectator,  for  General  Longstreet's  clear  head  and 
brave  heart  left  no  apology  for  interference." 

Franklin's  division  was  taken  by  transports  to  the 
mouth  of  Pamunkey  River,  and  was  supported  by  the 
navy.  On  the  7th  a  brigade  of  Sedgwick's  division  joined 
Franklin.  On  the  same  day,  Johnston's  army  was  col 
lected  near  Barhamville.  General  Whiting,  with  Hood's 
brigade  and  part  of  Hampton's,  engaged  the  advance  of 
Franklin's  command  and  forced  it  back.  This  cleared 
our  route  of  march  towards  Richmond,  Smith's  and  Ma- 
gruder's  divisions  by  the  road  to  New  Kent  Court-House, 
Hill's  and  Longstreet's  nearer  the  Chickahominy. 

General  McClellan's  plans  were  laid  according  to  strict 
rules  of  strategy,  but  he  was  not  quick  or  forcible  in 
handling  his  troops. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

SEVEN    PINES,    OK    FAIR    OAKS. 

A  New  Line  of  Defence — Positions  of  the  Confronting  Armies— Fitz- 
John  Porter — Terrific  Storm  on  the  Eve  of  Battle — General  John 
ston's  Orders  to  Longstreet,  Smith,  and  Huger — Lack  of  Co-operation 
on  the  Confederate  Side,  and  Ensuing  Confusion— Fatalities  among 
Confederate  Officers — Kearny's  Action— Serious  Wounding  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston  at  the  Close  of  the  Battle— Summary  and  Analysis  of 
Losses. 

ON  the  9th  of  May  the  Confederate  army  was  halted, 
its  right  near  Long  Bridge  of  the  Chickahominy  River ; 
its  left  and  cavalry  extending  towards  the  Pamunkey 
through  New  Kent  Court-House.  On  the  llth  the  com 
mander  of  the  Confederate  ram  "  Virginia"  ("  Merrimac"), 
finding  the  water  of  James  River  not  sufficient  to  float  her 
to  the  works  near  Richmond,  scuttled  and  sank  the  ship 
where  she  lay. 

On  the  15th  the  Federal  navy  attacked  our  works  at 
Chapin's  and  Drury's  Bluffs,  but  found  them  too  strong 
for  water  batteries.  That  attack  suggested  to  General 
Johnston  that  he  move  nearer  Richmond  to  be  in  position 
to  lend  the  batteries  assistance  in  case  of  need.  He  crossed 
the  Chickahominy,  his  right  wing  at  Long  Bridge,  his  left 
by  Bottom's  Bridge,  and  took  position  from  Drury's  Bluff 
on  his  right,  to  the  Mechanicsville  turnpike,  with  his  in 
fantry,  the  cavalry  extending  on  the  left  and  front  to  the 
lower  Rappahannock  and  Fredericksburg.  The  right 
wing,  D.  H.  Hill's  and  Longstreet's  divisions,  under 
Longstreet,  from  James  River  to  White  Oak  Swamp ;  the 
left  under  G.  W.  Smith.  Smith's  division  and  Magruder's 
command  from  White  Oak  Swamp,  extending  thence  to 
the  Mechanicsville  pike,  with  Jackson  a  hundred  miles 
away  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 

6  81 


82  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

After  careful  study  of  the  works  and  armaments  at 
Drury's  Bluff,  I  ventured  the  suggestion  that  we  recross 
the  Chickahominy  at  Mechanicsville  and  stand  behind 
Beaver  Dam  Creek,  prepared  against  McClellan's  right 
when  he  should  be  ready  to  march  towards  Richmond, 
and  call  him  to  relieve  his  flank  before  crossing  the  river. 

Although  the  country  between  McClellan's  landing  on 
the  Pamunkey  to  the  Chickahominy  was  free  of  all  ob 
stacles  on  the  15th  of  May,  the  head  of  his  advance  did 
not  reach  the  banks  of  the  latter  river  till  the  21st.  On 
the  16th  he  established  his  permanent  depot  at  the  White 
House,  on  the  Pamunkey,  and  organized  two  provisional 
army  corps, — the  Fifth,  of  Fitz-John  Porter's  division, 
and  Sykes's,  under  command  of  Porter ;  the  Sixth,  of 
Franklin's  and  W.  F.  Smith's  divisions,  under  Franklin. 
On  the  26th  the  York  River  Railroad  as  far  as  the  bridge 
across  the  Chickahominy  was  repaired  and  in  use.  This, 
with  other  bridges,  was  speedily  repaired,  and  new  bridges 
ordered  built  at  such  points  as  should  be  found  necessary 
to  make  free  communication  between  the  posts  of  the 
army. 

On  the  24th  parties  were  advanced  on  the  Williamsburg 
road  as  far  as  Seven  Pines,  where  a  spirited  affair  occurred 
between  General  Naglee's  forces  and  General  Hatton's 
brigade,  the  latter  withdrawing  a  mile  and  a  half  on  the 
Williamsburg  road.  At  the  same  time  two  other  parties 
of  Federals  were  sent  up  the  left  bank,  one  under  General 
Davidson,  of  the  cavalry,  with,  artillery  and  infantry  sup 
ports,  as  far  as  Mechanicsville,  where  he  encountered  and 
dislodged  a  Confederate  cavalry  force  under  Colonel  B.  H. 
Robertson  and  occupied  the  position.  The  third  party, 
under  Colonel  Woodbury,  the  Fourth  Michigan  Infantry 
and  a  squadron  of  the  Second  United  States  Cavalry, 
moved  up  to  New  Bridge,  where  the  Fifth  Louisiana, 
Colonel  Hunt,  of  Semmes's  brigade,  was  on  picket.  Find 
ing  the  bridge  well  guarded,  a  party,  conducted  by  Lieu- 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR    OAKS.  83 

tenant  Bowen,  Topographical  Engineers,  marched  up  the 
river,  concealing  their  movements,  crossed  to  the  west 
bank,  and,  passing  down,  surprised  the  Fifth  Louisiana, 
threw  it  into  disorder,  and  gained  position  on  the  west 
side. 

Pleased  at  these  successes,  General  McClellan  sent  a 
sensational  despatch  to  the  President.  His  position  thus 
masked,  rested  his  right  upon  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  stream 
that  flows  from  the  height  between  the  Chickahominy  and 
Pamunkey  Rivers  south  to  its  confluence  with  the  former 
a  few  hundred  yards  below  Mechanicsville  Bridge.  Its 
banks  are  scarped,  about  six  feet  high,  and  eight  feet 
apart,  making  a  strong  natural  ditch  for  defensive  works. 

On  commanding  ground  south  of  the  creek  admirably 
planned  field-works  were  soon  constructed,  which  made 
that  flank  unassailable.  Two  miles  out  from  the  river  the 
creek  loses  its  value  as  a  defensive  line.  From  Beaver 
Dam  the  line  was  extended  down  the  river  to  New  Bridge, 
where  it  crossed  and  reached  its  left  out  to  White  Oak 
Swamp,  and  there  found  as  defensible  guard  as  the  right 
at  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  The  swamp  is  about  a  quarter  of 
a  mile  wide  at  the  left,  and  down  to  the  Chickahominy 
studded  with  heavy  forest-trees,  always  wet  and  boggy, 
but  readily  forded  by  infantry,  and  at  places  by  cavalry. 

Near  the  middle  of  the  line,  back  from  New  Bridge, 
was  Stoneman's  cavalry.  Fitz- John  Porter's  corps  (Fifth) 
was  posted  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  Franklin's  (Sixth)  two 
miles  lower  down,  Sumner's  (Second)  near  the  middle 
of  the  line,  about  three  miles  from  the  river.  The  Third 
and  Fourth  Corps  were  on  the  south  side,  Kearny's 
division  of  the  Third  at  Savage  Station  of  the  York 
River  Eailroad,  Hooker's  division  at  White  Oak  Swamp 
Bridge,  with  entrenched  lines.  The  Fourth  Corps  was 
posted  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  Couch's  division  about 
a  mile  in  advance  of  Hooker's,  of  the  Third,  at  the 
junction  of  the  Nine  Miles  road,  entrenched,  and  field 


84  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

of  abatis ;  Casey's  division  of  the  Third  half  a  mile  in 
advance  of  Couch's,  entrenched,  and  field  of  abatis.  The 
point  occupied  by  Couch's  division  is  known  as  Seven 
Pines.  His  advanced  picket-guard  on  the  Nine  Miles 
road  was  at  Fair  Oaks  Station  of  the  York  River 
Railroad. 

The  line,  which  was  somewhat  concave  towards  Rich 
mond,  was  strengthened  at  vulnerable  points  by  field- 
works.  General  Sumner  was  senior  of  the  corps  com 
manders,  and  in  command  of  the  right  wing ;  General 
Heintzelman,  the  senior  of  the  south  side,  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  left  wing.  The  Chickahominy  is  a  hundred 
feet  wide  as  far  up  as  Mechanicsville  Bridge,  but  narrows 
above  to  forty  and  thirty.  Along  the  line  of  McClellan's 
deployment  its  course  was  through  lowlands  of  tangled 
woods  that  fringe  its  banks,  the  valley  seldom  more  than  a 
hundred  yards  wide.  Artillery  was  posted  to  command 
all  bridges  and  those  ordered  for  construction.  On 
the  26th,  General  McClellan  ordered  General  Fitz-John 
Porter  to  organize  a  force  to  march  against  a  Confederate 
outpost  near  Hanover  Court-House.  Porter  took  of  Mo- 
rell's  division  three  brigades, — Martindale's,  Butterfield's, 
and  McQuade's, — Berdan's  Sharp-shooters  and  three  bat 
teries,  two  regiments  of  cavalry  under  General  Emory, 
and  Benson's  horse  battery ;  Warren's  brigade  to  march 
up  the  right  bank  of  the  Pamunkey  in  connection  with 
operations  projected  for  the  fighting  column.  Porter  was 
the  most  skilful  tactician  and  strongest  fighter  in  the  Fed 
eral  army,  thoroughly  trained  in  his  profession  from  boy 
hood,  and  of  some  experience  in  field  work. 

The  Confederate  outpost  was  commanded  by  Brigadier- 
General  L.  O'B.  Branch,  six  regiments  of  infantry,  one 
battery,  under  Captain  Latham,  and  a  cavalry  regiment, 
under  Colonel  Robertson.  General  Branch  was  a  briga 
dier  from  civil  life.  The  result  of  the  affair  was  the  dis 
comfiture  of  General  Branch,  with  the  loss  of  one  gun 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR    OAKS.  85 

and  about  seven  hundred  prisoners.  Losses  in  action,  not 
including  prisoners  :  Confederates,  265  ;  Federals,  285. 

A.  P.  Hill  was  promoted  to  major-general,  and  assigned 
to  command  of  a  division  at  that  outpost  and  stationed  at 
Ashland. 

On  the  27th,  General  Johnston  received  information 
that  General  McDowell's  corps  was  at  Fredericksburg, 
and  on  the  march  to  reinforce  McClellan's  right  at 
Mechanicsville.  He  prepared  to  attack  McClellan  before 
McDowell  could  reach  him.  To  this  end  he  withdrew 
Smith's  division  from  the  Williamsburg  road,  relieving  it 
by  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill ;  withdrew  Longstreet's 
division  from  its  position,  and  A.  P.  Hill's  from  Ashland. 
The  fighting  column  was  to  be  under  General  G.  W. 
Smith,  his  next  in  rank,  and  General  Whiting  was  as 
signed  command  of  Smith's  division, — the  column  to 
consist  of  A.  P.  Hill's,  Whiting's,  and  D.  R.  Jones's  di 
visions.  The  latter  was  posted  between  the  Mechanics 
ville  pike  and  Meadow  Bridge  road.  A.  P.  Hill  was  to 
march  direct  against  McClellan's  outpost  at  Mechanics 
ville,  Whiting  to  cross  the  river  at  Meadow  Bridge,  and 
D.  E.  Jones  at  Mechanicsville,  thus  completing  the  column 
of  attack  on  the  east  side. 

I  was  to  march  by  the  Mechanicsville  road  to  the  vi 
cinity  of  the  bridge,  and  to  strike  down  against  the  Fed 
eral  right,  west  of  the  river,  the  march  to  be  made  during 
the  night ;  D.  H.  Hill  to  post  a  brigade  on  his  right  on 
the  Charles  City  road  to  guard  the  field  to  be  left  by  his 
division,  as  well  as  the  line  left  vacant  by  Longstreet's 
division. 

At  nightfall  the  troops  took  up  the  march  for  their 
several  assigned  positions.  Before  dark  General  Johns 
ton  called  a  number  of  his  officers  together  for  instruc 
tions, — viz.,  Smith,  Magruder,  Stuart,  and  Longstreet. 
When  we  were  assembled,  General  Johnston  announced 
later  information:  that  McDowell's  line  of  march  had 


86  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

been  changed, — that  he  was  going  north.  Following  the 
report  of  this  information,  General  Smith  proposed  that 
the  plan  for  battle  should  be  given  up,  in  view  of  the  very 
strong  ground  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek.*  I  urged  that  the 
plan  laid  against  the  concentrating  columns  was  made 
stronger  by  the  change  of  direction  of  McDowell's  col 
umn,  and  should  suggest  more  prompt  and  vigorous  pros 
ecution.  In  this  Magruder  and  Stuart  joined  me.  The 
pros  and  cons  were  talked  over  till  a  late  hour,  when  at 
last  General  Johnston,  weary  of  it,  walked  aside  to  a  sepa 
rate  seat.  I  took  the  opportunity  to  draw  near  him,  and 
suggested  that  the  Federal  position  behind  Beaver  Dam 
Creek,  so  seriously  objected  to  by  General  Smith,  could  be 
turned  by  marching  to  and  along  the  high  ground  be 
tween  the  Chickahominy  and  Pamunkey  Rivers ;  that 
the  position  of  the  enemy  when  turned  would  be  aban 
doned  without  a  severe  struggle,  and  give  a  fair  field  for 
battle ;  that  we  should  not  lose  the  opportunity  to  await 
another  possible  one. 

General  Johnston  replied  that  he  was  aware  of  all  that, 
but  found  that  he  had  selected  the  wrong  officer  for  the 
work.  This  ended  the  talk,  and  I  asked  to  be  allowed  to 
halt  my  columns  as  soon  as  possible.  The  other  move 
ments  were  arrested,  except  that  of  A.  P.  HilPs  division, 
which  was  ordered  to  continue  its  march,  cross  the  Chick 
ahominy  at  Meadow  Bridge,  and  take  position  between 
the  Meadow  Bridge  road  and  the  Brooke  turnpike.  The 
counter-order  reinstated  my  command  of  the  right  wing, 
including  D.  H.  Hill's  division  on  the  Williamsburg  road 
and  extending  to  the  York  River  Railroad.  Before 
leaving  the  conference,  I  announced  that  we  would  fight 
on  the  Williamsburg  road  if  we  had  to  find  the  enemy 
through  bayous. 

The  order  to  halt  the  columns  found  Smith's  division 

*  Smith's  War  Papers. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR   OAKS.  87 

between  the  Mechanicsville  and  Meadow  Bridge  roads, 
Longstreet's  near  the  city  at  the  Nine  Miles  road ;  D.  R. 
Jones  had  not  moved. 

On  the  29th  and  30th,  General  D.  H.  Hill  sent  out 
reconnoitring  parties  on  the  Williamsburg  and  Charles 
City  roads.  On  the  30th  he  received  a  fair  report  of 
Casey's  intrenched  camp,  and  the  probable  strength  and 
extent  of  the  line  of  his  skirmishers  reaching  out  his 
left  front  to  White  Oak  Swamp.  On  the  29th,  General 
Johnston  wrote  General  Whiting,  commanding  Smith's 
division,  giving  notice  of  a  reconnoissance  ordered  by 
General  Hill,  cautioning  the  former  that  his  division 
should  be  drawn  towards  the  right,  to  be  in  better  position 
for  support  of  a  battle  of  his  right,  and  adding, — 

"Who  knows  but  that  in  the  course  of  the  morning  Long- 
street's  scheme  may  accomplish  itself?  If  we  get  into  a  fight 
here,  you  will  have  to  hurry  to  help  us." 

The  report  of  General  D.  H.  Hill's  reconnoissance  of 
the  30th  was  forwarded  to  head-quarters.  I  followed  it, 
and  found  General  Johnston  ready  to  talk  over  plans  for 
battle.  General  Huger  had  reported  with  three  of  his 
brigades,  and  was  in  camp  near  the  outskirts  of  Richmond 
on  Gillis  Creek.  The  plan  settled  upon  was  that  the 
attack  should  be  made  by  General  D.  H.  Hill's  division 
on  the  Williamsburg  road,  supported  by  Longstreet's  divi 
sion.  Huger's  division,  j  ust  out  of  garrison  duty  at  Norfolk, 
was  to  march  between  Hill's  right  and  the  swamp  against 
the  enemy's  line  of  skirmishers,  and  move  abreast  of  the 
battle ;  G.  W.  Smith's  division,  under  Whiting,  to  march 
by  the  Gaines  road  to  Old  Tavern,  and  move  abreast  of 
the  battle  on  its  left.  The  field  before  Old  Tavern  was 
not  carefully  covered  by  the  enemy's  skirmishers  north  of 
Fair  Oaks,  nor  by  parties  in  observation. 

Experience  during  the  discussion  of  the  battle  ordered 
for  the  28th  caused  me  to  doubt  of  effective  work  from  the 


88  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

troops  ordered  for  the  left  flank,  but  the  plan  seemed  so 
simple  that  it  was  thought  impossible  for  any  one  to  go 
dangerously  wrong ;  and  General  Johnston  stated  that  he 
would  be  on  that  road,  the  better  to  receive  from  his  troops 
along  the  crest  of  the  Chickahominy  information  of  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  on  the  farther  side  of  the  river,  arid 
to  look  to  the  co-operation  of  the  troops  on  the  Nine  Miles 
road. 

To  facilitate  marches,  Huger's  division  was  to  have  the 
Charles  City  road  to  the  head  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  file 
across  it  and  march  down  its  northern  margin  ;  D.  H.  Hill 
to  have  the  Williamsburg  road  to  the  enemy's  front; 
Longstreet's  division  to  march  by  the  Nine  Miles  road 
and  a  lateral  road  leading  across  the  rear  of  General  Hill 
on  the  Williamsburg  road ;  G.  W.  Smith  by  the  Gaines 
road  to  Old  Tavern  on  the  Nine  Miles  road. 

The  tactical  handling  of  the  battle  on  the  Williamsburg 
road  was  left  to  my  care,  as  well  as  the  general  conduct 
of  affairs  south  of  the  York  River  Railroad,  the  latter 
line  being  the  left  of  the  field  to  which  I  had  been  as 
signed,  the  right  wing. 

While  yet  affairs  were  under  consideration,  a  terrific 
storm  of  vivid  lightning,  thunderbolts,  and  rain,  as  severe 
as  ever  known  to  any  climate,  burst  upon  us,  and  con 
tinued  through  the  night  more  or  less  severe.  In  the  first 
lull  I  rode  from  General  Johnston's  to  my  head-quarters, 
and  sent  orders  for  early  march. 

For  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  affairs  as  ordered,  it 
may  be  well  to  explain  that  General  Johnston  ordered 
Smith's  division  by  the  Gaines  road,  so  that,  in  case  of 
delay  of  its  march,  McLaws's  division,  on  that  road  and 
nearer  the  field  of  proposed  action,  could  be  brought  in  to 
the  left  of  the  battle,  leaving  the  place  of  his  division  to 
be  occupied  by  Smith's,  when  the  latter  reached  McLaws's 
vacated  line.  There  was,  therefore,  no  reason  why  the 
orders  for  march  should  be  misconstrued  or  misapplied. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OK    FAIR    OAKS.  89 

I  was  with  General  Johnston  all  of  the  time  that  he  was 
engaged  in  planning  and  ordering  the  battle,  heard  every 
word  and  thought  expressed  by  him  of  it,  and  received 
his  verbal  orders  ;  Generals  Huger  and  Smith  his  written 
orders. 

General  Johnston's  order  to  General  Smith  was : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"May  30,  9.15P.M. 
" MAJOR- GENERAL  G.  W.  SMITH: 

"  GENERAL, — If  nothing  prevents,  we  will  fall  upon  the  enemy 
in  front  of  Major- General  Hill  (who  occupies  the  position  on  the 
Williamsburg  road  from  which  your  troops  moved  to  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Meadow  Bridge)  early  in  the  morning,  as  early  as 
practicable.  The  Chickahominy  will  be  passable  only  at  the 
bridge,  a  great  advantage  to  us.  Please  be  ready  to  move  by  the 
Gaines  road,  coming  as  early  as  possible  to  the  point  at  which 
the  road  to  New  Bridge  turns  off.  Should  there  be  cause  for 
haste,  Major- General  McLaws,  on  your  approach,  will  be  ordered 
to  leave  his  ground  for  you,  that  he  may  reinforce  General  Long- 
street. 

"Most  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

"J.  E.  JOHNSTON."* 

General  Johnston's  order  for  General  Huger  read : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"May  30,  1862,  8.30P.M. 
" MAJOR- GENERAL  HUGER: 

"  GENERAL, — The  reports  of  Major- General  D.  H.  Hill  give 
me  the  impression  that  the  enemy  is  in  considerable  strength  in 
his  front.  It  seems  to  me  necessary  that  we  should  increase  our 
force  also  ;  for  that  object  I  wish  to  concentrate  the  troops  of  your 
division  on  the  Charles  City  road,  and  to  concentrate  the  troops 
of  Major-General  Hill  on  the  Williamsburg  road.  To  do  this  it 
will  be  necessary  for  you  to  move,  as  early  in  the  morning  as  pos 
sible,  to  relieve  the  brigade  of  General  Hill's  division  now  on  the 
Charles  City  road.  I  have  desired  General  Hill  to  send  you  a 
guide.  The  road  is  the  second  large  one  diverging  to  the  right 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  iii.  p.  563. 


90  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

from  the  Williaiiisburg  road.  The  first  turns  off  near  the  toll- 
gate.  On  reaching  your  position  on  the  Charles  City  road,  learn 
at  once  the  route  to  the  main  roads,  to  Richmond  on  your  right 
and  left,  especially  those  to  the  left,  and  try  to  find  guides.  Be 
ready,  if  an  action  should  begin  on  your  left,  to  fall  upon  the 
enemy's  left  flank. 

* '  Most  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

"J.  E.  JOHNSTON. 
"  P.S. — It  is  necessary  to  move  very  early."  * 

The  Nine  Miles  road  takes  the  name  from  the  distance 
by  that  road  from  Richmond  to  Seven  Pines.  The  Wil- 
liamsburg  road  to  the  same  point  was  sometimes  called  the 
Seven  Miles  road,  because  of  the  distance  by  that  road  to 
Seven  Pines. 

As  expressed  and  repeated  in  his  orders,  General  John 
ston's  wish  was  to  have  the  battle  pitched  as  early  as 
practicable.  When  his  orders  were  issued,  he  was  under 
the  impression  that  I  would  be  the  ranking  officer  on 
the  right  of  the  York  Railroad,  and  would  give  detailed 
instructions  to  govern  the  later  operations  of  Huger's 
troops. 

Subsequent  events  seem  to  call  for  mention  just  here 
that  General  Smith,  instead  of  moving  the  troops  by  the 
route  assigned  them,  marched  back  to  the  Nine  Miles 
road  near  the  city,  rode  to  Johnston's  head-quarters  about 
six  in  the  morning,  and  reported  that  he  was  with  the  di 
vision,  but  not  for  the  purpose  of  taking  command  from 
General  Whiting.  As  General  Johnston  did  not  care  to 
order  him  back  to  his  position  as  commander  of  the  left 
wing,  he  set  himself  to  work  to  make  trouble,  complained 
that  my  troops  were  on  the  Nine  Miles  road  in  the  way  of 
his  march,  and  presently  complained  that  they  had  left 
that  road  and  were  over  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  and 
induced  General  Johnston  to  so  far  modify  the  plans  as  to 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  938. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OK    FAIR   OAKS.  91 

order  three  of  my  brigades  down  the  Nine  Miles  road  to 
the  New  Bridge  fork. 

The  order  was  sent  by  Lieutenant  Washington,  of 
Johnston's  staff,  who,  unused  to  campaigning,  failed  to 
notice  that  he  was  not  riding  on  my  line  of  march,  and 
rode  into  the  enemy's  lines.  This  accident  gave  the 
enemy  the  first  warning  of  approaching  danger ;  it  was 
misleading,  however,  as  it  caused  General  Keyes  to  look 
for  the  attack  by  the  Nine  Miles  road. 

The  storms  had  flooded  the  flat  lands,  and  the  waters  as 
they  fell  seemed  weary  of  the  battle  of  the  elements,  and 
inclined  to  have  a  good  rest  on  the  soft  bed  of  sand  which 
let  them  gently  down  to  the  substratum  .of  clay ;  or  it 
may  have  been  the  purpose  of  kind  Providence  to  so  in 
termix  the  upper  and  lower  strata  as  to  interpose  serious 
barriers  to  the  passing  of  artillery,  and  thus  break  up  the 
battle  of  men. 

My  march  by  the  Nine  Miles  and  lateral  roads  leading 
across  to  the  Williamsburg  road  was  interrupted  by  the 
flooded  grounds  about  the  head  of  Gillis  Creek.  At  the 
same  time  this  creek  was  bank  full,  where  it  found  a  chan 
nel  for  its  flo^v  into  the  James.  The  delay  of  an  hour  to 
construct  a  bridge  was  preferred  to  the  encounter  of  more 
serious  obstacles  along  the  narrow  lateral  road,  flooded  by 
the  storm.  As  we  were  earlier  at  the  creek,  it  gave  us 
precedence  over  Huger's  division,  which  had  to  cross  after 
us.  The  division  was  prepared  with  cooked  rations,  had 
wagons  packed  at  six  o'clock,  and  rested  in  the  rear  of 
General  Hill's  at  nine  A.M. 

Meanwhile,  General  G.  W.  Smith's  division  had 
marched  by  the  Nine  Miles  road  and  was  resting  near 
the  fork  of  the  New  Bridge  road  at  Old  Tavern.  Upon 
meeting  General  Huger  in  the  morning,  I  gave  him  a 
succinct  account  of  General  Johnston's  plans  and  wishes ; 
after  which  he  inquired  as  to  the  dates  of  our  commissions, 
which  revealed  that  he  was  the  ranking  officer,  when  I 


92  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

suggested  that  it  was  only  necessary  for  him  to  take  com 
mand  and  execute  the  orders.  This  he  declined.  Then 
it  was  proposed  that  he  should  send  two  of  his  brigades 
across  to  join  on  the  right  of  the  column  of  attack,  while  he 
could  remain  with  his  other  brigade,  which  was  to  relieve 
that  of  General  Hill  on  the  Charles  City  road.  Though 
he  expressed  himself  satisfied  with  this,  his  manner  was 
eloquent  of  discontent.  The  better  to  harmonize,  I  pro 
posed  to  reinforce  his  column  by  three  of  my  brigades,  to 
be  sent  under  General  Wilcox,  to  lead  or  follow  his  di 
vision,  as  he  might  order.  Under  this  arrangement  it 
seemed  that  concert  of  action  was  assured.  I  gave  es 
pecial  orders  to  General  Wilcox  to  have  care  that  the  head 
of  his  column  was  abreast  the  battle  when  it  opened,  and 
rode  forward  to  join  General  Hill,  my  other  three  bri 
gades  advancing  along  the  Williamsburg  road. 

Opposing  and  in  the  immediate  front  of  General  Hill 
was  the  division  of  General  Casey,  of  the  Fourth  (Reyes's) 
Corps.  The  division  stood  in  an  intrenched  camp  across 
the  Williamsburg  road,  with  a  pentagonal  redoubt  (un 
finished)  on  the  left  of  his  line.  Half  a  mile  in  rear  of 
Casey's  division  was  that  of  Couch,  of  the  same  corps, 
behind  a  second  trenched  line,  at  its  junction  of  the 
Nine  Miles  road,  part  of  Couch's  extending  along  the 
latter  road  to  Fair  Oaks  Station  of  the  York  River  Rail 
road,  and  intrenched ;  farther  forward  he  had  a  guarded 
picket  station.  Between  Couch  and  Casey  a  skirt  of 
wood  stretched  from  the  swamp  on  their  left  across  the 
Williamsburg  and  Nine  Miles  roads  and  the  railroad. 
Between  the  stretch  of  forest  and  Couch  was  an  open ; 
spreading  across  the  roads,  and  at  Casey's  front,  was  an 
other  open,  though  more  limited,  some  abatis  being 
arranged  along  their  front  lines.  These  were  the  only 
cleared  fields  on  the  south  side  of  the  railroad  within  two 
miles  of  Casey's  picket  line,  our  line  of  march  and  attack. 

General  D.  H.  Hill  stood  ready  for  battle  at  an  early 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR   OAKS.  93 

hour,  waiting  for  his  brigade  on  the  Charles  City  road. 
Under  the  delay  to  relieve  that  brigade  by  one  of  Huger's 
divisions,  I  sent  orders  to  General  Wilcox  to  pull  off 
from  column  on  that  road  and  march  for  the  position 
assigned  him  near  the  head  of  White  Oak  Swamp. 

The  detailed  instructions  for  battle  were  that  the  ad 
vance  should  be  made  in  columns  of  brigades  two  on  each 
side  the  Williamsburg  road,  preceded  by  strong  lines  of 
skirmishers ;  the  advance,  approaching  an  open  or  abatis 
or  trench  line,  should  reinforce  the  skirmish  line  to  strong 
engagement,  while  the  lines  of  battle  turned  those  obsta 
cles  by  flank  or  oblique  march  when  the  general  advance 
should  be  resumed.  As  the  wooded  field  was  not  conve 
nient  for  artillery  use,  we  only  held  the  batteries  of 
Bondurant  and  Carter  ready  for  call.  At  eleven  o'clock, 
weary  of  delay,  General  Hill  asked  to  let  loose  his  signal- 
gun  and  engage,  but  was  ordered  to  wait  for  his  absent 
brigade. 

The  reports  of  the  hour  of  opening  battle  are  more 
conflicting  in  this  than  in  most  battles,  owing  possibly  to 
the  fact  that  many  are  fixed  by  the  beginning  of  the  hot 
battle  about  the  trenched  camp,  while  others  are  based  on 
the  actual  firing  of  the  signal-guns.  The  weight  of  evi 
dence  seems  conclusive  of  the  former  attack  at  one  P.M., 
and  this  would  place  the  firing  of  the  signal-guns  back  to 
noon  or  a  little  after.  As  events  occurred,  however,  the 
hour  is  not  of  especial  interest,  as  it  is  shown  that  the  bat 
tle  was  in  time  for  a  finish  before  night  if  it  had  been 
promptly  followed  up.  I  will  say,  therefore,  that  General 
HilPs  second  appeal  to  open  the  signal-gun  was  made  a 
little  before  noon,  and  that  he  stated  in  this  appeal  that 
his  brigade  from  the  Charles  City  road  was  approaching, 
and  would  be  with  him.  He  was  then  authorized  to 
march,  but  to  give  instructions  that  the  advance  should  be 
carefully  conducted  until  all  the  troops  were  in  place,  to 
give  full  force  to  his  battle.  He  had  four  brigades,  and 


94  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

was  ordered  to  advance  in  columns  of  brigades,  two  on 
each  side  of  the  road.  Garland's  and  G.  B.  Anderson's 
brigades  in  columns,  preceded  by  skirmishers,  advanced 
on  the  left  of  the  road  at  the  sound  of  the  guns,  and  en 
gaged  after  a  short  march  from  the  starting.  As  Rodes's 
brigade  was  not  yet  in  position,  some  little  time  elapsed 
before  the  columns  on  the  right  moved,  so  that  Garland's 
column  encountered  more  than  its  share  of  early  fight, 
but  Rodes,  supported  by  Rains's  brigade,  came  promptly 
to  his  relief,  which  steadied  the  advance.  The  enemy's 
front  was  reinforced  and  arrested  progress  of  our  skir 
mishers,  but  a  way  was  found  by  which  the  enemy  was 
turned  out  of  position,  and  by  and  by  the  open  before  the 
intrenched  camp  was  reached.  In  the  redoubt  was  a  six- 
gun  battery,  and  on  the  right  another  section  of  two 
pieces.  General  Hill  ordered  Bondurant's  battery  to  the 
open  into  action,  and  presently  the  battery  of  Captain 
Carter. 

Garland  and  G.  B.  Anderson  had  severe  contention  at 
one  o'clock,  but  by  pushing  front  and  flank  movements 
got  to  the  enemy's  strong  line.  R.  H.  Anderson's  brigade 
was  pushed  up  in  support  of  their  left,  when  a  bold  move 
gave  us  the  section  of  artillery  and  that  end  of  the  line. 
At  the  same  time  Carter's  battery  was  in  close  practice 
with  five  guns  within  four  hundred  yards  of  the  redoubt, 
and  the  enemy  was  seriously  disturbed  ;  but  General  Hill 
was  disposed  to  wait  a  little  for  Huger,  thought  to  be  be 
tween  him  and  the  swamp,  to  get  farther  in  ;  then,  fearing 
that  longer  wait  might  be  hazardous  of  his  opportunity, 
he  ordered  Rains's  brigade  past  the  enemy's  left,  when 
Rodes  seized  the  moment,  rushed  in,  and  gained  the  re 
doubt  and  the  battery.  The  officers  at  the  battery  made  a 
brave  effort  to  spike  their  guns,  but  were  killed  in  the  act. 
So  Rodes,  who  had  some  artillerists  acting  as  infantry, 
turned  them  with  some  effect  upon  the  troops  as  they 
retired. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR   OAKS.  95 

When  General  Hill  reported  that  he  must  use  Rains's 
brigade  to  march  around  the  redoubt,  other  orders  were 
sent  General  Wilcox  to  leave  General  Huger's  column  and 
march  to  his  position  on  the  right  of  General  Hill's  battle, 
directing,  in  case  there  were  serious  obstacles  to  his  march 
by  the  Charles  City  road,  to  march  over  to  and  down  the 
Williamsburg  road.  A  slip  of  paper  was  sent  General 
Johnston  reporting  progress  and  asking  co-operation  on 
our  left. 

The  battle  moved  bravely  on.  R.  H.  Anderson's  bri 
gade  was  ordered  to  support  its  left  at  Fair  Oaks,  and 
Pickett's,  on  the  railroad,  ivas  drawn  near.  Hill  met 
Casey's  troops  rallying,  and  reinforcements  with  them 
coming  to  recover  the  lost  ground,  but  they  were  forced 
back  to  the  second  intrenched  line  (Couch's),  where  severe 
fighting  ensued,  but  the  line  was  carried  at  two  o'clock, 
cutting  Couch  with  four  regiments  and  two  companies  of 
infantry,  and  Brady's  six-gun  battery,  off  at  Fair  Oaks 
Station.  Finding  that  he  could  not  cut  his  way  back  to 
his  command,  Couch  stood  back  from  the  railroad  and 
presently  opened  his  battery  fire  across  our  advancing 
lines.  As  he  was  standing  directly  in  front  of  Smith's 
division,  we  thought  that  he  would  soon  be  attacked  and 
driven  off.  Nevertheless,  it  was  not  prudent  to  leave  that 
point  on  our  flank  unguarded  until  we  found  Smith's 
division  in  action.  The  force  was  shut  off  from  our  view 
by  the  thick  pine  wood,  so  that  we  could  know  nothing 
of  its  strength,  and  only  knew  of  its  position  from  its 
artillery  fire.  We  could  not  attack  it  lest  we  should  fall 
under  the  fire  of  the  division  in  position  for  that  attack. 
Anderson's  other  regiments,  under  the  gallant  Colonel  M. 
Jenkins,  were  ordered  into  Hill's  forward  battle,  as*  his 
troops  were  worn.  Jenkins  soon  found  himself  in  the 
van,  and  so  swiftly  led  on  that  the  discomfited  troops 
found  no  opportunity  to  rally.  Reinforcements  from  the 
Third  Corps  came,  but  in  the  swampy  wood  Jenkins  was 


96  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

prompt  enough  to  strike  their  heads  as  their  retreating 
comrades  passed.  Right  and  left  and  front  he  applied 
his  beautiful  tactics  and  pushed  his  battle. 

General  Kearny,  finding  that  he  could  not  arrest  the 
march,  put  Berry's  brigade  off  to  the  swamp  to  flank  and 
strike  it,  and  took  part  of  Jamison's  brigade  to  follow. 
They  got  into  the  swamp  and  followed  it  up  to  the  open 
near  the  Couch  intrenchment,*  but  Jenkins  knew  that 
there  was  some  one  there  to  meet  them,  and  pushed  his 
onward  battle.  General  Hill  ordered  Rains's  brigade  to 
turn  this  new  force,  while  Rodes  attacked,  but  the  latter's 
men  were  worn,  and  some  of  them  were  with  the  advance. 
Kemper's  brigade  was  sent  to  support  the  forward  battle, 
but  General  Hill  directed  it  to  his  right  against  Berry, 
in  front  of  Rains,  and  it  seems  that  the  heavy,  swampy 
ground  so  obstructed  operations  on  both  sides  as  to  limit 
their  work  to  infantry  fusillades  until  six  o'clock. 

Our  battle  on  the  Williamsburg  road  was  in  a  sack. 
We  were  strong  enough  to  guard  our  flanks  and  push 
straight  on,  but  the  front  was  growing  heavy.  It  was 
time  for  Wilcox's  brigades  under  his  last  order,  but 
nothing  was  heard  of  them.  I  asked  General  Stuart,  who 
had  joined  me,  if  there  were  obstacles  to  Wilcox's  march 
between  the  Charles  City  and  Williamsburg  roads.  He 
reported  that  there  was  nothing  more  than  swamp  lands, 
hardly  knee-deep.  He  was  asked  for  a  guide,  who  was 
sent  with  a  courier  bearing  orders  for  them  to  remain 
with  General  Wilcox  until  he  reported  at  my  head 
quarters. 

Again  I  reported  the  cramped  condition  of  our  work, 
owing  to  the  artillery  practice  from  beyond  the  railroad, 
and  "asked  General  Johnston  to  have  the  division  that  was 
with  him  drive  that  force  away  and  loose  our  left.  This 
note  was  ordered  to  be  put  into  General  Johnston's  hands. 

*  General  Berry  thought  that  he  got  up  as  far  as  the  Casey  camp,  but 
mistook  Couch's  opening  for  that  of  Casey. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIK    OAKS.  97 

He  gave  peremptory  commands  to  that  effect,  but  the  move 
ments  were  so  slow  that  he  lost  patience  and  rode  with 
Hood's  leading  brigade,  pulled  it  on,  and  ordered  commu 
nication  opened  with  my  left. 

At  one  o'clock,  General  McClellan,  at  his  head-quarters 
beyond  the  river,  six  miles  away,  heard  the  noise  of  battle 
and  ordered  Sumner's  (Second)  corps  under  arms  to  await 
orders.  General  Sunnier  ordered  the  command  under 
arms,  marched  the  divisions  to  their  separate  bridges,  and 
put  the  columns  on  the  bridges,  partly  submerged,  to  hold 
them  to  their  moorings,  anxiously  awaiting  authority  from 
his  chief  to  march  to  the  relief  of  his  comrades.  The 
bridge  where  Sedgwick's  division  stood  was  passable,  but 
Richardson's  was  under  water  waist-deep,  and  the  flooding 
river  rising.  Richardson  waded  one  brigade  through,  but 
thought  that  he  could  save  time  by  marching  up  to  the 
Sedgwick  bridge,  which  so  delayed  him  that  he  did  not 
reach  the  field  until  after  night. 

As  General  Johnston  rode  with  Hood's  brigade,  he  saw 
the  detachment  under  General  Couch  marching  north  to 
find  at  the  Adams  House  the  road  to  Grapevine  Bridge, 
his  open  way  of  retreat.  Directly  he  heard  firing  where 
Couch  was  marching,  but  thought  that  Smith's  other  bri 
gades  were  equal  to  work  that  could  open  up  there,  and 
rode  on,  ordering  Hood  to  find  communication  with  my 
left.  Smith's  other  brigades  were  :  Whiting's,  commanded 
by  Colonel  Law ;  Hampton's,  Pettigrew's,  and  Hatton's ; 
Whiting  commanding  the  division,  Smith  commanding 
the  left  wing.  Smith  quotes  Colonel  Frobel,  who  was  with 
him  at  the  time, — viz. : 

" Whiting's  brigade  was  gone;  it  had  been  ordered  forward 
to  charge  the  batteries  which  were  firing  upon  us.  The  brigade 
was  repulsed,  and  in  a  few  minutes  came  streaming  back  through 
the  little  skirt  of  woods  to  the  left  of  the  Nine  Miles  road,  near 
the  crossing.  There  was  only  a  part  of  a  brigade  in  this  charge. 
Fender  soon  rallied  and  reformed  them  on  the  edge  of  the  woods. 

7 


98  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Whiting  sent  an  order  to  him  to  reconnoitre  the  batteries, 
and  if  he  thought  they  could  be  taken,  to  try  it  again.  Before 
he  could  do  so,  some  one  galloped  up,  shouting,  '  Charge  that 
battery  !'  The  men  hurried  forward  at  double- quick,  but  were 
repulsed  as  before.7'  * 

It  seems  that  at  that  moment  General  Sumner  reached 
the  field.  He  reported  : 

"  On  arriving  on  the  field,  I  found  General  Couch,  with  four 
regiments  and  two  companies  of  infantry  and  Brady's  battery. 
These  troops  were  drawn  up  in  line  near  Adams's  House,  and 
there  was  a  pause  in  the  battle." 

He  received  his  orders  at  2.30  P.M.  and  marched  with 
Sedgwick's  division — three  brigades — and  Kirby's  bat 
tery,  and  reached  the  ground  of  Couch's  work  at  4.30. 
In  less  than  an  hour  he  had  surveyed  the  ground  and 
placed  his  troops  to  receive  battle. 

General  Smith  attacked  with  Hampton's,  Pettigrew's, 
and  Hatton's  brigades.  It  seems  he  made  no  use  of  artil 
lery,  though  on  the  field  right  and  left  the  opportunity 
was  fair.  The  troops  fought  bravely,  as  did  all  Confed 
erate  soldiers.  We  heard  the  steady,  rolling  fire  of  mus 
ketry  and  the  boom  of  cannon  that  told  of  deadly  work  as 
far  as  the  Williamsburg  road,  but  it  did  not  last.  General 
Hatton  was  killed,  General  Pettigrew  wounded  and  a  pris 
oner,  and  General  Hampton  wounded.  General  Smith 
was  beaten. 

General  Sumner  reported : 

"I  ordered  the  following  regiments,  Eighty-second  New  York, 
Thirty-fourth  New  York,  Fifteenth  Massachusetts,  Twentieth 
Massachusetts,  and  Seventh  Michigan,  to  move  to  the  front  and 
charge  bayonets.  There  were  two  fences  between  us  and  the 
enemy,  but  our  men  gallantly  rushed  over  them,  and  the  enemy 
broke  and  fled,  and  this  closed  the  battle  of  Saturday."  f 


*  Confederate  War  Papers,  G.  W.  Smith, 
t  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  763. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR    OAKS.  99 

General  Smith  sent  to  call  Hood's  brigade  from  his 
right,  and  posted  it,  about  dark,  near  Fair  Oaks  Station. 
At  parting,  General  Hood  said,  "  Our  people  over  yonder 
are  whipped." 

General  Wilcox  filed  his  three  brigades  into  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  road,  followed  by  two  of  Huger's  division  at 
five  o'clock.  He  was  reminded  of  his  orders  to  be  abreast 
of  the  battle,  and  that  he  was  only  four  hours  behind  it ; 
but  reported  that  while  marching  by  the  first  order  by  the 
Charles  City  road,  he  received  orders  to  try  the  Williams- 
burg  road ;  that,  marching  for  that  road,  he  was  called  by 
orders  to  follow  a  guide,  who  brought  him  back  to  the 
Charles  City  road.  He  confessed  that  his  orders  to  march 
with  the  front  of  battle  were  plain  and  well  understood, 
but  his  marches  did  not  quite  agree  with  the  comprehen 
sive  view  of  his  orders. 

Two  of  his  regiments — the  Eleventh  Alabama,  under 
Colonel  Sydenham  Moore,  and  the  Nineteenth  Mississippi, 
under  Major  Mullens — were  ordered  to  join  Kemper,  turn 
the  position  of  the  enemy  at  that  point,  and  capture  or 
dislodge  them.  With  the  other  regiments,  General  Wil 
cox  was  ordered  by  the  Williamsburg  road  to  report  to 
General  Hill,  Pryor's  brigade  to  follow  him,  Colston's 
brigade  to  support  the  move  under  Colonel  Moore. 

Armistead's  and  Mahone's  brigades,  of  Huger's  division, 
were  sent  to  R.  H.  Anderson,  who  was  ordered  to  put  them 
in  his  position  and  move  his  other  regiments  to  the  front. 

Colonel  Moore  hurried  his  leading  companies  into  the 
turning  move  against  Berry's  brigade  before  his  regiment 
was  up,  and  before  the  Mississippi  regiment  was  in  sup 
porting  distance,  and  fell  mortally  wounded.  General 
Kearny,  seeing  the  move  and  other  troops  marching  to 
wards  it,  ordered  his  troops  out  and  in  retreat  through  the 
swamp.  He  reported  of  it : 

"  Although  so  critically  placed,  and  despite  the  masses  that 
gathered  on  and  had  passed  us,  checked  the  enemy  in  his  intent 


100  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

of  cutting  off  against  the  White  Oak  Swamp.  This  enabled  the 
advanced  regiments,  arrested  by  orders  and  this  contest  in  the 
rear,  to  return  from  their  hitherto  victorious  career  and  retire  by  a 
remaining  wood-path  known  to  our  scouts  (the  saw-mill  road), 
until  they  once  more  arrived  at  and  remained  in  the  impregnable 
position  we  had  left  at  noon  at  our  own  fortified  division 
camp."  * 

He  states  the  hour  as  six  P.M. 

Birney's  brigade  of  Kearny's  division  was  ordered 
along  the  north  side  of  the  railroad  a  little  before  night, 
and  had  several  encounters  with  parts  of  R.  H.  Ander 
son's  brigade  and  some  regiments  of  G.  B.  Anderson's. 
Jenkins,  nothing  daunted,  pushed  his  brave  battle  forward 
until  the  shades  of  night  settled  about  the  wood,  and 
flashes  of  dark-lanterns  began  to  creep  through  the  pines 
in  search  of  wounded,  friend  and  foe. 

At  seven  o'clock,  General  Johnston  ordered  his  troops 
on  the  field  to  sleep  on  their  lines,  and  be  ready  to  renew 
operations  in  the  morning,  and  ordered  General  Smith  to 
call  up  other  troops  of  the  left  wing.  At  half  after  seven 
he  was  hit  by  a  rifle-ball,  then  a  fragment  of  shell  un 
horsed  him,  and  he  was  borne  from  the  field,  so  severely 
wounded  that  he  was  for  a  considerable  time  incapacitated 
for  duty.  The  command  devolved  temporarily  upon 
General  G.  W.  Smith.  General  Johnston  was  skilled  in 
the  art  and  science  of  war,  gifted  in  his  quick,  pene 
trating  mind  and  soldierly  bearing,  genial  and  affectionate 
in  nature,  honorable  and  winning  in  person,  and  confiding 
in  his  love.  He  drew  the  hearts  of  those  about  him  so 
close  that  his  comrades  felt  that  they  could  die  for  him. 
Until  his  recovery  the  Confederacy  experienced  a  serious 
deprivation,  and  when  that  occurred  he  was  no  longer 
commander-in-chief,  for  General  Lee  was  promptly  called 
to  the  post  of  honor. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  813. 


SEVEN    PINES,  OR    FAIR    OAKS.  101 

The  brigades  were  so  mixed  up  through  the  pines  when 
the  battle  closed  that  there  was  some  delay  in  getting  the 
regiments  to  their  proper  commands,  getting  up  supplies, 
and  arranging  for  the  morning.  D.  H.  Hill's  was  put  in 
good  order  and  in  bivouac  near  the  Casey  intrenchment ; 
those  of  Longstreet  between  the  Williamsburg  road  and 
railroad.  Wilcox's  brigade  took  position  on  the  right,  in 
place  of  the  detachment  under  Jenkins ;  Pryor's  brigade 
next  on  the  left ;  Kemper,  Anderson,  and  Colston  near 
the  stage  road  (Williamsburg).  They  made  blazing  fires 
of  pine-knots  to  dry  their  clothing  and  blankets,  and 
these  lighted  reinforcing  Union  troops  to  their  lines  be 
hind  the  railroad. 

The  brigades  of  Huger's  division  (Armistead's  and 
Mahone's)  were  near  the  left.  Pickett  was  ordered  to 
report  to  General  Hill  at  daylight,  also  the  batteries  of 
Maurin,  Stribling,  and  Watson.  It  was  past  eleven 
o'clock  when  all  things  were  made  ready  and  the  killed 
and  wounded  cared  for;  then  I  rode  to  find  the  head 
quarters  of  our  new  commander. 


SUMMARY  OF   FORCES  AND  LOSSES. 

Union  troops  engaged  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  re 
ported  by  General  Heiutzelman,  commanding  Casey's, 
Couch's,  and  Kearny's  divisions 18,500 

Hooker's  division  was  at  hand,  but  no  part  of  it  engaged. 

Confederates  engaged  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  of  D.  H. 
Hill's' division 8900* 

Two  brigades  and  two  regiments  of  Longstreet's  divi 
sion  5700 

14,600 

Two  lines  of  intrenchments  were  attacked  and  carried,  six  pieces  of 
artillery  and  several  thousand  small-arms  were  captured,  and  the  enemy 
was  forced  back  to  his  third  line  of  intrenchments  by  night,  a  mile  and 
a  half  from  the  point  of  his  opening. 


*  Previous   returns   give   him  11,000,   but  one  of  his  brigades  was 
absent. 


102  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Sedg wick's  division  is  not  separately  accounted  for,  but 
an  average  of  the  divisions  reported  by  General  Heiut- 
zelman  will  give  him  . 6080 

Estimate  of  Couch's  command 2000 

Union  force  against  General  Smith 8080 

Smith's  division,  five  brigades 10,500 

But  Hood's  brigade  was  not  engaged 2,100 

Of  Smith's  division  in  action 8  400 

Union  losses  on  the  Williamsburg  road 4563 

Confederate  losses  on  the  Williamsburg  road 3515 

Union  losses  on  the  Nine  Miles  road 468 

Confederate  losses  on  the  Nine  Miles  road 1283 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

SEQUELA    OF    SEVEN    PINES. 

The  Forces  under  Command  of  G.  W.  Smith  after  Johnston  was  wounded 
— The  Battle  of  the  1st — Longstreet  requests  Reinforcements  and  a 
Diversion— Council  held— McLaws  alone  sustains  Longstreet's  Oppo 
sition  to  retiring— Severe  Fighting — Pickett's  Brave  Stand— General 
Lee  assigned  to  Command— He  orders  the  withdrawal  of  the  Army 
— Criticism  of  General  Smith — Confederates  should  not  have  lost  the 
Battle—  Keyes's  Corroboration. 

MAJOK-GENERAL  G.  W.  SMITH  was  of  the  highest 
standing  of  the  West  Point  classes,  and,  like  others  of  the 
Engineers,  had  a  big  name  to  help  him  in  the  position  to 
which  he  had  been  suddenly  called  by  the  incapacitation 
of  the  Confederate  commander. 

I  found  his  head-quarters  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
reported  the  work  of  the  commands  on  the  Williamsburg 
road  on  the  31st,  and  asked  for  part  of  the  troops  ordered 
up  by  General  Johnston,  that  we  might  resume  battle  at 
daylight.  He  was  disturbed  by  reports  of  pontoon 
bridges,  said  to  be  under  construction  for  the  use  of  other 
reinforcements  to  join  the  enemy  from  the  east  side,  and 
was  anxious  lest  the  enemy  might  march  his  two  corps  on 
the  east  side  by  the  upper  river  and  occupy  Richmond. 
But  after  a  time  these  notions  gave  way,  and  he  suggested 
that  we  could  renew  the  battle  on  the  Williamsburg  road, 
provided  we  would  send  him  one  of  our  brigades  to  help 
hold  his  position  and  make  the  battle  by  a  wheel  on  his 
right  as  a  pivot. 

As  the  commands  stood,  Smith's  division  on  our  left 
was  at  right  angles  to  the  York  River  Railroad,  facing 
east,  his  right  near  Fair  Oaks  Station.  Besides  his  di 
vision  of  ten  thousand,  he  had  Magruder's  and  other 
commands  of  fresh  troops  near  him, — twenty  thousand. 

103 


104  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

My  left  lay  near  Smith's  right,  the  line  extending  parallel 
to  the  railroad  for  a  mile,  facing  north ;  thence  it  broke  to 
the  rear,  and  covered  the  ground  from  that  point  to  the 
swamp,  the  return  front  facing  the  enemy's  third  in 
trenched  line.  Smith's  part  of  the  field  was  open  and  fine 
for  artillery  practice.  The  field  fronting  on  the  railroad 
was  so  shut  in  by  heavy  pine  forest  and  tangled  swamp 
that  we  had  no  place  for  a  single  gun.  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  was  in  reserve  near  the  Casey  encampment. 

The  enemy  stood :  Sedgwick's  division  in  front  of 
Smith ;  Richardson's  division  in  column  of  three  brigades 
parallel  to  the  railroad  and  behind  it,  prepared  to  attack 
my  left;  on  Richardson's  left  was  Birney's  brigade  be 
hind  the  railroad,  and  under  the  enemy's  third  intrenched 
line  were  the  balance  of  the  Third  and  all  of  the  Fourth 
Corps.  So  the  plan  to  wheel  on  Smith's  right  as  a  pivot, 
my  right  stepping  out  on  the  wheel,  would  have  left  the 
Third  and  Fourth  Corps  to  attack  our  rear  as  soon  as  we 
moved. 

Besides,  it  was  evident  that  our  new  commander  would 
do  nothing,  and  we  must  look  to  accident  for  such  aid  as 
might  be  drawn  to  us  during  the  battle. 

The  plan  proposed  could  only  be  considered  under  the 
hypothesis  that  Magruder  would  come  in  as  the  pivotal 
point,  and,  upon  having  the  enemy's  line  fully  exposed, 
would  find  the  field  fine  for  his  batteries,  and  put  them 
in  practice  without  orders  from  his  commander,  and, 
breaking  the  enemy's  line  by  an  enfilade  fire  from  his 
artillery,  would  come  into  battle  and  give  it  cohesive 
power. 

I  left  head-quarters  at  three  o'clock,  and  after  an  hour's 
repose  rode  to  the  front  to  find  General  Hill.  Wilcox's 
brigade  was  on  my  right  on  the  return  front,  Pryor's 
brigade  on  his  left,  and  R.  H.  Anderson,  Kemper,  Col 
ston  j  Armistead,  and  Mahone  occupied  the  line  between  the 
Williamsburg  road  and  the  railroad.  Pickett's  brigade 


SEQUELS   OF   SEVEN    PINES.  105 

was  ordered  to  be  with  General  Hill  at  daylight,  and 
Maurin's,  Stribling's,  and  Watson's  batteries,  of  Pickett's 
brigade,  to  take  position  on  the  right  of  Armistead's. 

I  found  General  Hill  before  he  had  his  breakfast,  en 
joying  the  comforts  of  Casey's  camp.  Pickett  had  passed 
and  was  in  search  of  his  position,  which  was  soon  disclosed 
by  a  fusillade  from  the  front  of  Richardson's  division.  A 
party  of  "  bummers"  from  Richmond  had  found  their  way 
into  the  camp  at  Fair  Oaks,  and  were  getting  such  things 
as  they  could  put  their  hands  on.  They  were  taken  in 
the  gray  of  the  morning  for  Confederate  troops  and  fired 
upon.  This  made  some  confusion  with  our  new  troops, 
and  part  of  them  opened  fire  in  the  wrong  direction,  put 
ting  two  or  three  bullets  through  General  Hill's  tent 
before  he  got  out  of  it.  Hood's  brigade  of  Smith's  di 
vision,  the  pivotal  point,  came  under  this  fire,  and  was 
immediately  withdrawn.  Hood  reported  his  position 
good,  but  his  orders  were  to  retire. 

Our  cavalry  had  established  communication  with  head 
quarters,  and  gave  prompt  notice  of  movements  as  they 
occurred.  The  pivot  was  moving  to  the  rear,  but  battle 
on  the  Williamsburg  road  steadily  advanced,  with  orders 
to  develop  the  enemy's  battle  front  through  its  extent 
along  the  railroad  ;  not  to  make  the  fancied  wheel,  but  to 
expose  his  line  to  the  practice  of  our  batteries  on  the  Nine 
Miles  road. 

Our  infantry  moved  steadily,  engaging  French's  brigade 
of  Richardson's  division,  which  was  led  by  one  of  How 
ard's  regiments.  French  was  supported  by  Howard's 
brigade,  and  Howard  by  Meagher's,  and  the  firing  ex 
tended  along  my  line  as  far  as  the  return  front  of  my 
right.  But  Magruder  was  not  on  the  field  to  seize  the 
opportunity  for  his  artillery.  He  was  nowhere  near  the 
battle, — had  not  been  called.  General  Whiting,  however, 
saw  the  opportunity  so  inviting,  and  reported  to  his 
commander  at  half  after  six  o'clock, — 


106  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"  1  am  going  to  try  a  diversion  for  Longstreet,  and  have  found, 
as  reported,  a  position  for  artillery.  The  enemy  are  in  full  view 
and  in  heavy  masses.  I  have  ordered  up  Lee  with  four  pieces. 
The  musketry  firing  in  advance  is  tremendous."  * 

General  Smith  had  parties  posted  along  the  heights  of 
the  Chickahominy  in  close  observation  of  the  movements 
of  the  enemy's  forces  on  the  east  bank.  These  parties  re 
ported  from  time  to  time  that  the  enemy  was  moving  his 
forces  down  the  east  bank  and  crossing  them  over  to  take 
part  in  the  fight.  The  accounts  proved  false,  but  they 
continued  to  come  to  head-quarters,  and  were  forwarded 
to  my  command  on  the  Williamsburg  road  and  gave  us 
some  concern.  Failing  to  receive  approval  of  his  chief, 
General  Whiting  reported  at  nine  o'clock, — 

"If  I  don't  receive  an  answer  in  half  an  hour,  I  shall  com 
mence  withdrawing  my  forces."  f 

The  answer  he  received  was  to  throw  back  his  right  and 
take  position  a  little  nearer  to  the  New  Bridge  fork  of  the 
Nine  Miles  road,J  thus  swinging  the  pivot  farther  back. 
General  Smith  complained  that  the  enemy  was  getting 
into  the  interval  between  our  lines,  but  position  between 
two  fires  was  not  the  place  the  enemy  wanted ;  he  could 
not  know  that  Smith  wouldn't  shoot.  Under  this  long 
and  severe  infantry  fight  there  was  no  point  on  my*  part 
of  the  field  upon  which  we  could  post  a  single  gun.  Part 
of  Armistead's  new  troops  gave  way,  but  the  gallant  brig 
adier  maintained  his  ground  and  soon  collected  his  other 
regiments.  Before  this  I  had  reported  ready,  and  awaiting 
a  guide,  the  brigade  that  was  to  be  sent  over  to  the  Nine 
Miles  road.  At  half  after  ten  o'clock,  General  Smith 
sent  word  that  he  had  heard  nothing  of  the  brigade  ex 
pected  to  come  to  his  support,  and  renewed  his  reports 
of  the  enemy  crossing  over  and  concentrating  against  us 

*  Smith's  War  Papers.  f  Ibid.  J  Ibid. 


SEQUELAE    OF    SEVEN    PINES.  107 

on  the  Williamsburg  road.  He  repeated,  too,  his  wish  to 
have  his  cavalry  keep  close  communication  between  the 
wings  of  the  army.  This  close  communication  had  been 
established  early  in  the  morning  and  was  maintained 
through  the  day,  and  the  reports  of  the  enemy's  crossing 
were  all  false,  but  our  new  commander  seemed  to  forget. 
At  the  same  time  he  wrote  me, — 

"I  have  directed  Whiting  to  take  close  defensive  relations 
with  Magruder.  At  any  rate,  that  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
enable  a  good  defence  to  be  made  whilst  you  are  pivoting  on 
Whiting's  position."  * 

Whiting's  position,  instead  of  being  pivotal,  began  its 
rearward  move  at  the  opening  fire  at  daybreak,  and  con 
tinued  in  that  line  of  conduct  until  it  reached  a  point  of 
quiet.  General  Smith  was  informed  that  the  brigade  called 
for  by  him  would  not  be  sent  over ;  that  his  troops  were 
doing  nothing,  while  all  of 'mine  were  in  severe  battle, 
except  a  single  brigade,  and  the  enemy  was  massing  his 
fighting  force  against  me  ;  that  the  grounds  were  so  flooded 
that  it  was  difficult  to  keep  up  our  supply  of  ammunition ; 
that  with  the  aid  of  his  troops  the  battle  would  be  ours. 

But  just  then  he  held  a  council  with  Generals  McLaws 
and  Whiting  and  Chief  Engineer  Stevens,  and  submitted 
the  question,  "Must  the  troops  be  withdrawn,  or  the 
attack  continued  ?" 

All  voted  in  favor  of  the  former  except  McLaws.  In 
a  letter,  since  written,  he  has  said, — 

"I  alone  urged  that  you  be  reinforced  and  the  attack  con 
tinued,  and  the  question  was  reconsidered,  and  I  was  sent  to 
learn  your  views."  f 

Before  General  McLaws  found  me,  I  wrote  General 
Smith, — 

*  Smith's  War  Papers.  t  Ibid. 


108  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"Can  you  reinforce  me1?  The  entire  enemy  seems  to  be  op 
posed  to  me.  We  cannot  hold  out  unless  we  get  help.  If  we  can 
fight  together,  we  can  finish  the  work  to-day,  and  Mac's  time  will 
be  up.  If  I  cannot  get  help,  I  fear  that  I  must  fall  back.'7 

General  McLaws  reported  of  his  ride  to  my  lines, — 

"I  went  and  found  you  with  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.  You  were  in 
favor  of  resuming  the  assault,  and  wanted  five  thousand  men."  * 

Nothing  was  sent  in  reply  to  McLaws's  report,  but  we 
soon  learned  that  the  left  wing  of  the  army  was  quiet 
and  serene  in  defensive  positions  about  the  New  Bridge 
fork  of  the  Nine  Miles  road. 

At  the  first  quiet  of  our  battle,  after  the  left  wing  quit 
the  field,  I  ordered  the  brigades  withdrawn  to  defensive 
position  about  the  trenches  at  Seven  Pines,  but  before  the 
order  reached  the  front  the  fight  was  renewed  by  Hooker's 
division  upon  AVilcox  and  Pryor,  and  reached  out  to  our 
left  near  Fair  Oaks.  In  the  heat  of  this,  General  Wilcox 
received  the  order  to  retire,  and  in  undue  haste  pulled  his 
command  out,  assumed  authority  over  Pryor,  and  ordered 
him  off.  Pickett,  the  true  soldier,  knowing  that  the  order 
was  not  intended  for  such  emergency,  stood  and  resisted 
the  attack.  Colston  was  sent  to  his  aid,  and  the  attack 
was  repulsed.  Immediately  after  this  repulse  was  a  quiet 
advance  upon  Pickett's  right.  The  commander  asked, 
"What  troops  are  these ?"  "Virginians!"  "Don't 
fire !"  he  ordered ;  "  we  will  capture  the  last  one  of  these 
Virginians."  Just  then  the  Virginians  rose  and  opened 
a  fearful  fire  that  drove  him  back  to  his  bushy  cover, 
which  ended  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines.  Pickett  was 
withdrawn  to  position  assigned  for  his  brigade,  our  line  of 
skirmishers  remaining  near  the  enemy's  during  the  day 
and  night.  General  Wilcox  reported  of  his  battle,  when 

*  Letter  from  General  McLaws. 


SEQUELS   OF    SEVEN    PINES.  109 

he  pulled  off  from  it,  that  he  was  doing  as  well  as  he 
could  wish,  but  General  Hooker  reported,  "  Pursuit  was 
hopeless." 

The  failure  of  the  enemy  to  push  the  opportunity  made 
by  the  precipitate  retreat  of  General  Wilcox,  and  Pickett's 
successful  resistance,  told  that  there  was  nothing  in  the 
reports  of  troops  coming  over  from  the  east  side  to  take 
part  in  the  battle,  and  we  were  convinced  that  the  river 
was  not  passable.  I  made  an  appeal  for  ten  thousand 
men,  that  we  might  renew  our  battle  without  regard  to 
General  Smith  and  those  about  him.  It  received  no  more 
consideration  than  the  appeal  made  through  General 
McLaws. 

Then  General  Lee,  having  been  assigned  to  command, 
came  upon  the  field  after  noon  by  the  Nine  Miles  road, 
and,  with  General  Smith,  came  over  to  the  Williamsburg 
road.  A  similar  proposition  was  made  General  Lee,  but 
General  Smith  protested  that  the  enemy  was  strongly  for 
tified.  At  the  time  the  enemy's  main  battle  front  was 
behind  the  railroad,  fronting  against  me  but  exposed  to 
easy  enfilade  fire  of  batteries  to  be  posted  on  his  right 
flank  on  the  Nine  Miles  road,  while  his  front  against  me 
was  covered  by  the  railway  embankment.  It  is  needless 
to  add  that  under  the  fire  of  batteries  so  posted  his  lines 
would  have  been  broken  to  confusion  in  twenty  minutes. 
General  Holmes  marched  down  the  Williamsburg  road 
and  rested  in  wait  for  General  Lee.  Like  General  Huger, 
he  held  rank  over  me.  General  Lee  ordered  the  troops 
back  to  their  former  lines.  Those  on  the  Williamsburg 
road  were  drawn  back  during  the  night,  the  rear-guard, 
Pickett's  brigade,  passing  the  Casey  works  at  sunrise  on 
the  2d  unmolested.  Part  of  Kichardson's  division  mistook 
the  camp  at  Fair  Oaks  for  the  Casey  camp,  and  claimed 
to  have  recovered  it  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  but  it  was 
not  until  the  morning  of  the  2d  that  the  Casey  camp  was 
abandoned. 


110  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  Confederate  losses  in  the  two  days'  fight  were 
6134;  the  Union  losses,  5031. 

It  seems  from  Union  accounts  that  all  of  our  dead  were 
not  found  and  buried  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st.  It  is 
possible,  as  our  battle  was  in  the  heavy  forest  and  swamp 
tangles. 

General  Smith  has  written  a  great  deal  about  the  battle 
of  Seven  Pines  during  the  past  twenty  or  thirty  years,  in 
efforts  to  show  that  the  failure  of  success  was  due  to  want 
of  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  forces  on  the  Williamsburg 
road.  He  claims  that  he  was  only  out  as  a  party  of  obser 
vation,  to  prevent  reinforcement  of  the  enemy  from  the 
east  side  of  the  river,  and  that  he  kept  Sumner  off  of  us. 
But  he  waited  three  hours  after  the  enemy's  ranks  and 
lines  had  been  broken,  instead  of  moving  with  and  finish 
ing  the  battle,  thus  giving  Sumner  time  to  march  from 
the  east  of  the  river,  and  strike  him  and  beat  him  to  dis 
order,  and  change  the  lost  battle  to  success.  He  shows 
that  Hill's  and  Longstreet's  divisions  could  have  gained 
the  battle  unaided, — which  may  be  true  enough,  but  it 
would  have  been  a  fruitless  success,  for  the  enemy  got 
forces  over  to  protect  those  of  the  west  side ;  whereas, 
the  stronger  battle,  ordered  by  the  four  divisions,  could 
and  would  have  made  a  complete  success  of  it  but  for  the 
balky  conduct  of  the  divisions  ordered  to  guard  the  flanks. 
Instead  of  six  hours'  hard  work  to  reach  the  enemy's  third 
line,  we  could  have  captured  it  in  the  second  hour  and 
had  the  field  cleaned  up  before  Sumner  crossed  the  river. 

General  Keyes,  the  commander  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
in  his  "  Fifty  Years'  Observations,"  says, — 

"The  left  of  my  lines  were  all  protected  by  the  White  Oak 
Swamp,  but  the  right  was  on  ground  so  favorable  to  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  and  so  far  from  the  Chickahominy,  that  if  Johnston 
had  attacked  them  an  hour  or  two  earlier  than  he  did,  I  could 
have  made  but  a  feeble  defence  comparatively,  and  every  man  of 
us  would  have  been  killed,  captured,  or  driven  into  the  swamp  or 
river  before  assistance  could  have  reached  us.'7 


SEQUELS   OF    SEVEN    PINES.  Ill 

General  Smith  lay  in  wait  three  hours  after  the  enemy's 
positions  were  broken  and  carried,  giving  ample  time  for 
the  march  of  the  succoring  forces.  The  hour  of  the  at 
tack  was  not  so  important  as  prompt  and  vigorous  work. 
If  the  battle  had  opened  at  sunrise,  Smith  would  have 
made  the  same  wait,  and  Sumner's  march  would  have  been 
in  time  to  beat  him.  All  elements  of  success  were  in  the 
plan,  but  balky  troops  will  mar  the  strongest  plans.  He 
tries  to  persuade  himself  that  he  intended  to  join  our 
battle  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  but  there  was  no  fight 
in  his  heart  after  his  maladroit  encounter  with  Sedgwick's 
division  on  the  afternoon  of  the  31st.  The  opportunity 
for  enfilade  fire  of  his  artillery  along  the  enemy's  battle 
front,  at  the  morning  opening  and  all  of  the  forenoon, 
was  waiting  him ;  while  reports  of  the  enemy  crossing 
the  river,  reinforcing  against  my  single  contest,  were  de 
manding  relief  and  aid. 

He  reported  sick  on  the  2d  and  left  the  army.  When 
ready  for  duty  he  was  assigned  about  Richmond  and  the 
seaboard  of  North  Carolina.  He  applied  to  be  restored 
to  command  of  his  division  in  the  field,  but  the  authorities 
thought  his  services  could  be  used  better  elsewhere.  He 
resigned  his  commission  in  the  Confederate  service,  went 
to  Georgia,  and  joined  Joe  Brown's  militia,  where  he  found 
congenial  service,  better  suited  to  his  ideas  of  vigorous 
warfare. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

EGBERT    E.    LEE    IN    COMMAND. 

The  Great  General's  Assignment  not  at  first  assuring  to  the  Army- 
Able  as  an  Engineer  but  limited  as  to  Field  Service— He  makes  the 
Acquaintance  of  his  Lieutenants — Calls  a  Council— Gains  Confidence 
by  saying  Nothing — "  A  Little  Humor  now  and  then" — Lee  plans  a 
Simultaneous  Attack  on  McClellan's  Front  and  Rear— J.  E.  B.  Stuart's 
Daring  Reconnoissance  around  the  Union  Army. 

THE  assignment  of  General  Lee  to  command  the  army 
of  Northern  Virginia  was  far  from  reconciling  the  troops 
to  the  loss  of  our  beloved  chief,  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  with 
whom  the  army  had  been  closely  connected  since  its  earli 
est  active  life.  All  hearts  had  learned  to  lean  upon  him 
with  confidence,  and  to  love  him  dearly.  General  Lee's 
experience  in  active  field  work  was  limited  to  his  West 
Virginia  campaign  against  General  Rosecrans,  which  was 
not  successful.  His  services  on  our  coast  defences  were 
known  as  able,  and  those  who  knew  him  in  Mexico  as 
one  of  the  principal  engineers  of  General  Scott's  column, 
marching  for  the  capture  of  the  capital  of  that  great  re 
public,  knew  that  as  military  engineer  he  was  especially 
distinguished ;  but  officers  of  the  line  are  not  apt  to  look 
to  the  staff  in  choosing  leaders  of  soldiers,  either  in  tac 
tics  or  strategy.  There  were,  therefore,  some  misgivings 
as  to  the  power  and  skill  for  field  service  of  the  new 
commander.  The  change  was  accepted,  however,  as  a 
happy  relief  from  the  existing  halting  policy  of  the  late 
temporary  commander. 

During  the  first  week  of  his  authority  he  called  his 
general  officers  to  meet  him  on  the  Nine  Miles  road  for  a 
general  talk.  This  novelty  was  not  reassuring,  as  experience 
had  told  that  secrecy  in  war  was  an  essential  element  of  suc 
cess  ;  that  public  discussion  and  secrecy  were  incompatible. 
112 


ROBEKT  E.  LEE  IN  COMMAND.  113 

As  he  disclosed  nothing,  those  of  serious  thought  became 
hopeful,  and  followed  his  wise  example.  The  brigadiers 
talked  freely,  but  only  of  the  parts  of  the  line  occupied 
by  their  brigades ;  and  the  meeting  finally  took  a  playful 
turn.  General  Toombs's  brigade  was  before  some  formi 
dable  works  under  construction  by  General  Franklin. 
He  suggested  an  elevation  a  few  hundred  yards  in  his  rear, 
as  a  better  defensive  line  and  more  comfortable  position 
for  his  men ;  a  very  good  military  point.  This  seemed 
strange  in  General  Toombs,  however,  as  he  was  known  to 
have  frequent  talks  with  his  troops,  complaining  of  West 
Point  men  holding  the  army  from  battle,  digging  and 
throwing  up  lines  of  sand  instead  of  showing  lines  of 
battle,  where  all  could  have  fair  fight. 

Eeferring  to  his  suggestion  to  retire  and  construct  a 
new  line,  General  D.  H.  Hill,  who  behind  the  austere 
presence  of  a  major-general  had  a  fund  of  dry  humor, 
said, — 

"I  think  it  may  be  better  to  advance  General  Toombs' s  brigade, 
till  he  can  bring  Franklin's  working  parties  under  the  fire  of  his 
short-range  arms,  so  that  the  working  parties  may  be  broken  up." 

General  Whiting,  who  was  apprehensive  of  bayous  and 
parallels,  complained  of  sickness  in  his  command,  and 
asked  a  change  of  position  from  the  unfair  Fair  Oaks. 
Though  of  brilliant,  highly  cultivated  mind,  the  dark  side 
of  the  picture  was  always  more  imposing  with  him.  Sev 
eral  of  the  major-generals  failed  to  join  us  till  the  confer 
ence  was  about  to  disperse.  All  rode  back  to  their  camps 
little  wiser  than  when  they  went,  except  that  they  found 
General  Lee's  object  was  to  learn  of  the  temper  of  those 
of  his  officers  whom  he  did  not  know,  and  of  the  condi 
tion  and  tone  among  their  troops.  He  ordered  his  engi 
neers  over  the  line  occupied  by  the  army,  to  rearrange 
its  defensive  construction,  and  to  put  working  parties  on 
all  points  needing  reinforcing.  Whiting's  division  was 


114  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

broken  up.  Three  of  the  brigades  were  ordered  to  A.  P. 
Hill's  division.  He  was  permitted  to  choose  two  brigades 
that  were  to  constitute  his  own  command.  Besides  his 
own,  he  selected  Hood's  brigade.  With  these  two  he  was 
ordered  by  way  of  Lynchburg  to  report  to  General 
Jackson,  in  the  Valley  district. 

General  Lee  was  seen  almost  daily  riding  over  his  lines, 
making  suggestions  to  working  parties  and  encouraging 
their  efforts  to  put  sand-banks  between  their  persons  and 
the  enemy's  batteries,  and  they  were  beginning  to  appre 
ciate  the  value  of  such  adjuncts.  Above  all,  they  soon 
began  to  look  eagerly  for  his  daily  rides,  his  pleasing  yet 
commanding  presence,  and  the  energy  he  displayed  in 
speeding  their  labors. 

The  day  after  the  conference  on  the  Nine  Miles  road, 
availing  myself  of  General  Lee's  invitation  to  free  inter 
change  of  ideas,  I  rode  over  to  his  head-quarters,  and 
renewed  my  suggestion  of  a  move  against  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  right  flank,  which  rested  behind  Beaver  Dam 
Creek.  The  strength  of  the  position  was  explained,  and 
mention  made  that,  in  consequence  of  that  strong  ground, 
a  move  somewhat  similar,  ordered  by  General  Johnston 
for  the  28th  of  May,  was  abandoned.  At  the  same  time 
he  was  assured  that  a  march  of  an  hour  could  turn  the 
head  of  the  creek  and  dislodge  the  force  behind  it.  He 
received  me  pleasantly  and  gave  a  patient  hearing  to  the 
suggestions,  without  indicating  approval  or  disapproval. 
A  few  days  after  he  wrote  General  Jackson  :  * 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,    NEAR  RICHMOND,    VA., 

"  June  11,  1862. 
"  BRIGADIER- GENERAL  THOMAS  J.  JACKSON, 

"  Commanding  Valley  District: 

"  GENERAL, — Your  recent  successes  have  been  the  cause  of  the 
liveliest  joy  in  this  army  as  well  as  in  the  country.  The  admira 
tion  excited  by  your  skill  and  boldness  has  been  constantly 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  iii.  p.  910. 


KOBEKT    E.    LEE    IN    COMMAND.  115 

mingled  with  solicitude  for  your  situation.  The  practicability 
of  reinforcing  you  has  been  the  subject  of  earnest  consideration. 
It  has  been  determined  to  do  so  at  the  expense  of  weakening 
this  army.  Brigadier- General  Lawton,  with  six  regiments  from 
Georgia,  is  on  the  way  to  you,  and  Brigadier-General  Whiting, 
with  eight  veteran  regiments,  leaves  here  to-day.  The  object  is 
to  enable  you  to  crush  the  forces  opposed  to  you.  Leave  your 
enfeebled  troops  to  watch  the  country  and  guard  the  passes  cov 
ered  by  your  cavalry  and  artillery,  and  with  your  main  body, 
including  Ewell's  division  and  Lawton' s  and  Whiting's  com 
mands,  move  rapidly  to  Ashland  by  rail  or  otherwise,  as  you 
may  find  most  advantageous,  and  sweep  down  between  the  Chick  - 
ahominy  and  Pamunkey,  cutting  up  the  enemy's  communica 
tions,  etc.,  while  this  army  attacks  General  McClellan  in  front. 
He  will  thus,  I  think,  be  forced  to  come  out  of  his  intrench- 
ments,  where  he  is  strongly  posted  on  the  Chickahoniiny,  and 
apparently  preparing  to  move  by  gradual  approaches  on  Eich- 
mond.  Keep  me  advised  of  your  movements,  and,  if  practicable, 
precede  your  troops,  that  we  may  confer  and  arrange  for  simul 
taneous  attack. 

"I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE,  General" 

The  brigades  under  Generals  Lawton  and  Whiting 
were  transported  as  above  ordered. 

As  indicated  in  his  letter  to  General  Jackson,  General 
Lee's  plan  was  a  simultaneous  attack  on  General  McClel- 
lan's  army  front  and  rear.  Following  his  instructions  for 
General  Jackson,  on  the  same  day  he  ordered  his  cavalry, 
under  General  Stuart,  upon  a  forced  reconnoissance  around 
General  McClellan's  army  to  learn  if  the  ground  behind 
his  army  was  open. 

These  plans  and  the  promptness  with  which  they  were 
conceived  and  put  in  operation  ought  to  be  a  sufficient 
refutation  of  the  silly  report  that  the  Confederacy  had 
any  idea  of  withdrawing  from  their  capital, — a  report 
which,  notwithstanding  its  unreasonable  nature,  was  given 
a  degree  of  credence  in  some  quarters.* 

*  Of  interest  in  this  connection  is  a  letter  to  the  author  from  General 
D.  H.  Hill : 


116  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPO?.IATTOX. 

Upon  nearing  Richmond,  after  leaving  Yorktown,  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  first  thought  had  been  to  stand  on  the 
table-lands  between  the  Pamunkey  and  the  Chickahominy 
Rivers,  on  the  flank  of  McClellan's  march  for  Rich 
mond,  and  force  him  into  battle.  He  selected  ground 
with  that  view  and  posted  his  army,  where  it  remained 
some  eight  days,  giving  general  and  engineer  officers 
opportunity  to  ride  over  and  learn  the  topographical 
features  of  the  surroundings.  A  prominent  point  was 
Beaver  Dam  Creek,  which  was  so  noted  by  the  officers. 
When  Johnston  proposed  to  recross  the  Chickahominy 
and  make  battle  on  the  28th  of  May,  in  anticipation  of 
McDowell's  approach,  the  strong  ground  at  Beaver  Dam 
Creek  again  came  under  discussion  and  was  common  talk 
between  the  generals,  so  that  the  position  and  its  ap 
proaches  became  a  familiar  subject.  Then  Stuart's  famous 
ride  had  correlative  relation  to  the  same,  and  drew  us  to 
careful  study  of  the  grounds. 

For  the  execution  of  his  orders  General  Stuart  took 
twelve  hundred  cavalry  and  a  section  of  Stuart's  horse 
artillery.  The  command  was  composed  of  parts  of  the 
First,  Fourth,  and  Ninth  Virginia  Cavalry.  The  Fourth, 

"  FAYETTEVILLE,  ARK.,  February  4,  1879. 
"  GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET  : 

"Mv  DEAR  GENERAL, — I  never  heard  of  the  proposed  abandonment 
of  Richmond  at  the  time  General  Lee  took  command.  I  had  charge 
of  one  of  the  four  divisions  with  which  the  retreat  from  Yorktown  was 
effected,  and  was  called  several  times  into  General  Lee's  most  important 
councils.  I  never  heard  any  officer  suggest  such  a  course  in  these  coun 
cils  or  in  private  conversations. 

"  I  feel  sure  that  General  Johnston  always  intended  to  fight  the  in 
vading  force,  and  so  far  as  I  know  no  officer  of  rank  entertained  any 
other  view. 

"I  remember  very  well  that  some  days  before  the  council  on  the 
Nine  Miles  road  (when  yourself,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  myself  were  present) 
that  you  suggested  the  plan  of  attacking  McClellan's  right  flank,  and 
that  I  expressed  my  preference  for  an  attack  on  the  other  flank.  This 
shows  that  there  was  no  thought  of  retreat. 

"  Very  truly  yours, 

"D.  H.  HILL." 


ROBERT    E.    LEE    IN   COMMAND.  117 

having  no  field  officer  on  duty  with  it,  was  distributed  for 
the  expedition  between  the  First,  Colonel  Fitzhugh  Lee, 
and  the  Ninth,  Colonel  W.  H.  F.  Lee  commanding ;  also 
two  squadrons  of  the  Jeff  Davis  Legion,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  W.  T.  Martin  commanding.  The  section  of  artil 
lery  was  under  First  Lieutenant  James  Breathed. 

On  the  night  of  the  12th  of  June  he  gathered  his 
squadrons  beyond  the  Chickahominy,  and  the  next  day 
marched  by  the  road  west  of  the  Richmond,  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  Potomac  Railroad  towards  Louisa  Court-House, 
to  produce  the  impression,  should  the  march  be  discovered, 
that  he  was  going  to  join  General  Jackson.  After  a 
march  of  fifteen  miles,  he  bivouacked  in  the  pine  forests 
of  Hanover,  near  the  South  Anna  Bridge,  without  light 
or  sound  of  bugle,  and,  throwing  aside  the  cares  of  the 
day  and  thoughts  of  the  morrow,  sunk  to  repose  such  as 
the  soldier  knows  how  to  enjoy.  An  hour  before  daylight 
he  was  up  in  readiness  to  move  as  soon  as  the  first  light 
of  morning  revealed  the  line  of  march.  Up  to  that  mo 
ment  no  one  of  the  expedition,  except  the  commander, 
knew  the  direction  or  the  purpose  of  the  march.  He 
called  his  principal  officers  about  him  and  told  of  the 
object  of  the  ride,  and  impressed  the  necessity  for  secrecy, 
prompt  and  intelligent  attention  to  orders.  At  the  mute 
signal  the  twelve  hundred  men  swung  into  their  saddles 
and  took  the  road  leading  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  army.  At  Hanover  Court-House  a  small  force 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  discovered,  but  they  retired 
towards  their  camp,  out  of  the  line  of  Stuart's  ride.  At 
Hawes's  Shop  a  picket  was  driven  off  and  several  vedettes 
captured.  They  proved  to  be  of  the  Fifth  United  States 
Cavalry,  General  Lee's  old  regiment.  Between  Hawes's 
Shop  and  Old  Church  the  advance-guard,  well  to  the 
front,  reported  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  apparently  in 
some  force.  The  column  pressed  forward,  expecting  a 
fierce  encounter  of  Southern  volunteers  with  United  States 


118          FKOM  MAN  ASS  AS  TO  APPOMATTOX. 

regulars,  but  the  latter  was  a  single  troop  and  retreated 
beyond  Totopotomy  Creek  to  Old  Church,  where  there 
was  a  camp  of  four  companies  of  the  Fifth  Cavalry  under 
Captain  Royal,  which  made  a  brave  stand.  Captain 
Latane  led  the  first  squadron,  and  Captain  Royal  received 
the  first  shock,  and  furiously  the  combat  went  on,  both 
leaders  falling,  Latane  dead  and  Royal  severely  wounded. 
The  enemy  fied  and  scattered  through  the  woods.  A 
number  of  prisoners  were  taken,  including  several  officers, 
and  there  were  captured  horses,  arms,  equipments,  and 
four  guidons.  In  the  enemy's  camp,  near  Old  Church, 
several  officers  and  privates  were  captured,  a  number  of 
horses  and  arms  taken,  and  the  stores  and  tents  were 
burned.  Here  it  became  a  question  whether  to  attempt 
to  return  by  way  of  Hanover  Court-House  or  to  press  on 
and  try  to  make  a  circuit  around  the  entire  army,  and 
take  the  chance  of  fording  or  swimming  the  Chicka- 
hominy  beyond  the  enemy's  extreme  left.  Stuart  decided 
that  the  bolder  ride  "  was  the  quintessence  of  prudence."  * 
Arriving  opposite  Garlick's,  on  the  Pamunkey, — one  of 
the  enemy's  supply  stations, — a  squadron  was  sent  out  and 
burned  two  transports  with  army  stores  and  a  number  of 
wagons.  Near  Tunstall's  Station  a  wagon-train  was  dis 
covered  guarded  by  five  companies  of  cavalry,  which 
manifested  a  determination  to  stand  and  defend  it,  but 
they  abandoned  it  and  rode  away,  leaving  the  train  in 
possession  of  Stuart,  who  burned  it,  and,  night  coming  on, 
the  country  was  brilliantly  lighted  up  by  its  flames.  After 
resting  a  few  hours  at  Talleysville,  the  ride  was  resumed, 
and  the  party  reached  the  Chickahominy  at  Forges  Bridge 
at  daylight.  The  stream  was  not  fordable,  but,  by  exer 
cise  of  great  energy  and  industry,  a  rude  foot-bridge  was 
laid.  That  part  of  the  command  near  it  dismounted  and 
walked  over,  swimming  their  horses.  In  a  few  hours  the 

*  Official  account,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  i.  p.  1036. 


ROBERT  E.  LEE  IN  COMMAND.  119 

bridge  was  made  strong  and  the  artillery  and  other  mounts 
were  passed  safely  over  to  the  Richmond  side,  and  resumed 
the  march  for  their  old  camp-grounds. 

This  was  one  of  the  most  graceful  and  daring  rides 
known  to  military  history,  and  revealed  valuable  facts 
concerning  the  situation  of  the  Union  forces,  their  opera 
tions,  communications,  etc.  When  congratulated  upon 
his  success,  General  Stuart  replied,  with  a  lurking  twinkle 
in  his  eye,  that  he  had  left  a  general  behind  him.  Asked 
as  to  the  identity  of  the  unfortunate  person,  he  said,  with 
his  joyful  laugh,  "  General  Consternation." 


CHAPTEE   X. 

FIGHTING    ALONG    THE    CHICKAHOMINY. 

Eetreat— Lee's  Bold  Initiative— Lee  and  his  Lieutenants  planning 
Battle— The  Confederates'  Loss  at  Mechanicsville— Gaines's  Mill— A. 
P.  Hill's  Fight — Longstreet's  Reserve  Division  put  in — McClellan's 
Change  of  Base— Savage  Station — Longstreet  engages  McClellan's 
Main  Force  at  Frayser's  Farm  (or  Glendale)— President  Davis  on  the 
Field — Testimony  of  Federal  Generals— Fierce  Bayonet  Charges — 
"Greek  meets  Greek"— Capture  of  General  McCall— McClellau's 
Masterly  Retreat. 

THE  day  after  Stuart's  return  I  rode  over  to  General 
Lee's  head-quarters  and  suggested  that  General  Jackson 
be  withdrawn  from  the  Valley  to  take  position  on  our 
left,  to  march  against  McClellan's  right,  and  was  informed 
that  the  order  for  Jackson  was  sent  when  Whiting's  di 
vision  was  detached  and  sent  to  join  him. 

Then  it  was  that  General  Lee  revealed  the  plan  indi 
cated  in  his  instructions  of  the  llth,  for  General  Jackson 
to  march  down  and  attack  McClellan's  rear,  while  he 
made  a  simultaneous  attack  upon  his  front.  The  sugges 
tion  was  offered  that  the  enemy  had  probably  destroyed 
the  bridges  and  ferries  on  the  Pamunkey  along  the  line 
of  his  rear,  which  might  leave  Jackson  in  perilous  condi 
tion  if  the  front  attack  should  be  delayed  ;  that  that  attack 
must  be  hazardous,  as  the  enemy  was  in  well-fortified 
positions  with  four  army  corps.  After  deliberation,  he 
changed  the  plan  and  accepted  the  suggestion  in  favor 
of  combining  his  fighting  columns  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Chickahominy  in  echelon  march  against  McClellan's 
right  flank,  leaving  troops  in  the  trenches  in  front  of 
McClellan  to  defend  in  case  of  a  move  towards  Richmond. 

At  the  first  mention  of  this  march  before  this  conference 

a  change  of  base  was  spoken  of  by  General  D.  H.  Hill, 
120 


FIGHTING    ALONG    THE    CHICKAHOMINY.  121 

but  with  our  troops  to  be  left  in  the  trenches,  so  near  the 
flank  of  such  a  move,  and  our  columns  afield,  pressing 
close  upon  its  rear,  it  was  thought  impracticable.  General 
D.  H.  Hill,  in  view  of  the  possibility,  preferred  that  our 
attack  should  be  made  against  the  enemy's  left  by  crossing 
White  Oak  Swamp  below  the  enemy's  left. 

Jackson  was  called  in  advance  of  his  command  to  meet 
the  Hills  and  myself  at  General  Lee's  head-quarters  for 
conference  on  the  execution.  On  the  forenoon  of  the  23d 
of  June  we  were  advised  of  his  approach,  and  called  to 
head-quarters  to  meet  him.  He  was  there  before  us,  having 
ridden  fifty  miles  by  relay  of  horses  since  midnight.  We 
were  together  in  a  few  minutes  after  his  arrival,  in  Gen 
eral  Lee's  private  office.  The  general  explained  the  plan 
briefly  :  Jackson  to  march  from  Ashland  by  heights  be 
tween  the  Chickahominy  and  Pamunkey,  turning  and 
dislodging  the  Federal  right,  thus  clearing  the  way  for 
the  march  of  troops  to  move  on  his  right ;  A.  P.  Hill  to 
cross  the  upper  Chickahominy  and  march  for  Mechanics- 
ville,  in  echelon  to  Jackson ;  the  Mechanicsville  Bridge 
being  clear,  D.  H.  Hill's  division  and  mine  to  cross,  the 
former  to  reinforce  Jackson's  column,  the  latter  to  file  to 
the  right  and  march  down  the  river  in  right  echelon  to 
A.  P.  Hill's  direct  march  through  Mechanicsville  to 
Gaines's  Mill. 

General  Lee  then  excused  himself  to  attend  to  office 
business,  asking  that  we  talk  the  matter  over  for  our 
better  comprehension. 

Turning  to  Jackson,  I  said, — 

"You  have  distance  to  overcome,  and  in  all  probability  ob 
stacles  will  be  thrown  in  the  way  of  yonr  march  by  the  enemy. 
As  your  move  is  the  key  of  the  campaign,  you  should  appoint 
the  hour  at  which  the  connection  may  be  made  co-operative." 

He  promptly  responded,— 
"The  morning  of  the  25th." 


122  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

I  expressed  doubt  of  his  meeting  that  hour,  and  sug 
gested  that  it  would  be  better  to  take  a  little  more  time, 
as  the  movements  of  our  columns  could  be  readily  ad 
justed  to  those  of  his.  He  then  appointed  the  morning 
of  the  26th. 

Upon  his  return,  report  was  made  General  Lee  that 
the  officers  understood,  and  would  be  prepared  to  execute 
the  plans ;  that  General  Jackson  had  appointed  the  morn 
ing  of  the  26th,  when  he  would  lead  the  march.  Verbal 
instructions  were  given,  followed  by  written  orders,  em 
bodying  in  minute  detail  the  plan  already  given  in  general. 

The  topographical  features  of  the  ground  about  Beaver 
Dam  Creek  have  been  given  in  a  former  chapter.  Behind 
it  battery  epaulements  had  been  skilfully  laid  and  con 
structed,  as  well  as  rifle-trenches.  These  were  occupied 
by  the  troops  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  commanded  by  General 
Fitz-John  Porter.  McCall's  division  had  joined  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  was  assigned  as  part  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  with  the  divisions  of  Sykes  and  Morell.  Two  of 
McCalPs  brigades,  J.  F.  Reynolds's  and  Seymour's,  with 
thoroughly-equipped  artillery,  were  especially  charged 
with  the  defences,  the  Third  Brigade,  Meade's,  in  reserve, 
the  other  divisions  in  supporting  distance.  McCall's  ad 
vanced  brigades  had  guards  at  the  bridges  as  far  as 
Meadow  Bridge,  and  a  strong  outpost  at  Mechanicsville, 
under  orders  to  retire  when  the  strength  of  the  enemy's 
advance  was  so  developed  as  to  warrant  their  doing  so. 

Three  batteries,  two  of  six  guns  each  and  one  of  four, 
manned  the  epaulements  at  the  opening  of  the  fight. 

Before  sunrise  on  the  26th  of  June  the  division  of  A.  P. 
Hill  was  in  position  at  Meadow  Bridge  ;  his  brigade,  under 
General  Branch,  and  Johnson's  battery,  seven  miles  above, 
at  Brook  Turnpike  Bridge ;  my  division  and  that  of  D. 
H.  Hill  on  the  heights  overlooking  the  Mechanicsville 
Bridge, — all  awaiting  the  approach  of  the  initial  column. 
Not  anticipating  delay,  the  divisions  had  no  special  cause 


FIGHTING   ALONG    THE    CHICK AHOMINY.  123 

to  conceal  their  presence,  nor  did  the  lay  of  the  ground 
offer  good  cover.     Morning  came,  and  noon  passed. 

A  few  minutes  after  ten  A.M.,  General  Branch  received 
a  note  informing  him  that,  at  the  hour  of  its  writing, 
General  Jackson's  column  was  crossing  the  Central  Rail 
road.  He  assembled  his  command,  crossed  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  and  marched  down  along  the  route  designated  for 
his  column,  without  sending  information  to  the  division 
commander.  Of  his  march  he  reported, — 

' i  Interruption  by  the  enemy,  but  with  no  other  effect  than  to 
retard  without  cheeking  our  march. 

"Near  Crenshaw's  the  road  on  which  the  column  commanded 
by  Major-General  Ewell"  (of  Jackson's)  "was  advancing  and 
that  on  which  I  was  advancing  approach  within  one-fourth  of  a 
mile  of  each  other.  The  heads  of  our  columns  reached  this  point 
simultaneously,  and,  after  a  short  personal  interview  between 
General  Ewell  and  myself,  we  proceeded  on  our  respective  routes. 

"After  dislodging  the  enemy  from  several  ambuscades  with 
only  a  small  loss  to  my  command,  I  reached  the  Meadow  Bridge 
road,  when  I  learned  from  stragglers  that  Major-General  Hill 
had  crossed  the  Chickahominy,  without  opposition,  with  the  re 
mainder  of  the  division  and  gone  on  to  Mechanicsville,  then  dis 
tant  about  one  and  a  half  miles.  A  courier  from  the  general  soon 
assured  me  of  the  correctness  of  the  information,  and,  closing  in 
my  skirmishers,  I  made  all  haste  to  join  him  at  Mechanicsville. 
The  brigade  reached  the  field  almost  an  hour  before  sunset."  * 

At  three  o'clock,  General  A.  P.  Hill,  hearing  nothing 
from  Jackson  or  his  brigade  under  Branch,  decided  to 
cross  the  river  and  make  his  move  without  reference  to 
Jackson  or  Branch.  He  crossed  and  moved  down  against 
Mechanicsville,  attacked  by  Field's  brigade,  Anderson  and 
Archer  on  Field's  left,  Fender  and  Gregg  on  his  right, 
and  six  field  batteries  (four  guns  each) .  The  outpost  was 
driven  in,  and  Hill  prepared  and  attacked  against  the 
front  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  Meanwhile  the  Mechanics 
ville  Bridge  had  been  cleared,  and,  after  a  little  delay  re- 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  882. 


124  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

pairing  breaks,  D.  H.  Hill's  and  Longstreet's  divisions 
crossed. 

A.  P.  Hill's  battle  soon  became  firm,  but  he  waited  a  little 
for  Jackson  before  giving  it  full  force.  Jackson  came  up, 
marched  by  the  fight  without  giving  attention,  and  went 
into  camp  at  Hundley's  Corner,  half  a  mile  in  rear  of  the 
enemy's  position  of  contention.  A.  P.  Hill  put  his  force 
in  severe  battle  and  was  repulsed.  As  D.  H.  Hill  ap 
proached,  he  was  called  into  the  fray  by  the  commanding 
general,  then  by  the  President.  He  sent  Ripley's  brigade 
and  five  batteries,  which  made  the  battle  strong  and  hot 
along  the  line. 

The  most  determined  efforts  were  against  the  enemy's 
right,  where  General  McCall,  reinforced  by  Kern's  battery 
and  Griffin's  and  Martindale's  brigades  (Morell's  divis 
ion),  Edwards's  battery,  and  the  Third  Regiment  of 
Meade's  brigade,  beat  off  the  repeated  and  formidable 
efforts  of  A.  P.  Hill,  when  he  essayed  a  column  against 
the  crossing  at  Ellerson's  Mill,  which  McCall  reinforced 
by  the  Seventh  Regiment  of  Meade's,  Eastman's  battery, 
and  before  night  the  Fourth  Michigan,  Twelfth  New 
York,  and  Berdan's  Sharp-shooters  came  in  to  reinforce 
the  line  and  relieve  regiments  exhausted  of  ammunition. 
The  battle  was  in  close  conflict  till  nine  o'clock  at  night, 
when  Hill  was  obliged  to  give  over  till  morning.  The 
Federal  reinforcements  were  not  all  engaged,  and  some 
that  were  suffered  but  little ;  none  very  severely.  McCall 
replenished  ammunition  and  prepared  to  renew  the  fight 
the  next  morning. 

The  Federal  loss  in  the  engagement  was  361  aggre 
gate.* 

No  especial  account  of  the  Confederate  loss  was  made 
in  separate  report,  but  it  could  not  have  been  less  than 
two  thousand,  and  may  have  reached  three  thousand. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  38. 


CALIFORNIA..- 


FIGHTING   ALONG   THE   CHICKAHOMINY.  125 

General  D.  H.  Hill  reported  of  his  Forty-fourth  Georgia 
Regiment,  the  lieutenant-colonel,  Estes  (J.  B.),  wounded, 
and  others,  aggregating  334  killed  and  wounded.  Of  his 
First  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Colonel  Stokes,  Major 
Skinner,  six  captains,  and  the  adjutant  killed,  and  133 
privates  killed  and  wounded. 

During  the  night  General  McClellan  ordered  his  troops 
withdrawn.  They  retired  at  daylight  on  the  27th,  leaving 
a  line  of  skirmishers  to  cover  their  march.  The  skir 
mishers  were  not  seriously  molested,  the  Confederates 
being  satisfied  that  the  direct  assault  had  failed,  and  the 
flanking  march  non-aggressive.  Early  in  the  morning, 
D.  H.  Hill  was  ordered  to  march  to  the  left  to  turn  the 
position,  and  was  on  the  Federal  right  before  their  lines 
were  well  out  of  their  trenches.  He  came  up  with  Jack 
son  and  led  the  march  of  that  column  from  Hundley's 
Corner.  A.  P.  Hill  marched  by  the  direct  route  to 
Gaines's  Mill,  and  Longstreet,  in  reserve,  moved  by  the 
route  nearer  the  river  and  Dr.  Gaines's  house. 

D.  H.  Hill  marched  by  Bethesda  Church  to  Old  Cold 
Harbor.  He  understood  the  plan  of  campaign  and 
promptly  engaged  the  new  position  along  the  Chicka- 
hominy  Heights,  on  the  enemy's  right,  where  he  found 
a  well-posted  battery  of  ten  guns  near  swamp  lands 
commanding  the  only  road  of  approach.  He  ordered 
Bondurant's  battery  into  action,  but  the  combat  was 
unequal;  the  latter  was  forced  to  retire,  and  General 
Jackson  ordered  the  division  back  to  selected  ground 
parallel  to  a  road  over  which  he  supposed  that  the  Fed 
erals  would  presently  retreat. 

As  my  division  was  in  reserve,  it  could  only  be  used  in 
the  last  extremity.  So  the  driving  could  only  be  made  by 
the  division  of  A.  P.  Hill,  while  Jackson,  with  his  own, 
EwelFs,  D.  H.  Hill's,  and  Whiting's  divisions,  had  more 
than  half  of  our  moving  column,  organized  as  our  leading 
battle  force,  held  in  ambush  for  the  enemy. 


126  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  enemy  was  found  strongly  posted  upon  high  ground 
over  the  Grapevine  Bridge,  forming  a  semicircle,  his  flanks 
near  the  river.  A  deep  and  steep  chasm  in  front  of  his 
left  divided  the  height  upon  which  he  stood  from  an  open 
plateau  over  which  he  must  be  attacked,  if  at  all,  on  his 
left.  The  side  slope  leading  up  to  that  position  was  covered 
by  open  forest,  obstructed  and  defended  by  fallen  trees. 
On  the  crest  were  felled  trees,  occasional  sand-bags,  piles 
of  rails,  and  knapsacks.  Behind  these  lines  were  the  di 
visions  of  Sykes  and  Morel  1,  with  bristling  artillery  for 
the  first  defence,  with  McCall's  division  of  infantry  and  a 
tremendous  array  of  artillery  in  reserve.  Further  strength 
was  given  to  the  position  by  a  stream  which  cut  in  between 
the  two  heights  with  deep  scarped  banks.  His  right  was 
covered  to  some  extent  by  swamp  lands  and  forest  tangles 
almost  as  formidable  as  the  approach  towards  his  left. 
General  Fitz-John  Porter  was  the  commander  on  the  field. 

A.  P.  Hill  came  upon  a  detachment  at  Gaines's  Mill, 
forced  his  way  across  the  creek,  and  followed  to  the 
enemy's  strong  position,  where  he  promptly  engaged  about 
the  time  of  D.  H.  Hill's  withdrawal.  He  found  himself 
fighting  not  only  strong  numbers,  but  against  a  very  strong 
defensive  ground.  As  General  D.  H.  Hill  withdrew,  Gen 
eral  Porter  prepared  to  follow,  but  the  fierce  assaults  of 
A.  P.  Hill  told  him  that  he  must  hold  his  concentration. 
It  was  a  little  after  two  P.M.  when  A.  P.  Hill  put  all  of 
his  force  into  action  and  pressed  his  battle  with  great  zeal 
and  courage,  but  he  was  alone.  Jackson,  finding  the  fire  of 
the  enemy  steady  and  accumulating  against  A.  P.  Hill, 
ordered  his  troops  forward  into  action.  D.  H.  Hill  en 
gaged  again  at  the  swamp  land,  and  found  that  he  must 
capture  the  battery  firing  across  his  advance.  With  the 
aid  of  some  of  Elzey's  brigade  he  succeeded  in  this,  tem 
porarily,  but  Sykes  doubled  on  him,  recovered  it,  and  put 
it  again  into  action.  Parts  of  Ewell  and  Lawton,  of 
Jackson's,  came  in  on  D.  H.  Hill's  right.  Meanwhile, 


FIGHTING    ALONG    THE    CHICKAHOMINY.  127 

A.  P.  Hill  had  fought  to  exhaustion,  and  found  himself 
obliged  to  put  his  troops  down  to  hold  his  line.  The 
enemy  putting  in  his  reserves,  spliced  his  thinned  ranks 
with  artillery  and  infantry,  and  fought  a  desperate  and 
very  gallant  battle,  calling  for  troops  from  across  the 
river. 

My  division  came  up  near  A.  P.  Hill's  rear,  being  the 
reserve,  and  awaited  orders.  About  five  o'clock  a  messen 
ger  came  from  General  Lee  asking  a  diversion  by  part 
of  my  troops  against  the  enemy's  left  to  draw  off  troops 
from  his  right,  so  as  to  let  our  left  in  through  his  weak 
ening  lines.  Three  brigades  were  sent  to  open  fire  and 
threaten  their  left  from  the  forest  edge,  with  orders  not  to 
cross  the  open.  These  brigades  engaged  steadily,  and 
parts  of  them  essayed  to  pass  the  field  in  front  as  their 
blood  grew  hot,  but  were  recalled,  with  orders  repeated  to 
engage  steadily,  only  threatening  assault.  The  army  all 
the  while  engaged  in  efforts  to  find  a  point  that  could  be 
forced. 

Finally,  a  little  before  sunset,  General  Lee  sent  to  me 
to  say  that  "  all  other  efforts  had  failed,  and  unless  I  could 
do  something,  the  day  was  lost."  *  Pickett's  brigade  and 
part  of  R.  H.  Anderson's  had  been  drawn  up  under  the 
crest  in  rear  of  A.  P.  Hill's  right,  and  Kemper's  brigade 
was  near,  also  under  cover.  Upon  the  receipt  of  the  last 
message,  Pickett  and  Anderson  were  ordered  into  action 
as  assaulting  columns,  and  Kemper  called  up.  Just  as 
the  brigades  advanced,  General  Whiting  burst  through 
the  woods  with  his  own  and  Hood's  brigades,  reported 
to  me  that  he  had  lost  sight  of  his  commander,  General 
Jackson,  in  the  forest,  and  asked  me  to  put  him  into 
battle.  He  was  ordered  to  form  for  assault,  and  to  follow 
on  the  left  of  Pickett's  and  Anderson's  columns,  then  in 
motion,  as  the  columns  of  direction.  As  my  troops  reached 

*  From  memory  I  will  say  that  this  message  from  General  Lee  was 
delivered  by  Captain  A.  P.  Mason. 


128  FROM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  crest  under  which  they  had  rested  they  came  under 
the  full  blaze  of  the  battle,  but  Pickett  and  Anderson 
were  comparatively  fresh,  and  dashed  through  the  open 
and  down  the  slope  before  the  fire  had  time  to  thin  their 
ranks.  The  steep  descent  of  the  hither  slope  from  its 
crest  soon  took  them  below  the  fire  of  the  batteries,  and 
A.  P.  Hill's  severe  fight  had  so  thinned  the  enemy's  in 
fantry  lines  of  men  and  ammunition  that  their  fire  grew 
weaker.  Whiting's  brigade,  sore  under  its  recent  disas 
trous  effort  in  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  drifted  from  my 
left  towards  the  woodland,  but  Hood,  with  his  Fourth 
Texas  Regiment  and  Eighteenth  Georgia,  obliqued  to  the 
right  behind  that  brigade  and  closed  the  interval  towards 
Anderson's  left,  leaving  his  other  regiments,  the  First  and 
Fifth  Texas,  on  Whiting's  left.  Hood  clambered  over  the 
deep  ravine  with  his  two  regiments  and  maintained  posi 
tion  with  the  assaulting  columns,  while  the  balance  of 
Whiting's  division  followed  in  close  echelon.  As  the 
advanced  lines  of  Pickett,  Anderson,  and  Hood  reached 
and  crowned  the  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  Anderson  and 
Pickett  moved  up  in  pursuit  of  the  broken  lines,  and  were 
almost  in  possession  of  their  massed  reserve  artillery — 
had  it  under  easy  musketry  range — when  a  dash  of  cav 
alry  admonished  them  that  their  ranks,  while  in  order  for 
following  the  infantry  lines,  were  not  in  proper  form  to 
receive  a  charge  of  cavalry.  They  concentrated  well 
enough  to  pour  a  repelling  fire  into  the  troopers,  but  the 
delay  had  made  time  for  the  retreating  infantry  to  open 
the  field  for  the  reserve  batteries,  and,  night  growing 
apace,  they  returned  to  the  line  of  their  trophies  and  used 
the  captured  guns  against  their  late  owners. 

General  Whiting  asked  for  another  brigade  of  Jackson's 
that  had  reported  to  me,  and  turned  his  forces  against  the 
enemy's  line  on  our  left.  The  divisions  of  Ewell  and 
D.  H.  Hill  advancing  at  the  same  time,  the  general  break 
seemed  almost  simultaneous,  and  was  claimed  by  all. 


FIGHTING    ALONG    THE   CHICK AHOMINY.  129 

The  messages  from  General  Lee  were  so  marked  by 
their  prompt  and  successful  execution  that,  in  reporting 
of  the  battle,  it  occurred  to  me  that  they  could  be  better 
noted  in  his  report  than  in  mine,  but  he  adopted  the 
claim  of  a  general  and  simultaneous  break  along  the  line. 

A  letter  from  General  Porter,  written  since  the  war, 
assures  the  writer  that  his  guns  had  become  so  foul  from 
steady  protracted  fire  that  his  men  had  difficulty  in  ram 
ming  their  cartridges  to  the  gun-chambers,  and  that  in 
some  instances  it  could  only  be  accomplished  by  putting 
the  rammers  against  trees  and  hammering  them  down. 

The  position  was  too  strong  to  leave  room  to  doubt  that 
it  was  only  the  thinning  fire,  as  the  battle  progressed,  that 
made  it  assailable ;  besides,  the  repulse  of  A.  P.  Hill's  re 
peated,  desperate  assaults  forcibly  testified  to  the  fact.  It 
was,  nevertheless,  a  splendid  charge,  by  peerless  soldiers. 
When  the  cavalry  came  upon  us  our  lines  were  just  thin 
enough  for  a  splendid  charge  upon  artillery,  but  too  thin 
to  venture  against  a  formidable  cavalry.  Five  thousand 
prisoners  were  turned  over  to  General  Lee's  provost-guard, 
a  number  of  batteries  and  many  thousand  small-arms  to 
the  Ordnance  Department,  by  my  command.  The  Con 
federate  commanders,  except  A.  P.  Hill,  claimed  credit  for 
the  first  breach  in  General  Porter's  lines,  but  the  solid 
ranks  of  prisoners  delivered  to  the  general  provost-guard, 
and  the  several  batteries  captured  and  turned  in  to  the  Ord 
nance  Department,  show  the  breach  to  have  been  made 
by  the  columns  of  Anderson,  Pickett,  and  Hood's  two 
regiments.  The  troops  of  the  gallant  A.  P.  Hill,  that  did 
as  much  and  effective  fighting  as  any,  received  little  of 
the  credit  properly  due  them.  It  was  their  long  and 
steady  fight  that  thinned  the  Federal  ranks  and  caused 
them  to  so  foul  their  guns  that  they  were  out  of  order 
when  the  final  struggle  came. 

Early   on  the   28th  my  advance,   reaching  the  river, 
found  the  bridges  destroyed  and  the  enemy  concentrating 


130  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

on  the  other  side.  Under  the  impression  that  the  enemy 
must  reopen  connection  with  his  base  on  the  Pamunkey, 
General  Lee  sent  Stuart's  cavalry  and  part  of  Jackson's 
command  (Ewell's)  to  interpose  on  that  line.  They  cut 
the  line  at  Despatch  Station,  where  Ewell's  division  was 
halted.  Stuart,  following  down  towards  the  depot  on  the 
Pamunkey  till  he  approached  the  White  House,  cut  off  a 
large  detachment  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  under 
General  Stoneman  that  retreated  down  the  Peninsula. 
At  night  Stuart  rested  his  command,  finding  supplies  of 
forage  and  provisions  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  At  the 
same  time  fires  were  seen  along  the  line  of  supplies,  and 
houses  in  flames.  On  the  29th  he  followed  towards  the 
depot,  still  in  flames. 

' { The  command  was  now  entirely  out  of  rations  and  the  horses 
without  forage.  I  had  relied  on  the  enemy  at  the  White  House 
to  supply  me  with  those  essentials,  and  I  was  not  disappointed,  in 
spite  of  their  efforts  to  destroy  everything.  Provisions  and  deli 
cacies  of  every  description  lay  in  heaps,  and  men  regaled  them 
selves  on  fruits  of  the  tropics  as  well  as  the  substantiate  of  the 
land.  Large  quantities  of  forage  were  left  also."  * 

On  the  28th,  Major  Meade  and  Lieutenant  Johnson's 
engineers  were  sent  from  my  head-quarters  to  learn  of  the 
enemy's  operations  or  movements.  Early  on  the  29th 
they  made  their  way  across  the  Chickahominy,  into  the 
grounds  and  works  of  the  enemy  just  left  vacant,  and  sent 
the  first  account  of  the  enemy's  move  on  his  change  of 
base.  The  conflagrations  of  the  day  before  told  of  speedy 
change  of  position  in  some  direction,  but  this  was  the  first 
information  we  had  from  a  reliable  source.  Their  report 
was  sent  to  General  Lee.  While  planning  and  ordering 
pursuit,  he  received  a  similar  report  from  General  Magru- 
der,  coupled  with  the  statement  that  he  was  preparing  to 
attack  one  of  the  enemy's  forts. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  517.     Stuart. 


FIGHTING   ALONG    THE   CHICKAHOMINY.  131 

General  Jackson  was  ordered  to  follow  on  the  enemy's 
rear  with  his  column,  including  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill, 
crossing  the  river  at  Grapevine  Bridge,  Magruder  to  join 
pursuit  along  the  direct  line  of  retreat,  Huger  to  strike  at 
the  enemy's  flank;  meanwhile,  Hansom's  brigade  had 
joined  Huger's  division.  My  division  was  to  cross  with 
A.  P.  Hill's  at  New  Bridge,  march  back  near  Richmond, 
across  to  and  down  the  Darbytown  road  to  interpose  be 
tween  the  enemy  and  James  River.  Stuart  was  directed 
to  operate  against  the  enemy's  left  or  rear,  or  front,  as  best 
he  could. 

All  the  commands,  being  in  waiting,  marched  at  the 
first  moment  of  their  orders. 

Jackson  was  long  delayed  repairing  Grapevine  Bridge. 
He  probably  knew  that  the  river  was  fordable  at  that 
season,  but  preferred  to  pass  his  men  over  dry-shod. 

General  D.  H.  Hill,  of  that  column,  reported,— 

"  Scouts  from  Hood's  brigade  and  the  Third  Alabama  (Rodes's 
brigade)  succeeded  in  crossing,  and  my  pioneer  corps  under  Cap 
tain  Smith,  of  the  Engineers,  repaired  Grapevine  Bridge  on  the 
29th,  and  we  crossed  over  at  three  o'clock  that  night."  * 

On  the  28th  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Georgia  Regi 
ments  were  sent  out  a  little  before  night  to  ascertain  the 
probable  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  encountered  part  of 
W.  F.  Smith's  division,  Sixth  Corps,  meeting  the  Forty- 
ninth  Pennsylvania  and  Thirty-third  New  York  Regi 
ments.  Colonel  Lamar  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Towers 
and  Adjutant  Harper,  of  the  Eighth  Georgia  Regiment, 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands,  and  twenty-nine  others  of  the 
Seventh  and  Eighth  Regiments  were  taken  prisoners. 
Just  as  this  affair  was  well  begun  a  recall  of  the  regiments 
was  ordered  ;  hence  the  number  of  casualties.  About  the 
same  hour  a  cavalry  affair  at  Despatch  Station  occurred 
which  resulted  to  the  credit  of  the  Confederates. 


I 

Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  627.     D.  H.  HUE    ' 


132  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

At  night  General  McClellan  called  his  corps  command 
ers  to  head-quarters  and  announced  his  plan  for  change 
of  base  to  the  James  River.  The  Fourth  Corps  had  been 
ordered  to  prepare  the  route  of  crossing  at  White  Oak 
Swamp,  and  pass  over  to  defend  it.  The  Fifth  and  Slo- 
cum's  division  of  the  Sixth  were  to  follow  at  night  of  the 
28th.  The  Second,  Third,  and  Smith's  division  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  were  to  defend  the  crossing  against  pursuit ; 
the  Fourth,  continuing  its  move,  was  to  stand  at  Turkey 
Bridge,  defending  the  approach  from  Richmond  by  the 
river  road ;  the  Fifth  to  stand  at  Malvern  Hill,  with 
McCall's  division  across  the  Long  Bridge  road,  and  Slo- 
cum's  across  the  Charles  City  road,  defending  the  avenues 
of  approach  from  Richmond.  On  the  29th,  Magruder  in 
pursuit  came  upon  Sumner's  (Second)  corps  at  Allen's 
Farm,  and,  after  a  spirited  affair,  found  Sumner  too  strong 
for  him.  After  his  success,  Sumner  retired  to  Savage 
Station,  where  he  joined  Franklin  with  his  division  under 
Smith.  The  Third  Corps  (Heintzelman's),  under  mis 
conception  of  orders,  or  misleading  of  staff-officers,  fol 
lowed  the  marching  corps  across  the  swamp,  leaving  the 
Second  and  Smith's  division  of  the  Sixth  as  the  only 
defending  forces.  At  Savage  Station,  Magruder  came 
upon  them  and  again  joined  battle,  but  his  force  was 
not  equal  to  the  occasion.  The  commander  of  his  left 
(D.  R.  Jones),  realizing  the  importance  of  action  and  the 
necessity  for  additional  troops,  called  upon  General  Jack 
son  to  co-operate  on  his  left,  but  Jackson  reported  that 
he  had  other  important  duties  to  perform.  The  affair, 
therefore,  against  odds  was  too  strong  for  Magruder,  so 
that  he  was  forced  back  without  important  results  for  the 
Confederates,  the  Federals  making  safe  passage  of  the 
crossing  and  gaining  position  to  defend  against  pursuit  in 
that  quarter. 

On  the  29th,  General  Holmes  marched  down  the  James 
River  road  to  New  Market  with  part  of  Colonel  Daniel's 


FIGHTING   ALONG   THE    CHICKAHOMINY.  133 

brigade  and  two  batteries,  and  -  General  J.  G.  Walker's 
brigade  and  two  batteries,  and  was  there  reinforced  by 
part  of  General  Wise's  brigade  and  two  batteries,  in  co 
operative  position  to  my  division  and  that  of  A.  P.  Hill, 
on  the  Darbytown  and  Long  Bridge  roads. 

On  his  night  march  along  the  Long  Bridge  road,  Fitz- 
John  Porter  got  on  the  wrong  end  and  rubbed  up  against 
my  outpost,  but  recognized  his  adversary  in  time  to  recover 
his  route  and  avert  a  night  collision.  He  posted  McCalPs 
division  in  front  of  Charles  City  cross-roads  ;  his  divisions 
under  Morell  and  Sykes  at  Malvern  Hill,  and  Warren's 
brigade,  near  the  Fourth  Corps,  on  the  river  routes  from 
Richmond.  As  the  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  arrived 
they  were  posted, — Kearny  between  the  Charles  City 
and  Long  Bridge  roads,  on  McCalPs  right;  Hooker  in 
front  of  the  Quaker  road,  on  McCall's  left ;  Sedgwick's 
division,  Sumner's  corps,  behind  McCall. 

Before  noon  of  the  30th,  Jackson's  column  encountered 
Franklin,  defending  the  principal  crossing  of  White  Oak 
Swamp  by  the  divisions  of  Richardson  and  W.  F.  Smith 
and  Naglee's  brigade.  About  the  same  time  my  command 
marched  down  the  Long  Bridge  road  and  encountered  the 
main  force  of  McClellan's  army  posted  at  the  Charles 
City  cross-roads  (Frayser's  Farm,  or  Glendale).  My 
division  was  deployed  across  the  Long  Bridge  road  in 
front  of  the  divisions  of  McCall  and  Kearny,  holding 
the  division  of  A.  P.  Hill  at  rest  in  the  rear,  except  the 
brigade  under  Branch,  which  was  posted  off  to  my  right 
and  rear  to  guard  against  Hooker's  division,  standing 
behind  the  Quaker  road,  in  threatening  position  on  my 
right  flank.  The  ground  along  the  front  of  McCall  and 
Kearny  was  a  dark  forest,  with  occasional  heavy  tangles, 
as  was  the  ground  in  front  of  Hooker.  The  front  of 
Slocum,  along  the  Charles  City  road,  was  something  simi 
lar,  but  offering  some  better  opportunities  for  artillery 
practice  and  infantry  tactics. 


134  FKOM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

As  Jackson  and  Franklin  engaged  in  artillery  combat, 
my  division  advanced  under  desultory  fire  of  skirmishers 
to  close  position  for  battle,  awaiting  nearer  approach  of 
Jackson  and  signal  of  approach  of  our  troops  on  the 
Charles  City  road.  In  the  wait  the  skirmish-lines  were 
more  or  less  active,  and  an  occasional  shot  came  from  one 
of  the  Federal  batteries. 

During  the  combat  between  Jackson  and  Franklin, 
Sedgwick's  brigades  under  Dana  and  Sully  were  sent  back 
to  reinforce  at  the  crossing,  but  upon  the  opening  of  the 
engagement  at  Frayser's  Farm  they  were  brought  back 
on  the  double-quick. 

After  a  time  reports  of  cannon  fire  came  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Charles  City  road,  signalling,  as  we  supposed,  the 
approach  of  Huger's  column.  To  this  I  ordered  one  of 
our  batteries  to  return  salutation.  The  senior  brigadier 
of  the  division,  R.  H.  Anderson,  was  assigned  to  imme 
diate  supervision  of  my  front  line,  leaving  his  brigade 
under  Colonel  M.  Jenkins.  While  awaiting  the  nearer 
approach  of  Jackson  or  the  swelling  volume  of  Huger's 
fire,  the  President,  General  Lee,  and  General  A.  P.  Hill, 
with  their  staffs  and  followers,  rode  forward  near  my  line 
and  joined  me  in  a  little  clearing  of  about  three  acres, 
curtained  by  dense  pine  forests.  All  parties  engaged  in 
pleasant  talk  and  anticipations  of  the  result  of  a  combina 
tion  supposed  to  be  complete  and  prepared  for  concen 
trating  battle, — Jackson  attacking  in  the  rear,  Huger  on 
the  right  flank,  A.  P.  Hill  and  myself  standing  in  front. 
Very  soon  we  were  disturbed  by  a  few  shells  tearing  and 
screaming  through  the  forests  over  our  heads,  and  pres 
ently  one  or  two  burst  in  our  midst,  wounding  a  courier 
and  killing  and  wounding  several  horses.  The  little 
opening  was  speedily  cleared  of  the  distinguished  group 
that  graced  its  meagre  soil,  and  it  was  left  to  more  humble, 
active  combatants. 

Near  the  battery  from  which  the  shots  came  was  R.  H. 


FIGHTING    ALONG    THE   CHICKAHOMINY.  135 

Anderson's  brigade,  in  which  Colonel  Jenkins  had  a  bat 
talion  of  practised  sharp-shooters.  I  sent  orders  for  Jen 
kins  to  silence  the  battery,  under  the  impression  that  our 
wait  was  understood,  and  that  the  sharp-shooters  would  be 
pushed  forward  till  they  could  pick  off  the  gunners,  thus 
ridding  us  of  that  annoyance ;  but  the  gallant  Jenkins, 
only  too  anxious  for  a  dash  at  a  battery,  charged  and 
captured  it,  thus  precipitating  battle.  The  troops  right 
and  left  going  in,  in  the  same  spirit,  McCall's  fire  and  the 
forest  tangle  thinned  our  ranks  as  the  lines  neared  each 
other,  and  the  battle  staggered  both  sides,  but,  after  a  for 
midable  struggle,  the  Confederates  won  the  ground,  and 
Randol's  gallant  battery.  Sedgwick's  division  reinforced 
the  front  and  crowded  back  the  Confederate  right,  while 
Kearny's,  reinforced  by  Slocum,  pushed  severely  against 
my  left,  and  then  part  of  Hooker's  division  came  against 
my  right.  Thus  the  aggressive  battle  became  defensive, 
but  we  held  most  of  the  ground  gained  from  McCall. 
In  his  official  account,  General  Heintzelman  said, — 

"In  less  than  an  hour  General  McCalFs  division  gave  way. 
General  Hooker,  being  on  his  left,  by  moving  to  the  right  re 
pulsed  the  rebels  in  the  handsomest  manner  and  with  great 
slaughter.  General  Sumner,  who  was  with  General  Sedgwick,  in 
McCalFs  rear,  also  greatly  aided  with  his  artillery  and  infantry 
in  driving  back  the  enemy.  They  now  renewed  the  attack  with 
vigor  on  Kearny's  left,  and  were  again  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 
The  attack  continued  until  some  time  after  night. 

"  This  attack  commenced  at  four  P.M.  and  was  pushed  by  heavy 
masses  with  the  utmost  determination  and  vigor.  Captain  Thomp 
son7  s  battery,  directed  with  great  skill,  firing  double  charges, 
swept  them  back.  The  whole  open  space,  two  hundred  paces 
wide,  was  filled  with  the  enemy.  Each  repulse  brought  fresh 
troops. 

"  Seeing  that  the  enemy  was  giving  way,  I  returned  to  the 
forks  of  the  road,  where  I  received  a  call  from  General  Kearny 
for  aid.  Knowing  that  all  of  General  Sedgwick' s  troops  were 
unavailable,  I  was  glad  to  avail  myself  of  the  kind  offer  of  Gen 
eral  Slocum  to  send  the  New  Jersey  brigade  of  his  division  to 


136  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Kearny's  aid.  I  rode  out  far  enough  on  the  Charles 
City  road  to  see  that  we  had  nothing  to  fear  from  that  direc 
tion."  * 

General  McCall  reported, — 

i  i  I  had  ridden  into  the  regiment  to  endeavor  to  check  them, 
but  with  only  partial  success.  It  was  my  fortune  to  witness  one 
of  the  fiercest  bayonet  charges  that  ever  occurred  on  this  con 
tinent.  Bayonet  wounds,  mortal  and  slight,  were  given  and 
received.  I  saw  skulls  smashed  by  the  butts  of  muskets,  and 
every  effort  made  by  either  party  in  this  life-and- death  struggle 
proving  indeed  that  here  Greek  had  met  Greek.  The  Seventh 
Regiment  was  at  this  time  on  the  right  of  the  Fourth,  and  was 
too  closely  engaged  with  a  force  also  of  great  superiority  in  num 
bers  to  lend  any  assistance  to  the  gallant  few  of  the  Fourth  who 
were  struggling  at  their  side.  In  fine,  these  few  men,  some  sev 
enty  or  eighty,  were  borne  bodily  off  among  the  rebels,  and  when 
they  reached  a  gap  in  the  fence  walked  through  it,  while  the 
enemy,  intent  on  pursuing  those  in  front  of  them,  passed  on 
without  noticing  them. 

"  It  was  at  this  moment,  on  witnessing  this  scene,  I  keenly 
felt  the  want  of  reinforcements.  I  had  not  a  single  regiment  left 
to  send  to  the  support  of  those  so  overpowered.  There  was  no 
running,  but  my  division,  reduced  by  the  furious  battles  to  less 
than  six  thousand,  had  to  contend  with  the  divisions  of  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill  (considered  two  of  the  strongest  and  best  among 
many  of  the  Confederate  army,  numbering  that  day  eighteen  or 
twenty  thousand  men),  and  it  was  reluctantly  compelled  to  give 
way  before  heavier  force  accumulated  upon  them.  My  right  was, 
as  I  say,  literally  forced  off  the  ground  by  the  weight  simply  of 
the  enemy's  column." 

His  account  is  incorrect  in  the  estimate  of  numbers  and 
the  two  divisions.  Hill  was  not  put  in  until  a  later  hour, 
and  encountered  the  troops  of  Kearny  and  Slocum. 
Hill's  orders  were  to  hold  the  line  gained  until  Jackson 
and  Huger  approached,  to  warrant  more  aggressive  battle. 

Magruder's  march  had  been  directed  to  succor  Holmes. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  100.     Heintzelman. 


FIGHTING   ALONG   THE   CHICK AHOMINY.  137 

In  his  official  account,  General  Holmes  wrote  of  parts  of 
his  cavalry  and  artillery,  "  whose  conduct  was  shameful 
in  the  extreme."  He  reported  his  casualties  : 

" Daniel's  brigade,  2  killed,  22  wounded;  Walker's  brigade, 
12  wounded  ;  artillery,  15  wounded. 

"The  strength  of  the  enemy's  position  and  their  imposing 
numbers  were  such  that  to  attempt  an  attack  upon  them  with  my 
small  force,  unsupported,  would  have  been  perfect  madness  ;  for 
to  have  done  this  would  have  required  a  march  of  over  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  up  a  steep  hill  destitute  of  cover.  I  accord 
ingly  withdrew  about  nine  P.M.  to  a  position  somewhat  in  advance 
of  that  occupied  in  the  morning."  * 

In  his  account  of  the  fight,  General  Kearny  wrote, — 

"At  four  P.M.  the  attack  commenced  on  my  line  with  a  deter 
mination  and  vigor,  and  in  such  masses,  as  I  had  never  witnessed. 
Thompson's  battery,  directed  with  great  skill,  literally  swept  the 
slightly  falling  open  space  with  the  completest  execution,  and, 
mowing  them  down  by  ranks,  would  cause  the  survivors  to  mo 
mentarily  halt;  but,  almost  instantly  after,  increased  masses 
came  up,  and  the  wave  bore  on.  .  .  . 

"In  concluding  my  report  of  this  battle,  one  of  the  most  des- 
perate  of  the  war,  the  one  most  fatal,  if  lost,  I  am  proud  to  give 
my  thanks  and  to  include  in  the  glory  of  my  own  division  the 
First  New  Jersey  Brigade,  General  Taylor,  who  held  McCall's 
deserted  ground,  and  General  Caldwell."  f 

A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  held  at  rest  several  hours 
after  the  battle  was  pitched  (Branch's  brigade  on  guard 
on  my  right  retired,  and  Gregg's  on  my  left).  Under  our 
plan,  that  Huger  was  to  assault  the  Federal  right  and 
Jackson  the  rear,  the  battle  joined  ;  Hill  was  to  be  put  in 
fresh  to  crown  it.  As  night  approached  without  indications 
of  attack  from  either  of  those  columns,  Hill  was  advanced 
to  relieve  the  pressure  against  my  worn  troops.  At  the  first 

*  Rebellion  llecord,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  107. 
f  Ibid.,  pp.  162-164. 


138  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

dash  he  again  grasped  and  held  Randol's  battery,  that 
had  been  the  source  of  contention  from  the  first  onset. 
Field's  brigade  pushed  on  through  the  enemy's  line,  and, 
supported  by  Fender's  and  Branch's,  drove  back  rein 
forcements  coming  to  their  succor  from  one  of  Sedgwick's 
brigades ;  pushed  Caldwell's  off  to  Kearny's  position, 
where,  with  the  additional  aid  of  part  of  Slocum's  divi 
sion,  Kearny  succeeded  in  recovering  his  own  ground 
and  in  putting  Caldwell's  brigade  into  part  of  McCalPs 
original  right,  leaving  the  Confederates  holding  part  of 
McCalPs  first  line,  Field's  brigade  some  little  distance  in 
advance  of  it.  Archer  and  Branch,  on  Field's  right, 
made  strong  that  part  of  it.  Gregg's  brigade  on  the  left 
made  little  progress  beyond  holding  most  of  the  ground 
taken  by  the  first  assault,  The  battle  thus  braced  held 
its  full  and  swelling  volume  on  both  sides.  My  right, 
thinned  by  the  heavy  fighting  and  tangled  forest,  found  a 
way  around  the  left  of  the  contention,  then  gravitating 
towards  its  centre.  In  this  effort  Hooker's  division  came 
against  its  right  flank.  By  change  of  front  a  clever  fight 
was  made,  but  Branch's  brigade,  ordered  for  service  at 
that  point,  had  been  withdrawn  by  General  Hill  to  sup 
port  his  centre,  so  that  Hooker  pushed  us  off  into  closed 
ranks  along  our  line  in  rear  and  back  ;  but  his  gallant  on 
set  was  checked  and  failed  of  progress.  General  Hooker 
claimed  that  he  threw  Longstreet  over  on  Kearny,  but 
General  McCall  said  that  by  a  little  stretch  of  the  hyper 
bole  he  could  have  said  that  he  threw  Longstreet  over  the 
moon.  To  establish  his  centre,  Hill  sent  in  J.  R.  Ander 
son's  brigade  astride  the  Long  Bridge  road,  which  held 
the  battle  till  the  near  approach  of  night,  when  McCall, 
in  his  last  desperate  effort  to  reinforce  and  recover  his  lost 
ground,  was  caught  in  the  dark  of  twilight  and  invited  to 
ride  to  my  head-quarters.  Friends  near  him  discovered 
his  dilemma  in  time  to  avert  their  own  capture,  and  ag 
gressive  battle  ceased.  The  artillery  combat,  with  occa- 


FIGHTING    ALONG    THE    CHICKAHOMINY.  139 

sional  exchanges  of  shots,  held  till  an  hour  after  the  beat 
of  tattoo. 

It  was  the  Forty-seventh  Virginia  Regiment  that  caught 
and  invited  General  McCall  to  quarter  with  the  Confed 
erates.  Although  his  gallant  division  had  been  forced 
from  the  fight,  the  brave  head  and  heart  of  the  general 
were  not  fallen  till  he  found  himself  on  his  lonely  ride. 
He  was  more  tenacious  of  his  battle  than  any  one  who 
came  within  my  experience  during  the  war,  if  I  except 
D.  H.  Hill  at  Sharpsburg. 

In  years  gone  by  I  had  known  him  in  pleasant  army 
service,  part  of  the  time  as  a  brevet  lieutenant  of  his 
company.  When  the  name  was  announced,  and  as  he 
dismounted,  I  approached  to  offer  my  hand  and  such 
amenities  as  were  admissible  under  the  circumstances,  but 
he  drew  up  with  haughty  mien,  which  forbade  nearer  ap 
proach,  so  that  the  courtesies  were  concluded  by  the  offer 
of  staff-officers  to  escort  him  to  the  city  of  Richmond. 

It  was  during  this  affair  that  General  Holmes's  division 
advanced  against  the  Federals  at  Turkey  Bridge  with  a 
six-gun  field  battery  and  engaged,  and  was  met  by  the 
fire  of  thirty  field  guns  and  the  gunboat  batteries,  which 
drove  him  to  confusion,  abandoning  two  guns.  Earlier 
in  the  day,  Magruder's  column  had  been  ordered  by  a 
long  detour  to  support  the  fight  at  Frayser's  Farm,  but 
the  trouble  encountered  by  Holmes's  division  seemed 
serious,  and  caused  the  Confederate  commander  to  divert 
Magruder's  march  to  support  that  point,  through  which  a 
resolute  advance  might  endanger  our  rear  at  Frayser's 
Farm.  After  night  Magruder  was  called  to  relieve  the 
troops  on  the  front  of  my  line.  His  march  during  the 
day  was  delayed  by  his  mistaken  guide. 

The  Confederates  claimed  as  trophies  of  the  battle  ten 
pieces  of  artillery,  some  prisoners,  and  most  of  the  field 
from  which  McCalPs  division  had  been  dislodged. 
Holmes's  division  lost  two  guns  in  the  affair  at  Turkey 


140  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Bridge,  but  other  Confederates  secured   and  afterwards 
made  better  use  of  them. 

During  this  eventful  day  the  Federals  were  anxiously 
pushing  their  trains  to  cover  on  the  river,  and  before  noon 
of  July  1  all,  except  those  of  ammunition  necessary  for 
immediate  use,  had  safely  passed  the  field  selected  for 
their  Malvern  Hill  battle. 


CHAPTER  XL 

BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 

Last  Stand  in  the  Great  Retreat— Strength  of  McClellan's  Position — 
The  Confederates  make  Poor  Use  of  their  Artillery— A  Mistake  and 
Defeat  for  Lee's  Army — The  Campaign  as  a  Whole  a  Great  Success, 
but  it  should  have  been  far  greater— McClellan's  Retreat  showed  him 
well  equipped  in  the  Science  of  War— Review  of  the  Campaign — 
Jackson's  and  Magruder's  Misunderstanding — Moral  Effect  of  the 
Gunboats  on  the  James  River — "  There  should  be  a  Gunboat  in  Every 
Family." 

AT  Malvern  Hill,  hardly  a  league  away  from  Frayser's, 
now  left  to  silence  save  for  the  moans  of  the  unfortunate 
fallen,  and  standing  south  of  the  line  to  Turkey  Bridge, 
was  Fitz-John  Porter  with  the  reserve  artillery  massed, 
supported  by  the  divisions  of  Sykes  and  Morell  on  the  left 
and  Couch's  on  the  right,  from  the  Crew  House  to  J.  W. 
Binford's.  The  field  had  been  carefully  selected  and  as 
judiciously  guarded  by  well-posted  commands,  holding 
the  only  way  left  which  gave  hope  of  successful  passage 
to  cover  under  the  gunboats.  During  the  night  of  the 
30th  of  June  and  early  morn  of  the  1st  of  July  this  po 
sition  was  reinforced  by  the  retreating  Federals, — first  by 
the  Second  and  Third  Corps,  McCall's  division  of  the 
Fifth,  and  W.  F.  Smith's  of  the  Sixth,  and  later  by  other 
troops.  Among  the  trains  moving  for  the  river  was  one 
of  ten  siege  guns  under  Colonel  Tyler.  These  were 
dropped  in  Porter's  rear  and  put  in  battery,  giving  them 
a  sweep  of  the  avenues  of  approach  and  extensive  rake 
of  the  woodlands,  and  a  great  number  of  lighter  batteries 
bristled  upon  the  brow  and  down  the  slopes  of  the  hill. 
On  either  flank  the  plateau  was  somewhat  guarded  by 
ravines  and  tangled  marsh  lands,  while  the  front  approach 
was  over  ascending  slopes,  so  broken  as  to  make  advancing 
artillery  combat  slow  and  hazardous. 

141 


142  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Early  on  the  1st,  the  columns  under  Huger,  Jackson, 
and  Magruder  met  at  the  Charles  City  cross-roads,  but  the 
enemy  had  given  up  that  position  and  marched  away, 
leaving  to  them  the  abandoned  forest  land.  The  disap 
pointment  of  the  Confederate  commander  in  the  failure 
of  combination  ordered  for  the  30th  was  noted  by  those 
who  were  near  him,  while  the  composure  with  which  it  was 
borne  indicated  the  grander  elements  of  his  character,  and 
drew  those  who  knew  his  plans  and  purposes  closer  to  him. 

Jackson  was  ordered  to  follow  on  the  direct  line  of 
the  enemy's  retreat ;  Huger  and  Magruder  marched  to 
co-operate  on  his  right ;  Longstreet's  and  A.  P.  Hill's 
divisions  were  held  in  reserve.  General  Lee  rode  near 
Jackson's  column  to  view  the  army  on  that  front.  Feel 
ing  unwell  and  much  fatigued,  he  called  me  to  temporary 
service  near  him.  As  he  rode  to  the  left,  he  ordered  me, 
with  the  columns  of  Huger  and  Magruder,  to  make  recon- 
noissance  of  the  enemy's  new  position  in  that  quarter, 
and  to  report  of  the  feasibility  of  aggressive  battle. 

I  found  some  difference  between  General  Lee's  maps 
and  General  Magruder's  guides,  but  my  authority  was 
only  for  a  reconnoissance,  and  posting  the  divisions.  An 
elevated  point  was  found  off  the  enemy's  left  front,  as 
high  as  the  plateau  upon  which  his  army  stood,  from 
which  a  fair  view  was  had  of  his  position  and  down  along 
his  front  and  the  open  as  far  as  Jackson's  field,  the  latter 
just  filing  in  by  his  batteries  on  much  lower  but  open 
ground. 

Profound  silence  rested  upon  the  field.  Jackson's  bat 
teries,  yet  a  little  beyond  the  point  of  range,  marched  to 
their  places  as  quietly  as  if  taking  positions  for  review. 
Porter's  field  seemed  as  little  concerned  at  the  develop 
ments  along  his  flank  and  front,  indicating  that  there  was 
to  be  no  waste  of  ammunition  on  that  July  day.  His 
guns  could  not  be  counted,  but  blocking  them  off  by  bat 
teries  there  seemed  to  be  eighty  on  his  front,  besides  the 


BATTLE  OF 

MALVERN   HILL 

SCALE 


BATTLE    OF    MALVEKN    HILL.  143 

siege  battery  in  rear.  His  guns  were  all  trailed  to  Jack 
son's  front,  thus  presenting  a  flank  towards  the  high  point 
upon  which  I  stood.  From  the  crest  at  this  little  ridge  the 
ground  dropped  off  sharply  some  eighteen  inches  or  two  feet 
to  a  lower  terrace,  forming  a  natural  parapet  and  terre-plein 
for  forty  or  sixty  guns,  massed.  The  spacious  open  along 
Jackson's  front  appeared  to  offer  a  field  for  play  of  a  hun 
dred  or  more  guns,  and  although  his  lower  ground  was 
not  inviting  of  combat  even  by  a  hundred  guns,  it  was 
yet  judged  that  advancing  combat  by  eighty  or  a  hundred 
guns,  in  combination  with  the  forty-gun  battery  of  posi 
tion,  might  justify  assault,  and  the  tremendous  game  at 
issue  called  for  adventure. 

I  thought  it  probable  that  Porter's  batteries,  under  the 
cross-fire  of  the  Confederates  thus  posted  on  his  left  and 
front,  could  be  thrown  into  disorder,  and  thus  make  way 
for  combined  assaults  of  the  infantry.  I  so  reported,  and 
General  Lee  ordered  disposition  accordingly,  sending  the 
pioneer  corps  out  to  cut  a  road  for  the  right  batteries  of 
position. 

I  suggested  position  to  Magruder  for  his  division,  but 
he  insisted  that  the  Quaker  road  was  not  correctly  located 
on  General  Lee's  maps,  so  I  left  that  part  of  the  order  to 
be  looked  after  by  General  Lee's  recognized  staff.  Gen 
eral  Chilton,  chief  of  staff,  was  then  sent  by  General  Lee 
to  assist  General  Magruder  in  posting  the  troops,  and  I 
was  ordered  back  to  locate  the  batteries. 

But  eight  guns  came  in  proper  time  and  were  posted. 
These  General  Magruder  proposed  to  supplement  by  thirty 
of  his  own  under  Colonel  S.  D.  Lee,  to  be  reinforced  by 
the  others  as  they  came  up.  With  this  understanding  T 
returned  to  head-quarters,  made  my  report,  and  was  per 
mitted  to  go  back  to  my  command  proper. 

The  most  convenient  point  for  observing  the  effect  of 
the  artillery  fire  was  occupied  by  General  Armistead's 
brigade.  That  officer  was  designated  by  General  Lee  to 


144  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

give  notice,  if  the  combat  was  successful,  by  advancing 
his  brigade,  under  the  shouts  of  infantry  charge,  as  the 
signal  for  general  assault. 

The  eight  guns  for  the  right  battery  were  all  that  got 
into  position  on  time,  and  Jackson  failed  to  open  fire  by 
advancing  all  of  the  batteries  along  his  front,  so  that  the 
practice  from  those  quarters  was  not  forcibly  executed. 
When  the  eight  guns  finally  opened,  Porter  shifted  his 
aim  from  his  proper  front,  which  Jackson  failed  to  combat, 
and  put  in  the  fire  of  forty  guns  against  the  eight-gun  bat 
tery  of  our  right.  The  gunboat  batteries  also  came  into 
that  practice,  but  it  was  found  that  they  damaged  friends 
almost  as  much  as  the  enemy,  and  were  ordered  to  discon 
tinue.  Jackson's  cross-fire,  feeble  at  best  and  at  long 
range,  was  finally  drawn  off  by  other  batteries  far  on  the 
enemy's  right,  so  that  the  eight  guns  were  soon  piled  a 
heterogeneous  mass  of  caissons,  guns,  limbers,  and  horses. 
Some  other  batteries  got  into  action  at  the  same  point, 
eight  or  ten  at  a  time,  but  suffered  like  disaster. 

So  the  plan  for  battle  and  order  of  the  day  were  given 
over  by  the  Confederate  commander,  who  sent  for  me  to 
ride  with  him  over  to  his  left  in  search  of  a  route  by  which 
the  enemy's  right  might  be  turned.  This  seemed  feasible 
under  the  hasty  reconnoissance,  and  he  ordered  the  re 
serves  on  that  move.  As  we  started  on  the  march  the 
noise  of  battle  reached  us  and  the  march  was  arrested. 
Under  the  impression  that  his  officers  realized  the  failure 
and  abandonment  of  his  original  plan,  General  Lee  failed 
to  issue  orders  specifically  recalling  the  appointed  battle. 

It  seems  that  just  as  the  troops  marched  to  the  left 
under  the  last  order,  information  was  received  by  some 
of  the  officers  at  the  front  that  the  enemy  was  getting 
away  from  us. 

To  ascertain  as  to  this  matter,  and  anxious  to  atone  for 
lost  opportunities  of  the  day  before,  part  of  the  troops  near 
our  right  moved  forward,  and  soon  encountered  the  enemy's 


BATTLE   OF    MALVERN    HILL.  145 

infantry,  as  well  as  the  formidable  artillery.  This  impact 
burst  into  the  noise  of  battle,  and  was  taken  as  the  signal 
for  assault  under  the  original  order  of  the  day.  From 
the  right  to  the  left,  as  far  as  and  including  D.  H.  Hill's 
division,  the  Confederates  attacked  in  splendid  style, 
making  repeated  brave  charges,  but  they  were  as  firmly 
met  by  the  enemy,  and  their  dead  and  wounded  were 
mingled  on  the  same  lines.  The  Confederate  ranks  thin 
ning  rapidly,  Magruder  called  on  me  for  reinforcements, 
and  Jackson  was  sent  to  reinforce  D.  H.  Hill's  left,  but 
night  closed  in  upon  us  before  the  reinforcements  could 
get  into  action. 

As  the  order  for  battle  had  been  given  about  noon,  and 
had  been  abandoned  some  hours  before  the  opening,  upon 
receiving  Magruder's  call,  I  supposed  the  conflict  had 
been  brought  on  by  the  enemy  to  force  our  right  back 
and  better  clear  the  route  of  his  retreat.  I  ordered  A. 
P.  Hill  direct  to  Magruder,  and  my  own  division  for 
support  on  our  extreme  right.  The  result  of  the  battle 
was  a  repulse  of  the  Confederates  along  the  entire  line 
and  the  sacrifice  of  several  thousand  brave  officers  and 
men,  though  some  of  our  troops  held  ground  nearer  the 
enemy  than  at  the  onset  of  the  ba,ttle.  During  the  night 
the  enemy  resumed  his  march  for  the  river,  leaving  his 
dead,  some  of  his  wounded,  and  exhibiting  other  marks 
of  the  precipitate  character  of  his  retreat. 

Stuart's  cavalry  had  been  recalled  from  north  of  the 
Chickahominy  on  the  30th  to  join  us  on  the  south  side, 
and  reached  Jackson's  left  Tuesday  night  after  the  battle. 

The  morning  of  the  2d  opened  heavy  and  oppressive. 
The  storm  front  of  bursting  cannon  and  bristling  bayonets 
was  changed  to  a  wide  sweep  of  heavy  clouds  that  covered 
the  dead  that  had  grappled  and  fallen  together  on  Malvern 
Hill.  The  enemy  was  gone,  and  reached  his  lodgement  at 
Harrison's  Landing  on  James  River,  the  old  seat  of  that 
family  which  has  given  our  country  two  Presidents.  Jack- 


10 


146  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

son  stood  on  the  direct  route  of  the  enemy's  retreat,  and 
was  ordered  to  follow  it ;  Magruder's  and  Huger's  com 
mands  to  follow  Jackson.  General  Lee  rode  with  them. 
D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  left  to  care  for  the  wounded  and 
dead  of  Malvern  Hill.  To  obviate  pressure  upon  a  single 
track,  the  reserve  divisions  were  ordered  by  Nance's  Store, 
but  the  heavy  clouds  soon  began  to  let  down  a  pelting 
rain  that  became  more  severe  and  delayed  all  movements. 

The  reports  of  Jackson  and  Stuart  of  the  operations  of 
the  3d  are  conflicting.  The  former  claimed  that  he  was 
near  the  landing  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  and  advanced 
his  line  of  skirmishers.  The  latter  reported  that  he  found 
during  the  night  of  the  2d  a  fine  position  on  Erlington 
Heights,  from  which  the  enemy  could  be  shelled  out  of 
his  new  position  by  artillery ;  that  he  occupied  and  held 
that  position  by  a  squadron  and  howitzer  until  driven 
from  it  by  the  enemy  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  3d ;  that  he  reported  of  that  position  to  Generals  Lee 
and  Jackson  during  the  night  of  the  2d.  Other  accounts 
go  with  that  of  Stuart.  It  seems  that  the  "  foot  cavalry"  * 
and  the  reserve  divisions  met  at  the  landing  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  3d.  The  troops  from  the  Valley  district 
had  not  been  engaged  in  the  battles  of  the  march  except 
that  of  Gaines's  Mill. 

At  daylight  of  the  4th  I  rode  to  the  front,  and  ordered 
General  Jackson  to  drive  in  the  enemy's  skirmishers  and 
prepare  to  attack.  D.  R.  Jones's  division  of  Magruder's 
command,  coming  up,  was  ordered  on  Jackson's  left,  A.  P. 
Hill's  on  his  right ;  my  own  division  to  support  Jackson's 
direct  move  for  Erlington  Heights.  After  pushing  the 
skirmish  line  back,  Jackson  reported  his  troops  not  in  con 
dition  for  the  work,  and  asked  delay  until  the  command 
ing  general  was  up.  As  General  Lee  was  reported  near, 
attack  was  delayed,  and  a  note  was  sent  asking  him  to 

*  A  name  taken  by  the  infantry  from  the  Valley  district  on  account 
of  their  swift  secret  marches. 


BATTLE   OF    MALVEKN    HILL,  147 

ride  forward  as  soon  as  convenient.  He  rode  up  in  about 
half  an  hour,  and,  after  mature  deliberation,  decided  that 
the  attack  should  not  be  made.  He  reinforced  his  cavalry 
and  horse  artillery  by  a  number  of  his  choicest  field  bat 
teries,  and  ordered  General  Stuart  to  use  them  against  the 
enemy's  transports  on  the  lower  James.  This  expedition 
did  some  damage,  but  the  superior  batteries  of  the  gun 
boats,  convoys  of  the  transports,  enabled  them  to  maintain 
safe-conduct  along  the  line  of  supplies  and  reinforcements. 
On  the  8th  he  withdrew  his  army  to  points  more  con 
venient  to  supplies,  and  towards  the  open  highway  to 
Washington  City. 

Passing  in  critical  review  the  events  of  the  campaign, 
they  fail  to  disclose  a  flaw  as  it  was  projected  by  the  Con 
federate  chief.  It  even  opened  up  grander  possibilities 
than  came  within  his  most  hopeful  anticipations  at  the 
period  of  projection. 

The  Union  commander  left  his  Fifth  Corps  engaged  at 
Beaver  Dam  Creek  while  Jackson's  column  marched  by 
it  as  far  as  Hundley's  Corner  and  went  into  camp.  The 
object  and  instructions  of  Jackson's  advanced  echelon 
were  to  have  him  file  in  against  any  force  that  he  might 
pass  and  attack  it  in  flank  and  rear.  If,  instead  of  going 
into  camp  at  Hundley's  Corner  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
26th  of  June,  he  had  filed  to  his  right  behind  the  Fifth 
Corps,  he  would  have  had  it  surrounded  by  fifty  thousand 
men  beyond  the  reach  of  succor. 

He  was  troubled  by  conflicting  orders.  The  general 
order  for  the  campaign  and  verbal  instructions  were  in 
tended  to  supersede  all  others,  bat  General  Lee's  letter  of 
the  llth  was  not  recalled,  so  he  marched  with  the  two 
orders  in  his  pocket,  which  made  not  a  little  trouble. 

Before  Jackson's  army  was  called  from  the  Valley,  it 
was  reinforced  and  organized  for  our  working  column. 
On  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  June  it  was  further  aug 
mented  by  the  division  under  D.  H.  Hill  and  Stuart's 


148  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

cavalry.  His  line  of  march  during  the  day  led  him 
around  Porter's  position  near  Gaines's  Mill  to  the  enemy's 
right,  the  most  favorable  point  for  attack.  He  partially 
engaged  by  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  then  withdrew  it,  and 
posted  his  troops  in  a  position  selected  to  catch  the  Fed 
erals  in  their  flight  from  A.  P.  Hill's  division.  Finally, 
when  Porter's  defence  developed  too  much  strength  for 
A.  P.  Hill,  he  deployed  into  line  of  battle  from  left  to 
right,  overspreading  the  enemy's  entire  front. 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  June,  General  Lee 
thought  to  draw  McClellan  out  from  his  works,  force  him 
to  defend  his  base  on  the  Pamunkey,  and  to  so  cripple 
him  on  his  retreat  as  to  warrant  strong  detachments 
from  his  army  in  the  direction  of  Washington,  and  thus 
force  him  to  defend  his  own  capital. 

Before  marching  to  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  he 
ordered  a  detachment  of  cavalry  to  the  south  side  of 
White  Oak  Swamp,  under  careful  watch  for  the  enemy's 
movements  by  vedettes,  even  as  far  as  Chickahominy 
River,  so  that  on  the  night  of  the  27th  he  had  a  cordon 
of  troops  and  vedettes  extending  completely  around  Mc- 
Clellan's  army.  Notwithstanding  precautions  so  carefully 
laid,  McClellan  started  to  march  for  his  new  base  on  the 
night  of  the  27th,  continued  his  preparations  and  move 
ments  through  the  day  and  night  of  the  28th,  and  the 
first  reliable  information  of  the  move  towards  James 
River  came  from  Major  Meade  and  Lieutenant  Johnson, 
engineers.  The  information,  though  coming  from  a 
source  least  looked  for,  was  more  than  gratifying  to  Gen 
eral  Lee,  for  he  thought  the  enemy  had  essayed  a  move 
not  practicable ;  that  General  McClellan's  army  was  in 
his  power  and  must  be  our  prize,  never  to  reach  the  new 
base. 

Just  as  he  was  mapping  out  orders  of  pursuit,  a  staff- 
officer  of  General  Magruder's  came  from  the  other  side 
of  the  river  to  report  the  Federal  army  in  retreat,  and 


BATTLE   OF    MALVERN    HILL.  149 

that  General  Magruder  was  preparing  to  assault  the  fort 
in  his  immediate  front.     General  Lee  said,— 

"My  compliments  to  General  Magruder,  and  ask  him  not  to 
hurt  my  young  friends,  Major  Meade  and  Lieutenant  Johnson, 
who  are  occupying  that  fort." 

Uniformly  military,  but  courteous  in  his  bearing,  it  was 
very  rare  that  he  became  facetious  when  on  parade  service, 
but  anticipations  that  General  McClellan  was  soon  to  be 
his  prisoner  excused  the  giving  way  to  impulse  born  of 
this  unexpected  adventure. 

Within  an  hour  his  troops  on  the  east  side  were  on  the 
march  for  their  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy.  He  then 
rode  across,  gave  orders  to  General  Magruder,  rode  with 
him  some  distance,  and  repeated  the  orders  before  leaving 
him. 

Following  up  the  rear-guard,  General  Magruder  came 
upon  it  in  force  at  Savage  Station.  The  Second  Corps 
and  Franklin's  division  under  W.  F.  Smith  of  the  Sixth, 
under  General  Sumner,  were  posted  there  to  cover  the 
retreat.  Magruder  planned  battling  with  his  own  six 
brigades  against  their  front,  two  brigades  of  Huger's  di 
vision  to  come  on  the  enemy's  left  down  the  Williamsburg 
road,  Jackson's  twelve  or  fifteen  brigades  to  attack  their 
right.  But  when  Magruder  thought  his  arrangements 
complete,  he  received  a  message  from  General  Huger 
"  that  his  brigades  would  be  withdrawn."  * 

Then  other  information  not  anticipated  came  to  him,— 
viz.,  that  General  Jones,  commanding  on  Magruder's  left, 
called  for  co-operation  in  that  quarter.  General  Jackson 
sent  word  in  reply  that  "  he  had  other  important  duty  to 
perform.'' 

Referring  to  Jackson's  orders  of  the  29th,  General  Lee 
wrote  General  Magruder : 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  664. 


150  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"  HEAD- QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"June  29,  1862. 
"  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  B.  MAGRUDER, 

' l  Commanding  Division  : 

"  GENERAL,—  I  regret  much  that  you  have  made  so  little 
progress  to-day  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  In  order  to  reap  the 
fruits  of  our  victory  the  pursuit  should  be  most  vigorous.  I  must 
urge  you,  then,  again  to  press  on  his  rear  rapidly  and  steadily. 
We  must  lose  no  time,  or  he  will  escape  us  entirely. 

11  Very  respectfully  yours,  etc., 

"R.  E.  LEE, 

11 General. 

"p.S. — Since  the  order  was  written,  I  learn  from  Major  Tay 
lor  that  you  are  under  the  impression  that  General  Jackson  has 
been  ordered  not  to  support  you.  On  the  contrary,  he  has  been 
directed  to  do  so,  and  to  push  the  pursuit  vigorously."  * 

Sumner,  besides  his  greater  force,  having  some  advan 
tage  from  the  earthworks  previously  constructed,  repulsed 
Magruder's  attack,  and  the  affair  of  cross-purposes  failed 
of  effect. 

If  Jackson  could  have  joined  against  the  right  of 
Sumner  with  his  brigades,  the  latter  could  have  been 
dislodged,  the  Confederates  passing  the  swamp  with  him, 
which  would  have  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end.  The 
occasion  was  especially  propitious,  for  Heintzelman's  corps, 
that  had  been  designated  as  part  of  the  rear-guard  with 
Sumner  and  Franklin,  through  some  misconception  had 
marched  over  the  swamp,  to  camp  near  Charles  City  cross 
roads,  leaving  easy  work  for  Jackson  and  Magruder. 

When,  on  the  forenoon  of  the  30th,  Jackson  found  his 
way  across  the  swamp  blocked  by  Franklin,  he  had  time 
to  march  to  the  head  of  and  across  it  to  the  Charles  City 
road  in  season  for  the  engagement  contemplated  at  Fray- 
ser's  Farm,  the  distance  being  about  four  miles.  General 
Wright,  of  Huger's  division,  marched  his  brigade  from 
the  head  of  the  swamp  to  Jackson's  line  at  the  bridge, 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi.  part  ii.  p.  687. 


BATTLE   OF   MALVERN   HILL.  151 

and  returned,  making  several  halts  and  crossings  to  recon 
noitre. 

But  little  remains  to  be  said  of  the  engagements  at 
Frayser's  Farm  and  Malvern  Hill.  The  former  was  a 
halting  failure  of  combination  of  forces ;  the  latter  an 
accident  resulting  from  the  armies  standing  close  abreast 
many  hours.  Malvern  Hill  left  out,  the  two  armies  would 
have  mingled  their  lines  between  that  and  Westover  dur 
ing  the  3d  and  4th  of  July. 

The  failure  of  concert  of  action  by  the  Confederates 
should  not  discount  the  conduct  of  McClellan's  masterly 
retreat.  In  the  emergency  he  showed  himself  well 
equipped  in  the  science  of  war,  and  prepared  to  cross 
swords  with  his  able  adversary.  At  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  he  had  in  hand  one  hundred  and  five  thousand 
men.  General  Lee's  returns  were  not  accurately  made, 
but  a  fair  estimate  puts  his  numbers  between  eighty  and 
eighty-five  thousand. 

The  losses  of  the  campaign  were,  on  the  Union  side, 
15,249  ;  on  the  Confederate  side,  greater  ;  in  the  absence  of 
complete  returns,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  they  were  from  18,000 
to  19,000.  Up  to  the  time  of  Malvern  Hill  the  casualties 
were  about  equally  divided  between  the  two  armies,  but 
in  that  battle  the  Confederates  lost  not  far  from  5000 
men,  and  the  Federals  not  more  than  one-third  that 
number. 

Upon  reaching  the  gunboats,  General  McClellan's 
power  was  about  doubled.  Although  fire  from  the  gun 
boats  was  not  very  effective  against  a  land  battle,  the 
moral  effect  of  fighting  batteries  that  could  not  be  reached 
was  most  powerful.  It  was  reported  on  the  Confederate 
side  that  General  McClellan,  on  boarding  one  of  the 
boats,  where  he  spent  most  of  the  day  of  battle,  said, 
"  There  should  be  a  gunboat  in  every  family." 

Some  critics  say  that  McClellan  should  have  taken 
Richmond  during  the  campaign.  The  great  Napoleon 


152  FROM    MAXASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

would  have  done  so  after  the  disaster  at  Malvern  Hill 
with  his  regularly  organized  army  of  veterans.  They 
say,  too,  that  Lee  should  have  captured  McClellan  and 
his  army.  So  thought  General  Lee,  but  some  of  his 
leaders  were  working  at  cross-purposes,  and  did  not  have 
that  close  attention  that  the  times  called  for. 

We  may  now  consider  the  probable  result  of  the  plan 
mapped  out  and  ordered  by  General  Lee  in  his  letter 
of  June  llth  to  General  Jackson  had  it  been  followed, 
— i.e.,  Jackson  to  march  down  the  right  bank  of  the 
Pamunkey  with  his  troops  from  the  Valley  district  and 
attack  McClellan's  rear  east  of  the  Cliickahominy,  while 
Lee  attacked  from  the  Richmond  side  with  his  army.  On 
the  Richmond  side,  McClellan  had  four  army  corps,  well 
fortified,  supported  by  his  powerful  artillery.  The  battle 
of  Gaines's  Mill,  where  the  troops  from  the  Valley  were 
reinforced  by  four  of  Lee's  choice  divisions  and  most  of 
his  cavalry, — more  than  doubling  Jackson's  column, — may 
be  significant  of  the  result  of  Jackson's  attack  on  that 
side  if  it  had  been  made  as  ordered.  The  battle  of  Mal 
vern  Hill,  from  an  open  field,  may  tell  the  result  of  an 
attack  upon  the  four  corps  in  their  fortified  position  had 
the  attack  been  made  upon  them  from  the  Richmond  front. 


CHAPTEE  XII. 

HALLECK    AND    POPE    IN    FEDERAL    COMMAND. 

Centres  of  Activity  gravitate  towards  Orange  and  Culpeper  Counties- 
Pope's  Unsoldierly  Preliminary  Orders— Jackson's  and  Pope's  En 
counter  at  Cedar  Mountain— Confidence  in  and  Esteem  for  General 
Lee— The  Confederate  Commander's  Plans  for  cutting  off  Pope  mis 
carry—Capture  of  Captain  Fitzhugh  with  Important  Orders— Long- 
street  puts  General  Toombs  under  Arrest— General  Pope  withdraws. 

THE  Federals  had  by  this  time  organized  the  "  Army 
of  Virginia"  from  the  independent  forces  in  the  State, — 
the  First  Corps  under  General  Sigel,  the  Second  under 
General  Banks,  the  Third  under  General  McDowell,  com 
manded  by  Major-General  John  Pope,  brought  from  the 
West  for  that  object  and  appointed  June  26.  This  army 
reported  July  31,  46,858  strong,  for  field  service. 

On  the  23d  of  July,  General  H.  W.  Halleck  assumed 
command  of  the  Federal  armies  as  general-in-chief,  by 
order  of  the  President  of  July  11. 

The  quiet  of  General  McClellan's  army  at  Harrison's 
Landing  assured  General  Lee  of  his  opportunity  for  at 
tention  to  the  movements  of  the  army  under  General  Pope, 
working  towards  Richmond  by  the  Orange  and  Alexan 
dria  Railway.  On  the  13th  of  July  he  ordered  General 
Jackson,  with  his  own  and  Swell's  division,  to  Gordons- 
ville,  to  have  a  watch  upon  the  Federal  'force  operating  in 
that  quarter,  promising  reinforcements  as  soon  as  occasion 
should  call  for  them.  Stuart  was  at  Hanover  Court- 
House,  in  observation  towards  Fredericksburg,  and  Rob 
ertson's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  Jackson,  to  reinforce  his 
cavalry  under  Colonel  Munford. 

To  engage  attention  pending  these  movements,  General 
D.  H.  Hill,  in  command  on  the  south  side  of  the  James, 

153 


154  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

was  ordered  to  have  all  of  his  artillery  on  that  side  avail 
able  put  in  battery  on  the  banks  of  the  river  against 
McClellan's  camps  on  the  north  side  and  his  transports 
on  the  water. 

General  Pope  immediately  displayed  bold  front  as  a 
diversion,  seeking  to  draw  General  Lee  away  from  Mo 
Clellan. 

So  General  Lee  sent  General  A.  P.  Hill  with  his  di 
vision  to  reinforce  Jackson,  with  orders  to  the  latter  to 
strike  out  for  the  enemy  in  his  front. 

The  threatening  attitude  of  the  Confederates  at  Gor- 
donsville  caused  apprehension  at  Washington,  and  induced 
the  authorities  to  consider  the  withdrawal  of  McClellan's 
army  to  reinforce  the  army  under  Pope. 

Upon  receipt  of  an  intimation  to  that  effect,  General 
McClellan  ordered  a  strong  force  under  General  Hooker 
to  advance  in  threatening  move  against  General  Lee  on 
the  4th  of  August.  Hooker  marched  on  the  5th,  and 
occupied  the  ground  of  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill.  Gen 
eral  Lee  ordered  the  divisions  of  McLaws,  D.  R.  Jones, 
that  under  Ripley  (D.  H.  Hill's),  and  my  own  to  march 
against  Hooker.  It  was  night  when  our  troops  were 
posted,  and  before  daylight  of  the  next  morning  Hooker 
had  marched  back  to  his  camp  at  Harrison's  Landing. 

Just  here,  as  a  digression  from  following  the  operations 
of  the  armies  of  Lee  and  Pope,  it  should  be  remarked 
that  the  latter,  by  injudicious  and  unsoldierly  attitude 
assumed  at  the  outstart  of  his  campaign,  intensely  in 
censed  the  people  of  Virginia  and  the  South  generally, 
the  Confederate  army  to  a  man,  and  probably  to  a  con 
siderable  degree  discomfited  the  most  considerate  and 
thoughtful  of  his  own  officers  and  the  authorities  behind 
him.  The  exigencies  of  war  did  not  demand  some  of  the 
harsh  measures  that  he  promulgated, — such,  for  instance, 
as  his  notorious  "General  Orders  No.  11"  and  several 
other  of  his  pronunciamentos  : 


HALLECK    AND    POPE    IN    FEDERAL   COMMAND.         155 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  VIRGINIA, 

"  WASHINGTON,  July  23,  1862. 
"GENERAL  ORDERS  No.  11.* 

"  Commanders  of  army  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  detached 
commands  will  proceed  immediately  to  arrest  all  disloyal  male 
citizens  within  their  lines  or  within  their  reach  in  rear  of  their 
respective  stations. 

"Such  as  are  willing  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States,  and  will  furnish  sufficient  security  for  its  observ 
ance,  shall  be  permitted  to  remain  at  their  homes  and  pursue  in 
good  faith  their  accustomed  avocations.  Those  who  refuse  shall 
be  conducted  south  beyond  the  extreme  pickets  of  this  army,  and 
be  notified  that  if  found  again  anywhere  within  our  lines,  or  at 
any  point  in  rear,  they  will  be  considered  spies,  and  subjected  to 
the  extreme  rigor  of  military  law. 

"If  any  person,  having  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  as  above 
specified,  be  found  to  have  violated  it,  he  shall  be  shot,  and  his 
property  seized  and  applied  to  the  public  use. 

"All  communication  with  any  person  whatever  living  within 
the  lines  of  the  enemy  is  positively  prohibited,  except  through 
the  military  authorities  and  in  the  manner  specified  by  military 
law  ;  and  any  person  concerned  in  writing  or  in  carrying  letters 
or  messages  in  any  other  way  will  be  considered  and  treated  as  a 
spy  within  the  lines  of  the  United  States  army. 

"By  command  of  Major- General  Pope. 

1 i  GEO.  D.  EUGGLES, 
"  Colonel,  Assistant  Adjutant- General,  and  Chief  of  Staff." 

This  was  a  measure  of  unnecessary  severity  towards 
non-combatants,  and  had  an  unsalutary  effect.  When 
men  volunteer  to  fight  in  their  country's  cause  they  should 
be  credited  with  faith  in  its  righteousness,  and  with  expec 
tations  of  meeting  soldiers  worthy  of  their  mettle.  Ap 
peals  to  turn  their  strength  against  women  and  children 
and  non-combatants  are  offensive  to  manhood,  demoral 
izing  in  influence,  and  more  likely  to  aggravate  and  pro 
long  war  spirit  than  to  open  ways  of  order  and  amity. 
Besides,  such  orders  indicate  a  flaw  in  the  armor  of  the 
author. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  52. 


156  FEOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Scott  set  an  example  worthy  of  eternal  emula 
tion.  In  his  march  through  Mexico  he  was  as  strict  in  the 
requirement  of  order  and  protection  for  non-combatants 
as  he  could  have  been  in  marching  through  his  own  civil 
communities.  The  result  was  speedy  peace,  respect  from 
all  the  people,  admiration  and  affection  from  many. 

When  A.  P.  Hill's  division  joined  General  Jackson  at 
Gordonsville,  General  Pope's  army  was  posted, — the  First 
Corps  (Sigel's)  at  Sperryville,  the  Second  (Banks's)  at 
Culpeper  Court-House,  the  Third  (McDowell's),  one  di 
vision  near  Culpeper  Court-House,  and  one  at  Fredericks- 
burg — these  two  under  Ricketts  and  King  respectively ; 
his  cavalry  under  Buford,  Bayard,  and  Hatch  along  the 
Rapidan  from  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Fredericksburg. 

The  point  held  by  his  left  was  thought  essential  by  the 
Washington  authorities  as  holding  the  way  for  reinforce 
ments  from  McClellan's  army  on  the  James  to  join  in 
the  contemplated  march  by  General  Pope's  route  to  Rich 
mond. 

On  the  2d  of  August,  Jackson  sent  part  of  his  cav 
alry  forward  as  far  as  Orange  Court-House,  under  Colonel 
W.  E.  Jones,  who  encountered  at  that  point  a  formidable 
cavalry  guard  of  the  enemy,  when  a  spirited  affair  oc 
curred,  creditable  alike  to  both  sides.  This  was  followed 
up,  on  the  8th,  by  the  advance  of  Jackson's  entire  force, 
his  own  division  under  Winder  leading,  Swell's  and  A.  P. 
Hill's  following. 

General  Pope's  outpost  at  Cedar  Run,  held  by  cavalry 
and  Crawford's  brigade  of  infantry,  had  meantime  been 
reinforced  by  the  balance  of  the  Second  Corps  under 
Banks,  and  Ricketts's  division  put  in  supporting  position 
of  the  advance  post. 

On  the  9th,  Jackson  advanced  and  found  the  enemy  in 
strong  position  at  Cedar  Run.  His  division  under  Ewell 
was  posted  on  the  northeast  slope  of  Slaughter  Mountain, 
his  own  division  under  Winder  formed  to  the  left.  The 


HALLECK    AND    POPE    IN    FEDERAL    COMMAND.         157 

engagement  was  pitched  and  soon  became  severe.  While 
yet  posting  his  troops,  Winder  was  mortally  struck  by 
a  fragment  of  shell.  Banks,  gaining  confidence  in  his 
battle,  moved  forward  to  closer  and  severe  fight  and  held 
it  an  hour,  at  points  putting  Jackson's  troops  in  disorder. 
Jackson,  reinforced  by  A.  P.  Hill's  brigades,  recovered 
his  lost  ground,  advanced  and  renewed  attack,  drove  the 
enemy  back,  engaged  against  reinforcements  of  Ricketts's 
division,  continued  the  fight  till  near  midnight,  then  reor 
ganized  for  battle  away  from  the  immediate  front  of  the 
enemy,  where  he  awaited  next  day,  During  the  evening 
of  the  9th,  Pope  received  his  First  Corps  under  Sigel  and 
called  up  McDowell's  division,  under  King,  from  Freder- 
icksburg.  On  the  10th  both  armies  remained  quiet.  On 
the  llth  a  flag  of  truce  was  sent  in  asking  for  time  to 
bury  the  dead,  which  Jackson  granted,  and  extended  to  a 
late  hour  of  the  day.  King's  division  coming  up,  Pope 
decided  to  engage  again  on  the  12th,  but  Jackson,  having 
information  of  the  extent  of  reinforcements,  decided  to 
withdraw  during  the  night. 

The  loss  was  severe  on  both  sides, — Jackson's,  1276, 
including  his  most  promising  brigadier,  Winder  ;  Pope's, 
2381,  including  three  brigadiers,  two  wounded  and  one 
taken  prisoner. 

After  drawing  King's  division  to  his  field,  General 
Pope  had  about  thirty-six  thousand  present  for  service. 
Jackson's  reports  as  to  these  forces  were  such  that  he  ac 
cepted  the  advice  of  prudence  and  retired  to  stronger 
ground  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rapidan. 

In  the  battle  of  the  9th  the  troops  engaged  were,  ac 
cording  to  official  return  of  July  31,* — 

Second  Corps  (Banks's),  artillery  and  infantry •   •    14,567 

Ricketts's  division,  half  of  Third  Corps,  artillery  and  infantry  .      9,287 

Total 23,854 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  53. 


158  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  absence  of  Lawton's  brigade  and  one  from  Jack 
son's  division  reduced  his  force  to  something  less  than 
eighteen  thousand.  The  troops  engaged  in  battle,  how 
ever,  were  not  far  from  equal,  Jackson  probably  the 
stronger. 

That  this  was  only  a  partial  success — coming  on  the 
heels  of  the  cruel  orders  of  the  Federal  commander — was 
gratifying  to  the  Confederates,  and  encouraging  as  well. 

Inaction  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  gave  General 
Lee  opportunity  for  movement  of  his  troops  towards  Wash 
ington  and  the  army  under  General  Pope.  On  the  15th 
I  was  ordered  to  Gordons ville  by  the  Central  Railroad 
with  ten  brigades.  Two  others  under  Hood  at  Hanover 
Junction  were  ordered  to  join  me. 

Before  despatching  my  corps,  General  Lee  expressed 
his  thought  to  advance  the  right  column  and  cavalry  by 
the  lower  fords  of  the  Rapidan,  the  left  by  the  fords 
above  the  railroad  bridge,  but  left  the  question  open,  with 
orders  to  me  to  work  on  it. 

The  brigades  that  moved  with  me  were  D.  R.  Jones's, 
Kemper's,  Pickett's,  Pryor's,  Jenkins's,  Featherston's, 
Wilcox's,  Toombs's,  Evans's,  and  Drayton's.  Hood's 
and  Whiting's  joined  us  near  Gordons  ville,  Hood  com 
manding  the  demi-division, — his  own  and  Whiting's 
brigades. 

It  may  be  well  to  write  just  here  that  experience  during 
the  seven  days  about  Richmond  established  between  Gen 
eral  Lee  and  his  first  lieutenant  relations  of  confidence 
and  esteem,  official  and  personal,  which  ripened  into 
stronger  ties  as  the  mutations  of  war  bore  heavier  upon 
us.  He  always  invited  the  views  of  the  latter  in  moves  of 
strategy  and  general  policy,  not  so  much  for  the  purpose  of 
having  his  own  views  approved  and  confirmed  as  to  get  new 
light,  or  channels  for  new  thought,  and  was  more  pleased 
when  he  found  something  that  gave  him  new  strength 
than  with  efforts  to  evade  his  questions  by  compliments. 


HALLECK    AND    POPE    IN    FEDERAL    COMMAND.        159 

When  oppressed  by  severe  study,  he  sometimes  sent  for 
me  to  say  that  he  had  applied  himself  so  closely  to  a 
matter  that  he  found  his  ideas  running  around  in  a  circle, 
and  was  in  need  of  help  to  find  a  tangent.  Our  personal 
relations  remained  as  sincere  after  the  war  until  politics 
came  between  us  in  1867. 

General  Pope  was  industriously  increasing  his  strength. 
The  Ninth  Corps,  General  Burnside,  had  been  ordered  to 
Fredericksburg  via  Acquia  Creek,  and  a  division  under 
General  Reno  of  eight  thousand  of  that  corps  reported  to 
the  commander  at  Culpeper  Court-House  on  the  14th. 
Besides  reinforcements  called  to  support  him  from  General 
McClellan's  army,  Pope  was  authorized  to  call  to  his  aid 
the  greater  part  of  the  army  in  West  Virginia  under 
General  Cox. 

After  reaching  Gordonsville  and  learning  something 
of  the  position  of  the  armies,  and  more  of  the  features  of 
the  country,  it  occurred  to  me  that  a  move  against  General 
Pope's  right  would  give  us  vantage-ground  for  battle  and 
pursuit,  besides  the  inviting  foot-hills  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
for  strategy,  and  this  preference  was  expressed  to  General 
Lee.*  He  joined  us  on  the  loth,  and  the  brigades,  in 
cluding  those  under  Hood,  were  advanced  to  position  for  a 
general  march.  He  thought  it  better  to  strike  in  between 
General  Pope's  left  and  the  reinforcements  that  could 
join  him  from  Fredericksburg  than  to  adopt  the  proposi 
tion  to  move  his  army  by  the  upper  fords  of  the  Rapidan 
and  strike  down  upon  the  enemy's  right,  and  decided  to 
throw  his  right  wing  forward  by  the  Raccoon  Ford,  and 
his  left  by  the  Somerville  Ford,  the  latter  above  the  rail 
road, — Fitzhugh  Lee  and  Robertson's  cavalry  with  his 
right,  and  T.  T.  Munford's  with  the  left  wing ;  General 
Stuart  with  the  column  on  the  right. 

My  command  marched  on  the  16th  to  position  for  cross- 


His  letter  of  August  14,  1862. 


160  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ing  by  the  lower  fords.  Jackson  was  in  position  for  the 
upper  crossings.  As  all  of  the  cavalry  was  not  up,  General 
Lee  ordered  his  march  for  the  18th,  to  give  time  for  the 
arrival  of  General  Stuart  and  his  marching  troopers. 

Leaving  the  cavalry  on  the  march,  under  General  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee,  with  instructions  to  camp  on  the  plank-road 
opposite  Raccoon  Ford  on  the  17th,  General  Stuart  rode 
on  the  cars  to  General  Lee's  head-quarters,  received  his 
orders,  and  rode  out  on  the  plank-road  to  join  his  com 
mand  under  Fitzhugh  Lee,  then  due.  The  latter,  how 
ever,  "  by  failure  to  comply  with  instructions,"  as  his 
commander  expressed  it  subsequently,  lost  a  day  in  a 
roundabout  ride,  which  so  jaded  his  horses  that  another 
day  was  sacrificed  to  give  them  rest.  As  if  this  were  not 
sufficient  misfortune,  Captain  Fitzhugh  (General  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart's  adjutant)  was  captured,  and,  as  a  crowning  dis 
aster,  the  despatch  of  the  Confederate  commander  giving 
instructions  for  the  march  of  his  army  as  ordered  for  the 
18th  was  lost.  The  despatch  was  taken  to  General  Pope, 
who,  thus  advised  by  accident,  immediately  set  about  re 
tiring  from  Culpeper  to  the  east  bank  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock.  General  Pope  reported  that 

"  The  cavalry  expedition  sent  out  on  the  16th  in  the  direction 
of  Louisa  Court-House  captured  the  adjutant-general  of  General 
Stuart,  and  was  very  near  capturing  that  officer  himself.  Among 
the  papers  taken  was  an  autograph  letter  of  General  Robert  E. 
Lee  to  General  Stuart,  dated  Gordonsville,  August  15,  which 
made  manifest  to  me  the  position  and  force  of  the  army,  and 
their  determination  to  overwhelm  the  army  under  my  command 
before  it  could  be  reinforced  by  any  portion  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac."  * 

Thus  on  that  day  Pope  put  his  army  in  retreat  by  the 
several  crossings  of  the  Eappahannock  to  its  strong  camps 
of  the  north  side,  leaving  his  cavalry  in  observation. 


*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  29. 


HALLECK  AND  POPE  IN  FEDERAL  COMMAND.    161 

As  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  failed  to  get  to  position  on 
my  right  on  the  17th,  I  ordered  two  regiments  of  infantry 
to  be  posted  as  guard  on  the  road  to  Raccoon  Ford  until 
the  cavalry  could  relieve  them.  The  detail  fell  upon 
Toombs's  brigade.  As  we  were  to  be  in  wait  during  the 
17th,  General  Toombs  rode 'off  that  morning  to  visit  an 
old  Congressional  friend,  and  was  absent  when  the  order 
was  received  at  his  brigade  head-quarters.  The  detail  was 
filled  by  his  next  in  rank,  Colonel  H.  L.  Benning,  and  duly 
posted.  On  his  return,  General  Toombs  rode  upon  his 
picket,  claimed  that  his  troops  should  not  have  been  moved 
except  by  orders  through  himself,  and  ordered  the  detail 
back  to  their  camps.  Upon  learning  of  General  Stuart's 
mishap,  and  the  ride  of  the  Federal  cavalry  by  Raccoon 
Ford,  I  sent  to  inquire  how  the  cavalry  happened  to  es 
cape  my  picket-guard.  Finding  that  the  troops  had  been 
ordered  off  by  General  Toombs,  the  chief  of  staff  was 
directed  to  put  on  his  sword  and  sash  and  order  him 
under  arrest.  Afterwards  he  was  ordered  to  the  rear,  to 
confine  himself  to  the  limits  of  Gordonsville. 

In  addition  to  Reno's  command,  Stevens's  division  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  joined  General  Pope  on  the  15th.  On 
the  17th,  Reno  sent  out  a  party  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men  and  captured  Jackson's  signal-station  on  Clarke's 
Mountain ;  and  it  appears  from  the  official  report  of  this 
occurrence  that  the  Federals  were  misinformed  as  to  our 
position,  and  that  up  to  the  receipt  of  the  captured  de 
spatch,  General  Pope  knew  nothing  of  the  arrival  of  the 
troops  of  my  command. 

On  the  18th  report  came  from  Clarke's  Mountain  of 
unusual  stir  in  the  Federal  commands  about  Culpeper 
Court-House,  and  General  Lee  sent  for  me  to  ride  with 
him  to  the  mountain  to  observe  the  movements.  From 
the  summit  we  had  a  fair  view  of  many  points,  and  the 
camp-flags,  as  they  opened  their  folds  to  the  fitful  breezes, 

seemed  to  mark  places  of  rest.     Changing  our  glasses  to 

11 


162  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  right  and  left  and  rear,  the  white  tops  of  army 
wagons  were  seen  moving.  Half  an  hour's  close  watch 
revealed  that  the  move  was  for  the  Rappahannock  River. 
Changing  the  field  of  view  to  the  bivouacs,  they  seemed 
serenely  quiet,  under  cover  from  the  noonday  August  sun. 
As  we  were  there  to  learn  from  personal  observation,  our 
vigilance  was  prolonged  until  the  wagons  rolled  down  the 
declivities  of  the  Rappahannock.  Then,  turning  again  to 
view  the  bivouacs,  a  stir  was  seen  at  all  points.  Little 
clouds  of  dust  arose  which  marked  the  tramp  of  soldiers, 
and  these  presently  began  to  swell  into  dense  columns 
along  the  rearward  lines.  Watching  without  comment 
till  the  clouds  grew  thinner  and  thinner  as  they  ap 
proached  the  river  and  melted  into  the  bright  haze  of  the 
afternoon  sun,  General  Lee  finally  put  away  his  glasses, 
and  with  a  deeply-drawn  breath,  expressive  at  once  of 
disappointment  and  resignation,  said,  "  General,  we  little 
thought  that  the  enemy  would  turn  his  back  upon  us  thus 
early  in  the  campaign." 


CHAPTEE  XIII. 

MAKING    READY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN. 

General  Lee  modifies  his  Order  of  March— Continuous  Skirmishing- 
Cavalry  Commander  Stuart  gets  into  General  Pope's  Head-quarters 
and  captures  his  Personal  Equipment— His  Uniform  Coat  and  Hat 
shown  along  the  Confederate  Lines— Jackson's  Superb  Flank  Move 
ment—Confederates  capture  Trains,  Supplies,  Munitions,  and  Prison 
ers—Hooker  and  Ewell  at  Bristoe  Station— Jackson  first  on  the  Old 
Field  of  Bull  Run— Longstreet's  Command  joins  passing  Thorough 
fare  Gap— Pope  practically  throws  Responsibility  for  Aggressive  Ac 
tion  on  McDowell— Preliminary  Fighting— General  Pope  surprised 
by  Jackson— Pope's  Orders  to  Fitz-John  Porter. 

UNDER  the  retrograde  of  the  Union  army,  General  Lee 
so  modified  his  order  of  march  as  to  meet  the  new  condi 
tions.     On  the  20th  of  August  the  march  was  made,  the 
right  wing  to  the  vicinity  of  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock  River,  the  left  to  the  railroad  bridge  and  fords 
above.     At  Kelly's  Ford  it  seemed  possible  to  force  a 
crossing.     As  we  were  preparing  for  it,  an  order  came 
reporting  the  upper  crossings  too  well  defended,  and  call 
ing  for  the  right  wing  to  march  to  that  point,  while  the 
left  marched  up  in  search  of  more  favorable  points.     As 
we  were  leaving  Kelly's  the  enemy  made  a  dash  to  cross, 
and  engaged  some  of  the  brigades  in  a  sharp  fight,  intend 
ing  to  delay  our  movements,  but  the  main  column  marched 
on,  while  this  affair  was  still  in  progress.     By  mutual 
consent  the  fight  subsided,  both  parties  joined  their  proper 
commands  and  proceeded  on  their  upward  march,  each 
on    its    own   side    of   the  stream.     At   Beverley's  Ford, 
Stuart's  cavalry  under  Rosser  crossed  and  made  a  lodge 
ment  on   the  east   bank,  but  the  near  approach  of  the 
enemy's  column  threatening,  before  the  infantry  could  get 
up  in  support,  made  necessary  the  abandonment  of  the 
ground,  and  the  left  wing  continued  to  feel  along  higher 


163 


164  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

up  for  a  crossing.  Passing  up,  Trimble's  brigade  was  left 
at  Beverley's  as  guard  to  Jackson's  rear.  The  enemy, 
conceiving  an  opportunity,  crossed  at  Freeman's  Ford  and 
attacked  Trimble.  Meanwhile,  a  detachment  had  been 
called  for  from  the  right  wing.  Hood,  with  his  own  and 
Whiting's  brigade,  was  ordered,  and  was  in  time  to  join  in 
Trimble's  fight,  which  ended  in  repulse  of  the  adventurous 
force. 

The  east  banks  of  the  Rappahannock  lifted  quite  above 
those  occupied  by  the  Confederates,  giving  advantageous 
position  to  the  Union  artillery  fire,  and  offering  no  point 
above  Kelly's  Ford  to  force  a  crossing. 

When  the  left  wing  marched  from  Rappahannock 
Bridge,  the  enemy  crossed  a  considerable  force  to  the 
west  bank,  and  covered  it  with  a  number  of  superior  bat 
teries  well  posted  on  the  east  side.  To  dislodge  that  force 
I  put  a  number  of  batteries  into  action,  including  the 
Washington  Artillery,  and,  later,  part  of  the  reserved 
battalion  under  Colonel  S.  D.  Lee.  The  combat  consumed 
much  of  the  day  of  the  23d,  when  the  enemy  withdrew 
from  that  bank  and  burned  some  of  the  dwellings  as  he  left. 

Riding  along  the  line  of  batteries  during  the  combat, 
we  passed  a  soldier-lad  weeping  over  his  brother,  who  had 
just  been  killed ;  just  then  a  shell  came  screaming  by, 
exploded,  and  dashed  its  fragments  into  the  ground  near 
enough  to  dust  us  a  little.  "  Dad  drat  those  Yankees  !" 
he  said ;  "  if  I  had  known  that  they  were  going  to  throw 
such  things  as  that  at  a  fellow,  I  would  have  stayed  in 
Texas."  He  had  travelled  a  thousand  miles  to  volunteer 
in  the  same  company  with  his  brother. 

Assured  of  the  transfer  of  McClellan's  forces  from  the 
James,  General  Lee  called  up  the  divisions  of  Generals 
D.  H.  Hill,  McLaws,  the  half  division  under  J.  G. 
Walker,  and  Hampton's  cavalry  from  Richmond.  Ander 
son's  division  was  marching  from  Orange  Court-House  as 
our  reserve  force. 


MAKING    READY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  165 

On  the  22d,  Munford's  cavalry  reported  the  Warrenton 
road  open  as  far  as  the  vicinity  of  General  Pope's  head 
quarters.  General  Stuart  was  ordered  over,  with  parts 
of  his  brigades,  to  investigate  and  make  trouble  in  the 
enemy's  rear.  He  crossed  at  Waterloo  and  Hunt's  Mill 
with  fifteen  hundred  troopers  and  Pelham's  horse  artillery, 
and  rode  to  Warrenton.  Passing  through,  he  directed 
his  ride  towards  Catlett's  Station  to  first  burn  the  bridge 
over  Cedar  Creek. 

Before  reaching  Catlett's  a  severe  storm  burst  upon 
him,  bogging  the  roads  and  flooding  the  streams  behind 
him.  The  heavy  roads  delayed  his  artillery  so  that  it 
was  after  night  when  he  approached  Catlett's.  He  caught 
a  picket-guard  and  got  into  a  camp  about  General  Pope's 
head-quarters,  took  a  number  of  prisoners,  some  camp 
property,  and,  meeting  an  old  acquaintance  and  friend  in 
a  colored  man,  who  conducted  him  to  General  Pope's 
tents,  he  found  one  of  the  general's  uniform  coats,  a  hat, 
a  number  of  official  despatches,  a  large  amount  of  United 
States  currency,  much  of  the  general's  personal  equip 
ments,  and  one  of  the  members  of  his  staff,  Major  Gould- 
ing.  He  made  several  attempts  to  fire  the  bridge  near 
Catlett's,  but  the  heavy  rains  put  out  all  fires  that  could 
be  started,  when  he  sought  axes  to  cut  it  away.  By  this 
time  the  troops  about  the  camps  rallied  and  opened  severe 
fire  against  him,  but  with  little  damage.  The  heavy  rain 
fall  admonished  him  to  forego  further  operations  and 
return  to  the  army  while  yet  there  was  a  chance  to  cross 
Cedar  Creek  and  the  Rappahannock  before  the  tides 
came  down.  On  the  night  of  the  23d  he  reached  Sulphur 
Springs,  where  he  met  General  Jackson's  troops  trying  to 
make  comfortable  lodgement  on  the  east  bank,  passed 
over,  and  resumed  position  outside  General  Lee's  left. 
The  despatch-book  of  General  Pope  gave  information  of 
his  troops  and  his  anxiety  for  reinforcements,  besides 
mention  of  those  that  had  joined  him,  but  General 


166  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Stuart's  especial  pleasure  and  pride  were  manifested  over 
the  possession  of  the  uniform  coat  and  hat  of  General 
Pope.  Stuart  rode  along  the  line  showing  them,  and 
proclaiming  that  he  was  satisfied  with  the  exchange  that 
made  even  his  loss  at  Verdierville  before  the  march ;  but 
the  despatch  lost  at  Verdierville  was  the  tremendous  blow 
that  could  not  be  overestimated. 

All  of  the  23d  was  spent  in  severe  artillery  combat. 
General  Jackson  had  gained  the  east  bank  at  Warrenton 
(Sulphur  Springs)  crossing,  and  there  seemed  a  fair  pros 
pect  of  making  a  permanent  lodgement,  but  the  tides  from 
the  severe  storm  of  the  day  and  night  previous  were  coming 
down  in  torrents,  threatening  floods  at  all  of  the  fords. 

On  the  22d,  Pope  had  formed  a  plan  of  concentrating 
his  forces  to  cross  and  attack  Lee's  right  by  the  lower 
fords,  but  the  freshet  had  shut  him  off  in  that  quarter ; 
so  he  turned  to  the  detachment  of  Jackson,  on  the  east 
side,  just  cut  off  from  support.  Marching  up  the  river 
bank,  Jackson  succeeded  in  so  reinforcing  his  detach 
ment  as  to  defend  it  to  an  upper  crossing  till  it  found  safe 
footing  on  the  west  bank.  The  high  water  cut  off  all 
operations  by  direct  moves  on  the  24th.  Meanwhile, 
General  Pope  had  received  the  divisions  of  Kearny  and 
Reynolds  from  McClellan's  army,  forty-five  hundred  and 
twenty-five  hundred  respectively. 

About  this  time  a  letter  came  to  head-quarters  of  the 
right  wing  from  General  Toombs,  expressing  regret  at  his 
unfortunate  mistake  in  relieving  his  troops  from  picket 
service,  and  asking  to  be  released  from  arrest,  that  he 
might  have  the  opportunity  to  show  in  the  approaching 
conflicts  his  deep  interest  in  the  cause.  The  adjutant- 
general  was  instructed  to  say  in  reply  that  the  chief  of 
corps  was  pleased  to  know  that  the  malefeasance  was  from 
want  of  experience,  not  intentional  breach  of  authority, 
and  that  he  would  be  more  than  welcome  back  by  the  gen 
eral  and  the  troops  of  his  brigade. 


GENERAL  THOMAS  J.  JACKSON  (STONEWALL). 


MAKING    READY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  167 

On  the  25th,  Jackson  was  ordered  to  pull  away  from 
our  main  force  with  the  left  wing,  march  by  the  crossings 
of  the  upper  tributaries  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and 
strike  the  railway  in  the  enemy's  rear  at  Manassas  Junc 
tion,  his  supply  depot.  Stuart's  cavalry  was  ordered  to 
follow  during  the  night. 

By  a  rapid  march  Jackson  crossed  the  fords  of  the 
upper  streams  and  made  his  bivouac  near  Salem.  Forcing 
his  march  on  the  26th,  he  passed  Thoroughfare  Gap  to 
Gainesville,  where  Stuart  joined  him  with  all  of  his  cav 
alry.  From  Gainesville  he  inclined  to  the  right  for 
Bristoe  Station,  the  cavalry  holding  the  curtain  between 
his  column  and  Pope's.  A  little  after  sunset  he  reached 
the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  a  march  of  thirty 
miles.  Approaching  the  station,  trains  were  heard  on 
the  rails.  General  Ewell  divided  his  force  and  took  two 
points  on  the  rails,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  trains.  Mun- 
ford's  cavalry  assisted  in  the  job.  Two  trains  and  a 
number  of  prisoners  were  taken,  the  greater  part  of  the 
detachment  at  the  station  making  safe  retreat.  His  plans 
against  General  Lee's  right  cut  off  by  the  high  water, 
General  Pope  extended  his  right,  under  Sigel,  Banks,  and 
Reno,  in  search  of  Jackson  up  the  river,  who  meanwhile 
had  spirited  himself  away  looking  towards  Pope's  rear. 
I  was  left  on  the  river  bank  in  front,  the  reserve  in 
fantry,  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  and  artillery  near  at 
hand. 

Although  the  night  of  the  26th  was  very  dark,  and  his 
troops  were  severely  worn,  to  be  sure  of  his  opportunity, 
Jackson  sent  a  detachment  to  Manassas  Junction  (seven 
miles) .  The  gallant  Trimble,  with  five  hundred  of  his  men, 
volunteered  for  the  service,  and  set  out  at  once  on  the  march. 
Stuart  Avas  afterwards  ordered  to  join  Trimble  with  his 
cavalry,  and  as  ranking  officer  to  command  the  operations 
of  the  entire  force.  The  infantry  advanced  and  attacked 
the  enemy  as  soon  as  it  could  be  formed  for  work,  captured 


168  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

three  hundred  prisoners,  an  eight-gun  battery  complete, 
and  immense  quantities  of  army  supplies. 

Feeling  the  main  force  of  his  adversary  in  his  front 
awaiting  opportunity,  General  Pope  became  anxious  about 
his  left  and  rear,  and  was  further  hampered  by  instruc 
tions  from  the  Washington  authorities  to  hold  his  Fred- 
ericksburg  connections  and  "  fight  like  the  devil."  (It 
may  have  been  fortunate  for  the  Confederates  that  he 
was  not  instructed  to  fight  like  Jackson.)  On  the  23d  he 
was  informed  of  strong  reinforcements  to  reach  him  at 
Warrenton  Junction  on  the  next  day,  and  that  larger 
forces  would  be  shipped  him  on  the  24th,  to  join  him  on 
the  25th. 

Nevertheless,  he  began  to  realize,  as  he  felt  Jackson's 
march  to  his  right,  that  he  must  abandon  the  line  of  the 
Rappahannock  and  attend  on  the  movements  of  that  com 
mand  gone  astray  by  the  mountains.  He  concentrated 
the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  which  Reynolds's  division  had 
been  assigned,  at  and  near  Warrenton  under  McDowell ; 
Reno  east  of  Warrenton  about  three  miles,  on  the  turn 
pike  ;  Porter's  (Fifth)  corps  near  Bealton,  ordered  to  join 
Reno,  and  Heintzelman's  (Third)  corps,  ten  thousand 
strong,  at  Warrenton  Junction.  The  Sixth  (Franklin's) 
Corps,  ten  thousand  strong,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  at 
Alexandria  awaiting  transportation,  as  were  the  divisions 
of  Sturgis,  ten  thousand,  and  Cox,  seven  thousand, — the 
latter  from  West  Virginia.  General  Pope  asked  to  have 
Franklin's  corps  march  by  the  Warrenton  turnpike  to 
join  him,  and  sent  instructions  to  different  parties  to  see 
that  the  guards  in  his  rear  were  strengthened;  that  at 
Manassas  Junction  by  a  division. 

Under  assurances  from  Washington  of  the  prompt  ar 
rival  of  forces  from  that  quarter,  he  looked  for  the  ap 
proach  of  Franklin  as  far  as  Gainesville,  marching  by  the 
Warrenton  turnpike,  and  a  division  to  reinforce  the  com 
mand  at  Manassas  Junction,  so  that  when  Jackson  cut  in 


MAKING    READY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  169 

on  his  rear  and  captured  the  detachment  at  the  Junction, 
he  was  not  a  little  surprised.  He  was  in  position  for 
grand  tactics,  however,  midway  between  the  right  and  left 
wings  of  his  adversary's  forces,  that  in  his  rear  worn  by 
severe  marches  and  some  fighting,  that  in  his  front  be 
hind  a  river,  the  crossings  of  which  were  difficult,  and  the 
lines  of  march  to  bring  the  distant  wings  to  co-operation 
over  routes  that  could  be  defended  by  small  commands. 

Communication  with  Washington  being  severed,  the 
forces  at  and  near  Alexandria  were  thrown  in  the  dark. 
To  move  by  rail  they  were  liable  to  run  into  the  wrong 
camps,  and  the  rapid  change  by  water  to  the  new  position 
left  them  short  of  land  transportation. 

Pope  stood  on  the  evening  of  the  27th :  McDowell's 
corps,  including  Reynolds's  division,  15,500;  SigeFs 
corps,  9000;  Banks's,  5000;  Reno's,  7000;  Heintzel- 
man's  and  Porter's  corps,  18,000, — in  all  54,500  men, 
with  4000  cavalry ;  Platt's  brigade,  Sturgis's  division, 
which  joined  him  on  the  26th,  not  included.  In  his  rear 
was  Jackson,  20,000 ;  in  front  on  the  Rappahannock 
was  my  25,000 ;  R.  H.  Anderson's  reserve  division,  5000 ; 
total,  50,000,  with  3000  of  cavalry  under  Stuart. 

On  the  26th  I  moved  up  to  and  crossed  at  Hinson's 
Mill  Ford,  leaving  Anderson's  division  on  the  Warrenton 
Sulphur  Springs  route. 

On  the  27th,  Jackson  marched  at  daylight  to  Manassas 
Junction  with  his  own  division,  under  Taliaferro,  and 
A.  P.  Hill's,  leaving  Ewell's  at  Bristoe  Station,  with  orders 
to  withdraw  if  severely  pressed.  Approaching  the  Junc 
tion,  a  cavalry  regiment  came  in,  threatening  attack,  and 
was  driven  off  by  Colonel  Baylor's  regiment.  A  field 
battery  came  from  the  direction  of  Centreville,  and  tried 
to  make  trouble  at  long  range,  but  was  driven  off  by 
superior  numbers.  Then  a  brigade  of  infantry  under 
General  Taylor,  of  New  Jersey,  just  landed  from  the  cars 
from  Alexandria,  advanced  and  made  a  desperate  effort 


170  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

to  recover  the  lost  position  and  equipage  at  Manassas 
Junction.  Field's,  Archer's,  Fender's,  and  Thomas's  bri 
gades,  moving  towards  the  railroad  bridge,  met  Taylor's 
command  and  engaged  it,  at  the  same  time  moving  to 
wards  its  rear,  threatening  to  cut  off  its  retreat.  It  was 
driven  back  after  a  fierce  struggle,  General  Taylor,  com 
manding,  mortally  wounded.  Part  of  the  Kanawha  divi 
sion  under  General  Scammon  was  ordered  to  its  support, 
but  was  only  in  time  to  assist  in  its  retreat.  Reporting 
this  affair,  General  Jackson  said, — 

"The  advance  was  made  with  great  spirit  and  determination, 
and  under  a  leader  worthy  of  a  better  cause.77 

The  spoils  were  then  quietly  divided,  such  as  could  be 
consumed  or  hauled  off,  and  the  balance  given  to  the 
torch. 

I  marched  from  the  Rappahannock,  following  on  Jack 
son's  trail,  and  camped  at  White  Plains.  The  march 
during  the  day  was  delayed  about  an  hour  by  a  large  force 
of  cavalry  which  showed  itself  on  my  right  front.  As  I 
had  no  cavalry,  a  little  time  was  spent  in  learning  of  its 
import  and  following. 

General  Pope  ordered  McDowell,  with  his  own  corps, 
including  Reynolds's  division  and  Sigel's  corps,  to  march 
so  as  to  be  at  Gainesville  at  nightfall ;  Reno's  corps  and 
Kearny's  division  of  the  Third  to  Greenwich  to  support 
McDowell.  He  rode  with  Hooker's  division  of  the  Third 
along  the  route  by  the  railroad  for  Bristoe  Station,  ordered 
Porter's  Fifth  Corps  to  remain  at  Warrenton  Junction  till 
relieved  by  Banks's  corps,  then  to  push  on  towards  Gaines 
ville,  Banks  to  follow  by  the  railroad  route. 

In  the  afternoon,  Hooker  encountered  Ewell  at  Bristoe 
Station,  where  the  divisions  engaged  in  a  severe  fight, 
which  was  handsomely  maintained  till  after  night.  Ewell, 
under  his  orders,  withdrew  to  join  Jackson.  The  conduct 
of  the  affair  was  about  equally  creditable  to  the  commands. 


MAKING    READY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  171 

After  this  affair,  General  Pope  so  far  modified  his  order 
of  the  day  as  to  call  Porter  to  him  by  direct  route,  to 
march  at  one  A.M.  and  join  him  at  daylight.  Kearny's 
division  was  ordered  for  Bristoe  Station,  Reno's  corps  for 
Manassas  Junction,  and  McDowell,  from  Gainesville,  was 
ordered  to  swing  around  to  his  right  and  march,  guided 
by  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  to  Manassas  Junction. 

Ewell  made  his  way  along  the  railroad  to  Jackson  in 
time  to  refresh  his  men  on  the  good  things  of  the  captures 
and  for  several  hours  of  sleep.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  three 
regiments  of  cavalry,  was  ordered  on  to  Fairfax  Court- 
House  and  along  the  railroad  towards  Alexandria  to  cut 
off  rail  connection. 

General  McClellan  reached  Alexandria,  Virginia,  on 
the  27th.  On  the  28th,  Jackson  was  first  to  move  at 
12.20  A.M.  He  applied  the  torch  to  the  stores  of  pro 
visions,  and  marched  with  his  division,  under  Taliaferro, 
by  the  New  Market  Sudley  Springs  road  across  the  War- 
renton  turnpike,  and  pitched  bivouac  on  a  line  from  near 
Groveton,  towards  Sudley  Mills,  on  the  field  of  first  Ma 
nassas,  at  daylight. 

At  one  A.M.,  A.  P.  Hill  marched  from  Manassas  Junc 
tion,  crossed  Bull  Run,  and  halted  at  Centreville.  Ewell 
followed  at  daylight  towards  Centreville,  crossed  Bull 
Run,  marched  up  some  distance,  recrossed,  and  joined 
Jackson,  forming  on  Taliaferro's  left.  After  the  morning 
fires  of  the  bivouac  burned  out,  Jackson's  position  could 
not  be  seen  except  upon  near  approach.  He  was  hid 
away  under  the  cuts  and  embankments  of  an  unfinished 
railroad. 

The  road  upon  which  Porter  marched  was  crowded 
during  the  night,  so  that  he  and  his  officers  thought  that 
they  would  make  better  time  and  be  in  better  condition  by 
marching  at  three  A.M.  He  reached  Bristoe  at  ten  A.M., 
Kearny  at  eight,  and  Reno  in  due  season.  But  it  was 
late  in  the  morning  when  McDowell  was  ready  to  march, 


172  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  later  in  the  day  when  his  left  swung  out  on  the  march 
to  the  Junction. 

At  twelve  o'clock,  General  Pope  reached  Manassas  Junc 
tion.  Misled  by  the  movements  of  A.  P.  Hill  and  Ewell, 
he  ordered  Reno's  corps  and  Kearny's  and  Hooker's  divi 
sions  of  the  Third  to  Centreville,  in  search  of  Jackson, 
while  the  latter  was  little  more  than  a  league  from  him, 
resting  quietly  in  his  hiding-place,  and  his  detached  di 
visions  had  doubled  on  their  courses  and  were  marching 
to  join  him.  McDowell,  having  information  of  my  ap 
proach,  delayed  his  march,  detaching  Ricketts's  division 
to  hold  me  in  check  at  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

The  first  passage  at  arms  of  the  day  was  between  part 
of  Stuart's  cavalry,  supported  by  B.  T.  Johnson's  infantry, 
and  Meade's  brigade  of  McDowell's  command.  As  the 
latter  swung  around  for  his  march  to  the  Junction,  the 
brigade  approached  Jackson's  right.  A  detachment  was 
pushed  out  against  Meade,  and  some  artillery  practice  fol 
lowed.  The  Confederates  retired,  but  reported  no  loss. 
Under  the  impression  that  the  force  encountered  was  some 
cavalry  rear-guard  or  reconnoitring  party,  McDowell  re 
sumed  his  march  "  as  soon  as  the  killed  and  wounded  were 
cared  for." 

The  noise  made  by  this  affair  caused  Sigel  to  counter 
march  his  corps,  and  otherwise  delayed  the  march  of  Mc 
Dowell's  entire  forces,  while  it  gave  no  inconvenience  to 
the  Confederates  further  than  a  change  of  front  of  part  of 
Jackson's  command  to  receive  battle,  not  intended,  by  his 
adversary.  Jackson  changed  his  front,  but  finding  the 
direction  of  the  enemy  changed  so  as  to  march  away  from 
him,  he  took  the  move  for  a  general  retreat,  made  report 
of  it  to  A.  P.  Hill,  who  was  yet  north  of  Bull  Run,  and 
ordered  him  to  intercept  the  retreat  by  manning  the  lower 
fords  of  Bull  Run.  The  order  was  received  at  ten  A.M., 
but  General  Hill  had  intercepted  despatches  of  General 
Pope  giving  notice  of  his  preparation  for  battle  at  Manas- 


MAKING    KEADY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  173 

sas  the  next  day,  and  thought  it  better  to  march  on  and  join 
Jackson.  He  filed  into  line  on  Jackson's  left  about  noon. 

General  Jackson  was  right.  If  General  Hill  had  moved 
as  ordered,  he  would  have  met  detachments  ordered  by 
General  Pope  to  Centreville,  and  held  them  back  to  the 
south  side  until  Jackson  could  join  him  to  hold  the  line. 
The  natural  sequence  of  Confederate  operations  was  posi 
tion  to  intercept  General  Pope's  return  to  Washington. 
The  scenes  were  shifting  and  inviting  of  adventure,  and 
the  marches  should  have  followed  them.  General  Hill  was 
justified  by  the  circumstances  that  influenced  his  march. 

When  General  Pope  reached  the  Junction  with  Heint- 
zelman's  and  Reno's  corps,  the  game  was  on  other  fields. 
As  the  last  of  the  Confederate  columns  had  hied  away 
towards  Centreville,  he  ordered  thither  those  corps,  and 
called  up  the  Fifth  to  join  him.  He  then  changed  the 
orders  of  McDowell's  column,  directing  it  towards  Centre 
ville,  to  mass  his  cavalry,  and  find  Jackson,  and  presently 
(at  two  P.M.)  so  far  modified  these  as  to  direct  McDowell 
to  use  his  own  judgment,  and  give  him  the  benefit  of  his 
views,  as  he  knew  the  country  better,  but  ordered  that  he 
should  not  go  farther  towards  Manassas  Junction.  These 
instructions  were  urgent,  with  assurances  that  McDowell's 
moves  should  be  supported  by  other  columns.  Had  these 
been  promptly  executed,  McDowell's  entire  force  should 
have  encountered  Jackson  before  four  o'clock,  but  Mc 
Dowell  did  not  find  Jackson.  As  his  division,  under 
King,  marched  along  the  turnpike  a  little  before  night, 
Jackson  saw  and  engaged  it  in  battle,  as  we  shall  see. 

The  head  of  my  column  reached  Thoroughfare  Gap 
early  in  the  afternoon.  Reports  from  General  Jackson 
were  that  he  was  resting  quietly  on  the  flank  of  the  enemy, 
and  between  him  and  Washington.  Parties  from  the  Gap 
reported  it  clear,  and  the  Confederate  commander  called  a 
rest  for  the  night,  but  D.  R.  Jones's  division  was  ordered 
on  to  occupy  the  Gap. 


174  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

As  we  approached  it,  officers  riding  to  the  front  returned 
reporting  the  enemy  coming  in  heavy  columns  on  the  other 
side.  Jones  was  ordered  to  halt  his  division  till  he  could 
advance  his  skirmishers.  The  Ninth  Georgia  Regiment, 
G.  T.  Anderson's  brigade,  was  sent  and  followed  at  proper 
distance  by  the  division.  The  skirmishers  met  the  enemy's 
pickets  in  the  Gap,  drove  them  off,  and  followed  till  they 
in  turn  were  met  by  a  strong  force  and  pushed  back.  The 
enemy's  leading  brigade  reached  the  plateau  running  along 
the  eastern  side  of  the  mountain,  which,  with  his  batteries 
and  infantry,  gave  him  command  at  that  end.  Anderson 
reinforced  his  Ninth  by  the  First,  then  by  his  other  regi 
ments  on  the  mountain-side,  to  the  left  of  the  Gap,  and 
advanced  till  arrested  by  the  impenetrable  tangle  of  the 
mountain  undergrowth. 

The  Gap  is  a  pass  cut  through  Bull  Run  Mountain  for 
the  flow  of  a  streamlet,  through  Occoquan  Creek,  to  the 
waters  of  the  Potomac.  Its  mean  width  is  eighty  yards. 
Its  faces  of  basaltic  rock  rise  in  vertical  ascent  from  one 
hundred  to  three  hundred  feet,  relieved  hither  and  thither 
by  wild  ivy,  creeping  through  their  fissures  and  from  the 
tops  of  boulders  in  picturesque  drapery.  It  was  in  the 
midst  of  this  bold  and  beautiful  scenery,  in  this  narrow 
gorge  where  the  Indians  had  doubtless  often  contested  ages 
ago,  that  the  seasoned  soldiers  of  our  civilized  armies  now 
battled  for  right  of  way. 

Finding  his  passage  over  the  mountain  by  the  left  side 
of  the  Gap  blocked  by  the  mountain  tangle,  Jones  called 
up  Toombs's  brigade,  under  command  of  Colonel  Benning, 
and  ordered  it  over  the  mountain  obstacle  by  the  south 
side.  Drayton's  brigade  was  held  in  rear.  By  the  time 
the  troops  were  so  disposed,  Ricketts's  division  was  well 
deployed  along  the  plateau  on  the  east. 

Benning  put  Major  Waddell,  with  the  Twentieth  Geor 
gia,  on  the  mountain-side  as  skirmishers,  and  strengthened 
it  by  another  under  Colonel  Holmes,  in  double  time,  to 


MAKING    READY    FOK    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  175 

gain  the  crest  on  that  side.  The  Twentieth  gained  the 
crest  while  the  Federals  were  yet  about  eighty  yards  below 
on  their  side.  The  Georgians  knew  how  to  maintain  their 
advantage,  and  their  fire  arrested  farther  advance  of  the 
enemy,  when,  after  a  spirited  fusillade,  reinforcements 
joined  them  in  good  season,  and  extended  the  line  and 
held  it,  driving  back  the  second  assaulting  force  and  fol 
lowing  down  the  eastern  slope. 

As  soon  as  the  fire  of  the  Federal  batteries  opened, 
Hood  was  ordered  with  his  two  brigades  to  cross  the  moun 
tain  on  the  north  side  of  the  Gap  away  by  a  cattle-trail, 
and  three  other  brigades  were  despatched  under  General 
Wilcox  to  Hopewell  Pass,  about  three  miles  north  of 
Thoroughfare  Gap. 

Advancing  his  men,  selected  for  their  long-range  rifles, 
Benning  drove  off  a  battery  seeking  position  to  play  upon 
the  mountain  slope  and  eastern  end  of  the  gorge,  and 
moved  forward  under  cover  of  a  ravine  until  he  gained  a 
flank  fire  upon  the  enemy's  batteries.  This,  with  the 
march  of  Wilcox  through  Hopewell  Pass  and  the  crossing 
of  one  of  Hood's  brigades,  gave  the  Confederates  com 
manding  position,  and  Bicketts  withdrew  in  time  to  escape 
disaster. 

About  six  o'clock  McDowell  put  his  troops  on  the 
countermarch,  Sigel's  corps  and  Beynolds's  division  back 
by  the  New  Market  road  for  its  crossing  of  the  Warren- 
ton  turnpike,  and  King's  division  of  his  own  corps  down 
the  turnpike.  A.  P.  Hill's  and  Ewell's  divisions,  return 
ing  from  the  north  of  Bull  Bun,  hardly  had  time  for  rest, 
when  the  march  of  King's  division  was  reported.  About 
the  same  time  the  divisions  that  had  been  ordered  by  Pope 
to  Centreville  reached  that  point,  driving  off  some  Con 
federate  cavalry  loitering  along  the  way. 

As  King's  division  was  marching  by,  Jackson  thought 
to  come  out  from  his  lurking-place  to  learn  the  meaning 
of  the  march.  The  direction  of  the  move  again  impressed 


176  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

him  that  Pope  was  retreating,  and  that  his  escape  to  the 
north  side  of  Bull  Run  would  put  his  army  in  a  position 
of  safety  before  General  Lee  could  join  him.  It  was  late, 
the  sun  had  set,  but  Jackson  was  moved  to  prompt  action, 
as  the  only  means  of  arresting  and  holding  Pope  for  Gen 
eral  Lee's  arrival.  He  was  in  plain  view  of  the  white 
smoke  of  the  rifles  of  my  infantry  as  they  climbed  over 
Bull  Run  Mountain,  seven  miles  away,  and  in  hearing  of 
our  artillery  as  the  boom  of  the  big  guns,  resounding  along 
the  rock-faced  cliffs,  gathered  volume  to  offer  salutations 
and  greetings  for  the  union  of  comrades  and  commands. 
He  changed  the  front  of  his  right  division,  and,  noting 
the  movement  of  Sigel's  troops  along  the  New  Market 
road,  called  out  Ewell  with  his  brigades  under  Lawton 
and  Trimble,  and  in  addition  to  the  artillery  of  these  com 
mands  used  the  horse  artillery  under  Pelham.  As  formed, 
this  new  line  was  broadside  against  the  turnpike,  his  left  a 
little  way  from  Grove  ton. 

The  ground  upon  which  the  action  occurred  had  been 
passed  an  hour  before  by  the  division  commander,  General 
Hatch,  who  saw  no  indication  of  the  presence  of  a  foe.  As 
the  division  marched,  the  column  was  made  up  of  the  bri 
gades  of  Hatch,  Gibbon,  Doubleday,  and  Patrick.  The 
action  fell  against  the  brigade  commanded  by  General  Gib 
bon,  who,  taking  it  for  a  cavalry  annoyance  to  cover  retreat, 
opened  against  it,  and  essayed  aggressive  fight,  till  he  found 
himself  engaged  against  a  formidable  force  of  infantry  and 
artillery.  He  was  assisted  by  part  of  Doubleday's  brigade, 
and  asked  for  other  assistance,  which  failed  to  reach  him, 
till  night  came  and  ended  the  contest.  His  fight  was  des 
perate  and  courageous  against  odds,  but  he  held  it  and  his 
line  till  dark.  His  loss  was  seven  hundred  and  fifty-one, 
including  Colonel  O'Connor  and  Major  May,  mortally 
wounded,  with  many  other  officers  with  lighter  hurts.* 


*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  378. 


MAKING    KEADY    FOR    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  177 

General  Doubleday  joined  the  fight  with  his  brigade, 
and  reported  his  loss  nearly  half  of  the  troops  engaged. 
General  Gibbon  called  it  "a  surprise."*  And  well  he 
might,  after  his  division  commander  had  just  passed  over 
the  route  and  failed  to  find  any  indication  of  the  lurking 
foe. 

General  Jackson  reported,  "  The  conflict  here  was  firm 
and  sanguinary."  He  fails  to  give  his  number  lost,  but 
acknowledges  his  severe  loss  in  the  division  commanders, 
General  Ewell  losing  a  leg,  and  Taliaferro  severely 
wounded. 

During  the  night  the  Federal  commander  reported  to 
his  subordinates  that  McDowell  had  "  intercepted  the 
retreat  of  Jackson,  and  ordered  concentration  of  the  army 
against  him,"  f  whereas  it  was,  of  course,  Jackson  who 
had  intercepted  McDowell's  march.  He  seems  to  have 
been  under  the  impression  that  he  was  about  to  capture 
Jackson,  and  inclined  to  lead  his  subordinates  to  the  same 
opinion. 

Of  the  time,  Major  Edward  Pye  reported,— 

"  We  were  sent  forward  towards  evening  to  pursue  the  enemy, 
who  were  said  to  be  retreating.  Found  the  enemy,  but  did  not 
see  them  retreat.  A  deadly  fire  from  three  sides  welcomed  and 
drove  us  back. ' '  J 

After  night  Gibbon  held  his  front  by  a  line  of  skir 
mishers,  and  withdrew  his  command  to  a  place  of  rest. 
At  one  A.M.  the  division  was  withdrawn  and  marched 
back  to  Manassas.  Bicketts,  finding  himself  in  isolated 
position  at  Gainesville,  left  at  daylight  and  marched  to 
Bristoe.  Jackson  moved  his  forces  at  daylight,  and  re 
established  his  line  behind  the  unfinished  railroad,  his 
own  division  under  General  Stark,  EwelPs  under  General 
Lawton,  with  A.  P.  Hill  on  his  left. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  381. 

t  Ibid.,  pp.  74,  75.  J  Ibid.,  p.  371. 

12 


178  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Pope's  orders  for  the  night  directed  the  march 
of  Kearny's  division  from  Centreville  by  the  turnpike 
at  one  A.M.,  to  reinforce  the  troops  against  Jackson ;  the 
other  division  of  Heintzelman's  corps  (Hooker's)  to 
march  by  the  same  route  at  daylight,  and  to  be  fol 
lowed  by  the  corps  under  Reno.  These  orders  were 
urgent,  and  directed  that  the  commands  should  move 
promptly,  leaving  fragments  behind  if  all  could  not  be 
got  together  in  time ;  Kearny  to  attack  at  daylight,  to 
be  supported  by  Hooker. 

McDowell's  operations  of  the  afternoon  left  Sigel's  corps 
and  Reynolds's  division  in  the  vicinity  of  the  field  of 
King's  fight.  General  Pope's  orders  were  given  under 
the  impression  that  King's  division  was  still  occupying 
the  ground  of  the  late  conflict,  and  that  Ricketts's  division 
was  not  far  away  ;  but  these  divisions  had  been  removed 
to  points  before  mentioned,  though  special  instructions 
had  been  sent  McDowell  and  King  to  hold  the  position 
"  at  all  hazards,  to  prevent  the  retreat  of  Jackson,"  with 
assurances  that  at  daylight  in  the  morning  the  entire 
force  from  Centreville  and  Manassas  Junction  should  be 
up  and  in  prompt  co-operation. 

But  McDowell  had  probably  learned  that  Jackson  had 
no  thought  of  retreating,  and  King  had  found  that  his 
ground  was  not  tenable.  The  order  intended  for  King 
failed  to  reach  him. 

Before  he  was  advised  of  the  withdrawal  of  King's  di 
vision,  General  Pope  sent  orders  to  General  Porter  direct 
ing  movements  for  the  29th,  informing  him  of  the  orders 
of  Kearny  and  Hooker,  and  directing  Porter  to  move  at 
daylight  towards  Centreville,  for  position  in  co-operation 
of  the  projected  battle,  and  ordering  Reno  to  march  for 
the  battle  by  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  Under  the  orders, 
Porter  marched  towards  Centreville,  and  Reno  towards 
the  field  for  battle.  Kearny  deferred  his  march  till  day 
light,  and  was  followed  by  Hooker's  division  at  convenient 


MAKING    READY    FOK    MANASSAS    AGAIN.  179 

marching  distance.     Reno's  column  followed  the  march 
<of  the  latter. 

As  soon  as  advised  of  the  withdrawal  of  King's  division 
from  the  ground  of  the  28th,  General  Pope  sent  as  sub 
stitutes  for  his  orders  of  the  early  morning  that  General 
Porter  should  push  forward  with  his  corps  and  King's  divi 
sion  of  McDowell's  command  to  Gainesville,  to  co-operate 
with  his  movements  along  the  Warrenton  turnpike.*  This 
order  was  received  by  Porter  at  9.30  A.M.,f  but  General 
McDowell  joined  this  column,  and  as  ranking  officer  ob 
jected  to  the  transfer  of  his  division  under  King  to  other 
authority,  which  brought  out  the  joint  order  to  McDowell 
and  Porter  to  have  their  joint  commands  execute  the  move 
towards  Gainesville. 


*  Rebellion   Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  518. 
flbid.,  p.  520. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

SECOND    BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS    (BULL    RUN). 

Battle  opened  by  the  Federals  on  Jackson's  Right,  followed  by  Kearny 
— Longstreet's  Reconnoissance- -Stuart,  the  Cavalry  Leader,  sleeps  on 
the  Field  of  Battle— Pope  thought  at  the  Close  of  the  29th  that  the 
Confederates  were  retreating — Second  Day— Fitz-John  Porter  struck 
in  Flank— Longstreet  takes  a  Hand  in  the  Fight  late  in  the  Day- 
Lee  under  Fire— The  Federal  Retreat  to  Centreville— That  Point 
turned— Pope  again  dislodged— "  Stonewall"  Jackson's  Appearance 
and  Peculiarities— Killing  of  "Fighting  Phil"  Kearny— Losses- 
Review  of  the  Campaign. 

GENERAL  POPE  at  daylight  sent  orders  to  General 
Sigel's  corps,  with  Reynolds's  division,  to  attack  as  soon 
as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  and  bring  the  enemy  to  a 
stand  if  possible.  At  the  same  time  orders  were  sent 
Heintzelman  and  Reno  for  their  corps  to  hurry  along  the 
turnpike  and  join  on  the  right  of  Sigel.  The  batteries 
opened  in  an  irregular  combat  on  the  left,  centre,  and 
right  a  little  after  eight  o'clock,  and  drew  from  Jackson  a 
monotonous  but  resolute  response.  And  thus  early  upon 
the  29th  of  August  was  begun  the  second  battle  upon  this 
classic  and  fateful  field. 

I,  marched  at  daylight  and  filed  to  the  left  at  Gaines 
ville  at  nine  o'clock.  As  the  head  of  the  column  approached 
Gainesville  the  fire  of  artillery  became  more  lively,  and  its 
volume  swelled  to  proportions  indicating  near  approach  to 
battle.  The  men  involuntarily  quickened  step,  filed  down 
the  turnpike,  and  in  twenty  minutes  came  upon  the  battle 
as  it  began  to  press  upon  Jackson's  right,  their  left  battery 
partially  turning  his  right.  His  battle,  as  before  stated, 
stood  upon  its  original  line  of  the  unfinished  railroad. 

As  my  columns  approached,  the  batteries  of  the  leading 
brigades  were  thrown  forward  to  ground  of  superior 
sweep.  This  display  and  the  deploy  of  the  infantry  were 

180 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MAN  ASS  AS.          181 

so  threatening  to  the  enemy's  left  batteries  that  he  thought 
prudent  to  change  the  front  of  that  end  of  his  line  more 
to  his  left  and  rear.  Hood's  two  brigades  were  deployed 
across  the  turnpike  at  right  angles,  supported  by  the  bri 
gade  under  Evans.  A  battery  advanced  on  their  right  to 
good  position  and  put  in  some  clever  work,  which  caused 
the  enemy  to  rectify  all  that  end  of  his  line.  Kemper 
deployed  two  of  his  brigades,  supported  by  the  third,  on 
the  right  of  Hood.  The  three  brigades  under  Wilcox 
were  posted  in  rear  of  Hood  and  Evans,  and  in  close  sup 
porting  distance.  On  Hood's  left  and  near  Jackson's 
right  was  open  field,  of  commanding  position.  This  was 
selected  by  Colonel  Walton,  of  the  Washington  Artillery, 
for  his  battalion,  and  he  brought  it  bounding  into  position 
as  soon  as  called.  The  division  under  D.  R.  Jones  was 
deployed  in  the  order  of  the  others,  but  was  broken  off  to 
the  rear,  across  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  to  guard 
against  forces  of  the  enemy  reported  in  the  direction  of 
Manassas  Junction  and  Bristoe.  As  formed,  my  line  made 
an  obtuse  angle  forward  of  Jackson's,  till  it  approached 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  where  D.  R.  Jones's  division  was 
broken  in  echelon  to  the  rear.  At  twelve  o'clock  we  were 
formed  for  battle. 

About  eleven  o'clock,  Hooker's  division  filed  to  the 
right  from  the  turnpike,  to  reinforce  the  Federal  right 
under  Kearny,  who,  with  Sigel's  corps  and  Reynolds's 
division,  were  engaged  in  a  desultory  affair  against  Jack 
son's  left,  chiefly  of  artillery. 

R.  H.  Anderson's  division  marched  at  daylight  along 
the  Warrenton  turnpike  for  Gainesville. 

When  I  reported  my  troops  in  order  for  battle,  General 
Lee  was  inclined  to  engage  as  soon  as  practicable,  but  did 
not  order.  All  troops  that  he  could  hope  to  have  were  up 
except  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  which  was  near  enough 
to  come  in  when  the  battle  was  in  progress.  I  asked 
him  to  be  allowed  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  the  enemy's 


182  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ground,  and  along  his  left.  After  an  hour's  work,  mounted 
and  afoot,  under  the  August  sun,  I  returned  and  reported 
adversely  as  to  attack,  especially  in  view  of  the  easy  ap 
proach  of  the  troops  reported  at  Manassas  against  my 
right  in  the  event  of  severe  contention.  We  knew  of 
Ricketts's  division  in  that  quarter,  and  of  a  considerable 
force  at  Manassas  Junction,  which  indicated  one  corps. 

At  two  o'clock  Kearny  made  an  earnest  opening  against 
Jackson's  left,  but  no  information  of  battle  reached  us  on 
the  right.  He  made  severe  battle  by  his  division,  and  with 
some  success,  but  was  checked  by  Jackson's  movements  to 
meet  him.  General  Stevens  supported  his  battle,  but  his 
numbers  were  not  equal  to  the  occasion.  General  Sigel 
joined  in  the  affair,  and  part  of  General  Hooker's  divi 
sion,  making  a  gallant  fight,  but  little  progress.  General 
Grover's  brigade  made  a  gallant  charge,  but  a  single  bri 
gade  was  a  trifle,  and  it  met  with  only  partial  success,  and 
was  obliged  to  retire  with  heavy  loss  of  killed  and  wounded, 
— four  hundred  and  eighty-four. 

At  one  time  the  enemy  broke  through  the  line,  cut 
ting  off  the  extreme  left  brigade,  and  gained  position  on 
the  railroad  cut ;  but  Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill  reinforced 
against  that  attack,  and  were  in  time  to  push  it  back  and 
recover  the  lost  ground. 

Their  attacks  were  too  much  in  detail  to  hold  even  the 
ground  gained,  but  they  held  firmly  to  the  battle  and  their 
line  until  after  night,  when  they  withdrew  to  await  orders 
for  the  next  day. 

Though  this  fight  opened  at  two  o'clock,  and  was  fiercely 
contested  till  near  night,  no  account  of  it  came  from  head 
quarters  to  my  command,  nor  did  General  Jackson  think  to 
send  word  of  it.  General  Lee,  not  entirely  satisfied  with 
the  report  of  my  reconnoissance,  was  thinking  of  sending 
some  of  the  engineers  for  more  critical  survey  of  his  right 
front,  when  his  chief  of  cavalry  sent  to  inform  him  of  the 
approach  of  a  formidable  column  of  infantry  and  artillery 


SECOND    BATTLE   OP    MANASSAS.  183 

threatening  his  right.  Wilcox's  division  was  changed  to 
supporting  position  of  our  right,  under  Jones,  and  I  rode 
to  look  at  this  new  force,  its  strength,  and  the  ground  of 
its  approach.  It  was  the  column  of  McDowell's  and  Por 
ter's  corps,  marching  under  the  joint  order.  Porter's  corps 
in  advance  deployed  Morell's  division,  and  ordered  But- 
terfield's  brigade,  preceded  by  a  regiment  of  skirmishers, 
to  advance  on  their  right,  Sykes's  division  to  support 
Morell.  As  this  was  in  process  of  execution,  McDowell, 
whose  corps  was  in  rear,  rode  to  the  front  and  objected  to 
the  plan  and  attack  so  far  from  the  main  force. 

A  few  shots  were  exchanged,  when  all  became  quiet 
again.  We  saw  nothing  of  McDowell's  corps,  and  our 
cavalry  had  not  been  able  to  get  far  enough  towards  their 
rear  to  know  of  its  presence  or  force.  He  afterwards 
drew  off  from  Porter's  column  and  marched  by  the 
Sudley  Springs  road  to  join  the  main  force  on  the  turn 
pike.  I  rode  back  and  reported  to  General  Lee  that  the 
column  was  hardly  strong  enough  to  mean  aggressive 
work  from  that  quarter,  and  at  the  same  time  reported  a 
dust  along  the  New  Market  road  which  seemed  to  indicate 
movement  of  other  troops  from  Manassas. 

General  Stuart  rode  up,  making  similar  report,  and 
asked  for  orders.  As  our  chief  was  not  ready  with  his 
orders  at  the  moment,  Stuart  was  asked  to  wait.  The 
latter  threw  himself  on  the  grass,  put  a  large  stone  under 
his  head,  asked  the  general  to  have  him  called  when  his 
orders  were  ready  for  him,  and  went  sound  asleep. 

Our  chief  now  returned  to  his  first  plan  of  attack  by 
his  right  down  the  turnpike.  Though  more  than  anxious 
to  meet  his  wishes,  and  anticipating  his  orders,  I  sug 
gested,  as  the  day  was  far  spent,  that  a  reconnoissance  in 
force  be  made  at  nightfall  to  the  immediate  front  of  the 
enemy,  and  if  an  opening  was  found  for  an  entering 
wedge,  that  we  have  all  things  in  readiness  at  daylight  for 
a  good  day's  work.  After  a  moment's  hesitation  he  as- 


184  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

sented,  and  orders  were  given  for  the  advance  at  early 
twilight. 

This  gave  General  Stuart  half  an  hour  siesta.  When 
called,  he  sprang  to  his  feet,  received  his  orders,  swung 
into  his  saddle,  and  at  a  lope,  singing,  "  If  you  want  to 
have  a  good  time,  jine  the  cavalry,"  his  banjo-player, 
Sweeny,  on  the  jump  behind  him,  rode  to  his  troopers. 

Wilcox  was  recalled  and  ordered  to  march  in  support 
of  Hood  and  Evans  when  they  advanced  on  the  recon- 
noissance.  It  so  happened  that  our  advance  had  been 
anticipated  by  an  order  to  move  from  the  enemy's  side 
against  us.  They  attacked  along  the  turnpike  by  King's 
division  about  sunset. 

To  the  Confederates,  who  had  been  searching  for  an 
opportunity  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  and  were 
about  to  march  through  the  approaching  darkness  to  find 
it,  this  was  an  agreeable  surprise.  Relieved  of  that  irk 
some  toil,  and  ready  for  work,  they  jumped  at  the  pres 
ence,  to  welcome  in  countercharge  the  enemy's  coming. 
A  fierce  struggle  of  thirty  minutes  gave  them  advantage 
which  they  followed  through  the  dark  to  the  base  of  the 
high  ground  held  by  bayonets  and  batteries  innumer 
able  as  compared  with  their  limited  ranks.  Their  task 
accomplished,  they  were  halted  at  nine  o'clock  to  await 
the  morrow.  One  cannon,  a  number  of  flags,  and  a  few 
prisoners  were  taken. 

Generals  Wilcox  and  Hood  were  ordered  to  carefully 
examine  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  report  of  the  fea 
sibility  of  attack  at  daylight.  They  came  to  corps  head 
quarters  a  little  before  twelve  o'clock,  and  made  separate 
reports,  both  against  attack,  with  minute  items  of  their 
conclusions.  Hood  was  ordered  to  have  the  carriage  of 
the  captured  gun  cut  up  and  left,  and  both  were  ordered 
to  withdraw  their  commands  to  their  first  positions. 

Meanwhile,  General  Pope  had  sent  orders  to  General 
Porter,  dated  4.30  P.M.,  to  attack  upon  my  right  flank,  but 


SECOND    BATTLE   OF    MANASSAS.  185 

the  order  was  not  received  until  it  was  too  late  for  battle, 
and  the  force  was  not  strong  enough,  and  a  fight  at  that 
hour  might  have  been  more  unfortunate  than  the  fights  by 
detail  on  their  right.  If  it  had  been  sent  to  General  Mc 
Dowell  before  he  left,  the  two  corps,  if  he  could  have  been 
induced  to  go  in,  might  have  given  serious  trouble.  The 
field  on  their  left  was  favorable  for  tactics,  but  on  Porter's 
front  it  was  rough,  and  K.  H.  Anderson's  division  was  in 
striking  distance  of  their  left,  if  that  effort  had  been  made. 

Anderson  marched  in  the  dark  as  far  as  Hood's  front 
before  reporting  for  position,  and  was  ordered  back  to 
Gainesville. 

The  4.30  order  was  issued  under  the  impression  that  my 
troops,  or  the  greater  part  of  them,  were  still  at  Thorough 
fare  Gap,  and  General  Pope  said,  in  his  official  report, — 

"I  believe,  in  fact  I  am  positive,  that  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  29th;  General  Porter  had  in  his  front  no  consid 
erable  body  of  the  enemy.  I  believed  then,  as  I  am  very  sure 
now,  that  it  was  easily  practicable  for  him  to  have  turned  the 
right  flank  of  Jackson  and  to  have  fallen  npon  his  rear ;  that 
if  he  had  done  so,  we  shonld  have  gained  a  decisive  victory  over 
the  army  under  Jackson  before  he  could  have  been  joined  by  any 
of  the  forces  of  Longstreet."  * 

After  night,  Porter's  column  marched  by  its  right  to 
follow  the  route  of  McDowell. 

The  morning  of  the  30th  broke  fair,  and  for  the  Fed 
eral  commander  bright  with  anticipations  for  the  day.  He 
wired  the  Washington  authorities  of  success,  that  "the 
enemy  was  retreating  to  the  mountains,"  and  told  of  his 
preparations  for  pursuit.  It  seems  that  he  took  my  recon- 
noissance  for  a  fight,  and  my  withdrawal  for  retreat,  also 
interpreting  reports  from  the  right  as  very  favorable.  He 
reported,— 

' '  General  Hooker  estimated  the  loss  of  the  enemy  as  at  least 
two  to  one,  and  General  Kearny  as  at  least  three  to  one." 


*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  40.     General  Pope. 


186  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

He  construed  the  operations  of  the  night  of  the  29th 
and  the  reports  of  the  morning  of  the  30th  as  indications 
of  retreat  of  the  Confederates.  Prisoners  captured  during 
the  night,  paroled  and  returning  to  him,  so  reported  on 
the  morning  of  the  30th,  and  his  general  officers  had 
impressions  of  the  Confederate  left  that  confirmed  the 
other  accounts,  and  convinced  him  that  we  were  in  retreat. 

The  forces  threatening  our  right  the  day  before  having 
marched  around  towards  the  turnpike,  D.  R.  Jones's  di 
vision  was  advanced  to  position  near  Kemper's  right. 
Colonel  S.  D.  Lee's  artillery  battalion  was  advanced  to 
relieve  the  Washington  Artillery,  making  our  line  com 
plete,  in  battle  front. 

About  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  General  Pope  or 
dered  attack  against  Jackson's  front  by  the  corps  under 
General  Porter,  supported  by  King's  division,  Heintzel- 
man  and  Reno  to  move  forward  and  attack  Jackson's  left, 
to  turn  it  and  strike  down  against  the  flank,  Ricketts's 
division  in  support  of  it ;  but  Ricketts  was  recalled  and 
put  near  the  turnpike,  to  support  that  part  of  Porter's 
field. 

During  the  early  part  of  this  severe  battle  not  a  gun 
was  fired  by  my  troops,  except  occasional  shots  from  S.  D. 
Lee's  batteries  of  reserve  artillery,  and  less  frequent  shots 
from  one  or  two  of  my  other  batteries. 

Developments  appearing  unfavorable  for  a  general 
engagement,  General  Lee  had  settled  upon  a  move  by 
Sudley  Springs,  to  cross  Bull  Run  during  the  night  and 
try  to  again  reach  Pope's  rear,  this  time  with  his  army. 

About  three  P.M.  I  rode  to  the  front  to  prepare  to  make 
a  diversion  a  little  before  dark,  to  cover  the  plan  proposed 
for  our  night  march.  As  I  rode,  batteries  resting  on  the 
sides  of  the  turnpike  thought  that  battle  was  at  hand, 
and  called  their  officers  and  men  to  stand  to  their  guns 
and  horses.  Passing  by  and  beyond  my  lines,  a  message 
came  from  General  Jackson  reporting  his  lines  heavily 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF 

BULL  RUN 

POSITION  OF  TROOPS 
AS   THE   BATTLE   ENGAGED 

Aug.  30th,  1862 


Federal* 

Confederates — 


SECOND    BATTLE    OF    MAN  ASS  AS.  187 

pressed,  and  asking  to  be  reinforced.  Riding  forward  a 
few  rods  to  an  open,  which  gave  a  view  of  Jackson's 
field,  I  came  in  sight  of  Porter's  battle,  piling  up  against 
Jackson's  right,  centre,  and  left.  At  the  same  time  an 
order  came  from  General  Lee  for  a  division  to  be  sent 
General  Jackson.  Porter's  masses  were  in  almost  direct 
line  from  the  point  at  which  I  stood,  and  in  enfilade  fire. 
It  was  evident  that  they  could  not  stand  fifteen  minutes 
under  the  fire  of  batteries  planted  at  that  point,  while  a 
division  marching  back  and  across  the  field  to  aid  Jack 
son  could  not  reach  him  in  an  hour,  more  time  probably 
than  he  could  stand  under  the  heavy  weights  then  bearing 
down  upon  him.  Boldness  was  prudence  !  Prompt  work 
by  the  wing  and  batteries  could  relieve  the  battle.  Re 
inforcements  might  not  be  in  time,  so  I  called  for  my 
nearest  batteries.  Ready,  anticipating  call,  they  sprang 
to  their  places  and  drove  at  speed,  saw  the  opportunity 
before  it  could  be  pointed  out,  and  went  into  action. 
The  first  fire  was  by  Chapman's  battery,  followed  in  roll 
ing  practice  by  Boyce's  and  Reilly's.  Almost  immediately 
the  wounded  began  to  drop  off  from  Porter's  ranks ;  the 
number  seemed  to  increase  with  every  shot ;  the  masses 
began  to  waver,  swinging  back  and  forth,  showing  signs 
of  discomfiture  along  the  left  and  left  centre. 

In  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  it  crumbled  into  disorder  and 
turned  towards  the  rear.  Although  the  batteries  seemed 
to  hasten  the  movements  of  the  discomfited,  the  fire  was 
less  effective  upon  broken  ranks,  which  gave  them  courage, 
and  they  made  brave  efforts  to  rally ;  but  as  the  new  lines 
formed  they  had  to  breast  against  Jackson's  standing 
line,  and  make  a  new  and  favorable  target  for  the  batteries, 
which  again  drove  them  to  disruption  and  retreat.  Not 
satisfied,  they  made  a  third  effort  to  rally  arid  fight  the 
battle  through,  but  by  that  time  they  had  fallen  back  far 
enough  to  open  the  field  to  the  fire  of  S.  D.  Lee's  artil 
lery  battalion.  As  the  line  began  to  take  shape,  this 


188  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

fearful  fire  was  added  to  that  under  which  they  had  tried 
so  ineffectually  to  fight.  The  combination  tore  the  line 
to  pieces,  and  as  it  broke  the  third  time  the  charge  was 
ordered.  The  heavy  fumes  of  gunpowder  hanging  about 
our  ranks,  as  stimulating  as  sparkling  wine,  charged  the 
atmosphere  with  the  light  and  splendor  of  battle.  Time 
was  culminating  under  a  flowing  tide.  The  noble  horses 
took  the  spirit  of  the  riders  sitting  lightly  in  their  sad 
dles.  As  orders  were  given,  the  staff,  their  limbs  already 
closed  to  the  horses'  flanks,  pressed  their  spurs,  but  the 
electric  current  overleaped  their  speedy  strides,  and  twenty- 
five  thousand  braves  moved  in  line  as  by  a  single  impulse. 
My  old  horse,  appreciating  the  importance  of  corps  head 
quarters,  envious  of  the  spread  of  his  comrades  as  they 
measured  the  green,  yet  anxious  to  maintain  his  role, 
moved  up  and  down  his  limited  space  in  lofty  bounds, 
resolved  to  cover  in  the  air  the  space  allotted  his  more 
fortunate  comrades  on  the  plain. 

Leaving  the  broken  ranks  for  Jackson,  our  fight  was 
made  against  the  lines  near  my  front.  As  the  plain 
along  Hood's  front  was  more  favorable  for  the  tread 
of  soldiers,  he  was  ordered,  as  the  column  of  direction,  to 
push  for  the  plateau  at  the  Henry  House,  in  order  to  cut 
off  retreat  at  the  crossings  by  Young's  Branch.  Wilcox 
was  called  to  support  and  cover  Hood's  left,  but  he  lost 
sight  of  two  of  his  brigades, — Featherston's  and  Pryor's, 
— and  only  gave  the  aid  of  his  single  brigade.  Kemper 
and  Jones  were  pushed  on  with  Hood's  right,  Evans  in 
Hood's  direct  support.  The  batteries  were  advanced  as 
rapidly  as  fields  were  opened  to  them,  Stribling's,  J.  B. 
Richardson's,  Eshleman's,  and  Rogers's  having  fairest 
field  for  progress. 

At  the  first  sound  of  the  charge,  General  Lee  sent  to 
revoke  his  call  in  favor  of  Jackson,  asked  me  to  push 
the  battle,  ordered  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  up,  and 
rode  himself  to  join  me. 


SECOND    BATTLE   OF    MANASSAS.  189 

In  the  fulness  of  the  battle,  General  Toombs  rode  up 
on  his  iron-gray  under  sweat  and  spur,  his  hat  off,  and 
asked  for  his  command.  He  was  told  that  a  courier  was 
about  to  start  with  an  order  for  the  division  commander, 
and  would  guide  him.  He  asked  to  be  the  bearer  of  the 
order,  received  it,  and  with  the  guide  rode  to  find  his  post 
in  the  battle.  The  meeting  of  the  brigade  and  its  com 
mander  was  more  than  joyful. 

Jackson  failed  to  pull  up  even  on  the  left,  which  gave 
opportunity  for  some  of  the  enemy's  batteries  to  turn  their 
fire  across  the  right  wing  in  enfilade,  as  we  advanced,  and 
the  enemy  strongly  reinforced  against  us  from  troops 
drawn  from  Jackson's  front,  but  we  being  on  the  jump, 
the  fire  of  the  batteries  was  not  effective.  It  was  severely 
threatening  upon  General  Lee,  however,  who  would  ride 
under  it,  notwithstanding  appeals  to  avoid  it,  until  I 
thought  to  ride  through  a  ravine,  and  thus  throw  a  trav 
erse  between  him  and  the  fire.  He  sent  orders  to  Jackson 
to  advance  and  drive  off  or  capture  the  batteries  standing 
in  his  front  and  firing  across  our  line,  but  it  was  not  in 
season  to  relieve  us.  Hood's  aggressive  force  was  well 
spent  when  his  troops  approached  the  Chinn  House,  but 
R.  H.  Anderson  was  up  and  put  in  to  reinforce  and  relieve 
his  battle. 

General  Pope  drew  Ricketts's  division  from  his  right 
to  brace  his  left,  then  Reno's  command  to  aid  in  checking 
our  march,  but  its  progress,  furiously  resisted,  was  steady, 
though  much  delayed.  Piatt's  brigade  was  also  put 
against  us.  This  made  time  for  Porter  to  gather  his 
forces.  His  regulars  of  Sykes's  division,  particularly, 
made  desperate  resistance,  that  could  only  be  overcome 
by  our  overreaching  lines  threatening  their  rear. 

When  the  last  guns  were  fired  the  thickening  twilight 
concealed  the  lines  of  friend  and  foe,  so  that  the  danger 
of  friend  firing  against  friend  became  imminent.  The 
hill  of  the  Henry  House  was  reached  in  good  time,  but 


190  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

darkness  coming  on  earlier  because  of  thickening  clouds 
hovering  over  us,  and  a  gentle  fall  of  rain  closely  follow 
ing,  the  plateau  was  shut  off  from  view,  and  its  ascent 
only  found  by  groping  through  the  darkening  rainfall. 
As  long  as  the  enemy  held  the  plateau,  he  covered  the 
line  of  retreat  by  the  turnpike  and  the  bridge  at  Young's 
Branch.  As  he  retired,  heavy  darkness  gave  safe-con 
duct  to  such  of  his  columns  as  could  find  their  way  through 
the  weird  mists. 

Captain  William  H.  Powell,  of  the  Fourth  Regular 
Infantry,  wrote  of  his  experience, — 

"As  we  filed  from  the  battle-field  into  the  turnpike  leading 
over  the  stone  bridge,  we  caine  upon  a  group  of  mounted  officers, 
one  of  whom  wore  a  peculiar  style  of  hat  which  had  been  seen 
on  the  field  that  day,  and  which  had  been  the  occasion  of  a  great 
deal  of  comment  in  the  ranks.  As  we  passed  these  officers,  the 
one  with  the  peculiar  hat  called  out  in  a  loud  voice,— 

"  '  What  troops  are  those  f 

"  'The  regulars,'  answered  somebody. 

"  ' Second  Division,  Fifth  Corps,'  replied  another. 

"  'God  bless  them  !  they  saved  the  army,'  added  the  officer. 

"  Subsequently  we  learned  that  he  was  General  Irvin  Mc 
Dowell." 

"As  we  neared  the  bridge  we  came  upon  confusion.  Men 
singly  and  in  detachments  were  mingled  with  sutlers'  wagons, 
artillery  caissons,  supply  wagons,  and  ambulances,  each  striving 
to  get  ahead  of  the  other.  Vehicles  rushed  through  organized 
bodies  and  broke  the  columns  into  fragments.  Little  detachments 
gathered  by  the  road-side  after  crossing  the  bridge,  crying  out  to 
members  of  their  regiments  as  a  guide  to  scattered  comrades. 
And  what  a  night  it  was  !  Dark,  gloomy,  and  beclouded  by  the 
volumes  of  smoke  which  had  risen  from  the  battle-field.* 

At  six  o'clock,  General  Pope  received  report  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  that  had  marched  from  Alexandria  under 
General  Franklin  to  the  vicinity  of  Centreville,  and  or 
dered  the  several  commands  to  concentrate  about  that 

*  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War. 


SECOND    BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS.  191 

hamlet  during  the  night.  The  Second  Corps  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  under  General  Sumner  also  joined 
him  at  Centreville. 

But  for  the  dropping  off  of  two  of  Wilcox's  brigades 
from  close  connection  with  the  right  wing,  and  the  deflec 
tion  of  Drayton's  brigade,  which  was  taken  off  by  some 
unauthorized  and  unknown  person  from  my  right  to  the 
support  of  cavalry,  it  is  possible  that  my  working  column 
could  have  gained  the  plateau  of  the  Henry  House  before 
it  was  dark.  Or  if  Jackson  had  been  fresh  enough  to 
pull  up  even  with  us,  he  could  have  retained  the  com 
mands  under  Reno  and  Sykes's  regulars  in  his  front, 
which  could  have  given  us  safe  sweep  to  the  plateau,  an 
hour  before  sundown,  and  in  sight  of  great  possibilities. 

By  morning  of  the  31st  everything  off  the  turnpike 
was  nasty  and  soggy.  Stuart's  cavalry,  followed  by 
Pryor's  brigade,  were  ordered  across  the  Run  at  Stone 
Bridge  as  a  diversion,  while  we  were  trying  another  move 
to  reach  the  enemy's  rear.  The  Confederates  had  worked 
all  of  the  winter  before,  fortifying  this  new  position,  just 
taken  by  Pope  at  Centreville.  Direct  pursuit  by  the 
turnpike  against  these  fortifications  would  therefore  be 
fruitless. 

General  Jackson  was  called  to  head-quarters  early  in 
the  morning.  Upon  receiving  General  Lee's  orders  to 
cross  Bull  Run  at  Sudley's  and  march  by  Little  River 
turnpike  to  intercept  the  enemy's  march,  he  said, 
"  Good !"  and  away  he  went,  without  another  word,  or 
even  a  smile. 

Though  the  suggestion  of  a  smile  always  hung  about 
his  features,  it  was  commonly  said  that  it  never  fully 
developed,  with  a  single  exception,  during  his  military 
career,  though  some  claim  there  were  other  occasions  on 
which  it  ripened,  and  those  very  near  him  say  that  he 
always  smiled  at  the  mention  of  the  names  of  the  Fed 
eral  leaders  whom  he  was  accustomed  to  encounter  over 


192  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

in  the  Valley  behind  the  Blue  Ridge.  Standing,  he 
was  a  graceful  figure,  five  feet  ten  inches  in  height,  with 
brown  wavy  hair,  full  beard,  and  regular  features.  At 
first  glance  his  gentle  expression  repelled  the  idea  of  his 
severe  piety,  the  full  beard  concealing  the  lower  features, 
which  had  they  been  revealed  would  have  marked  the 
character  of  the  man  who  claimed  "  his  first  duty  to  God, 
and  his  next  to  Jackson  and  General  Lee."  Mounted, 
his  figure  was  not  so  imposing  as  that  of  the  bold  dragoon, 
Charley  May,  on  Black  Tom.  He  had  a  habit  of  raising 
his  right  hand,  riding  or  sitting,  which  some  of  his  fol 
lowers  were  wont  to  construe  into  invocation  for  Divine 
aid,  but  they  do*  not  claim  to  know  whether  the  prayers 
were  for  the  slain,  or  for  the  success  of  other  fields.  The 
fact  is,  he  received  a  shot  in  that  hand  at  the  First  Bull 
Run,  which  left  the  hand  under  partial  paralysis  and  the 
circulation  through  it  imperfect.  To  relieve  the  pressure 
and  assist  the  circulation  he  sometimes  raised  his  arm. 

I  was  ordered  to  look  after  the  dead  and  those  whose 
misfortune  it  was  to  be  wounded,  till  Jackson  could  have 
time  to  stretch  out  on  his  new  march,  then  to  follow  him, 
leaving  the  work  to  details  and  to  General  D.  H.  Hill's 
division,  just  coming  in  from  Richmond. 

After  giving  orders  for  the  day,  General  Lee  rode  out 
towards  Centreville  for  personal  observation,  halted,  and 
dismounted  at  a  point  which  seemed  safe  from  danger  or 
observation.  Suddenly  alarm  was  given  of  "  The  enemy's 
cavalry  !"  The  group  dispersed  in  hot  haste  to  have  the 
heels  of  their  animals  under  them.  The  rush  and  confu 
sion  frightened  the  general's  horse,  so  that  he  pulled  him 
violently  to  the  ground,  severely  spraining  his  right  wrist, 
besides  breaking  some  of  the  bones  of  the  hand. 

On  reaching  his  head-quarters,  Jackson  ordered  the  as 
sembly  sounded,  mounted  his  horse,  and  marched  for  the 
Sudley  Springs  crossing.  He  cleared  the  way  in  time  for 
my  column  to  reach  that  point  at  dark,  the  head  of  his 


SECOND    BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS.  193 

own  column  tapping  Little  Eiver  turnpike.  The  march 
was  over  a  single-track  country  road,  bad  enough  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river,  much  worn  through  a  post-oak 
forest  over  quicksand  subsoil  on  the  north  side.  If  Jack 
son  had  been  followed  by  an  enemy  whose  march  he 
wished  to  baffle,  his  gun-carriages  could  not  have  made 
deeper  cuts  through  the  mud  and  quicksand. 

Stuart  was  ordered  over  to  the  Little  River  turnpike, 
and  advanced  to  the  vicinity  of  Ox  Hill  and  Fairfax 
Court-House.  He  made  some  interesting  captures  and 
reports  of  movements  by  the  enemy.  He  slept  near  their 
lines,  north  of  the  turnpike,  east  of  Chantilly. 

The  Little  River  and  Warrenton  turnpikes  converge 
and  join  as  they  near  Fairfax  Court-House.  At  vulner 
able  points  on  the  latter,  General  Pope  posted  parts  of  his 
command  to  cover  his  rearward  march.  At  Ox  Hill 
(Chantilly)  were  stationed  Heintzelman's  and  Reno's 
corps,  the  divisions  of  Hooker,  Kearny,  Stevens,  and 
Reno. 

Early  on  the  1st  of  September  the  Confederates  resumed 
their  march.  Jackson  reached  Ox  Hill  late  in  the  after 
noon,  and  deployed  by  inversion, — A.  P.  Hill's  division 
on  his  right,  Swell's  under  Lawton  next,  his  own  under 
Stuart  on  his  left,  on  the  right  of  the  road.  On  the  left 
of  the  road  were  Stuart's  cavalry  and  the  artillery.  Two 
of  Hill's  brigades  were  thrown  out  to  find  the  enemy,  and 
were  soon  met  by  his  advance  in  search  of  Jackson,  which 
made  a  furious  attack,  driving  back  the  Confederate  bri 
gades  in  some  disorder.  Stevens,  appreciating  the  crisis 
as  momentous,  thought  it  necessary  to  follow  the  opportu 
nity  by  aggressive  battle,  in  order  to  hold  Jackson  away 
from  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  Kearny,  always  ready  to 
second  any  courageous  move,  joined  in  the  daring  battle. 
At  the  critical  moment  the  rain  and  thunder-storm  burst 
with  great  violence  upon  the  combatants,  the  high  wind 
beating  the  storm  in  the  faces  of  the  Confederates.  So 

13 


194  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

firm  was  the  unexpected  battle  that  part  of  Jackson's  line 
yielded  to  the  onslaught.  At  one  moment  his  artillery 
seemed  in  danger.  Stevens  Avas  killed  when  the  storm  of 
battle,  as  well  as  that  of  the  elements,  began  to  quiet  down. 
Stuart's  cavalry  drew  near  Jackson's  left  during  the  prog 
ress  of  the  battle.  As  I  rode  up  and  met  General  Jack 
son,  I  remarked  upon  the  number  of  his  men  going  to 
the  rear  : 

"  General,  your  men  don't  appear  to  work  well  to-day." 
"  No,"  he  replied,  "  but  I  hope  it  will  prove  a  victory 
in  the  morning." 

His  troops  were  relieved  as  mine  came  up,  to  give  them 
a  respite  till  morning.  While  my  reliefs  were  going 
around,  General  Philip  Kearny  rode  to  the  line  in  search 
of  his  division.  Finding  himself  in  the  presence  of  Con 
federates,  he  wheeled  his  horse  and  put  spurs,  preferring 
the  danger  of  musket-balls  to  humiliating  surrender. 
Several  challenges  called,  but  not  heeded,  were  followed 
by  the  ring  of  half  a  dozen  muskets,  when  he  fell  mor 
tally  hurt,  and  so  perished  one  of  the  most  gallant  and 

dashing  of  the  Union  generals. 

"  September  2,  1862. 
"  MAJOR-  GENERAL  JOHN  POPE, 

'  '  United  States  Army  : 

"SiR,  —  The  body  of  General  Philip  Kearny  was  brought  from 
the  field  last  night,  and  he  was  reported  dead.  I  send  it  forward 
under  a  flag  of  truce,  thinking  the  possession  of  his  remains  may 
be  a  consolation  to  his  family. 

i  '  I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE, 


The  rain  so  concealed  the  fight  in  its  last  struggles  that 
the  troops  escaped  before  we  were  aware  that  it  had  been 
abandoned. 

As  both  Federal  division  commanders  fell,  the  accounts 

*  Rebel!  ion  Record. 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MAN  ASS  AS.          195 

fail  to  do  justice  to  their  fight.  Stevens  in  his  short 
career  gave  evidence  of  courage,  judgment,  skill,  and 
genius  not  far  below  his  illustrious  antagonist. 

During  the  fight  Stuart  had  parties  out  seeking  infor 
mation,  and  early  on  the  second  had  his  troopers  in  the 
saddle  in  pursuit.  The  army,  ready  to  move,  awaited 
reports  of  the  cavalry,  which  came  from  time  to  time,  as 
they  followed  on  the  line  of  retreat.  From  Fairfax 
Court-House  came  the  report  that  the  enemy's  rear  had 
passed  in  rapid  retreat  quite  out  of  reach,  approaching 
the  fortifications  of  Alexandria  and  Washington  City. 
Arms  were  ordered  stacked,  and  a  good  rest  was  given 
the  troops.  Stuart's  cavalry  pursued  and  engaged  the 
retreating  army. 

In  the  afternoon  the  First  Corps  started  on  the  march 
via  Dranesville  for  Leesburg  and  the  Potomac  River,  fol 
lowed  on  the  third  by  the  Second. 

The  results  to  the  Confederates  of  the  several  engage 
ments  about  Manassas  Plains  were  seven  thousand  prison 
ers,  two  thousand  of  the  enemy's  wounded,  thirty  pieces 
of  artillery,  many  thousand  small-arms  picked  up  from 
the  field,  and  many  colors,  besides  the  captures  made  at 
Manassas  Junction  by  General  Jackson.* 

A  fair  estimate  of  forces  engaged  : 

Federal  army,  aggregate 63,000 

Confederates 53,500 

Losses  between  Eappahannock  River  and  Washing 
ton  : 

Federals,  aggregate 15,000 

Confederates 10,000 

The  figures  are  given  in  round  numbers,  as  the  safest 
approximate  estimate,  but  the  records  now  accessible  give 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xii.  part  ii.  p.  558.     General  Lee's  report. 


196  FROM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

accurate  details  of  losses  in  each  command  about  the  same 
as  these. 

And  so  it  came  to  pass  that  from  Cedar  Run  and  Bull 
Run  we  had  the  term  All  Run.  It  is  due  to  the  gallant 
Surnner  and  his  brave  corps,  however,  to  say  that  they 
so  covered  the  last  as  to  save  disgraceful  retreat. 

A  cursory  review  of  the  campaign  reveals  the  pleasure 
ride  of  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  by  Louisa  Court-House 
as  most  unseasonable.  He  lost  the  fruits  of  our  summer's 
work,  and  lost  the  Southern  cause.  Proud  Troy  was  laid 
in  ashes.  His  orders  were  to  meet  his  commander  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  17th,  on  the  plank-road  near  Raccoon 
Ford,  and  upon  this  appointment  was  based  General  Lee's 
order  of  march  for  the  18th.  If  the  march  had  been 
made  as  appointed,  General  Lee  would  have  encountered 
the  army  of  General  Pope  upon  weak  ground  from  Rob 
ertson  River  to  near  Raccoon  Ford  of  the  Rapid  an,  and 
thus  our  march  would  have  been  so  expedited  that  we 
could  have  reached  Alexandria  and  Washington  before 
the  landing  of  the  first  detachment  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Alexandria  on  the  24th.  The  artillery  and 
infantry  were  called  to  amend  the  delinquency  by  severe 
marches  and  battles. 

It  would  have  been  possible  to  make  good  the  lost  time, 
but  the  despatch  lost  in  the  Stuart  escapade  was  handed 
to  General  Pope  that  morning  (the  18th),  and  gave  him 
notice  of  our  plans  and  orders.  The  delay  thus  brought 
about  gave  time  for  him  to  quit  his  weaker  ground  and 
retire  to  strong  defensive  heights  behind  the  Rappahan- 
nock  River,  where  he  held  us  in  check  five  days. 

Referring  to  the  solid  move  proposed  before  opening 
the  campaign  by  the  upper  Rapidan  to  strike  Pope's 
right,  it  may  be  said  that  it  was  not  so  dependent  upon 
the  cavalry  that  was  marching  behind  us.  That  used  by 
Jackson  in  his  battle  of  the  9th  was  enough  for  imme 
diate  use.  Jackson  could  have  passed  the  upper  Rapidan 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF 

BULL  RUN 

POSITION  OF  TROOPS 
AT  NIGHTFALL 

Aug.  3Oth,   1862 


Federal*— 

Confederates- 


SECOND    BATTLE    OF    MANASSAS.  197 

on  the  16th,  and  followed  by  the  right  wing  in  time  to 
strike  Pope's  right  on  the  17th  in  solid  phalanx,  when 
time  was  mightier  than  cannon-balls.  After  losing  eight 
days  between  Orange  Court-House  and  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  we  found  at  last  that  we  must  adopt  the  move  by 
our  left  to  get  around  the  strong  ground  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  and  the  move  must  now  be  made  by  detach 
ments,  not  so  approved  of  the  usages  of  war.  I  was  west 
of  the  Rappahannock  when  the  command  should  have 
been  at  Washington  City. 

The  conduct  of  General  Pope's  army  after  his  receipt  of 
the  captured  despatch  was  good,  especially  his  plans  and 
orders  for  the  27th  and  28th.  The  error  was  his  failure 
to  ride  with  his  working  columns  on  the  28th,  to  look  after 
and  conduct  their  operations.  He  left  them  in  the  hands 
of  the  officer  who  lost  the  first  battle  of  Manassas.  His 
orders  of  the  28th  for  General  McDowell  to  change  direc 
tion  and  march  for  Centreville  were  received  at  3.15  P.M. 
Had  they  been  promptly  executed,  the  commands,  King's 
division,  Sigel's  corps,  and  Reynolds's  division,  should 
have  found  Jackson  by  four  o'clock.  As  it  was,  only  the 
brigades  of  Gibbon  and  Doubleday  were  found  passing 
by  Jackson's  position  after  sunset,  when  he  advanced 
against  them  in  battle.  He  reported  it  "  sanguinary." 
With  the  entire  division  of  King  and  that  of  Reynolds, 
with  Sigel's  corps,  it  is  possible  that  Pope's  campaign 
would  have  brought  other  important  results.  On  the 
29th  he  was  still  away  from  the  active  part  of  his  field, 
and  in  consequence  failed  to  have  correct  advice  of  the 
time  of  my  arrival,  and  quite  ignored  the  column  under 
R.  H.  Anderson  approaching  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike. 
On  the  30th  he  was  misled  by  reports  of  his  officers  and 
others  to  believe  that  the  Confederates  were  in  retreat, 
and  planned  his  movements  upon  false  premises. 

Jackson's  march  to  Bristoe  and  Manassas  Junction  was 
hazardous,  or  seemed  so,  but  in  view  of  his  peculiar  talent 


198  FROM    MASTASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

for  such  work  (the  captured  despatch  of  General  Pope 
giving  information  of  his  affairs),  and  Lee's  skill,  it 
seemed  the  only  way  open  for  progressive  manoeuvre. 
The  strength  of  the  move  lay  in  the  time  it  gave  us  to 
make  issue  before  all  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could 
unite  with  the  army  under  General  Pope.  His  game  of 
hide-and-seek  about  Bull  Run,  Centreville,  and  Manassas 
Plains  was  grand,  but  marred  in  completeness  by  the 
failure  of  General  A.  P.  Hill  to  meet  his  orders  for  the 
afternoon  of  the  28th.  As  a  leader  he  was  fine  ;  as  a 
wheel-horse,  he  was  not  always  just  to  himself.  He  was 
fond  of  the  picturesque. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN. 

General  Lee  continues  Aggressive  Work — From  Foraged  Fields  of 
Virginia  into  a  Bounteous  Land — Longstreet  objected  to  the  Move 
ment  on  Harper's  Ferry— Lee  thinks  the  Occasion  Timely  for  Pro 
posal  of  Peace  and  Independence — Confederates  singing  through 
the  Streets  of  Fredericktown— McClellan's  Movements— Cautious 
Marches—  Lee's  Lost  Order  handed  to  the  Federal  Chief  at  Frederick. 

"  There  is  a  tide  in  the  affairs  of  men, 
Which,  taken  at  the  flood,  leads  on  to  fortune ; 
Omitted,  all  the  voyage  of  their  life 
Is  bound  in  shallows,  and  in  miseries. 
On  such  a  full  sea  are  we  now  afloat." 

As  our  columns  approached  Leesburg,  "  Maryland,  my 
Maryland"  was  in  the  air,  and  on  the  lips  of  every  man 
from  General  Lee  down  to  the  youngest  drummer.  Our 
chief  could  have  safely  ordered  the  ranks  to  break  in 
Virginia  and  assemble  in  Fredericktown.  All  that  they 
would  ask  was  a  thirty  minutes'  plunge  in  the  Potomac 
to  remove  some  of  the  surplus  dust,  before  they  encoun 
tered  the  smiles  of  the  winsome  lasses  of  Maryland.  Yet 
he  expressed  doubt  of  trusting  so  far  from  home  solely 
to  untried  and  unknown  resources  for  food-supplies. 
Receiving  his  anxious  expressions  really  as  appeals  for 
reinforcement  of  his  unexpressed  wish,  but  warm  to  brave 
the  venture,  I  related  my  Mexican  War  experiences  with 
Worth's  division,  marching  around  the  city  of  Monterey 
on  two  days'  rations  of  roasting-ears  and  green  oranges, 
and  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  we  could  trust  the 
fields  of  Maryland,  laden  with  ripening  corn  and  fruit,  to 
do  as  much  as  those  of  Mexico;  that  we  could  in  fact 

199 


200  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

subsist  on  the  bounty  of  the  fields  until  we  could  open 
communication  with  our  organized  base  of  supplies. 

As  factors  in  the  problem,  important  as  Lee's  masterly 
science  and  Jackson's  great  skill,  stood  the  fortitude  and 
prowess  of  the  Confederate  soldiers,  and  their  faith  in  the 
friendship  and  generosity  of  their  countrymen.  Hungry, 
sparsely  clad,  worn  with  continuous  bivouac  and  battle 
since  the  26th  of  June,  proud  of  their  record  from  the 
First  to  the  honors  of  the  Second  Manassas,  their  cheery 
smiles  and  elastic  step  told  better  than  words  of  anticipa 
tions  of  welcome  from  friends  in  Maryland,  and  of  new 
fields  of  honor  for  their  solid  ranks, — of  the  day  when 
they  should  be  masters  of  the  field  and  of  a  new-born 
republic. 

Though  a  losing  battle,  the  Union  armies  had  made  a 
splendid  fight  at  Second  Manassas.  The  stand  at  Ox  Hill 
was  severe ;  severe  till  the  march  of  retreat,  so  that  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  should  have  held  in  profound 
respect  its  formidable  adversary,  seasoned  by  many  bloody 
fields. 

The  policy  of  the  Richmond  government  was  defensive 
rather  than  aggressive  warfare,  but  the  situation  called  for 
action,  and  there  was  but  one  opening, — across  the  Poto 
mac.  General  Lee  decided  to  follow  his  success  in  its 
natural  leading,  and  so  reported  to  the  Richmond  authori 
ties. 

He  was  not  so  well  equipped  as  an  army  of  invasion 
should  be,  but  the  many  friends  in  Maryland  and  the 
fields  on  the  north  side  of  the  Potomac  were  more  in 
viting  than  those  of  Virginia,  so  freely  foraged.  He 
knew  from  events  of  the  past  that  his  army  was  equal  to 
the  service  to  which  he  thought  to  call  it,  and  ripe  for  the 
adventure ;  that  he  could  march  into  Maryland  and  re 
main  until  the  season  for  the  enemy's  return  into  Virginia 
for  autumn  or  winter  work  had  passed,  improve  his  trans 
portation  supplies,  and  the  clothing  of  his  army,  and  do 


THE   MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  201 

that,  if  not  more,  for  relief  of  our  Southern  fields  and  lim 
ited  means,  besides  giving  his  army  and  cause  a  moral  in 
fluence  of  great  effect  at  home  and  abroad.  He  decided 
to  make  his  march  by  the  most  direct  route  from  Chan- 
tilly,  where  he  had  last  fought,  to  the  Potomac,  and  so 
crossed  by  the  fords  near  Leesburg.  Marching  by  this 
route,  he  thought  to  cut  off  a  formidable  force  of  Union 
troops  at  Winchester,  at  Martinsburg,  and  a  strong  garri 
son  occupying  the  fortified  position  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

To  summarize  the  situation,  we  were  obliged  to  go  into 
Maryland  or  retreat  to  points  more  convenient  to  supplies 
and  the  protection  of  Richmond. 

At  Leesburg  Lee  learned  that  the  Union  troops  in  the 
Valley  had  left  Winchester,  and  sent  back  orders  to  have 
the  crippled  and  feeble  soldiers  wending  their  way  to  the 
army  march  through  the  Valley  to  join  us  in  Maryland. 
Trains  of  supplies  were  ordered  to  move  by  the  same  route. 

On  the  5th  and  6th  the  columns  crossed  the  Potomac 
by  the  fords  near  Leesburg.  Stuart's  cavalry,  coming  up 
from  the  line  near  Alexandria  and  the  Long  Bridge, 
passed  to  front  and  right  flank  of  the  army.  General 
McLaws's  division,  General  J.  G.  Walker,  with  two  bri 
gades  of  his  division,  and  General  Hampton's  cavalry 
brigade,  including  Colonel  Baker's  North  Carolina  regi 
ment,  joined  us  on  the  march.  On  the  7th  our  infantry 
and  artillery  commands  came  together  near  Frederick 
City.  _ 

Riding  together  before  we  reached  Frederick,  the  sound 
of  artillery  fire  came  from  the  direction  of  Point  of  Rocks 
and  Harper's  Ferry,  from  which  General  Lee  inferred 
that  the  enemy  was  concentrating  his  forces  from  the 
Valley,  for  defence  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  proposed  to 
me  to  organize  forces  to  surround  and  capture  the  works 
and  the  garrison. 

I  thought  it  a  venture  not  worth  the  game,  and  sug 
gested,  as  we  were  in  the  enemy's  country  and  presence, 


202  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

that  he  would  be  advised  of  any  move  that  we  made  in  a 
few  hours  after  it  was  set  on  foot ;  that  the  Union  army, 
though  beaten,  was  not  disorganized  ;  that  we  knew  a 
number  of  their  officers  who  could  put  it  in  order  and 
march  against  us,  if  they  found  us  exposed,  and  make 
serious  trouble  before  the  capture  could  be  accomplished ; 
that  our  men  were  worn  by  very  severe  and  protracted 
service,  and  in  need  of  repose ;  that  as  long  as  we  had 
them  in  hand  we  were  masters  of  the  situation,  but  dis 
persed  into  many  fragments,  our  strength  must  be  greatly 
reduced.  As  the  subject  was  not  continued,  I  supposed 
that  it  was  a  mere  expression  of  passing  thought,  until, 
the  day  after  we  reached  Frederick,  upon  going  over  to 
head-quarters,  I  found  the  front  of  the  general's  tent 
closed  and  tied.  Upon  inquiring  of  a  member  of  the 
staff,  I  was  told  that  he  was  inside  with  General  Jackson. 
As  I  had  not  been  called,  I  turned  to  go  away,  when 
General  Lee,  recognizing  my  voice,  called  me  in.  The 
plan  had  been  arranged.  Jackson,  with  his  three  divi 
sions,  was  to  recross  the  Potomac  by  the  fords  above  Har 
per's  Ferry,  march  via  Martinsburg  to  Bolivar  Heights ; 
McLaws's  division  by  Crampton's  Gap  to  Maryland 
Heights ;  J.  G.  Walker's  division  to  recross  at  Cheek's 
Ford  and  occupy  Loudoun  Heights,  these  heights  overlook 
ing  the  positions  of  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  ;  D.  H. 
Hill's  division  to  march  by  the  National  road  over  South 
Mountain  at  Turner's  Gap,  and  halt  at  the  western  base,  to 
guard  trains,  intercept  fugitives  from  Harper's  Ferry,  and 
support  the  cavalry,  if  needed ;  the  cavalry  to  face  the 
enemy  and  embarrass  his  movements.  I  was  to  march 
over  the  mountain  by  Turner's  Gap  to  Hagerstown. 

As  their  minds  were  settled  firmly  upon  the  enterprise, 
I  offered  no  opposition  further  than  to  ask  that  the  order 
be  so  modified  as  to  allow  me  to  send  E.  H.  Anderson's 
division  with  McLaws  and  to  halt  my  own  column  near 
the  point  designated  for  bivouac  of  General  D.  H. 


THE   MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  203 

Hill's  command.     These  suggestions  were  accepted,  and 
the  order  *  so  framed  was  issued. 

It  may  be  well  to  digress  from  my  narrative  for  a  mo 
ment  just  here  to  remark  that  General  Lee's  confidence 
in  the  strength  of  his  army,  the  situation  of  affairs,  and 

*  "  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"September  9,  1862. 
"  SPECIAL  ORDERS,  No.  191. 

44  The  army  will  resume  its  march  to-morrow,  taking  the  Hagerstown 
road.  General  Jackson's  command  will  form  the  advance,  and,  after 
passing  Middletown,  with  such  portion  as  he  may  select,  take  the  route 
towards  Sharpsburg,  cross  the  Potomac  at  the  most  convenient  point, 
and,  by  Friday  night,  take  possession  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road,  capture  such  of  the  enemy  as  may  be  at  Martinsburg,  and  inter 
cept  such  as  may  attempt  to  escape  from  Harper's  Ferry. 

44  General  Longstreet's  command  will  pursue  the  same  road  as  far  as 
Boonsborough,  where  it  will  halt  with  the  reserve,  supply,  and  baggage 
trains  of  the  army. 

44  General  McLaws,  with  his  own  division  and  that  of  General  R.  H. 
Anderson,  will  follow  General  Longstreet.  On  reaching  Middletown 
he  will  take  the  route  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  by  Friday  morning  pos 
sess  himself  of  the  Maryland  Heights,  and  endeavor  to  capture  the 
enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  vicinity. 

44  General  Walker,  with  his  division,  after  accomplishing  the  object 
in  which  he  is  now  engaged,  will  cross  the  Potomac  at  Cheek's  Ford, 
ascend  its  right  bank  to  Lovettsville,  take  possession  of  Loudoun 
Heights,  if  practicable,  by  Friday  morning,  Key's  Ford  on  his  left,  and 
the  road  between  the  end  of  the  mountain  and  the  Potomac  on  his 
right.  He  will,  as  far  as  practicable,  co-operate  with  General  McLaws 
and  General  Jackson  in  intercepting  the  retreat  of  the  enemy. 

44  General  D.  H.  Hill's  division  will  form  the  rear-guard  of  the  army, 
pursuing  the  road  taken  by  the  main  body.  The  reserve  artillery,  ord 
nance,  supply-trains,  etc.,  will  precede  General  Hill. 

44  General  Stuart  will  detach  a  squadron  of  cavalry  to  accompany  the 
commands  of  Generals  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and  McLaws,  and  with 
the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  will  cover  the  route  of  the  army  and  bring 
up  all  stragglers  that  may  have  been  left  behind. 

41  The  commands  of  Generals  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker,  after 
accomplishing  the  objects  for  which  they  have  been  detached,  will  join 
the  main  body  of  the  army  at  Boonsborough  or  Hagerstown. 

44  Each  regiment  on  the  march  will  habitually  carry  its  axes  in  the 
regimental  ordnance  wagons,  for  use  of  the  men  at  their  encampments 
to  procure  wood,  etc. 

44  By  command  of  General  R.  E.  Lee. 

44R.  H.  CHILTON, 
"  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 
44  MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  H.  HILL, 

44  Commanding  Division.'11 


204  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  value  of  the  moral  effect  upon  the  country,  North  and 
South,  was  made  fully  manifest  by  the  nature  of  the  cam 
paign  he  had  just  entered  upon,  especially  that  portion 
of  it  directed  against  Harper's  Ferry,  which,  as  events 
were  soon  to  prove,  weakened  the  effectiveness  of  his  army 
in  the  main  issue,  which  happened  to  be  Antietam. 

In  another  and  a  very  different  way,  and  with  even 
greater  plainness,  his  high  estimate  of  opportunity  and 
favoring  condition  of  circumstances  existing  at  the  time 
was  indicated  to  the  authorities,  though  of  course  not  at 
that  time  made  public.  This  was  his  deliberate  and  ur 
gent  advice  to  President  Davis  to  join  him  and  be  pre 
pared  to  make  a  proposal  for  peace  and  independence 
from  the  head  of  a  conquering  army.  Fresh  from  the 
Second  Manassas,  and  already  entered  upon  the  fateful 
Maryland  campaign,  he  wrote  the  President  this  impor 
tant  letter : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  NEAR  FREDERICKTOWN,  MD., 

"  September  8,  1862. 
"His  EXCELLENCY  JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 

* l  President  of  the  Confederate  States,  Richmond,  Va. : 

' l  MR.  PRESIDENT,  — The  present  position  of  affairs,  in  my  opin 
ion,  places  it  in  the  power  of  the  government  of  the  Confederate 
States  to  propose  with  propriety  to  that  of  the  United  States  the 
recognition  of  our  independence.  For  more  than  a  year  both 
sections  of  the  country  have  been  devastated  by  hostilities  which 
have  brought  sorrow  and  suffering  upon  thousands  of  homes, 
without  advancing  the  objects  which  our  enemies  proposed  to 
themselves  in  beginning  the  contest.  Such  a  proposition, 
coming  from  us  at  this  time,  could  in  no  way  be  regarded  as 
suing  for  peace  ;  but,  being  made  when  it  is  in  our  power  to  in 
flict  injury  upon  our  adversary,  would  show  conclusively  to  the 
world  that  our  sole  object  is  the  establishment  of  our  indepen 
dence  and  the  attainment  of  an  honorable  peace.  The  rejection 
of  this  offer  would  prove  to  the  country  that  the  responsibility  of 
the  continuance  of  the  war  does  not  rest  upon  us,  but  that  the 
party  in  power  in  the  United  States  elect  to  prosecute  it  for  pur 
poses  of  their  own.  The  proposal  of  peace  would  enable  the 
people  of  the  United  States  to  determine  at  their  coming  elections 
whether  they  will  support  those  who  favor  a  prolongation  of  the 


THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  205 

war,  or  those  who  wish  to  bring  it  to  a  termination,  which  can 
but  be  productive  of  good  to  both  parties  without  affecting  the 
honor  of  either. 

' '  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect, 

* '  Your  obedient  servant, 

"B.  E.  LEE, 
"General."* 

And  now  I  return  to  my  narrative. 

General  Walker's  division  was  on  detached  service  at 
the  time  of  the  order,  trying  to  cut  the  canal.  He 
marched,  however,  at  the  appointed  time,  found  Cheek's 
Ford  under  the  severe  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  and 
marched  on  up  the  left  bank  as  far  as  the  Point  of  Rocks, 
where  he  crossed  and  rested  on  the  llth.  On  the  12th 
he  marched  to  and  bivouacked  at  Hillsboro' ;  on  the  13th, 
to  the  foot  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  occupied  Loudoun 
Heights  by  a  detachment  under  Colonel  Cooke. 

Not  satisfied  with  the  organization  of  McLaws's  column, 
I  asked  and  obtained  permission  on  the  10th  to  strengthen 
it  by  three  other  brigades, — Wilcox's,  under  Colonel  Al 
fred  Gumming ;  Featherston's,  and  Pryor's,  which  were  at 
tached  to  R.  H.  Anderson's  division. 

The  different  columns  from  Frederick  marched  as  or 
dered,  except  in  the  change  authorized  for  Anderson's 
division.  It  was  a  rollicking  march,  the  Confederates 
playing  and  singing,  as  they  marched  through  the  streets 
of  Frederick,  "  The  Girl  I  left  behind  me." 

Jackson  recrossed  the  Potomac  on  the  llth,  at  Light's 
Ford,  ordered  A.  P.  Hill's  division  by  the  turnpike  to 
Martinsburg,  his  own  and  Ewell's  northwest  to  North 
Mountain  Depot  to  intercept  troops  that  might  retreat  in 
that  direction  from  Martinsburg.  General  White,  com 
manding  the  Union  troops,  abandoned  Martinsburg  the 
night  of  the  llth,  having  timely  advice  of  Jackson's 
movements,  and  retreated  to  Harper's  Ferry.  On  the 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  ii.  p.  600. 


206  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

12th,  Jackson's  troops  came  together  at  Martinsburg, 
found  some  stores  of  bacon  and  bread  rations,  and  marched 
on  the  13th  for  Harper's  Ferry,  where  he  found  the  Union 
troops  in  battle  array  along  Bolivar  Heights. 

I  marched  across  South  Mountain  at  Turner's  Pass,  and 
bivouacked  near  its  western  base.  General  Lee  ordered 
my  move  continued  to  Hagerstown.  The  plans  of  the 
Confederates,  as  blocked  out,  anticipated  the  surrender 
of  Harper's  Ferry  on  Friday,  the  12th,  or  Saturday, 
the  13th,  at  latest.  The  change  of  my  position  from 
Boonsborough  to  Hagerstown  further  misled  our  cavalry 
commander  and  the  commanders  of  the  divisions  at 
Boonsborough  and  Harper's  Ferry  into  a  feeling  of 
security  that  there  could  be  no  threatening  by  the  army 
from  Washington. 

D.  H.  Hill's  division  crossed  by  Turner's  Gap  and 
halted  near  Boonsborough.  McLaws  took  the  left-hand 
road,  marched  through  Burkittsville,  and  halted  for  the 
night  at  the  east  base  of  the  mountain,  near  Crampton's 
and  Brownsville  Passes. 

Near  Crampton's  Pass  on  the  west  the  mountain  un 
folds  into  two  parallel  ridges,  the  eastern,  the  general 
range  of  South  Mountain,  the  western,  Elk  Ridge,  open 
ing  out  Pleasant  Valley,  about  three  miles  from  crest  to 
crest. 

Crampton's  is  the  northern  of  the  two  passes,  and  about 
eight  miles  south  of  Turner's.  One  mile  south  of  Cramp- 
ton  is  the  Brownsville  Pass,  and  four  miles  from  that  the 
river  pass,  which  cuts  in  between  the  Blue  Ridge  of  Vir 
ginia  and  South  Mountain  of  Maryland.  Through  the 
river  pass  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway,  the  canal,  and 
the  Fredericktown  turnpike  reach  out  to  the  west,  and  at 
the  pass  is  the  little  town  of  Riverton.  Between  River- 
ton  and  Harper's  Ferry  was  the  hamlet  Sandy  Hook,  oc 
cupied  by  about  fifteen  hundred  Federal  troops.  Two 
roads  wind  through  Pleasant  Valley,  one  close  under 


THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  207 

South  Mountain,  the  other  hugging  the  foot-hills  of  Elk 
Ridge, — the  latter  rugged,  little  used. 

Harper's  Ferry,  against  which  Lee's  new  movement 
was  directed,  nestles  at  the  confluence  of  the  Potomac  and 
Shenandoah  Rivers,  on  the  Virginia  side,  under  the  tow 
ering  cliffs  of  Maryland  or  Cumberland  Heights.  At 
Harper's  Ferry  the  river  cuts  in  so  close  under  Maryland 
Heights  that  they  stand  almost  perpendicularly  over  it. 
The  crowded  space  between  the  heights  and  the  river, 
filled  by  the  railway,  canal,  and  turnpike,  was  made  by 
blastings  from  the  southern  extremities  of  Maryland 
Heights.  Under  the  precipice  the  railroad  bridge  crosses 
the  Potomac,  and  a  pontoon  bridge  was  laid  a  few  yards 
above  it. 

McLaws  marched  over  into  Pleasant  Valley  on  the 
llth,  through  Brownsville  Pass,  near  which  and  over  Elk 
Ridge  a  road  passes  through  Solomon's  Gap  of  Elk  Ridge. 
From  the  top  of  this  gap  is  a  rugged  way  along  the  ridge 
leading  down  to  its  southern  projections  and  limits,  by 
which  infantry  only  could  find  foothold.  That  southern 
point  is  called  Maryland  Heights.  Two  brigades — Ker- 
shaw's  and  Barksdale's — under  General  Kershaw  were 
ordered  to  ascend  Elk  Ridge,  march  along  its  summit, 
driving  off  opposition,  and  capture  the  enemy's  position 
on  the  heights.  General  Semmes  was  left  near  the  pass, 
over  which  the  troops  had  marched  with  his  own  and 
Mahone's  brigades,  the  latter  under  Colonel  Parham  with 
orders  to  send  a  brigade  to  the  top  of  Solomon's  Gap  to 
cover  Kershaw's  rear.  General  Wright,  of  Anderson's 
division,  was  ordered  with  his  brigade  and  two  pieces  of 
artillery  along  the  crest  ridge  of  South  Mountain  to  its 
projection  over  Riverton.  General  Cobb  was  ordered 
with  his  brigade  along  the  base  of  Elk  Ridge,  to  be 
abreast  of  Kershaw's  column.  With  the  balance  of  his 
command,  General  McLaws  moved  down  the  Valley  by 
the  South  Mountain  road,  connecting  his  march,  by  signal, 


208  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

with  General  Kershaw's.  Kershaw  soon  met  a  strong 
force  of  skirmishers,  which  was  steadily  pushed  back  till 
night.  General  Wright,  without  serious  opposition, 
reached  the  end  of  the  mountain,  when  R.  H.  Anderson 
sent  another  brigade — Pryor's — to  occupy  Weverton.  On 
the  13th,  Kershaw  renewed  his  fight  against  very  strong 
positions,  forced  his  way  across  two  abatis,  along  a  rugged 
plateau,  dropping  off  on  both  sides,  in  rocky  cliffs  of  forty 
or  fifty  feet,  encountered  breastworks  of  logs  and  boul 
ders,  struggled  in  a  severe  fight,  captured  the  position,  the 
enemy's  signal  station,  and  at  four  P.M.  gained  possession 
of  the  entire  hold.  Cobb's  brigade  was  advanced,  and 
took  possession  of  Sandy  Hook  without  serious  opposition. 
The  column  near  South  Mountain  was  advanced  to  com 
plete  the  grasp  against  the  enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Up  to 
this  hour  General  McLaws  had  heard  nothing  direct  from 
Generals  Jackson  and  Walker,  though  from  the  direction 
of  the  former  sounds  of  artillery  reached  him,  and  later 
a  courier  told  that  Jackson  thought  his  leading  division 
would  approach  at  two  o'clock  that  afternoon.  During 
the  day  heavy  cannonading  was  heard  towards  the  east 
and  northeast,  and  rumors  reached  McLaws  of  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  from  Frederick,  but  the  signal-parties  and 
cavalry  failed  to  discover  movements,  so  the  firing  was 
not  credited  as  of  significance.  The  morning  of  the  14th 
was  occupied  in  cutting  a  road  for  his  artillery  up  to  the 
point  overlooking  Harper's  Ferry,  and  at  two  P.M.  Cap 
tains  Read  and  Carlton  had  their  best  guns  in  position 
over  the  town.  But  during  these  progressions  the  Confed 
erates  on  other  fields  had  been  called  to  more  serious  work. 
General  McClellan,  moving  his  columns  out  from  the 
vicinity  of  Washington  City  on  the  5th,  made  slow  and 
very  cautious  marches  to  save  fatigue  of  his  men  and  at 
the  same  time  cover  the  capital  against  unforeseen  contin 
gency  ;  so  slow  and  cautious  was  the  march  that  he  only 
covered  forty  or  fifty  miles  in  seven  days.  On  the  12th 


THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  209 

his  head-quarters  were  at  Urbana,  where  he  received  the 
following  telegram  from  President  Lincoln : 

"  Governor  Curtin  telegraphs  me,  '  I  have  advices  that  Jack 
son  is  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Willianisport,  and  probably  the 
whole  rebel  army  will  be  drawn  from  Maryland.'  ' 

The  President  added, — 

"Receiving  nothing  from  Harper's  Ferry  or  Martinsburg  to 
day,  and  positive  information  from  Wheeling  that  the  line  is  cut, 
corroborates  the  idea  that  the  enemy  is  recrossing  the  Potomac. 
Please  do  not  let  him  get  off  without  being  hurt."  * 

Elsewhere  General  McClellan  has  written  of  the  12th  : 

"During  these  movements  I  had  not  imposed  long  marches  on 
the  columns.  The  absolute  necessity  of  refitting  and  giving  some 
little  rest  to  the  troops  worn  down  by  previous  long- continued 
marches  and  severe  fighting,  together  with  the  uncertainty  as  to 
the  actual  position,  strength,  and  intentions  of  the  enemy,  ren 
dered  it  incumbent  upon  me  to  move  slowly  and  cautiously  until 
the  head-quarters  reached  Urbana,  where  I  first  obtained  reliable 
information  that  the  enemy's  object  was  to  move  upon  Harper's 
Ferry  and  the  Cumberland  Valley,  and  not  upon  Washington 
and  Baltimore." 

His  army  was  organized :  Eight  wing,  under  General 
Burnsi.de :  First  and  Ninth  Corps ;  the  Kanawha  Divi 
sion,  under  General  J.  D.  Cox,  was  assigned  with  the 
Ninth  Corps  about  the  8th  instant. 

Centre  column  :  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps,  under  Gen 
eral  Sumner. 

Left  wing :  Sixth  Corps  and  Couch's  division  of  the 
Fourth  under  General  Franklin ;  Sykes's  division,  Fifth 
Corps,  independent.f 

Besides  the  despatches  of  the  llth  and  12th,  his  cav 
alry  under  General  Pleasonton,  which  was  vigilant  and 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i.  p.  41.  McClellan's  official  ac 
count. 

f  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i. 

14 


210  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

pushing,  sent  frequent  reports  of  his  steady  progress.  In 
the  afternoon  Pleasonton  and  the  Ninth  Corps  under  Gen 
eral  Reno  entered  Fredericktown.  This  advance,  by  the 
National  road,  threatened  to  cut  off  two  of  Stuart's  cavalry 
regiments  left  at  the  Monocacy  Bridge.  To  detain  the 
enemy  till  these  were  withdrawn,  the  outpost  on  that  road 
was  reinforced.  Hampton  retired  his  cavalry  beyond 
Frederick  and  posted  his  artillery  to  cover  the  line  of 
march,  where  he  was  soon  attacked  by  a  formidable  force. 
To  make  safe  the  retreat  of  the  brigade,  a  cavalry  charge 
was  ordered,  under  Colonel  Butler,  Lieutenant  Meaghan's 
squadron  leading.  Colonel  Moore,  of  the  Twenty-eighth 
Ohio  Cavalry,  and  a  number  of  other  prisoners  were  cap 
tured.  This  so  detained  the  enemy  as  to  give  safe  with 
drawal  for  the  brigade  to  Middletown,  leaving  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Martin's  cavalry  and  two  guns  on  guard  at  the 
gap  of  the  Catoctin  range  of  mountains. 

Before  withdrawing  from  Frederick  on  the  12th,  Gen 
eral  Stuart  sent  orders  for  the  brigade  under  General 
Fitzhugh  Lee  to  move  around  the  right  of  the  Union 
army  and  ascertain  the  meaning  and  strength  of  its 
march. 

Following  his  orders  of  the  12th,  General  Pleasonton 
detached  a  cavalry  brigade  on  the  13th  and  section  of  ar 
tillery  under  Colonel  McReynolds  to  follow  Fitzhugh 
Lee,  and  Rush's  Lancers  were  sent  to  Jefferson  for  Gen 
eral  Franklin's  column.  With  his  main  force  he  pursued 
the  Confederates  towards  Turner's  Pass  of  South  Moun 
tain.  Midway  between  Frederick  and  South  Mountain, 
running  parallel,  is  a  lesser  range,  Catoctin,  where  he 
encountered  Stuart's  rear-guard.  After  a  severe  affair  he 
secured  the  pass,  moved  on,  and  encountered  a  second 
force  near  Middletown.  Reinforced  by  Gibson's  battery, 
he  attacked  and  forced  the  way  to  a  third  stand.  This  in 
turn  was  forced  back  and  into  the  mountain  at  Turner's 
Pass. 


THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  211 

On  that  day  McClellan's  columns  marched:  Ninth 
Corps,  to  and  near  Middletown,  eight  miles ;  First  Corps, 
to  the  Monocacy,  eight  miles ;  Twelfth  Corps,  to  Freder 
ick,  nine  miles  ;  Second  Corps,  to  Frederick,  eight  miles  ; 
Sixth  Corps,  to  Buckeystown,  seven  miles ;  Couch's  di 
vision,  to  Licksville,  six  miles ;  Sykes's  division,  to  Fred 
erick,  eight  miles. 

At  Frederick,  General  Lee's  special  order  No.  191  was 
handed  to  General  McClellan  at  his  head-quarters  with 
his  centre  (Simmer's)  column. 

How  lost  and  how  found  we  shall  presently  see,  and 
see  that  by  the  mischance  and  accident  the  Federal  com 
mander  came  in  possession  of  information  that  gave  a 
spur,  and  great  advantage,  to  his  somewhat  demoralized 
army. 


UNIVERSITY 


CHAPTEE    XVI. 

"  THE  LOST  ORDER" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN. 

How  the  Federals  found  the  Despatch— With  every  Advantage  McClel- 
lan  "  made  haste  slowly" — Lee  turns  hack  to  meet  him  at  South  Moun 
tain — Longstreet  preferred  that  the  Stand  should  be  made  at  Sharps- 
burg — The  Battle  at  the  Pass — Many  killed— General  Garland  of  the 
Confederate  and  General  Reno  of  the  Union  side— A  future  President 
among  the  wounded — Estimate  of  Forces  engaged. 

THE  strange  losing  and  stranger  finding  of  Lee's  "  Gen 
eral  Order  No.  191,"  commonly  referred  to  as  "  the  lost 
despatch,"  which  he  had  issued  September  9  for  the  move 
ment  of  his  army,  made  a  difference  in  our  Maryland 
campaign  for  better  or  for  worse. 

Before  this  tell-tale  slip  of  paper  found  its  way  to  Mc- 
Clellan's  head -quarters  he  was  well  advised  by  his  cavalry, 
and  by  despatches  wired  him  from  east  and  west,  of  the 
movements  of  Lee's  army,  and  later,  on  that  eventful  13th 
day  of  September,  he  received  more  valuable  information, 
even  to  a  complete  revelation  of  his  adversary's  plans  and 
purpose,  such  as  no  other  commander,  in  the  history  of 
war,  has  had  at  a  time  so  momentous.  So  well  satisfied 
was  he  that  he  was  master  of  the  military  zodiac  that  he 
despatched  the  Washington  authorities  of  Lee's  "gross 
mistake"  and  exposure  to  severe  penalties.  There  was  not 
a  point  upon  which  he  wanted  further  information  nor  a 
plea  for  a  moment  of  delay.  His  army  was  moving 
rapidly ;  all  that  he  wished  for  was  that  the  plans  of  the 
enemy  would  not  be  changed.  The  only  change  that  oc 
curred  in  the  plans  was  the  delay  of  their  execution, 
which  worked  to  his  greater  advantage.  By  following  the 
operations  of  the  armies  through  the  complications  of  the 
campaign  we  may  form  better  judgment  of  the  work  of 
the  commanders  in  finding  ways  through  its  intricacies : 
212 


"THE  LOST  ORDER" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.          213 

of  the  efforts  of  one  to  grasp  the  envied  crown  so  hap 
lessly  tendered  ;  of  the  other  in  seeking  refuge  that  might 
cover  catastrophe  involved  in  the  complexity  of  miscon 
ceived  plans. 

The  copy  of  the  order  that  was  lost  was  sent  by  Gen 
eral  Jackson  to  General  D.  H.  Hill  under  the  impression 
that  Hill's  division  was  part  of  his  command,  but  the  di 
vision  had  not  been  so  assigned,  and  that  copy  of  the 
order  was  not  delivered  at  Hill's  head-quarters,  but  had 
been  put  to  other  use.  The  order  sent  to  General  Hill 
from  general  head-quarters  was  carefully  preserved. 

When  the  Federals  marched  into  Frederick,  just  left 
by  the  Confederates,  General  Sumner's  column  went  into 
camp  about  noon,  and  it  was  then  that  the  despatch  was 
found  by  Colonel  Silas  Colgrove,  who  took  it  to  division 
head-quarters,  whence  it  was  quickly  sent  to  the  Federal 
commander. 

General  McClellan  reported  to  General  Halleck  that 
the  lost  order  had  been  handed  him  in  the  evening, 
but  it  is  evident  that  he  had  it  at  the  time  of  his  noonday 
despatch  to  the  President,  from  his  reference  to  the  facts 
it  exposed. 

It  is  possible  that  it  was  at  first  suspected  as  a  ruse 
de  guerre,  and  that  a  little  time  was  necessary  to  convince 
McClellan  of  its  genuineness,  which  may  account  for  the 
difference  between  the  hinted  information  in  his  despatch 
to  General  Halleck  and  the  confident  statement  made  at 
noonday  to  the  President. 

Some  of  the  Confederates  were  a  little  surprised  that  a 
matter  of  such  magnitude  was  intrusted  to  pen-and-ink 
despatches.  The  copy  sent  me  was  carefully  read,  then 
used  as  some  persons  use  a  little  cut  of  tobacco,  to  be  as 
sured  that  others  could  not  have  the  benefit  of  its  con 
tents. 

It  has  been  in  evidence  that  the  copy  that  was  lost  had 
been  used  as  a  wrapper  for  three  fragrant  Confederate 


214  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

cigars  in  the  interim  between  its  importance  when  issued 
by  the  Confederate  chief  and  its  greater  importance  when 
found  by  the  Federals. 

General  Halleck  thought  the  capital  in  imminent  peril 
before  he  heard  from  McClellan  on  the  13th,  as  shown  on 
that  day  by  a  despatch  to  General  McClellan : 

"The  capture  of  this  place  will  throw  us  back  six  months,  if 
it  should  not  destroy  us." 

But  later,  the  "  lost  despatch"  having  turned  up  at  head 
quarters  of  General  McClellan,  that  commander  apprised 
the  authorities  of  the  true  condition  of  affairs  in  the  fol 
lowing  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  FREDERICK,  September  13,  1862,  12  M. 

("  Eeceived  2.35  A.M.,  September  14.) 
t  i  To  THE  PRESIDENT  : 

1  i  I  have  the  whole  rebel  force  in  front  of  me,  but  am  confident, 
and  no  time  shall  be  lost.  I  have  a  difficult  task  to  perform,  but 
with  God's  blessing  will  accomplish  it.  I  think  Lee  has  made  a 
gross  mistake,  and  that  he  will  be  severely  punished  for  it.  The 
army  is  in  motion  as  rapidly  as  possible.  I  hope  for  a  great  suc 
cess  if  the  plans  of  the  rebels  remain  unchanged.  We  have  pos 
session  of  Catoctin.  I  have  all  the  plans  of  the  rebels,  and  will 
catch  them  in  their  own  trap  if  my  men  are  equal  to  the  emer 
gency.  I  now  feel  that  I  can  count  on  them  as  of  old.  All  forces 
of  Pennsylvania  should  be  placed  to  co-operate  at  Chambersburg. 
My  respects  to  Mrs.  Lincoln.  Eeceived  most  enthusiastically  by 
the  ladies.  Will  send  you  trophies.  All  well,  and  with  God's 
blessing  will  accomplish  it. 

"GEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

"FREDERICK  CITY,  MD.,  September  13,  1862,  11  P.M. 

("  Eeceived  1  P.M.,  September  14.) 
"  MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  General-in-Chief: 

"  An  order  from  General  E.  E.  Lee.  addressed  to  General  D.  H. 
Hill,  which  has  accidentally  come  into  my  hands  this  evening,— 
the  authenticity  of  which  is  unquestionable, — discloses  some  of 


"  THE  LOST  ORDER" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.          215 

the  plans  of  the  enemy,  and  shows  most  conclusively  that  the 
main  rebel  army  is  now  before  us,  including  Longstreet's,  Jack 
son's,  the  two  Hills' s,  McLaws's,  Walker's,  R.  H.  Anderson's,  and 
Hood's  commands.  That  army  was  ordered  to  march  on  the  10th, 
and  to  attack  and  capture  our  forces  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  Mar- 
tinsburg  yesterday,  by  surrounding  them  with  such  a  heavy  force 
that  they  conceived  it  impossible  they  could  escape.  They  were 
also  ordered  to  take  possession  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road  ;  afterwards  to  concentrate  again  at  Boonsborough  or  Hagers- 
town.  That  this  was  the  plan  of  campaign  on  the  9th  is  con 
firmed  by  the  fact  that  heavy  firing  has  been  heard  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Harper's  Ferry  this  afternoon,  and  the  columns  took  the 
roads  specified  in  the  order.  It  may,  therefore,  in  my  judgment, 
be  regarded  as  certain  that  this  rebel  army,  which  I  have  good 
reasons  for  believing  amounts  to  120,000  men  or  more,  and  know 
to  be  commanded  by  Lee  in  person,  intended  to  attempt  pene 
trating  Pennsylvania.  The  officers  told  their  friends  here  that 
they  were  going  to  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia.  My  advance 
has  pushed  forward  to-day  and  overtaken  the  enemy  on  the 
Middletown  and  Harper' s  Ferry  roads,  and  several  slight  engage 
ments  have  taken  place,  in  which  our  troops  have  driven  the 
enemy  from  their  position.  A  train  of  wagons,  about  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  long,  was  destroyed  to-day  by  the  rebels  in 
their  flight.  We  took  over  fifty  prisoners.  This  army  marches 
forward  early  to-morrow  morning,  and  will  make  forced  marches, 
to  endeavor  to  relieve  Colonel  Miles,  but  I  fear,  unless  he  makes 
a  stout  resistance,  we  may  be  too  late. 

11  A  report  came  in  just  this  moment  that  Miles  was  attacked 
to-day,  and  repulsed  the  enemy,  but  I  do  not  know  what  credit 
to  attach  to  the  statement.  I  shall  do  everything  in  my  power  to 
save  Miles  if  he  still  holds  out.  Portions  of  Burnside's  and 
Franklin's  corps  move  forward  this  evening. 

"  I  have  received  your  despatch  of  ten  A.M.  You  will  perceive, 
from  what  I  have  stated,  that  there  is  but  little  probability  of  the 
enemy  being  in  much  force  south  of  the  Potomac.  I  do  not,  by 
any  means,  wish  to  be  understood  as  undervaluing  the  importance 
of  holding  Washington.  It  is  of  great  consequence,  but  upon  the 
success  of  this  army  the  fate  of  the  nation  depends.  It  was  for 
this  reason  that  I  said  everything  else  should  be  made  subordi 
nate  to  placing  this  army  in  proper  condition  to  meet  the  large 
rebel  force  in  our  front.  Unless  General  Lee  has  changed  his 
plans,  I  expect  a  severe  general  engagement  to-morrow.  I  feel 
confident  that  there  is  now  no  rebel  force  immediately  threaten- 


216  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ing  Washington  or  Baltimore,  but  that  I  have  the  mass  of  their 
troops  to  contend  with,  and  they  outnumber  me  when  united. 

* '  GEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

' l  Major-  General. ' '  * 


With  the  knowledge  afforded  by  securing  Lee's  "  lost 
order"  the  passes  of  the  South  Mountain  became  im 
portant  points.  If  he  could  force  them,  McClellan 
might  fall  on  the  divided  columns  of  the  Confederates 
and  reach  Harper's  Ferry  in  time  to  save  its  garrison ; 
but  Lee  received  intelligence  of  his  only  moderate  forward 
movement,  and,  without  knowing  then  how  it  came  to  be 
made,  recalled  a  force  to  make  resistance,  and,  so  supple 
menting  or  complementing  by  his  rapid  moves  the  Federal 
commander's  slowness,  saved  his  campaign  from  the  disas 
trous  failure  that  threatened  it. 

General  McClellan  claimed  to  have  been  more  vigorous 
in  pursuit  after  he  received  the  "  lost  despatch,"  but 
events  do  not  support  the  claim.  He  had  time  after  the 
despatch  was  handed  him  to  march  his  army  to  the  foot 
of  South  Mountain  before  night,  but  gave  no  orders, 
except  his  letter  to  General  Franklin  calling  for  vigor 
ous  action,  which  was  afterwards  tempered  by  caution 
to  wait  for  developments  at  Turner's  Pass.  He  gave  no 
intimation  of  the  despatch  to  his  cavalry  leader,  who 
should  have  been  the  first  to  be  advised  of  the  points  in 
his  possession.  General  Pleasonton  had  pushed  the  Con 
federate  cavalry  back  into  the  mountains  long  before  night 
of  the  13th  under  his  instructions  of  the  12th.  Had  he 
been  informed  of  the  points  known  by  his  chief  in  the 
afternoon,  he  would  have  occupied  South  Mountain  at 
Turner's  Pass  before  any  of  the  Confederate  infantry  was 
there  or  apprised  of  his  approach.  General  McClellan's 
orders  for  the  14th  were  dated, — 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  ii.  p  281. 


"THE  LOST  ORDEK" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.         217 

"13th,  6.45  P.M.,  Couch  to  move  to  Jefferson  with  his  whole 
division,  and  join  Franklin. 

"  13th,  8.45  P.M.,  Simmer  to  move  at  seven  A.M. 

"  13th,  11.30  P.M.,  Hooker  to  march  at  daylight  to  Middletown. 

"13th,  11.30  P.M.,  Sykes  to  move  at  six  A.M.,  after  Hooker  on 
the  Middletown  and  Hagerstown  road. 

"  14th,  one  A.M.,  artillery  reserve  to  follow  Sykes  closely. 

"14th,  nine  A.M.,  Simmer  ordered  to  take  the  Shockstown  road 
to  Middletown. 

"Franklin's  corps  at  Buckeystown  to  march  for  Burkitts- 
ville."* 

He  wrote  General  Franklin  at  6.20  P.M.,  giving  the 
substance  of  information  of  the  despatch,  but  not  men 
tioning  when  or  how  he  came  by  it,  and  ordered  him  to 
march  for  the  mountain  pass  at  Crampton's  Gap,  to  seize 
the  pass  if  it  was  not  strongly  guarded,  and  march  for 
Kohrersville,  to  cut  off  the  command  under  McLaws  about 
Maryland  Heights,  capture  it,  and  relieve  the  garrison  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  return  to  co-operate  in  capturing  the 
balance  of  the  Confederate  army  north  of  the  Potomac ; 
but,  in  case  the  gap  was  occupied  by  a  strong  force,  to 
await  operations  against  it  until  he  heard  the  engagement 
of  the  army  moving  upon  Turner's  Pass.  He  wrote  Gen 
eral  Franklin  that  General  Pleasonton  had  cleared  the 
field  east  of  the  mountain  of  Confederate  cavalry.  After 
relieving  Harper's  Ferry,  Franklin  was  to  destroy  bridges 
and  guard  against  crossing  of  the  Confederates  to  the 
north  side,  his  idea  being  to  cut  the  Confederate  army  in 
two  and  capture  or  break  it  up  in  detail.  His  appeal  was 
urgent  for  the  best  work  that  a  general  could  exercise. 
The  division  under  General  Couch  was  ordered  to  General 
Franklin,  without  waiting  for  all  of  its  forces  to  join.  This 
is  the  only  order  of  the  records  that  indicates  unusual 
action  on  the  part  of  the  Union  commander,  and  General 
Franklin's  evidence  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i.  p.  48. 


218  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

of  the  War  shows  that  his  orders  of  the  loth  were  so 
modified  on  the  14th  as  to  direct  his  wait  for  Couch's 
division  to  join  him,  and  the  division  joined  him  after 
nightfall. 

The  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps  reached  Middletown 
on  the  13th,  under  the  orders  of  the  12th,  issued  before 
the  lost  despatch  was  found,  one  of  them  supporting 
Pleasonton's  cavalry  ;  but  Rodman's,  under  misconception 
of  orders,  marched  back  towards  Frederick. 

South  Mountain  range,  standing  between  the  armies, 
courses  across  Maryland  northeast  and  southwest.  Its 
average  height  is  one  thousand  feet;  its  rugged  passes 
give  it  strong  military  features.  The  pass  at  Turner  drops 
off  about  four  hundred  feet.  About  a  mile  south  of  this 
the  old  Sharpsburg  road  crosses  at  a  greater  elevation 
through  rugged  windings ;  a  fork  of  this  road,  on  the 
mountain-side,  makes  a  second  way  over  below  Fox's  Pass, 
while  another  turns  to  the  right  and  leads  back  into  the 
turnpike  at  the  summit,  or  Mountain  House. 

On  the  north  side  of  the  turnpike  a  road  leads  off  to 
the  right,  called  the  old  Hagerstown  road,  which  winds  its 
course  through  a  valley  between  a  spur  and  the  mountain, 
and  courses  back  to  the  turnpike  along  the  top.  A  more 
rugged  route  than  this  opens  a  way  to  the  mountain-top 
by  a  route  nearer  the  pike. 

General  Pleasonton,  not  advised  of  the  lost  despatch, 
did  not  push  for  a  careful  reconnoissance  on  the  13th. 
At  the  same  time,  General  Stuart,  forced  back  into  the 
mountains,  finding  his  cavalry  unserviceable,  advised 
General  D.  H.  Hill  of  severe  pressure,  called  for  a  brigade 
of  infantry,  ordered  Hampton's  cavalry  down  to  Cramp- 
ton's  Pass  to  assist  Robertson's  brigade,  Colonel  Munford 
commanding,  leaving  the  Jeff  Davis  Legion,  under 
Colonel  Martin,  Colonel  Rosser  with  another  cavalry  de 
tachment,  and  Stuart's  horse  artillery  to  occupy  the  passes 
by  the  old  Sharpsburg  road.  Colquitt's  brigade  of  infan- 


"  THE  LOST  ORDER" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.          219 

try  reported  to  him  under  his  call.  After  posting  it  near 
the  east  base  of  the  mountain  to  hold  the  pass,  he  rode  to 
join  his  other  cavalry  detachments  down  at  Crampton's 
Pass.  He  only  knew  of  two  brigades  of  infantry  press 
ing  him  back,  and  so  reported.  His  cavalry,  ordered 
around  the  Union  right  under  General  Fitzhugh  Lee, 
for  information  of  the  force  in  his  front,  had  failed  to 
make  report.  General  Hill  ordered  two  brigades,  Gar 
land's  and  Colquitt's,  into  the  pass  to  report  to  Stuart,  and 
drew  his  other  three  near  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  Gar 
land's  brigade  filed  to  the  right  after  ascending  the  moun 
tain,  and  halted  near  the  turnpike.  Colquitt's  brigade 
took  its  position  across  the  turnpike  and  down  towards 
the  base  of  the  mountain,  Lane's  batteries  at  the  summit. 

It  seems  that  up  to  the  night  of  the  13th  most  of  the 
Confederates  were  looking  with  confidence  to  the  surrender 
at  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  13th,  to  be  promptly  followed 
by  a  move  farther  west,  not  thinking  it  possible  that  a 
great  struggle  at  and  along  the  range  of  South  Mountain 
was  impending ;  that  even  on  the  14th  our  cavalry  leader 
thought  to  continue  his  retrograde  that  day.  General 
Hill's  attention  was  given  more  to  his  instructions  to  pre 
vent  the  escape  of  fugitives  from  Harper's  Ferry  than  to 
trouble  along  his  front,  as  the  instructions  covered  more 
especially  that  duty,  while  information  from  the  cavalry 
gave  no  indication  of  serious  trouble  from  the  front. 

A  little  after  dark  of  the  13th,  General  Lee  received, 
through  a  scout,  information  of  the  advance  of  the  Union 
forces  to  the  foot  of  South  Mountain  in  solid  ranks. 
Later  information  confirmed  this  report,  giving  the  esti 
mated  strength  at  ninety  thousand.  General  Lee  still 
held  to  the  thought  that  he  had  ample  time.  He  sent  for 
me,  and  I  found  him  over  his  map.  He  told  of  the  re 
ports,  and  asked  my  views.  I  thought  it  too  late  to  march 
on  the  14th  and  properly  man  the  pass  at  Turner's,  and 
expressed  preference  for  concentrating  D.  H.  Hill's  and 


220  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

my  own  force  behind  the  Antietam  at  Sharpsburg,  where 
we  could  get  together  in  season  to  make  a  strong  defensive 
fight,  and  at  the  same  time  check  McClellan's  march 
towards  Harper's  Ferry,  in  case  he  thought  to  relieve  the 
beleaguered  garrison  by  that  route,  forcing  him  to  first 
remove  the  obstacle  on  his  flank.  He  preferred  to  make 
the  stand  at  Turner's  Pass,  and  ordered  the  troops  to 
march,  next  morning,  ordering  a  brigade  left  at  Hagers- 
town  to  guard  the  trains.  No  warning  was  sent  McLaws 
to  prepare  to  defend  his  rear,  either  by  the  commanding 
general  or  by  the  chief  of  cavalry.  The  hallucination 
that  McClellan  was  not  capable  of  serious  work  seemed 
to  pervade  our  army,  even  to  this  moment  of  dreadful 
threatening. 

After  retiring  to  my  couch,  reflecting  upon  affairs,  my 
mind  was  so  disturbed  that  I  could  not  rest.  As  I  studied, 
the  perils  seemed  to  grow,  till  at  last  I  made  a  light  and 
wrote  to  tell  General  Lee  of  my  troubled  thoughts,  and 
appealed  again  for  immediate  concentration  at  Sharps- 
burg.  To  this  no  answer  came,  but  it  relieved  my  mind 
and  gave  me  some  rest. 

At  daylight  in  the  morning  the  column  marched  (eight 
brigades  with  the  artillery),  leaving  Toombs's  brigade. 
A  regiment  of  G.  T.  Anderson's  that  had  been  on  guard 
all  night  was  not  relieved  in  time  to  join  the  march,  and 
remained  with  Toombs.  The  day  was  hot  and  the  roads 
dry  and  beaten  into  impalpable  powder,  that  rose  in  clouds 
of  dust  from  under  our  feet  as  we  marched. 

Before  sunrise  of  the  14th,  General  Hill  rode  to  the 
top  of  the  mountain  to  view  the  front  to  which  his  bri 
gade  had  been  called  the  day  before.  As  he  rode  he  re 
ceived  a  message  from  General  Stuart,  informing  him  that 
he  had  sent  his  main  cavalry  force  to  Crampton's  Pass, 
and  was  then  en  route  to  join  it.  He  found  Garland's 
brigade  at  the  summit,  near  the  Mountain  House,  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  and  Colquitt's  well  advanced  down  the 


"THE  LOST  ORDER" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.         221 

east  side.  He  withdrew  the  latter  to  the  summit,  and 
posted  two  regiments  on  the  north  side  of  the  pike  behind 
stone  walls,  the  others  on  the  south  side  under  cover  of  a 
woodland.  Upon  learning  of  the  approaches  to  his  posi 
tion,  he  ordered  the  brigade  under  G.  B.  Anderson  and 
one  of  Ripley's  regiments  up,  leaving  Rodes's  brigade 
and  the  balance  of  Ripley's  to  watch  for  refugees  from 
Harper's  Ferry. 

While  he  was  withdrawing  and  posting  Colquitt's  bri 
gade,  General  Pleasonton  was  marching  by  the  road  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  south,  feeling  his  way  towards  Fox's 
Gap,  with  the  brigade  of  infantry  under  Colonel  Scam- 
mon.  Co-operating  with  this  advance,  Pleasonton  used 
his  cavalry  along  the  turnpike.  His  batteries  were  put 
in  action  near  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  except  one  section 
of  McMullen's  under  Lieutenant  Crome,  which  advanced 
with  the  infantry.  The  battle  was  thus  opened  by  Gen 
eral  Pleasonton  and  General  Cox  without  orders,  and 
without  information  of  the  lost  despatch.  The  latter  had 
the  foresight  to  support  this  move  with  his  brigade  under 
Colonel  Crook.  Batteries  of  twenty-pound  Parrott  guns 
were  posted  near  the  foot  of  the  mountain  in  fine  position 
to  open  upon  the  Confederates  at  the  summit. 

After  posting  Colquitt's  brigade,  General  Hill  rode  off 
to  his  right  to  examine  the  approach  to  Fox's  Gap,  near 
the  point  held  by  Rosser's  cavalry  and  horse  artillery. 
As  he  passed  near  the  gap  he  heard  noise  of  troops  work 
ing  their  way  towards  him,  and  soon  artillery  opened  fire 
across  the  gap  over  his  head.  He  hurried  back  and  sent 
Garland's  brigade,  with  Bondurant's  battery,  to  meet  the 
approaching  enemy.  Garland  made  connection  with  Ros 
ser's  detachment  and  engaged  in  severe  skirmish,  arresting 
the  progress  of  Scammon's  brigade  till  the  coming  of 
Crook's,  when  Cox  gave  new  force  to  his  fight,  and  after 
a  severe  contest,  in  which  Garland  fell,  the  division  ad 
vanced  in  a  gallant  charge,  which  broke  the  ranks  of  the 


222  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

brigade,  discomfited  by  the  loss  of  its  gallant  leader,  part 
of  it  breaking  in  confusion  down  the  mountain,  the  left 
withdrawing  towards  the  turnpike.  G.  B.  Anderson's 
brigade  was  in  time  to  check  this  success  and  hold  for  re 
inforcements.  Ripley's  brigade,  called  up  later,  came, 
but  passed  to  the  right  and  beyond  the  fight.  General 
Hill  had  posted  two  batteries  on  the  summit  north  of  the 
turnpike,  which  had  a  destructive  cross  fire  on  Cox  as  he 
made  his  fight,  and  part  of  Colquitt's  right  regiments  were 
put  in,  in  aid  of  G.  B.  Anderson's  men.  About  two  P.M., 
General  Cox  was  reinforced  by  the  division  under  General 
Wilcox,  and  a  little  after  three  o'clock  by  Sturgis's  divi 
sion,  the  corps  commander,  General  Reno,  taking  com 
mand  with  his  last  division  under  Rodman. 

As  Sturgis's  division  came  into  the  fight,  the  head  of 
my  column  reached  the  top  of  the  pass,  where  the  brigades 
of  G.  T.  Anderson  and  Drayton,  under  General  D.  R. 
Jones,  filed  to  the  right  to  meet  the  battle,  and  soon  after 
General  Hood  with  two  brigades.  The  last  reinforcement 
braced  the  Confederate  fight  to  a  successful  stand,  and 
held  it  till  after  night  in  hot  contest,  in  which  many  brave 
soldiers  and  valuable  officers  were  lost  on  both  sides. 

The  fight  was  between  eight  brigades  on  the  Union  side, 
with  a  detachment  of  cavalry  and  superior  artillery  attach 
ments,  against  two  of  D.  H.  Hill's  and  four  of  my  bri 
gades,  with  Rosser's  detachment  of  cavalry  and  artillery. 
Ripley's  brigade  of  Hill's  division  marched  for  the  fight, 
but  lost  its  direction  and  failed  to  engage.  The  Con 
federate  batteries  made  handsome  combat,  but  were  of 
inferior  metal  and  munitions.  Numerically,  the  Union 
brigades  were  stronger  than  the  Confederates,  mine  having 
lost  more  than  half  its  numbers  by  the  wayside,  from  ex 
haustion  under  its  forced  march.  It  seems  that  several 
brigades  failed  to  connect  closely  with  the  action.  Rip- 
ley's,  on  the  Confederate  side,  General  Hill  said,  "  didn't 
pull  a  trigger."  G.  T.  Anderson  claimed  that  some  of  his 


"THE  LOST  OKDER" — SOUTH  MOUNTAIN.         223 

skirmishers  pulled  a  few  triggers,  while  Harland's  Union 
brigade  of  Rodman's  division  seems  to  have  had  little 
use  for  its  guns.  Lieutenant  Crome  brought  a  section  of 
McMullen's  battery  up  in  close  connection  with  Cox's 
advance,  put  it  in,  and  held  it  in  gallant  action  till  his 
gunners  were  reduced  to  the  minimum  of  working  force, 
when  he  took  the  place  of  cannoneer  and  fought  till  mor 
tally  wounded. 

On  the  Union  side  the  officers  had  their  time  to  or 
ganize  and  place  their  battle,  and  showed  skill  in  their 
work.  The  Confederates  had  to  meet  the  battle,  as  it  was 
called,  after  its  opening,  on  Rosser's  detachment.  The 
lamented  Garland,  equal  to  any  emergency,  was  quick 
enough  to  get  his  fine  brigade  in,  and  made  excellent 
battle,  till  his  men,  discouraged  by  the  loss  of  their  chief, 
were  overcome  by  the  gallant  assault  under  Cox.  General 
Reno,  on  the  Union  side,  an  officer  of  high  character  and 
attainments,  was  killed  about  seven  o'clock  P.M.  Among 
the  Union  wounded  was  Colonel  Rutherford  B.  Hayes^ 
afterwards  President  of  the  United  States. 

The  pass  by  the  lower  trail,  old  Sharpsburg  road,  was 
opened  by  this  fight,  but  the  Confederates  standing  so 
close  upon  it  made  it  necessary  that  they  should  be  dis 
lodged  before  it  could  be  utilized. 

The  First  Corps  marched  from  the  Monocaey  at  day 
light  and  approached  the  mountain  at  one  P.M.  General 
Hooker  had  three  divisions,  under  Generals  Hatch,  Rick- 
etts,  and  Meade.  General  Hatch  had  four  brigades, 
Generals  Ricketts  and  Meade  three  each,  with  full  ar 
tillery  appointments.  At  two  o'clock,  General  Hooker 
was  ordered  north  of  the  turnpike  to  make  a  diversion  in 
favor  of  the  troops  operating  on  the  south  side  under 
General  Reno.  Meade's  division  was  marched,  followed 
by  Hatch's  and  Ricketts's, — Meade's  on  the  right,  Hatch 
on  Meade's  left,  Ricketts  in  reserve.  Meade's  division  was 
deployed  along  the  foot-hills.  A  cavalry  regiment  under 


224  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Colonel  Williams,  First  Massachusetts,  was  sent  to  the 
far  right  in  observation.  Meade's  advance  was  followed 
by  Hatch  and  Bicketts. 

General  Hill's  only  available  force  to  meet  this  formi 
dable  move  was  his  brigade  under  General  Rodes.  He 
ordered  Rodes  to  his  left  to  a  prominent  position  about  a 
mile  off  which  commanded  that  part  of  the  field.  Cutts's 
battalion  of  artillery  had  been  posted  on  the  left  of  the 
turnpike,  to  cover  by  its  fire  the  route  just  assigned  for 
Hooker's  march.  The  weight  of  the  attack  fell  upon 
Rodes's  brigade,  and  was  handsomely  received.  Evans's 
brigade,  fortunately,  came  up,  and  was  sent  to  General 
Hill,  who  ordered  it  out  to  connect  with  Rodes's  right. 
Before  making  close  connection  it  became  engaged,  and 
operated  near  Rodes's  right,  connecting  with  his  fight 
and  dropping  back  as  the  troops  on  his  left  were  gradually 
forced  from  point  to  point. 

As  the  brigades  under  Generals  Kemper,  Garnett, 
and  Colonel  Walker  (Jenkins's  brigade)  approached  the 
mountain,  a  report  reached  general  head-quarters  that 
the  enemy  was  forcing  his  way  down  the  mountain  by  the 
old  Sharpsburg  road.  To  meet  this  General  Lee  ordered 
those  brigades  to  the  right,  and  they  marched  a  mile  and 
more  down  a  rugged  way  along  the  base  of  the  mountain 
before  the  report  was  found  to  be  erroneous,  when  the 
brigades  were  ordered  back  to  make  their  way  to  the  pike 
and  to  the  top  of  the  mountain  in  double  time.  General 
Rodes  had  five  regiments,  one  of  which  he  left  to  partially 
cover  the  wide  opening  between  his  position  and  the  turn 
pike.  In  view  of  the  great  force  approaching  to  attack 
him  his  fight  seemed  almost  hopeless,  but  he  handled  his 
troops  with  skill,  and  delayed  the  enemy,  with  the  little 
help  that  finally  came,  till  night,  breaking  from  time  to 
time  as  he  was  forced  nearer  our  centre  at  the  turn 
pike. 

Gibbon's  brigade  had  been  called  from  Hooker's  corps, 


—SOUTH    MOUNTAIN.  225 

and  was  ordered  up  the  mountain  by  the  direct  route  as 
the  corps  engaged  in  its  fight  farther  off  on  the  right. 

A  spur  of  the  mountain  trends  towards  the  east,  open 
ing  a  valley  between  it  and  the  mountain.  Through  this 
valley  and  over  the  rising  ground  Meade's  division  ad 
vanced  and  made  successful  attack  as  he  encountered  the 
Confederates.  Cooper's  battery  marched,  and  assisted  in  the 
several  attacks  as  they  were  pushed  up  the  mountain  slope. 
The  ground  was  very  rough,  and  the  Confederates  worked 
hard  to  make  it  too  rough,  but  the  divisions,  with  their 
strong  lines  of  skirmishers,  made  progress.  Rodes  made 
an  effort  to  turn  the  right  of  the  advancing  divisions,  but 
Hooker  put  out  a  brigade  from  Hatch's  division,  which 
pushed  off  the  feeble  effort,  and  Rodes  lost  his  first 
position. 

It  was  near  night  when  the  brigades  under  Generals 
Kemper  and  Garnett  and  Colonel  Walker  returned  from 
their  march  down  the  foot  of  the  mountain  and  reached 
the  top.  They  were  put  in  as  they  arrived  to  try  to  cover 
the  right  of  Rodes  and  Evans  and  fill  the  intervening 
space  to  the  turnpike.  As  they  marched,  the  men  dropped 
along  the  road,  as  rapidly  as  if  under  severe  skirmish.  So 
manifest  was  it  that  nature  was  exhausted,  that  no  one 
urged  them  to  get  up  and  try  to  keep  their  ranks.  As  the 
brigades  were  led  to  places  along  the  line,  the  divisions 
of  Hatch  and  Ricketts  were  advancing ;  the  former,  in 
range,  caught  the  brigades  under  fire  before  their  lines 
were  formed.  At  the  same  time  Meade's  division  was 
forcing  Rodes  and  Evans  from  their  positions,  back 
towards  the  turnpike. 

General  McClellan  claimed  fifteen  hundred  prisoners 
taken  by  his  troops,  and  that  our  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  greater  than  his  own,  which  was  fifteen 
hundred.  He  estimated  the  forces  as  about  equal,  thirty 
thousand  each.  General  D.  H.  Hill  does  not  admit  that 
the  Confederates  had  more  than  nine  .thousand. 

15 


226  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Several  efforts  have  been  made  to  correctly  report  the 
numerical  strength  of  my  column,  some  erroneously  in 
cluding  the  brigades  detached  with  R.  H.  Anderson's, 
and  others  the  brigade  of  General  Toombs  and  the 
regiment  of  G.  T.  Anderson's  brigade,  that  were  left 
at  Hagerstown.  General  Hill  concedes  reluctantly  that 
four  thousand  of  my  men  came  to  his  support  in  detach 
ments,  but  does  not  know  how  to  estimate  the  loss.  Con 
sidering  the  severe  forced  march,  the  five  brigades  that 
made  direct  ascent  of  the  mountain  were  in  good  order. 
The  three  that  marched  south  of  the  turnpike,  along  a 
narrow  mountain  trail  part  of  the  way,  through  wood 
lands  and  over  boulders,  returning,  then  up  the  mountain, 
the  last  march  at  double  time,  were  thinned  to  skeletons 
of  three  or  four  hundred  men  to  a  brigade  when  they 
reached  the  Mountain  House.  That  they  succeeded  in 
covering  enough  of  the  position  to  conceal  our  retreat  after 
night  is  sufficient  encomium  of  their  valorous  spirit. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

PKELIMINARIES  OF  THE  GKEAT  BATTLE. 

Confederates  retreat  from  South  Mountain — Federals  follow  and  harass 
them — Franklin  and  Cobb  at  Crampton's  Pass — A  spirited  Action — 
Fighting  around  Harper's  Ferry — Its  Capitulation — The  Confederates 
take  Eleven  Thousand  Prisoners— Jackson  rejoins  Lee — Description 
of  the  Field  of  An  tie  tarn — McClellan  posts  his  Corps — Lee's  Lines 
advantageously  placed — Hooker's  Advance  on  the  Eve  of  Battle 
should  have  been  resisted. 

AT  first  sight  of  the  situation,  as  I  rode  up  the  moun 
tain-side,  it  became  evident  that  we  were  not  in  time  nor 
in  sufficient  force  to  secure  our  holding  at  Turner's  Gap, 
and  a  note  was  sent  General  Lee  to  prepare  his  mind  for 
disappointment,  and  give  time  for  arrangements  for  re 
treat. 

After  nightfall  General  Hill  and  I  rode  down  to  head 
quarters  to  make  report.  General  Lee  inquired  of  the 
prospects  for  continuing  the  fight.  I  called  upon  General 
Hill  to  demonstrate  the  situation,  positions  and  forces.  He 
explained  that  the  enemy  was  in  great  force  with  com 
manding  positions  on  both  flanks,  which  would  give  a 
cross-fire  for  his  batteries,  in  good  range  on  our  front, 
making  the  cramped  position  of  the  Confederates  at  the 
Mountain  House  untenable.  His  explanation  was  too 
forcible  to  admit  of  further  deliberation.  General  Lee 
ordered  withdrawal  of  the  commands  to  Keedysville,  and 
on  the  march  changed  the  order,  making  Sharpsburg 
the  point  of  assembly.  General  Hill's  troops  were  first 
withdrawn,  and  when  under  way,  the  other  brigades  fol 
lowed  and  were  relieved  by  General  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cav 
alry  on  the  mountain  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
Hood's  two  brigades,  with  G.  T.  Anderson's,  as  rear 
guard. 

227 


228  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  cover 
our  march,  but  Pleasonton  pushed  upon  him  so  severely 
with  part  of  the  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  and  Tidball's 
battery  that  he  was  forced  off  from  our  line  through  Boons- 
borough  and  found  his  way  to  the  Potomac  off  the  rear  of 
General  Lee's  left,  leaving  his  killed  arid  wounded  and 
losing  two  pieces  of  artillery.  Otherwise  our  march  was 
not  disturbed.  In  addition  to  his  regular  complement  of 
artillery,  General  D.  H.  Hill  had  the  battalion  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  S.  Cutts.  The  batteries  were  as 
signed  positions  near  the  ridge  under  the  crest,  where  they 
could  best  cover  the  fields  on  the  farther  side  of  the 
stream.  A  few  minutes  after  our  lines  were  manned, 
information  came  of  the  capitulation  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  to  the  Virginia  side 
of  the  Potomac. 

General  Toombs's  brigade  joined  us  early  on  the  15th, 
and  was  posted  over  the  Burnside  Bridge.  He  was  subse 
quently  ordered  to  detach  two  regiments,  as  guard  for 
trains  near  Williamsport. 

As  long  as  the  armies  were  linked  to  Harper's  Ferry,  the 
heights  in  front  of  Sharpsburg  offered  a  formidable  defen 
sive  line,  and  in  view  of  possible  operations  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  through  the  river  pass,  east  of  South  Mountain, 
formed  a  beautiful  point  of  strategic  diversion.  But  when 
it  transpired  that  Harper's  Ferry  was  surrendered  and 
the  position  was  not  to  be  utilized,  that  the  troops  there 
were  to  join  us  by  a  march  on  the  south  side,  its  charms 
were  changed  to  perplexities.  The  threatening  attitude 
towards  the  enemy's  rear  vanished,  his  line  of  communi 
cation  was  open  and  free  of  further  care,  and  his  army, 
relieved  of  entanglements,  was  at  liberty  to  cross  the 
Antietam  by  the  upper  fords  and  bridges,  and  approach 
from  vantage-ground  General  Lee's  left.  At  the  same 
time  the  Federal  left  was  reasonably  secured  from  aggres 
sion  by  cramped  and  rugged  ground  along  the  Confed- 


PRELIMINARIES  OF  THE  GREAT  BATTLE.      229 

erate  right.  Thus  the  altered  circumstances  changed  all 
of  the  features  of  the  position  in  favor  of  the  Federals. 

Approaching  Crampton's  Gap  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  Hampton's  cavalry  encountered  the. enemy's  and 
made  a  dashing  charge,  which  opened  his  way  to  Mun- 
ford's,  both  parties  losing  valuable  officers  and  men. 
When  General  Stuart  rode  up,  he  saw  nothing  seriously 
threatening,  and  ordered  Hampton  south  to  the  river  pass  ; 
thinking  that  there  might  be  something  more  important 
at  that  point,  he  rode  himself  to  Maryland  Heights  to  see 
General  McLaws,  and  to  witness  the  operations  at  Har 
per's  Ferry,  posting  Colonel  Munford  with  two  regiments 
of  cavalry,  two  regiments  of  Mahone's  brigade  under 
Colonel  Parham,  part  of  the  Tenth  Georgia  Infantry, 
Chew's  battery  of  four  guns,  and  a  section  of  navy  how 
itzers,  to  guard  the  pass.  The  infantry  regiments  were 
posted  behind  stone  walls  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  the 
cavalry  dismounted  on  the  flanks  acting  as  sharp-shooters. 

At  noon  General  Franklin  marched  through  Burkitts- 
ville  with  his  leading  division  under  General  Slocum, 
holding  the  division  under  General  W.  F.  Smith  in  re 
serve.  His  orders  were  to  wait  until  Couch's  division 
joined  him,  but  he  judged  that  the  wait  might  be  more 
favorable  to  the  other  side.  Slocum  deployed  his  bri 
gades,  Bartlett's,  Newton's,  and  Torbert's,  from  right  to 
left,  posted  Wolcott's  battery  of  six  guns  on  his  left  and 
rear,  and  followed  the  advance  of  his  skirmish  line,  the 
right  brigade  leading.  When  the  Confederate  position 
was  well  developed,  the  skirmishers  were  retired,  and  the 
order  to  assault  followed, — the  right  regiments  of  New 
ton's  brigade  supporting  Bartlett's  assault,  the  regiments 
on  the  left  supporting  Torbert's.  The  Confederates  made 
a  bold  effort  to  hold,  but  the  attack  was  too  well  organized 
and  too  cleverly  pushed  to  leave  the  matter  long  in  doubt. 
Their  flanks,  being  severely  crowded  upon,  soon  began  to 
drop  off,  when  a  sweeping  charge  of  Slocum's  line  gained 


230  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  position.  The  brigades  of  General  Brooks  and  Col 
onel  Irwin  of  General  Smith's  division  were  advanced  to 
Slocum's  left  and  joined  in  pursuit,  which  was  so  rapid 
that  the  Confederates  were  not  able  to  rally  a  good  line ; 
the  entire  mountain  was  abandoned  to  the  Federals, 
and  the  pursuit  ended.  Some  four  hundred  prisoners, 
seven  hundred  stand  of  arms,  and  one  gun  were  their 
trophies  in  this  affair.  General  Franklin's  total  loss  was 
five  hundred  and  thirty-three.* 

General  McLaws  had  ordered  General  Cobb's  brigade 
and  the  other  regiments  of  Mahone's  to  reinforce  the 
troops  at  the  gap,  but  they  only  came  up  as  the  Federals 
were  making  their  sweeping  charge,  and  were  driven  back 
with  their  discomfited  comrades.  General  Semmes's  bri 
gade  at  the  Brownsville  Pass,  a  mile  south,  with  five  or 
six  guns,  attempted  to  relieve  their  comrades,  but  the 
range  was  too  great  for  effective  work.  That  McLaws 
was  not  prepared  for  the  sudden  onslaught  is  evident  from 
the  assurances  made  him  by  the  cavalry  commander.  His 
orders  for  Cobb  were  severe  enough,  but  Franklin  was  too 
prompt  to  allow  Cobb  to  get  to  work.  Upon  hearing  the 
noise  of  battle,  he  followed  his  orders,  riding  with  General 
Stuart,  but  the  game  was  played  before  he  could  take  part 
in  it.  Night  came  and  gave  him  time  to  organize  his 
forces  for  the  next  day.  Had  the  defenders  been  posted 
at  the  crest  of  the  mountain  it  is  probable  they  could 
have  delayed  the  assaulting  forces  until  reinforced.  But 
cavalry  commanders  do  not  always  post  artillery  and  in 
fantry  to  greatest  advantage. 

General  Cobb  made  worthy  effort  to  arrest  the  retreat 
and  reorganize  the  forces,  but  was  not  able  to  fix  a  rally- 
ing-point  till  after  the  pass  was  lost  and  the  troops  were 
well  out  of  fire  of  the  pursuers.  General  Semmes  came 
to  his  aid,  with  his  staff,  but  could  accomplish  nothing 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i.  p.  183. 


Commanding  First  Division,  First  Army  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


PRELIMINARIES    OF    THE    GREAT    BATTLE.  231 

until  he  drew  two  of  his  regiments  from  Brownsville  Pass 
and  established  them  with  a  battery  as  a  rallying-point. 
General  McLaws  reformed  his  line  about  a  mile  and  a 
half  south  of  the  lost  gap,  and  drew  all  of  his  force  not 
necessary  to  the  bombardment  at  Harper's  Ferry  to  that 
line  during  the  night. 

Under  cover  of  the  night,  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  Davis, 
at  the  head  of  the  Union  cavalry,  left  Harper's  Ferry, 
crossed  the  Potomac,  marched  up  the  left  bank,  through 
Sharpsburg,  and  made  good  his  escape,  capturing  some 
forty  or  fifty  Confederate  wagons  as  they  were  moving 
south  from  Hagerstown. 

We  left  McLaws  in  possession  of  Maryland  Heights,  on 
the  14th,  with  his  best  guns  planted  against  the  garrison 
at  Harper's  Ferry.  The  Potomac  River  was  between  his 
and  Jackson's  and  Walker's  forces,  and  the  Shenandoah 
divided  Jackson's  and  Walker's  commands.  Walker 
posted  his  division  to  defend  against  the  escape  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  planted  three  Parrott  guns  of  Cap 
tain  French's  battery  and  two  rifle  pieces  of  Captain 
Branch's  on  Loudoun  Heights,  having  effective  fire  along 
Bolivar  Heights.  General  Jackson  sent  word  to  McLaws 
and  Walker  that  the  batteries  were  not  to  open  till  all 
were  ready,  but  the  latter,  hearing  the  engagement  along 
South  Mountain  drawing  nearer,  and  becoming  impatient 
lest  delay  should  prove  fatal,  ordered  his  guns  to  open 
against  the  batteries  along  Bolivar  Heights,  and  silenced 
those  under  range. 

General  Jackson  ordered  A.  P.  Hill's  division  along 
the  left  bank  of  the  Shenandoah  to  turn  the  enemy's  left, 
the  division  under  Lawton  down  the  turnpike  in  support 
of  Hill,  and  his  own  division  to  threaten  against  the 
enemy's  right.  Hill's  division  did  its  work  in  good  style, 
securing  eligible  positions  on  the  enemy's  left  and  left  rear 
of  Bolivar  Heights,  and  planted  a  number  of  batteries 
upon  them  during  the  night ;  and  Jackson  had  some  of 


232  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

his  best  guns  passed  over  the  Shenandoah  to  commanding 
points  near  the  base  of  Loudoun  Heights.  At  daylight 
Lawton's  command  moved  up  close  to  the  enemy.  At  the 
same  time  the  batteries  of  Hill's  division  opened  fire,  and  a 
little  later  all  the  batteries,  including  those  of  McLaws  and 
Walker.  The  signal  ordered  for  the  storming  columns 
was  to  be  the  cessation  of  artillery  fire.  In  about  one 
hour  the  enemy's  fire  ceased,  when  Jackson  commanded 
silence  upon  his  side.  Fender's  brigade  started,  when  the 
enemy  opened  again  with  his  artillery.  The  batteries  of 
Pegram  and  Crenshaw  dashed  forward  and  renewed  rapid 
fire,  when  the  signal  of  distress  was  raised. 

Colonel  D.  H.  Miles,  the  Federal  commander  at  Har 
per's  Ferry,  was  mortally  wounded,  and  the  actual  surren 
der  was  made  by  General  White,  who  gave  up  eleven 
thousand  prisoners,  thirteen  thousand  small-arms,  seventy- 
two  cannon,  quantities  of  quartermaster's  stores  and  of 
subsistence.* 

General  Franklin  had  posted  his  division  under  General 
Couch  at  Rohrersville  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and 
proceeded  to  examine  McLaws's  line  established  the  night 
before  across  Pleasant  Valley.  He  found  the  Confederates 
strongly  posted  covering  the  valley,  their  flanks  against 
the  mountain-side.  Before  he  could  organize  for  attack 
the  firing  at  Harper's  Ferry  ceased,  indicating  surrender 
of  that  garrison  and  leaving  the  troops  operating  there 
free  to  march  against  him.  He  prepared,  therefore,  for 
that  eventuality. 

The  "  lost  order"  directed  the  commands  of  Generals 
Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker,  after  accomplishing  the 
objects  for  which  they  had  been  detached,  to  join  the  main 
body  of  the  army  at  Boonsborough  or  Hagerstown.  Under 
the  order  and  the  changed  condition  of  affairs,  they  were 
expected,  in  case  of  early  capitulation  at  Harper's  Ferry, 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i.  p.  961. 


PRELIMINARIES    OF    THE    GREAT    BATTLE.  233 

to  march  up  the  Rohrersville-Boonsborough  road  against 
McClellan's  left.  There  were  in  those  columns  twenty- 
six  of  General  Lee's  forty  brigades,  equipped  with  a  fair 
apportionment  of  artillery  and  cavalry.  So  it  seemed  to 
be  possible  that  Jackson  would  order  McLaws  and  Walker 
up  the  Rohrersville  road,  and  move  with  his  own  corps 
through  the  river  pass  east  of  South  Mountain,  against 
McClellan's  rear,  as  the  speedier  means  of  relief  to  Gen 
eral  Lee's  forces.  But  prudence  would  have  gone  with 
the  bolder  move  of  his  entire  command  east  of  the  moun 
tain  against  McClellan's  rear,  with  a  fair  field  for  strategy 
and  tactics.  This  move  would  have  disturbed  McClellan's 
plans  on  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  while  there  seemed 
little  hope  that  McClellan  would  delay  his  attack  until 
Jackson  could  join  us,  marching  by  the  south  side. 

The  field,  and  extreme  of  conditions,  were  more  en 
couraging  of  results  than  was  Napoleon's  work  at  Arcola. 
General  Jackson  judged  it  better  to  join  us  by  the  south 
side,  marched  promptly  with  two  of  his  divisions  (leaving 
A.  P.  Hill  with  six  brigades  to  receive  the  surrender  and 
captured  property),  then  ordered  Walker's  and  McLaws's 
troops  to  follow  his  march.  With  his  report  of  surrender 
of  the  garrison  he  sent  advice  of  his  march  by  the  south 
side  to  join  us. 

At  daylight  on  the  15th  the  head  of  General  Lee's 
column  reached  the  Antietam.  General  D.  H.  Hill,  in 
advance,  crossed  and  filed  into  position  to  the  left  of  the 
Boonsborough  turnpike,  G.  B.  Anderson  on  his  right, 
Garland's  brigade  under  Colonel  McRae,  Ripley,  and 
Colquitt,  Rodes  in  rear  near  Sharpsburg,  my  command 
on  his  right.  The  two  brigades  under  Hood  were  on  my 
right,  Kemper,  Dray  ton,  Jenkins  (under  Colonel  W^alker), 
Washington  Artillery,  on  the  ridge  near  the  turnpike,  and 
S.  D.  Lee's  artillery.  Pickett's  brigade  (under  Garnett) 
was  in  a  second  line,  G.  T.  Anderson's  brigade  in  rear  of 
the  battalions,  Evans's  brigade  on  the  north  side  of  the 


234  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

turnpike ;  Toombs's  brigade  joined  and  was  posted  at 
bridge  No.  3  (Burnside  Bridge).  As  the  battalions  of 
artillery  attached  to  the  divisions  were  all  that  could  find 
places,  General  Lee  sent  the  reserve  artillery  under  Gen 
eral  Pendleton  across  the  Potomac. 

As  soon  as  advised  of  the  surrender  and  Jackson's 
march  by  the  south  side,  my  brigades  under  Hood  were 
moved  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  taking  the  division 
of  General  D.  H.  Hill  within  my  limits,  while  three  of 
S.  D.  Lee's  batteries  were  sent  in  support  of  Hood's  bri 
gades.  The  pursuit  ordered  by  General  McClellan  was 
the  First,  Second,  and  Twelfth  Corps  by  the  Boons- 
borough  turnpike,  the  Ninth  Corps  and  Sykes's  division 
of  the  Fifth  by  the  old  Sharpsburg  road ;  *  the  Ninth 
and  Fifth  to  reinforce  Franklin  by  the  Rohrersville  road, 
or  move  to  Sharpsburg. 

About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  advance  of  the 
Union  army  came  in  sight.  General  Porter  had  passed 
the  Ninth  Corps  with  his  division  under  Sykes  and  joined 
Richardson's  division  of  the  Second.  These  divisions  de 
ployed  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  turnpike  and  posted 
their  batteries,  which  drew  on  a  desultory  fire  of  artillery, 
continuing  until  night.  The  morning  of  the  16th  opened 
as  the  evening  of  the  previous  day  closed,  except  for  the 
arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  Union  troops.  The  Ninth 
Corps  took  post  at  the  lower  bridge  opposite  the  Con 
federate  right,  the  First,  the  other  divisions  of  the 
Second,  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  resting  nearer  Keedysville, 
The  display  of  their  finely  appointed  batteries  was  im 
posing,  as  seen  from  Sharpsburg  Heights. 

Before  maturing  his  plans,  General  McClellan  had  to 
make  a  careful  reconnoissance,  and  to  know  of  the  dispo 
sition  to  be  made  of  the  Confederate  forces  from  Harper's 
Ferry. 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix,  part  i.  p.  47. 


PRELIMINARIES   OF   THE    GREAT    BATTLE.  235 

Of  the  latter  point  he  was  informed,  if  not  assured, 
before  he  posted  the  Ninth  Corps.  Four  batteries  of 
twenty-pound  Parrotts  were  planted  on  the  height  over 
looking  the  Antietam  on  their  right ;  on  the  crest  near 
the  Burnside  Bridge,  Weed's  three-inch  guns  and  Benja 
min's  twenty-pound  Parrotts.  At  intervals  between  those 
were  posted  some  ten  or  more  batteries,  and  the  practice 
became  more  lively  as  the  day  wore  on,  till,  observing  the 
unequal  combat,  I  ordered  the  Confederates  to  hold  their 
ammunition,  and  the  batteries  of  the  other  side,  seeming 
to  approve  the  order,  slackened  their  fire. 

The  Antietam,  hardly  worthy  the  name  river,  is  a 
sluggish  stream  coming  down  from  Pennsylvania  heights 
in  a  flow  a  little  west  of  south  till  it  nears  the  Potomac, 
when  it  bends  westward  to  its  confluence.  It  is  spanned 
by  four  stone  bridges, — at  the  Williamsport  turnpike, 
the  Boonsborough-Sharpsburg  turnpike,  the  Rohrersville 
turnpike,  and  another  near  its  mouth.  The  third  was  after 
wards  known  as  the  Burnside  Bridge.  From  the  north  sub 
urbs  of  Sharpsburg  the  Hagerstown  turnpike  leads  north 
a  little  west  two  miles,  when  it  turns  east  of  north  to  the 
vanishing  point  of  operations.  A  mile  and  a  half  from 
Sharpsburg  on  the  west  of  this  road  is  the  Dunker  chapel, 
near  the  southern  border  of  a  woodland,  which  spreads 
northward  half  a  mile,  then  a  quarter  or  more  westward. 
East  of  the  pike  were  open  fields  of  corn  and  fruit,  with 
occasional  woodlands  of  ten  or  twenty  acres,  as  far  as  the 
stream,  where  some  heavier  forests  cumbered  the  river 
banks.  General  Lee's  line  stood  on  the  Sharpsburg 
Heights,  his  right  a  mile  southeast  of  the  village,  the  line 
extending  parallel  with  the  Hagerstown  turnpike,  three 
miles  from  his  right,  the  left  curved  backward  towards 
the  rear,  and  towards  the  great  eastern  bend  of  the  Poto 
mac^  near  which  were  the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery. 
Along  the  broken  line  were  occasional  ridges  of  limestone 
cropping  out  in  such  shape  as  to  give  partial  cover  to 


236  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

infantry  lying  under  them.  Single  batteries  were  posted 
along  the  line,  or  under  the  crest  of  the  heights,  and  the 
battalions  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  Cutts's,  and  S.  D. 
Lee's. 

In  forming  his  forces  for  the  battle,  General  McClellan 
divided  his  right  wing,  posted  the  Ninth  Corps  on  his 
left,  at  the  Burnside  Bridge,  under  General  Cox,  and  as 
signed  the  First  Corps,  under  General  Hooker,  for  his 
right  flank.  General  Burnside  was  retained  on  his  left. 
The  plan  was  to  make  the  main  attack  against  the  Con 
federate  left,  or  to  make  that  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the 
main  attack,  and  to  follow  success  by  his  reserve. 

At  two  P.M.  of  the  16th,  Hooker's  First  Corps  crossed 
the  Antietam  at  the  bridge  near  Keedysville  and  a  near 
by  ford,  and  marched  against  my  left  brigades,  Generals 
Meade,  Kicketts,  and  Doubleday  commanding  the  divi 
sions,  battalions,  and  batteries  of  field  artillery.  The 
sharp  skirmish  that  ensued  was  one  of  the  marked  pre 
liminaries  of  the  great  battle ;  but  the  Federals  gained 
nothing  by  it  except  an  advanced  position,  which  was  of 
little  benefit  and  disclosed  their  purpose. 

General  Jackson  was  up  from  Harper's  Ferry  with 
Swell's  division  and  his  own,  under  Generals  Lawton  and 
Jones.  They  were  ordered  out  to  General  Lee's  left,  and 
took  post  west  of  the  Hagerstown  turnpike,  the  right  of 
his  line  resting  on  my  left,  under  Hood,  Winder's  and 
Jones's  brigades  on  the  front,  Starke's  and  Taliaferro's  on 
the  second  line,  Early's  brigade  of  Swell's  division  on 
the  left  of  Jackson's  division,  with  Hays's  brigade  for  a 
second  ;  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades  were  left  at  rest 
near  the  chapel;  Poague's  battery  on  Jackson's  front; 
five  other  batteries  prepared  for  action.  Following  Jack 
son's  march  to  the  left,  General  J.  G.  Walker  came  up 
with  his  two  brigades,  and  was  posted  on  my  extreme 
right  in  the  position  left  vacant  by  the  change  of  Hood's 
brigades. 


PRELIMINARIES  OF  THE  GREAT  BATTLE.      237 

General  Hooker  was  joined,  as  he  marched  that  after 
noon,  by  his  chief,  who  rode  with  him  some  little  distance 
conversing  of  pending  affairs.  It  subsequently  transpired 
that  Hooker  thought  the  afternoon's  work  ordered  for  his 
corps  (thirteen  thousand)  so  far  from  support  extremely 
venturesome,  and  he  was  right.  Jackson  was  up  and  in 
position  with  two  divisions  well  on  the  flank  of  the  attack 
to  be  made  by  Hooker.  Hood  with  S.  D.  Lee's  batteries 
received  Hooker's  attack,  and  arrested  its  progress  for  the 
day.  If  Jackson  could  have  been  put  into  this  fight,  and 
also  the  brigades  under  J.  G.  Walker,  Hooker's  command 
could  have  been  fought  out,  if  not  crushed,  before  the 
afternoon  went  out.  He  was  beyond  support  for  the  day, 
and  the  posting  along  the  Antietam  was  such — we  will 
soon  see — as  to  prevent  effective  diversion  in  his  favor. 
Events  that  followed  authorize  the  claim  for  this  combi 
nation,  that  it  would  have  so  disturbed  the  plans  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan  as  to  give  us  one  or  two  days  more  for 
concentration,  and  under  that  preparation  we  could  have 
given  him  more  serious  trouble. 

Hood's  skirmish  line  was  out  to  be  driven,  or  drawn  in, 
but  throughout  the  severe  engagement  his  line  of  battle 
was  not  seriously  disturbed.  After  night  General  Jackson 
sent  the  brigades  of  Trimble  and  Lawton,  under  General 
Lawton,  to  replace  Hood's  men,  who  were  ordered  to  re 
plenish  ammunition,  and,  after  getting  food,  to  resume 
their  places  on  my  right.  Preparing  for  battle,  General 
Jackson  sent  the  brigade  under  General  Early  to  support 
Stuart's  cavalry  and  horse  artillery,  and  Lawton  drew  his 
brigade,  under  General  Hays,  to  support  his  others  on 
the  right  of  Jackson's  division. 

General  Mansfield  crossed  during  the  night  with  the 
Twelfth  Corps  and  took  position  supporting  General 
Hooker's  command,  with  the  divisions  of  Generals  A.  S. 
Williams  and  George  S.  Greene,  and  field  batteries. 

A  light  rain  began  to  fall  at  nine  o'clock.     The  troops 


238  FROM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

along  either  line  were  near  enough  to  hear  voices  from 
the  other  side,  and  several  spats  occurred  during  the  night 
between  the  pickets,  increasing  in  one  instance  to  ex 
change  of  many  shots ;  but  for  the  most  part  there  was 
silence  or  only  the  soft,  smothered  sound  of  the  summer 
rain  over  all  that  field  on  which  was  to  break  in  the 
morning  the  storm  of  lead  and  iron. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBUKG,    OR    ANTIETAM. 

Bloodiest  Single  Day  of  the  War — Comparison  of  Casualties — Hooker 
opens  the  Fight  against  Jackson's  Centre — Many  Officers  among  the 
Fallen  early  in  the  Day— McLaws  and  Walker  in  time  to  meet  Sum- 
ner's  Advance  under  Sedgwick — Around  Dimker  Chapel — Richard 
son's  splendid  Advance  against  the  Confederate  Centre  the  Signal 
of  the  bursting  of  another  Storm— Longstreet's  and  D.  H.  Hill's 
Troops  stood  before  it — Fall  of  General  G.  B.  Anderson — General 
Richardson  mortally  wounded — Aggressive  Spirit  of  his  Command 
broken— Wonderful  Cannon-shot— General  D.  H.  Hill's  Third  Horse 
killed  under  him. 

THE  field  that  I  have  described — the  field  lying  along 
the  Antietam  and  including  in  its  scope  the  little  town  of 
Sharpsburg — was  destined  to  pass  into  history  as  the 
scene  of  the  bloodiest  single  day  of  fighting  of  the  war, 
and  that  17th  of  September  was  to  become  memorable  as 
the  day  of  greatest  carnage  in  the  campaigns  between  the 
North  and  South. 

Gettysburg  was  the  greatest  battle  of  the  war,  but  it 
was  for  three  days,  and  its  total  of  casualties  on  either 
side,  terrible  as  it  was,  should  be  one-third  larger  to  make 
the  average  per  diem  equal  to  the  losses  at  Sharpsburg. 
Viewed  by  the  measure  of  losses,  Antietam  was  the 
fourth  battle  of  the  war,  Spottsylvania  and  the  Wilder 
ness,  as  well  as  Gettysburg,  exceeding  it  in  number  of 
killed  and  wounded,  but  each  of  these  dragged  its  tragedy 
through  several  days. 

Taking  Confederate  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  as  the 
criterion  of  magnitude  in  battles,  the  Seven  Days'  Battle 
(following  McClellan's  retreat),  Gettysburg,  and  Chicka- 
mauga  exceeded  Sharpsburg,  but  each  of  these  occupied 
several  days,  and  on  no  single  day  in  any  one  of  them 
was  there  such  carnage  as  in  this  fierce  struggle. 

239 


240  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  Confederates  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
_Seyen  Days'  Battle  19,739, — more,  it  will  be  observed, 
than  at  Gettysburg  (15,298),  though  the  total  loss,  in 
cluding  5150  captured  or  missing,  at  the  latter,  brought 
the  figures  up  to  those  of  the  former  (20,614),  in  which 
the  captured  or  missing  were  only  875.  Our  killed  and 
wounded  at  Chickamauga  were  16,986,  but  that  was  in 
two  days'  battle,  while  at  Chancellorsville  in  three  days 
the  killed  and  wounded  were  10,746.  It  is  impossible  to 
make  the  comparison  with  absolute  exactness  for  the  Con 
federate  side,  for  the  reason  that  our  losses  are  given  for 
the  entire  campaign  in  Maryland,  instead  of  separately 
for  the  single  great  battle  and  several  minor  engage 
ments.  Thus  computed  they  were  12,187. *  But  nearly 
all  of  these  are  known  to  have  been  losses  at  Sharpsburg, 
and,  making  proper  deductions  for  the  casualties  in  other 
actions  of  the  campaign,  the  Confederate  loss  in  this  single 
day's  fighting  was  still  in  excess  of  that  at  the  three 
days'  fight  at  Chancellorsville  (10,746),  and  for  the  single 
day  far  larger  proportionally  than  in  the  two  days  at 
Chickamauga,  three  days  at  Gettysburg,  or  seven  days 
on  the  bloody  Chickahominy. 

But  the  sanguinary  character  of  this  battle  is  most 
strikingly  exhibited  by  a  comparison  of  the  accurate 
figures  of  the  Federal  losses,  returned  specifically  for  the 
day.  These  show  a  total  killed  and  wounded  of  11,657 
(or,  including  the  captured  and  missing,  12,410),  as  con 
trasted  with  17,567  killed  and  wounded  in  three  days  at 
Gettysburg,  16,141  in  eight  days  at  Spottsylvania,  and 
14,283  in  the  three  days  at  the  Wilderness,  while  the 
three  and  two  days'  fighting  respectively  at  Chancellors 
ville  and  Chickamauga  were  actually  productive  of  less 
loss  than  this  battle  of  one  day.  The  exceeding  losses 

*Some  authorities  say  (including  a  small  number  of  "captured  or 
missing")  12,601. 


BATTLE   OF   SHARPSBURG,  OR   ANTIETAM.  241 

of  this  battle  are  further  shown  by  the  fact  that  of  the 
11,657  Federals  stricken  on  the  field,  the  great  number 
of  2108  were  actually  slain, — more  than  two-thirds  of 
the  number  killed  in  three  days  at  Gettysburg  (3070). 
And  this  tremendous  tumult  of  carnage  was  entirely 
compassed  in  the  brief  hours  from  dawn  to  four  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon. 

At  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  17th  firing  along 
the  picket  lines  of  the  confronting  and  expectant  armies 
became  quite  frequent,  and  before  daylight  the  batteries 
began  to  plough  the  fields  in  front  of  them,  feeling,  as  it 
were,  for  the  ranks  of  men  whose  destruction  was  better 
suited  to  their  ugly  purpose. 

As  the  dawn  came,  the  fire  spread  along  both  lines  from 
left  to  right,  across  the  Antietam  and  back  again,  and  the 
thunder  of  the  big  guns  became  continuous  and  increased 
to  mighty  volume.  To  this  was  presently  added  the 
sharper  rattling  of  musketry,  and  the  surge  of  mingling 
sound  sweeping  up  and  down  the  field  was  multiplied  and 
confused  by  the  reverberations  from  the  rocks  and  hills. 
And  in  this  great  tumult  of  sound,  which  shook  the 
air  and  seemed  to  shatter  the  cliffs  and  ledges  above  the 
Antietam,  bodies  of  the  facing  foes  were  pushed  forward 
to  closer  work,  and  soon  added  the  clash  of  steel  to  the 
thunderous  crash  of  cannon-shots. 

The  first  impact  came  from  Hooker's  right  division 
under  Doubleday,  led  by  the  choice  brigade  under  Gib 
bon.  It  was  deployed  across  the  turnpike  and  struck  the 
centre  of  Jackson's  division,  when  close  engagement  was 
strengthened  by  the  brigades  of  Patrick,  Phelps,  and  part 
of  Hofmann's,  Ricketts's  division,  engaged  in  close  connec 
tion  along  Lawton's  front.  Hooker  supported  his  battle 
by  his  division  under  Meade,  which  called  into  action 
three  of  D.  H.  Hill's  brigades, — Kipley's,  Colquitt's,  and 
McEae's.  Hartsuff,  the  leading  spirit  of  Bicketts's  di 
vision,  was  the  first  general  officer  to  fall  severely  hurt, 

16 


242  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  later  fell  the  commander  of  the  corps,  wounded  also. 
General  Starke,  commanding  Jackson's  division,  was 
killed.  At  six  o'clock  the  Twelfth  Corps  came  in,  when 
General  Law  ton  called  for  Hood's  brigades,  "  and  all  the 
help  he  could  bring."  Hood's  and  G.  T.  Anderson's 
brigades  were  put  in,  and  the  brigades  from  my  right, 
under  J.  G.  Walker,  marched  promptly  in  response  to 
this  call. 

The  weight  of  Mansfield's  fight  forced  Jackson  back 
into  the  middle  wood  at  the  Dunker  chapel,  and  D.  H. 
Hill's  brigades  to  closer  lines.  Hoo^  was  in  season  to 
brace  them,  and  hold  the  line  as  he  found  it.  In  this 
fight  the  corps  commander,  General  Mansfield,  fell,  mor 
tally  wounded,  which  took  from  that  corps  some  of  its 
aggressive  power. 

"Jackson,  worn  down  and  exhausted  of  Ammunition, 
withdrew  his  divisions  at  seven  A.M.,  except  Early's  bri 
gade,  that  was  with  the  cavalry.  This  he  called  back 
to  vacant  ground  on  Hood's  left.  Two  detachments,  one 
under  Colonel  Grigsby,  of  Virginia,  the  other  under 
Colonel  Stafford,  of  Louisiana,  remained  on  the  wooded 
ground  off  from  the  left  of  Jackson's  position.  One  of 
the  regiments  of  Early's  brigade  was  left  with  the  cav 
alry.  Stuart  retired  to  position  corresponding  to  the  line 
of  Jackson's  broken  front.  The  brigade  under  G.  T. 
Anderson  joined  on  Hood's  right,  and  the  brigades  under 
J.  G.  Walker  coming  up  took  place  on  Hood's  left, 
Walker  leaving  two  regiments  to  fill  a  vacant  place  be 
tween  Anderson's  brigade  and  Hood's  right.  Walker, 
Hood,  and  D.  H.  Hill  attacked  against  the  Twelfth  Corps ; 
worn  by  its  fight  against  Jackson,  it  was  driven  back 
as  far  as  the  post-and-rail  fence  in  the  east  open,  where 
they  were  checked.  They  were  outside  of  the  line,  their 
left  in  the  air  and  exposed  to  the  fire  of  a  thirty-gun 
battery  posted  at  long  range  on  the  Hagerstown  road  by 
General  Doubleday.  Their  left  was  withdrawn,  and  the 


BATTLE   OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  243 

line  rectified,  when  Greene's  brigade  of  the  Twelfth  re 
sumed  position  in  the  northeast  angle  of  the  wood,  which 
it  held  until  Sedgwick's  division  came  in  bold  march. 

In  these  fights  offensive  and  defensive  the  artillery  bat 
talions  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  D.  Lee  and  Major 
Frobel  were  in  active  combat,  the  former  from  the  first 
shot  made  before  daylight.  They  had  been  severely 
worked,  and  were  nearly  exhausted  of  ammunition.  The 
Washington  Artillery  was  called  on  for  a  battery  to  as 
sist  them,  and  some  of  the  guns  of  that  battalion  were 
sent  for  ammunition.  Miller's  battery  of  four  Napoleon 
guns  came.  ,1  ^ 

As  Jackson  withdrew,  General  Hooker's  corps  retired 
to  a  point  on  the  Hagerstown  road  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  north  of  the  battle-ground,  where  General 
Doubleday  established  his  thirty-gun  battery.  Jackson's 
and  Hooker's  men  had  fought  to  exhaustion,  and  the 
battle  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  taken  up  and  continued  by 
Mansfield,  had  taken  defensive  relations,  its  chief  mor 
tally  wounded. 

Generals  Lawton,  Ripley,  and  J.  K.  Jones  were  severely 
wounded,  and  Colonel  Douglas,  commanding  Lawton's 
brigade,  killed.  A  third  of  the  men  of  Lawton's,  Hays's, 
and  Trimble's  brigades  were  reported  killed  or  wounded. 
Four  of  the  field  officers  of  Colquitt's  brigade  were  killed, 
five  were  wounded,  the  tenth  and  last  contused  by  a 
shell.  All  of  Jackson's  and  D.  H.  Hill's  troops  engaged 
suffered  proportionally.  Hood's,  Walker's,  and  G.  T. 
Anderson's,  though  longer  engaged,  did  not  lose  so 
severely. 

General  Hooker's  aggregate  of  loss  was  2590 ;  General 
Mansfield's,  1746. 

The  Federal  batteries,  of  position,  on  the  east  side  were 
more  or  less  busy  during  the  engagement,  having  occa 
sional  opportunities  for  a  raking  fire  on  the  troops  along 
Jackson's  line  and  my  left.  The  horse  artillery  under 


244  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

Stuart  was  strengthening  to  the  Confederate  left,  and  had 
occasional  opportunities  for  destructive  fire  across  the 
Union  right  when  coming  into  action. 

Although  the  battle  along  the  line  of  contention  had 
become  defensive,  there  were  threatening  movements  on 
the  Boonsborough  pike  by  Sykes's  division  and  the  horse 
artillery  under  Pleasonton,  and  Burnside  was  busy  at  his 
bridge,  working  to  find  his  way  across. 

At  the  close  of  the  Walker-Hood-Hill  affair,  Hood 
found  his  line  making  a  large  angle  with  the  line  of  the 
latter,  which  was  rectified,  drawing  in  the  angle.  Early's 
regiments  were  in  the  wood  between  Walker  and  the 
cavalry,  and  the  detachments  under  Colonels  Grigsby  and 
Stafford  in  the  wood  some  distance  in  advance  of  Early's 
left. 

The  line  thus  organized  was  thin  and  worn  by  severe 

•  attrition.     The  men  were  losing  strength  and  the  ammu- 

</  nition  getting  low.     Some  gathered  cartridges  from  their 

fallen  comrades  and  distributed  them  as  far  as  they  would 

go,  others  went  for  fresh  supplies. 

McLaws's  column  came  up  at  nine  o'clock.  He  reported 
at  General  Lee's  head-quarters,  where  he  was  ordered  at 
rest,  and  afterwards  reported  to  me,  with  General  Lee's 
orders  for  his  own  division,  and  asked  the  disposition  to 
be  made  of  R.  H.  Anderson's.  He  was  ordered  to  send 
the  latter  to  report  to  General  D.  H.  Hill. 

Coincident  with  these  arrivals,  heavy  columns  of  Federal 
infantry  and  artillery  were  seen  crossing  the  Antietam. 
Morell's  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  up  and  relieved 
Richardson's  of  the  Second,  which  had  been  in  our  front 
since  its  arrival  on  the  15th.  Richardson's  following  the 
march  of  the  troops  by  the  upper  crossing  advised  us  that 
the  next  engagement  would  be  by  the  Second  Corps,  under 
General  Sumner ;  Sedgwick's  division  was  in  the  lead  as 
they  marched.  Our  left  centre  was  almost  exhausted  of 
men  and  ammunition.  The  divisions  of  French  and  Rich- 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  245 

ardson  followed  in  left  echelon  to  Sedgwick.  Hood's  bri 
gades  had  retired  for  fresh  supply  of  ammunition,  leaving 
the  guard  to  Walker's  two  brigades,  G.  T.  Anderson's 
brigade  on  Walker's  right,  part  of  Early's  brigade  on 
Walker's  left,  and  the  regiments  under  Colonels  Grigsby 
and  Stafford  off  the  left  front.  McLaws's  division  was 
called  for,  and  on  the  march  under  conduct  of  Major 
Taylor  of  general  head-quarters  staff. 

At  sight  of  Sumner's  march,  General  .Early  rode  from 
the  field  in  search,  as  he  reported,  of  reinforcements. 
His  regiments  naturally  waited  on  the  directions  of  the 
leader. 

General  Sumner  rode  with  his  leading  division  under 
General  Sedgwick,  to  find  the  battle.  Sedgwick  marched 
in  column  of  brigades,  Gorman,  Dana,  and  Howard. 
There  was  no  officer  on  the  Union  side  in  charge  of  the 
field,  the  other  corps  commanders  having  been  killed  or 
wounded.  General  Sumner  testified, — 

"  On  going  upon  the  field  I  found  that  General  Hooker's  corps 
had  been  dispersed  and  routed.  I  passed  him  some  distance  in 
the  rear,  where  he  had  been  carried  wounded,  but  I  saw  nothing 
of  his  corps  at  all,  as  I  was  advancing  with  my  command  on  the 
field.  There  were  some  troops  lying  down  on  the  left  which  I 
took  to  belong  to  Mansfield's  command.  In  the  mean  time  Gen 
eral,  Mansfield  had  been  killed,  and  a  portion  of  his  corps  (for 
merly  Banks7 s)  had  also  been  thrown  into  confusion."  * 

He  passed  Greene's  brigade  of  the  Twelfth,  and  marched 
through  the  wood,  leaving  the  Dunker  chapel  on  his 
left. 

As  McLaws  approached,  General  Hood  was  sent  to  give 
him  careful  instructions  of  the  posture,  of  the  grounds, 
and  the  impending  crisis.  He  marched  with  his  brigades, 
— Cobb's,  Kershaw's,  Semmes's,  and  Barksdale's.  The 
leading  brigade  filed  to  the  right,  before  the  approaching 

*  Report  of  Committee,  part  i.  p.  368. 


246 


FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 


march.  Kershaw's  leading  regiment  filed  into  line  as 
Sedgwick's  column  approached  the  south  side  of  the 
Dunker  chapel  wood, — the  latter  on  a  diagonal  march, — - 
while  Kershaw's  regiment  was  in  fair  front  against  it. 


Confederate 


Relative  positions  of  McLaws  and  other  Confederates  and  Sedgwick  at  their 

opening. 

The  regiment  opened  prompt  fire,  and  the  other  regiments 
came  into  line  in  double  time,  opening  fire  by  company  as 
they  came  to  the  front.  The  other  brigades  came  into 
line  by  companies,  and  forward  into  line  by  regiments. 
Armistead's  brigade  had  been  drawn  from  E.  H.  Ander 
son's  column  to  reinforce  McLaws. 

Sedgwick's  diagonal  march  exposed  his  left  to  a 
scattering  fire  from  Walker's  left  brigade  under  M. 
Eansom,  but  he  kept  his  steady  march  while  Walker  in 
creased  his  fire.  McLaws  increasing  his  fire  staggered 
the  march  of  Sedgwick,  and  presently  arrested  it.  The 
regiments  under  Colonels  Stafford  and  Grigsby,  coming 
from  their  lurking-places,  opened  fire  on  Sedgwick's  right 
rear.  At  McLaws's  opening  Sedgwick  essayed  to  form 
line  of  battle ;  the  increasing  fire  on  his  right  and  left 


BATTLE  OF 

SHARPSBURG 

Federals  ™^  Confederates  " 


BATTLE   OF    SHARPSBUKG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  247 

rear,  with  the  terrible  fire  in  front,  was  confusing,  but  the 
troops  were  eager  to  return  the  fire  they  found  pouring 
into  their  lines  from  three-quarters  of  a  circle.  To  counter 
the  rear  fire  of  Walker,  General  Sumner  ordered  the  rear 
brigade  to  face  about.  The  troops,  taking  this  to  mean  a 
rearward  march,  proceeded  to  execute  it  without  awaiting 
further  orders,  which  was  soon  followed  by  the  other 
brigades. 

McLaws  and  Walker,  pushing  their  success,  were  joined 
by  G.  T.  Anderson's,  the  brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill's  left, 
and  those  of  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  making  strong 
battle  through  the  woodland  and  open  to  the  post-and-rail 
fence  and  to  the  Roulette  House,  where  they  encountered 
Sumner's  division  under  French,  and  parts  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  rallied  on  that  part  of  the  field.  This  contention 
was  firm  and  wasting  on  both  sides,  but  held  with  per 
severing  courage  until  Richardson's  reserve,  under  Brooke, 
was  put  against  Hill's  right  and  broke  the  Confederate 
line  back  to  the  woodlands  south  of  the  chapel,  where 
Early's  regiments  had  formed  a  rallying  line. 

When  Hill's  right  was  struck  and  pressed  so  severely, 
Rodes's  brigade,  the  reserve  of  his  division,  was  ordered 
out  to  support  his  right.  The  brigade  advanced  in  good 
strong  battle,  but  General  Rodes  reported  that  he  could 
not  move  his  Sixth  Alabama  Regiment  in  time,  notwith 
standing  his  personal  efforts ;  that  with  the  support  of 
that  regiment  the  battle  line  of  the  Confederates  could 
have  waited  other  supports. 

General  Sumner  was  eager  in  riding  with  his  leading 
division.  He  was  always  anxious  to  get  in  in  time  to  use 
all  of  his  power,  and  thought  others  like  himself.  Had  he 
formed  the  corps  into  lines  of  divisions,  in  close  echelon, 
and  moved  as  a  corps,  he  would  have  marched  through 
and  opened  the  way  for  Porter's  command  at  bridge  No. 
2,  and  Pleasonton's  cavalry,  and  for  Burnside  at  the  third 
bridge,  and  forced  the  battle  back  to  the  river  bank. 


248  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

He  was  criticised  for  his  opposition  to  Franklin's  pro 
posed  attack,  but  the  chances  are  even  that  he  was  right. 
The  stir  among  Franklin's  troops  was  observed  from  a 
dead  angle  of  our  lines,  and  preparations  were  made  to 
meet  it.  General  Jackson  was  marching  back  to  us,  and 
it  is  possible  that  the  attack  might  have  resulted  in  min 
gling  our  troops  with  Franklin's  down  on  the  banks  of  the 
Antietam. 

After  this  fight  the  artillery  battalions  of  S.  D.  Lee  and 
Frobel,  quite  out  of  ammunition,  retired  to  replenish. 
The  battery  of  Napoleons  was  reduced  to  one  section,  that 
short  of  ammunition  and  working  hands. 

General  Hill  rallied  the  greater  part  of  G.  B.  Ander 
son's  and  Rodes's  brigades  in  the  sunken  road.  Some  of 
Ripley's  men  came  together  near  Miller's  guns  at  the 
Hagerstown  pike.  General  R.  H.  Anderson  and  his  next 
in  rank,  General  Wright,  were  wounded.  The  next 
officer,  General  Pryor,  not  advised  of  his  new  authority, 
the  brigades  assembled  at  points  most  suited  to  their  con 
venience,  in  rear  of  D.  H.  Hill's  brigades. 

But  time  was  up.  Confederate  affairs  were  not  encour 
aging.  Our  men  were  all  leg-weary  and  heavy  to  handle, 
while  McClellan,  with  his  tens  of  thousands,  whom  he  had 
marched  in  healthful  exercise  the  past  two  weeks,  was 
finding  and  pounding  us  from  left  to  right  under  con 
verging  fire  of  his  batteries  east  and  west  of  the  An 
tietam. 

The  signal  of  the  approaching  storm  was  the  bursting 
of  Richardson's  command,  augmented  by  parts  of  French's 
division,  through  the  field  of  corn,  hardly  ruffled  by  the 
affair  at  the  Roulette  House,  spreading  its  grand  march 
against  our  centre.  They  came  in  brave  style,  in  full 
appreciation  of  the  work  in  hand,  marched  better  than 
on  drill,  unfolded  banners  making  gay  their  gallant  step. 

The  Fifth  Corps  and  Pleasonton's  cavalry  were  in 
active  preparation  to  cross  at  the  second  bridge  and  join 


BATTLE   OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  249 

on  Richardson's  left,  and  Burnside  at  the  third  bridge 
was  pressing  his  claim  for  a  passage  against  our  right. 

I  had  posted  G.  T.  Anderson's  brigade  behind  a  stone 
fence  near  the  Hagerstown  pike,  about  the  safest  spot  to 
be  found  on  the  field  of  Sharpsburg, — a  dead  angle,  so  to 
speak.  The  batteries  on  the  field  north  and  the  long- 
range  thirty-gun  battery  of  General  Doubleday  were 
playing  their  fire  down  the  pike,  taking  their  aim  by 
the  direction  of  the  road,  where  they  stood.  This 
brought  their  fire  into  the  field  about  one  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  Anderson's  line.  As  the  fire  came  from  an 
enfilade  direction,  the  troops  assumed  that  they  were  under 
enfilade  fire,  and  General  Anderson  changed  position 
without  reporting.  General  D.  H.  Hill  got  hold  of  him 
and  moved  him  to  the  Boonsborough  pike  to  defend 
against  Sykes's  and  Pleasonton's  forces,  advancing  in  that 
quarter.  Thus,  when  Richardson's  march  approached  its 
objective,  the  Confederates  had  Boyce's  battery,  well  out 
in  the  corn-field,  facing  the  march ;  Miller's  section  of 
Napoleons  in  the  centre,  and  a  single  battery  at  McLaws's 
rear,  with  fragments  of  scattered  brigades  along  the  pike, 
and  the  Twenty-seventh  North  Carolina  Regiment  to  hold 
the  left  centre,  besides  the  brigades  in  the  sunken  road, 
and  the  brigades  of  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  awaiting 
the  bloody  struggle.  They  received  the  severe  attack 
in  firm  holding  for  a  long  half-hour,  the  enemy  pressing 
closer  at  intervals,  until  an  order  of  General  Rodes's  was 
misconstrued  and  part  of  his  brigade  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Lightfoot,  of  the  Sixth  Alabama  Regiment,  was 
forced  to  the  rear,  and  marched  off,  informing  others  that 
that  was  the  order. 

General  G.  B.  Anderson  fell  mortally  wounded.  The 
enemy  pressed  in  on  his  outer  flank  and  called  for  surren 
der  of  the  forces  cut  off  and  outflanked.  Meagher's  bri 
gade  was  retired  to  replenish  ammunition,  and  Barlow 
swung  to  his  right  and  came  against  our  fragments  about 


250  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Miller's  guns,  standing  near  his  flank.  Miller  had  two 
guns,  the  others  off  for  a  supply  of  ammunition.  Cooke's 
Twenty-seventh  North  Carolina  Regiment  was  well  organ 
ized,  but  short  of  ammunition ;  fragments  of  Ripley's 
brigade  and  some  others  were  on  the  turnpike;  Miller 
was  short  of  hands  and  ammunition,  even  for  two  guns ; 
McLaws's  division  and  the  other  part  of  Walker's  were 
in  front  of  threatenings  of  parts  of  French's  division  and 
of  troops  rallying  on  their  front,  and  the  Sixth  Corps  was 
up  and  coming  against  them,  so  that  it  seemed  hazardous 
to  call  them  off  and  leave  an  open  way.  Our  line  was 
throbbing  at  every  point,  so  that  I  dared  not  call  on  Gen 
eral  Lee  for  help.  Sergeant  Ellis  thought  that  he  could 
bring  up  ammunition  if  he  was  authorized  to  order  it. 
He  was  authorized,  and  rode  for  and  brought  it.  I 
held  the  horses  of  some  of  my  staff  who  helped  to  man 
the  guns  as  cannoneers. 

As  the  attacking  forces  drew  nearer,  Colonel  Cooke  re 
ported  his  ammunition  exhausted.  He  was  ordered  to 
hold  on  with  the  bayonet,  and  sent  in  return  that  he 
would  "  hold  till  ice  forms  in  regions  where  it  was  never 
known,"  or  words  to  that  effect.  As  Richardson  ad 
vanced  through  the  corn  he  cut  off  the  battery  under 
Boyce,  so  that  it  was  obliged  to  retire  to  save  itself,  and  as 
Barlow  came  upon  our  centre,  the  battery  on  our  left  was 
for  a  time  thrown  out  of  fire  lest  they  might  injure  friend 
as  much  as  foe.  Barlow  marched  in  steady  good  ranks, 
and  the  remnants  before  him  rose  to  the  emergency. 
They  seemed  to  forget  that  they  had  known  fatigue ;  the 
guns  were  played  with  life,  and  the  brave  spirits  man 
ning  them  claimed  that  they  were  there  to  hold  or  to  go 
down  with  the  guns. 

As  our  shots  rattled  against  the  armored  ranks,  Colonel 
Fairfax  clapped  his  hands  and  ran  for  other  charges. 
The  mood  of  the  gunners  to  a  man  was  one  of  quiet  but 
unflinching  resolve  to  stand  to  the  last  gun.  Captain 


Assistant  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General,  First  Corps. 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  251 

Miller  charged  and  double-charged  with  spherical  case 
and  canister  until  his  guns  at  the  discharge  leaped  in  the 
air  from  ten  to  twelve  inches. 

When  the  crest  was  reached,  the  rush  that  was  expected 
to  sweep  us  away  paused, — the  Confederates  became  hope 
ful.  Soon  the  advancing  ranks  lay  behind  the  crest,  and 
presently  drew  nearer  Richardson's  part  of  the  line,  then 
mounting  the  crest  over  the  Piper  House.  This  latter 
point,  once  established,  must  cut  and  break  the  Confed 
erate  position  as  effectually  as  our  centre  just  saved.  He 
occupied  the  Piper  House  with  two  regiments  under 
Colonel  Brooke  in  advance  of  his  line  along  the  crest, 
and  called  up  some  of  his  batteries. 

The  Confederates  meanwhile  were  collecting  other  bat 
teries  and  infantry  in  defence,  when  a  shot  from  one  of 
our  batteries  brought  Richardson  down,  mortally  wounded. 
His  taking-ofF  broke  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  division 
and  reduced  its  fight  to  the  defensive.  The  regiments  at 
the  Piper  House  found  their  position  thus  advanced  too 
much  exposed,  and  withdrew  to  the  stronger  line  of  the 
crest.  General  Meagher's  brigade  came  up  with  ammuni 
tion  replenished.  General  Hancock  was  despatched  to 
take  command  of  the  division.  In  the  midst  of  the 
tragedy,  as  Richardson  approached  the  east  crest,  there 
was  a  moment  of  amusement  when  General  Hill,  with 
about  fifty  men  and  a  battle-flag,  ran  to  gain  a  vantage- 
point  for  flank  fire  against  Richardson's  left.  Colonel 
Ross,  observing  the  move  and  appreciating  the  oppor 
tunity,  charged  with  two  regiments  for  the  same  and 
secured  it.  General  Hill  claimed  (and  rightly)  that  it 
had  effect  in  giving  the  impression  that  there  were  other 
forces  coming  to  support  him. 

Another  regiment  came  to  the  relief  of  the  Twenty- 
seventh,  under  Cooke.  The  movement  of  troops  in  that 
quarter  was  construed  by  the  enemy  as  a  threatened  flank 
move  against  Richardson,  which  caused  some  little  delay 


252  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

in  his  march.  Though  the  Confederates  had  but  frag 
ments  here  and  there,  the  enemy  were  kept  busy  and 
watchful  lest  they  should  come  upon  another  surprise 
move. 

The  Confederates  were  surprised  but  much  relieved 
when  they  found  this  affair  reduced  to  the  defensive,  and 
assumed  that  every  missile  they  sent  must  have  found  one 
or  more  victims.  But  accounts  of  the  other  side  make 
clear  that  the  result  was  due  to  accidental  artillery  shots 
that  cut  down  Colonel  Barlow,  the  aggressive  spirit  of 
Richardson's  right  column,  and  General  Richardson  him 
self  at  his  culminating  moment.  Barlow  fell  from  a  case- 
or  canister-shot,  as  did  Richardson.  All  the  Union  ac 
counts  refer  to  a  battery  on  their  right  throwing  shell,  and 
the  "  two  brass  guns  in  front  throwing  case  and  canister," 
and  this  latter  was  the  only  artillery  at  work  against  them 
at  the  time  of  Barlow's  fall.  When  Barlow's  command 
drew  nearer  the  division  the  brass  guns  were  turned  upon 
Richardson,  but  at  the  moment  of  his  taking-off  another 
battery  was  in  action  on  his  left.  General  D.  H.  Hill 
thought  that  Carter's  battery  was  in  time  to  divide  the 
honor  of  the  last  shot  with  the  section  of  Napoleons  under 
Miller. 

Orders  were  given  General  Pleasonton,  at  the  second 
bridge,  to  be  ready  to  enter  the  battle  as  soon  as  the  at 
tack  by  Richardson  should  open  the  way.  To  meet  these 
orders  skirmishers  were  advanced,  and  Tidball's  battery, 
by  piece,  using  canister,  to  drive  back  the  Confederate 
sharp-shooters.  The  Fifth  Corps  (General  Porter's)  was 
ordered  to  be  ready  for  like  service. 

When  Richardson  swung  his  line  up  along  the  crest  at 
the  Piper  House,  Pleasonton  advanced  troopers  and  bat 
teries,  crossed  the  bridge  at  a  gallop  by  the  Fifth  Regular 
Cavalry,  Farnsworth's  brigade,  Rush's  brigade,  two  regi 
ments  of  the  Fifth  Brigade  under  B.  F.  Davis,  and  the 
batteries  of  Tidball,  Robertson,  Hains,  and  Gibson.  The 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  253 

batteries  were  put  into  action  under  the  line  of  skirmishers, 
that  were  reinforced  by  Sykes's  division  of  the  Fifth  and 
Tenth  Infantry  under  Lieutenant  Poland. 

General  Hill  seized  a  musket  and  by  example  speedily 
collected  a  number  of  men,  who  joined  him  in  reinforcing 
the  line  threatened  by  this  heavy  display.  The  parts  of 
brigades  under  General  Pryor,  Colonels  Cummings,  Posey, 
and  G.  T.  Anderson  afterwards  got  up  to  help  the  brigade 
of  Evans  already  there.  By  these,  with  the  batteries  of 
Squires,  Gardner,  and  Richardson,  this  threatening  demon 
stration  was  checked.  Then  it  was  reinforced  by  the  bat 
teries  of  Randol,  Kusserow,  and  Van  Reed,  and  the  Fourth 
United  States  Infantry,  Captain  Dryer  ;  the  first  battalion 
of  the  Twelfth,  Captain  Blount ;  second  battalion  of  the 
Twelfth,  Captain  Anderson ;  first  battalion  of  the  Four 
teenth,  Captain  Brown,  and  second  battalion  of  the  Four 
teenth,  Captain  McKibbin,  of  Sykes's  division ;  the  bat 
teries  posted  to  command  the  field,  right  and  left,  to  cover 
Sumner's  and  Burnside's  fronts,  as  soon  as  they  could  rise 
to  the  plateau.  S.  D.  Lee's  batteries  were  back  on  the 
crest,  replenished  of  ammunition,  while  the  Union  bat 
teries  were  on  low  ground,  near  the  river.  A  very 
clever  well-organized  advance  was  made,  but  their  advan 
tages  of  position  and  the  tenacious  hold  of  the  Confed 
erates,  even  after  the  attack  reached  the  crest,  enabled 
them  to  drive  back  the  assaulting  forces.  The  horse  bat 
teries  went  back  to  positions  on  the  west  side  after  replen 
ishing  with  ammunition,  except  Gibson's,  which  was  put 
in  defensive  attitude  on  the  east.  Pleasonton,  with  a  com 
prehensive  view  of  the  opportunity,  called  for  additional 
force,  but  two  of  MorelPs  brigades  had  been  ordered  by 
the  upper  crossing  to  Sumner's  relief,  and  a  detachment 
had  been  sent  to  assist  Burnside,  which  reduced  the  Fifth 
Corps  to  the  minimum  of  force  necessary  to  the  service  to 
which  it  was  assigned ;  not  equal  to  the  aggressive  fight 
to  which  it  was  invited.  But  for  the  breaking  up  of 


254  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Richardson's  aggression,  this  last  advance  could  have 
gained  the  field. 

The  Third  Brigade  of  the  Second  Division,  Sixth 
Corps,  made  an  erratic  march  across  part  of  the  field,  the 
Seventh  Maine  Regiment  leading,  and  retired  like  a 
meteor  that  loses  its  own  fire. 

A  little  after  one  o'clock  this  and  other  parts  of  the  line, 
except  at  the  Burnside  Bridge,  settled  down  to  defensive. 
Burnside  was  still  hard  at  work  in  search  of  a  practical 
line  of  advance,  Toombs  standing  manfully  against  him. 

During  the  lull,  after  the  rencounter  of  Walker's, 
Hill's,  and  Hood's  divisions  against  Mansfield's  last  fight, 
General  Lee  and  myself,  riding  together  under  the  crest 
of  General  D.  H.  Hill's  part  of  the  line,  were  joined  by 
the  latter.  We  were  presently  called  to  the  crest  to  ob 
serve  movements  going  on  in  the  Union  lines.  The  two 
former  dismounted  and  walked  to  the  crest ;  General  Hill, 
a  little  out  of  strength  and  thinking  a  single  horseman 
not  likely  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire,  rode.  As  we  reached 
the  crest  I  asked  him  to  ride  a  little  apart,  as  he  would 
likely  draw  fire  upon  the  group.  While  viewing  the  field 
a  puff  of  white  smoke  was  seen  to  burst  from  a  cannon's 
mouth  about  a  mile  off.  I  remarked,  "  There  is  a  shot  for 
General  Hill,"  and,  looking  towards  him,  saw  his  horse 
drop  on  his  knees.  Both  forelegs  were  cut  off  just  below 
the  knees.  The  dropping  forward  of  the  poor  animal  so 
elevated  his  croup  that  it  was  not  an  easy  matter  for  one 
not  an  expert  horseman  to  dismount  a  la  militaire.  To 
add  to  the  dilemma,  there  was  a  rubber  coat  with  other 
wraps  strapped  to  the  cantle  of  the  saddle.  Failing  in 
his  attempt  to  dismount,  I  suggested  that  he  throw  his 
leg  forward  over  the  pommel.  This  gave  him  easy  and 
graceful  dismount.  This  was  the  third  horse  shot  under 
him  during  the  day,  and  the  shot  was  one  of  the  best 
I  ever  witnessed.  An  equally  good  one  was  made  by  a 
Confederate  at  Yorktown.  An  officer  of  the  Topograph- 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  255 

ical  Engineers  walked  into  the  open,  in  front  of  our  lines, 
fixed  his  plane  table  and  seated  himself  to  make  a  map 
of  the  Confederate  works.  A  non-commissioned  officer, 
without  orders,  adjusted  his  gun,  carefully  aimed  it,  and 
fired.  At  the  report  of  the  gun  all  eyes  were  turned  to 
see  the  occasion  of  it,  and  then  to  observe  the  object, 
when  the  shell  was  seen  to  explode  as  if  in  the  hands  of 
the  officer.  It  had  been  dropped  squarely  upon  the  draw 
ing-table,  and  Lieutenant  Wagner  was  mortally  wounded.* 
Of  the  first  shot,  Major  Alfred  A.  Woodlmll,  under  date 
of  June  8,  1886,  wrote,- 

"On  the  17th  of  September,  1862,  I  was  standing  in  Weed's 
battery,  whose  position  is  correctly  given  in  the  map,  when  a 
man  on,  I  think,  a  gray  horse,  appeared  about  a  mile  in  front 
of  us,  and  footmen  were  recognized  near.  Captain  Weed,  who 
was  a  remarkable  artillerist,  himself  sighted  and  fired  the  gun 
at  the  horse,  which  was  struck." 


*  Of  this  shot,  Captain  A.  B.  More,  of  Eichmond,  Virginia,  wrote, 
under  date  of  June  16,  1886,— 

"  The  Howitzers  have  always  been  proud  of  that  shot,  and,  thinking 
it  would  interest  you,  I  write  to  say  that  it  was  fired  by  Corporal  Hol/- 
burton,  of  the  Second  Company,  Richmond  Howitzers,  from  a  ten-pound 
Parrott." 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

BATTLE    OF    SHAKPSBURG,    OR,    ANTIETAM    (CONTINUED). 

Closing  Events  of  the  Great  Struggle — Burnside  crosses  the  Bridge  he 
made  famous — Toombs  made  Gallant  Defence,  but  was  outnumbered 
and  dislodged— The  Confederate  Brigades  from  Harper's  Ferry  under 
A.  P.  Hill  in  Time  for  the  Final  Crisis— Burnside' s  Advance  arrested 
by  them— The  Battle  against  Burnside  "  appeared  to  spring  from  the 
Earth"— "  Lee's  old  War  Horse"— The  Killing  of  a  Kinsman  at  the 
Bridge  seriously  affects  General  D.  R.  Jones — The  Sharp  Fight  at 
Shepherdstown— Confederates  retreat — Casualties  of  the  Battle — 
Confederate  Losses  in  the  Campaign — Neither  McClellan's  Plan  nor 
Execution  was  strong. 

AT  one  or  two  points  near  our  centre  were  dead  angles 
into  which  I  rode  from  time  to  time  for  closer  observation 
of  the  enemy  when  his  active  aggression  was  suspended. 
General  Burnside  was  busy  at  his  crossing,  but  no  report 
of  progress  had  been  sent  me.  One  of  my  rides  towards 
the  Dunker  chapel  revealed  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  renew 
his  work  on  that  part  of  the  field.  Our  troops  were 
ordered  to  be  ready  to  receive  it.  Its  non-aggression  sug 
gested  an  opportunity  for  the  Confederates,  and  I  ordered 
McLaws  and  Walker  to  prepare  to  assault.  Hood  was 
back  in  position  with  his  brigades,  and  Jackson  was  re 
ported  on  his  way,  all  in  full  supply  of  ammunition.  It 
seemed  probable  that  by  concealing  our  movements  under 
cover  of  the  wood  from  the  massed  batteries  of  Double- 
day's  artillery  on  the  north,  and  the  batteries  of  position  on 
the  east,  we  could  draw  our  columns  so  near  to  the  enemy 
in  front  before  our  move  could  be  known  that  we  would 
have  but  a  few  rods  to  march  before  we  could  mingle  our 
ranks  with  those  of  the  enemy ;  that  our  columns  massed 
and  in  goodly  numbers,  pressing  severely  upon  a  single 
point,  would  give  the  enemy  much  trouble,  and  might  cut 
him  in  two,  and  break  up  his  battle  arrangements  at  the 

256 


BATTLE    OF    SHAKPSBUKG,  OR   ANTIETAM.  257 

lower  bridge;  but  just  then  General  Jackson  reported, 
with  authority  from  General  Lee,  that  he  with  the  cavalry 
was  ordered  to  march  around  and  turn  the  entire  position 
of  the  enemy  by  his  right  flank,  and  strike  at  his  rear. 
He  found  that  the  march  would  be  long  and  extremely 
hazardous,  and  abandoned  his  orders.  So  it  appears  that 
counsels  were  divided  on  both  sides,  General  McClellan 
disapproving  the  attack  proposed  by  Franklin,  and  Gen 
eral  Lee  preferring  a  flank  move. 

Of  the  proposed  attack  from  the  Union  side,  General 
Franklin  reported,— 

"Slocuni's  division  arrived  on  the  field  about  eleven  o'clock. 
Immediately  after  its  arrival  two  of  his  brigades  (Newton's  and 
Torbert's)  were  formed  in  column  of  attack  to  carry  the  wood  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  White  Church.  The  other  brigade 
(Bartlett's)  had  been  ordered  by  General  Sunnier  to  keep  near  his 
right.  As  this  brigade  was  to  form  the  reserve  for  the  column 
of  attack,  I  waited  until  it  came  up.  About  the  same  time  Gen 
eral  Sumner  arrived  on  the  spot  and  directed  the  attack  to  be 
postponed,  and  the  enemy  at  once  proceeded  to  fill  the  wood  with 
infantry,  and  planted  a  battery  there  which  opened  a  severe  fire 
upon  us.  Shortly  afterwards  the  commanding  general  came  to 
the  position,  and  decided  that  it  would  not  be  prudent  to  make 
the  attack,  our  position  on  the  right  being  then  considerably  in 
advance  of  what  it  had  been  in  the  morning."  * 

General  McClellan  claimed  that  his  batteries  on  the 
east  side  dispersed  a  column  marching  in  the  afternoon  to 
reinforce  against  General  Sumner.  This  was  probably 
Jackson's  command  marching  to  their  position  on  the  line. 
The  fire  only  hurried  the  march  of  the  troops  to  the  front, 
where  they  resumed  their  position. 

We  left  General  Toombs  defending  the  crossing  at  the 
Burnside  Bridge,  with  the  Second,  Twentieth,  and  Fiftieth 
Georgia  Regiments,  and  a  company  of  Jenkins's  brigade 
of  South  Carolina  troops,  against  the  Ninth  Corps,  com- 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i.  p.  377. 
17 


258  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

manded  by  General  J.  D.  Cox,  General  Burnside,  the  com 
mander  of  the  right  wing  present,  commanding.  Toombs 
had  in  his  line  of  infantry  five  hundred  and  fifty  men  part 
way  up  the  swell  of  Sharpsburg  Heights.  Behind  him  he 
posted  Eubank's  battery,  and  overlooking  were  J.  B.  Rich 
ardson's  and  Eshleman's  to  rake  the  bridge ;  others  near. 
The  road  on  the  Union  side  leading  to  the  bridge  runs 
parallel  to  the  river  about  three  hundred  yards  before  it 
reaches  the  bridge,  and  turns  up-stream  after  crossing.  On 
the  parallel  to  this  line  of  march  on  the  Confederate  side 
Toombs  posted  his  infantry,  the  South  Carolina  company 
in  a  marginal  woodland  above  the  bridge.  Above  and 
near  the  bridge  was  a  fording-place  for  infantry ;  a  thou 
sand  yards  below  was  a  practicable  ford  for  infantry  and 
artillery,  by  a  country  road.  Toombs's  orders  were,  when 
dislodged,  to  retire  south  so  as  to  open  the  field  of  fire  to 
all  the  troops  on  the  heights  behind  him,  the  fire  of  his 
batteries  to  be  concentrated  upon  the  bridge,  and  his  in 
fantry  arranged  for  a  like  converging  fire.  The  ravines 
cutting  the  swells  of  the  foot-hills  gave  him  fair  ground 
for  retreat  when  he  found  his  position  no  longer  tenable. 
He  was  to  so  manoeuvre  as  to  have  a  flank  fire  on  the 
advancing  columns,  and  gradually  encircle  so  as  to  join 
his  division  after  passing  the  crest. 

Early  in  the  morning,  General  Burnside  had  been  or 
dered  to  prepare  the  Ninth  Corps  for  attack  at  the  bridge, 
but  to  await  further  orders.  At  eight  o'clock  orders  were 
sent  to  carry  the  bridge,  gain  possession  of  the  heights, 
and  to  advance  along  their  crest  upon  Sharpsburg  and 
its  rear.  The  order  was  repeated,  and,  finally,  losing 
patience,  General  McClellan  sent  the  inspector-general 
(Colonel  Sackett) 

"To  deliver  to  General  Burnside  my  positive  order  to  push 
forward  his  troops  without  a  moment's  delay,  and  if  necessary  to 
carry  the  bridge  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  and  I  ordered 


BATTLE   OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  259 

Colonel  Sackett  to  remain  with  General  Burnside  and  see  that  the 
order  was  promptly  executed.'7  * 

Upon  receipt  of  the  first  order  General  Burnside  ad 
vanced  his  troops,  General  Crook's  brigade,  supported 
by  General  Sturgis's  division,  to  the  bridge  and  ford  just 
above  it.  These  were  preceded  by  the  Eleventh  Con 
necticut  Regiment  as  skirmishers  under  Colonel  Kings- 
bury,  who  essayed  crossing  by  the  upper  ford,  but  after 
severe  skirmish  Colonel  Kingsbury  was  killed  and  the 
effort  failed.  The  division  under  General  Rodman  sup 
ported  by  Scammon's  brigade  (commanded  by  Colonel 
Ewing)  moved  towards  the  lower  ford.  Colonel  Scam- 
mon,  commanding  the  Kanawha  division,  moved  with  this 
column. 

Wilcox's  division  was  in  rear  of  Sturgis,  in  reserve,  and 
near  the  left  of  Benjamin's  battery.  Clark's  and  Durell's 
batteries  were  posted  on  the  right.  One  section  of  Sirn- 
monds's  battery  was  with  Crook's  brigade,  the  other  with 
Benjamin's  battery.  Dahlgren's  boat-howitzers  covered 
the  ford  at  Rodman's  crossing.  The  last  order  was  re 
ceived  at  ten  o'clock.  The  line  of  skirmishers  advanced 
and  engaged  across  the  river.  Crook's  brigade  marched 
for  the  bridge.  After  a  severe  engagement  of  some 
hours,  General  Crook  posted  two  of  Simmonds's  guns  in 
position  to  cover  the  bridge,  and  after  some  little  time 
General  Sturgis's  division  approached  the  bridge,  led  by 
Naglee's  brigade.  The  Second  Brigade,  General  Ferrero, 
was  posted  a  little  in  reserve.  The  Second  Maryland, 
Colonel  Duryea,  and  Sixth  New  Hampshire  Regiments 
were  ordered  forward  in  double  time  with  bayonets 
fixed  to  carry  the  bridge.  They  made  a  gallant,  dash 
ing  charge,  crowding  the  bridge  almost  to  its  western 
debouche,  but  the  fire  concentrated  a  storm  that  stunned 
their  ranks,  thinned  and  cut  them  down  until  they  were 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  i.  part  i.  p.  83. 


260  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

forced  to  retire.  General  Burnside  repeated  the  order  to 
force  the  way  at  all  hazards.  Arrangements  were  made, 
and  when  concluded  the  Fifty-first  New  York  and  Fifty- 
first  Pennsylvania  Regiments  were  sent.  They  found  a 
route  better  covered  from  the  Confederate  fire  than  that 
of  the  first  column  while  marching  for  the  bridge. 

By  a  dashing  charge  on  double  time  they  passed  it  under 
exulting  hurrahs  and  most  gallant  work,  and  gained  the 
west  bank.  The  crossing  by  Rodman's  division  at  the 
lower  ford  made  our  position  at  the  bridge  untenable, 
and  General  Toombs  was  prepared  to  retire  the  moment 
the  west  bank  was  gained  in  his  rear. 

Union  troops  were  hurried  over,  and  organized  for  ad 
vance  over  Sharpsburg  Heights,  but  Sturgis's  division  had 
suffered,  and,  the  ammunition  getting  low,  it  was  found 
necessary  to  replace  it  by  the  division  under  General 
Wilcox,  and  Sturgis  was  ordered  to  hold  position  near  the 
bridge  in  reserve.  The  brigades  under  Rodman  made 
their  crossing  sooner,  and  waited  a  little  for  those  at  the 
bridge.  As  soon  as  the  latter  formed  on  the  west  bank, 
Rodman  drew  nearer.  He  was  supported  by  the  Scam- 
mon  brigade  of  the  Kanawha  division,  the  brigade  under 
General  Crook  to  move  with  the  troops  from  the  bridge. 

Clark's,  Durell's,  Cook's,  Muhlenberg's,  and  part  of 
Simmonds's  batteries  crossed  with  the  infantry.  About 
four  o'clock  the  troops  were  over  and  advanced  under  very 
severe  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry,  increasing  in  force  as 
they  ascended  the  heights,  but  the  march  was  continued 
in  bold,  admirable  style,  the  troops  engaging  in  steady, 
brave  fight  as  they  marched.  Overreaching  my  right, 
they  forced  it  back,  breaking  off  Jones's  right  brigades 
under  Drayton,  Kemper,  and  Garnett.  Toombs,  working 
his  way  to  the  rear,  managed  to  encircle  the  advancing 
column  and  join  the  other  brigades  under  D.  R.  Jones  as 
they  were  forced  back.  Jones  used  some  of  them  in  or 
ganizing  a  stand  on  the  flank  of  the  Union  columns. 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBUKG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  261 

Toombs  was  joined  in  his  rearward  move  by  his  regiments 
that  had  been  sent  off  as  train  guards,  by  a  battalion  of 
the  Eleventh  Georgia  under  Major  Little,  and  sent  the 
regiments  with  him  to  replenish  ammunition.  Meanwhile, 
steady  advancing  battle  was  made  by  the  Federals. 

Batteries  from  all  parts  of  our  field  drove  to  General 
Lee,  as  well  as  detachments  of  infantry,  including  some 
with  fresh  wounds  from  the  morning  battle,  but  the  battle 
moved  bravely  on. 

When  General  Lee  found  that  General  Jackson  had  left 
six  of  his  brigades  under  General  A.  P.  Hill  to  receive 
the  property  and  garrison  surrendered  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
he  sent  orders  for  them  to  join  him,  and  by  magic  spell 
had  them  on  the  field  to  meet  the  final  crisis.  He  ordered 
two  of  them  guided  by  Captain  Latrobe  to  guard  against 
approach  of  other  forces  that  might  come  against  him  by 
bridge  No.  4,  Fender's  and  Brockenbrough's,  and  threw 
Branch's,  Gregg's  and  Archer's  against  the  fore-front  of 
the  battle,  while  Toombs's,  Kemper's,  and  Garnett's  en 
gaged  against  its  right.  Mclntosh's  battery,  sent  in  ad 
vance  by  A.  P.  Hill,  was  overrun  and  captured.  Pegram's 
and  Crenshaw's  batteries  were  put  in  with  Hill's  three 
brigades.  The  Washington  Artillery,  S.  D.  Lee's,  and 
Frobel's  found  places  for  parts  of  their  batteries,  am 
munition  replenished.  D.  H.  Hill  found  opportunity  to 
put  in  parts  of  his  artillery  under  Elliott,  Boyce,  Carter, 
and  Maurin.  Toombs's  absent  regiments  returned,  as  he 
made  his  way  around  to  the  enemy's  right,  and  joined  the 
right  of  General  D.  R.  Jones.  The  strong  battle  concen 
trating  against  General  Burnside  seemed  to  spring  from 
the  earth  as  his  march  bore  him  farther  from  the  river. 
Outflanked  and  staggered  by  the  gallant  attack  of  A.  P. 
Hill's  brigades,  his  advance  was  arrested. 

The  contention  about  the  heights  and  suburbs  of 
Sharpsburg  was  anxiously  held.  General  Cox,  reinforced 
by  his  reserve  under  General  Sturgis,  handled  well  his 


262  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

left  against  A.  P.  Hill ;  but,  assailed  in  front  and  on  his 
flank  by  concentrating  fires  that  were  crushing,  he  found 
it  necessary  to  recover  his  lines  and  withdraw.  A.  P. 
Hill's  brigades,  Toombs  and  Kemper,  followed.  They 
recovered  Macintosh's  battery  and  the  ground  that  had 
been  lost  on  the  right  before  the  slow  advancing  night 
dropped  her  mantle  upon  this  field  of  seldom  equalled 
strife. 

When  the  Ninth  Corps  dropped  back  under  the  crest 
they  had  so  bravely  won,  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  vir 
tually  ended,  though  the  fire  between  the  lines  was  con 
tinued  till  nine  o'clock.  The  field  made  classic  by  a 
struggle  of  eighteen  hours,  too  fearful  to  contemplate,  was 
yet  cumbered  by  the  dead  and  wounded.  After  the  firing 
ceased,  parties  from  both  sides,  by  mutual  consent,  went  in 
search  of  fallen  comrades. 

After  riding  along  the  lines,  giving  instructions  for  the 
night  and  morning,  I  rode  for  general  head-quarters  to 
make  report,  but  was  delayed  somewhat,  finding  wounded 
men  hidden  away  under  stone  walls  and  in  fence  corners, 
not  yet  looked  after,  and  afterwards  in  assisting  a  family 
whose  home  had  been  fired  by  a  shell,  so  that  all  the  other 
officers  had  arrived,  made  their  reports,  and  were  lounging 
about  on  the  sod,  when  I  rode  up.  General  Lee  walked 
up  as  I  dismounted,  threw  his  hands  upon  my  shoulders, 
and  hailed  me  with,  "  Here  is  my  old  war-horse  at  last !" 

One  of  those  peculiarly  painful  personal  experiences 
which  are  innumerable  in  war,  but  seldom  get  into  print 
(save  in  fiction),  came  under  my  observation  in  this 
battle.  Colonel  H.  W.  Kingsbury,  who  was  killed  while 
gallantly  leading  the  Eleventh  Connecticut  Regiment  at 
the  ford  near  the  Burnside  Bridge,  was  a  brother-in-law 
of  General  D.  R.  Jones,  who  commanded  the  Confederates 
immediately  opposing  him.  His  taking-off  was  a  severe 
blow  to  Jones,  and  one  from  which  he  never  recovered. 
His  health  had  not  been  strong  for  some  time.  He  asked 


BATTLE   OF   SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  263 

leave  of  absence  shortly  after  this  occurrence,  and,  gradu 
ally  but  hopelessly  sinking,  in  a  few  months  passed  over 
to  the  silent  majority  to  join  his  fallen  kinsman. 

A  few  shots  were  exchanged  early  on  the  18th,  but  a 
kindly  feeling  seemed  to  take  possession  of  the  troops,  as 
they  were  not  ordered  into  action,  and  excuses  were  passed 
between  the  lines  for  looking  after  wounded  comrades, 
which  resulted  in  a  quasi  truce  for  the  day. 

The  Burnside  battle  may  be  likened  to  that  contem 
plated  for  Fitz-John  Porter  under  his  4.30  order  at  the 
Second  Manassas.  The  latter,  however,  had  the  smaller 
force,  while  Burnside's  numbers  were  greater. 

In  the  afternoon  General  Lee  was  advised  of  new  ar 
rivals  in  General  McClellan's  army,  and,  thinking  the  few 
stragglers  who  came  up  to  swell  his  own  ranks  were  not 
sufficient  to  justify  him  in  renewing  the  battle  on  the 
19th,  ordered  his  trains  back,  and  after  night  marched 
his  troops  across  the  Potomac  at  the  ford  near  Shepherds- 
town. 

General  Stuart  was  ordered  to  cross  ahead  of  the  gen 
eral  move,  recross  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and  stand 
guard  to  the  rear  of  the  columns  in  case  of  danger  to  their 
crossing.  The  road  being  clear  at  nine  o'clock,  the  army 
marched  ;  the  First  Corps,  in  advance,  crossed  about  two 
A.M.  on  the  19th,  awaited  to  guard  the  crossing,  and  at 
daylight  was  deployed  on  the  south  side.  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  covered  the  retreat  of  the  army,  and  the  cavalry 
under  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  to  follow,  relieving  lines  of 
picket  guards  and  helping  the  feeble  footmen.  The  rear 
of  the  Confederate  column  crossed  into  Virginia  at  ten 
A.M.,  unmolested.  As  the  pursuit  was  not  threatening, 
General  Lee  ordered  his  army  to  continue  the  march  to 
proper  points  of  bivouac,  holding  the  artillery  reserve 
under  General  Pendleton  and  an  infantry  detail  of  the 
brigades  of  Armistead  and  Lawton,  commanded  by  Col 
onels  Hodges  and  Lamar,  as  guard  at  the  ford.  General 


264  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Pendleton  posted  some  thirty  guns  in  position  for  con 
verging  fire  at  the  ford,  and  put  a  line  of  skirmishers 
near  it,  holding  the  infantry  reserve  and  eleven  guns  at 
the  rear. 

About  noon  the  Union  cavalry  appeared  on  the  other 
bank.  The  batteries  of  Gibson,  Tidball,  and  Robertson 
were  put  in  action,  but  relieved  about  two  o'clock  by  ar 
tillery  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  After  a  severe  combat  the 
Fourth  Michigan  Regiment  and  parts  of  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania  and  Eighteenth  and 
Twenty-second  Massachusetts  were  ordered  over  under 
General  Griffin.  They  forced  the  passage  under  artillery 
and  infantry  fire,  scaled  the  heights,  and  got  possession  of 
five  guns  of  different  batteries  and  a  number  of  small-arms, 
when,  night  approaching,  the  detachment  was  recalled. 

General  Pendleton  reported  the  result  to  general  head 
quarters,  and  General  Lee  ordered  General  Jackson  to 
send  his  nearest  division  back  to  the  ford  early  in  the 
morning. 

A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  ordered.  He  was  fortunate 
in  approaching  the  ford  (Boteler's)  before  the  Federals 
had  crossed  all  of  their  advancing  column ;  formed  his 
brigades  in  two  lines  and  advanced  to  attack.  General 
Porter,  upon  the  report  of  this  advance,  found  that  his 
troops  could  not  get  position  on  the  south  bank  in  time  to 
meet  this  threatening,  ordered  the  troops  withdrawn  to 
cover  about  the  canal  and  adjacent  heights,  and  succeeded 
in  getting  most  of  his  men  safely  back. 

General  Hill  deployed  the  brigades  of  Gregg,  Thomas, 
and  Pender  as  his  front  line,  under  command  of  General 
Gregg.  Lane's  (Branch's  brigade),  Archer's,  and  Brock- 
enbrough's  brigades  were  of  his  second  line,  commanded 
by  General  Archer.  In  this  order  the  division  advanced 
and  engaged  in  a  severe  struggle.  Finding  the  fight  on 
his  front  heavy,  General  Pender  called  to  General  Archer 
for  support,  and  the  latter,  moving  by  his  left,  brought  his 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  265 

brigade  on  Fender's  left,  when  the  advance  was  pushed  to 
successful  issue.  The  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Penn 
sylvania  Regiment  was  thrown  into  confusion  and  suffered 
heavy  loss.  One  of  the  guns  lost  the  day  before  was 
recovered  and  two  hundred  prisoners  taken.  The  losses 
were  between  two  hundred  and  fifty  and  three  hundred 
on  each  side,  the  Federals  losing  about  twenty  more  than 
the  Confederates.  The  Confederate  accounts  of  this  affair 
were  overdrawn,  but  they  were  reassuring  after  the  severe 
experience  about  South  Mountain  and  Sharpsburg. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  then  marched  to 
the  vicinity  of  Martinsburg,  where  it  remained  in  repose 
for  several  days,  then  retired  to  the  vicinity  of  Winches 
ter.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  concentrated  about  Har 
per's  Ferry,  refitting  its  supplies  and  transportation. 

We  may  say  of  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  that  the  Con 
federates  foiled  every  attack  that  was  made,  and  brought 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  a  stand  at  night,  yet  the 
Federal  commander  scored  a  success  that  was  startling. 

The  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  reported 
his  strength  as  87,164.  His  estimate  of  the  strength  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  97,445.  The  Con 
federate  commander  estimated  his  own  strength  for  battle 
at  37,000,  and  that  of  his  adversary  at  90,000. 

The  Confederates  fought  all  of  their  men  that  were  on 
the  field,  except  two  brigades  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division  and 
some  of  their  field  batteries. 

Of  the  Federals,  the  Fifth  Corps,  except  about  one  bri 
gade  of  infantry,  was  not  in  action ;  and  the  Sixth 
Corps,  except  Irwin's  brigade,  seems  to  have  had  little 
serious  work. 

It  is  generally  conceded  that  the  Federals,  in  addition 
to  advantage  of  numbers,  had  their  organizations  in  hand, 
were  better  fed  and  clothed,  and  better  prepared,  there 
fore,  to  muster  a  larger  portion  of  their  number  for  battle. 

The  casualties  of  the  First  Corps,  Army  of  Northern 


266  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Virginia,  in  the  engagements  at  South  Mountain,  Cramp- 
ton's  Gap,  Maryland  Heights,  Harper's  Ferry,  and 
Sharpsburg,  as  tabulated  in  the  official  report,  were  7508.* 
Neither  General  Jackson's  report  nor  General  D.  H. 
Hill's  furnishes  a  detailed  account  of  casualties.  The 
former  gives  aggregate  figures  2438,  the  latter  3241, — 
making  a  grand  aggregate  of  13,187.f  None  of  these 
reports  include  the  losses  of  the  cavalry  command,  nor 
is  there  a  report  of  them  found  among  the  Records. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  concentrated  at  and 
near  Fredericktown  on  the  9th  of  September,  1862,  num 
bered  a  trifle  over  61,000,  all  arms.  General  Lee's  esti 
mate  of  his  troops  engaged  at  Sharpsburg  was  37,000. 
This  may  not  include  his  cavalry  arm,  conceding  which, 
his  force  on  the  field  should  have  been  about  41,000. 
Estimating  the  cavalry  loss  at  500,  our  losses  of  battle 
should  be  13,687,  which  leaves  20,000  to  be  accounted  for 
as  lost  by  severe  continuous  labor  and  marches.  This, 
added  to  the  losses  in  action,  makes  a  grand  total  of  33,687 
lost  in  the  Maryland  campaign.  The  losses  from  over 
work  were  only  temporary.  Most  of  them  were  back  in 
the  ranks  within  fifteen  days  after  the  return  to  Virginia. 
But  all  of  these  large  figures  are  trifles  compared  to  the 
lamentable  loss  of  the  fruits  of  devoted  service  from  the 
Chickahominy  campaign  to  the  Potomac. 

The  casualties  of  the  Union  side,  reported  by  official 
count,  were  12,410. 

The  best  tactical  moves  at  Antietam  were  made  by 
Generals  McLaws,  A.  P.  Hill,  Gibbon,  and  Patrick,  and 
Colonels  Barlow  and  Cross.  Generals  D.  H.  Hill  and 
Hood  were  like  game-cocks,  fighting  as  long  as  they  could 
stand,  engaging  again  as  soon  as  strong  enough  to  rise. 


*  This  includes  eighty-five  lost  by  S.  D.  Lee's  artillery,  not  regularly 
assigned  as  part  of  the  corps. 

t  Surgeon  Lafayette  Guild,  medical  director  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  in  his  official  tabulated  report,  accounts  for  10,291  only. 


BATTLE   OF    SHARPSBUKG,  OK    ANTIETAM.  267 

General  Toombs  and  Colonel  Benning  performed  very 
clever  work  at  the  Burnside  Bridge.  Of  Colonel  Cooke, 
the  Twenty-seventh  North  Carolina  Regiment,  Captain 
Miller,  Sergeant  Ellis,  and  their  men  of  the  Washington 
Artillery,  General  Lee  said,  "  They  were  heroic." 

General  McClellan's  plan  of  the  battle  was  not  strong, 
the  handling  and  execution  were  less  so.  Battles  by  the 
extreme  right  and  left,  divided  by  a  river,  gave  us  the 
benefit  of  interior  lines,  and  it  was  that  that  saved  the 
Confederate  army,  for  it  became  manifest  early  in  the  day  / 
that  his  reserves  were  held  at  the  bridge  No.  2,  which 
gave  us  freer  use  of  our  inner  lines. 

Following  is  a  condensed  but  accurate  presentation  or 
the  organization  of  the  contending  armies  in  the  battle 
of  Sharpsburg  and  the  Maryland  campaign :  * 

ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  GENERAL  ROBERT  E.  LEE  COM 
MANDING. 
LONGSTREET'S  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET. 

McLAWS's  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Lafayette  McLaws  :— Kershattfs  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Kershaw ;  2d  S.  C.,  Col.  John  D.  Kennedy  ;  3d 
S.  C.,  Col.  James  D.  Nance  ;  7th  S.  C.,  Col.  D.  Wyatt  Aiken  and  Capt, 
John  S.  Hard  ;  8th  S.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  J.  Hoole.  CobVs  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Howell  Cobb,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  C.  Sanders,  Lieut.-Col.  William 
MacRae ;  16th  and  24th  Ga.,  Cobb's  (Ga.)  Legion,  15th  N.  C.  Semmes's 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Paul  J.  Semmes  ;  10th  Ga.,  Capt.  P.  H.  Loud  ;  53d 
Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  Sloan  and  Capt.  S.  W.  Marshborne  ;  15th  Va., 
Capts.  E.  M.  Morrison  and  E.  J.  Willis  ;  32d  Va.,  Col.  E.  B.  Montague. 
Barksdale's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Barksdale  ;  13th  Miss.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Kennon  McElroy  ;  17th  Miss.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  Fiser  ;  18th  Miss., 
Maj.  J.  C.  Campbell  and  Lieut.-Col.  William  H.  Luse  ;  21st  Miss.,  Capt. 
John  Sims  and  Col.  Benjamin  G.  Humphreys.  Artillery,  Maj.  S.  P. 
Hamilton,  Col.  H.  C.  Cabell ;  Manly's  (N.  C.)  battery,  Capt.  B.  C. 
Manly ;  Pulaski  (Ga.)  Art.,  Capt.  J.  P.  W.  Read  ;  Richmond  (Fayette) 
Art.,  Capt.  M.  C.  Macon  ;  Richmond  Howitzers  (1st  Co.),  Capt.  E.  S. 
McCarthy  ;  Troup  (Ga.)  Art.,  Capt,  H.  H.  Carlton. 

ANDERSON'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Richard  H.  Anderson  :—Wilcox'8 
Brigade,  Col.  Alfred  dimming  ;  8th,  9th,  10th,  and  llth  Ala.  Mahone's 
Brigade,  Col.  William  A.  Parham  ;  6th,  12th,  16th,  41st,  and  61st  Va. 
Featherstori 's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Winfield  S.  Featherston,  Col.  Carnot 
Posey ;  12th  Miss.,  16th  Miss.,  Capt.  A.  M.  Feltus  ;  19th  Miss.,  2d  Miss. 

*  Compiled  from  the  official  reports. 


268  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Battn.  Armistead's  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  Lewis  A.  Arraistead,  Col.  J. 
G.  Hodges  ;  9th,  14th,  38th,  53d,  and  57th  Va.  Pryor's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Roger  A.  Pryor  ;  14th  Ala.,  2d  and  8th  Fla.,  3d  Va.  Wright's 
Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  A.  R.  Wright;  44th  Ala.,  3d,  22d,  and  48th  Ga. 
Artillery,  Maj.  John  S.  Saunders  ;  Donaldsonville  (La.)  Art.  (Mauriii's 
battery),  Huger's  (Va.)  battery,  Moorman's  (Va.)  battery,  Thompson's 
(Grimes's)  (Va.)  battery. 

JONES'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  David  R.  Jones  -—Toombs's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Robert  Toombs,  Col.  Henry  L.  Benning  ;  2d  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col. 
William  R.  Holmes  and  Major  Skidmore  Harris  ;  15th  Ga.,  Col.  W.  T. 
Millican  ;  17th  Ga.,  Capt.  J.  A.  McGregor  ;  20th  Ga.,  Col.  J.  B.  dim 
ming.  Drayton's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  F.  Dray  ton  ;  50th  Ga., 
Lieut.-Col.  F.  Kearse ;  51st  Ga.,  15th  S.  C.,  Col.  W.  D.  De  Saussure. 
Picket? s  Brigade,  Col.  Eppa  Him  ton,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  B.  Garnett ;  8th 
Va.,  Col.  Eppa  Hunton  ;  18th  Va.,  Maj.  George  C.  Cabell ;  19th  Va.,  Col. 
J.  B.  Strange,  Lieut.  W.  N.  Wood,  and  Capt.  J.  L.  Cochran ;  28th  Va., 
Capt.  Wingfleld  ;  56th  Va.,  Col.  William  D.  Stuart  and  Capt.  McPhail. 
Kemper's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  L.  Kemper  ;  1st,  7th,  llth,  17th,  and 
24th  Va.  Jenkins's  Brigade,  Col.  Joseph  Walker  ;  1st  S.  C.  (Vols.), 
Lieut.-Col.  D.  Livingston  ;  2d  S.  C.  Rifles,  5th  S.  C.,  Capt.  T.  C.  Beck- 
ham  ;  6th  S.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  M.  Steedman,  Capt.  E.  B.  Cantey ;  4th  S.  C. 
(Battn.),  Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Sharp-shooters.  Anderson's  Brigade,  Col. 
George  T.  Anderson  ;  1st  Ga.  (Regulars),  Col.  W.  J.  Magill ;  7th,  8th,  and 
9th  Ga.  ;  llth  Ga.,  Maj.  F.  H.  Little.  Artillery,  Fauquier  (Va.)  Art. 
(Stribling's  battery),*  Loudoun  (Va.)  Art.  (Rogers's  battery),*  Turner 
(Va.)  Art.  (Leake's  battery),*  Wise  (Va.)  Art.  (J.  S.  Brown's  battery). 

WALKER'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  G.  Walker  : —  Walker's  Bri 
gade,  Col.  Van  H.  Manning,  Col.  E.  D.  Hall ;  3d  Ark.,  Capt.  John  W. 
Reedy  ;  27th  N.  C.,  Col.  J.  R.  Cooke ;  46th  N.  C.,  Col.  E.  D.  Hall ;  48th 
N.  C.,  Col.  R.  C.  Hill ;  30th  Va.,  French's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt,  Thomas 
B.  French.  Ransom's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  Ransom,  Jr.  ;  24th 
N.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  L.  Harris  ;  25th  N.  C.,  Col.  H.  M.  Rutledge  ; 
35th  N.  C.,  Col.  M.  W.  Ransom  ;  49th  N.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  Lee  M.  McAfee  ; 
Branch's  Field  Art.  (Va.),  Capt.  Branch. 

HOOD'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.  Hood  -.—Hood's  Brigade,  Col. 
W.  T.  Wofford  ;  18th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  Z.  Ruff;  Hampton  (S.  C.)  Le 
gion,  Lieut.-Col.  M.  W.  Gary;  1st  Tex.,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  A.  Work;  4th 
Tex.,  Lieut.-Col.  B.  F.  Carter  ;  5th  Tex.,  Capt.  I.  N.  M.  Turner.  Law's 
Brigade,  Col.  E.  M.  Law  ;  4th  Ala.,  Lieut.-Col.  O.  K.  McLemore  ;  2d 
Miss.,  Col.  J.  M.  Stone  ;  llth  Miss.,  Col.  P.  F.  Liddell ;  6th  N.  C.,  Maj. 
Robert  F.  Webb.  Artillery,  Maj.  B.  W.  Frobel ;  German  Art.  (S.  C.), 
Capt.  W.  K.  Bachman  ;  Palmetto  Art,  (S.  C.),  Capt.  H.  R.  Garden  ; 
Rowan  Art.  (N.  C.),  Capt.  James  Reilly. 

EVANS'S  BRIGADE,  Brig.-Gen.  Nathan  G.  Evans,  Col.  P.  F.  Stevens  ;  f 
17th  S.  C.,  Col.  F.  W.  McMaster  ;  18th  S.  C.,  Col.  W.  H.  Wallace  ;  22d 
S.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  T.  C.  Watkins  and  Maj.  M.  Hilton;  23d  S.  C.,  Capt. 

*  Left  at  Leesburg. 

f  Commanding  brigade  while  General  Evans  commanded  provisional 
division. 


BATTLE    OF    SHAKPSBURG,  OK    ANTIETAM.  269 

S.  A.  Durham  and  Lieut.  E.  R.  White ;  Holcombe  (S.  C.)  Legion,  Col. 
P.  F.  Stevens ;  Macbeth  (S.  C.)  Art.,  Capt.  R.  Boyce. 

ARTILLERY  :—  Washington  (La.}  Artillery,  Col.  J.  B.  Walton  ;  1st  Co., 
Capt.  C.  W,  Squires ;  2d  Co.,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson  ;  3d  Co.,  Capt.  M. 
B.  Miller ;  4th  Co.,  Capt.  B.  F.  Eshleman.  Lee's  Battalion,  Col.  S.  D. 
Lee;  Ashland  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  P.  Woolfolk,  Jr.  ;  Bedford  (Va.)  Art., 
Capt.  T.  C.  Jordan;  Brooks  (S.  C.)  Art.,  Lieut.  William  Elliott;  Eu- 
bank's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank  ;  Madison  (La.)  Light  Art., 
Capt.  G.  V.  Moody ;  Parker's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt.  W.  W.  Parker. 

JACKSON'S  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS  J.  JACKSON. 

EWELL'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Lawton,  Brig. -Gen.  Jubal  A. 
Early  :— Lawton' s  Brigade,  Col.  M.  Douglass,  Maj.  J.  H.  Lowe,  Col. 
John  H.  Lamar ;  13th  and  26th  Ga,,  31st  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  T.  Crowder ; 
38th,  60th,  and  61st  Ga.  Early1 8  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Jubal  A.  Early, 
Col.  William  Smith  ;  13th  Va,,  Capt.  F.  V.  Winston  ;  25th,  31st,  and 
44th  Va.;  49th  Va,,  Col.  William  Smith  ;  52d  Va.,  Col.  M.  G.  Harman  ; 
58th  Va.  Trimble's  Brigade,  Col.  James  A.  Walker;  15th  Ala,,  Capt. 
I.  B.  Feagin  ;  12th  Ga.,  Capt.  Rogers  ;  21st  Ga.,  Maj.  Thomas  C.  Glover  ; 
21st  N.  C.,  Capt.  Miller  ;  1st  N.  C.  Battn.*  Hays's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
Harry  T.  Hays  ;  5th  La.,  6th  La.,  Col.  H.  B.  Strong  ;  7th,  8th,  and  14th 
La.  Artillery,^  Maj.  A.  R.  Courtney  ;  Charlottesville  (Va.)  Art.  (Car- 
rington's  battery),  Chesapeake  (Md.)  Art.  (Brown's  battery),  Courtney 
(Va.)  Art.  (Latimer's  battery),  Johnson's  (Va.)  battery,  La.  Guard  Art. 
(D'Aquin's  battery),  1st  Md.  Batt.  (Dement's  battery),  Staunton  (Va.) 
Art,  (Balthis's  battery). 

HILL'S  LIGHT  DIVISION,  Maj.  Gen.  Ambrose  P.  Hill: — Branch's 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  L.  O'B.  Branch,  Col.  James  H.  Lane;  7th  N.  C., 
18th  N.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  Purdie  ;  28th,  33d,  and  37th  N.  C.  Gregg's  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Maxcy  Gregg;  1st  S.  C.  (provisional  army),  Maj.  E. 
McCrady,  Jr.,  Col.  D.  H.  Hamilton  ;  1st  S.  C.  Rifles,  Lieut.-Col.  James 
M.  Perrin  ;  12th  S.  C.,  Col.  Dixon  Barnes,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  Jones,  and 
Maj.  W.  H.  McCorkle;  13th  S.  C.,  Col.  O.  E.  Edwards;  14th  S.  C., 
Lieut.-Col.  W.  D.  Simpson,  field's  Brigade,  Col.  Brockenbrough  ;  40th, 
47th,  and  55th  Va.,  22d  Va.  Battn.  Archer's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  J. 
Archer,  Col.  Peter  Turney  ;  5th  Ala.  Battn.,  Captain  Hooper  ;  19th  Ga., 
Maj.  J.  H.  Neal  and  Capt.  F.  M.  Johnston  ;  1st  Tenn.  (provisional 
army),  Col.  Peter  Turney ;  7th  Tenn.,  Maj.  S.  G.  Shepard  and  Lieut.  G. 
A.  Howard  ;  14th  Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  W.  Lockert.  Fender's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  William  D.  Pender,  Col.  R.  H.  Brewer;  16th  N.  C.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Stowe  ;  22d  N.  C.,  Maj.  C.  C.  Cole ;  34th  and  38th  N.  C.  Thomas's 
Brigade,  Col.  Edward  L.  Thomas  ;  14th  Ga.,  Col.  R.  W.  Folsom  ;  35th 
Ga.,  45th  Ga.,  Maj.  W.  L.  Grice  ;  49th  Ga,,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  M.  Manning. 
Artillery, %  Maj.  R.  L.  Walker;  Branch  (N.  C.)  Art.  (A.  C.  Latham's 

*  Attached  to  Twenty-first  North  Carolina  Regiment. 

f  John  R.  Johnson's  and  D'Aquin's  batteries  were  the  only  ones  pres 
ent  with  this  division  at  Sharpsburg. 

J  Braxton's,  Crenshaw's,  Mclntosh's,  and  Pegram's  batteries  engaged 
at  Sharpsburg. 


270  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

battery),  Crenshaw's  (Va.)  battery,  Fredericksburg  (Va.)  Art.  (Brax- 
ton's  battery),  Letcher  (Va.)  Art.  (Davidson's  battery),  Middlesex  (Va.) 
Art.  (Fleet's  battery),  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Art.  (Mclntosh's  battery),  Purcell 
(Va.)  Art.  (Pegram's  battery). 

JACKSON'S  DIVISION,  Brig. -Gen.  John  R.  Jones,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  E. 
Starke,  Col.  A.  J.  Grigsby  : —  Winder's  Brigade,  Col.  A.  J.  Grigsby, 
Lieut. -Col.  R.  D.  Gardner  (4th  Va.),  Maj.  H.  J.  Williams  ;  2d  Va.,  Capt. 
R.  T.  Colston  ;  4th  Va.,  Lieut-Col.  R.  D.  Gardner  ;  5th  Va.,  Maj.  H.  J. 
Williams;  27th  Va.,  Capt.  F.  C.  Wilson  ;  33d  Va.,  Capt.  Golladay  and 
Lieut.  Walton.  Taliaferro's  Brigade,  Col.  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Col.  J.  W. 
Jackson,  Col.  J.  L.  Sheffield  ;  47th  and  48th  Ala.,  10th,  23d,  and  37th 
Va.  Jones's  Brigade,  Col.  B.  T.  Johnson,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Jones,  Capt. 
J.  E.  Penn,  Capt.  A.  C.  Page,  Capt.  R.  W.  Withers  ;  21st  Va.,  Capt.  A. 

C.  Page ;  42d  Va.,  Capt.  R.  W.  Withers ;  48th  Va.,  Capt.  Chandler  ;  1st 
Va.  Battn.,  Lieut.  C.  A.  Davidson.     Starke' s  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Wil 
liam  E.  Starke,  Col.  L.  A.  Stafford,  Col.  E.  Pendleton  ;  1st  La.,  Lieut- 
Col.  M.  Nolan  ;  2d  La.,  Col.  J.  M.  Williams  ;  9th  La.,  10th  La.,  Capt  H. 

D.  Monier;  15th  La.,  Coppens's  (La.)  battalion.    Artillery,  Maj.  L.  M. 
Shumaker ;    Alleghany    (Va.)    Art    (Carpenter's    battery),     Brockeo- 
brough's  (Md.)  battery,  Danville  (Va.)  Art  (Wooding's  battery),  Hamp- 
den  (Va.)  Art  (Caskie's  battery),  Lee  (Va.)  Batt.  (Raines's),  Rockbridge 
(Va.)  Art.  (Poague's  battery). 

HILL'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Daniel  H.  Hill  -.—Ripley's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Roswell  S.  Ripley,  Col.  George  Doles  ;  4th  Ga,,  Col.  George  Doles ; 
44th  Ga,,  Capt  Key ;  1st  N.  C.,  Lieut-Col.  H.  A.  Brown  ;  3d  N.  C.,  Col. 
William  L.  De  Rosset.  Rodes's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes ;  3d 
Ala.,  Col.  C.  A.  Battle  ;  5th  Ala.,  Maj.  E.  L.  Hobson  ;  6th  Ala.,  Col.  J.  B. 
Gordon  ;  12th  Ala.,  Col.  B.  B.  Gayle  and  Lieut-Col.  S.  B.  Pickens  ;  26th 
Ala.,  Col.  E.  A.  O'Neal.  Garland's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  Gar 
land,  Jr.,  Col.  D.  K.  McRae  ;  5th  N.  C.,  Col.  D.  K.  McRae  and  Capt.  T. 
M.  Garrett ;  12th  N.  C.,  Capt.  S.  Snow ;  13th  N.  C.,  Lieut-Col.  Thomas 
Ruffin,  Jr. ;  20th  N.  C.,  Col.  Alfred  Iverson  ;  23d  N.  C.,  Col.  D.  H.  Chris 
tie.  Anderson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  B.  Anderson,  Col.  R.  T. 
Bennett ;  2d  N.  C.,  Col.  C.  C.  Tew  and  Capt  G.  M.  Roberts ;  4th  N.  C., 
Col.  Bryan  Grimes  and  Capts.  W.  T.  Marsh  and  D.  P.  Latham  ;  14th 
N.  C.,  Col.  R.  T.  Bennett ;  30th  N.  C.,  Col.  F.  M.  Parker  and  Maj.  W.  W. 
Sillers.  Colquitt's  Brigade,  Col.  A.  H.  Colquitt ;  13th  Ala.,  Col.  B.  D. 
Fry  ;  6th  Ga.,  Lieut-Col.  J.  M.  Newton  ;  23d  Ga,,  Col.  W.  P.  Barclay  ; 
27th  Ga.,  Col.  L.  B.  Smith  ;  28th  Ga.,  Maj.  T.  Graybill  and  Capt  N.  J. 
Garrison.  Artillery*  Maj.  Pierson  ;  Hardaway's  (Ala.)  battery,  Capt 
R.  A.  Hardaway  ;  Jeff' Davis  (Ala.)  Art,  Capt  J.  W.  Bondurant ;  Jones's 
(Va.)  battery,  Capt.  William  B.  Jones  ;  King  William  (Va.)  Art,  Capt, 
T.  H.  Carter. 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY,  Brig.-Gen.  William  N.  Pendleton  :— Brown's 
Battalion,}  Col.  J.  Thompson  Brown  ;  Powhatan  Art  (Dance's  battery), 

*  Cutts's  and  Jones's  battalions  also  under  D.  H.  Hill's  command  at 
Sharpsburg. 
f  First  Virginia  Artillery. 


BATTLE   OF    SHARPSBUKG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  271 

Richmond  Howitzers,  2d  Co.  (Watson's  battery),  Richmond  Howitzers, 
3d  Co.  (Smith's  battery),  Salem  Art.  (Hupp's  battery),  Williamsburg 
Art.  (Coke's  battery).  Cutts'a  Battalion,*  Lieut.-Col.  A.  S.  Cutts ; 
Blackshears's  (Ga.)  battery,  Irwin  (Ga.)  Art.  (Lane's  battery),  Lloyd's 
(N.  C.)  battery,  Patterson's  (Ga.)  battery,  Ross's  (Ga.)  battery.  Jones's 
Battalion*  Maj.  H.  P.  Jones.  Morris  (Va.)  Art.  (R.  C.  M.  Page's  bat 
tery),  Orange  ( Va.)  Art.  (Peyton's  battery),  Turner's  (Va.)  battery,  Wim- 
bish's  (Va.)  battery.  Nelson's  Battalion,  Maj.  William  Nelson  ;  Am- 
herst  (Va.)  Art.  (Kirkpatrick's  battery),  Fluvanna  (Va.)  Art.  (Ancell's 
battery),  Huckstep's  (Va.)  battery,  Johnson's  (Va.)  battery,  Milledge 
(Ga.)  Art.  (Milledge's  battery).  Miscellaneous,  Cutshaw's  (Va.)  battery, 
Dixie  (Va.)  Art.  (Chapman's  battery),  Magruder  (Va.)  Art,  (T.  J.  Page, 
Jr.'s,  battery),  Rice's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt.  W.  H.  Rice  ;  Thomas's  (Va.) 
Art.  (E.  J.  Anderson's  battery).f 

CAVALRY,  Maj  .-Gen.  James  E.  B.  Stuart : — Hampton'1  s  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.Wade  Hampton  ;  1st  N.  C.,  Col.  L.  S.  Baker  ;  2d  S.  C.,  Col.  M.  C.  But 
ler  ;  10th  Va.,  Cobb's  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  M.  B.  Young  ;  Jeff  Davis 
Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  T.  Martin.  Lee's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Fitzhugh 
Lee  ;  1st  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  L.  Tiernan  Brien  ;  3d  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  T. 
Thornton  ;  4th  Va.,  Col.  William  C.  Wickham  ;  5th  Va.,  Col.  T.  L.  Ros- 
ser ;  9th  Va.  Robertson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  B.  H.  Robertson,  Col. 
Thomas  T.  Munford  ;  2d  Va.,  Col.T.  T.  Munford  and  Lieut.-Col.  Burks  ; 
6th  Va.  ;  7th  Va.,  Capt.  S.  B.  Myers ;  12th  Va.,  Col.  A.  W.  Harman  ;  17th 
Va.  Battn. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY,  Capt.  John  Pelham  :— Chew's  (Va.)  battery, 
Hart's  (S.  C.)  battery,  Pelham's  (Va.)  battery. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,!  MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

U.  S.  ARMY. 

GENERAL  HEAD-QUARTERS  : — Escort,  Capt,  James  B.  Mclntyre  ;  In 
dependent  Company  Oneida  (N.  Y.)  Cav.,  Capt.  Daniel  P.  Mann  ;  4th 
U.  S.  Cav.,  Co.  A,  Lieut.  Thomas  H.  McCormick ;  4th  U.  S.  Cav.,  Co.  E, 
Capt.  James  B.  Mclntyre.  Regular  Engineer  Battalion,  Capt.  James 

C.  Duane.    Provost  Guard,  Maj.  William  H.  Wood.    2d  U.  S.  Cav., 
Cos.  E,  F,  H,  and  K,  Capt.  George  A.  Gordon  ;  8th  U.  S.  Inf.,  Cos.  A, 

D,  F,  and  G,  Capt,  Royal  T.  Frank ;  19th  U.  S.  Inf.,  Co.  G,  Capt.  Ed 
mund  L.  Smith  ;  19th  U.  S.  Inf.,  Co.  H,  Capt.  Henry  S.  Welton.  Head 
quarters  Guard,  Maj.  Granville  O.  Haller  ;  93d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Ben 
jamin  C.  Butler.     Quartermaster's  Guard,  1st  U.  S.  Cav.,  Cos.  B,  C,  H, 
and  I,  Capt.  Marcus  A.  Reno. 


*  With  D.  H.  Hill's  division  at  Sharpsburg. 

t  Left  at  Leesburg. 

t  Compiled  from  the  records  of  the  Adjutant-General's  Office.  On 
September  14  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  consisting  of  the  First  and 
Ninth  Corps,  was  commanded  by  Major-General  Burnside  ;  the  centre, 
composed  of  the  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps,  by  Major-General  Surnner, 
and  the  left  wing,  comprising  the  Sixth  Corps  and  Couch's  division 
(Fourth  Corps),  by  Major-General  Franklin. 


272  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,*  (1)  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER,!  (2)  BRIG 
ADIER-GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE.  Escort,  2d  N.  Y.  Cav.,  Cos.  A, 
B,  I,  and  K,  Capt.  John  E.  Nay  lor. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Rufus  King,J  (2)  Brig.-Gen.  John  P. 
Hatch,  §  (3)  Brig.-Gen.  Abner  Doubleday  :— First  Brigade,  Col.  Walter 
Phelps,  Jr. ;  22d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  McKie,  Jr. ;'  24th  N.  Y.,  Capt. 
John  D.  O'Brian  ;  30th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  M.  Searing  ;  84th  N.  Y.  (14th 
Militia),  Maj.  William  H.  de  Bovoise  ;  2d  U.  S.  Sharp-shooters,  Col. 
Henry  A.  V.  Post.  Second  Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Abner  Doubleday, 
(2)  Col.  William  P.  Wainwright,  f  (3)  Lieut.-Col.  J.  William  Hofmann  ; 
7th  Ind.,  Maj.  Ira  G.  Grover  ;  76th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  P.  Wainwright, 
Capt.  John  W.  Young  ;  95th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Edward  Pye  ;  56th  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  J.  William  Hofmann,  Capt.  Frederick  Williams.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Marsena  R.  Patrick  ;  21st  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  F.  Rogers  ;  23d 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Henry  C.  Hoffman  ;  35th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Newton  B.  Lord  ;  80th 
N.  Y.  (20th  Militia),  'Lieut.-Col.  Theodore  B.  Gates.  Fourth  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  John  Gibbon  ;  19th  Ind.,  Col.  Solomon  Meredith,  Lieut.-Col. 
Alois  O.  Bachman,  Capt.  William  W.  Dudley  ;  2d  Wis.,  Col.  Lucius  Fair- 
child,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  S.  Allen  ;  6th  Wis.,  Lieut-Col.  Edward  S. 
Bragg,  Maj.  Rufus  R.  Dawes ;  7th  Wis.,  Capt.  John  B.  Callis.  Artil 
lery,  Capt.  J.  Albert  Monroe  ;  N.  H.  Light,  First  Batt.,  Lieut.  Freder 
ick  M.  Edgell ;  1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt.  D.,  Capt.  J.  Albert  Monroe ;  1st 
N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  L,  Capt.  John  A.  Reynolds  ;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  B, 
Capt.  Joseph  B.  Campbell,  Lieut.  James  Stewart. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  James  B.  Ricketts  : — First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Abram  Duryea  ;  97th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Charles  Northrup ;  104th 
N.  Y.,  Maj.  Lewis  C.  Skinner  ;  105th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Howard  Carroll ;  107th 
Pa.,  Capt.  James  Mac  Thomson.  Second  Brigade,  (1)  Col.  William 
A.  Christian,  (2)  Col.  Peter  Lyle  ;  26th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Richard  H. 
Richardson  ;  94th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Calvin  Littlefield  ;  88th  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  George  W.  Gile,  Capt.  Henry  R.  Myers  ;  90th  Pa.,  Col.  Peter  Lyle, 
Lieut.-Col.  William  A.  Leech.  Third  Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  George  L. 
Hartsuff,t  (2)  Col.  Richard  Coulter  ;  16th  Me.,||  Col.  Asa  W.  Wildes  ;  12th 
Mass.,  Maj.  Elisha  Burbank,  Capt.  Benjamin  F.  Cook ;  13th  Mass.,  Maj. 
J.  Parker  Gould  ;  83d  N.  Y.  (9th  Militia),  Lieut.-Col.  William  Atterbury  ; 
llth  Pa.,  Col.  Richard  Coulter,  Capt.  David  M.  Cook.  Artillery,  1st  Pa. 
Light,  Batt.  F,  Capt.  Ezra  W.  Matthews ;  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt. 
James  Thompson. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  George  G.  Meade,  (2)  Brig.-Gen.  Tru 
man  Seymour  -.—First  Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Truman  Seymour,  (2)  Col. 
R.  Biddle  Roberts  ;  1st  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  R.  Biddle  Roberts,  Capt.  Wil 
liam  C.  Talley ;  2d  Pa.  Reserves,  Capt.  James  N.  Byrnes ;  5th  Pa.  Re- 

*  Designation  changed  from  Third  Corps,  Army  of  Virginia,  to  First 
Army  Corps,  by  General  Orders,  No.  129,  Adjutant-General's  Office, 
September  12,  1862. 

f  Wounded  September  17.  J  Relieved  September  14. 

g  Wounded  September  14. 

||  Joined  September  9,  and  detached  September  13  as  railroad  guard. 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  273 

serves,  Col.  Joseph  W.  Fisher  ;  6th  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  William  Sinclair ; 
13th  Pa.  Reserves  (1st  Rifles),  Col.  Hugh  W.  McNeil,  Capt.  Dennis  Mc- 
Gee.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Albert  L.  Magilton  ;  3d  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.  - 
Col.  John  Clark  ;  4th  Pa.  Reserves,  Maj.  John  Nyce  ;  7th  Pa.  Reserves, 
Col.  Henry  C.  Bolinger,  Major  Chauncey  M.  Lyman  ;  8th  Pa.  Reserves, 
Maj.  Silas  M.  Bally.  Third  Brigade,  (1)  Col.  Thomas  F.  Gallagher,*  (2) 
Lieut.-Col.  Robert  Anderson  ;  9th  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  An 
derson,  Capt.  Samuel  B.  Dick  ;  10th  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.-Col.  Adoniram 
J.  Warner,  Capt.  Jonathan  P.  Smith  ;  llth  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.-Col. 
Samuel  M.  Jackson  ;  12th  Pa.  Reserves,  Capt.  Richard  Gustiu.  Artil 
lery,  1st  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  A,  Lieut.  John  G.  Simpson  ;  1st  Pa.  Light, 
Batt,  B,  Capt,  James  H.  Cooper ;  1st  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  G,f  Lieut.  Frank 
P.  Amsden  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  C,  Capt.  Dun  bar  R.  Ransom. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  EDWIN  V.  SUMNER.  Escort, 
6th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  Co.  D,  Capt.  Henry  W.  Lyon  ;  6th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  Co.  K, 
Capt.  Riley  Johnson. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  (1)  Maj.-Gen.  Israel  B.  Richardson, \  (2)  Brig.-Gen. 
John  C.  Caldwell,  (3)  Brig.-Gen.  Win  field  S.  Hancock;  First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Caldwell ;  5th  N.  H.,  Col.  Edward  E.  Cross  ;  7th  N. 
Y.,  Capt.  Charles  Brestel ;  61st  and  64th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Francis  C.  Barlow, 
Lieut.-Col.  Nelson  A.  Miles ;  81st  Pa.,  Maj.  H.  Boyd  McKeen.  Second 
Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  F.  Meagher,  (2)  Col.  John  Burke  ;  29tli 
Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  H.  Barnes  ;  63d  N.  Y.,  Col.  John  Burke,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Henry  Fowler,  Maj.  Richard  C.  Bentley,  Capt.  Joseph  O'Neill  ;  69th 
N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  Kelly,  Maj.  James  Cavanagh  ;  88th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Patrick  Kelly.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  John  R.  Brooke  ;  2d  Del.,  Capt. 
David  L.  Strieker ;  52d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Paul  Frank  ;  57th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Philip  J.  Parisen,  Maj.  Alford  B.  Chapman  ;  66th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Julius 
Wehle,  Lieut.-Col.  James  H.  Bull ;  53d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Richards  McMi- 
chael.  Artillery,  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  B,  Capt.  Rufus  D.  Pettit ;  4th 
U.  S.,  Batts.  A  and  C,  Lieut.  Evan  Thomas. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  (1)  Maj.-Gen.  John  Sedgwick,J  (2)  Brig.-Gen. 
Oliver  O.  Howard  '.—First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Willis  A.  Gorman  ;  15th 
Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  W.  Kimball ;  1st  Minn.,  Col.  Alfred  Sully  ;  34th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  James  A.  Suiter  ;  82d  N.  Y.  (2d  Militia),  Col.  Henry  W.  Hud 
son  ;  Mass.  Sharp-shooters,  1st  Co.,  Capt.  John  Saunders  ;  Minn.  Sharp 
shooters,  2d  Co.,  Capt.  William  F.  Russell.  Second  Brigade,  (1)  Brig.- 
Gen.  Oliver  O.  Howard,  (2)  Col.  Joshua  T.  Owen,  (3)  Col.  De  Witt  C. 
Baxter ;  69th  Pa.,  Col.  Joshua  T.  Owen  ;  71st  Pa.,  Col.  Isaac  J.  Wistar, 
Lieut.  Richard  P.  Smith  (adjutant),  Capt.  Enoch  E.  Lewis ;  72d  Pa.,  Col. 
De  Witt  C.  Baxter ;  106th  Pa.,  Col.  Turner  G.  Morehead.  Third  Bri 
gade,  (1)  Brig-.Gen.  Napoleon  J.  T.  Dana,{  (2)  Col.  Norman  J.  Hall ;  19th 
Mass.,  Col.  Edward  W.  Hinks,  Lieut.-Col.  Arthur  F.  Devereux ;  20th 
Mass.,  Col.  William  R.  Lee  ;  7th  Mich.,  Col.  Norman  J.  Hall,  Capt. 

*  Wounded  September  14. 

t  Detached  at  Washington,  D.  C.,  since  September  6. 
%  Wounded  September  17. 
18 


274  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Charles  J.  Hunt ;  42d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  N.  Bomford,  Maj.  James 
E.  Mallon  ;  59th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  L.  Tidball.  Artillery,  1st  R.  I. 
Light,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  John  A.  Tompkins ;  1st  U.  S.,  Batt.  I,  Lieut. 
George  A.  Woodruff. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  H.  French  : — First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Nathan  Kimball ;  14th  Ind.,  Col.  William  Harrow  ;  8th  Ohio, 
Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  Sawyer ;  132d  Pa,,  Col.  Richard  A.  Oakford,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Vincent  M.  Wilcox  ;  7th  W.  Va.,  Col.  Joseph  Snider.  Second  Bri 
gade,  Col.  Dwight  Morris  ;  14th  Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  Sanford  H.  Perkins  ; 
108th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Oliver  H.  Palmer  ;  130th  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  I.  Zirm.  Third 
Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Max  Weber,*  (2)  Col.  John  W.  Andrews  ;  1st  Del., 
Col.  John  W.  Andrews,  Lieut.-Col.  Oliver  H.  Hopkinson  ;  5th  Md.,  Maj. 
Leopold  Blumenberg,  Capt.  E.  F.  M.  Faehtz  ;  4th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
D.  McGregor.  Unattached  Artillery,  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt,  G,  Capt. 
John  D.  Frank  ;  1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt.  B,  Capt,  John  G.  Hazard  ;  1st 
R.  I.  Light,  Batt,  G,  Capt.  Charles  D.  Owen. 

FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

FIRST  DIVISION, t  Maj.-Gen.  Darius  N.  Couch  : — First  Brigade,  Brig  - 
Gen.  Charles  Devens,  Jr. ;  7th  Mass.,  Col.  David  A.  Russell ;  10th  Mass., 
Col.  Henry  L.  Eustis ;  36th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  H.  Browne ;  2d  R.  L, 
Col.  Frank  Wheaton.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Albion  P.  Howe  ;  62d 
N.  Y.,  Col.  David  J.  Nevin  ;  93d  Pa.,  Col.  James  M.  McCarter  ;  98th  Pa., 
Col.  John  F.  Ballier  ;  102d  Pa,,  Col.  Thomas  A.  Rowley  ;  139th  Pa.,}  Col. 
Frank  H.  Collier.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Cochrane ;  65th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Alexander  Shaler  ;  67th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Julius  W.  Adams  ;  122d 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Silas  Titus  ;  23d  Pa.,  Col.  Thomas  H.  Neill ;  61st  Pa,,  Col. 
George  C.  Spear ;  82d  Pa.,  Col.  David  H.  Williams.  Artillery,  N.  Y. 
Light,  3d  Batt.,  \  Capt.  William  Stuart ;  1st  Pa.  Light,  Batt,  C,  Capt, 
Jeremiah  McCarthy ;  1st  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  D,  Capt.  Michael  Hall ,  2d 
U.  S.,  Batt.  G,  Lieut,  John  H.  Butler. 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER.     Escort, 
1st  Maine  Cavalry  (detachment),  Capt.  George  J.  Summat. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  George  W.  Morell  -.—First  Brigade,  Col. 
James  Barnes  ;  2d  Me.,  Col.  Charles  W.  Roberts  ;  18th  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Joseph  Hayes ;  22d  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  S.  Tilton  ;  1st  Mich.,  Capt. 
Emory  W.  Belton  ;  13th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Elisha  G.  Marshall ;  25th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Charles  A.  Johnson  ;  118th  Pa.,  Col.  Charles  M.  Prevost ;  Mass.  Sharp 
shooters,  2d  Co.,  Capt.  Lewis  E.  Wentworth.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Charles  Griffin  ;  2d  D.  of  C.,  Col.  Charles  M.  Alexander  ;  9th  Mass., 
Col.  Patrick  R.  Guiney  ;  32d  Mass.,  Col.  Francis  J.  Parker  ;  4th  Mich., 
Col.  Jonathan  W.  Childs ;  14th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  McQuade  ;  62d  Pa., 
Col.  Jacob  B.  Sweitzer.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  T.  B.  W.  Stockton  ;  20th 

*  Wounded  September  17. 

f  Assigned  to  the  Sixth  Corps  as  the  Third  Division,  September  26, 
1862. 
J  Joined  September  17.  §  Joined  September  15. 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR    ANTIETAM.  275 

Me.,  Col.  Adelbert  Ames  ;  16th  Mich.,  Lieut-Col.  Norval  E.  Welch  ;  12th 
N.  Y.,  Capt.  William  Huson  ;  17th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Nelson  B.  Bartram  ; 
44th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Freeman  Conner  ;  83d  Pa.,  Capt.  Orpheus  S.  Woodward  ; 
Mich.  Sharp-shooters,  Brady's  co.,  Lieut.  Jonas  H.  Titus,  Jr.  Artillery, 
Mass.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt.  Augustus  P.  Martin  ;  1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt. 
C,  Capt.  Richard  Waterman  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  D,  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Haz- 
lett.  Sharp-shooters,  1st  U.  S.,  Capt.  John  B.  Isler. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  George  Sykes  : — First  Brigade,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Robert  C.  Buchanan ;  3d  U.  S.,  Capt.  John  D.  Wilkins ;  4th  U.  S., 
Capt.  Hiram  Dryer;  12th  U.  S.,  1st  Battn.,  Capt.  Matthew  M.  Blunt; 
12th  U.  S.,  2d  Battn.,  Capt.  Thomas  M.  Anderson  ;  14th  U.  S.,  1st  Battn., 
Capt.  W.  Harvey  Brown  ;  14th  U.  S.,  2d  Battn.,  Capt.  David  B.  McKib- 
bin.  Second  Brigade,  Maj.  Charles  S.  Lovell ;  1st  and  6th  U.  S.,  Capt. 
Levi  C.  Bootes;  2d  and  10th  U.  S.,  Capt.  John  S.  Poland  ;  llth  U.  S., 
Capt.  DeL.  Floyd-Jones  ;  17th  U.  S.,  Maj.  George  L.  Andrews.  Third 
Brigade,  Col.  Gouverneur  K.  Warren  ;  5th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Cleveland  Wins- 
low  ;  19th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  W.  Marshall.  Artillery,  1st  U.  S., 
Batts.  E  and  G,  Lieut.  Alanson  M.  Randol ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  I,  Capt. 
Stephen  H.  Weed  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  K,  Lieut.  William  E.  Van  Reed. 

THIRD  DIVISION,*  Brig.-Gen.  Andrew  A.  Humphreys  -.—First  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Erastus  B.  Tyler ;  91st  Pa.,  Col.  Edgar  M.  Gregory  ; 
126th  Pa.,  Col.  James  G.  Elder  ;  129th  Pa.,  Col.  Jacob  G.  Frick ;  134th 
Pa.,  Col.  Matthew  S.  Quay.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Peter  H.  Allabach  ; 
123d  Pa.,  Col.  John  B.  Clark  ;  131st  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  B.  Shaut ; 
133d  Pa.,  Col.  Franklin  B.  Speakmaii ;  155th  Pa.,  Col.  Edward  J.  Allen. 
Artillery,  Capt.  Lucius  N.  Robinson  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt,  Al- 
inont  Barnes  ;  1st  Ohio  Light,  Batt.  L,  Capt.  Lucius  N.  Robinson.  Ar 
tillery  Reserve,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Hays  ;  1st  Battn.  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt. 
A,  Lieut.  Bernhard  Wever ;  1st  Battn.  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  B,  Lieut.  Al 
fred  von  Kleiser ;  1st  Battn.  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt.  Robert  Lang- 
ner  ;  1st  Battn.  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  D,  Capt.  Charles  Kusserow  ;  N.  Y. 
Light,  5th  Batt.,  Capt.  Elijah  D.  Taft ;  1st  U.  S.,  Batt.  K,  Capt.  William 
M.  Graham  ;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  G,  Lieut.  Marcus  P.  Miller. 


SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  WILLIAM  B.  FRANKI 
Escort,  6th  Pa.  Cav.,  Cos.  B  and  G,  Capt.  Henry  P.  Muirheid. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Maj  .-Gen.  Henry  W.  Slocum  '.—First  Brigade,  Col. 
Alfred  T.  A.  Torbert ;  1st  N.  J.,  Lieut.-Col.  Mark  W.  Collet ;  2d  N.  J., 
Col.  Samuel  L.  Buck ;  3d  N.  J.,  Col.  Henry  W.  Brown  ;  4th  N.  J.,  Col. 
William  B.  Hatch.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Joseph  J.  Bartlett ;  5th  Me., 
Col.  Nathaniel  J.  Jackson  ;  16th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joel  J.  Seaver  ;  27th 
N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Alexander  D.  Adams  ;  96th  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  L.  Cake. 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Newton  ;  18th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  George 
R.  Myers  ;  31st  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  E.  Pinto  ;  32d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Rod 
erick  Matheson  ;  Maj.  George  F.  Lemon  ;  95th  Pa.,  Col.  Gustavus  W. 
Town.  Artillery,  Capt.  Emory  Upton  ;  Md.  Light,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  John 

*  This  division  was  organized  September  12,  and  reached  the  battle 
field  of  Antietam  September  18. 


276  TKOM  MANASSAS  TO  APPOMATTOX. 

W.  Wolcott ;  Mass.  Light,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  Josiah  Porter ;  N.  J.  Light, 
Batt.  A,  Capt.  William  Hexamer ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batt,  D,  Lieut.  Edward 
B.  Williston. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  William  F.  Smith  -.—First  Brigade,  (1) 
Brig.-Gen.  Winfleld  S.  Hancock,*  (2)  Col.  Amasa  Cobb ;  6th  Me.,  Col. 
Hiram  Burnham  ;  43d  N.  Y.,  Maj.  John  Wilson  ;  49th  Pa,,  Lieut.-Col. 
William  Brisbane  ;  137th  Pa.,  Col.  Henry  M.  Bossert ;  5th  Wis.,  Col. 
Amasa  Cobb.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  T.  H.  Brooks ;  2d  Vt,, 
Maj.  James  H.  Walbridge  ;  8d  Vt.,  Col.  Breed  N.  Hyde  ;  4th  Vt.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Charles  B.  Stoughton  ;  5th  Vt.,  Col.  Lewis  A.  Grant ;  6th  Vt.,  Maj. 
Oscar  L.  Tuttle.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  William  H.  Irwin  ;  7th  Me.,  Maj. 
Thomas  W.  Hyde  ;  20th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Ernest  von  Vegesack  ;  33d  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  W.  Corning  ;  49th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  C.  Al- 
berger,  Maj.  George  W.  Johnson  ;  77th  N.  Y.,  Capt.  Nathan  S.  Babcock. 
Artillery,  Capt,  Romeyn  B.  Ayres  ;  Md.  Light,  Batt.  B,  Lieut.  Theodore 
J.  Vanneman  ;  N.  Y.  Light,  1st  Batt.,  Capt.  Andrew  Cowan  ;  5th  U.  S., 
Batt,  F,  Lieut.  Leonard  Martin. 

NINTH  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  AMBROSE  E.  BURNSIDE,! 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JESSE  L.  RENO,J  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JACOB  D. 
Cox.  Escort,  1st  Me.  Cav.,  Co.  G,  Capt.  Zebulon  B.  Blethen. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Orlando  B.  Willcox  '.—First  Brigade,  Col. 
Benjamin  C.  Christ ;  28th  Mass.,  Capt,  Andrew  P.  Carraher  ;  17th  Mich., 
Col.  William  H.  Withington  ;  79th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  David  Morrison  ; 
50th  Pa,,  Maj.  Edward  Overtoil,  Capt.  William  H.  Diehl.  Second  Bri 
gade,  Col.  Thomas  Welsh  ;  8th  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  Frank  Graves,  Maj. 
Ralph  Ely  ;  46th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  Gerhart ;  45th  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  John  I.  Curtin  ;  100th  Pa.,  Col.  David  A.  Leckey.  Artillery,  Mass. 
Light,  8th  Batt.,  Capt.  Asa  M.  Cook  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batt.  E,  Lieut.  Samuel 
N.  Benjamin. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  D.  Sturgis : — First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  James  Naglee  ;  2d  Md.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  Eugene  Duryea ;  6th 
N.  H.,  Col.  Simon  G.  Griffin  ;  9th  N.  H.,  Col.  Enoch  Q.  Fellows  ;  48th 
Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joshua  K.  Sigfried.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Edward 
Ferrero  ;  21st  Mass.,  Col.  William  S.  Clark  ;  35th  Mass.,  Col.  Edward  A. 
Wild,  Lieut-Col.  Sumner  Carruth  ;  51st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Robert  B.  Potter; 
51st  Pa.,  Col.  John  F.  Hartranft.  Artillery,  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  D,  Capt. 
John  W.  Durell ;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  E,  Capt,  Joseph  C.  Clark,  Jr. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Isaac  P.  Rodman  :  § — First  Brigade,  Col. 
Harrison  S.  Fairchild  ;  9th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Edgar  A.  Kimball ;  89th 
N.  Y.,  Maj.  Edward  Jardine  ;  103d  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Benjamin  Ringold.  Sec 
ond  Brigade,  Col.  Edward  Harland  ;  8th  Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  Hiram  Ap- 

*  Assigned  to  First  Division,  Second  Army  Corps,  September  17. 

t  On  the  16th  and  17th,  Major  General  Burnside  exercised  general 
command  on  the  left,  and  Brigadier-General  Cox  was  in  immediate 
command  of  the  corps. 

J  Killed  September  14. 

§  Wounded  September  17. 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG,  OR   ANTIETAM.  277 

pelman,  Maj.  John  E.  Ward ;  llth  Conn.,  Col.  Henry  W.  Kingsbury ; 
16th  Conn.,  Col.  Francis  Beach  ;  4th  R.  I.,  Col.  William  H.  P.  Steere, 
Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  B.  Curtis.  Artillery,  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  A,  Lieut.  Charles 
P.  Muhlenberg. 

KANAWHA  DIVISION,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Jacob  D.  Cox,  (2)  Col.  Eliakim  P. 
Seammon.  First  Brigade,  (1)  Col.  Eliakim  P.  Scammon,  (2)  Col.  Hugh 
Ewing  ;  12th  Ohio,  Col.  Carr  B.  White  ;  23d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Rutherford 
B.  Hayes,  Maj.  James  M.  Comly  ;  30th  Ohio,  Col.  Hugh  Ewing,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Theodore  Jones,  Maj.  George  H.  Hildt ;  Ohio  Light  Art.,  1st  Batt., 
Capt.  James  R.  McMullin  ;  Gilrnore's  co.  W.  Va.  Cav.,  Lieut.  James 
Abraham ;  Harrison's  co.  W.  Va.  Cav.,  Lieut.  Dennis  Delaney.  Sec 
ond  Brigade,  Col.  George  Crook  ;  llth  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Augustus  H. 
Coleman,  Maj.  Lyman  J.  Jackson  ;  28th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Gottfried 
Becker  ;  36th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Melvin  Clarke  ;  Schambeck's  co.  Chicago 
Dragoons,  Capt.  Frederick  Scharnbeck  ;  Ky.  Light  Art.,  Simmonds's 
battery,  Capt.  Seth  J.  Simmonds.  Unattached,  6th  N.  Y.  Cav.  (8  cos.), 
Col.  Thomas  C.  Devin  ;  Ohio  Cav.,  3d  Ind.  Co.,  Lieut.  Jonas  Seamen ; 
3d  U.  S.  Art.,  Batts.  L  and  M,  Capt.  John  Edwards,  Jr. 

TWELFTH  ARMY  CORPS,*  (1)  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOSEPH  K.  F.  MANS 
FIELD,  t  (2)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALPHEUS  S.  WILLIAMS.  Escort, 
1st  Mich.  Cav.,  Co.  L,  Capt.  Melvin  Brewer. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  Alpheus  S.  Williams,  (2)  Brig.-Gen. 
Samuel  W.  Crawford,  J  (3)  Brig.-Gen.  George  H.  Gordon.  First  Brigade, 
(1)  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  W.  Crawford,  (2)  Col.  Joseph  F.  Knipe  ;  5th  Conn., 
Capt.  Henry  W.  Daboll ;  10th  Me.,  Col.  George  L.  Beal ;  28th  N.Y.,  Capt. 
William  H.  H.  Mapes  ;  46th  Pa.,  Col.  Joseph  F.  Knipe,  Lieut.-Col.  James 
L.  Selfridge  ;  124th  Pa.,  Col.  Joseph  W.  Hawley,  Maj.  Isaac  L.  Halde- 
man  ;  125th  Pa.,  Col.  Jacob  Higgins ;  128th  Pa.,  Col.  Samuel  Croasdale, 
Lieut.-Col.  William  W.  Hamersly,  Maj.  Joel  B.  Wanner.  Third  Bri 
gade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  George  H.  Gordon,  (2)  Col.  Thomas  H.  Ruger  ;  27th 
Ind.,  Col.  Silas  Colgrove  ;  2d  Mass.,  Col.  George  L.  Andrews  ;  13th  N.  J., 
Col.  Ezra  A.  Carman  ;  107th  N.  Y.,  Col.  R.  B.  Van  Valkenburgh  ;  Zouaves 
d'Afrique,^  Pa. ;  3d  Wis.,  Col.  Thomas  H.  Ruger. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  George  S.  Greene : — First  Brigade,  (1) 
Lieut.-Col.  Hector  Tyndale,J  (2)  Maj.  Orrin  J.  Crane  ;  5th  Ohio,  Maj. 
John  Collins ;  7th  Ohio,  Maj.  Orrin  J.  Crane,  Capt.  Frederick  A.  Sey 
mour  ;  29th  Ohio,||  Lieut.  Theron  S.  Winship  ;  66th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Eugene  Powell ;  28th  Pa,,  Maj.  Ario  Pardee,  Jr.  /Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Henry  J.  Stainrook  ;  3d  Md.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  M.  Sudsburg  ;  102d  N.Y., 

*  Designation  changed  from  Second  Corps,  Army  of  Virginia,  to 
Twelfth  Army  Corps,  by  General  Orders,  No.  129,  Adjutant-General's 
Office,  September  12,  1862. 

f  Mortally  wounded  September  17. 

J  Wounded  September  17. 

$  No  officers  present ;  enlisted  men  of  company  attached  to  Second 
Massachusetts. 

11  Detached  September  9. 


278  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Lieut-Col.  James  C.  Lane  ;  109th  Pa.,*  Capt.  George  E.  Seymour  ;  lllth 
Pa.,  Maj.  Thomas  M.  Walker.  Third  Brigade,  (1)  Col.  William  B.  Good 
rich,!  (2)  Lieut.-Col.  Jonathan  Austin  ;  3d  Del.,  Maj.  Arthur  Maginnis  ; 
Purnell  Legion,  Md.,  Lieut.-Col.  Benjamin  L.  Simpson  ;  60th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Charles  R.  Brundage  ;  78th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Jonathan  Aus 
tin,  Capt.  Henry  R.  Stagg.  Artillery,  Capt.  Clermont  L.  Best ;  Me.  Light, 
4th  Batt.,  Capt.  O'Neil  W.  Robinson  ;  Me.  Light,  6th  Batt.,  Capt.  Free 
man  McGilvery  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  M.,  Capt.  George  W.  Cothran  ; 
N.  Y.  Light,  10th  Batt.,  Capt.  John  T.  Bruen  ;  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  E,  Capt. 
Joseph  M.  Knap  ;  Pa,  Light,  Batt,  F,  Capt.  Robert  B.  Hampton  ;  4th  U. 
S.,  Batt.  F,  Lieut,  Edward  D.  Muhlenberg. 

CAVALRY  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Pleasonton  : — First  Brigade, 
Maj.  Charles  J.  Whiting ;  5th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Joseph  H.  McArthur ;  6th  U. 
S.,  Capt.  William  P.  Sanders.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  John  F.  Farns- 
worth  ;  8th  111.,  Maj.  William  H.  Medill ;  3d  Ind.,  Maj.  George  H.  Chap 
man  ;  1st  Mass.,  Capt.  Casper  Crowninshield  ;  8th  Pa.,  Capt.  Peter  Kee- 
nan.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Richard  H.  Rush  ;  4th  Pa.,  Col.  James  H. 
Childs,  Lieut.-Col.  James  K.  Kerr  ;  6th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  Ross  Smith. 
Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  Andrew  T.  McReynolds  ;  1st  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Alonzo 
W.  Adams  ;  12th  Pa.,  Major  James  A.  Congdon.  Fifth  Brigade,  Col. 
Benj.  F.  Davis ;  8th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Benjamin  F.  Davis ;  3d  Pa,,  Lieut.-Col. 
Samuel  W.  Owen.  Artillery,  2d  U.  S.,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  John  C.  Tidball ; 
2d  U.  S.,  Batts.  B  and  L,  Capt.  James  M.  Robertson  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batt,  M. 
Lieut.  Peter  C.  Hains  ;  3d  U.  S.,  Batts.  C  and  G,  Capt.  Horatio  G.  Gib 
son.  Unattached,  1st  Me.  Cav.,J  Col.  Samuel  H.  Allen  ;  15th  Pa.  Cav. 
(detachment),  Col.  William  J.  Palmer. 

*  Detached  September  13. 

f  Killed  September  17. 

J  Detached  at  Frederick,  Md. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

EEVIEW    OF    THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN. 

Confederate  Expectations — General  Lee's  Salutatory  to  the  People  of 
Maryland — The  "Lost  Despatch" — McClellan's  Movements — Turn 
in  the  Tide  of  War— A  Miracle  great  as  the  throwing  down  of  the 
Walls  of  Jericho — In  Contempt  of  the  Enemy  the  Confederate  Army 
was  dispersed— Harper's  Ferry  a  u  Man-Trap"— It  diverted  the  Army 
from  the  Main  Issue — Lee  and  McClellan  compared  and  contrasted — 
Tribute  to  the  Confederate  Private  Soldier. 

FOR  conveying  to  the  reader  a  comprehensive  view  of 
the  military  zodiac  at  the  time  we  crossed  the  quiet 
Potomac,  the  5th  day  of  September,  1862,  and  an  under 
standing  of  the  logical  sequence  of  the  events  following, 
something  should  be  added  here  to  the  plain  narrative  of 
occurrences,  and  so  I  undertake  a  review  of  the  Maryland 
campaign. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  afield  without  a 
foe.  Its  once  grand  adversary,  discomfited  under  two 
commanders,  had  crept  into  cover  of  the  bulwarks  about 
the  national  capital.  The  commercial,  social,  and  blood 
ties  of  Maryland  inclined  her  people  to  the  Southern 
cause.  A  little  way  north  of  the  Potomac  were  inviting 
fields  of  food  and  supplies  more  plentiful  than  on  the 
southern  side ;  and  the  fields  for  march  and  manoeuvre, 
strategy  and  tactics,  were  even  more  inviting  than  the 
broad  fields  of  grain  and  comfortable  pasture-lands. 
Propitious  also  was  the  prospect  of  swelling  our  ranks  by 
Maryland  recruits. 

At  the  head  of  the  army  of  sixty  thousand  men  en 
couraged,  matured,  and  disciplined  by  victory  stood  the 
Confederate  chief,  challenging  on  its  own  soil  the  army 
that  had  marched  to  conquer  the  Southern  capital.  On 
the  7th  he  pitched  his  bivouac  about  Frederick  City.  On 

279 


280  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  8th  he  made  his  salutatory  to  the  people  in  these 
words : 

"  HE  AD-  QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"NEAR  FREDERICKTOWN,  MD.,  September  8,  1862. 
"To  THE  PEOPLE  OF  MARYLAND: 

"It  is  right  that  you  should  know  the  purpose  that  brought 
the  army  under  my  command  within  the  limits  of  your  State,  so 
far  as  that  purpose  concerns  yourselves.  The  people  of  the  Con 
federate  States  have  long  watched  with  the  deepest  sympathy  the 
wrongs  and  outrages  that  have  been  inflicted  upon  the  citizens  of 
a  commonwealth  allied  to  the  States  of  the  South  by  the  strongest 
social,  political,  and  commercial  ties.  They  have  seen  with  pro 
found  indignation  their  sister  State  deprived  of  every  right  and 
reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  conquered  province.  Under  the 
pretence  of  supporting  the  Constitution,  but  in  violation  of  its 
most  valuable  provisions,  your  citizens  have  been  arrested  and 
imprisoned  upon  no  charge  and  contrary  to  all  forms  of  law.  The 
faithful  and  manly  protest  against  this  outrage  made  by  the  ven 
erable  and  illustrious  Marylander,  to  whom  in  better  days  no 
citizen  appealed  for  right  in  vain,  was  treated  with  scorn  and 
contempt ;  the  government  of  your  chief  city  has  been  usurped 
by  armed  strangers  ;  your  legislature  has  been  dissolved  by  the 
unlawful  arrest  of  its  members ;  freedom  of  the  press  and  of 
speech  has  been  suppressed  ;  words  have  been  declared  offences 
by  an  arbitrary  decree  of  the  Federal  Executive,  and  citizens 
ordered  to  be  tried  by  a  military  commission  for  what  they  may 
dare  to  speak.  Believing  that  the  people  of  Maryland  possessed 
a  spirit  too  lofty  to  submit  to  such  a  government,  the  people  of 
the  South  have  long  wished  to  aid  you  in  throwing  off  this  foreign 
yoke,  to  enable  you  again  to  enjoy  the  inalienable  rights  of  free 
men,  and  to  restore  independence  and  sovereignty  to  your  State. 
In  obedience  to  this  wish,  our  army  has  come  among  you,  and  is 
prepared  to  assist  you  with  the  power  of  its  arms  in  regaining 
the  rights  of  which  you  have  been  despoiled. 

"This,  citizens  of  Maryland,  is  our  mission,  so  far  as  you  are 
concerned.  No  constraint  upon  your  free  will  is  intended  ;  no 
intimidation  will  be  allowed  within  the  limits  of  this  army,  at 
least.  Mary  landers  shall  once  more  enjoy  their  ancient  freedom 
of  thought  and  speech.  We  know  no  enemies  among  you,  and 
will  protect  all,  of  every  opinion.  It  is  for  you  to  decide  your 
destiny  freely  and  without  constraint.  This  army  will  respect 


KEVIEW    OF    THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  281 

your  choice,  whatever  it  may  be  5  and  while  the  Southern 
people  will  rejoice  to  welcome  you  to  your  natural  position 
among  them,  they  will  only  welcome  you  when  you  come  of  your 

own  free  will. 

"B.  E.  LEE, 
"  General,  Commanding." 

At  this  very  time  the  recently  displaced  commander, 
General  McClellan,  reinstated  in  command,  was  march 
ing  for  an  opportunity  to  recover  his  good  name,  and 
the  Union  cavalry  was  active  and  aggressive  in  work 
against  the  Confederates  at  Poolesville. 

On  the  9th  the  Confederate  commander  organized  his 
plans  for  the  surrounding  and  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  put  his  army  in  motion  on  the  10th.  Close  upon  the 
heels  of  the  march  followed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
only  twenty-five  miles  behind  the  rear  of  the  Confederate 
army,  with  the  cavalry  of  the  armies  in  contact.  The 
march  of  the  former  was  as  cautious  as  that  of  the  latter 
was  venturesome.  On  the  10th  the  Union  commander  was 
informed  of  the  march  of  J.  G.  Walker's  brigades  up  the 
river  from  Cheek's  Ford.  On  the  llth  his  signal  service 
reported  the  camp  across  the  river  at  Point  of  Rocks.  On 
the  12th,  at  Urbana,  he  was  informed  of  the  combination 
against  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  march  towards  the  Cum 
berland  Valley,  and  ordered  pressing  pursuit  to  force  the 
Confederates  to  a  stand.  Under  that  order  General  Pleas- 
onton,  the  Federal  cavalry  leader,  hurried  his  troops  and 
cleared  the  way  to  South  Mountain  on  the  13th.  From 
day  to  day  the  Confederates  marched  their  dispersing 
columns,  from  day  to  day  the  Union  columns  converged 
in  easy,  cautious  marches.  At  noon  of  the  13th,  General 
Lee's  order  distributing  his  forces  and  a  despatch  from 
the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  were  handed  General  Mc 
Clellan, — the  former  the  celebrated  "  lost  despatch," 
given  on  a  previous  page, — the  latter  reading  as  fol 
lows  : 


282  FllOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"  HARRISBURG,  PA.,  September  13, 1862. 
"  MAJOR  -GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN  : 

"When  may  we  expect  General  Beynolds  here?  Services 
needed  immediately.  Longstreet'  s  division  is  said  to  have  reached 
Hagerstown  last  night.  Jackson  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Wil- 
liamsport  to  capture  Martinsbnrg  and  Harper's  Ferry.  We  are 
assembling  militia  rapidly  at  Chambersburg.  Can  we  do  anything 

to  aid  your  movements  ? 

"A.  G.  CURTIN, 

"  Governor  of  Pennsylvania." 

This  told  of  the  change  of  march  of  my  brigades  from 
Turner's  Pass  to  Hagerstown,  and,  with  the  "lost  de 
spatch,"  revealed  that  Hill's  five  brigades  were  the  only 
troops  at  the  former  place. 

The  same  afternoon  General  McClellan's  signal  service 
despatched  him  that  the  Union  signal  station  on  Maryland 
Heights  had  gone  down.  General  Lee's  signals  failed  to 
connect,  so  that  General  McClellan  was  better  informed  of 
the  progress  of  the  Confederate  movements  than  was  the 
Confederate  commander.  That  afternoon  the  Union  army 
was  in  hand  for  battle.  The  Confederates  were  dispersed 
and  divided  by  rivers,  and  drifting  thirty  and  forty  and 
fifty  miles  apart.  Under  similar  circumstances  General 
Scott,  or  General  Taylor,  or  General  Worth  would  have 
put  the  columns  at  the  base  of  South  Mountain  before 
night,  and  would  have  passed  the  unguarded  gaps  before 
the  sun's  rays  of  next  morning  could  have  lighted  their 
eastern  slopes. 

The  Union  commander  claims  to  have  ordered  more 
vigorous  pursuit  after  the  "  lost  despatch"  was  handed 
him,  but  there  is  nothing  to  support  the  claim  except  his 
call  on  General  Franklin,  and  in  that  he  only  ordered 
preparation  at  Crampton's  to  await  events  at  Turner's 
Pass. 

General  Pleasonton  was  at  Turner's  Pass  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  13th,  and  made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  ways 
leading  up  the  east  side  of  the  mountain.  He  was  not 


REVIEW    OF    THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGNS  283 

informed  of  the  despatches  received  by  his  chief,  nor 
had  he  any  information  of  Confederate  movements  ex 
cept  such  as  he  had  gleaned  in  closely  following  their 
rear.  At  daylight  of  the  14th  he  led  General  Cox  and 
the  Ninth  Corps  to  attack,  and  in  this  manner  the  battle 
was  opened. 

His  orders  to  call  the  Confederates  to  a  stand  did  not 
anticipate  the  provocation  of  a  general  engagement,  but 
a  wait  for  his  chief,  who  rode  up  about  one  o'clock.  He 
thought  that  he  was  battling  against  seventeen  brigades, 
while  there  were  but  five ;  and,  had  the  battle  been  held 
in  wait  for  McClellan,  his  well-known  habit  of  careful 
reconnoissance  would  have  consumed  the  balance  of  the 
day.  His  last  orders  for  General  Franklin  directed  a  wait 
for  Couch's  division,  which  joined  him  at  eight  o'clock  in 
the  evening.  It  is  difficult  to  find  that  a  quicker  move 
was  given  the  Union  army  in  consequence  of  the  "  lost 
despatch  ;"  but  one  may  rather  concede  General  Hill's 
claim,  that  in  consequence  of  that  despatch  the  Union 
army  was  so  delayed  as  to  give  the  Confederates  time 
to  make  their  way  back  to  the  soil  of  "Old  Vir 
ginia."  Without  it,  the  main  column  of  the  Union 
forces  could  have  marched  through  Crampton's  Pass, 
and  relieved  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  14th,  but,  guided 
by  it,  their  commander  found  it  important  to  first  guard 
against  the  seventeen  brigades  that  should  be  at  Turner's 
Pass,  on  the  right  rear  of  a  column,  moving  against 
Crampton's. 

The  razing  of  the  walls  of  Jericho  by  encircling  marches 
of  priests  and  soldiers,  at  the  signal  of  long-drawn  blasts 
of  sacred  horns  and  shouts  of  the  multitude,  was  scarcely 
a  greater  miracle  than  the  transformation  of  the  con 
quering  army  of  the  South  into  a  horde  of  disordered 
fugitives  before  an  army  that  two  weeks  earlier  was  flying 
to  cover  under  its  homeward  ramparts. 

Providence  helps  those  who  can  avail  themselves  of 


284  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

His  tender  care,  but  permits  those  who  will  to  turn  from 
Him  to  their  own  arrogance.  That  His  gracious  hand  was 
with  the  Confederates  in  their  struggles  on  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  and  even  through  the  errors  of  the  Bull  Run 
campaign,  cannot  be  questioned.  When,  however,  in 
self-confidence,  they  lost  sight  of  His  helping  hand,  and 
in  contempt  of  the  enemy  dispersed  the  army,  they 
were  given  up  to  the  reward  of  vainglory.  That  the 
disaster  was  not  overwhelming  they  have  to  thank  the 
plodding  methods  of  the  Union  commander.  With  as 
much  faith  as  Captain  Joshua,  his  success  would  have 
been  as  complete. 

But  for  the  proper  solution  of  the  campaign  we  must 
turn  again  to  the  condition  of  the  Confederate  army  when 
it  crossed  into  Maryland.  It  was  then  all  that  its  leaders 
could  ask,  and  its  claim  as  master  of  the  field  was  estab 
lished,  but  it  was  worn  by  severe  marches  and  battles, 
and  in  need  of  rest.  Its  record  before  and  after  shows 
that,  held  in  hand  and  refreshed  by  easy  marchings  and 
comfortable  supplies,  it  would  have  been  prepared  to  main 
tain  its  supremacy.  The  first  necessity  was  a  little  time  to 
refresh,  while  the  grand  object  was  to  draw  the  enemy 
from  his  intrenched  lines  to  free  and  open  battle.  These 
facts  carefully  observed,  the  Confederate  army  would  have 
been  assured  of  its  claim  and  prestige. 

In  the  confusion  about  Washington  incident  to  the 
Bull  Run  campaign,  General  McClellan  was  ordered  to 
receive  the  retreating  columns  and  post  them  to  defend 
and  hold  their  fortified  lines.  He  had  not  emerged  from 
the  clouds  that  hung  about  his  untoward  campaign  in 
Virginia,  but,  familiar  with  the  provisions  that  had  been 
made  for  defence,  he  was  most  available  for  the  service. 
He  had  hardly  posted  the  troops  and  arranged  the  gar 
rison  when  he  found  that  the  Confederates,  instead  of 
moving  against  his  fortifications,  had  turned  the  head  of 
their  columns  north,  and  were  marching  to  invade  Union 


KEVIEW    OF    THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  285 

territory.  He  was  quick  to  discover  his  opportunity,  and, 
after  posting  guards  for  the  works  about  the  capital,  as 
sumed  command  of  the  army  and  took  the  field,  lest 
another  commander  should  be  assigned.  His  clouded 
fame  and  assumption  of  authority  committed  him  to  early 
aggressive  work.  He  had  nothing  to  lose,  but  the  world 
to  gain,  and  that  upon  the  field  of  battle. 

All  that  the  Confederates  had  to  do  was  to  hold  the 
army  in  hand  and  draw  the  enemy  to  a  field  wide  enough 
for  manoeuvre ;  then  call  him  to  his  battle.  It  is  possible 
that  ragged  affairs  about  the  mountain  passes  might  have 
given  him  safe  retreat  to  his  capital,  leaving  the  army  of 
the  South  afield,  a  free  lance. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  the  Southern  President 
should  join  the  troops,  and  from  the  head  of  his  victo 
rious  army  call  for  recognition.  Maryland  would  have 
put  out  some  of  her  resources,  and  her  gallant  youth 
would  have  helped  swell  the  Southern  ranks, — the  twenty 
thousand  soldiers  who  had  dropped  from  the  Confederate 
ranks  during  the  severe  marches  of  the  summer  would 
have  been  with  us.  Volunteers  from  all  parts  of  the 
South  would  have  come,  swimming  the  Potomac  to  find 
their  President  and  his  field-marshal,  while  Union  troops 
would  have  been  called  from  Kentucky  and  Tennes 
see,  and  would  have  left  easy  march  for  the  Confederate 
armies  of  the  West  to  the  Ohio  River. 

Even  though  the  Confederates  were  not  successful, 
the  fall  elections  were  against  the  Federal  adminis 
tration.  With  the  Southern  armies  victorious,  the  re 
sults  of  the  contest  at  the  polls  would  have  been  so 
pronounced  as  to  have  called  for  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy. 

General  McClellan  wrote  General  Halleck  of  the  effect, 
in  case  of  defeat  of  his  army, — 

"But  if  we  should  be  so  unfortunate  as  to  meet  with  defeat, 
our  country  is  at  their  mercy.'7 


286  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

So  much  has  been  said  and  written  about  Harper's 
Ferry  and  the  surrender  of  the  garrison,  that  it  seems 
difficult  to  pass  it  without  notice.  In  more  than  one 
report  General  McClellan  mentioned  it  as  a  "  shameful" 
surrender.  He  had  disapproved  the  position  as  false,  and 
asked  if  it  could  not  be  given  up.  Colonel  Miles,  the  com 
mander,  who  gave  his  life  in  its  defence,  was  acting  under 
the  following  order  from  the  department  commander, — 


' '  BALTIMORE,  September  5,  1862. 
1 1  COLONEL  MILES,  HARPER'  s  FERRY  : 

"The  position  on  the  heights  ought  to  enable  you  to  punish  the 
enemy  passing  up  the  road  in  the  direction  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
Have  your  wits  about  you,  and  do  all  you  can  to  annoy  the  rebels 
should  they  advance  on  you.  Activity,  energy,  and  decision  must 
be  used.  You  will  not  abandon  Harper's  Ferry  without  defend 
ing  it  to  the  last  extremity. 

"JOHN  E.  WOOL, 

u  Major -General."  * 

The  simple  truth  is,  it  was  defended  to  the  last  extrem 
ity.  The  nearer  the  approach  of  the  succoring  army,  the 
more  imperative  would  have  been  the  demand  for  action 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  columns,  and  had  battle 
been  forced  it  could  not  possibly  have  resulted  in  any  save 
one  way, — Confederate  victory,  and  an  overwhelming  one 
at  that. 

The  position  was  denounced  as  a  "  man-trap/'  and  so  it 
proved  to  Colonel  Miles  and  his  eleven  thousand  troops, 
but  it  was  in  fact  a  far  more  formidable  trap  for  the  Con 
federates,  who  to  seize  it  sacrificed  the  fruits  of  heavy 
waTj — victory  in  the  main  battle  of  the  campaign, — and 
were  forced  to  draw  their  crippled  ranks  to  homeward 
defence.  General  Jackson  wanted  it  till  he  got  posses 
sion  ;  then  gave  it  up.  General  McClellan  wanted  to 
give  it  up  before  it  was  taken.  After  it  had  been  taken 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xix.  part  i.  p.  520. 


REVIEW    OF    THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  287 

and  given  up,  he  reoccupied  it.  It  was  left  severely  alone 
in  the  Gettysburg  campaign, — an  admission  by  both  sides 
of  its  uselessness  as  a  point  d'appui. 

A  word  in  closing  about  the  chiefs  opposed  in  this  great 
campaign.  General  Lee  and  General  McClellan  were 
both  graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point.  The  former  took  the  second  honor  of  the 
class  of  1829,  the  latter  the  second  honor  of  the  class  of 
1846.  Their  service  in  the  United  States  army  was  as 
military  engineers.  In  1854  they  were  both  selected  by 
Secretary  of  War  Jefferson  Davis  for  promotion  to  the 
new  cavalry  regiments  as  lieutenant-colonel  and  captain 
respectively.  Their  early  opportunities,  social  and  educa 
tional,  were  superior.  They  studiously  improved  them  in 
youth,  and  applied  them  with  diligence  in  after-life.  Aspi 
rations  leading  to  the  higher  walks  of  social  and  profes 
sional  life  seem  to  have  been  alike  controlling  forces  in 
the  character  and  career  of  each.  They  were  not  un 
mindful  that  physical  development  was  important  in  sup 
port  of  mental  improvement.  In  moral  tone  and  habits 
they  may  be  called  exemplars.  In  his  service,  General 
Lee's  pride  was  duty  to  his  government  and  to  the  army 
under  his  command.  He  loved  admiration  of  the  outside 
world,  but  these  duties  better.  General  McClellan's  am 
bition  was  not  so  limited. 

In  stature  General  Lee  stood  five  feet  ten  inches,  was 
of  well-developed  muscular  figure,  as  trim  as  a  youth,  and 
weighed  one  hundred  and  seventy  pounds.  In  features  he 
was  a  model  of  manly  beauty.  His  teeth  were  of  ivory 
whiteness ;  his  mouth  handsome  and  expressive  of  frank 
ness,  kindness,  and  generosity.  His  nose  and  chin  were 
full,  regular,  strong,  and  gave  his  face  force  and  character. 
'Twas  seldom  that  he  allowed  his  mind  to  wander  to  the 
days  of  his  childhood,  and  talk  of  his  father  and  his  early 
associates,  but  when  he  did,  he  was  far  more  charming 
than  he  thought.  As  a  commander  he  was  much  of  the 


288  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Wellington  "  Up-and-at-'em"  style.  He  found  it  hard, 
the  enemy  in  sight,  to  withhold  his  blows.  With  Mc 
Clellan  it  was  more  difficult  to  strike  than  to  march  for 
the  enemy. 

General  McClellan  was  of  short,  stout  figure,  but  was 
of  soldierly  presence,  graceful,  and  handsome-featured. 

In  their  mounts  neither  of  the  great  commanders  lost 
anything  of  his  admirable  presence.  Both  were  masters 
of  the  science  but  not  of  the  art  of  war.  Lee  was  suc 
cessful  in  Virginia ;  McClellan  in  Maryland. 

Unjust  criticism  has  been  passed  upon  the  Confederate 
soldiers  in  the  Maryland  campaign,  based  principally  upon 
the  great  number  of  absentees.  To  those  who  have  spent 
their  lives  near  the  ranks  of  soldiers  and  learned  from 
experience  that  there  is  a  limit  to  physical  endurance, 
explanation  is  not  called  for  ;  to  those  who  look  upon  the 
soldier  as  a  machine,  not  even  needing  oil  to  facilitate 
motive  power,  I  will  say,  try  to  put  yourselves  in  the  sol 
diers'  places.  Another  point  to  be  noted  was,  that  in  the 
Confederate  ranks  there  were  thousands  of  soldiers  who 
had  been  wounded  once,  twice,  and  in  some  instances 
three  times,  who  in  any  other  service  would  have  been 
on  the  pension-rolls  at  their  comfortable  homes. 

Sickness  and  weakness  that  creep  into  an  army  from 
irregular  food,  collected  in  the  stress  of  march,  were  no 
trifling  impediments  to  the  maintenance  of  our  ranks  in 
vigorous  form. 

When,  in  mature  judgment,  the  historian  builds  monu 
ments  of  words  for  the  leaders  of  the  campaign  in  Mary 
land,  there  will  be  flowers  left  for  the  private  soldiers,  and 
for  the  private  soldiers'  graves. 

The  full  significance  of  Sharpsburg  to  the  Federal  au 
thorities  lay  in  the  fact  that  they  needed  a  victory  on 
which  to  issue  the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  which 
President  Lincoln  had  prepared  two  months  before  and 
had  held  in  abeyance  under  advice  of  members  of  his 


REVIEW    OF    THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN.  289 

\ 

Cabinet  until  the  Union  arms  should  win  a  success. 
Although  this  battle  was  by  no  means  so  complete  a  vic 
tory  as  the  President  wished,  and  he  was  sorely  vexed 
with  General  McClellan  for  not  pushing  it  to  completion, 
it  was  made  the  most  of  as  a  victory,  and  his  Emancipa 
tion  Proclamation  was  issued  on  the  22d  of  September, 
five  days  after  the  battle.  This  was  one  of  the  decisive 
political  events  of  the  war,  and  at  once  put  the  great 
struggle  outwardly  and  openly  upon  the  basis  where  it 
had  before  only  rested  by  tacit  and  covert  understanding. 
If  the  Southern  army  had  been  carefully  held  in  hand, 
refreshed  by  easy  marches  and  comfortable  supplies,  the 
proclamation  could  not  have  found  its  place  in  history. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Southern  President  would  have 
been  in  Maryland  at  the  head  of  his  army  with  his  mani 
festo  for  peace  and  independence. 


CHAPTEE    XXL 

REOKGANIZATION    AND    BEST    FOR    BOTH    AKMIES. 

The  Confederates  appoint  Seven  Lieutenant-Generals — The  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  organized  in  Corps — General  McClellan  relieved, 
and  General  Burnside  appointed  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac — A  Lift  for  the  South — McClellan  was  growing — Burnside's 
"  Three  Grand  Divisions"— The  Campaign  of  the  Rappahannock— 
Getting  Ready  for  Fredericksburg — Longstreet  occupies  Fredericks- 
burg — The  Town  called  to  surrender  by  General  Sumner — Exodus  of 
the  Inhabitants  under  a  Threat  to  shell  the  Town. 

UNDER  an  act  not  long  before  passed  by  the  Confed 
erate  Congress  authorizing  the  appointment  of  seven 
lieutenant-generals,  the  authorities  at  Richmond  about 
this  time  sent  commissions  to  Lieutenant-Generals  Long- 
street,  Polk,  Holmes,  Hardee,  E.  K.  Smith,  Jackson,  and 
Pemberton,  and  made  appointments  of  a  number  of 
major-generals.  Under  these  appointments  General  Lee 
organized  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  into  corps 
substantially  as  it  subsequently  fought  the  battle  of  Fred 
ericksburg.* 

The  Confederate  army  rested  along  the  lines  between 
the  Potomac  and  Winchester  till  late  in  October.  On  the 
8th,  General  Stuart  was  ordered  across  to  ride  around  the 
Union  army,  then  resting  about  Sharpsburg  and  Har 
per's  Ferry.  His  ride  caused  some  excitement  among  the 
Union  troops,  and  he  got  safely  to  the  south  side  with  the 
loss  of  a  few  men  slightly  wounded,  on  the  12th.  On  the 
26th,  General  McClellan  marched  south  and  crossed  the 
Potomac  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  Jackson  was  assigned 
the  duty  of  guarding  the  passes.  I  marched  south,  cor 
responding  with  the  march  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

*  See  organization  of  the  army  appended  to  account  of  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg. 
290 


LIEUTENANT-GENERAL   JAMES    LONGSTREET  (1862). 


REORGANIZATION    AND    REST    FOR    BOTH    ARMIES.       291 

A  division  crossed  at  Ashby's  Gap  to  Upperville  to  look 
for  the  head  of  McClellan's  army.  He  bore  farther  east 
ward  and  marched  for  Warrenton,  where  he  halted  on 
the  5th  of  November.  The  division  was  withdrawn  from 
Upperville  and  marched  for  Culpeper  Court-House,  ar 
riving  at  that  point  at  the  same  time  as  McClellan's  at 
Warrenton, — W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry  the  day  before  me. 
Soon  after  the  return  to  Culpeper  Court-House,  Evans's 
brigade  was  relieved  of  duty  with  the  First  Corps  and 
ordered  south.  Hood  had  a  brush  with  a  cavalry  force  at 
Manassas  Gap,  and  part  of  McLaws's  division  a  similar 
experience  at  the  east  end  of  Chester  Gap. 

I  reached  Culpeper  Court-House  with  the  divisions  of 
McLaws,  E.  H.  Anderson,  and  Pickett.  Hood's  division 
was  ordered  behind  Kobertson  Eiver,  and  Ransom  to 
Madison  Court-House,  General  Jackson  with  the  Second 
Corps  remaining  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  except  one 
division  at  Chester  Gap  of  the  Blue  Ridge. 

The  Washington  authorities  issued  orders  on  the  5th 
of  November  relieving  General  McClellan  of,  and  assign 
ing  General  Burnside  to,  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  On  the  9th  the  army  was  put  under  General 
Burnside,  in  due  form. 

When  informed  of  the  change,  General  Lee  expressed 
regret,  as  he  thought  that  McClellan  could  be  relied  upon 
to  conform  to  the  strictest  rules  of  science  in  the  conduct 
of  war.  He  had  been  McClellan's  preceptor,  they  had 
served  together  in  the  engineer  corps,  and  our  chief  thought 
that  he  thoroughly  understood  the  displaced  commander. 
The  change  was  a  good  lift  for  the  South,  however ;  Mc 
Clellan  was  growing,  was  likely  to  exhibit  far  greater 
powers  than  he  had  yet  shown,  and  could  not  have  given 
us  opportunity  to  recover  the  morale  lost  at  Sharpsburg, 
as  did  Burnside  and  Hooker. 

General  Burnside,  soon  after  assuming  command,  and 
while  waiting  at  Warrenton,  made  a  radical  change  in  the 


292  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

organization  of  the  army  by  consolidating  the  corps  into 
three  "  Grand  Divisions"  as  follows : 

THE  RIGHT  GRAND  DIVISION,  GENERAL  SUMNER  COMMANDING.— 
Second  Army  Corps,  General  D.  W.  Couch  ;  Ninth  Army  Corps,  Gen 
eral  O.  B.  Wilcox. 

CENTRE  GRAND  DIVISION,  GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER  COMMANDING. 
—Third  Army  Corps,  General  George  Stonemaii ;  Fifth  Army  Corps, 
General  Daniel  Butterfield. 

LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION,  GENERAL  W.  B.  FRANKLIN  COMMANDING. 
—First  Army  Corps,  General  J.  F.  Reynolds  ;  Sixth  Army  Corps,  Gen 
eral  W.  F.  Smith. 

CAVALRY  DIVISION.  —General  Alfred  Pleasonton. 

Artillery,  siege,  and  field  batteries,  370  guns,  General  Henry  J.  Hunt, 
Chief. 

At  the  time  of  the  change  of  commanders  the  Con 
federates  were  looking  for  a  Federal  move  north  of  Cul- 
peper  Court-House,  and  were  surveying  the  ground  be 
hind  Robertson  River  for  a  point  of  concentration  of  the 
two  wings  to  meet  that  move. 

General  Burnside,  however,  promptly  planned  opera 
tions  on  other  lines.  He  submitted  to  President  Lincoln 
his  proposition  to  display  some  force  in  the  direction  of 
Gordonsville  as  a  diversion,  while  with  his  main  army  he 
would  march  south,  cross  the  Rappahannock  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  and  reach  by  a  surprise  march  ground  nearer 
Richmond  than  the  holdings  of  the  Confederates.  This 
was  approved  by  the  President  with  the  suggestion  that 
its  success  depended  upon  prompt  execution. 

On  the  15th  light  began  to  break  upon  the  Confeder 
ates,  revealing  a  move  south  from  Warrenton,  but  it  was 
not  regarded  as  a  radical  change  from  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad  line  of  advance.  A  battery  of  ar 
tillery  was  sent  with  a  regiment  of  infantry  to  reinforce 
the  Confederate  outpost  at  Fredericksburg  under  Colonel 
Ball. 

On  the  17th  information  came  that  the  Right  Grand  Di 
vision  under  General  Sumner  had  inarched  south,  leaving 


REORGANIZATION    AND    REST    FOR    BOTH    ARMIES.       293 

the  railroad,  and  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry  was 
ordered  to  Fredericksburg. 

The  next  morning  I  marched  with  two  divisions,  Mc- 
Laws's  and  Ransom's,  the  former  for  Fredericksburg,  the 
latter  towards  the  North  Anna.  The  same  day,  General 
Lee  ordered  a  forced  reconnoissance  by  his  cavalry  to 
Warrenton,  found  that  the  Union  army  was  all  on  the 
march  towards  Fredericksburg,  and  ordered  my  other 
divisions  to  follow  on  the  19th. 

At  the  first  disclosure  he  was  inclined  to  move  for  a  po 
sition  behind  the  North  Anna,  as  at  that  time  the  position 
behind  Fredericksburg  appeared  a  little  awkward  for  the 
Confederates,  but,  taking  into  careful  consideration  the 
position  of  the  Union  army  on  the  Stafford  side,  the 
former  appeared  the  less  faulty  of  the  two.  Defence  be 
hind  the  Anna  would  have  been  stronger,  but  the  ad 
vantage  of  the  enemy's  attack  would  also  have  been  en 
hanced  there.  Then,  too,  anticipation  of  the  effect  of 
surprising  the  enemy  in  their  intended  surprise  had  some 
influence  in  favor  of  Fredericksburg. 

The  Burnside  march  was  somewhat  of  the  Horace 
Greeley  "  On-to-Richmond"  nolcns-volens  style,  which,  if 
allowed  to  run  on  long  enough,  sometimes  gains  headway 
that  is  troublesome. 

General  Sumner  reached  Falmouth  on  the  17th,  and 
proposed  to  cross,  but  his  advance  was  met  and  forced 
back  by  Colonel  Ball's  command. 

I  rode  with  the  leading  division  for  Fredericksburg, 
and  was  on  the  heights  on  the  19th.  My  head-quarters 
were  there  when  General  Sumner  called  upon  the  civil 
authorities  to  surrender  the  city  by  the  following  commu 
nication  : 

"  HE  AD  -QUARTERS   ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC, 

"November  21,  1862. 
"  MAYOR  AND  COMMON  COUNCIL  OF  FREDERICKSBURG  : 

"  GENTLEMEN, — Under  cover  of  the  houses  of  your  city  shots 
have  been  fired  upon  the  troops  of  my  command.  Your  mills 


294  FROM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  manufactories  are  furnishing  provisions  and  the  material  for 
clothing  for  armed  bodies  in  rebellion  against  the  government  of 
the  United  States.  Your  railroads  and  other  means  of  transpor 
tation  are  removing  supplies  to  the  depots  of  such  troops.  This 
condition  of  things  must  terminate,  and,  by  direction  of  General 
Burnside,  I  accordingly  demand  the  surrender  of  the  city  into 
my  hands,  as  the  representative  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  at  or  before  five  o'clock  this  afternoon. 

"  Failing  an  affirmative  reply  to  this  demand  by  the  hour  indi 
cated,  sixteen  hours  will  be  permitted  to  elapse  for  the  removal 
from  the  city  of  women  and  children,  the  sick  and  wounded  and 
aged,  etc.,  which  period  having  expired,  I  shall  proceed  to  shell 
the  town.  Upon  obtaining  possession  of  the  city,  every  necessary 
means  will  be  taken  to  preserve  order  and  secure  the  protective 
operation  of  the  laws  and  policy  of  the  United  States  govern 
ment. 

6 '  I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"E.    V.    SUMNER, 

"  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  Army,  commanding  Eight  Grand  Division.1'1  * 

The  officers  who  received  the  call,  by  consent  of  Gen 
eral  Patrick,  who  delivered  it,  referred  the  paper  to  my 
head-quarters.  I  asked  the  civil  authorities  to  reply  that 
the  city  would  not  be  used  for  the  purposes  complained  of, 
but  that  neither  the  town  nor  the  south  side  of  the  river 
could  be  occupied  by  the  Union  army  except  by  force  of 
arms. 

General  Sumner  ordered  two  batteries  into  position 
commanding  the  town,  but  in  a  few  hours  received  the 
following  reply  from  the  mayor : 

"  MAYOR'S  OFFICE, 

"  FREDERICKSBURG,  November  21,  1862. 
"  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  V.  SUMNER, 

1  i  Commanding  U.  8.  Army  : 

"SiR,—  I  have  received,  at  4.40  o'clock  this  afternoon,  your 
communication  of  this  date.  In  it  you  state  that,  under  cover 
of  the  houses  of  this  town,  shots  have  been  fired  upon  the  troops 
of  your  command  ;  that  our  mills  and  manufactories  are  furnish 
ing  provisions  and  the  material  for  clothing  for  armed  bodies  in 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxi.   part  i.  p.  783. 


REORGANIZATION    AND    REST    FOR    BOTH    ARMIES.       295 

rebellion  against  the  government  of  the  United  States  ;  that  our 
railroads  and  other  means  of  transportation  are  removing  sup 
plies  to  the  depots  of  such  troops  ;  that  this  condition  of  things 
must  terminate  ;  that,  by  command  of  Major-General  Burnside, 
you  demand  the  surrender  of  this  town  into  your  hands,  as  the 
representative  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  at  or  be 
fore  five  o'clock  this  afternoon  ;  that,  failing  an  affirmative  reply 
to  this  demand  by  the  time  indicated,  sixteen  hours  will  be  per 
mitted  to  elapse  for  the  removal  from  the  town  of  the  women  and 
children,  the  sick,  wounded,  and  aged,  which  period  having 
elapsed,  you  will  proceed  to  shell  the  town. 

"In  reply  I  have  to  say  that  this  communication  did  not  reach 
me  in  time  to  convene  the  Council  for  its  consideration,  and  to 
furnish  a  reply  by  the  hour  indicated  (five  P.M.).  It  was  sent  to 
me  through  the  hands  of  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  near  this  town,  to  whom  it  was  first  delivered,  by 
consent  of  General  Patrick,  who  bore  it  from  you,  as  I  am  in 
formed,  and  I  am  authorized  by  the  commander  of  the  Confed 
erate  army  to  say  that  there  was  no  delay  in  passing  it  through 
his  hands  to  me. 

"In  regard  to  the  matters  complained  of  by  you,  the  firing  of 
shot  upon  your  troops  occurred  upon  the  northern  suburbs  of  the 
town,  and  was  the  act  of  the  military  officer  commanding  the 
Confederate  forces  near  here,  for  which  matter  (neither)  the  citi 
zens  nor  civil  authorities  of  this  town  are  responsible.  In  regard 
to  the  other  matters  of  complaint,  I  am  authorized  by  the  latter 
officer  to  say  that  the  condition  of  things  therein  complained  of 
shall  no  longer  exist ;  that  your  troops  shall  not  be  fired  on  from 
this  town  ;  that  the  mills  and  manufactories  here  will  not  furnish 
any  further  supplies  of  provisions  or  material  for  clothing  for 
the  Confederate  troops,  nor  will  the  railroads  or  other  means  of 
transportation  here  convey  supplies  from  the  town  to  the  depots 
of  said  troops. 

' '  Outside  of  the  town  the  civil  authorities  of  Fredericksburg 
have  no  control,  but  I  am  assured  by  the  military  authorities  of 
the  Confederate  army  near  here  that  nothing  will  be  done  by 
them  to  infringe  the  conditions  herein  named  as  to  matters  within 
the  town.  But  the  latter  authorities  inform  us  that,  while  their 
troops  will  not  occupy  the  town,  they  will  not  permit  yours  to 
do  so. 

' '  You  must  be  aware  that  there  will  not  be  more  than  three  or 
four  hours  of  daylight  within  the  sixteen  hours  given  by  you  for 
the  removal  of  the  sick  and  wounded,  the  women  and  children, 


296  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  aged  and  infirm,  from  this  place  ;  and  I  have  to  inform  you 
that,  while  there  is  no  railroad  transportation  accessible  to  the 
town,  because  of  the  interruption  thereof  by  your  batteries,  all 
other  means  of  transportation  within  the  town  are  so  limited  as 
to  render  the  removal  of  the  classes  of  persons  spoken  of  within 
the  time  indicated  as  an  utter  impossibility. 

i  i  I  have  convened  the  Council,  which  will  remain  in  session 
awaiting  any  further  communications  you  may  have  to  make. 
* '  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"M.  SLAUGHTER, 
"Mayor." 

To  this  General  Sumner  responded  the  same  day, — 

"  MAYOR  AND  COMMON  COUNCIL  OF  FREDERICKSBURG,  VA.  : 

"  Your  letter  of  this  afternoon  is  at  hand,  and,  in  consideration 
of  your  pledges  that  the  acts  complained  of  shall  cease,  and  that 
your  town  shall  not  be  occupied  by  any  of  the  enemy's  forces, 
and  your  assertion  that  a  lack  of  transportation  renders  it  impos 
sible  to  remove  the  women,  children,  sick,  wounded,  and  aged,  I 
am  authorized  to  say  to  you  that  our  batteries  will  not  open  upon 
your  town  at  the  hour  designated. 

"General  Patrick  will  meet  a  committee  or  representative 
from  your  town  to-morrow  morning,  at  nine  o'clock,  at  the  Lacy 

House. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"E.  V.  SUMNER, 
"  Brevet  Major- General,  U.  8.  Army,  Commanding  Division." 

As  the  inference  from  the  correspondence  was  that  the 
shelling  was  only  postponed,  the  people  were  advised  to 
move  with  their  valuables  to  some  place  of  safety  as  soon 
as  possible.  Without  complaint,  those  who  could,  packed 
their  precious  effects  and  moved  beyond  reach  of  the 
threatened  storm,  but  many  preferred  to  remain  and  en 
counter  the  dangers  rather  than  to  leave  their  homes  and 
valuables.  The  fortitude  with  which  they  bore  their  trials 
quickened  the  minds  of  the  soldiers  who  were  there  to 
defend  them.  One  train  leaving  with  women  and  chil 
dren  was  fired  upon,  making  some  confusion  and  dismay 
among  them,  but  the  two  or  three  shells  did  no  other 
mischief,  and  the  firing  ceased. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

BATTLE    OF    FKEDERICKSBURG. 

Description  of  the  Field— Marye's  Heights— Position  of  the  Troops  of 
Longstreet's  Command— General  Jackson  called  down  from  Orange 
Court-House,  and  Preparations  made  for  a  Determined  Stand— Signal 
Guns  at  Three  o'Clock  in  the  Morning  announce  the  Long-Expected 
Battle— Burnside's  Bridge-Builders  thrice  driven  back  from  their 
Work— The  Crossing  finally  made  by  Boats— Federals  under  Hot 
Fire  enter  Fredericksburg— How  they  obtained  their  Foothold  on 
the  West  Bank  of  the  Kappahannock— Gallant  Officers  and  Men— 
Ninety-seven  killed  or  wounded  in  the  Space  of  Fifty  Yards— Gen 
eral  Burnside's  Plan  of  Battle— Strength  of  the  Contending  Forces. 

McLAWs's  division  of  my  corps  was  posted  on  the 
heights  in  rear  of  the  city,  one  brigade  in  the  sunken  road 
in  front  of  the  Marye  mansion,  the  others  extending  across 
the  Telegraph  road  through  the  wood  of  Lee's  Hill. 
As  the  other  divisions  of  the  corps  came  up  they  were 
posted,  R.  H.  Anderson  on  Taylor's  Hill;  Ransom  in 
reserve,  near  corps  head-quarters ;  Pickett  in  the  wood, 
in  rear  of  McLaws's  right ;  Hood  at  Hamilton's  Crossing. 

The  Federal  Grand  Divisions  under  Franklin  and 
Hooker  marched  on  the  18th  of  November,  and  on  the 
19th  pitched  their  camps,  the  former  at  Stafford  Court- 
House,  and  the  latter  at  Hartwood,  each  about  ten  miles 
from  Falmouth.  A  mile  and  a  half  above  Fredericksburg 
the  Kappahannock  cuts  through  a  range  of  hills,  which 
courses  on  the  north  side  in  a  southeasterly  direction,  nearly 
parallel,  and  close  to  its  margin.  This  range  (Stafford 
Heights)  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  for  his  batteries  of 
position,  one  hundred  and  forty-seven  siege  guns  and 
long-range  field  batteries.  These  heights  not  only  com 
mand  those  of  the  west,  but  the  entire  field  and  flats 
opened  by  the  spreading  out  of  the  range  on  the  west 
side.  At  points,  however,  they  stand  so  close  beside  the 


297 


298  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

river  that  the  guns  on  their  crest  could  not  be  so  depressed 
as  to  plunge  their  fire  to  the  water.  The  heights  are  cut 
at  points  by  streamlets  and  ravines  leading  into  the  river, 
and  level  up  gradually  as  they  approach  nearer  to  the 
Potomac  on  its  west  slope,  and  towards  the  sea  on  the 
south.  The  city  of  Fredericksburg  nestles  under  those 
heights  on  the  opposite  bank.  McLaws  had  a  brigade 
on  picket  service,  extending  its  guard  up  and  down  the 
banks  of  the  river,  in  connection  with  details  from  R.  H. 
Anderson's  division  above  and  Hood's  below,  the  latter 
meeting  Stuart's  cavalry  vedettes  lower  down. 

At  the  west  end  of  the  ridge  where  the  river  cuts 
through  is  Taylor's  Hill  (the  Confederate  left),  which 
stands  at  its  highest  on  a  level  with  Stafford  Heights. 
From  that  point  the  heights  on  the  south  side  spread, 
unfolding  a  valley  about  a  mile  in  width,  affording  a 
fine  view  of  the  city,  of  the  arable  fields,  and  the  heights 
as  they  recede  to  the  vanishing  limits  of  sight.  Next  be 
low  Taylor's  is  Marye's  Hill,  rising  to  half  the  elevation 
of  the  neighboring  heights  and  dropping  back,  leaving  a 
plateau  of  half  a  mile,  and  then  swelling  to  the  usual 
altitude  of  the  range.  On  the  plateau  is  the  Marye  man 
sion.  Along  its  base  is  a  sunken  road,  with  retaining 
walls  on  either  side.  That  on  the  east  is  just  breast-high 
for  a  man,  and  just  the  height  convenient  for  infantry 
defence  and  fire.  From  the  top  of  the  breast-work  the 
ground  recedes  gradually  till  near  the  canal,  when  it  drops 
off  three  or  four  feet,  leaving  space  near  the  canal  of  a 
rod  or  two  of  level  ground.  The  north  end  of  the  sunken 
road  cuts  into  the  plank  or  Gordonsville  road,  which  is 
an  extension  of  Hanover  Street  from  near  the  heart  of 
the  town.  At  the  south  end  it  enters  the  Telegraph  road, 
extending  out  from  the  town  limits  and  up  over  the  third, 
or  Telegraph  Hill,  called,  in  its  bloody  baptismal,  "  Lee's 
Hill."  An  unfinished  railroad  lies  along  the  Telegraph 
road  as  far  as  the  highlands.  The  Fredericksburg  and 


BATTLE  OF 

FREDERICKSBURG 

Dec.  13th,  1862. 

SCALE 


BATTLE    OF    FREDERICKSBUKG.  299 

Potomac  Railroad  lies  nearly  parallel  with  the  river 
four  miles,  and  then  turns  south  through  the  highlands. 
The  old  stage  road  from  the  city  runs  about  half-way  be 
tween  the  river  and  the  railroad  four  miles,  when  it  turns 
southwest  and  crosses  the  railroad  at  Hamilton's  Crossing. 
The  hamlet  of  Falmouth,  on  the  north  side  of  the  river, 
was  in  front  of  the  right  centre  of  the  Federal  position, 
half  a  mile  from  Fredericksburg. 

General  Jackson,  advised  of  General  Burnside's  move 
to  Fredericksburg,  drew  his  corps  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
as  far  as  Orange  Court-House. 

Before  the  end  of  November  it  became  evident  that 
Fredericksburg  was  to  be  our  winter  station  and  the  scene 
of  a  severe  battle  before  it  could  be  relieved.  General 
Lee  advised  the  citizens  who  still  remained  in  the  place 
(and  some  who  had  returned)  to  remove  their  effects. 
Those  who  had  friends  found  comfortable  places  of  rest, 
but  many  took  the  little  that  they  could  get  away  with, 
and  made  their  homes  in  the  deep  forest  till  the  storm 
could  pass.  Still,  none  complained  of  the  severe  ordeal 
which  they  were  called  upon  to  endure. 

Towards  the  latter  part  of  the  month  General  Jackson 
was  called  down  and  assigned  position  on  the  right  near 
Hamilton's  Crossing  and  the  Massaponax.  He  objected 
to  the  position,  preferring  the  North  Anna,  but  General 
Lee  had  already  weighed  the  matter,  and  had  decided  in 
favor  of  Fredericksburg.  Hood's  division,  relieved  at 
Hamilton's  Crossing,  was  drawn  to  my  right  and  stretched 
across  the  valley  of  Deep  Run,  a  little  to  the  rear  of 
Jackson's  left  and  McLaws's  right. 

Batteries  of  position  were  assigned  from  the  reserve 
artillery  along  the  heights,  with  orders  to  cover  the  guns, 
by  epaulements  or  pitting  them.  The  work  was  progress 
ing  while  the  guns  were  held  under  cover  remote  from 
the  enemy's  better  appointed  artillery  until  the  positions 
were  covered  by  solid  banks  or  good  pits.  The  small  field 


300  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

pieces  were  removed  for  safety  to  convenient  points  for 
field  service  in  case  opportunity  called  for  them.  The 
Confederates  had  three  hundred  and  six  guns,  including 
two  thirty-pound  Parrotts  of  Richmond  make.  These 
were  covered  by  epaulements  on  Lee's  Hill. 

On  the  1st  of  December  the  batteries  of  reserve  artil 
lery  were  relieved  from  the  First  Corps  by  those  of  the 
Washington  and  Alexander's  artillery.  Orders  were 
given  to  examine  all  lines  of  approach,  and  to  measure 
particularly  the  distance  of  the  crossings  of  the  canal  on 
the  Plank  and  Telegraph  roads ;  to  inspect  and  improve 
the  parapets  and  pits  along  the  front,  and  to  traverse  all 
batteries  not  securely  covered  against  the  batteries  oppo 
site  Taylor's  Hill,  and  others  within  range  of  our  lines, 
and  McLaws  was  directed  to  open  signal  line  with  his 
brigade  and  guards  along  the  river  bank. 

The  day  after  Jackson  joined  us  several  gun-boats  were 
reported  in  the  lower  river  at  Port  Royal.  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  was  detached  with  several  select  batteries  to  watch 
and  guard  at  that  point  against  a  crossing,  should  it  be 
attempted,  and  to  engage  and  try  the  metal  of  the  gun 
boats.  After  some  little  practice  the  boats  drew  off  and 
dropped  down-stream  ;  but  Hill's  division  was  left  near 
the  point  in  observation  with  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry. 
The  brigade  of  cavalry  under  General  Hampton  kept 
careful  watch  of  the  fords  of  the  upper  Rappahannock. 
To  guard  against  further  encroachments  of  the  gun-boats, 
a  battery  was  intrenched  on  the  river  bank  under  direc 
tion  of  Major  T.  M.  R.  Talcot,  of  the  general  staff.  At 
the  river,  sharp-shooters,  by  concealing  themselves  in 
the  ravines  and  pits,  could  escape  artillery  fire  and  lie 
in  secure  readiness  to  attack  parties  engaged  in  laying 
bridges.  After  driving  off  working  parties  they  were 
to  seek  cover  till  again  needed.  By  such  practice  they 
were  to  delay  the  bridge-builders  till  the  commands  had 
time  to  assemble  at  their  points  of  rendezvous.  The  nar- 


BATTLE   OF    FREDEKICKSBUKG.  301 

row,  deep  bed  of  the  stream,  a  mile  away  from  any  point 
of  the  Confederate  lines  where  batteries  could  be  planted, 
and  covered  as  it  was  by  the  guns  of  Stafford  Heights, 
prevented  the  thought  of  successful  resistance  to  laying 
bridges  at  any  point  from  Falmouth  to  the  extreme  left 
of  the  Federal  line  ;  but  the  strong  ground  upon  which 
the  Confederates  were  to  accept  battle  offset  the  uncomfort 
able  feeling  in  regard  to  the  crossing  of  the  river. 

General  Burnside  made  some  show  of  disposition  to 
cross  fourteen  miles  below,  at  Skinker's  Neck,  but  that 
was  under  guard  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  and  he  saw  that 
his  purpose  could  not  be  effected.  The  plan  which  he 
finally  adopted  was  to  span  the  river  by  bridges  near  the 
centre  and  lower  limits  of  the  city,  and  two  others  a  mile 
below  the  latter,  and  just  below  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run, 
the  Right  Grand  Division  to  cross  by  the  upper  and 
second  bridges,  the  Left  Grand  Division  by  the  lower 
bridges,  and  the  Centre  Grand  Division  to  be  in  position 
near  the  others  to  reinforce  their  battle. 

The  stir  and  excitement  about  the  enemy's  camps  on  the 
10th  of  December,  as  well  as  the  reports  of  scouts,  gave 
notice  that  important  movements  were  pending.  Notice 
was  given  the  commands,  and  the  batteries  were  ordered 
to  have  their  animals  in  harness  an  hour  before  daylight 
of  the  next  morning,  and  to  continue  to  hitch  up  daily 
at  that  hour  until  further  orders. 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  llth  the  deep 
boom  of  a  cannon  aroused  both  armies,  and  a  second  gun  was 
recognized  as  the  signal  for  battle.  In  a  few  minutes  the 
commands  were  on  the  march  for  their  positions.  Orders 
were  sent  to  call  D.  H.  Hill's  division  and  all  of  the  Sec 
ond  Corps  to  their  ground  along  the  woodland  over  Ham 
ilton's  Crossing. 

Barksdale's  brigade  of  Mississippians  was  on  picket  duty 
in  Fredericksburg  at  the  time  ;  the  Seventeenth  and  Eigh 
teenth  Regiments,  with  the  Eighth  Florida,  of  R.  H.  An- 


UN 


302  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

derson's  division,  were  on  the  river  line ;  the  other  regi 
ments  of  the  brigade  and  the  Third  Georgia,  of  R.  H. 
Anderson's,  in  reserve. 

The  first  noise  made  by  the  enemy's  bridge-builders  was 
understood  by  the  picket  guards,  as  was  all  of  their  early 
work  of  construction,  but  a  heavy  mist  along  the  water 
concealed  them  from  view  until  their  work  upon  the  bridge 
was  well  advanced.  As  soon  as  the  forms  of  the  workmen 
could  be  discerned  the  skirmishers  opened  fire,  which  was 
speedily  answered  from  the  other  side  in  efforts  to  draw 
the  fire  from  the  bridge-builders,  but  the  Confederates 
limited  their  attention  to  the  builders  till  they  were  driven 
off,  when  they  ceased  firing.  Another  effort  to  lay  the 
bridge  met  a  like  result.  Then  a  third  received  the 
same  stormy  repulse,  when  it  seemed  that  all  the  cannon 
within  a  mile  of  the  town  turned  their  concentrating  fire 
of  shot  and  shell  upon  the  buildings  of  the  devoted  city, 
tearing,  crushing,  bursting,  burning  their  walls  with  angry 
desperation  that  must  have  been  gratifying  to  spirits  deep 
down  below. 

Under  the  failures  to  lay  the  bridge,  General  Hunt 
suggested  that  the  pontoon-boats  be  filled  with  infantry 
men,  rushed  across  and  landed  on  the  other  bank  until  a 
sufficient  force  was  in  position  to  protect  the  bridge-build 
ers.  Barksdale  had  been  notified  before  noon  that  the 
army  was  in  position,  and  that  he  could  withdraw  his 
troops  at  any  moment,  but  he  preferred  his  little  fight  in 
Fredericksburg.  At  four  o'clock,  when  the  landing  was 
made  by  the  boats,  he  thought  the  city  safe  against  artil 
lery  practice,  and  was  pleased  to  hold  till  night  could 
cover  his  withdrawal. 

Colonel  Norman  J.  Hall,  of  the  Seventh  Michigan 
Regiment,  commanded  the  troops  working  for  a  foothold 
on  the  west  bank.  After  the  several  attempts  to  have  the 
bridge  built,  he  accepted  General  Hunt's  proposition  to 
load  the  boats  and  have  the  men  push  across.  Lieutenant- 


BATTLE    OF    FKEDEEICKSBURG.  303 

Colonel  Baxter,  commanding  the  regiment,  volunteered  to 
lead  the  party.  Captain  Weymouth,  of  the  Nineteenth 
Massachusetts,  proposed  to  support  the  move.  Under  sig 
nal  for  artillery  fire  to  cease,  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Baxter  pushed  across.  Under  the  best  fire  the 
pickets  could  bring  to  bear  only  one  man  was  killed  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Baxter  and  several  men  were  wounded. 
The  party  of  seventy  were  rushed  up  the  bank,  gained 
position,  captured  some  prisoners,  and  were  soon  rein 
forced.  The  enemy's  fire  over  the  west  bank  was  so 
sweeping  that  Barksdale  could  not  reinforce  at  the  point 
of  landing.  The  Nineteenth  Massachusetts  was  deployed 
to  the  right,  and  the  Seventh  Michigan  to  the  left. 
The  Twenty-eighth  Massachusetts  reinforced  them.  The 
Twelfth  and  Fifty-ninth  New  York  and  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty-seventh  Pennsylvania  Regiments  joined  the 
command  in  the  city.  Colonel  Hall  found  that  he  must 
prepare  for  some  fighting,  and  speedily,  as  night  was 
coming  on.  He  sent  to  the  rear  to  ask  for  time  to  pre 
pare  and  make  his  fight  to  suit  him,  but  was  hurried  on 
by  the  division  pushing  forward  to  get  across  the  bridge, 
with  orders  to  secure  the  streets  at  all  hazards.  The 
Seventh  Michigan  and  Nineteenth  Massachusetts  had 
been  brought  to  a  stand,  when  the  Twenty-eighth  Massa 
chusetts  was  rushed  forward  in  gallant  style.  Colonel 
Hall  reported,  "  Platoon  after  platoon  were  swept  away, 
but  the  head  of  the  column  did  not  falter.  Ninety-seven 
officers  and  men  were  killed  or  wounded  in  the  space 
of  about  fifty  yards."  The  eastern  part  of  the  town  was 
occupied,  and  at  a  late  hour  of  the  night  the  Confederates 
retired. 

As  Barksdale's  brigade  withdrew,  he  was  relieved  at 
the  sunken  road  by  the  Eighteenth  and  Twenty-fourth 
Georgia  Regiments  and  Cobb's  Georgia  Legion,  General 
T.  R.  R.  Cobb  in  command. 

The  Third  Grand  Division  had  no  severe  work  in  lay- 


304  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ing  the  bridges  below  Deep  Run,  and  were  ready  for  co 
operation  some  hours  in  advance  of  the  right. 

The  Federals  occupied  the  12th  in  moving  the  Right 
Grand  Division  into  the  city  by  the  upper  bridges,  and 
the  Left  Grand  Division  by  the  bridges  below  Deep 
Creek.  One  hundred  and  four  guns  crossed  with  the 
right,  one  hundred  and  twenty  with  the  left.  The  Centre 
Grand  Division  was  held  in  reserve.  Two  divisions  of 
the  Third  Corps  were  sent  to  the  lower  bridges  during  the 
night  to  support  the  battle  of  the  left,  and  were  ordered 
over  on  the  13th. 

The  plan  of  battle  by  the  Federal  commander,  in  brief, 
was  to  drive  the  Confederate  right  back  into  the  high 
lands  and  follow  that  success  by  attacking  the  Confederate 
left  by  his  Right  Grand  Division. 

The  beginning  only  of  this  plan  was  carried  out.  The 
Left  Grand  Division  having  duly  crossed  the  river  at  the 
lower  bridges  on  the  12th, — the  Sixth  Corps  and  Bayard's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  then  the  First  Corps, — the  Sixth  de 
ployed  two  divisions,  supported  by  the  third,  parallel  to 
the  old  Richmond  road  ;  the  First  formed  at  right  angles  to 
the  Sixth,  its  right  on  the  left  of  the  Sixth,  its  left  on  the 
river,  two  divisions  on  the  front  line,  one  in  support.  The 
cavalry  was  sent  out  to  reconnoitre.  The  entire  field  of 
the  command  was  an  open  plain  between  the  highlands 
and  the  river,  traversed  by  the  old  Richmond  road,  which 
had  well-formed  embankments  and  ditches  on  both 
sides. 

The  Federal  troops  of  their  left  divisions  were  in  full 
view  of  the  heights  (Lee's  Hill)  occupied  by  the  Confed 
erates  ;  those  of  the  right  were  concealed  by  the  buildings 
of  Fredericksburg  and  under  the  river  banks,  and  their 
bridges  were  under  the  steep  also.  The  two  brigades  on 
the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps  were  to  the  right  of  Deep 
Run ;  the  others,  of  the  First  and  Sixth  Corps,  on  the 
left.  The  batteries  of  the  corps  were  under  authority 


BATTLE  OF  FREDERICK  SBURG.  305 

of  corps  commanders.  There  were  but  few  shots  ex 
changed  during  the  12th,  and  these  not  of  great  damage. 

On  the  Confederate  side  the  First  Corps  (Longstreet's) 
was  in  position  from  Taylor's  Hill  across  Deep  Run  Bot 
tom.  The  Second  Corps  was  in  mass  about  the  wooded 
heights  at  Hamilton's  Crossing.  His  cavalry  and  horse 
artillery  were  on  his  right  in  the  Massaponax  Valley. 
General  R.  Ransom's  division  was  posted  in  rear  of  the 
left  of  Marye's  Hill ;  his  Twenty-fourth  North  Carolina 
Regiment  was  advanced  to  the  left  of  Cobb's  line  in  the 
sunken  road.  His  brigade  under  Colonel  Cooke  was  de 
ployed  as  sharp-shooters  on  the  crest  of  the  hill.  He  was 
especially  charged  with  looking  after  the  left  of  Cobb's 
line.  In  front  of  this  line  and  about  six  hundred  yards 
from  it  was  a  canal,  or  large  wet  ditch,  about  four  hundred 
yards  out  from  the  city  limits.  The  crossings  at  the  Plank 
and  Telegraph  roads  had  been  bridged,  and  the  bridges 
were  ordered  wrecked,  but  were  only  partially  destroyed, 
the  string-pieces  being  left  in  place.  The  corps  in  posi 
tion,  the  Confederate  commander  prepared  to  stand  and 
receive  battle. 

In  concluding  this  account  of  the  confronting  armies 
on  the  eve  of  battle,  let  us  glance  at  their  relative  strength 
as  expressed  in  numbers. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  reported  by  General 
Burnside,  had  on  December  10  an  "  aggregate  present  for 
duty"  of  132,017  *  officers  and  men  (not  including  cav 
alry).  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  reported  by 
General  Lee  on  the  same  date  to  have  had  an  aggregate 
of  69,391  f  (not  including  cavalry) . 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxi.  part  i.  p.  1121. 
f  Ibid.,  p.  1057. 


20 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

BATTLE   OF    FREDERICKSBUKG    (CONTINUED). 

The  Battle-field  veiled  by  a  Heavy  Fog— Terrific  Fighting  of  the  13th 
of  December — Forlorn  Hope  of  the  Federals — General  Meade's  Di 
vision  of  Franklin's  Command  makes  the  First  Advance — General 
French  leads  against  the  Confederate  Left — Hancock  follows — General 
Cobb  killed— The  Sunken  Road  and  Stone  Wall  below  Marye's  Hill- 
Desperate  Advances  and  Determined  Repulses — Humphreys's  Heroic 
Assault — The  Stoue  Wall  "a  Sheet  of  Flame" — General  Jackson  loses 
his  Opportunity  to  advance — The  Charge  of  Meade's  Divisions  com 
pared  with  that  of  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and  Trimble's  Columns  at 
Gettysburg — Forty  Per  Cent,  killed  in  charging  Lines  here,  and  Sixty 
Per  Cent,  at  Gettysburg — Total  Losses — Peace  to  be  declared  because 
Gold  had  gone  to  200— Organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia. 

ON  the  morning  of  the  13th  of  December  the  confront 
ing  armies,  which  were  destined  that  day  to  clash  in  one 
of  the  bloodiest  conflicts  of  the  war,  stood  completely  veiled 
from  each  other's  sight  by  an  impenetrable  mist.  The 
entire  Confederate  army  was  now  for  the  first  time  upon 
the  field,  for  General  Jackson  had  during  the  night 
brought  up  his  scattered  divisions  from  down  the  river. 

Before  daylight  I  rode  to  view  my  line  and  troops  from 
right  to  left.  Hood's  division  on  the  right  was  found  on 
the  alert,  as  was  the  enemy  near  that  point.  The  voices 
of  the  Union  officers  as  they  gave  their  commands  were 
carried  to  us  with  almost  startling  clearness  by  the  heavy 
fog  that  covered  the  field  and  surroundings.  So  heavy 
was  this  fog  that  nothing  could  be  seen  at  a  distance 
of  ten  or  twelve  rods,  and  yet  so  distinctly  were  the 
voices  of  the  officers  brought  to  us  that  they  seemed  quite 
near  at  hand,  and  General  Hood  was  looking  for  assault 
ing  columns  against  his  front.  He  was  told  that  such 
move  would  put  the  enemy's  column  in  a  cul-de-sac,  and 
therefore  his  position  was  in  no  danger  of  attack;  that 


BATTLE   OF    FKEDERICKSBUKG.  307 

the  attack  would  be  aimed  against  Jackson's  front ;  that 
in  case  it  broke  through  there  he  should  swing  around  to 
his  right  and  take  the  attacking  forces  in  reverse ;  that 
Pickett's  division  would  be  ordered  to  a  corresponding 
move  on  his  left,  with  the  batteries  of  the  two  divisions  in 
the  plain  off  the  left ;  that  my  front  would  be  attacked, 
but  it  was  safely  posted,  and  not  likely  to  need  other  than 
the  troops  on  that  ground.  Pickett's  command  was  under 
arms,  expecting  orders.  They  were  given  instructions 
similar  to  those  just  mentioned  for  Hood.  The  divisions 
of  McLaws,  Ransom,  and  R.  H.  Anderson  were  in  readi 
ness,  as  were  all  the  batteries.  But  the  fog,  nothing 
abated,  hung  so  heavy  that  not  a  sight  for  a  cannon-shot 
was  open  till  a  late  hour  of  the  morning. 

The  front  of  the  Second  Corps  was  occupied  by  A.  P. 
Hill's  division,  the  brigades  of  Archer,  Lane,  and  Pender 
on  the  first  line ;  those  of  Thomas,  Gregg,  and  Brocken- 
brough  on  the  second.  A  third  line  was  occupied  by 
Taliaferro's  and  Early's  divisions.  D.  H.  Hill's  division 
was  off  to  the  rear  of  the  right.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Walker  posted  a  fourteen-gun  battery  of  the  division  ar 
tillery  on  A.  P.  Hill's  right,  and  two  other  field  batteries 
on  the  plain  on  his  left.  Stuart's  horse  artillery  and  cav 
alry  were  on  the  plain  on  the  right,  in  the  valley  of  the 
Massaponax,  supporting  the  Second  Corps. 

About  7.45  in  the  morning  General  Hardie,  of  Burn- 
side's  staff,  reported  to  General  Franklin  that  his  orders 
would  reach  him  in  a  few  minutes  by  the  hands  of  an  aide- 
de-camp.  Hardie  was  ordered  to  remain  near  General 
Franklin's  head-quarters.  At  eight  o'clock  the  order 
came,  and  at  8.30  Meade's  division  moved  towards  the 
general  direction  of  Jackson's  position. 

At  ten  o'clock  the  fog  lifted  and  revealed  Meade's  lines, 
six  batteries  on  his  left  and  four  on  his  right,  Gibbon's 
division  supporting  the  right  and  Doubleday's  covering 
the  left.  The  order  for  the  commander  of  the  Left  Grand 


308  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Division  was  to  make  the  advance  by  at  least  one  division. 
The  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  were  thought  to  fully 
meet  the  terms  of  the  order. 

Meade's  lines  advanced  in  handsome,  solid  ranks,  leaving 
heavy  reserves  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  two  divisions  of 
the  Third  that  had  been  called  over  from  the  Centre 
Grand  Division.  The  fire  of  Stuart's  horse  artillery 
against  their  left  caused  delay  until  some  of  the  batteries 
of  the  left  engaged  and  drove  off  the  fire.  After  half 
an  hour's  delay  the  advance  was  resumed,  the  batteries 
thrown  to  the  front  to  shell  the  field  in  search  of  the 
Confederate  batteries.  The  latter  had  been  ordered,  for 
the  most  part,  to  reserve  their  fire  for  infantry.  After  an 
hour's  heavy  artillery  practice  Meade's  march  was  re 
sumed,  and  with  great  vigor,  the  batteries  ploughing  the 
way  for  the  infantry  columns.  At  the  same  time  the 
fourteen-gun  battery  of  A.  P.  Hill's  right  and  his  left 
batteries  replied  with  equal  spirit  and  practice,  though 
with  unequal  metal. 

The  view  of  the  battle  of  the  enemy's  left  burst  upon 
us  at  Lee's  Hill,  as  the  mist  rolled  away  under  the  bright 
noonday  sun.  We  noted  the  thin,  pale  smoke  of  infantry 
fire  fading  in  the  far  away  of  their  left,  the  heavy  clouds 
rising  from  the  batteries  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  the 
bright  armored  ranks  and  banners,  and  our  elevation 
seemed  to  draw  them  so  close  to  us,  on  their  right,  that 
we  thought  to  turn  our  best  guns  upon  that  part  of  the 
line,  and  General  Lee  authorized  the  tesfrof  their  range. 
Only  a  few  shots  were  sent  when  the  troops  that  had  been 
lying  concealed  in  the  streets  of  the  city  came  flying  out 
by  both  roads  in  swarms  at  double  time  and  rushed 
towards  us.  Every  gun  that  we  had  in  range  opened 
upon  the  advancing  columns  and  ploughed  their  ranks 
by  a  fire  that  would  test  the  nerves  of  the  bravest  soldiers. 
But  the  battle  of  the  Federal  left  had  the  first  opening, 
and  calls  for  first  notice. 


BATTLE   OF   FREDERICKSBURG.  309 

Under  a  strong  artillery  combat  Meade  marched  for 
ward,  with  Gibbon's  division  in  close  support  on  his  right, 
and  Doubleday's  farther  off  on  his  left.  The  line  en 
countered  Lane's  brigade  front  in  a  steady,  hard  fight, 
and,  developing  against  Archer's  left,  broke  through, 
forcing  the  brigades  back,  encountered  Thomas's  and 
Gregg's  brigades,  threw  the  latter  into  confusion,  and  killed 
General  Gregg.  Brockenbrough's  and  Fender's  brigades 
turned  against  the  penetrating  columns  and  were  forced 
back.  Under  skilful  handling  the  brigades  finally 
brought  the  battle  to  steady  work,  but  Meade's  impetuous 
onward  march  was  bravely  made  and  pressed  until  three 
brigades  of  Early's  division  were  advanced  and  thrown 
into  action,  commanded  by  Colonels  Atkinson,  Walker, 
and  Hoke.  These,  with  the  combined  fire  of  Hill's  broken 
lines,  forced  Meade  back.  Two  regiments  of  Berry's  bri 
gade  of  the  Third  Corps  came  to  the  relief  of  Meade  and 
were  driven  back,  when  Gibbon's  division  which  followed 
was  met,  and  after  severe  battle  was  repulsed.  The  Con 
federates  made  a  partial  following  of  the  success,  beyond 
the  railroad,  and  until  they  encountered  the  fire  of  the 
relieving  divisions  under  Birney  and  Sickles  and  the  re 
serve  batteries.  Doubleday's  division  protected  Meade's 
left  as  Jackson's  right  under  Taliaferro  partially  engaged 
against  them ;  both  encountered  loss.  Hood  got  one  of 
his  brigades  in  in  time  to  follow  the  troops  as  they  retired 
towards  their  reserve  line.  At  the  first  moment  of  the 
break  on  Jackson's  lines  Pickett  rode  to  Hood  and  urged 
that  the  opportunity  anticipated  was  at  hand,  but  Hood 
failed  to  see  it  in  time  for  effective  work.  About  two  P.M. 
the  battle  quieted  into  defensive  practice  of  artillery  and 
sharp-shooters. 

The  opening  against  the  Confederate  left,  before  re 
ferred  to,  was  led  by  French's  division  of  the  Second 
Corps,  about  10.30.  The  Eighteenth  and  Twenty-fourth 
Georgia  Regiments,  Cobb's  Georgia  Legion,  and  the 


310  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Twenty-fourth  North  Carolina  Regiment  were  in  the 
sunken  road,  the  salient  point.  On  Marye's  Hill,  back 
and  above,  was  the  Washington  Artillery,  with  nine  guns, 
Ransom's  and  Cooke's  North  Carolina  brigade  in  open 
field,  the  guns  under  partial  cover,  pitted.  Other  bat 
teries  on  Taylor's  and  Lee's  Hills  posted  to  this  defence 
as  many  as  twenty  guns,  holding  under  range  by  direct 
and  cross  fire  the  avenues  of  approach  and  the  open  field 
along  Cobb's  front. 

French's  division  came  in  gallant  style,  but  somewhat 
hurried.  He  gathered  his  ranks  behind  the  swell  of 
ground  near  the  canal  and  moved  to  the  assault.  An  in 
tervening  plank  fence  gave  the  troops  some  trouble  in 
crossing  under  fire,  so  that  his  ranks  were  not  firm  after 
passing  it  to  the  attack.  Hancock,  coming  speedily  with 
his  division,  was  better  organized  and  in  time  to  take  up 
the  fight  as  French  was  obliged  to  retire.  This  advance 
was  handsomely  maintained,  but  the  galling  fire  they  en 
countered  forced  them  to  open  fire.  Under  this  delay 
their  ranks  were  cut  up  as  rapidly  as  they  had  collected 
at  the  canal,  and  when  within  a  hundred  yards  of  the 
stone  wall  they  were  so  thinned  that  they  could  do  nothing 
but  surrender,  even  if  they  could  leap  to  the  road-bed. 
But  they  turned,  and  the  fire  naturally  slackened,  as  their 
hurried  steps  took  them  away  to  their  partial  cover.  The 
troops  behind  the  stone  wall  were  reinforced  during  this 
engagement  by  two  of  Cooke's  regiments  from  the  hill-top, 
ordered  by  General  Ransom,  and  General  McLaws  or 
dered  part  of  Kershaw's  brigade  in  on  their  right. 

After  Hancock's  engagement  some  minutes  passed  be 
fore  arrangements  were  made  for  the  next.  Howard's  di 
vision  had  been  feeling  for  a  way  to  get  by  Cobb's  left, 
when  he  was  called  to  the  front  attack,  and  ordered  over 
the  same  ground.  He  arranged  his  forces  with  care,  and 
advanced  in  desperate  fight.  Under  the  severe  fire  of  the 
Confederates  his  troops  were  provoked  to  return  fire,  and 


BATTLE   OF   FREDERICKSBURGL  311 

during  the  delay  thus  caused  his  ranks  were  so  speedily 
decimated  that  they  in  turn  were  obliged  to  return  to 
cover.  The  Confederate  commander,  General  Cobb,  was 
killed.  General  Kershaw,  with  the  other  regiments  of  his 
brigade,  was  ordered  to  the  front.  The  Washington  Ar 
tillery,  exhausted  of  ammunition,  was  relieved  by  guns 
of  Alexander's  battalion.  The  change  of  batteries  seemed 
to  give  new  hope  to  the  assaulting  forces.  They  cheered  and 
put  in  their  best  practice  of  sharp-shooters  and  artillery. 
The  greater  part  of  Alexander's  loss  occurred  while  gal 
loping  up  to  his  position.  General  Ransom  advanced  the 
other  regiments  of  his  brigade  to  the  crest  of  the  hill. 
At  the  suggestion  of  General  Lee  the  brigades  of  Jenkins 
and  Kemper  of  Pickett's  division  were  called  up  and  as 
signed,  the  former  to  General  McLaws  and  the  latter  to 
General  Ransom.  A  supply  of  ammunition  was  sent 
down  to  the  troops  in  the  road  in  time  to  meet  the  next 
attack,  by  Sturgis's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  which 
made  the  usual  brave  fight,  and  encountered  the  same 
damaging  results.  Getty's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
came  to  his  support  on  the  left,  but  did  not  engage  fiercely, 
losing  less  than  eight  hundred  men.  Carroll's  brigade  of 
Whipple's  division,  Third  Corps,  came  in  on  Sturgis's  left, 
but  only  to  brace  that  part  of  the  fight. 

As  the  troops  hurried  forward  from  the  streets  of  the 
city  for  the  Telegraph  road,  they  came  at  once  under  the 
fire  of  the  long-range  guns  on  Lee's  Hill.  The  thirty- 
pound  Parrotts  were  particularly  effective  in  having  the 
range  and  dropping  their  shells  in  the  midst  of  the  col 
umns  as  they  dashed  forward.  Frequently  commands 
were  broken  up  by  this  fire  and  that  of  other  long-range 
guns,  and  sought  shelter,  as  they  thought,  in  the  rail 
road  cut,  but  that  point  was  well  marked,  and  the  shots 
were  dropped  in,  in  enfilade  fire,  with  precision,  often 
making  wide  gaps  in  their  ranks.  The  siege  guns  of 
Stafford  Heights  gave  their  especial  attention  to  our 


312  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

heavy  guns  and  put  their  shots  over  the  parapets  very 
often. 

One  shell  buried  itself  close  under  the  parapet  at  Gen 
eral  Lee's  side,  as  he  sat  among  the  officers  of  his  staff, 
but  it  failed  to  explode.  Soon  after  this  our  big  Parrott 
gun  burst  into  many  fragments.  It  was  closely  surrounded 
by  General  Lee  and  staff,  officers  of  the  First  Corps 
head-quarters,  and  officers  and  gunners  of  the  battery, 
but  the  explosion  caused  no  other  damage  than  the  loss 
of  the  gun. 

Griffin's  division  was  next  ordered  to  attack,  and  made 
the  usual  desperate  struggle.  The  Confederates  mean 
while  had  accumulated  such  force  in  the  road  that  a  single 
division,  had  it  reached  that  point,  would  have  found  its 
equal  in  numbers,  and  of  greater  vigor,  with  Ransom  at 
the  top  of  the  hill  prepared  to  rush  down  and  join  in 
the  melee.  At  that  hour  we  could  have  safely  invited 
one  division  into  our  midst,  if  assured  it  was  to  be  the 
last. 

The  next  attack  was  made  by  Humphreys's  division. 
Its  commander  was  a  man  of  superior  attainments  and 
accomplishments  in  the  walks  of  civil  as  well  as  military 
life.  He  measured  justly  the  situation,  and  arranged  his 
battle  in  the  only  order  by  which  success  could  have  been 
made  possible,  but  he  had  only  two  brigades  with  which 
to  take  a  position  not  assailable  and  held  by  more  than 
three  brigades  of  superior  troops.  His  troops  were  new, 
so  that  he  felt  called  to  personal  example  as  well  as  skilful 
handling.  He  ordered  the  attack  with  empty  muskets, 
and  led  with  his  brigade  commanders,  but  half-way  up 
towards  the  goal  his  men  stopped  to  load  and  open  fire, 
which  neither  he  nor  his  officers  could  prevent,  so  they 
were  driven  back.  Then  he  made  a  like  effort  with  his 
other  brigade,  under  special  orders  from  Generals  Burnside 
and  Hooker  that  the  point  must  be  carried  before  night, — 
and  the  dew  was  then  falling.  (Just  then  our  second  big 


BATTLE   OF    FREDERICKSBUKG.  313 

Parrott  gun  went  into  fragments,  but  without  damage 
to  the  men.)  The  troops  that  had  been  driven  back  from 
previous  attacks  joined  in  trying  to  persuade  Hum- 
phreys's  men  not  to  go  forward.  Notwithstanding  the 
discouraging  surroundings,  he  led  his  men  on,  encountered 
the  same  terrific  and  death-dealing  opposition,  and  his 
men  retired  in  greater  confusion,  going  beyond  his  control 
to  the  vicinity  of  the  city  before  he  could  get  them  again 
in  ranks.  His  account  of  the  last  effort  is  interesting: 

"The  stone  wall  was  a  sheet  of  flame  that  enveloped  the  head 
and  flanks  of  the  column.  Officers  and  men  were  falling  rapidly, 
and  the  head  of  the  column  was  at  length  brought  to  a  stand  when 
close  up  to  the  wall.  Up  to  this  time  not  a  shot  had  been  fired 
by  the  column,  but  now  some  firing  began.  It  lasted  but  a  min 
ute,  when,  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts,  the  column  turned  and  began 
to  retire  slowly.  I  attempted  to  rally  the  brigade  behind  the  nat 
ural  embankment  so  often  mentioned,  but  the  united  efforts  of 
General  Tyler,  myself,  our  staff,  and  other  officers  could  not  arrest 
the  retiring  mass."  * 

At  that  time  there  were  three  brigades  behind  the  stone 
wall  and  one  regiment  of  Ransom's  brigade.  The  ranks 
were  four  or  five  deep, — the  rear  files  loading  and  passing 
their  guns  to  the  front  ranks,  so  that  the  volleys  by  bri 
gade  were  almost  incessant  pourings  of  solid  sheets  of  lead. 

Two  brigades  of  Sykes's  division,  First  and  Second  Reg 
ulars,  were  sent  to  the  front  to  guard  the  line.  It  was 
some  time  after  nightfall,  so  that  their  line  could  only  be 
distinguished  by  the  blaze  of  their  fire.  Some  of  the  bat 
teries  and  infantry  engaged  against  their  fire  till  night 
was  well  advanced. 

General  Jackson  thought  to  advance  against  the  enemy's 
left  late  in  the  afternoon,  but  found  it  so  well  posted  and 
guarded  that  he  concluded  the  venture  would  be  too  haz 
ardous.  He  lost  his  opportunity,  failing  to  follow  close 
upon  the  repulse  of  Meade's  and  Gibbon's  divisions.  His 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxi.  part  i.  p.  432. 


314  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

command  was  massed  and  well  in  hand,  with  an  open 
field  for  infantry  and  artillery.  He  had,  including  the 
divisions  of  Hood  and  Pickett, — ordered  to  work  with 
him, — about  fifty  thousand  men.  Franklin  had,  including 
troops  of  the  Centre  Grand  Division,  about  equal  force. 

The  charge  of  Meade's  division  has  been  compared  with 
that  of  Pickett's,  Pettigrew's,  and  Trimble's  at  Gettys 
burg,  giving  credit  of  better  conduct  to  the  former.  The 
circumstances  do  not  justify  the  comparison. 

When  the  fog  lifted  over  Meade's  advance  he  was  within 
musket-range  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  closely  supported  on 
his  right  by  Gibbon's,  and  guarded  on  his  left  by  Double- 
day's  division.  On  Hill's  right  was  a  fourteen-gun  bat 
tery,  on  his  left  eight  guns.  Meade  broke  through  Hill's 
division,  and  with  the  support  of  Gibbon  forced  his  way 
till  he  encountered  part  of  Swell's  division,  when  he  was 
forced  back  in  some  confusion.  Two  fresh  divisions  of  the 
Third  Corps  came  to  their  relief,  and  there  were  as  many 
as  fifty  thousand  men  at  hand  who  could  have  been  thrown 
into  the  fight.  Meade's  march  to  meet  his  adversary  was 
half  a  mile, — the  troops  of  both  sides  fresh  and  vigorous. 

Of  the  assaulting  columns  of  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and 
Trimble,  only  four  thousand  seven  hundred  under  Pickett 
were  fresh ;  the  entire  force  of  these  divisions  was  only 
fifteen  thousand  strong.  They  had  a  mile  to  march  over 
open  field  before  reaching  the  enemy's  line,  strengthened 
by  field-works  and  manned  by  thrice  their  numbers.  The 
Confederates  at  Gettysburg  had  been  fought  to  exhaustion 
of  men  and  munitions.  They  lost  about  sixty  per  cent, 
of  the  assaulting  forces, — Meade  about  forty.  The  latter 
had  fresh  troops  behind  him,  and  more  than  two  hundred 
guns  to  cover  his  rallying  lines.  The  Confederates  had 
nothing  behind  them  but  field  batteries  almost  exhausted 
of  ammunition.  That  Meade  made  a  brave,  good  fight  is 
beyond  question,  but  he  had  superior  numbers  and  ap 
pointments.  At  Gettysburg  the  Confederate  assault  was 


BATTLE   OF    FKEDEKICKSBUKG. 


315 


made  against  intrenched  lines  of  artillery  and  infantry, 
where  stood  fifty  thousand  men. 

A  series  of  braver,  more  desperate  charges  than  those 
hurled  against  the  troops  in  the  sunken  road  was  never 
known,  and  the  piles  and  cross-piles  of  dead  marked  a 
field  such  as  I  never  saw  before  or  since. 

Between  1.30  and  2.30  of  the  afternoon  several  orders 
and  messages  were  sent  by  General  Burnside  calling  on 
General  Franklin  to  renew  the  battle  of  the  left.  Before 
2.30  he  received  from  General  Burnside,  through  his  aide- 
de-camp,  Captain  Goddard,  this  despatch : 

"Tell  General  Franklin,  with  my  compliments,  that  I  wish 
him  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  with  his  whole  force.  Our  right 
is  hard  pressed.'7 

Under  ordinary  circumstances  this  would  be  regarded 
as  a  strong  order,  but  Franklin  had  gone  far  enough  in  his 
first  battle  to  be  convinced  that  an  attack  by  his  "  whole 
force/7  the  other  end  of  the  army  "  hard  pressed,"  would 
be  extremely  hazardous.  If  undertaken  and  proved  dis 
astrous,  he  could  have  been  made  to  shoulder  the  whole 
responsibility,  for  a  "  wish"  implies  discretion.  It  is  not 
just  to  the  subordinate  to  use  such  language  if  orders  are 
intended  to  be  imperative.  Men  bred  as  soldiers  have  no 
fancy  for  orders  that  carry  want  of  faith  on  their  face. 

The  losses  at  Fredericksburg  were  as  follows :  * 

UNION   ARMY. 


Organization. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Captured 
or 
Missing. 

Total. 

Right  Grand  Division  (Sumner)  .  . 
Centre  Grand  Division  (Hooker)  .  . 
Left  Grand  Division  (Franklin)  .  . 
Engineers 

523 
352 
401 

8 

4281 
2501 
2761 
49 

640 
502 
625 

2 

5,444 
3,355 

3,787 

t\Q 

Artillery  Reserve  .  ... 

8 

Q 

Aggregate  

1284 

9600 

1769 

12  653 

Vol.  xxi.  of  the  Official  Records. 


316 


FROM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 


CONFEDERATE    ARMY. 


Organization. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Captured 
or 
Missing. 

Total. 

First  Army  Corps  (Longstreet)    .   . 
Second  Array  Corps  (Jackson)  .   .   . 
Stuart's  Cavalry  

251 
344 

1516 
2545 
13 

127 
526 

1894 
3415 
13 

595 

4074 

653 

5322 

During  the  night,  before  twelve  o'clock,  a  despatch- 
bearer  lost  his  way  and  was  captured.  He  had  on  his 
person  a  memorandum  of  the  purpose  of  General  Burn- 
side  for  renewing  the  battle  against  Marye's  Hill  in  the 
morning.  The  information  was  sent  up  to  general  head 
quarters,  and  orders  were  sent  General  Ransom  to  intrench 
his  brigade  along  the  crest  of  the  hill.  Orders  were  sent 
other  parts  of  the  line  to  improve  defences  and  prepare 
for  the  next  day  in  ammunition,  water,  and  rations,  under 
conviction  that  the  battle  of  next  day,  if  made  as  ordered, 
would  be  the  last  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Morning  came  and  passed  without  serious  demonstra 
tions  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  Orders  were  sent  out, 
however,  for  renewed  efforts  to  strengthen  the  position. 
Colonel  Alexander  found  a  point  at  which  he  could  pit  a 
gun  in  enfilade  position  to  the  swell  of  ground  behind 
which  the  enemy  assembled  his  forces  before  advancing  to 
the  charge,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Latrobe  sunk  a  gun 
in  similar  position  for  fire  across  the  field  of  their  charges. 
We  were  so  well  prepared  that  we  became  anxious  before 
the  night  of  the  14th  lest  General  Burnside  would  not 
come  again.  In  the  night  he  drew  back  to  the  river,  and 
during  the  night  of  the  15th  recrossed  and  sent  his  troops 
to  their  camps. 

The  stone  wall  was  not  thought  before  the  battle  a  very 
important  element.  We  assumed  that  the  formidable 
advance  would  be  made  against  the  troops  of  McLaws's 


Chief  of  Staff  of  the  First  Corps,  after  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 


BATTLE    OF    FKEDERICKSBURG.  317 

division  at  Lee's  Hill,  to  turn  the  position  at  the  sunken 
road,  dislodge  my  force  stationed  there,  then  to  occupy 
the  sunken  road,  and  afterwards  ascend  to  the  plateau 
upon  which  the  Marye  mansion  stands ;  that  this  would 
bring  their  forces  under  cross  and  direct  fire  of  all  of  our 
batteries — short-  and  long-range  guns — in  such  concen 
tration  as  to  beat  them  back  in  bad  disorder. 

General  Hood's  failure  to  meet  his  orders  to  make 
counter  to  the  anticipated  attack  upon  Jackson  was  re 
ported  in  the  official  accounts.  As  he  was  high  in  favor 
with  the  authorities,  it  did  not  seem  prudent  to  attempt  to 
push  the  matter,  as  called  for  under  the  ordinary  usages  of 
war.  "  Bis  peccare  in  bello  non  licet" 

General  Lee  went  down  to  Richmond  soon  after  the 
battle  to  propose  active  operations,  and  returned  with  in 
formation  that  gold  had  advanced  to  200  in  New  York ; 
that  the  war  was  over  and  peace  would  be  announced  in 
sixty  days ;  that  it  was  useless  to  harass  the  troops  by 
winter  service.  As  gold  had  gone  well  up  on  the  South 
ern  side  without  bringing  peace,  it  was  difficult  for  sol 
diers  to  see  the  bearing  that  it  could  have  on  the  other 
side;  still,  we  had  some  trust  and  hope  in  the  judgment 
of  superiors. 

The  forces  available  for  battle  at  Fredericksburg  were  : 
Federal  (according  to  General  Burnside's  report),  116,683  ; 
Confederate,  78,000.  About  fifty  thousand  of  the  Union 
troops  were  put  into  battle,  and  less  than  twenty  thousand 
of  the  Confederates  were  engaged. 

The  organization  of  the  Confederate  army  at  this  time 
was  as  follows : 

ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 
FIRST  CORPS,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET. 

McLAWS's  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Lafayette  McLaws  : — Kershaw's  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Kersbaw  ;  2d  S.  C.,  Col.  John  D.  Kennedy ; 
3d  S.  C.,  Col.  James  D.  Nance,  Lieut.-Col.  William  D.  Rutherford,  Maj. 
Robert  C.  Maffett,  Capt.  William  W.  Hance,  Capt.  John  C.  Summer, 
Capt.  John  K.  G.  Nance  ;  7th  S.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  Elbert  Bland  ;  8th  S.  C., 


318  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Capt.  E.  T.  Stackhouse  ;  5th  S.  C.,  Col.  W.  D.  DeSaussure  ;  3d  S.  C.  Battn., 
Lieut.-Col.  W.  G.  Rice.  Barksdale's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William 
Barksdale  ;  13th  Miss.,  Col.  J.  W.  Carter  ;  17th  Miss.,  Col.  John  C.  Fiser  ; 
18th  Miss.,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  H.  Luse ;  21st  Miss.,  Col.  Benjamin  G.  Hum 
phreys.  Cobb's  Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  T.  R.  R.  Cobb,  (2)  Col.  Robert 
McMillan  ;  16th  Ga.,  Col.  Goode  Bryan  ;  18th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  Z.  Ruff; 
24th  Ga.,  Col.  Robert  McMillan  ;  Cobb  Legion  ;  Phillips's  Legion,  Col. 
B.  F.  Cook.  Semmes's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  PaulJ.  Semmes  ;  10th,  50th, 
51st,  and  53d  Ga.  Artillery,  Col.  H.  C.  Cabell ;  Manly 's  (N.  C.)  battery, 
Read's  (Ga.)  battery,  Richmond  Howitzers  (1st),  McCarthy's  battery  ; 
Troup  (Ga.)  Art.  (Carlton's  battery). 

ANDERSON'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Richard  H.Anderson: — Wilcox's 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox  ;  8th,  9th,  10th,  llth,  and  14th 
Ala.  Mahone's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Mahone  ;  6th,  12th,  16th, 
41st,  and  61st  Va.  Feather  ston' s  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  S.  Feather- 
ston  ;  12th,  16th,  19th,  and  48th  Miss.  (5  cos.).  Wright's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  A.  R.  Wright;  3d  (Col.  Edward  J.  Walker),  22d,  48th  (Capt,  M. 
R.  Hall),  and  2d  Ga.  Battn.  (Capt.  C.  J.  Moffett).  Perry's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  E.  A.  Perry  ;  2d,  5th,  and  8th  Fla.,  Capt.  David  Lang,  Capt. 
Thomas  R.  Love.  Artillery,  Donaldsonville  (La.)  Art.,  Capt.  V.  Mauriu  ; 
Huger's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt.  Frank  Huger  ;  Lewis's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt. 
John  W.  Lewis ;  Norfolk  (Va.)  Light  Art.  Blues,  Lieut.  William  T.  Peet. 

PICKETT'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  George  E.  Pickett : — Garnett's  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Richard  B.  Garnett ;  8th,  18th,  19th,  28th,  and  56th  Va. 
Armistead's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Lewis  A.  Armistead ;  9th,  14th,  38th, 
53d,  and  57th  Va.  Kcmper's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  L.  Kemper ; 
1st,  3d,  7th,  llth,  and  24th  Va.  Jenkins's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  M.  Jen 
kins  ;  1st  (Hagood's),  2d  (Rifles),  5th,  and  6th  S.  C. ;  Hampton  Legion  ; 
Palmetto  Sharp-shooters.  Corse's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Montgomery  D. 
Corse  ;  15th,  17th,  30th,  and  32d  Va.  Artillery,  Dearing's  (Va.)  battery, 
Fauquier  (Va.)  Art.  (Stribling's  battery),  Richmond  (Fayette)  Art. 
(Macon's  battery). 

HOOD'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  John  B.  Hood  : — Law's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  E.  M.  Law  ;  4th  arid  44th  Ala. ;  6th  and  54th  N.  C.  (Col.  J.  C.  S. 
McDowell) ;  57th  N.  C.,  Col.  A.  C.  Goodwin.  Robertson's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  J.  B.  Robertson  ;  3d  Ark. ;  1st,  4th,  and  5th  Tex.  Anderson's  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  T.  Anderson  ;  1st  (Regulars),  7th,  8th,  9th,  and 
llth  Ga.  Toombs's  Brigade,  Col.  H.  L.  Benning;  2d,  15th,  17th,  and 
20th  Ga.  Artillery,  German  (S.  C.)  Art,  (Bachman's  battery),  Palmetto 
(S.  C.)  Light  Art,  (Garden's  battery;,  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Art.  (Reilly's 
battery). 

RANSOM'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  Ransom,  Jr. :— Ransom's  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  Ransom,  Jr. ;  24th,  25th  (Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  C. 
Bryson),  35th,  and  49th  N.  C. ;  Branch's  (Va.)  battery.  Cooke's  Bri 
gade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Cooke,  (2)  Col.  E.  D.  Hall ;  15th  N.  C.  ;  27th 
N.  C.,  Col.  John  A.  Gilrner,  Jr.  ;  46th  N.  C.,  Col.  E.  D.  Hall  ;  48th  N.  C., 
Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  H.  Walkup  ;  Cooper's  (Va.)  battery. 

FIRST  CORPS  ARTILLERY:* — Washington  (La.}  Artillery,  Col.  J.  B. 

*  Not  assigned  to  divisions. 


BATTLE    OF   FKEDEKICKSBUKG.  319 

Walton  ;  1st  Co.,  Capt,  C.  W.  Squires ;  2d  Co.,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson  ; 
3d  Co.,  Capt.  M.  B.  Miller  ;  4th  Co.,  Capt.  B.  F.Eshleman.  Alexander's 
Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  Porter  Alexander ;  Bedford  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt. 
Tyler  C.  Jordan  ;  Eubank's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt.  J.  L.  Eubank  ;  Madison 
Light  Art.  (La.),  Capt.  Geo.  V.  Moody  ;  Parker's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt. 
William  W.  Parker ;  Rhett's  (S.  C.)  battery,  Capt.  A.  B.  Rhett ;  Wool- 
folk's  (Va.)  battery,  Capt.  P.  Woolfolk,  Jr. 

SECOND  CORPS,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  THOMAS  J.  JACKSON. 

D.  H.  HILL'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Daniel  H.  Hill  -.—First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes  ;  3d,  5th,  6th,  12th,  and  26th  Ala.  Second  (Rip- 
ley's)  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  Doles  ;  4th  Ga. ;  44th  Ga.,  Col.  John  B. 
Estes  ;  1st  and  3d  N.  C.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  H.  Colquitt ;  13th 
Ala. ;  6th,  23d,  27th,  and  28th  Ga.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred 
Iverson  ;  5th,  12th,  20th,  and  23d  N.  C.  Fifth  (Ramseur's)  Brigade,  Col. 
Bryan  Grimes  ;  2d,  4th,  14th,  and  30th  N.  C.  Artillery,  Maj.  H.  P. 
Jones;  Hardaway's  (Ala.)  battery,  Jeff  Davis  (Ala.)  Art.  (Bondurant's 
battery),  King  William  (Va.)  Art.  (Carter's  battery),  Morris  (Va.)  Art. 
(Page's  battery),  Orange  (Va.)  Art.  (Fry's  battery). 

A.  P.  HILL'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Ambrose  P.  Hill  -.—First  (Field's] 
Brigade,  Col.  J.  M.  Brockenbrough  ;  40th,  47th  (Col.  Robert  M.  Mayo), 
55th,  and  22d  Va.  Battu.,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  P.  Tayloe.  Second  Brigade,  (I). 
Brig.-Gen.  Maxcy  Gregg,  (2)  Col.D.  H.  Hamilton  ;  1st  S.  C.  (P.  A.),  Col. 
D.  H.  Hamilton  ;  1st  S.  C.  Rifles  ;  12th,  13th,  and  14th  S.  C.  (Col.  Samuel 
McGowan).  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  L.  Thomas  ;  14th,  35th,  45th, 
and  49th  Ga.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  Lane  ;  7th  N.  C.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  J.  L.  Hill ;  18th  N.  C.,  Col.  Thomas  J.  Purdie  ;  28th  N.  C.,  Col.  S.  D. 
Lowe  ;  33d  N.  C.,  Col.  Clark  M.  Avery  ;  37th  N.  C.,  Col.  W.  M.  Barbour. 
Fifth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  J.  Archer  ;  5th  Ala.  Battn.,  Maj.  A.  S.  Van 
de  GraafF,  Capt.  S.  D.  Stewart ;  19th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  J.  Hutchius  ;  1st 
Term.  (Pro.  Army),  Col.  Peter  Turney,  Lieut.-Col.  N.  J.  George,  Capt.  M. 
Turney,  Capt.  H.  J.  Hawkins;  7th  Tenn.,  Col.  John  F.  Goodner  ;  14th 
Tenn.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  W.  Lockert.  Sixth  Brigade,  (1)  Brig.-Gen.  William 
D.  Pender,  (2)  Col.  A.  M.  Scales ;  13th  N.  C.,  Col.  A.  M.  Scales ;  16th 
N.  C.,  Col.  John  S.  McElroy  ;  22d  N.  C.,  Maj.  Christopher  C.  Cole  ;  34th 
and  38th  N.  C.  Artillery,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  L.  Walker  ;  Branch  (N.  C.) 
Art.,  Lieut.  J.  R.  Potts  ;  Crenshaw  (Va.)  Batt.,  Lieut.  J.  Ellett ;  Fred- 
ericksburg  (Va.)  Art.,  Lieut.  E.  A.  Marye  ;  Johnson's  (Va.)  battery,  Lieut. 
V.  J.  Clutter ;  Letcher  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt,  G.  Davidson  ;  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.) 
Art.,  Capt.  D.  G.  Mclntosh  ;  Purcell  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  W.  J.  Pegram. 

SWELL'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Jubal  A.  Early  : — Laivton's  Brigade, 
(1)  Col.  E.  N.  Atkinson,  (2)  Col.  C.  A.  Evans  ;  13th  Ga.,  Col.  J.  M.  Smith  ; 
26th  Ga.,  Capt.  B.  F.  Grace  ;  31st  Ga.,  Col.  C.  A.  Evans  ;  38th  Ga,,  Capt. 
William  L.  McLeod  ;  60th  Ga,,  Col.  W.  H.  Stiles  ;  61st  Ga,,  Col.  J.  H. 
Lamar,  Maj.  C.  W.  Me  Arthur.  Trimble's  Brigade,  Col.  R.  F.  Hoke  ; 
15th  Ala.  ;  12th  Ga. ;  21st  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  W.  Hooper  ;  21st 
N.  C.  and  1st  N.  C.  Battn.  Early's  Brigade,  Col.  J.  A.  Walker;  13th 
Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  B.  Terrill ;  25th,  31st,  44th,  49th,  52d,  and  58th  Va. 
Hays's  (1st  La.}  Brigade,  Gen.  Harry  T.  Hays  ;  5th,  6th,  7th,  8th,  and 
9th  La.  Artillery,  Capt.  J.  W.  Latimer  ;  Charlottesville  (Va.)  Art,,  Capt. 


320  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

J.  McD.  Carrington  ;  Chesapeake  (Md.)  Art.,  Lieut.  John  E.  Plater ; 
Courtney  (Va.)  Art.,  Lieut.  W.  A.  Tanner  ;  1st  Md.  Batt.,  Capt.  William 
F.  Dement;  La.  Guard  Art.,  Capt.  Louis  E.  D'Aquiu  ;  Stauuton  (Va.) 
Art.,  Lieut.  Asher  W.  Garber. 

JACKSON'S  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  William  B.  Taliaferro : — First  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  F.  Paxton  ;  2d  Va.,  Capt.  J.  Q.  A.  Nadenbousch  ; 
4th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  D.  Gardner,  Maj.  William  Terry  ;  5th  Va.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  H.  J.  Williams ;  27th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  K.  Edmondson  ;  33d  Va., 
Col.  Edwin  G.  Lee.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Jones  ;  21st,  42d, 
and  48th  Va. ;  1st  Va.  Battn.  Third  (Taliaferro' s]  Brigade,  Col.  E.  T. 
H.  Warren  ;  47th  Ala.,  Capt.  James  M.  Campbell ;  48th  Ala.,  Capt.  C.  B. 
St.  John  ;  10th  Va.,  Capt.  W.  B.  Yancey  ;  23d  Va.,  Capt.  A.  J.  Richard 
son  ;  37th  Va.,  Col.  T.  V.  Williams.  Fourth  (Starke's)  Brigade,  Col. 
Edmund  Pendleton  ;  1st  La.  (Vols.),  Lieut.-Col.  M.  Nolan  ;  2d  La.,  Maj. 
M.  A.  Grogan  ;  10th  La.,  Maj.  John  M.  Legett ;  14th  La.,  Capt.  H.  M. 
Verlander  ;  15th  La.,  Lieut.-CoL  McG.  Goodwyn  ;  Coppens's  (La.)  Battn. 
Artillery,  Capt.  J.  B.  Brockenbrough  ;  Carpenter's  (Va.)  battery,  Lieut. 
George  McKendree  ;  Danville  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  G.  W.  Wooding  ;  Hamp- 
den  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  W.  H.  Caskie  ;  Lee  (Va.)  Art.,  Lieut.  C.  W.  Statham  ; 
Lusk's  (Va.)  battery. 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY,*  Brig.-Gen.  W.  N.  Pendleton  :— Brown's  Bat 
talion,  Col.  J.  Thompson  Brown  ;  Brooke's  (Va.)  battery,  Dance's  battery, 
Powhatan  Art.,  Hupp's  battery,  Salem  Art.,  Poague's  (Va.)  battery, 
Rockbridge  Art.,  Smith's  battery,  3d  Howitzers  ;  Watson's  battery,  2d 
Howitzers.  Cults1  s  (Ga.)  Battalion,  Lane's  battery,  Patterson's  battery, 
Ross's  battery,  Capt.  H.  M.  Ross.  Nelson's  Battalion,  Maj.  William 
Nelson  ;  Kirkpatrick's  (Va.)  battery,  Amherst  Art. ;  Massie's  (Va.)  bat 
tery,  Fluvanna  Art. ;  Milledge's  (Ga.)  battery.  Miscellaneous  Batteries, 
Ells's  (Ga.)  battery ;  Nelson's  (Va.)  battery,  Hanover  Art.,  Capt.  G.  W. 
Nelson  ;  Breathed  (Va.)  battery,  J.  Breathed ;  Chew's  (Va.)  battery, 
R.  P.  Chew  ;  Hart's  (S.  C.)  battery,  J.  F.  Hart ;  Henry's  (Va.)  battery, 
M.  W.  Henry  ;  Moorman's  (Va.)  battery,  M.  N.  Moorman. 

CAVALRY,!  Maj  .-Gen.  James  E.  B.  Stuart: — First  Brigade,^  Brig.- 
Gen.  Wade  Hampton  ;  1st  N.  C.,  Col.  L.  S.  Baker ;  1st  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  L. 
Black  ;  2d  S.  C.,  Col.  M.  C.  Butler ;  Cobb  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  M. 
B.  Young ;  Phillips's  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  William  W.  Rich.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee;  1st  Va,,  Col. James  H.  Drake;  2d 
Va.,  Col.  Thomas  T.  Munford ;  3d  Va.,  Col.  T.  H.  Owen ;  4th  Va,,  Col. 
William  C.  Wickham ;  5th  Va.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  H.  F. 


*  Majors  Garnett,  Hamilton,  and  T.  J.  Page,  Jr.,  are  mentioned  in  the 
reports  as  commanding  artillery  battalions,  but  their  composition  is  not 
stated. 

f  Organization  of  brigades  as  established  November  10,  1862.  On 
roster  for  December  16, 1862,  Hart's,  Breathed's,  Moorman's,  and  Chew's 
batteries  appear  as  attached,  respectively,  to  the  First,  Second,  Third, 
and  Fourth  Brigades.  Commanders  are  given  as  reported  December  16, 
1862. 

J  Detachment  on  raid  to  Dumfries. 


BATTLE    OF    FREDEKICKSBUKG.  321 

Lee  ;  2d  N.  C.,  Col.  S.  Williams  ;  9th  Va.,  Col.  R  L.  T.  Beale  ;  10th  Va., 
Col.  J.  Lucius  Davis  ;  13th  Va.,  Col.  J.  R.  Chambliss,  Jr.  ;  15th  Va.,  Col. 
William  B.  Ball.  Fourth  Brigade*  Brig.-Gen.  W.  E.  Jones ;  6th  Va., 
Col.  John  S.  Green  ;  7th  Va.,  Col.  B.  H.  Dulany  ;  12th  Va.,  Col.  A.  W. 
Harman  ;  17th  (Va.)  Battn.,  Lieut.-Col.  O.  B.  Funsten  ;  White's  (Va.) 
Battn.,  Maj.  E.  V.  White. 


*  In  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 


21 


CHAPTEE  XXIV. 

PREPARING    FOR   THE    SPRING    OF    '63. 

Burnside's  Abortive  Moves— The  "  Mud  March"— General  Hooker 
supersedes  Burnside— The  Confederates  strengthen  their  Position  for 
the  Winter — Longstreet  ordered  to  Petersburg— Secretary  of  War 
Seddon  and  the  Author  talk  of  General  Grant  and  the  Confederate 
Situation  on  the  Mississippi  and  in  the  West — Longstreet  makes  a 
Radical  Proposition  for  Confederate  Concentration  in  Tennessee, 
thus  to  compel  Grant  to  abandon  Vicksburg— The  Skilful  Use  of 
Interior  Lines  the  Only  Way  of  equalizing  the  Contest— Battle 
of  Chancellorsville,  Lee's  Brilliant  Achievement— Criticism — Death 
of  "  Stonewall"  Jackson— The  Resolve  to  march  Northward— The 
Army  reorganized  in  Three  Corps— E well  and  A.  P.  Hill  appointed 
Lieutenant-Generals. 

BEFORE  we  were  fully  settled  in  our  winter  quarters, 
and  when  just  beginning  to  enjoy  our  camp  theatricals, 
we  heard  that  General  Burnside  was  looking  for  another 
crossing  by  the  lower  Rappahannock.  We  were  not 
greatly  concerned  about  that,  however,  as  we  thought  the 
quicksands  along  the  flats,  made  especially  protective  by 
the  winter  rains,  would  so  delay  his  march  as  to  allow  us 
ample  time  to  prepare  for  him.  But  the  Washington 
authorities  having  received  reports  of  it  through  some 
of  the  superior  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
march  was  arrested  by  orders  of  the  War  Department. 

Another  move  was  set  on  foot  a  few  weeks  later,  at  a 
time  when  General  Lee  happened  to  be  in  Richmond. 
The  information  was  forwarded  to  him  and  the  army  or 
dered  under  arms,  prepared  to  take  the  field.  A  few 
weeks  before,  General  Burnside  had  ordered  material  to  be 
hauled  to  the  point  below,  which  he  had  chosen  when  pre 
paring  for  his  crossing  that  had  been  arrested  by  the  War 
Department.  When  we  found  that  his  army  was  in  motion, 
General  Jackson  insisted  that  the  crossing  would  be  made 

322 


PREPARING    FOR   THE   SPRING   OF  '63.  323 

below,  and  proposed  to  march  his  corps  down  to  meet  it. 
He  was  told  that  the  neck  of  land  between  the  Potomac 
and  the  Rappahannock  was  so  interlaced  with  wet-weather 
streams  and  ravines  that  the  route  leading  below  was  not 
practicable  at  that  season ;  that  the  quicksands  on  the  flats 
of  the  west  side  were  formidable  obstacles  to  the  march 
of  an  army ;  that  the  only  possible  route  for  crossing  the 
river  was  by  the  fords  of  the  highlands,  and  that  he  must 
hold  his  troops  ready  to  move  accordingly.  He  was 
not  satisfied  with  the  refusal  to  accept  his  construction  of 
the  enemy's  purpose,  and  demurred  against  authority 
less  than  General  Lee's,  but  found  that  the  order  must  be 
obeyed. 

Not  many  hours  after  the  report  came,  the  noise  of 
the  army  working  through  the  mud  was  distinctly  heard 
by  my  picket  guards  along  the  upper  river.  Some 
of  the  guards  called  out  derisively,  offering  help  to  get 
the  batteries  through  the  mud  if  they  could  only  be 
assured  that  the  army  would  cross.  The  bottomless  roads 
and  severe  weather  broke  up  the  campaign,  and  the  move 
back  to  camp  was  reported  to  me  before  the  Confederates 
marched  from  their  camps.  This  effort,  called  by  Burn- 
side's  soldiers  "  The  Mud  March,"  was  followed  by  the 
assignment  of  General  Hooker  to  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

Long  and  close  study  of  the  field  from  the  Potomac  to 
the  James  River,  and  the  experiences  of  former  campaigns, 
made  it  clear  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been 
drawn  into  a  false  position,  and  it  became  manifest  that 
there  were  but  two  moves  left  open  for  its  spring  cam 
paign, — first,  by  crossing  the  upper  fords  of  the  Rap- 
pahannock ;  secondly,  by  detaching  forces  to  the  south 
side  of  the  James,  and  by  that  route  moving  against 
Richmond. 

To  guard  against  the  former  I  laid  out  lines  for  field- 
works  and  rifle-pits  covering  all  approaches  by  the  upper 


324  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

fords  as  far  as  the  road  leading  from  United  States  Ford. 
From  that  point  the  line  broke  to  the  rear,  crossing  the 
Plank  road  and  extending  back  half  a  mile  to  command 
the  road  from  Chancellorsville  to  Spottsylvania  Court- 
House.  When  the  lines  for  these  works  were  well  marked, 
I  was  ordered,  with  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  Pickett 
and  Dearing's  and  Henry's  artillery  battalions,  to  the  south 
side  near  Petersburg,  to  be  in  position  to  meet  the  latter 
move,  leaving  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  R.  H.  An 
derson  to  finish  the  work  on  the  lines  of  defence. 

After  passing  to  the  south  side  of*  James  River,  assign 
ing  the  troops  to  points  of  observation  near  Blackwater 
River,  and  establishing  head-quarters  at  Petersburg,  I 
/  learned  that  there  was  a  goodly  supply  of  produce  along 
the  east  coast  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  inside  the 
military  lines  of  the  Federal  forces.  To  collect  and  trans 
port  this  to  accessible  points  for  the  Confederates,  it  was 
necessary  to  advance  our  divisions  so  as  to  cover  the 
country,  and  to  hold  the  Federal  forces  in  and  about  their 
fortified  positions  while  our  trains  were  at  work.  To  that 
end  I  moved  with  the  troops  in  Virginia  across  the  Black- 
water  to  close  lines  about  the  forts  around  Suffolk,  and 
ordered  the  troops  along  our  line  in  North  Carolina  to  a 
like  advance.  The  movements  were  executed  without 
serious  trouble,  and  the  work  was  prosecuted  up  to  the 
time  of  my  recall  by  General  Lee. 

While  lying  near  Suffolk  a  couple  of  young  men  dressed 
as  citizens  entered  my  tent  one  night  with  letters  from 
Secretary  of  War  Seddon,  recommending  them  as  trust 
worthy  and  efficient  scouts.  They  were  sent  off  through 
the  swamp  to  find  their  way  to  Norfolk  and  southward  to 
report  of  roads  or  routes  for  our  troops  in  case  we  should 
wish  to  make  a  detour  for  the  capture  of  Suffolk.  One 
of  them,  Harrison,  proved  to  be  an  active,  intelligent,  en 
terprising  scout,  and  was  retained  in  service. 

The   accounts   that  we  gained  indicated  that  Suffolk 


PKEPAKING    FOR    THE   SPRING    OF  '63.  325 

could  be  turned  and  captured  with  little  loss,  but  as  we 
had  given  it  up  the  year  before  as  untenable,  and  were 
liable  to  be  called  upon  at  any  moment  to  give  it  up 
again,  it  appeared  that  the  "  cost  of  the  whistle'7  would  be 
too  high. 

The  only  occurrence  of  serious  moment  while  we  had 
our  forces  about  Suffolk  was  the  loss  of  Captain  Stribling's 
battery,  which  had  been  inadvertently  posted  by  the  officer 
in  charge  of  the  artillery  on  a  neck  running  out  into  a 
bend  of  the  Nansemond  River.  The  Federal  gun-boats, 
seeing  the  opportunity,  came  into  the  river  and  took  posi 
tions  commanding  the  ground  in  rear  of  the  battery  so  as 
to  sweep  the  field  against  all  succoring  parties,  while  a 
direct  attack  was  made  upon  the  battery,  resulting  in  its 
capture. 

About  this  time  the  soldiers  on  both  sides  had  consider 
able  amusement  aver  a  Federal  signal  station  that  was 
inside  our  lines  as  we  had  laid  them.  The  Union  troops 
had  some  time  previously  trimmed  up  a  tall  pine-tree 
and  built  near  the  top  a  platform  for  use  as  a  signal  sta 
tion,  and,  coming  upon  this,  to  gratify  his  curiosity  a  Con 
federate  soldier  climbed  to  the  staging  and  seated  himself 
for  a  leisurely  view  of  the  Federal  forces  inside  their 
works.  An  artillerist  of  the  other  side,  after  allowing 
sufficient  time  to  satisfy  a  reasonable  curiosity,  trained  one 
of  his  rifle  guns  upon  the  platform,  and  sent  a  shell 
screaming  and  bursting  too  near  for  the  comfort  of  the 
"  man  up  a  tree."  As.  he  did  not  care  to  be  seen  in  pre 
cipitate  retreat,  he  thought  to  wait  a  little,  but  a  second 
shot  admonished  him  that  hurry,  if  less  graceful,  might 
be  more  wise  than  deliberate  retreat.  Acting  under  press 
ure  of  the  situation,  his  legs,  to  the  amusement  of  the  men 
on  both  sides,  soon  brought  him  to  safe  cover.  When  night 
closed  in  over  the  belligerents  this  soldier  went  to  work  on 
a  scheme  by  which  he  hoped  to  get  even  with  the  Yankees. 
He  carefully  constructed  and  equipped  a  full-sized  man, 


326  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

dressed  in  a  new  suit  of  improved  "  butternut"  *  dry-goods, 
and,  in  due  form  christening  him  "  Julius  Caesar,"  took 
him  to  the  platform,  adjusted  him  to  graceful  position,  and 
made  him  secure  to  the  framework  by  strong  cords.  A 
little  after  sunrise  "  Julius  Caesar"  was  discovered  by  some 
of  the  Federal  battery  officers,  who  prepared  for  the 
target, — so  inviting  to  skilful  practice.  The  new  soldier 
sat  under  the  hot  fire  with  irritating  indifference  until  the 
Confederates,  not  able  to  restrain  their  hilarity,  exposed 
the  joke  by  calling  for  "  three  cheers  for  Julius  Caesar." 
The  other  side  quickly  recognized  the  situation,  and  good- 
naturedly  added  to  ours  their  cheers  for  the  old  hero. 

About  the  28th  day  of  April  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
under  General  Hooker,  took  up  its  march  for  the  fords  of 
the  upper  Rappahannock  to  cross  against  General  Lee  at 
Fredericksburg.  At  the  same  time  General  Grant  crossed 
the  Mississippi  below  Vicksburg,  marched  against  General 
Pemberton's  army  in  Mississippi,  and  was  driving  it  back 
upon  its  fortifications  about  Vicksburg. 

When  General  Hooker's  movements  were  so  developed 
as  to  make  sure  of  his  purpose,  repeated  calls  came  to 
me  over  the  wires  to  pull  away  from  Suffolk  and  return 
to  General  Lee  with  all  speed.  These  came  from  General 
Lee,  and  also  from  the  Richmond  authorities.  In  reply  I 
despatched  that  our  trains  were  at  the  front  along  the 
coast  collecting  supplies;  that  they  would  be  hurried 
to  our  rear,  and  as  soon  as  safe  we  would  march.  The 
calls  became  so  frequent  and  urgent,  however,  that  I  in 
quired  if  we  should  abandon  our  trains.  To  this  no 
answer  came ;  and  I  was  left  to  the  exercise  of  my  own 
judgment. 

As  soon  as  the  trains  were  safely  back,  we  drew  off, 
marched  back  to  the  Blackwater,  and  thence  en  route  for 


*  The  Confederate  dry-goods  factories,  for  want  of  other  dye-stuffs, 
had  long  before  this  resorted  to  the  use  of  the  butternut  coloring. 


PREPARING    FOR    THE    SPRING    OF  '63.  327 

Richmond  and  Fredericksburg.  Before  we  reached  the 
former  place  a  telegram  came  announcing  the  great  battle 
and  victory  of  Chancellorsville. 

Passing  through  Richmond,  I  called  to  report  to  Sec 
retary  of  War  Seddon,  who  referred  to  affairs  in  Missis 
sippi,  stating  that  the  department  was  trying  to  collect  an 
army  at  Jackson,  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
sufficient  to  push  Grant  away  from  his  circling  lines  about 
Vicksburg.  He  spoke  of  the  difficulty  of  feeding  as  well 
as  collecting  an  army  of  that  magnitude  in  Mississippi, 
and  asked  my  views. 

The  Union  army  under  General  Rosecrans  was  then 
facing  the  Confederate  army  under  General  Bragg  in 
Tennessee,  at  Murfreesboro'  and  Shelbyville. 

I  thought  that  General  Grant  had  better  facilities  for 
collecting  supplies  and  reinforcements  on  his  new  lines, 
and  suggested  that  the  only  prospect  of  relieving  Vicks 
burg  that  occurred  to  me  was  to  send  General  Johnston 
and  his  troops  about  Jackson  to  reinforce  General  Bragg's 
army  ;  at  the  same  time  the  two  divisions  of  my  command, 
then  marching  to  join  General  Lee,  to  the  same  point ;  that 
the  commands  moving  on  converging  lines  could  have  rapid 
transit  and  be  thrown  in  overwhelming  numbers  on  Rose 
crans  before  he  could  have  help,  break  up  his  army,  and 
march  for  Cincinnati  and  the  Ohio  River ;  that  Grant's 
was  the  only  army  that  could  be  drawn  to  meet  this 
move,  and  that  the  move  must,  therefore,  relieve  Vicks 
burg. 

It  was  manifest  before  the  war  was  accepted  that  the 
only  way  to  equalize  the  contest  was  by  skilful  use  of  our 
interior  lines,  and  this  was  so  impressed  by  two  years' 
experience  that  it  seemed  time  to  force  it  upon  the  Rich 
mond  authorities.  But  foreign  intervention  was  the 
ruling  idea  with  the  President,  and  he  preferred  that  as 
the  easiest  solution  of  all  problems. 

The  only  objection  offered  by  the  Secretary  was  that 


328  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Grant  was  such  an  obstinate  fellow  that  he  could  only  be 
induced  to  quit  Vicksburg  by  terribly  hard  knocks. 

On  the  contrary,  I  claimed  that  he  was  a  soldier,  and 
would  obey  the  calls  of  his  government,  but  was  not  lightly 
to  be  driven  from  his  purpose. 

My  march  was  continued,  and  we  joined  General  Lee 
at  Fredericksburg,  where  I  found  him  in  sadness,  notwith 
standing  that  he  was  contemplating  his  great  achievement 
and  brilliant  victory  of  Chancellorsville,  for  he  had  met 
with  great  loss  as  well  as  great  gains.  The  battle  had  cost 
heavily  of  his  army,  but  his  grief  was  over  the  severe 
wounding  of  his  great  lieutenant,  General  Thomas  Jona 
than  Jackson,  the  head  of  the  Second  Corps  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia ;  cut  off,  too,  at  a  moment  so  much 
needed  to  finish  his  work  in  the  battle  so  handsomely 
begun.  With  a  brave  heart,  however,  General  Lee  was 
getting  his  ranks  together,  and  putting  them  in  condition 
for  other  useful  work. 

At  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  according  to  its  return  of  a  few  days  before, 
consisted  of  officers  and  men  actually  available  for  line 
of  battle,  113,838,  with  404  pieces  of  artillery.*  The 
return  of  casualties  showed  the  enormous  loss  of  17,287. 
Returns  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  for  March, 
1863,  showed  an  effective  aggregate  of  59,681 ;  f  batteries 
in  action,  about  160  guns.  To  this  may  possibly  be  added 
one  thousand  of  troops  returning  during  April  in  time  for 
the  battle.  The  casualties  reported  by  the  medical  direc 
tor  numbered  10,281,  but  reports  of  the  commanders 
showed  over  12,000,  not  including  artillery  or  cavalry,  or 
slightly  wounded  and  missing,  which  would  probably  add 
another  thousand. 

Chancellorsville  is  usually  accepted  as  General  Lee's 
most  brilliant  achievement,  and,  considered  as  an  indepen- 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxv.  part  ii.  p.  320. 
f  Ibid.,  p.  696. 


PREPARING    FOR   THE   SPRING    OF  '63.  329 

dent  affair,  it  was  certainly  grand.  As  I  had  no  part  in 
its  active  conduct,  it  is  only  apropos  to  this  writing  to 
consider  the  plan  of  battle  as  projected  some  four  months 
previous, — i.e.,  to  stand  behind  our  intrenched  lines  and 
await  the  return  of  my  troops  from  Suffolk. 

Under  that  plan  General  Lee  would  have  had  time  to 
strengthen  and  improve  his  trenches,  while  Hooker  was 
intrenching  at  Chancellorsville.  He  could  have  held  his 
army  solid  behind  his  lines,  where  his  men  would  have 
done  more  work  on  the  unfinished  lines  in  a  day  than  in 
months  of  idle  camp  life. 

General  Hooker  had  split  his  army  in  two,  and  was  vir 
tually  in  the  condition  which  President  Lincoln  afterwards 
so  graphically  described  in  his  letter  addressed  to  him 
June  5  following, — viz.  : 

"I  would  not  take  any  risk  of  being  entangled  upon  the  river, 
like  an  ox  jumped  half  over  a  fence  and  liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs 
front  and  rear,  without  a  fair  chance  to  gore  one  way  or  to  kick 
the  other." 

My  impression  was,  and  is,  that  General  Lee,  standing 
under  his  trenches,  would  have  been  stronger  against 
Hooker  than  he  was  in  December  against  Burnside,  and 
that  he  would  have  grown  stronger  every  hour  of  delay, 
while  Hooker  would  have  grown  weaker  in  morale  and 
in  confidence  of  his  plan  and  the  confidence  of  his  troops. 
He  had  interior  lines  for  defence,  while  his  adversary  was 
divided  by  two  crossings  of  the  river,  which  made  Lee's 
sixty  thousand  for  defence  about  equal  to  the  one  hundred 
and  thirteen  thousand  under  General  Hooker.  By  the 
time  that  the  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Hood  could  have 
joined  General  Lee,  General  Hooker  would  have  found 
that  he  must  march  to  attack  or  make  a  retreat  without 
battle.  It  seems  probable  that  under  the  original  plan 
the  battle  would  have  given  fruits  worthy  of  a  general 
engagement.  The  Confederates  would  then  have  had 


330  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

opportunity,  and  have  been  in  condition  to  so  follow 
Hooker  as  to  have  compelled  his  retirement  to  Washing 
ton,  and  that  advantage  might  have  drawn  Grant  from 
Vicksburg ;  whereas  General  Lee  was  actually  so  crippled 
by  his  victory  that  he  was  a  full  month  restoring  his  army 
to  condition  to  take  the  field.  In  defensive  warfare  he 
was  perfect.  When  the  hunt  was  up,  his  combativeness 
was  overruling. 

It  was  probably  a  mistake  to  draw  McLaws  away  from 
his  position  at  Marye's  Hill,  where  he  and  Ransom  had 
successfully  held  against  six  or  seven  severe  attacks  of  the 
Burnside  battle,  with  three  brigades,  two  of  his  own  and 
one  of  Ransom's.  General  Early  was  assigned  to  that 
position  with  five  brigades.  He  was  attacked  by  about 
one-fourth  the  number  of  McLaws's  assailants,  the  posi 
tion  was  carried,  and  Early  was  driven  off  in  confusion, 
losing,  besides  large  numbers  as  prisoners,  many  pieces  of 
artillery.  His  especial  assignment  was  to  defend  the  Plank 
road  against  the  enemy's  march  to  attack  General  Lee's 
rear.  Instead,  he  retreated  by  the  Telegraph  road,  leav 
ing  the  Plank  road  free  for  the  enemy.  After  driving 
Early  off,  the  enemy  marched  by  the  Plank  road,  and 
Early  marched  back  to  his  late  position  at  Marye's  Hill. 
So  General  Lee  was  obliged  to  take  McLaws  and  Ander 
son  from  his  battle  at  Chancellorsville  to  drive  back  the 
force  threatening  his  rear. 

The  battle  as  pitched  and  as  an  independent  affair  was 
brilliant,  and  if  the  war  was  for  glory  could  be  called 
successful,  but,  besides  putting  the  cause  upon  the  hazard 
of  a  die,  it  was  crippling  in  resources  and  of  future  prog 
ress,  while  the  wail  of  a  few  days  would  have  given  time 
for  concentration  and  opportunities  against  Hooker  more 
effective  than  we  experienced  with  Burnside  at  Freder- 
icksburg.  This  was  one  of  the  occasions  where  success 
was  not  a  just  criterion. 

After  reporting  to  General  Lee,  I  offered  the  sugges- 


PREPARING    FOR    THE    SPRING    OF  '63.  331 

tions  made  to  Secretary  Seddon,  in  regard  to  the  means 
that  should  be  adopted  for  the  relief  of  Vicksburg.  I 
thought  that  honor,  interest,  duty,  and  humanity  called 
us  to  that  service,  and  asked  the  aid  of  his  counsels  with 
the  War  Department,  and  reinforcements  from  his  army 
for  the  West,  to  that  end.  I  suggested  that  General 
Johnston,  instead  of  trying  to  collect  an  army  against 
General  Grant,  should  be  sent  to  reinforce  General  Bragg, 
then  standing  against  the  Union  forces  under  General 
Rosecrans  in  Middle  Tennessee  ;  that  at  the  same  time  he 
should  send  my  divisions,  just  up  from  Suffolk,  to  join 
Johnston's  reinforcements  to  Bragg's  army ;  that  the 
combination  once  made  should  strike  immediately  in  over 
whelming  force  upon  Rosecrans,  and  march  for  the  Ohio 
River  and  Cincinnati. 

He  recognized  the  suggestion  as  of  good  combina 
tion,  and  giving  strong  assurance  of  success,  but  he  was 
averse  to  having  a  part  of  his  army  so  far  beyond  his 
reach.  He  reflected  over  the  matter  one  or  two  days,  and 
then  fell  upon  the  plan  of  invading  the  Northern  soil,  and 
so  threatening  Washington  as  to  bring  about  the  same 
hoped-for  result.  To  that  end  he  bent  his  energies. 

His  plan  or  wishes  announced,  it  became  useless  and 
improper  to  offer  suggestions  leading  to  a  different  course. 
All  that  I  could  ask  was  that  the  policy  of  the  campaign 
should  be  one  of  defensive  tactics ;  that  we  should  work 
so  as  to  force  the  enemy  to  attack  us,  in  such  good  position 
as  we  might  find  in  his  own  country,  so  well  adapted  to 
that  purpose, — which  might  assure  us  of  a  grand  triumph. 
To  this  he  readily  assented  as  an  important  and  material 
adjunct  to  his  general  plan.  His  confidence  in  making 
moves  threatening  Washington  and  the  invasion  of  Mary 
land  and  Pennsylvania  grew  out  of  the  known  anxiety 
of  the  Washington  authorities  as  to  the  safety  of  their 
capital  and  of  quiet  within  the  Union  lines. 

In  the  midst  of  his  work  of  preparation  came  the  an- 


332  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

nouncement  that  General  Jackson's  trouble  had  taken  an 
unfortunate  turn,  that  he  was  thought  to  be  sinking,  and 
not  many  hours  after  that  the  news  came  that  he  had  gone 
to  rest.  But  the  full  realization  of  all  that  this  meant 
was  delayed  until,  at  the  railroad  station,  the  train  that 
was  to  bear  his  remains  to  their  final  resting-place  started 
upon  its  sad  journey.  Then  officers  and  soldiers  gath 
ered  to  do  last  honors  to  their  dead  comrade  and  chieftain 
seemed  suddenly  to  realize  that  they  were  to  see  "  Stone 
wall"  Jackson  no  more  forever,  and  fully  to  measure  the 
great  misfortune  that  had  come  upon  them.  And  as  we 
turned  away,  we  seemed  to  face  a  future  bereft  of  much 
of  its  hopefulness. 

General  Jackson's  death  suggested  to  General  Lee  a 
reorganization  of  his  army  into  three  corps,  and  B,.  S. 
Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill,  appointed  lieutenant-generals,  were 
assigned  to  the  Second  and  Third  respectively. 

As  the  senior  major-general  of  the  army,  and  by  reason 
of  distinguished  services  and  ability,  General  Ewell  was 
entitled  to  the  command  of  the  Second  Corps,  but  there 
were  other  major-generals  of  rank  next  below  Ewell  whose 
services  were  such  as  to  give  them  claims  next  after 
E  well's,  so  that  when  they  found  themselves  neglected 
there  was  no  little  discontent,  and  the  fact  that  both  the 
new  lieutenant-generals  were  Virginians  made  the  trouble 
more  grievous.*  Afterwards,  when  Early,  noted  as  the 
weakest  general  officer  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
was  appointed  lieutenant-general  over  those  who  held 
higher  rank  than  he,  there  was  a  more  serious  feeling  of 
"  too  much  Virginia."  Longstreet  and  Jackson  had  been 
assigned  by  General  Johnston. 

In  our  anxious  hours  and  hopeful  anticipations  the  little 

*  General  D.  H.  Hill  was  next  in  rank  to  General  Ewell.  He  was  the 
hero  of  Bethel,  Seven  Pines,  South  Mountain,  and  the  hardest  fighter 
at  Sharpsburg.  His  record  was  as  good  as  that  of  "  Stonewall"  Jack 
son,  but,  not  being  a  Virginian,  he  was  not  so  well  advertised. 


PREPARING    FOR    THE    SPRING   OF  '63.  333 

quarrel  was  soon  lost  sight  of, — displaced  by  affairs  of 
greater  moment.  Reaction  began  to  show  the  effect  of 
General  Lee's  strong  hand  and  hard  work.  Hope  and 
confidence  impaired  by  the  failure  of  the  Maryland  cam 
paign  were  restored,  and  we  prepared  to  abandon  all 
uncomfortable  thoughts  with  the  graves  of  our  fallen 
comrades. 

As  soon  as  affairs  took  such  shape  as  to  assure  me  that 
the  advance  northward  was  inevitable,  I  sent  a  requisition 
down  to  Richmond  for  gold  coin  for  my  scout  Harrison, 
gave  him  what  he  thought  he  would  need  to  get  along  in 
Washington,  and  sent  him  off  with  secret  orders,  telling 
him  that  I  did  not  care  to  see  him  till  he  could  bring 
information  of  importance, — that  he  should  be  the  judge 
of  that.  He  wanted  to  know  where  he  would  find  us,  and 
was  told  that  the  head-quarters  of  the  First  Corps  were 
large  enough  for  any  intelligent  man  to  find.  With  these 
orders  he  left  us,  and  after  about  three  weeks  was  arrested 
in  Pennsylvania  and  brought  under  guard  to  my  head 
quarters. 


UNIVERSITY 

'^CALIFORNIA- 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

INVASION    OF    PENNSYLVANIA. 

Plan  of  the  Confederate  March  North — General  Lee  hoped  to  draw 
Troops  from  the  South  and  develop  Important  Results  North  of  the 
Potomac — He  wanted  Beauregard  sent  to  support  the  Movement — 
The  Authorities  in  Richmond  failed  to  comprehend— The  Value  of 
the  "Interior  Lines"  not  appreciated— Spirited  Cavalry  Fight  at 
Brandy  Station  between  Stuart's  and  Pleasonton's  Commands — En 
gagement  of  Ewell  and  Milroy  at  Winchester— The  Question  of  Au 
thority  for  the  Cavalry  Movements— Lieutenant-Colonel  Fremantle 
of  the  Coldstream  Guards,  British  Army,  as  a  Guest  and  Observer 
—The  Confederate  Advance  reaches  Pennsylvania  Soil— General  Lee 
issues  Orders  for  a  March  on  Harrisburg — Municipal  Authorities  of 
York  and  Gettysburg  surrender  to  General  John  B.  Gordon. 

THE  absorbing  study  now  was  the  projected  campaign 
into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania, — the  invasion  of  the 
enemy's  country.  The  plan  of  defensive  tactics  gave 
some  hope  of  success,  and,  in  fact,  I  assured  General  Lee 
that  the  First  Corps  would  receive  and  defend  the  battle 
if  he  would  guard  its  flanks,  leaving  his  other  corps  to 
gather  the  fruits  of  success.  The  First  Corps  was  as  solid 
as  a  rock — a  great  rock.  It  was  not  to  be  broken  of  good 
position  by  direct  assault,  and  was  steady  enough  to  work 
and  wait  for  its  chosen  battle. 

The  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  gave  us  firm,  broad 
roads  for  the  march  north,  curtained  by  the  solid  range 
of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  South  Mountains.  There  were 
some  Federal  troops  occupying  points  in  the  Valley  of 
Virginia,  but  not  more  than  enough  to  give  healthful  em 
ployment  to  our  leading  columns  as  they  advanced.  The 
army  as  reorganized  in  three  corps  had  three  divisions  of 
each  corps,  with  four  brigades  to  the  division,  except  R. 
H.  Anderson's,  Pickett's,  and  Rodes's,  each  of  which  had 
five.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart's  cavalry  consisted  of  the  brigades 

334 


INVASION   OF    PENNSYLVANIA.  335 

of  Wade  Hampton,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  Bev 
erly  Robertson,  and  W.  E.  Jones.  The  cavalry  of  Jen 
kins  and  Imboden,  operating  in  the  Valley  and  West  Vir 
ginia  near  our  route,  was  to  move,  the  former  with  Ewell, 
the  latter  on  his  left.  Six  batteries  of  horse  artillery 
under  Major  R.  F.  Beckham  were  of  Stuart's  command, 
and  to  each  army  corps  were  attached  five  battalions  of 
artillery  of  four  guns  to  a  battery,  and  four  batteries  to  a 
battalion,  making  of  the  whole  artillery  organization,  in 
cluding  batteries  of  reserve  and  the  thirty  guns  of  horse 
artillery,  two  hundred  and  eighty-seven  guns.  In  the 
three  army  corps  there  were  thirty -nine  brigades,  proper, 
of  infantry. 

In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  fifty-one  brigades 
of  infantry,  eight  brigades  of  cavalry,  and  three  hun 
dred  and  seventy  guns  of  artillery.  The  artillery  ap 
pointments  were  so  superior  that  our  officers  sometimes 
felt  humiliated  when  posted  to  unequal  combat  with  their 
better  metal  and  munitions.  In  small-arms  also  the 
Union  troops  had  the  most  improved  styles. 

Notwithstanding,  we  were  prepared  to  march  forward 
and  cheerfully  accept  the  gage,  hoping  to  overbalance 
these  advantages  through  the  morale  afforded  by  brave 
hearts  and  the  strategic  skill  to  throw  the  onus  of  battle 
upon  the  enemy. 

The  plan  of  campaign  as  projected  was  by  the  march 
of  the  Second  Corps  through  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah  to  drive  off  or  capture  the  Federal  forces  stationed 
along  the  Valley,  and  continue  the  march  to  Pennsylva 
nia  until  further  orders,  meanwhile  collecting  supplies  for 
the  advance  and  for  those  who  were  to  follow,  Jenkins's 
brigade  of  cavalry  working  with  the  advance,  and  Im- 
boden's  on  its  left ;  the  First  Corps  and  main  force  of 
cavalry  to  march  near  the  east  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
threatening  towards  the  rear  line  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  occupy  the  Blue  Ridge,  while  the  trains  and 


336  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

other  troops  passed  behind  the  mountains  to  follow  the 
advance  march.  Stuart's  cavalry  brigades  were  to  ob 
serve  between  the  First  Corps  and  the  Union  army. 
When  the  Third  Corps  had  passed  behind  the  First,  the 
latter  and  the  cavalry  were  to  withdraw  and  follow  the 
general  march.  Stuart,  whose  movements  were  to  corre 
spond  to  those  of  the  First  Corps,  was  to  follow  its  with 
drawal  and  cross  the  Potomac  on  our  right  flank  at  Shep- 
herdstown.  The  brigades  of  Generals  M.  Jenkins  and 
M.  D.  Corse  of  Pickett's  division,  left  in  Virginia  near 
Petersburg  and  Hanover  Junction,  were  to  follow  and  join 
their  division,  as  will  soon  appear. 

General  Beauregard  was  to  be  called  from  his  post,  in 
the  South,  with  such  brigades  as  could  be  pulled  away 
temporarily  from  their  Southern  service,  and  thrown  for 
ward,  with  the  two  brigades  of  Pickett's  division  (Jenkins's 
and  Corse's)  and  such  others  as  could  be  got  together, 
along  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  in  threatening 
attitude  towards  Washington  City,  and  he  was  to  suddenly 
forward  Pickett's  brigades  through  the  Valley  to  the  di 
vision,  and  at  his  pleasure  march  on,  or  back  towards 
Richmond. 

As  the  season  of  fevers  along  the  coast  of  the  Carolinas 
was  approaching,  General  Lee  thought  that  active  opera 
tions  in  the  far  South,  especially  along  the  seaboard,  would 
be  suspended,  that  his  move  northward  might  draw  most 
of  them  towards  him,  and  possibly  troops  operating  in 
the  Southwest,  the  latter  being  really  a  prominent  part 
of  the  object  of  his  northern  march.  He  thought  that 
Beauregard's  appearance  in  Northern  Virginia  would  in 
crease  the  known  anxiety  of  the  Washington  authorities 
and  cause  them  to  draw  troops  from  the  South,  when  in 
the  progress  of  events  other  similar  movements  might 
follow  on  both  sides  until  important  results  could  be  de 
veloped  north  of  the  Potomac. 

His  early  experience  with  the   Richmond  authorities 


INVASION    OF    PENNSYLVANIA.  337 

taught  him  to  deal  cautiously  with  them  in  disclosing  his 
views,  and  to  leave  for  them  the  privilege  and  credit  of 
approving,  step  by  step,  his  apparently  hesitant  policy, 
so  that  his  plans  were  disclosed  little  at  a  time ;  and,  find 
ing  them  slow  in  approving  them,  still  slower  in  advancing 
the  brigades  of  Pickett's  division,  and  utterly  oblivious  of 
the  effect  of  a  grand  swing  north  on  our  interior  lines,  he 
did  not  mention  the  part  left  open  for  Beauregard  until 
he  had  their  approval  of  the  march  of  the  part  of  his 
command  as  he  held  it  in  hand.  The  part  assigned  for 
Beauregard  became  the  subject  for  correspondence  be 
tween  the  authorities  and  the  officers  who  knew  nothing 
of  the  general  ideas  and  plans.  The  latter  failed  to  see 
any  benefit  to  accrue  by  taking  troops  from  their  com 
mands,  and  naturally  offered  objections  to  their  going. 
The  authorities,  not  comprehending  the  vast  strength  to 
be  gathered  by  utilizing  our  interior  lines,  failed  to  bring 
about  their  execution,  and  the  great  possibility  was  not 
fully  tested. 

In  pursuance  of  the  plan  for  the  northern  campaign 
our  march  was  taken  up  on  Wednesday,  the  3d  of  June, 
McLaws's  division  of  the  First  Corps  marching  on  that 
date  from  Fredericksburg,  and  Hood's  from  near  Orange 
Court-House  on  the  4th ;  Kodes's  division  of  the  Second 
Corps  followed,  and  on  the  5th  Johnson's  and  Early's  of 
the  Second.  Pickett  of  the  First,  with  three  of  his  bri 
gades,  followed  the  course  of  Hood's  division.  All  were 
to  assemble  at  Culpeper  Court-House,  near  our  cavalry 
head-quarters.  The  Third  Corps,  General  A.  P.  Hill, 
was  left  in  observation  of  the  enemy  at  Fredericksburg. 

When  General  Hooker  discovered  the  thinning  of  our 
camps  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg,  he  put  a  bridge  across 
the  Rappahannock  at  Deep  Hun,  crossed  a  considerable 
force  of  artillery  and  infantry,  and  constructed  a  line  of 
rifle-pits  along  the  river  bank.  At  the  report  of  these 
movements,  General  Lee  thought  to  delay  the  movements 

22 


338  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

of  the  Second  Corps,  though  he  hurried  those  of  the  First 
to  draw  off  the  Federals  from  action  against  Hill,  but 
holding  the  Second  ready  to  go  back  to  him  should  there 
be  need.  Hill  made  a  similar  demonstration  against 
Hooker,  threatening  on  the  river  below,  though  not  so 
far  as  to  cross  it,  which  caused  the  Federals  to  draw  their 
troops  from  the  south  side.  The  Second  Corps  was  then 
hurried  on  to  Culpeper  Court-House. 

The  First  and  Second  Corps  waited  at  the  court-house  to 
know  if  indications  about  Fredericksburg  were  such  as  to 
warrant  the  onward  march.  General  Hooker,  not  con 
vinced  that  General  Lee  had  left  him,  ordered  his  cavalry 
under  General  Pleasonton,  supported  by  two  brigades  of 
infantry,  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  in  search  of  Stuart's 
cavalry,  and  to  secure  information  of  the  Confederate 
plans.  Pleasonton's  force,  including  infantry,  was  eleven 
thousand.  He  divided  his  command,  sending  one  half  by 
Beverley's,  the  other  by  Kelly's  Ford,  to  march  on  con 
verging  roads  to  Brandy  Station,  near  Fleetwood,  the 
latter  point  the  head-quarters  of  our  cavalry  chief,  five 
miles  west  of  Rappahannock  Bridge. 

Happily  for  the  Confederates,  the  cavalry  brigades  had 
been  drawn  together  on  the  8th  for  review  by  General 
Lee,  and  rested  that  night  not  remote  from  cavalry  head 
quarters.  On  the  9th,  Pleasonton's  columns  made  an  un 
looked-for  advance  and  engaged  the  Confederates,  before 
notice  could  be  sent  to  the  columns  at  their  camps.  The 
march  resulted  in  a  very  severe  and  strongly  disputed 
cavalry  fight,  ending  in  heavy  losses  on  both  sides.  Gen 
eral  Stuart  called  for  infantry  supports  before  the  close 
of  the  conflict,  but  succeeded  in  recovering  his  position 
before  the  infantry  reached  him, — not,  however,  until  some 
important  despatches  were  taken  by  the  enemy,  which 
gave  the  information  they  were  seeking.  Stuart  reported 
485  officers  and  men  lost ;  Pleasonton,  907,  and  three 
pieces  of  artillery.  On  the  10th,  Ewell  took  up  his 


INVASION    OF    PENNSYLVANIA.  339 

march  for  the  Valley  by  Chester  Gap.  Now,  General 
Milroy  had  a  division  of  nine  thousand  Federals  at  Win 
chester,  and  sought  to  hold  it  contrary  to  his  orders  to 
retire  to  the  command  at  Harper's  Ferry.  He  had  a  bri 
gade  on  outpost  at  Berryville  under  McReynolds.  Gen 
eral  Kelly  had  ten  thousand  men  at  Harper's  Ferry,  with 
a  strong  detachment  of  infantry  and  a  battery  at  Martins- 
burg,  under  Colonel  B.  F.  Smith. 

Upon  entering  the  Valley,  General  Ewell  detached 
Rodes's  division  and  Jenkins's  cavalry  to  cut  off  and  cap 
ture  the  force  at  Berryville,  but  McReynolds  withdrew 
in  time  to  join  the  forces  at  Winchester.  This  Confeder 
ate  column  then  marched  for  Martinsburg,  and  got  pos 
session  there  on  the  14th,  the  garrison  marching  out  and 
joining  the  troops  on  Maryland  Heights.  The  artillery 
trying  to  escape  north  towards  Williamsport  was  followed 
so  closely  that  they  lost  some  three  or  four  guns.  With 
his  divisions  under  Johnson  and  Early,  General  Ewell 
marched  to  Winchester  and  attacked  and  carried  the  out 
works  of  Milroy's  fortified  position,  when  the  latter,  after 
calling  a  council,  decided  to  retreat,  leaving  his  artillery 
and  wagon-trains.  Ewell  had  anticipated  this,  and  sent 
a  part  of  Johnson's  division,  one  brigade,  to  intercept  him 
on  the  Martinsburg  road.  The  commands  met  about  day 
light,  and  there  ensued  a  severe  engagement,  successful  to 
the  Federals  till  reinforcements  came  to  the  Confederates, 
when  Milroy's  command  was  broken  up,  part  of  his  troops 
escaping  to  Harper's  Ferry  and  part  getting  over  the 
Potomac  at  Hancock.  The  Federals  at  Harper's  Ferry 
abandoned  their  position  in  Virginia,  seeking  shelter  on 
the  heights  on  the  Maryland  side. 

On  his  march  through  the  Valley,  General  Ewell  took 
4000  prisoners  and  small-arms,  25  cannon,  11  standards, 
250  wagons,  400  horses,  and  large  quantities  of  subsistence 
and  quartermaster's  stores,  with  a  loss  of  269  of  all  arms. 
He  crossed  the  Potomac  on  the  15th,  occupying  Hagerstown 


340  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  Sharpsburg,  on  the  Maryland  side,  and  sent  the 
cavalry  brigade,  under  Jenkins,  north  towards  Chambers- 
burg. 

By  the  plan  of  march  from  the  Valley  of  Virginia  the 
leading  corps  (Second)  was  to  divide  and  cross  the  Poto 
mac  River  at  Williamsport  and  Shepherdstown,  the 
column  through  Williamsport  to  march  through  Hagers- 
town  and  Chambersburg  towards  Harrisburg,  collecting 
produce  and  supplies  for  the  army,  Imboden's  cavalry  on 
its  left  flank.  The  eastern  column  was  to  march  through 
Sharpsburg,  Emmitsburg,  and  Gettysburg  towards  the 
bridge  over  the  Susquehanna  River  at  Wrightsville,  Jen 
kins's  cavalry  brigade  working  with  the  two  columns. 
The  Third  Corps,  passing  behind  the  Blue  Ridge,  was  to 
cross  at  Shepherdstown  and  follow  the  march  of  the  east 
ern  column.  The  First  Corps  was  to  draw  back  from  the 
Blue  Ridge  and  cross  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  to  be 
followed  by  the  cavalry,  which  was  to  cross  at  Shepherds- 
town  and  ride  severely  towards  Baltimore,  to  force  the 
enemy  to  eastern  concentration. 

The  object  of  the  march  of  the  eastern  columns,  besides 
opening  a  wide  field  for  foraging,  was  to  draw  the  enemy 
from  the  route  of  travel  of  the  supply  trains,  and  to  press 
him  off  east  to  give  opportunity  for  the  western  columns 
to  file  in  between  him  and  Washington. 

The  reconnoissance  and  cavalry  fight  made  against 
Stuart  at  Fleetwood  gave  General  Hooker  conclusive  evi 
dence  of  the  march  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
and  he  drew  off  from  Stafford  Heights  on  the  13th,  and 
marched  towards  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad 
and  the  Potomac  River.  The  First  Corps  was  ordered 
north  along  the  east  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  guard  our 
line  of  march  and  cover,  in  a  measure,  the  Confederate 
plans,  Stuart's  cavalry  to  ride  between  the  First  Corps 
and  the  Union  army.  On  the  19th  the  divisions  of  the 
First  Corps  were  posted  along  the  Blue  Ridge  from 


INVASION    OF    PENNSYLVANIA.  341 

Ashby's  Gap  on  the  right  to  Snicker's  Gap  on  the  left, 
McLaws  at  the  former,  Hood  at  the  latter,  Pickett's  three 
brigades  between  the  others.  Under  the  impression  that 
the  cavalry  was  to  operate  with  the  First  Corps,  in  the 
general  plan,  the  commander  was  ordered  to  follow  its 
withdrawal  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  cross  the  Potomac 
on  its  right  at  Shepherdstown,  and  make  his  ride  towards 
Baltimore.  He  claimed  that  General  Lee  had  given  him 
authority  to  cross  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge. 

After  the  First  Corps  was  in  position  on  the  Blue  Ridge, 
and  while  the  Third  was  passing  our  rear  down  the  Val 
ley,  it  seems  that  General  Lee  so  far  modified  the  plan  of 
march  north  as  to  authorize  his  cavalry  chief  to  cross 
the  Potomac  with  part  of  his  command  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  and  to  change  the  march  of  the  Third  Corps  by 
Hagerstown  and  Chambersburg.  The  point  at  which  the 
cavalry  force  should  cross  the  river  was  not  determined 
between  the  Confederate  commander  and  his  chief  of 
cavalry,  there  being  doubt  whether  the  crossing  could 
better  be  made  at  Point  of  Rocks,  between  the  Union 
army  and  the  Blue  Ridge,  or  between  that  army  and 
Washington  City.  That  question  was  left  open,  and  I 
was  ordered  to  choose  between  the  two  points  named  at 
the  moment  that  my  command  took  up  its  line  of  march. 

The  First  Corps  was  withdrawn  from  the  Blue  Ridge 
on  the  20th,  forded  the  Shenandoah,  and  camped  on  its 
left  bank.  On  the  21st,  Pleasonton  came,  in  full  force, 
supported  by  infantry,  against  Stuart's  cavalry  brigades. 
The  severe  part  of  the  fight  came  from  Upperville,  and 
succeeded  in  driving  Stuart  back  into  Ashby's  Gap.  Part 
of  McLaws's  division  was  sent  back  in  time  to  support 
Stuart,  and  in  the  morning  McLaws  ordered  Wofford's 
brigade  down  upon  the  plain,  but  Pleasonton  had  with 
drawn.  The  infantry  was  recalled  after  an  exchange  of 
a  few  shots  at  great  range. 

Connected  with  the  cavalry  raid  and  orders  authorizing 


342  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

it  are  matters  of  more  than  usual  interest.  On  the  22d 
the  Confederate  commander  sent  unsealed  instructions  to 
his  cavalry  chief,  through  head-quarters  of  the  First 
Corps,  to  be  forwarded,  provided  the  cavalry  could  be 
spared  from  my  front  and  could  make  the  ride  without 
disclosing  our  plans,  expressing  his  preference  for  the 
ride  through  Hopewell  Gap  east  of  the  Union  army. 
As  previously  stated,  I  was  to  decide  at  the  last  moment 
between  the  two  points  that  had  been  named.  As  my 
front  was  changed  to  the  rear  for  the  march  north,  the 
cavalry  could  be  of  no  service  there.  The  extent  of 
authority  with  me,  therefore,  was  to  decide  whether 
the  crossing  should  be  made  at  the  Point  of  Rocks  or 
around  through  Hopewell  Gap  east  of  the  Union  army. 
The  crossing  at  Point  of  Rocks  was  not  only  hazardous, 
but  more  likely  to  indicate  our  plans  than  any  move  that 
could  be  made,  leaving  the  ride  through  Hopewell  Gap 
the  only  route  for  the  raiding  party.  In  my  note  to  Gen 
eral  Stuart  enclosing  General  Lee's  instructions  was  this 
item : 

"P.  S. — I  think  your  passage  of  the  Potomac  by  our  rear  at 
the  present  moment  will,  in  a  measure,  disclose  our  plans.  You 
had  better  not  leave  us,  therefore,  unless  you  can  take  the  route 
in  rear  of  the  enemy." 

This  has  been  put  in  italics  and  published  as  evidence 
that  the  raid  was  made  by  my  orders,  as  well  as  by  Gen 
eral  Lee's.  In  the  postscript  three  points  are  indicated: 

First,  the  move  along  my  rear  to  the  crossing  at  Point 
of  Rocks. 

Second,  my  preferred  march  on  my  flank  to  the  Shep- 
herdstown  crossing. 

Third,  the  route  indicated  by  General  Lee. 

All  of  which  General  Stuart  understood  as  well  as  I  did. 
Especially  did  he  know  that  my  orders  were  that  he  should 
ride  on  the  right  of  my  column,  as  originally  designed,  to 


Lieutenant-Colonel  Coldstreain  Guards,  Her  Majesty's  Service. 


4fl>>\ 

CFTHE  \ 

UNIVERSITT) 

CALIFORNI^^^ 


INVASION    OF    PENNSYLVANIA.  343 

the  Shepherdstown  crossing.  In  the  body  of  my  note  were 
orders  that  he  should  report  to  me  of  affairs  along  the 
cavalry  line  before  leaving ;  that  he  should  assign  Gen 
eral  Hampton  to  command  of  the  cavalry  to  be  left  with 
us,  with  orders  to  report  at  my  head-quarters.  These 
orders,  emanating  properly  from  the  commander  of  the 
rear  column  of  the  army,  should  not  have  been  questioned, 
but  they  were  treated  with  contumely.  He  assigned 
General  Kobertson  to  command  the  cavalry  that  was  left 
on  the  mountain,  without  orders  to  report  at  my  head 
quarters;  and  though  left  there  to  guard  passes  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  he  rode  on  a  raid,  so  that  when  the  cavalry 
was  most  needed  it  was  far  away  from  the  army.  The 
raid  and  the  absence  of  the  cavalry  at  the  critical 
moment  were  severely  criticised  through  the  army  and 
the  country.  If  General  Stuart  could  have  claimed  au 
thority  of  my  orders  for  his  action,  he  could  not  have 
failed  to  do  so  in  his  official  account.  He  offered  no 
such  excuse,  but  claimed  to  act  under  the  orders  of  his 
chief,  and  reported  that  General  Lee  gave  consent  to 
his  application  for  leave  to  make  the  march.  So  our 
plans,  adopted  after  deep  study,  were  suddenly  given 
over  to  gratify  the  youthful  cavalryman's  wish  for  a 
nomadic  ride. 

About  this  time  we  entertained  a  distinguished  visitor. 
An  officer  of  the  British  service,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Arthur  J.  L.  Fremantle,  of  the  Coldstream  Guards, 
brought  letters  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General 
Lee  and  myself.  He  was  seeking  opportunity  to  observe 
the  campaign  as  a  non-combatant ;  he  travelled  with  us, 
divided  his  time  between  general  head-quarters  and 
head-quarters  of  the  First  Corps,  cheerfully  adapted  his 
tastes  to  the  rough  ways  of  Confederate  soldiers,  and 
proved  to  be  an  interesting  companion.  To  avoid  the 
blockade  he  came  to  the  Confederacy  through  Mexico. 
He  gave  a  graphic  account  of  his  experience  in  Texas  and 


344  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

travel  after  crossing  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  interior  in  a 
two-horse  hack.  The  drivers  of  his  conveyance  were  Mr. 
Sargeant  and  Judge  Hyde,  two  characters  whom  I  had 
met  years  before  while  in  army  service  on  the  Texas 
frontier.  They  called  their  team  Grant  and  Sherman, 
and  enjoyed  their  glorious  rides  down  the  smooth  slopes 
of  the  prairie  roads,  as  they  rattled  their  heels  upon  the 
box  of  the  hack  and  plied  their  team,  Grant  and  Sherman, 
with  whips  and  oaths.  But  the  great  novelty  to  him  was 
the  position  of  the  judge.  In  England  there  are  few 
judges  comparatively,  and  those  of  high  estate.  To  find 
an  American  judge  playing  assistant  to  a  hack-driver  was 
refreshing,  and  Colonel  Fremantle  thoroughly  enjoyed 
it.  I  now  have  the  pleasure  to  salute  our  genial  war-time 
visitor  as  governor  at  Malta  and  Lieutenant-General  Sir 
Arthur  James  Lyon  Fremantle,  K.C.M.,  G.C.B.,  and  to 
offer  congratulations  to  Her  Most  Noble  Majesty  upon 
her  worthy  subject. 

On  the  23d  of  June  the  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps 
passed  on  towards  the  Potomac,  followed  by  those  of  the 
First,  the  former  crossing  at  Shepherdstown,  the  latter  at 
Williamsport.  The  corps  came  together  at  Hagerstown, 
in  Maryland,  continued  their  march  till  the  27th,  and 
rested  two  days  at  Chambersburg,  in  Pennsylvania.  The 
cavalry  under  General  Imboden,  ordered  on  General 
EwelFs  left,  was  due  as  far  north  as  McConnellsburg,  but 
had  halted  at  Hancock. 

On  the  28th,  General  Lee  issued  orders  for  the  march 
upon  Harrisburg.  General  Ewell  had  marched  his  main 
column  through  Chambersburg  to  Carlisle.  His  column, 
intending  to  move  east  of  the  mountains  through  Emmits- 
burg  and  Gettysburg,  had  marched  parallel  to  the  main 
column  as  far  as  Greenwood,  when  orders  were  renewed 
for  it  to  march  east  through  Gettysburg.  General  Early, 
commanding,  ordered  Gordon's  brigade  and  a  detachment 
of  cavalry  through  Gettysburg;  but  his  other  troops 


INVASION    OF    PENNSYLVANIA.  345 

marched  north  through  Mummasburg.  The  failure  of 
the  Imboden  cavalry  on  his  left  caused  General  Ewell  to 
send  General  George  H.  Steuart  through  McConnellsburg 
as  guard  of  that  flank.  Steuart's  command  rejoined  him 
at  Carlisle.  As  General  Ewell  marched  he  sent  us  three 
thousand  head  of  beef  cattle  and  information  of  five 
thousand  barrels  of  flour.  He  halted  at  Carlisle  on  the 
27th.  The  municipal  authorities  of  Gettysburg  and  York 
surrendered  to  General  Gordon,  who  took  some  prisoners 
of  the  State  militia,  and  marched  to  the  bridge  over  the 
Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville,  where  he  had  other  prison 
ers,  but  the  bridge  was  burned  before  him.  His  brigade 
returned  to  the  vicinity  of  York,  where  the  division  had 
marched  and  bivouacked  on  the  night  of  the  28th. 


CHAPTEK   XXVI. 

GETTYSBURG — FIRST    DAY. 

Information  of  Federal  Force  and  Positions  brought  by  the  Scout  Har 
rison — General  Lee  declines  to  credit  it  — General  Lougstreet  suggests 
a  Change  of  Direction  in  Conformance  with  the  Revelation — General 
Meade  had  succeeded  Hooker  in  Command  Five  Days  before  Battle — 
Positions  on  the  Eve  of  the  First  Day — Confederate  Cavalry  "not  in 
sight"—"  The  Eyes  of  the  Army"  sadly  needed— A  Description  of  the 
Famous  Battle-field— Generals  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill  engage  the  Fed 
erals — Death  of  General  John  F.  Reynolds— The  Fight  on  Seminary 
Ridge— General  Hancock  in  Federal  Command  on  the  Field — Con 
cerning  the  Absent  Cavalry  and  Information  given  by  the  Scout — 
Conditions  at  the  Close  of  the  First  Day's  Fight. 

THE  eve  of  the  great  battle  was  crowded  with  events. 
Movements  for  the  concentration  of  the  two  vast  armies 
went  on  in  mighty  force,  but  with  a  silence  in  strong  con 
trast  to  the  swift-coming  commotion  of  their  shock  in 
conflict.  It  was  the  pent  quiet  of  the  gathering  storm 
whose  bursting  was  to  shake  the  continent  and  suddenly 
command  the  startled  attention  of  the  world. 

After  due  preparation  for  our  march  of  the  29th,  all 
hands  turned  in  early  for  a  good  night's  rest.  My  mind 
had  hardly  turned  away  from  the  cares  and  labors  of  the 
day,  when  I  was  aroused  by  some  one  beating  on  the  pole 
of  my  tent.  It  proved  to  be  Assistant  Inspector-General 
Fairfax.  A  young  man  had  been  arrested  by  our  out 
lying  pickets  under  suspicious  circumstances.  He  was 
looking  for  General  Longstreet's  head-quarters,  but  his 
comfortable  apparel  and  well-to-do,  though  travel-stained, 
appearance  caused  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  guards  of 
his  being  a  genuine  Confederate  who  could  be  trusted 
about  head-quarters.  So  he  was  sent  up  under  a  file  of 
men  to  be  identified.  He  proved  to  be  Harrison,  the 
valued  scout.  He  had  walked  through  the  lines  of  the 

346 


HARRISON. 

The  Confederate  scout  wlio  brought  to  General  Lee  the  first  news  of  Meade's  assignment  to 
command,  and  the  positions  of  the  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


GETTYSBURG — FIRST    DAY.  347 

Union  army  during  the  night  of  the  27th  and  the  28th, 
secured  a  mount  at  dark  of  the  latter  day  to  get  in  as  soon 
as  possible,  and  brought  information  of  the  location  of 
two  corps  of  Federals  at  night  of  the  27th,  and  approxi 
mate  positions  of  others.  General  Hooker  had  crossed 
the  Potomac  on  the  25th  and  26th  of  June.  On  the  27th 
he  had  posted  two  army  corps  at  Frederick,  and  the  scout 
reported  another  near  them,  and  two  others  near  South 
Mountain,  as  he  escaped  their  lines  a  little  after  dark  of 
the  28th.  He  was  sent  under  care  of  Colonel  Fairfax  to 
make  report  of  his  information  at  general  head-quarters. 
General  Lee  declined,  however,  to  see  him,  though  he 
asked  Colonel  Fairfax  as  to  the  information  that  he 
brought,  and,  on  hearing  it,  expressed  want  of  faith  in  re 
ports  of  scouts,  in  which  Fairfax  generally  agreed,  but 
suggested  that  in  this  case  the  information  was  so  near 
General  Longstreet's  ideas  of  the  probable  movements  of 
the  enemy  that  he  gave  credit  to  it.  I  also  sent  up  a  note 
suggesting  a  change  of  direction  of  the  head  of  our  column 
east.  This  I  thought  to  be  the  first  and  necessary  step 
towards  bringing  the  two  armies  to  such  concentration 
east  as  would  enable  us  to  find  a  way  to  draw  the  enemy 
into  battle,  in  keeping  with  the  general  plan  of  campaign, 
and  at  the  same  time  draw  him  off  from  the  travel  of  our 
trains. 

There  were  seven  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
afield.  We  were  informed  on  the  28th  of  the  approxi 
mate  positions  of  five  of  them, — three  near  Frederick  and 
two  near  the  base  of  South  Mountain.  The  others,  of 
which  we  had  no  definite  information,  we  now  know  were 
the  Sixth  (Sedgwick's) ,  south  of  Frederick  and  east  of  the 
Monocacy,  and  the  Twelfth,  towards  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  the  26th,  General  Hooker  thought  to  use  the  Twelfth 
Corps  and  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  to  strike  the 
line  of  our  communication,  but  General  Halleck  forbade 
the  use  of  the  troops  of  that  post,  when  General  Hooker 


348  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

asked  to  be  relieved  of  the  responsibility  of  command, 
and  was  succeeded  by  General  Meade  on  the  night  of  the 
27th. 

If  General  Hooker  had  been  granted  the  authority  for 
which  he  applied,  he  would  have  struck  our  trains,  ex 
posed  from  Chambersburg  to  the  Potomac  without  a  cav 
alryman  to  ride  and  report  the  trouble.  General  Stuart 
was  riding  around  Hooker's  army,  General  Robertson  was 
in  Virginia,  General  Imboden  at  Hancock,  and  Jenkins's 
cavalry  was  at  our  front  with  General  Ewell. 

By  the  report  of  the  scout  we  found  that  the  march  of 
E well's  east  wing  had  failed  of  execution  and  of  the  effect 
designed,  and  that  heavy  columns  of  the  enemy  were  hover 
ing  along  the  east  base  of  the  mountain.  To  remove  this 
pressure  towards  our  rear,  General  Lee  concluded  to  make 
a  more  serious  demonstration  and  force  the  enemy  to  look 
eastward.  With  this  view  he  changed  direction  of  the  pro 
posed  march  north,  by  counter-orders  on  the  night  of  the 
28th,  calling  concentration  east  of  the  mountains  at  Cash- 
town,  and  his  troops  began  their  inarch  under  the  last 
orders  on  the  29th. 

It  seems  that  General  Hill  misconstrued  the  orders  of 
the  day,  or  was  confused  by  the  change  of  orders,  and  was 
under  the  impression  that  he  was  to  march  by  York  and 
cross  the  Susquehanna  towards  Philadelphia  or  Harris- 
burg.  He  ordered  his  leading  division  under  Heth  to 
Cashtown,  however,  and  followed  with  Pender's  division 
on  the  30th,  leaving  orders  for  the  division  of  R.  H.  An 
derson  to  follow  on  the  1st.  The  purpose  of  General  Lee's 
march  east  was  only  preliminary, — a  concentration  about 
Cashtown. 

General  Ewell  was  ready  to  march  for  Harrisburg  on 
the  29th,  when  orders  reached  him  of  the  intended  concen 
tration  at  Cashtown.  He  was  at  Carlisle  with  Rodes's  and 
E.  Johnson's  divisions  and  the  reserve  artillery  ;  his  other 
division  under  Early  was  at  York.  On  the  30th,  Rodes 


GETTYSBURG — FIRST    DAY.  349 

was  at  Heidlersburg,  Early  near  by,  and  Johnson,  with 
the  reserve  artillery,  near  Green  Village. 

Pettigrew's  brigade  of  Heth's  division,  advancing  to 
wards  Gettysburg  on  the  30th,  encountered  Buford's 
cavalry  and  returned  to  Cashtown. 

On  the  29th,  General  Meade  wired  General  Halleck, — 

"  If  Lee  is  moving  for  Baltimore,  I  expect  to  get  between  his 
main  army  and  that  place.  If  he  is  crossing  the  Susquehanna, 
I  shall  rely  upon  General  Couch,  with  his  force,  holding  him, 
until  I  can  fall  upon  his  rear  and  give  him  battle,  which  I  shall 
endeavor  to  do.  ...  My  endeavor  will  be,  in  my  movements,  to 
hold  my  force  well  together,  with  the  hope  of  falling  upon  some 
portion  of  Lee's  army  in  detail.* 

As  the  change  of  orders  made  Gettysburg  prominent  as 
the  point  of  impact,  the  positions  of  the  commands  rela 
tive  thereto  and  their  distances  therefrom  are  items  of 
importance  in  considering  the  culmination  of  events. 

POSITIONS  OF  ARMY  OF   NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  NIGHT  OF   JUNE  30. 

General  Lee's  head-quarters,  Greenwood. 

First  Corps,  Chanibersburg,  twenty -four  miles  to  Gettysburg ; 
part  at  Greenwood,  sixteen  miles. 

Second  Corps  and  Jenkins's  cavalry,  Heidlersburg,  ten  miles ; 
part  near  Green  Village,  twenty-three  miles  (Johnson's  division 
and  trains). 

Third  Corps,  near  Greenwood,  sixteen  miles,  and  Cashtown, 
eight  miles. 

Stuart's  cavalry,  circling  between  York  and  Carlisle,  out  of 
sight. 

Eobertson's  cavalry,  in  Virginia,  beyond  reach. 

Imboden's  cavalry,  at  Hancock,  out  of  sight. 

The  Confederates  not  intending  to  precipitate  battle. 

POSITIONS  OF   ARMY   OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

General  Meade' s  head- quarters,  Taneytown,  fourteen  miles. 
General  Hunt,  artillery  reserve,  Taneytown. 
First  Corps,  Marsh  Run,  six  miles. 

*  Report  Committee,  vol.  i.  p.  480. 


350  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Second  Corps,  Uniontown,  twenty-two  miles. 
Third  Corps,  Bridgeport,  twelve  miles. 
Fifth  Corps,  Union  Mills,  fifteen  miles. 
Sixth  Corps,  Manchester,  twenty -two  miles. 
Eleventh  Corps,  Emmitsburg,  twelve  miles. 
Twelfth  Corps,  Littletown,  nine  miles. 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  Hanover,  thirteen  miles. 
Gregg's  cavalry,  Manchester,  twenty -two  miles. 
Buford's  cavalry,  Gettysburg. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  field  of  contention 
was  south  and  east  of  Gettysburg,  so  that  the  Union  troops 
were  from  two  to  four  miles  nearer  their  formation  for 
battle  than  were  the  Confederates,  who  had  to  march  from 
two  to  four  miles  beyond  the  town. 

Referring  to  the  map,  it  may  be  seen  that  the  Confed 
erate  corps  had  two  routes  by  which  to  march  for  concen 
tration, — viz.,  from  Heidlersburg  to  Cashtown,  part  of 
the  Second  Corps ;  on  the  road  from  Chambersburg,  the 
First,  Third,  and  part  of  the  Second  Corps  (with  all  of 
the  trains  of  the  latter),  with  but  a  single  track,  the  Cham- 
bersburg-Gettysburg  turnpike.  Some  of  their  distances 
were  greater  than  any  of  the  columns  of  the  enemy,  while 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  almost  as  many  routes  of 
march  as  commands,  and  was  marching  from  day  to  day 
anticipating  a  general  engagement,  which  they  were  espe 
cially  cautioned  on  the  30th  was  imminent. 

General  Hill  decided  to  go  beyond  Cashtown  on  the 
1st  to  ascertain  as  to  the  enemy  reported  at  Gettysburg. 
He  gave  notice  of  his  intentions  to  General  Ewell,  and 
sent  back  to  the  commanding  general  to  have  Anderson's 
division  sent  forward.  He  was  at  Cashtown  with  Heth's 
and  Fender's  divisions  and  their  batteries;  his  reserve 
artillery  with  Anderson's  division  at  Fayetteville. 

The  armies  on  the  night  of  June  30  stood  thus : 

The  Confederate :  First  Corps,  two  divisions  at  Green 
wood  (except  one  brigade  detached  under  orders  from 
head-quarters  at  New  Guilford)  ;  Pickett's  three  brigades 


GETTYSBURG FIRST    DAY.  351 

at  Chambersburg,  left  under  orders  from  head-quarters  to 
guard  trains ;  the  Second  Corps,  two  divisions  near  Heid- 
lersburg,  one  near  and  north  of  Chambersburg  ;  the  Third 
Corps  at  Cashtown  and  Fayetteville ;  cavalry  not  in  sight 
or  hearing,  except  Jenkins's  brigade  and  a  small  detach 
ment. 

The  Union  army:  the  First  Corps  on  Marsh  Run, 
the  Second  at  Uniontown,  the  Third  at  Bridgeport,  the 
Fifth  at  Union  Mills,  the  Sixth  at  Manchester,  the 
Eleventh  at  Emmitsburg,  the  Twelfth  at  Littlestown, 
Fitzpatrick's  cavalry  at  Hanover,  Buford's  at  Gettysburg 
(except  one  brigade,  detached,  guarding  his  trains).  Gen 
eral  Meade's  head-quarters  and  reserve  artillery  were  at 
Taneytown.  His  army,  including  cavalry,  in  hand. 

General  Lee's  orders  called  his  troops  on  converging 
lines  towards  Cashtown,  but  he  found  that  part  of  his  in 
fantry  must  be  left  at  Chambersburg  to  await  the  Imboden 
cavalry,  not  up,  and  one  of  Hood's  brigades  must  be  de 
tached  on  his  right  at  New  Guilford  to  guard  on  that  side 
in  place  of  Robertson's  cavalry  (in  Virginia).  So  that 
as  he  advanced  towards  his  adversary,  the  eyes  and  ears 
of  his  army  were  turned  afar  off,  looking  towards  the 
homes  of  non-combatants.  It  is  bootless  to  this  writing 
to  restate  whence  came  this  mishap.  There  is  no  doubt  it 
greatly  disturbed  General  Lee's  mind,  and  he  would  have 
called  a  halt  under  ordinary  circumstances,  but  his  orders 
did  not  contemplate  immediate  movements  beyond  Cash- 
town.  In  that  he  felt  safe,  depending  upon  his  cavalry 
coming  up  in  time  to  meet  him  there. 

He  was  in  his  usual  cheerful  spirits  on  the  morning  of 
the  1st,  and  called  me  to  ride  with  him.  My  column  was 
not  well  stretched  on  the  road  before  it  encountered  the 
division  of  E.  Johnson  (Second  Corps)  cutting  in  on  our 
front,  with  all  of  Ewell's  reserve  and  supply  trains.  He 
ordered  the  First  Corps  halted,  and  directed  that  John 
son's  division  and  train  should  pass  on  to  its  corps,  the 


352  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

First  to  wait.  During  the  wait  I  dismounted  to  give 
Hero  a  little  respite.  (The  Irish  groom  had  christened 
my  favorite  horse  "  Haro"} 

After  a  little  time  General  Lee  proposed  that  we  should 
ride  on,  and  soon  we  heard  reports  of  cannon.  The  fire 
seemed  to  be  beyond  Cashtown,  and  as  it  increased  he 
left  me  and  rode  faster  for  the  front. 

The  brigades  of  Gamble  and  Devin  of  Buford's  cav 
alry  were  the  force  that  met  Pettigrew's  brigade  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  30th,  when  the  latter  retired  to  the  post 
of  the  divisions  at  Cashtown. 

From  Gettysburg  roads  diverge  to  the  passes  of  the 
mountains,  the  borders  of  the  Potomac  and  Susquehanna, 
and  the  cities  of  Baltimore  and  Washington ;  so  that  it 
was  something  of  a  strategic  point.  From  the  west  side 
two  broad  roads  run,  one  northwest  to  Chambersburg 
via  Cashtown,  the  other  southwest  through  Fairfield  to 
Hagerstown.  They  cross  an  elevated  ridge,  a  mile  out 
north,  and  south  of  the  Lutheran  Seminary,  known  to 
the  Confederates  as  Seminary  Ridge,  covered  by  open 
forests.  At  the  northward,  about  two  miles  from  the 
town,  the  ridge  divides,  a  lesser  ridge  putting  out  west,  and 
presently  taking  a  parallel  course  with  the  greater.  This 
was  known  as  McPherson's  Ridge,  and  was  about  five 
hundred  yards  from  the  first,  where  the  road  crosses  it. 
Nearly  parallel  with  the  Chambersburg  pike  and  about  two 
hundred  yards  distant  was  the  cut  of  an  unfinished  rail 
road.  Willoughby's  Run  flows  south  in  a  course  nearly 
parallel  to  and  west  of  the  ridge,  and  is  bordered  by  tim 
bered  lands.  North  of  Gettysburg  the  grounds  are  open 
and  in  fair  fields.  Directly  south  of  it  a  bold  ridge  rises 
with  rough  and  steep  slopes.  The  prominent  point  of  the 
south  ridge  is  Cemetery  Hill,  and  east  of  this  is  Gulp's 
Hill,  from  which  the  ridge  turns  sharply  south  half  a 
mile,  and  drops  off  into  low  grounds.  It  was  well  wooded 
and  its  eastern  ascent  steep.  East  of  it  and  flowing  south 


GETTYSBURG FIRST    DAY.  353 

is  Rock  Creek.  From  Cemetery  Hill  the  ground  is  ele 
vated,  the  ridge  sloping  south  to  the  cropping  out  of 
Little  Round  Top,  Devil's  Den,  and  the  bolder  Round 
Top,  the  latter  about  three  miles  south  of  the  town.  Ceme 
tery  Hill  is  nearly  parallel  to  Seminary  Ridge,  and  is 
more  elevated. 

At  five  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July  1,  General  A. 
P.  Hill  marched  towards  Gettysburg  with  the  divisions  of 
Heth  and  Pender,  and  the  battalions  of  artillery  under 
Pegram  and  Mclntosh,  Heth's  division  and  Pegram's  ar 
tillery  in  advance.  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  with  the 
reserve  artillery  left  at  Fayetteville,  was  ordered  to  march 
and  halt  at  Cashtown.  About  ten  o'clock  Heth  en 
countered  Buford's  cavalry.  Archer's  brigade,  leading, 
engaged,  and  Davis's  brigade  came  up  on  his  left  with  part 
of  Pegram's  artillery.  The  cavalry  was  forced  back  till 
it  passed  Willoughby's  Run. 

On  the  30th  of  June,  General  John  F.  Reynolds  had 
been  directed  to  resume  command  of  the  right  wing  of 
the  Union  army, — First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps.  He 
was  advised  that  day  of  the  threatening  movements  of  the 
Confederates  on  the  Cashtown  and  Mummasburg  roads. 
At  the  same  time  the  indications  from  General  Meade's 
head-quarters  pointed  to  Pipe  Creek  as  the  probable  line 
in  case  of  battle.  Reynolds,  however,  prepared  to  sup 
port  Buford's  line  of  cavalry,  and  marched  at  eight  o'clock 
on  the  1st  of  July  with  Wadsworth's  division  and  Hall's 
battery,  leaving  the  other  divisions  of  Doubleday  and 
Robinson  with  the  artillery  to  follow  under  General 
Doubleday,  who  became  commander  of  the  corps  upon 
the  assignment  of  Reynolds  to  command  of  the  wing. 

As  Reynolds  approached  Gettysburg,  in  hearing  of  the 
cavalry  fight,  he  turned  the  head  of  his  column  to  the 
left  and  marched  through  the  fields  towards  the  engage 
ment.  As  the  cavalry  skirmish  line  retired  and  passed 
Willoughby's  Run,  he  approached  with  his  reinforcements, 

23 


354  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Brigadier-General  Cutter  in  advance,  and  was  put  in  on 
the  north  of  the  Cashtown  road,  followed  by  Hall's 
battery.  Brigadier-General  Meredith  following,  his  bri 
gade  was  put  into  line  on  the  left.  As  fast  as  the  troops 
got  into  line  they  became  severely  engaged.  Doubleday, 
in  advance  of  the  divisions  under  him,  put  Meredith's 
brigade  in  formidable  position  on  a  strip  of  woodland  on 
the  left. 

As  the  Confederate  left  advanced  through  the  railroad 
cut  they  came  upon  Hall's  battery,  and  were  about  to  get 
it,  when  it  was  saved  by  speedy  withdrawal,  which  caused 
the  Union  right  to  retire,  while  Archer's  brigade  of  the 
Confederate  right,  in  pushing  to  the  front,  came  in  open 
space  before  Meredith's  brigade,  which  in  turn  made  a 
gallant  advance,  drove  Archer  back,  followed  across  the 
run,  and  captured  General  Archer  and  one  thousand  of  his 
men.  The  other  two  brigades  of  Fender's  division,  Petti- 
grew's  and  Brockenbrough's,  were  put  in  on  the  right  of 
Archer's  men.  During  the  severe  engagement  on  his 
right  the  advance  of  the  Confederate  infantry  got  in  so 
close  along  the  railroad  cut  that  General  Reynolds,  in 
efforts  to  extricate  his  right,  was  shot,  when  the  right, 
still  under  severe  pressure,  was  forced  to  retire  towards 
Seminary  Ridge.  Hall's  battery,  severely  crippled,  suc 
ceeded  in  getting  away  as  the  right  retired. 

Doubleday's  other  divisions  came  up  about  the  moment 
General  Reynolds  was  killed.  The  Second  (Robinson's) 
and  Third  (Rowley's)  Divisions  deployed  on  the  right 
and  left.  Cooper's  battery  of  four  three-inch  guns 
followed  the  left  division.  At  the  same  time  Hill 
reinforced  by  his  division  under  Pender,  Thomas's  bri 
gade  on  his  left,  Lane,  Scales,  and  Perrin  to  the  right. 
These  restored  the  Confederate  right,  overlapping  the 
Federal  left ;  at  the  same  time  Thomas's  brigade  made 
successful  battle  on  the  left,  pushing  off  Wadsworth's 
right  and  Hall's  battery,  when  the  two  brigades  of  the 


GETTYSBUEG FIRST    DAY.  355 

Second  Division  (Robinson's)  were  sent  to  their  support, 
but  were,  in  turn,  forced  back  towards  Seminary  Ridge. 
The  Confederate  sharp-shooters  cut  down  the  horses  of 
one  of  Hall's  guns  and  forced  him  to  drop  it.  Hill 
advanced  Pegram's  and  Mclntosh's  artillery  to  Mc- 
Pherson's  Ridge,  forcing  the  entire  Union  line  back  to 
Seminary  Ridge.  General  Doubleday,  anticipating  such 
contingency,  had  ordered  trenches  made  about  Semi 
nary  Ridge,  and  sent  his  three  other  batteries  under 
Colonel  Wainwright  to  that  point.  He  formed  his  line 
along  the  ridge  and  occupied  the  trenches  by  part  of  his 
infantry.  At  this  period  Swell's  divisions  under  Rodes 
approached  against  Doubleday's  right. 

General  Howard,  upon  his  first  approach  to  the  battle, 
marched  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  Cemetery  Hill,  and 
there  posted  it  until  called  upon  by  General  Doubleday 
for  assistance.  To  meet  the  call  he  ordered  his  divisions 
under  Generals  Barlow  and  Schurz  to  Doubleday's  right, 
to  occupy  a  prominent  point  at  the  north  end  of  Semi 
nary  Ridge,  reserving  his  division  under  Steinwehr  and 
part  of  his  artillery  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

As  the  divisions  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  approached  the 
Confederate  left,  Rodes's  division  of  Ewell's  corps  ad 
vanced.  The  Federals  then  stood  across  the  Cashtown 
road,  their  left  in  advance  of  the  Seminary,  their  right 
thrown  or  standing  more  to  the  rear.  Rodes  was  in  season 
to  sweep  the  field  of  approach  to  the  high  point  intended 
to  be  occupied  by  the  divisions  sent  by  Howard,  and  came 
in  good  position  to  enfilade  Robinson's  division  of  the 
First  Corps.  As  Rodes  approached  he  was  threatened  by 
Buford's  cavalry,  but,  finding  cover  under  woodland,  he 
made  advance  by  three  brigades  in  line  till  he  came  to 
the  point  of  view  which  gave  him  command  of  that  end 
of  the  field  in  elevated  position,  and  in  plunging  fire  down 
Robinson's  line  and  in  advance  of  the  divisions  sent  by 
General  Howard  to  occupy  that  point.  While  posting 


356  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

his  infantry,  Rodes  ordered  Carter's  battery  of  artillery 
into  action  against  Robinson's  lines  stretched  out  and 
engaged  against  Hill's  corps.  At  that  moment  the 
divisions  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  were  not  in  full  front 
of  Rodes,  so  that  his  fire  upon  Robinson's  line  was 
something  of  a  surprise,  as  well  as  most  discomfiting. 
The  divisions  and  artillery  of  the  Eleventh  came  to  the 
front,  however,  almost  simultaneously  with  Robinson's 
necessitated  change  of  right  front  rearward  towards  Rodes. 

These  changes  and  dispositions  gave  Hill  opportunity  to 
press  on  by  his  front,  when  Doubleday  was  obliged  to  call 
for  help,  and  Schurz  called  for  support  on  his  right.  Cos 
ter's  brigade  was  sent  from  Steinwehr's  reserve,  and  Bu- 
ford's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  brace  as  far  as  practicable 
the  centre  of  the  First  Corps,  and  another  battery  was 
sent  to  Schurz's  division.  At  2.45  another  call  for  help 
by  the  First  Corps  was  received,  and  General  Schurz  was 
asked  to  answer  it  if  he  could  by  a  regiment  or  more. 
Calls  were  sent  to  hurry  Slocum's  (Twelfth)  corps,  some 
miles  away,  but  then  Ewell  was  swinging  his  division 
under  Early  into  line  nearer  to  Gettysburg,  Gordon's  bri 
gade  and  Jones's  battery  coming  in  in  good  time  to  make 
strong  Rodes's  left,  and  Hill's  corps  had  overlapped  the 
left  of  the  First  Corps,  so  that  General  Howard  found 
himself  forced  to  command  a  steady,  orderly  retreat  to 
Cemetery  Hill. 

The  Confederates  pushed  rapidly  on,  particularly  the 
fresher  troops  of  Ewell,  cleared  the  field,  and  followed 
on  through  the  streets  of  Gettysburg  at  four  o'clock.  The 
retreat  began  and  continued  in  good  order  till  they  passed 
Gettysburg,  when  the  ranks  became  so  scattered  that  the 
final  march  was  little  better  than  "  Sauve  quipeut" 

As  the  troops  retreated  through  Gettysburg,  General 
Hancock  rode  upon  the  field,  and  under  special  assignment 
assumed  command  at  three  o'clock.  As  the  retreating 
troops  arrived,  Wadsworth's  division  on  the  right,  the 


GETTYSBURG FIRST    DAY.  357 

Eleventh  Corps  across  the  Baltimore  pike,  the  balance 
of  the  First  under  Doubleday  on  the  left  of  the  Eleventh, 
General  Howard  and  others  assisted  in  forming  the  new 
line. 

The  total  effectives  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps, 
according  to  the  consolidated  moving  report  of  June  30, 
was  19,982.  From  the  latest  returns  of  General  Lee's 
army,  an  average  estimate  of  his  four  divisions  gave  his 
total  as  25,252.  Part  of  the  reserve  division  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps  was  not  engaged,  but  Buford  had  two 
brigades  of  cavalry,  and  so  the  foregoing  may  be  a 
fair  estimate  of  the  forces  engaged,  less  the  reserve  on 
Cemetery  Hill. 

At  Cashtown,  General  Lee  found  that  General  Hill  had 
halted  his  division  under  E.  H.  Anderson  and  his  reserve 
artillery.  He  had  General  Anderson  called,  who  subse 
quently  wrote  me  of  the  interview  as  follows : 

"About  twelve  o'clock  I  received  a  message  notifying  me  that 
General  Lee  desired  to  see  me.  I  found  General  Lee  intently  lis 
tening  to  the  fire  of  the  guns,  and  very  much  disturbed  and  de 
pressed.  At  length  he  said,  more  to  himself  than  to  me,  '  I  cannot 
think  what  has  become  of  Stuart.  I  ought  to  have  heard  from  him 
long  before  now.  He  may  have  met  vvith  disaster,  but  I  hope  not. 
In  the  absence  of  reports  from  him,  I  am  in  ignorance  as  to  what 
we  have  in  front  of  us  here.  It  may  be  the  whole  Federal  army, 
or  it  may  be  only  a  detachment.  If  it  is  the  whole  Federal  force, 
we  must  fight  a  battle  here.  If  we  do  not  gain  a  victory,  those 
defiles  and  gorges  which  we  passed  this  morning  will  shelter  us 
from  disaster.' ' 

He  ordered  Anderson  forward,  and  rode  on  to  Seminary 
Ridge  in  time  to  view  the  closing  operations  of  the  engage 
ment.  The  Union  troops  were  in  disorder,  climbing  Cem 
etery  Heights,  the  Confederates  following  through  the 
streets  of  Gettysburg.  Two  other  divisions  of  Confed 
erates  were  up  soon  after,  E.  Johnson's  of  the  Second  and 
R.  H.  Anderson's  of  the  Third  Corps. 

After  a  long  wait  I  left  orders  for  the  troops  to  follow 


358  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  trains  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  rode  to  find  General 
Lee.  His  head-quarters  were  on  Seminary  Ridge  at  the 
crossing  of  the  Cashtown  road.  Anderson's  division  was 
then  filed  off  along  the  ridge,  resting.  Johnson's  had 
marched  to  report  to  the  corps  commander.  Dismount 
ing  and  passing  the  usual  salutation,  I  drew  my  glasses 
and  made  a  studied  view  of  the  position  upon  which  the 
enemy  was  rallying  his  forces,  and  of  the  lay  of  the  land 
surrounding.  General  Lee  was  engaged  at  the  moment. 
He  had  announced  beforehand  that  he  would  not  make 
aggressive  battle  in  the  enemy's  country.  After  the  sur 
vey  and  in  consideration  of  his  plans, — noting  movements 
of  detachments  of  the  enemy  on  the  Emmitsburg  road, 
the  relative  positions  for  manoeuvre,  the  lofty  perch  of 
the  enemy,  the  rocky  slopes  from  it,  all  marking  the  posi 
tion  clearly  defensive, — I  said,  "  We  could  not  call  the 
enemy  to  position  better  suited  to  our  plans.  All  that  we 
have  to  do  is  to  file  around  his  left  and  secure  good  ground 
between  him  and  his  capital."  This,  when  said,  was 
thought  to  be  the  opinion  of  my  commander  as  much  as 
my  own.  I  was  not  a  little  surprised,  therefore,  at  his 
impatience,  as,  striking  the  air  with  his  closed  hand,  he 
said,  "  If  he  is  there  to-morrow  I  will  attack  him." 
In  his  official  account,  General  Lee  reported, — 

"  It  had  not  been  intended  to  deliver  a  general  battle  so  far 
from  our  base  unless  attacked.  But  coming  unexpectedly  upon 
the  whole  Federal  army,  to  withdraw  through  the  mountains  with 
our  extensive  trains  would  have  been  difficult  and  dangerous." 

When  he  rode  away  from  me  in  the  forenoon  he  made 
no  mention  of  his  absent  cavalry,  nor  did  he  indicate 
that  it  was  not  within  call.  So  I  was  at  a  loss  to  under 
stand  his  nervous  condition,  and  supported  the  suggestion 
so  far  as  to  say,  "If  he  is  there  to-morrow  it  will  be 
because  he  wants  you  to  attack,"  and  queried,  "  If  that 
height  has  become  the  objective,  why  not  take  it  at  once? 


GETTYSBURG FIKST    DAY.  359 

We  have  forty  thousand  men,  less  the  casualties  of  the 
day ;  he  cannot  have  more  than  twenty  thousand.7'  Then 
it  was  that  I  heard  of  the  wanderings  of  the  cavalry  and 
the  cause  of  his  uneven  temper.  So  vexed  was  he  at  the 
halt  of  the  Imboden  cavalry  at  Hancock,  in  the  opening 
of  the  campaign,  that  he  was  losing  sight  of  Pickett's  bri 
gades  as  a  known  quantity  for  battle.  His  manner  sug 
gested  to  me  that  a  little  reflection  would  be  better  than 
further  discussion,  and  right  soon  he  suggested  to  the 
commander  of  the  Second  Corps  to  take  Cemetery  Hill  if 
he  thought  it  practicable,  but  the  subordinate  did  not 
care  to  take  upon  himself  a  fight  that  his  chief  would 
not  venture  to  order.* 

The  following  circular  orders  were  sent  the  command 
ers  of  columns  of  the  First  Corps  : 

"  HE  AD-  QUARTERS  FlRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

"NEAR  GETTYSBURG,  July  1,  5.30  P.M. 

"  COLONEL, — The  commanding  general  desires  you  to  come  on 
to-night  as  fast  as  you  can  without  distressing  your  men  and  ani 
mals.  Hill  and  Ewell  have  sharply  engaged  the  enemy,  and  you 
will  be  needed  for  to-morrow's  battle.  Let  us  know  where  you 
will  stop  to-night. 

"  Eespectfully, 

"G.  M.  SORREL, 

"COLONEL  WALTON,  "A.  A.  General. 

"  Chief  of  Artillery." 

*  From  General  Lee's  official  report  :  "...  It  was  ascertained  from 
the  prisoners  that  we  had  been  engaged  with  two  corps  of  the  army 
formerly  commanded  by  General  Hooker,  and  that  the  remainder  of  that 
army,  under  General  Meade,  was  approaching  Gettysburg.  Without 
information  as  to  its  proximity,  the  strong  position  which  the  enemy 
had  assumed  could  not  be  attacked  without  danger  of  exposing  the 
four  divisions  present,  already  weakened  and  exhausted  by  a  long  and 
bloody  struggle,  to  overwhelming  numbers  of  fresh  troops.  General 
Ewell  was,  therefore,  instructed  to  carry  the  hill  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
if  he  found  it  practicable,  but  to  avoid  a  general  engagement  until  the 
arrival  of  the  other  divisions  of  the  army,  which  were  ordered  to  hasten 
forward.  He  decided  to  await  Johnson's  division,  which  had  marched 
from  Carlisle  by  the  road  west  of  the  mountains  to  guard  the  trains 
of  his  corps,  and  consequently  did  not  reach  Gettysburg  until  a  late 
hour.  .  .  ." 


360  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

At  12.15  of  the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  General  Halleck 
sent  a  cipher  despatch  to  General  Meade  approving  his 
tactics,  but  asking,  as  to  his  strategy,  "Are  you  not  too  far 
east,  and  may  not  Lee  attempt  to  turn  your  left  and  cut 
you  off  from  Frederick  ?" 

In  this  connection  may  be  noted  the  plan  that  General 
Meade  had  mapped  in  his  own  mind  and  given  to  some  of 
his  generals  for  battle  to  be  formed  behind  Pipe  Creek,  a 
position  that  would  have  met  the  views  of  General  Hal 
leck,  as  well  as  his  own,  covering  Washington  and  Balti 
more  under  close  lines  that  could  not  be  turned.  At 
Gettysburg  the  Confederates  had  comparatively  an  open 
field. 

Reports  coming  in  to  head-quarters  about  six  o'clock 
that  the  enemy  was  in  some  force  off  our  right  towards 
Fairfield,  General  Lee  ordered  General  Anderson  to  put 
one  of  his  brigades  out  on  the  right  as  picket-guard. 
Wilcox's  brigade  and  Ross's  battery  were  marched  and 
posted  near  Black  Horse  Tavern. 

Nothing  coming  from  the  centre  troops  about  Cemetery 
Hill,  General  Lee  ordered  the  Second  Corps,  after  night, 
from  his  left  to  his  right,  for  work  in  that  direction,  but 
General  Ewell  rode  over  and  reported  that  another  point — 
Gulp's  Hill — had  been  found  on  his  left,  which  had  com 
manding  elevation  over  Cemetery  Hill,  from  which  the 
troops  on  the  latter  could  be  dislodged,  by  artillery,  and 
was  under  the  impression  that  his  troops  were  in  posses 
sion  there.  That  was  accredited  as  reported  and  approved, 
and  the  corps  commander  returned,  and  ordered  the  hill 
occupied  if  it  had  not  been  done.  But  the  officer  in  charge 
had  waited  for  specific  orders,  and  when  they  were  re 
ceived  he  had  made  another  reconnoissance.  It  was  then 
twelve  o'clock.  By  the  reconnoissance  it  was  found  that 
the  enemy  was  there,  and  it  was  thought  that  this  should 
be  reported,  and  further  orders  waited. 

General  Ewell's  troops  and  trains  passed  the  junction 


GETTYSBURG FIRST    DAY.  361 

of  the  roads  at  four  o'clock.  The  train  was  fourteen  miles 
long.  It  was  followed  by  the  troops  of  the  First  Corps 
that  had  been  waiting  all  day.  After  night  the  Washing 
ton  Artillery  and  McLaws's  division  camped  at  Marsh 
Run,  four  miles  from  Gettysburg.  Here  is  Hood's  account 
of  his  march : 

"While  lying  in  camp  near  Ohainbersburg  information  was 
received  that  Hill  and  Ewell  were  about  to  come  into  contact  with 
the  enemy  near  Gettysburg.  My  troops,  together  with  McLaws's 
division,  were  at  once  put  in  motion  upon  the  most  direct  road  to 
that  point,  which  we  reached  after  a  hard  march  at  or  before  sun 
rise  on  July  2.  So  imperative  had  been  our  orders  to  hasten  for 
ward  with  all  possible  speed  that  on  the  march  my  troops  were 
allowed  to  halt  and  rest  only  about  two  hours  during  the  night 
from  the  1st  to  the  2d  of  July." 

When  I  left  General  Lee,  about  seven  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  he  had  formed  no  plans  beyond  that  of  seizing 
Gulp's  Hill  as  his  point  from  which  to  engage,  nor  given 
any  orders  for  the  next  day,  though  his  desperate  mood 
was  painfully  evident,  and  gave  rise  to  serious  apprehen 
sions.  He  had  heard  nothing  of  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  since  his  crossing  the  Potomac,  except  the  report  of 
the  scout.  His  own  force  on  the  field  was  the  Second 
Corps,  Rodes's,  Early's,  and  E.  Johnson's  divisions  from 
right  to  left  through  the  streets  of  Gettysburg  around 
towards  Gulp's  Hill ;  on  Rodes's  right,  Fender's  division 
of  the  Third ;  on  Seminary  Ridge,  R.  H.  Anderson's 
division  of  the  Third  (except  Wilcox's  brigade  at  Black 
Horse  Tavern) ;  behind  Seminary  Ridge,  Heth's  division 
of  the  Third  ;  on  the  march  between  Cashtown  and 
Greenwood,  the  First  Corps. 


CHAPTER   XXVII. 

GETTYSBURG SECOND    DAY. 

The  Confederate  Commander  reviews  the  Field  and  decides  on  Plan  of 
Battle — Positions  on  the  Morning  of  July  2 — Night  March  of  the  Fed 
eral  Sixth  Corps— It  was  excelled  by  Law's  Brigade  of  Confederates 
— The  Battle  was  opened  after  Mid-day — General  Hood  appeals  for 
Permission  to  turn  the  Federal  Left — Failure  to  make  the  Flanking 
Movement  by  the  Confederate  Right  was  a  Serious  Mistake— Hood,  in 
his  usual  Gallant  Style,  led  his  Troops  forward  among  the  Rocks — Des 
perate  Charges  against  an  Earnest  Adversary — Hood  wounded — 
General  Law  succeeds  him  in  command  of  the  Division — "  Little 
Round  Top"  an  Important  Point— "  The  Citadel  of  the  Field"— It 
was  a  Fight  of  Seventeen  Thousand  Confederates  against  twice  their 
Number— Quiet  along  the  Lines  of  other  Confederate  Commands — "  A 
Man  on  the  Left  who  didn't  care  to  make  the  Battle  win" — Evidence 
against  the  Alleged  Order  for  "  Battle  at  Sunrise"— The  "  Order"  to 
Ewell  was  Discretionary — Lee  had  lost  his  Balance. 

THE  stars  were  shining  brightly  on  the  morning  of  the 
2d  when  I  reported  at  General  Lee's  head-quarters  and 
asked  for  orders.  After  a  time  Generals  McLaws  and 
Hood,  with  their  staffs,  rode  up,  and  at  sunrise  their  com 
mands  filed  off  the  road  to  the  right  and  rested.  The 
Washington  Artillery  was  with  them,  and  about  nine 
o'clock,  after  an  all-night  march,  Alexander's  batteries 
were  up  as  far  as  Willoughby's  Eun,  where  he  parked 
and  fed,  and  rode  to  head-quarters  to  report. 

As  indicated  by  these  movements,  General  Lee  was  not 
ready  with  his  plans.  He  had  not  heard  from  his  cavalry, 
nor  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy  further  than  the 
information  from  a  despatch  captured  during  the  night, 
that  the  Fifth  Corps  was  in  camp  about  five  miles  from 
Gettysburg,  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  reported  near 
Gulp's  Hill.  As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  how 
ever,  the  enemy  was  found  in  position  on  his  formidable 
heights  awaiting  us. 

362 


BATTLE  OF 

GETTYSBURG 


GETTYSBURG — SECOND    DAY.  363 

The  result  of  efforts  during  the  night  and  early  morn 
ing  to  secure  Gulp's  Hill  had  not  been  reported,  and  Gen 
eral  Lee  sent  Colonel  Venable  of  his  staff  to  confer  with 
the  commander  of  the  Second  Corps  as  to  opportunity  to 
make  the  battle  by  his  left.  He  was  still  in  doubt  whether 
it  would  be  better  to  move  to  his  far-off  right.  About  nine 
o'clock  he  rode  to  his  left  to  be  assured  of  the  position 
there,  and  of  the  general  temper  of  affairs  in  that  quar 
ter.  After  viewing  the  field,  he  held  conference  with  the 
corps  and  division  commanders.  They  preferred  to  ac 
cept  his  judgment  and  orders,  except  General  Early,  who 
claimed  to  have  learned  of  the  topographical  features  of 
the  country  during  his  march  towards  York,  and  recom 
mended  the  right  of  the  line  as  the  point  at  which  strong 
battle  should  be  made.  About  ten  o'clock  General  Lee 
returned  to  his  head-quarters,  but  his  engineer  who  had 
been  sent  to  reconnoitre  on  his  right  had  not  come  back. 
To  be  at  hand  for  orders,  I  remained  with  the  troops  at 
his  head-quarters.  The  infantry  had  arms  stacked ;  the 
artillery  was  at  rest. 

The  enemy  occupied  the  commanding  heights  of  the 
city  cemetery,  from  which  point,  in  irregular  grade,  the 
ridge  slopes  southward  two  miles  and  a  half  to  a  bold 
outcropping  height  of  three  hundred  feet  called  Little 
Round  Top,  and  farther  south  half  a  mile  ends  in  the 
greater  elevation  called  Round  Top.  The  former  is 
covered  from  base  to  top  by  formidable  boulders.  From 
the  cemetery  to  Little  Round  Top  was  the  long  main  front 
of  General  Meade's  position.  At  the  cemetery  his  line 
turned  to  the  northeast  and  east  and  southeast  in  an  ellip 
tical  curve,  with  his  right  on  Gulp's  Hill. 

At  an  early  hour  of  the  2d  the  Union  army  was  posted  : 
the  Twelfth  Corps  at  Gulp's  Hill,  extending  its  left  to 
Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First ;  on  Wadsworth's  left 
the  Eleventh  Corps  ;  on  the  left  of  the  Eleventh  the  other 
troops  of  the  First ;  on  their  left  the  Second,  and  left  of 


364  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

that  to  Little  Round  Top  the  Third  Corps;  the  Fifth 
Corps  stood  in  reserve  across  the  bend  from  the  right  of 
the  Twelfth  to  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps.  Thus  there 
was  formed  a  field  of  tremendous  power  upon  a  convex 
curve,  which  gave  the  benefit  of  rapid  concentration  at 
any  point  or  points.  The  natural  defences  had  been  im 
proved  during  the  night  and  early  morning.  The  Sixth 
Corps  was  marching  from  Manchester,  twenty-two  miles 
from  Gettysburg.  Its  first  order,  received  near  Manches 
ter  before  night  of  the  1st,  was  to  march  for  Taneytown, 
but  after  passing  the  Baltimore  pike  the  orders  were 
changed,  directing  a  prompt  march  to  Gettysburg.  The 
march  has  been  variously  estimated  from  thirty  to  thirty- 
five  miles,  but  the  distance  from  Manchester  via  Taney 
town  to  Gettysburg  is  only  twenty-nine  miles,  and  as  the 
ground  for  which  the  corps  marched  was  three  miles  east 
of  Gettysburg,  the  march  would  have  been  only  twenty- 
six  miles  via  Taneytown  ;  as  the  corps  marched  back  and 
took  the  Baltimore  pike,  some  distance  must  have  been 
saved.  It  was  on  the  field  at  three  o'clock  of  the  afternoon, 
— the  Union  cavalry  under  General  Pleasonton  in  reach. 

The  Confederate  left  was  covering  the  north  and  east 
curve  of  the  enemy's  line,  Johnson's  division  near  Gulp's 
Hill,  Early's  and  Rodes's  extending  the  line  to  the  right 
through  Gettysburg ;  Fender's  division  on  the  right  of 
Rodes's ;  the  other  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  resting 
on  Seminary  Ridge,  with  McLaws's  division  and  Hood's 
three  brigades  near  general  head-quarters;  Pickett's 
brigades  and  Law's  of  Hood's  division  at  Chambersburg 
and  New  Guilford,  twenty-two  and  twenty-four  miles 
away.  Law  had  received  orders  to  join  his  division,  and 
was  on  the  march.  The  cavalry  was  not  yet  heard  from. 
The  line  so  extended  and  twisted  about  the  rough  ground 
that  concentration  at  any  point  was  not  possible. 

It  was  some  little  time  after  General  Lee's  return  from 
his  ride  to  the  left  before  he  received  the  reports  of  the 


GETTYSBURG SECOND    DAY.  365 

reconnoissance  ordered  from  his  centre  to  his  right.  His 
mind,  previously  settled  to  the  purpose  to  fight  where  the 
enemy  stood,  now  accepted  the  explicit  plan  of  making 
the  opening  on  his  right,  and  to  have  the  engagement 
general.  He  ordered  the  commander  of  the  Third  Corps 
to  extend  the  centre  by  Anderson's  division,  McLaws's 
and  Hood's  divisions  to  extend  the  deployment  to  his 
right.  Heth's  division  of  the  Third  was  drawn  nearer 
the  front,  and  notice  of  his  plans  was  sent  the  commander 
of  the  Second  Corps. 

At  the  intimation  that  the  battle  would  be  opened  on 
the  right  by  part  of  the  First  Corps,  Colonel  Alexander  was 
asked  to  act  as  director  of  artillery,  and  sent  to  view  the 
field  in  time  to  assign  the  batteries  as  they  were  up.  It 
was  eleven  o'clock  when  General  Lee's  order  was  issued, 
but  he  had  ordered  Law's  brigade  to  its  division,  and  a 
wait  of  thirty  minutes  was  necessary  for  it  to  get  up. 
Law  had  received  his  orders  at  three  in  the  morning,  and 
had  marched  twenty-three  miles.  The  battle-ground  was 
still  five  miles  off  by  the  route  of  march,  but  Law  com 
pleted  his  march  of  twenty-eight  miles  in  eleven  hours,— 
the  best  marching  done  in  either  army  to  reach  the  field 
of  Gettysburg. 

The  battle  was  to  be  opened  on  the  right  by  two  di 
visions  of  the  First  Corps,  supported  on  their  left  by  four 
of  the  brigades  of  Anderson's  division ;  the  opening  to  be 
promptly  followed  on.  Lee's  left  by  the  Second  Corps,  and 
continued  to  real  attack  if  the  opportunity  occurred ;  the 
Third  (centre)  Corps  to  move  to  severe  threatening  and 
take  advantage  of  opportunity  to  attack ;  the  movements  of 
the  Second  and  Third  Corps  to  be  prompt,  and  in  close, 
severe  co-operation,  so  as  to  prevent  concentration  against 
the  battle  of  the  right.  The  little  cavalry  that  was  with 
the  army  was  kept  on  the  extreme  left.  Not  so  much 
as  one  trooper  was  sent  us. 

General  Lee  ordered  his  reconnoitring  officer  to  lead 


366  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  troops  of  the  First  Corps  and  conduct  them  by  a 
route  concealed  from  view  of  the  enemy.  As  I  was  re 
lieved  for  the  time  from  the  march,  I  rode  near  the  middle 
of  the  line.  General  Lee  rode  with  me  a  mile  or  more. 
General  Anderson  marched  by  a  route  nearer  the  enemy's 
line,  and  was  discovered  by  General  Sickles,  who  com 
manded  the  Third  Corps,  the  left  of  the  Union  line.  A 
little  uncomfortable  at  his  retired  position,  and  seeing  that 
the  battle  was  forming  against  him,  General  Sickles  thought 
to  put  the  Third  Maine  Regiment  and  the  Berdan  Sharp 
shooters  on  outpost  in  a  bold  woodland  cover,  to  develop 
somewhat  of  the  approaching  battle,  and  presently  threw 
his  corps  forward  as  far  as  the  Peach  Orchard,  half  a  mile 
forward  of  the  position  assigned  to  it  in  the  general  line. 
The  Tenth  Alabama  Regiment  was  sent  against  the  out 
post  guard,  and,  reinforced  by  the  Eleventh  Regiment, 
drove  it  back,  and  Anderson's  division  found  its  place  in 
proper  line. 

General  Birney's  account  of  the  affair  at  the  outpost 
puts  it  at  twelve  o'clock,  and  the  signal  accounts,  the  only 
papers  dated  on  the  field,  reported, — 

"The  enemy's  skirmishers  advancing  from  the  west  one  mile 
from  here — 11.45." 

And  presently, — 

"The  rebels  are  in  force  ;  our  skirmishers  give  way — 12.55." 

There  is  no  room  for  doubt  of  the  accuracy  of  these  re- 
ports,  which  go  to  show  that  it  was  one  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  when  the  Third  Corps,  upon  which  the  First 
Corps  was  to  form,  was  in  position. 

Under  the  conduct  of  the  reconnoitring  officer,  our 
march  seemed  slow, — there  were  some  halts  and  counter 
marches.  To  save  time,  I  ordered  the  rear  division  to 
double  on  the  front,  and  we  were  near  the  affair  of  Ander 
son's  regiments  with  the  outpost  guard  of  Sickles.  Ander- 


GETTYSBURG — SECOND    DAY.  367 

son's  division  deployed, — Wilcox's,  Perry's,  Wright's, 
Posey's,  and  Mahone's  brigades  from  right  to  left. 

General  Hood  was  ordered  to  send  his  select  scouts  in 
advance,  to  go  through  the  woodlands  and  act  as  vedettes, 
in  the  absence  of  cavalry,  and  give  information  of  the 
enemy,  if  there.  The  double  line  marched  up  the  slope 
and  deployed, — McLaws  on  the  right  of  Anderson,  Hood's 
division  on  his  right,  McLaws  near  the  crest  of  the  pla 
teau  in  front  of  the  Peach  Orchard,  Hood  spreading  and 
enveloping  Sickles's  left.  The  former  was  readily  adjusted 
to  ground  from  which  to  advance  or  defend.  Hood's 
front  was  very  rugged,  with  no  field  for  artillery,  and  very 
rough  for  advance  of  infantry.  As  soon  as  he  passed  the 
Emmitsburg  road,  he  sent  to  report  of  the  great  advantage 
of  moving  on  by  his  right  around  to  the  enemy's  rear. 
His  scouting  parties  had  reported  that  there  was  nothing 
between  them  and  the  enemy's  trains.  He  was  told  that 
the  move  to  the  right  had  been  proposed  the  day  before 
and  rejected ;  that  Ganeral  Lee's  orders  were  to  guide  my 
left  by  the  Emmitsburg  road. 

In  our  immediate  front  were  the  divisions  of  the  Third 
Corps  under  Generals  Humphreys  and  Birney,  from  right 
to  left,  with  orders  for  supports  of  the  flanks  by  divisions 
of  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps.  The  ground  on  the  left 
of  Birney's  division  was  so  broken  and  obstructed  by 
boulders  that  his  left  was  dropped  off  to  the  rear,  forming  a 
broken  line.  In  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  between  his  lines 
and  Little  Round  Top,  was  a  very  rough  elevation  of 
eighty  feet  formed  by  upheavals  that  left  open  passage 
deep  down  Devil's  Den.  Smith's  battery  was  on  Birney's 
left,  Winslow's  between  the  right  and  next  brigade.  Other 
batteries  in  position  were  Clark's,  Ames's,  Randolph's, 
Seeley's,  and  TurnbulPs. 

As  McLaws's  division  came  up  on  line,  Barksdale's  bri 
gade  was  in  front  of  a  battery  about  six  hundred  yards 
off.  He  appealed  for  permission  to  charge  and  capture  it, 


368  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

but  was  told  to  wait.  On  his  right  was  Kershaw's  bri 
gade,  the  brigades  of  Semmes  and  Wofford  on  the  second 
line.  Hood's  division  was  in  two  lines, — Law's  and  Rob 
ertson's  brigades  in  front,  G.  T.  Anderson's  and  Ben- 
ning's  in  the  second  line.  The  batteries  were  with  the 
divisions, — four  to  the  division.  One  of  G.  T.  Anderson's 
regiments  was  put  on  picket  down  the  Emmitsburg  road. 

General  Hood  appealed  again  and  again  for  the  move 
to  the  right,  but,  to  give  more  confidence  to  his  attack,  he 
was  reminded  that  the  move  to  the  right  had  been  care 
fully  considered  by  our  chief  and  rejected  in  favor  of  his 
present  orders. 

The  opportunity  for  our  right  was  in  the  air.  General 
Halleck  saw  it  from  Washington.  General  Meade  saw 
and  was  apprehensive  of  it.  Even  General  Pendleton 
refers  to  it  in  favorable  mention  in  his  official  report. 
Failing  to  adopt  it,  General  Lee  should  have  gone  with 
us  to  his  right.  He  had  seen  and  carefully  examined 
the  left  of  his  line,  and  only  gave  us  a  guide  to  show  the 
way  to  the  right,  leaving  the  battle  to  be  adjusted  to 
formidable  and  difficult  grounds  without  his  assistance. 
If  he  had  been  with  us,  General  Hood's  messengers 
could  have  been  referred  to  general  head-quarters,  but  to 
delay  and  send  messengers  five  miles  in  favor  of  a  move 
that  he  had  rejected  would  have  been  contumacious.  The 
opportunity  was  with  the  Confederates  from  the  assem 
bling  on  Cemetery  Hill.  It  was  inviting  of  their  pre 
conceived  plans.  It  was  the  object  of  and  excuse  for  the 
invasion  as  a  substitute  for  more  direct  efforts  for  the 
relief  of  Vicksburg.  Confederate  writers  and  talkers 
claim  that  General  Meade  could  have  escaped  without 
making  aggressive  battle,  but  that  is  equivalent  to  con 
fession  of  the  inertia  that  failed  to  grasp  the  opportunity. 

Beaten  in  the  battle  of  the  1st,  dislodged  of  position, 
and  outgeneralled,  the  Union  army  would  have  felt  the 
want  of  spirit  and  confidence  important  to  aggressive 


GETTYSBURG — SECOND    DAY.  369 

battle ;  but  the  call  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederates, 
and  these  circumstances  would  have  made  their  work 
more  facile,  while  the  Union  commander  would  have  felt 
the  call  to  save  his  capital  most  imperative.  Even  as 
events  passed  it  was  thought  helpful  to  the  Union  side 
to  give  out  the  report  that  General  McClellan  was  at 
hand  and  would  command  the  army. 

Four  of  the  brigades  of  Anderson's  division  were 
ordered  to  advance  in  echelon  in  support  of  my  left. 

At  three  o'clock  the  artillery  was  ordered  to  open  prac 
tice.  General  Meade  was  then  with  General  Sickles  dis 
cussing  the  feasibility  of  withdrawing  his  corps  to  the 
position  to  which  it  was  originally  assigned,  but  the  open 
ing  admonished  him  that  it  was  too  late.  He  had  just  sent 
a  cipher  telegram  to  inform  General  Halleck,  commander- 
in-chief,  that  in  the  event  of  his  having  no  opportunity  to 
attack,  and  should  he  find  the  Confederates  moving  to  in 
terpose  between  him  and  Washington,  he  would  fall  back 
on  his  supplies  at  Westminster.*  But  my  right  division 
was  then  nearer  to  Westminster,  and  our  scouting  parties 
of  infantry  were  within  rifle  range  of  the  road  leading  to 
that  point  and  to  Washington.  So  it  would  have  been 
convenient,  after  holding  our  threatening  attitude  till 
night,  to  march  across  his  line  at  dark,  in  time  to  draw 
other  troops  to  close  connection  before  the  next  morning. 

Prompt  to  the  order  the  combat  opened,  followed  by 
artillery  of  the  other  corps,  and  our  artillerists  measured 
up  to  the  better  metal  of  the  enemy  by  vigilant  work. 
Hood's  lines  were  not  yet  ready.  After  a  little  practice 
by  the  artillery,  he  was  properly  adjusted  and  ordered  to 
bear  down  upon  the  enemy's  left,  but  he  was  not  prompt, 
and  the  order  was  repeated  before  he  would  strike  down.f 

In  his  usual  gallant  style  he  led  his  troops  through  the 
rocky  fastnesses  against  the  strong  lines  of  his  earnest 


Report  of  Committee,  vol.  i.  p.  488.  f  His  account. 

24 


370  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

adversary,  and  encountered  battle  that  called  for  all  of  his 
power  and  skill.  The  enemy  was  tenacious  of  his  strong 
ground  ;  his  skilfully-handled  batteries  swept  through  the 
passes  between  the  rocks  ;  the  more  deadly  fire  of  infantry 
concentrated  as  our  men  bore  upon  the  angle  of  the 
enemy's  line  and  stemmed  the  fiercest  onset,  until  it 
became  necessary  to  shorten  their  work  by  a  desperate 
charge.  This  pressing  struggle  and  the  cross-fire  of  our 
batteries  broke  in  the  salient  angle,  but  the  thickening 
fire,  as  the  angle  was  pressed  back,  hurt  Hood's  left  and 
held  him  in  steady  fight.  His  right  brigade  was  drawn 
towards  Round  Top  by  the  heavy  fire  pouring  from  that 
quarter,  Benning's  brigade  was  pressed  to  the  thickening 
line  at  the  angle,  and  G.  T.  Anderson's  was  put  in  support 
of  the  battle  growing  against  Hood's  right. 

I  rode  to  McLaws,  found  him  ready  for  his  opportunity, 
and  Barksdale  chafing  in  his  wait  for  the  order  to  seize 
the  battery  in  his  front.  Kershaw's  brigade  of  his  right 
first  advanced  and  struck  near  the  angle  of  the  enemy's 
line  where  his  forces  were  gathering  strength.  After  ad 
ditional  caution  to  hold  his  ranks  closed,  McLaws  ordered 
Barksdale  in.  With  glorious  bearing  he  sprang  to  his 
work,  overriding  obstacles  and  dangers.  Without  a  pause 
to  deliver  a  shot,  he  had  the  battery.  Kershaw,  joined  by 
Semmes's  brigade,  responded,  and  Hood's  men,  feeling  the 
impulsion  of  relief,  resumed  their  bold  fight,  and  presently 
the  enemy's  line  was  broken  through  its  length.  But 
his  well-seasoned  troops  knew  how  to  utilize  the  advan 
tage  of  their  grounds  and  put  back  their  dreadful  fires 
from  rocks,  depressions,  and  stone  fences,  as  they  went 
for  shelter  about  Little  Round  Top. 

That  point  had  not  been  occupied  by  the  enemy,  nor 
marked  as  an  important  feature  of  the  field.  The  broken 
ranks  sought  shelter  under  its  rocks  and  defiles  as  birds  fly 
to  cover.  General  Hood  fell  seriously  hurt,  and  General 
Law  succeeded  to  command  of  the  division,  but  the  well- 


GETTYSBURG SECOND    DAY.  371 

seasoned  troops  were  not  in  need  of  a  close  guiding  hand. 
The  battle  was  on,  and  they  knew  how  to  press  its  hottest 
contention. 

General  Warren,  chief  engineer  of  the  Federal  army, 
was  sent  at  the  critical  moment  to  Little  Round  Top,  and 
found  that  it  was  the  citadel  of  the  field.  He  called  for 
troops  to  occupy.it.  The  Fifth  Corps  (Sykes's)  was  hur 
ried  to  him,  and  General  Hancock  sent  him  Caldwell's 
division  of  the  Second  Corps.  At  the  Brick  House,  away 
from  his  right,  General  Sickles  had  a  detachment  that  had 
been  reinforced  by  General  Hancock.  This  fire  drew 
Anderson's  brigade  of  direction  (Wilcox)  a  little  off  from 
support  of  Barksdale's  left.  General  Humphreys,  seeing 
the  opportunity,  rallied  such  of  his  troops  as  he  could, 
and,  reinforced  by  Hays's  division  (Willard's  brigade)  of 
Hancock's  corps,  came  against  Barksdale's  flank,  but  the 
latter  moved  bravely  on,  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  battle. 
Wright's  Georgia  and  Perry's  Florida  brigades  were 
drawn  in  behind  Wilcox  and  thrown  against  Humphreys, 
pushing  him  off  and  breaking  him  up. 

The  fighting  had  by  this  time  become  tremendous,  and 
brave  men  and  officers  were  stricken  by  hundreds.  Posey 
and  Wilcox  dislodged  the  forces  about  the  Brick  House. 

General  Sickles  was  desperately  wounded ! 

General  Willard  was  dead  ! 

General  Semmes,  of  McLaws's  division,  was  mortally 
wounded ! 

Our  left  relieved,  the  brigades  of  Anderson's  division 
moved  on  with  Barksdale's,  passed  the  swale,  and  moved 
up  the  slope.  Caldwell's  division,  and  presently  those  of 
Ayres  and  Barnes  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  met  and  held  our 
strongest  battle.  While  thus  engaged,  General  Sykes 
succeeded  in  putting  Vincent's  and  Weed's  brigades  and 
Hazlett's  battery  on  the  summit  of  Little  Round  Top,  but 
presently  we  overreached  Caldwell's  division,  broke  it  off, 
and  pushed  it  from  the  field.  Of  his  brigade  commanders, 


372  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPO^IATTOX. 

Zook  was  killed,  and  Brooke  and  Cross  were  wounded, 
the  latter  mortally.  General  Hancock  reported  sixty  per 
cent,  of  his  men  lost.  On  our  side,  Barksdale  was  down 
dying,  and  G.  T.  Anderson  wounded. 

We  had  carried  Devil's  Den,  were  at  the  Hound  Tops 
and  the  Wheat-Field,  but  Ayres's  division  of  regulars  and 
Barnes's  division  were  holding  us  in  equal  battle.  The 
struggle  throughout  the  field  seemed  at  its  tension.  The 
brigades  of  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  could  hold  off  other 
troops  of  Hancock's,  but  were  not  strong  enough  to  step  to 
the  enemy's  lines.  When  Caldwell's  division  was  pushed 
away,  Ayres's  flank  and  the  gorge  at  Little  Round  Top 
were  only  covered  by  a  sharp  line  of  picket  men  behind 
the  boulders.  If  we  could  drive  in  the  sharp-shooters  and 
strike  Ayres's  flank  to  advantage,  we  could  dislodge  his 
and  Barnes's  divisions,  occupy  the  gorge  behind  Sykes's 
brigades  on  Round  Top,  force  them  to  retreat,  and  lift 
our  desperate  fighters  to  the  summit.  I  had  one  brigade 
— Wofford's — that  had  not  been  engaged  in  the  hottest 
battle.  To  urge  the  troops  to  their  reserve  power  in  the 
precious  moments,  I  rode  with  Wofford.  The  rugged 
field,  the  rough  plunge  of  artillery  fire,  and  the  piercing 
musket-shots  delayed  somewhat  the  march,  but  Alexander 
dashed  up  with  his  batteries  and  gave  new  spirit  to  the 
worn  infantry  ranks.  By  a  fortunate  strike  upon  Ayres's 
flank  we  broke  his  line  and  pushed  him  and  Barnes  so 
closely  that  they  were  obliged  to  use  most  strenuous  efforts 
to  get  away  without  losing  in  prisoners  as  well  as  their 
killed  and  wounded.  We  gained  the  Wheat-Field,  and 
were  so  close  upon  the  gorge  that  our  artillery  could  no 
longer  venture  their  fire  into  it.  We  were  on  Little 
Round  Top  grappling  for  the  crowning  point.  The  bri 
gade  commanders  there,  Vincent  and  Weed,  were  killed, 
also  the  battery  commander,  Hazlett,  and  others,  but  their 
troops  were  holding  to  their  work  as  firmly  as  the  mighty 
boulders  that  helped  them.  General  Meade  thought  that 


GETTYSBURG SECOND    DAY.  373 

the  Confederate  army  was  working  on  my  part  of  the 
field.  He  led  some  regiments  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  and 
posted  them  against  us,  called  a  division  of  Newton's  corps 
(First)  from  beyond  Hancock's,  and  sent  Crawford's  divi 
sion,  the  last  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  splitting  through  the 
gorge,  forming  solid  lines,  in  places  behind  stone  fences, 
and  making  steady  battle,  as  veterans  fresh  in  action  know 
so  well  how  to  make.  While  Meade's  lines  were  growing 
my  men  were  dropping ;  we  had  no  others  to  call  to  their 
aid,  and  the  weight  against  us  was  too  heavy  to  carry. 
The  extreme  left  of  our  lines  was  only  about  a  mile  from  us 
across  the  enemy's  concentric  position,  which  brought  us 
within  hearing  of  that  battle,  if  engaged,  and  near  enough 
to  feel  its  swell,  but  nothing  was  heard  or  felt  but  the 
clear  ring  of  the  enemy's  fresh  metal  as  he  came  against 
us.  No  other  part  of  our  army  had  engaged !  My  seven 
teen  thousand  against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac !  The 
sun  was  down,  and  with  it  went  down  the  severe  battle. 
I  ordered  recall  of  the  troops  to  the  line  of  Plum  Eun 
and  Devil's  Den,  leaving  picket  lines  near  the  foot  of  the 
Round  Tops.  My  loss  was  about  six  thousand,  Meade's 
between  twelve  and  fourteen  thousand;  but  his  loss  in 
general  and  field  officers  was  frightful.  When  General 
Humphreys,  who  succeeded  to  Barksdale's  brigade,  was 
called  back  to  the  new  line,  he  thought  there  was  some 
mistake  in  the  orders,  and  only  withdrew  as  far  as  a  cap 
tured  battery,  and  when  the  order  was  repeated,  retired 
under  protest. 

General  Stuart  came  down  from  Carlisle  with  his 
column  of  cavalry  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2d.  As 
he  approached  he  met  a  cavalry  force  of  the  enemy 
moving  towards  the  Confederate  left  rear,  and  was  suc 
cessful  in  arresting  it.  He  was  posted  with  Jenkins's 
three  thousand  cavalry  *  on  the  Confederate  left. 

*  In  his  official  report  he  puts  Jenkins's  force  at  the  opening  cam 
paign  at  three  thousand  eight  hundred. 


374  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Notwithstanding  the  supreme  order  of  the  day  for  gen 
eral  battle,  and  the  reinforcement  of  the  cavalry  on  our 
left,  the  Second  and  Third  Corps  remained  idle  during 
all  of  the  severe  battle  of  the  Confederate  right,  except 
the  artillery,  and  the  part  of  that  on  the  extreme  left 
was  only  in  practice  long  enough  to  feel  the  superior  metal 
of  the  enemy,  when  it  retired,  leaving  a  battery  of  four 
guns  in  position.  General  Early  failed  to  even  form 
his  division  in  battle  order,  leaving  a  brigade  in  position 
remote  from  the  line,  and  sending,  later,  another  to  be 
near  Stuart's  cavalry.  The  latter  returned,  however, 
before  night. 

At  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  division  on  our  ex 
treme  left,  E.  Johnson's,  advanced.  The  brigades  were  J. 
M.  Jones's,  Nicholls's,  Steuart's,  and  Walker's.  Walker's 
was  detached,  as  they  moved,  to  look  for  a  detachment  of 
the  enemy  reported  threatening  the  far  away  left.  When 
the  three  brigades  crossed  Rock  Creek  it  was  night.  The 
enemy's  line  to  be  assaulted  was  occupied  by  Greene's 
brigade  of  the  Twelfth  Corps.  It  was  reinforced  by 
three  regiments  of  Wadsworth's  division  and  three  from 
the  Eleventh  Corps.  After  brave  attack  and  defence, 
part  of  the  line  was  carried,  when  the  fight,  after  a 
severe  fusillade  between  the  infantry  lines,  quieted,  and 
Walker's  brigade  returned  to  the  division.  Part  of  the 
enemy's  trenches,  east  of  the  point  attacked  (across  a 
swale),  vacated  when  the  corps  moved  over  to  the  left, 
General  Johnson  failed  to  occupy. 

Before  this,  General  Rodes  discovered  that  the  enemy, 
in  front  of  his  division,  was  drawing  off  his  artillery  and 
infantry  to  my  battle  of  the  right,  and  suggested  to 
General  Early  that  the  moment  had  come  for  the  divi 
sions  to  attack,  and  drew  his  forces  from  entanglements 
about  the  streets  to  be  ready.  After  E.  Johnson's  fight 
on  our  extreme  left,  General  Early  ordered  two  brigades 
under  General  Harry  T.  Hays  to  attack.  Hays  had  with 


GETTYSBURG — SECOND  DAY.  375 

his  Louisiana  brigade  Hoke's  North  Carolina  brigade 
under  Colonel  Avery.  He  made  as  gallant  a  fight  as 
was  ever  made.  Mounting  to  the  top  of  the  hill,  he 
captured  a  battery,  and  pushed  on  in  brave  order,  taking 
some  prisoners  and  colors,  until  he  discovered  that  his  two 
brigades  were  advancing  in  a  night  affair  against  a  grand 
army,  when  he  found  that  he  was  fortunate  in  having 
night  to  cover  his  weakness,  and  withdrew.  The  gallant 
Colonel  Avery,  mortally  wounded  and  dying,  wrote  on  a 
slip  of  paper,  "  Tell  father  that  I  died  with  my  face  to  the 
enemy"  When  Rodes  was  prepared,  Hays  had  retired, 
and  the  former  did  not  see  that  it  was  part  of  the  order 
for  general  engagement  to  put  his  division  in  night  attack 
that  could  not  be  supported. 

Thus  the  general  engagement  of  the  day  was  dwarfed 
into  the  battle  of  the  right  at  three  o'clock,  that  on  the 
left  at  eight  by  a  single  division,  and  that  nearer  the 
centre  at  nine  o'clock  by  two  brigades. 

There  was  a  man  on  the  left  of  the  line  who  did  not 
care  to  make  the  battle  win.  He  knew  where  it  was,  had 
viewed  it  from  its  earliest  formation,  had  orders  for  his 
part  in  it,  but  so  withheld  part  of  his  command  from  it  as 
to  make  co-operative  concert  of  action  impracticable.  He 
had  a  pruriency  for  the  honors  of  the  field  of  Mars,  was 
eloquent,  before  the  fires  of  the  bivouac  and  his  chief,  of 
the  glory  of  war's  gory  shield  ;  but  when  its  envied  laurels 
were  dipping  to  the  grasp,  when  the  heavy  field  called 
for  bloody  work,  he  found  the  placid  horizon,  far  and 
away  beyond  the  cavalry,  more  lovely  and  inviting.  He 
wanted  command  of  the  Second  Corps,  and,  succeeding  to 
it,  held  the  honored  position  until  General  Lee  found,  at 
last,  that  he  must  dismiss  him  from  field  service. 

General  Lee  ordered  Johnson's  division  of  his  left,  oc 
cupying  part  of  the  enemy's  trenches  about  Gulp's  Hill, 
to  be  reinforced  during  the  night  of  the  2d  by  two  brigades 
of  Rodes's  division  and  one  of  Early's  division.  Why  the 


376  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

other  brigades  of  those  divisions  were  not  sent  does  not 
appear,  but  it  does  appear  that  there  was  a  place  for  them 
on  Johnson's  left,  in  the  trenches  that  were  vacated  by 
the  Federal  Twelfth  Corps  when  called  over  to  reinforce 
the  battle  of  Meade's  left.  Gulp's  Hill  bore  the  same  re 
lations  to  the  enemy's  right  as  Little  Round  Top  did  to 
his  left.  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  quotes  evidence  from 
General  Meade  that  had  Gulp's  Hill  been  occupied,  in 
force,  by  Confederates,  it  would  have  compelled  the  with 
drawal  of  the  Federal  troops.* 

General  Meade,  after  the  battle  of  his  left,  ordered  the 
divisions  of  his  Twelfth  Corps  back  to  their  trenches,  to 
recover  the  parts  occupied  by  the  Confederate  left.  It 
was  night  when  the  First  Division  approached.  General 
Ruger,  commanding,  thought  to  feel  his  way  through  the 
dark  by  a  line  of  skirmishers.  He  found  the  east  end  of 
his  trenches,  across  the  swale,  unoccupied,  and  took  pos 
session.  Pressing  his  adventure,  he  found  the  main  line  of 
his  works  occupied  by  the  Confederates  in  force,  and  dis 
posed  his  command  to  wait  for  daylight.  The  Second  Di 
vision  came  during  the  night,  when  General  Williams, 
commanding  the  corps,  posted  it  on  the  left  of  the  First, 
and  the  division  commanders  ordered  batteries  in  proper 
positions. 

During  the  night,  General  Meade  held  a  council,  which 
decided  to  fight  it  out.  So  it  began  to  look  as  if  the  vicis 
situdes  of  the  day  had  so  worked  as  to  call  General  Meade 
from  defensive  to  aggressive  battle  for  Gulp's  Hill.  But 
the  Confederates  failed  to  see  the  opportunity  and  force 
the  issue  as  it  was  presented. 

In  General  Meade's  evidence  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  he  puts  his  losses  of  the  first 
and  second  days  at  twenty  thousand,  and  assigns  two- 
thirds  of  these  to  the  battle  of  the  2d.  As  the  fighting 

*  General  Lee,  by  Fitzhugh  L.ee  (note),  p.  299. 


GETTYSBURG SECOND    DAY.  377 

against  the  three  brigades  of  our  left  after  night,  and  two 
brigades,  later  in  the  night,  from  our  centre,  could  not 
have  been  very  severe,  I  claim  that  his  loss  in  the  battle 
of  his  left  was  from  twelve  to  fourteen  thousand. 

As  events  of  the  battle  of  the  2d  passed,  it  seems 
fair  to  claim  that  with  Pickett's  brigades  present  at  the 
moment  of  Wofford's  advance  for  the  gorge  at  Little 
Round  Top,  we  could  have  had  it  before  Crawford  was 
there. 

Under  ordinary  circumstances  this  account  of  the  sec 
ond  day,  made  from  the  records,  would  be  complete  and 
conclusive ;  but  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  which  may  be 
called  the  epitome  of  the  war,  has  been  the  subject  of 
many  contentions  of  words.  Knights  of  the  quill  have 
consumed  many  of  their  peaceful  hours  in  publishing, 
through  books,  periodicals,  and  newspapers,  their  plans 
for  the  battle,  endeavoring  to  forestall  the  records  and  to 
find  a  scapegoat,  and  their  representations  may  be  given, 
though  they  do  not  deserve  it,  a  word  of  reply. 

General  W.  N.  Pendleton  led  off  when  making  a  lec 
turing  tour  through  the  South  for  a  memorial  church  for 
General  Lee.  He  claims  that  he  made  a  reconnoissance 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  of  July,  and  that  upon  his 
reporting  it,  General  Lee  ordered  General  Longstreet  to 
attack  at  sunrise  the  next  day.  He  did  not  venture  to 
charge  that  the  Second  and  Third  Corps,  that  were  on  the 
field  and  had  had  a  good  night's  rest,  were  part  of  the 
command  ordered  for  the  early  battle,  for  the  commanders, 
both  Virginians,  and  not  under  the  political  ban,  could 
have  brought  confusing  evidence  against  him ;  nor  did  he 
intend  to  put  General  Lee  in  the  anomalous  position, 
inferentially,  of  ordering  part  of  the  First  Corps — that 
should  march  through  the  night  and  all  night — to  make 
the  battle  alone.  The  point  of  battle  was  east  of  the 
Emmitsburg  road ;  to  find  it,  it  was  necessary  to  cross 
that  road,  but  General  Sickles  was  moving  part  of  his 


378  FROM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

corps  over  the  road  during  that  afternoon,  and  rested 
there  the  latter  part  of  the  day  and  during  the  night.  So, 
to  make  the  reconnoissance,  General  Pendleton  passed  the 
Union  troops  in  Confederate  uniform — he  was  military  in 
his  dress — and  found  the  point  of  battle.  Giving  him 
credit,  for  the  moment,  for  this  delicate  work  and  the 
mythical  order,  let  us  find  the  end  to  which  it  would  lead. 

The  only  troops  that  could  come  under  the  order  were 
McLaws's  division,  part  of  Hood's,  and  the  artillery, — 
about  ten  thousand  men.  These,  after  a  hurried  all-night's 
march,  reached  General  Lee's  head-quarters  about  sunrise 
of  the  2d,  and  by  continued  forced  march  could  have 
reached  the  point  of  battle,  about  five  miles  away,  by  seven 
o'clock,  where  they  would  have  encountered  a  division  of 
the  Third  Corps  (Birney's)  ;  presently  the  Second  and 
Fifth  Corps  under  Hancock  and  Sykes ;  then  the  First, 
Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  under  Newton,  Howard,  and  Slo- 
cum ;  then  the  balance  of  the  Third  coming  in  on  our 
rear  along  the  Emmitsburg  road, — making  sixty  thou 
sand  men  and  more.  There  was  reason  to  be  proud  of 
the  prowess  of  the  troops  of  the  First  Corps,  but  to  credit 
a  part  of  it  with  success  under  the  circumstances  was  not 
reasonable. 

That  the  Confederate  Second  Corps  did  not  have  orders 
for  the  alleged  sunrise  battle  is  evidenced  by  the  report  of 
its  commander,  who,  accounting  for  his  work  about  Gulp's 
Hill  during  the  night  of  the  1st  and  morning  of  the  2d, 
reported  of  the  morning,  "  It  was  now  daylight,  and  too 
late,"  meaning  that  it  was  too  late  for  him  to  attack  and 
carry  that  hill,  as  General  Lee  had  authorized  and  ex 
pected  him  to  do  during  the  night  before.  If  he  had  been 
ordered  to  take  part  in  the  sunrise  battle,  he  would  have 
been  in  the  nick  of  time.  That  the  Third  Corps  was  not 
to  be  in  it  is  evidenced  by  the  position  of  the  greater  part 
of  it  on  Seminary  Ridge  until  near  noon  of  the  2d.  So 
General  Lee  must  have  ordered  a  position  carried,  at  sun- 


GETTYSBURG — SECOND    DAY.  379 

rise,  by  ten  thousand  men,  after  it  had  gathered  strength 
all  night, — a  position  that  he  would  not  assault  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  1st  with  forty  thousand  men,  lest  they 
should  encounter  "  overwhelming  numbers/'  * 

As  the  other  corps,  after  receiving  their  orders  for  the 
afternoon  battle  of  the  2d,  failed  to  engage  until  after 
nightfall,  it  is  not  probable  that  they  would  have  found 
the  sunrise  battle  without  orders. 

General  Pendleton's  official  report  is  in  conflict  with 
his  memorial  lecture.  In  the  former  he  makes  no  refer 
ence  to  the  sunrise-battle  order,  but  mentions  a  route  by 
which  the  left  of  the  enemy  could  be  turned. 

Letters  from  the  active  members  of  General  Lee's  staff 
and  from  his  military  secretary,  General  A.  L.  Long,  show 
that  the  sunrise  battle  was  not  ordered,  and  a  letter  from 
Colonel  Fairfax  shows  that  the  claim  that  it  was  so 
ordered  was  set  up  after  General  Lee's  death.f 

*  His  official  report. 

f  Following  are  the  essential  portions  of  the  letters  referred  to,  af 
fording  unquestionable  and  overwhelming  testimony  against  the  claim 
that  General  Longstreet  was  ordered  to  give  battle  "at  sunrise"  : 

"NORFOLK,  VA.,  April  28,  1875. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL, —  ...  I  can  only  say  that  I  never  before  heard  of 
the  '  sunrise  attack'  you  were  to  have  made,  as  charged  by  General  Pen- 
dleton.  If  such  an  order  was  given  you  I  never  knew  of  it,  or  it  has 
strangely  escaped  my  memory.  I  think  it  more  than  probable  that  if 
General  Lee  had  had  your  troops  available  the  evening  previous  to  the 
day  of  which  you  speak,  he  would  have  ordered  an  early  attack,  but 
this  does  not  touch  the  point  at  issue.  I  regard  it  as  a  great  mistake  on 
the  part  of  those  who,  perhaps  because  of  political  differences,  now 
undertake  to  criticise  and  attack  your  war  record.  Such  conduct  is 
most  ungenerous,  and  I  am  sure  meets  the  disapprobation  of  all  good 
Confederates  with  whom  I  have  had  the  pleasure  of  associating  in  the 
daily  walks  of  life. 

"  Yours,  very  respectfully, 

"W.H.TAYLOR." 

"  UNIVERSITY  OP  VIRGINIA,  May  11,  1875. 
"  GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET  : 

"  DEAR  GENERAL, —  ...  I  did  not  know  of  any  order  for  an  attack 
on  the  enemy  at  sunrise  on  the  2d,  nor  can  I  believe  any  such  order  was 
issued  by  General  Lee.  About  sunrise  on  the  2d  of  July  I  was  sent  by 


380  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

In  a  published  account,  General  Long  mentions  my 
suggestion  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  for  the  turning 

General  Lee  to  General  Ewell  to  ask  him  what  he  thought  of  the  ad 
vantages  of  an  attack  on  the  enemy  from  his  position.  (Colonel  Mar 
shall  had  been  sent  with  a  similar  order  on  the  night  of  the  1st.)  Gen 
eral  Ewell  made  me  ride  with  him  from  point  to  point  of  his  lines,  so  as 
to  see  with  him  the  exact  position  of  things.  Before  he  got  through  the 
examination  of  the  enemy's  position,  General  Lee  came  himself  to  Gen 
eral  Swell's  lines.  In  sending  the  message  to  General  Ewell,  General 
Lee  was  explicit  in  saying  that  the  question  was  whether  he  should 
move  all  the  troops  around  on  the  right  and  attack  on  that  side.  I  do 
not  think  that  the  errand  on  which  I  was  sent  by  the  commanding  gen 
eral  is  consistent  with  the  idea  of  an  attack  at  sunrise  by  any  portion 
of  the  army. 

"Yours,  very  truly, 

"  CHARLES  S.  VENABLE." 

"  BALTIMORE,  MD.,  May  7,  1875. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL, —  ...  I  have  no  personal  recollection  of  the  order 
to  which  you  refer.  It  certainly  was  not  conveyed  by  me,  nor  is  there 
anything  in  General  Lee's  official  report  to  show  the  attack  on  the  2d 
was  expected  by  him  to  begin  earlier,  except  that  he  notices  that  there 
was  not  proper  concert  of  action  on  that  day.  .  .  . 

"Respectfully, 

"  CHARLES  MARSHALL." 

"  BIG  ISLAND,  BEDFORD,  VA.,  May  31,  1875. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, —  ...  I  do  not  recollect  of  hearing  of  an  order  to 
attack  at  sunrise,  or  at  any  other  designated  hour,  pending  the  opera 
tions  at  Gettysburg  during  the  first  three  days  of  July,  1863.  .  .  . 

"  Yours  truly, 

"  A.  L.LONG." 

"FREESTONE  P.  O.,  PRINCE  WILLIAM  COUNTY,  VA., 

"November  12,  1877. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  LONGSTREET,—  .  .  .  The  winter  after  the  death 
of  General  Lee  I  was  in  Lexington,  visiting  my  sons  at  the  V.  M.  I. 
General  Pendleton  called  to  see  me  at  the  hotel.  General  Custis  Lee 
was  in  my  room  when  he  came  in.  After  General  Lee  left,  General  Pen 
dleton  asked  me  if  General  Longstreet  was  not  ordered  to  attack  on  the 
2d  of  July  at  Gettysburg  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  did  not  attack 
until  four  o'clock  in  the  evening.  I  told  him  it  was  hot  possible.  When 
he  left  me  I  was  under  the  impression  I  had  convinced  him  of  his  mis 
taken  idea.  I  told  General  Pendleton  that  you  and  General  Lee  were 
together  the  greater  part  of  the  day  up  to  about  three  o'clock  or  later  ; 
that  you  separated  at  the  mouth  of  a  lane  not  long  thereafter.  You 
said  to  me,  '  Those  troops  will  be  in  position  by  the  time  you  get  there  ; 
tell  General  Hood  to  attack.'  When  I  gave  the  order  to  General  Hood 
he  was  standing  within  a  step  or  two  of  his  line  of  battle.  I  asked  him 


GETTYSBUKG SECOND    DAY.  381 

march  around  the  enemy's  left,  which  he  says,  after  con 
sideration,  was  rejected.* 

Colonel  Taylor  claims  that  the  attack  by  the  Confed 
erate  right  should  have  been  sooner,  and  should  have  met 
the  enemy  back  on  his  first  or  original  line,  and  before 
Little  Kound  Top  was  occupied.  But  Little  Round  Top 
was  not  occupied  in  force  until  after  my  battle  opened, 
and  General  Sickles's  advance  to  his  forward  lines  was 
made  in  consequence  of  the  Confederate  threatening,  and 
would  have  been  sooner  or  later  according  as  that  threat 
ening  was  made.  He  calls  the  message  of  General  Lee  to 
General  Ewell  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  an  order.  Gen 
eral  Lee  says, — 

"The  strong  position  which  the  enemy  had  assumed  could  not 
be  attacked  without  danger  of  exposing  the  four  divisions  present, 
exhausted  by  a  long  and  bloody  struggle,  to  overwhelming  num 
bers  of  fresh  troops.  General  Ewell  was  thereupon  instructed  to 
carry  the  hill  occupied  by  the  enemy  if  he  found  it  practicable." 

It  is  the  custom  of  military  service  to  accept  instruc 
tions  of  a  commander  as  orders,  but  when  they  are  coupled 
with  conditions  that  transfer  the  responsibility  of  battle 
and  defeat  to  the  subordinate,  they  are  not  orders,  and 
General  Ewell  was  justifiable  in  not  making  attack  that 
his  commander  would  not  order,  and  the  censure  of  his 
failure  is  unjust  and  very  ungenerous. 

to  please  delay  his  attack  until  I  could  communicate  to  General  Long- 
street  that  he  can  turn  the  enemy, — pointing  to  a  gorge  in  the  moun 
tain,  where  we  would  be  sheltered  from  his  view  and  attack  by  his  cav 
alry.  General  Hood  slapped  me  on  the  knee  and  said,  '  I  agree  with 
you,— bring  General  Longstreet  to  see  for  himself.'  When  I  reported 
to  you,  your  answer  was,  '  It  is  General  Lee's  order  ;  the  time  is  up, — 
attack  at  once.'  I  lost  no  time  in  repeating  the  same  to  General  Hood, 
and  remained  with  him  to  see  the  attack,  which  was  made  instantly. 
We  had  a  beautiful  view  of  the  enemy's  left  from  Hood's  position,  which 
was  close  up  to  hirn.  He  gave  way  quickly.  General  Hood  charged, 
and  I  spurred  to  report  to  you  ;  found  you  with  hat  in  hand  cheering 
on  General  McLaws's  division.  .  .  . 

"  Truly  your  friend, 

"  JOHN  W.  FAIRFAX." 
*  "  Four  Years  with  General  Lee." 


382  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  Virginia  writers  have  been  so  eager  in  their  search 
for  a  flaw  in  the  conduct  of  the  battle  of  the  First  Corps 
that  they  overlook  the  only  point  into  which  they  could 
have  thrust  their  pens. 

At  the  opening  of  the  fight,  General  Meade  was  with 
General  Sickles  discussing  the  feasibility  of  moving  the 
Third  Corps  back  to  the  line  originally  assigned  for  it, 
but  the  discussion  was  cut  short  by  the  opening  of  the 
Confederate  battle.  If  that  opening  had  been  delayed 
thirty  or  forty  minutes  the  corps  would  have  been  drawn 
back  to  the  general  line,  and  my  first  deployment  would 
have  enveloped  Little  Round  Top  and  carried  it  before  it 
could  have  been  strongly  manned,  and  General  Meade 
would  have  drawn  off  to  his  line  selected  behind  Pipe 
Creek.  The  point  should  have  been  that  the  battle  was 
opened  too  soon. 

Another  point  from  which  they  seek  comfort  is  that 
Sedgwick's  corps  (Sixth)  was  not  up  until  a  late  hour  of 
the  2d,  and  would  not  have  been  on  the  field  for  an  ear 
lier  battle.  But  Sedgwick  was  not  engaged  in  the  late 
battle,  and  could  have  been  back  at  Manchester,  so  far  as 
the  afternoon  battle  was  concerned.  And  they  harp  a 
little  on  the  delay  of  thirty  minutes  for  Law's  brigade  to 
join  its  division.  But  General  Lee  called  for  the  two 
divisions,  and  had  called  for  Law's  brigade  to  join  his 
division.  It  was  therefore  his  order  for  the  division  that 
delayed  the  march.  To  have  gone  without  it  would  have 
justified  censure.  As  we  were  not  strong  enough  for  the 
work  with  that  brigade,  it  is  not  probable  that  we  could 
have  accomplished  more  without  it. 

Colonel  Taylor  says  that  General  Lee  urged  that  the 
march  of  my  troops  should  be  hastened,  and  was  chafed 
at  their  non-appearance.  Not  one  word  did  he  utter  to 
me  of  their  march  until  he  gave  his  orders  at  eleven 
o'clock  for  the  move  to  his  right.  Orders  for  the  troops 
to  hasten  their  march  of  the  1st  were  sent  without  even  a 


GETTYSBUKG — SECOND    DAY.  383 

suggestion  from  him,  but  upon  his  announcement  that  he 
intended  to  fight  the  next  day,  if  the  enemy  was  there.* 

*  Upon  the  various  matters  of  this  momentous  day,  which  have  been 
subject  of  controversy,  the  following  testimony  from  J.  S.  D.  Cullen  is 
interesting  and  important : 

"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  May  18,  1875. 
"GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET  : 

"DEAR  GENERAL., —  ...  It  was  an  astounding  announcement  to  the 
survivors  of  the  First  Army  Corps  that  the  disaster  and  failure  at  Get 
tysburg  was  alone  and  solely  due  to  its  commander,  and  that  had  he 
obeyed  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief  Meade's  army  would 
have  been  beaten  before  its  entire  force  had  assembled,  and  its  final 
discomfiture  thereby  made  certain.  It  is  a  little  strange  that  these 
charges  were  not  made  while  General  Lee  was  alive  to  substantiate  or 
disprove  them,  and  that  seven  years  or  more  were  permitted  to  pass  by 
in  silence  regarding  them.  You  are  fortunate  in  being  able  to  call  upon 
the  adjutant-general  and  the  two  confidential  officers  of  General  Lee's 
staff  for  their  testimony  in  the  case,  and  I  do  not  think  that  you  will 
have  any  reason  to  fear  their  evidence.  They  knew  every  order  that 
was  issued  for  that  battle,  when  and  where  attacks  were  to  be  made, 
who  were  slow  in  attacking,  and  who  did  not  make  attacks  that  were 
expected  to  be  made.  I  hope,  for  the  sake  of  history  and  for  your  brave 
military  record,  that  a  quietus  will  at  once  be  put  on  this  subject.  I 
distinctly  remember  the  appearance  in  our  head-quarters  camp  of  the 
scout  who  brought  from  Frederick  the  first  account  that  General  Lee 
had  of  the  definite  whereabouts  of  the  enemy ;  of  the  excitement  at 
General  Lee's  head-quarters  among  couriers,  quartermasters,  commis 
saries,  etc.,  all  betokening  some  early  movement  of  the  commands  de 
pendent  upon  the  news  brought  by  the  scout.  That  afternoon  General 
Lee  was  walking  with  some  of  us  in  the  road  in  front  of  his  head-quar 
ters,  and  said,  l  To-morrow,  gentlemen,  we  will  not  move  to  Harrisburg 
as  we  expected,  but  will  go  over  to  Gettysburg  and  see  what  General 
Meade  is  after.'  Orders  had  then  been  issued  to  the  corps  to  move  at 
sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  and  promptly  at  that  time  the 
corps  was  put  on  the  road.  The  troops  moved  slowly  a  short  distance 
when  they  were  stopped  by  Ewell's  wagon-trains  and  Johnson's  division 
turning  into  the  road  in  front  of  them,  making  their  way  from  some 
point  north  to  Cashtown  or  Gettysburg.  How  many  hours  we  were  de 
tained  I  am  unable  to  say,  but  it  must  have  been  many,  for  I  remember 
eating  a  lunch  or  dinner  before  moving  again.  Being  anxious  to  see 
you,  I  rode  rapidly  by  the  troops  (who,  as  soon  as  they  could  get  into 
the  road,  pushed  hurriedly  by  us  also),  and  overtook  you  about  dark  at 
the  hill  this  side  of  Gettysburg,  about  half  a  mile  from  the  town.  You 
had  been  at  the  front  with  General  Lee,  and  were  returning  to  your 
camp,  a  mile  or  two  back.  I  spoke  very  exultingly  of  the  victory  we 
were  thought  to  have  obtained  that  day,  but  was  surprised  to  find  that 
you  did  not  take  the  same  cheerful  view  of  it  that  I  did,  and  presently 
you  remarked  that  it  would  have  been  better  had  we  not  fought  than  to 


384  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

That  he  was  excited  and  off  his  balance  was  evident  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  and  he  labored  under  that  op 
pression  until  enough  blood  was  shed  to  appease  him. 

have  left  undone  what  we  did.  You  said  that  the  enemy  were  left  oc 
cupying  a  position  that  it  would  take  the  whole  army  to  drive  them 
from  and  then  at  a  great  sacrifice.  We  soon  reached  the  camp,  three 
miles,  perhaps,  from  Gettysburg,  and  found  the  column  near  by.  Orders 
were  issued  to  be  ready  to  march  at  'daybreak,'  or  some  earlier  hour, 
next  morning.  About  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  while  the  stars 
were  shining,  you  left  your  head-quarters  and  rode  to  General  Lee's, 
where  I  found  you  sitting  with  him  after  sunrise  looking  at  the  enemy 

on  Cemetery  Hill.  .  .  ." 

"  I  am  yours,  very  truly, 

11  J.  S.  D.  CULLEN." 


CHAPTER   XXVIII. 

GETTYSBUKG — THIRD    DAY. 

The  Stroke  of  Arms  that  shook  the  Continent— Longstreet  opposed  the 
Attack  as  planned  and  made— The  Confederate  Column  of  Assault- 
It  was  weak  in  Numbers  but  strong  in  Spirit— Tremendous  Artillery 
Combat  begins  the  Day's  Fighting— Charge  of  Generals  Pickett,  Trim 
ble,  and  Pettigrew— Armistead  falls  by  the  Side  of  the  Federal  Guns— 
The  Federal  Cavalry  Charge  of  General  Farnsworth— The  Com 
mander  falls  with  Five  Mortal  Wounds— Could  the  Assaulting  Column 
have  been  safely  augmented  from  Longstreet's  Right?— Testimony 
as  to  that  Point— Where  rested  the  Responsibility  for  Disaster?— Criti 
cism  of  the  Battle  as  a  whole— Cemetery  Hill  stronger  than  Marye's 
Hill  at  Fredericksburg— Controverted  Points— Casualties  of  the  Three 
Days'  Fight— Organization  of  the  Forces  engaged. 

GENERAL  LEE  has  reported  of  arrangements  for  the 
day,— 

"  The  general  plan  was  unchanged.  Longstreet,  reinforced  by 
Pickett' s  three  brigades,  which  arrived  near  the  battle-field  during 
the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  was  ordered  to  attack  the  next  morning, 
and  General  Ewell  was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy's  right  at 
the  same  time.  The  latter  during  the  night  reinforced  General 
Johnson  with  two  brigades  from  Rodes's  and  one  from  Early 's 
division."  * 

This  is  disingenuous.  He  did  not  give  or  send  me 
orders  for  the  morning  of  the  third  day,  nor  did  he  rein 
force  me  by  Pickett's  brigades  for  morning  attack.  As  his 
head-quarters  were  about  four  miles  from  the  command,  I 
did  not  ride  over,  but  sent,  to  report  the  work  of  the 
second  day.  In  the  absence  of  orders,  I  had  scouting 
parties  out  during  the  night  in  search  of  a  way  by  which 
we  might  strike  the  enemy's  left,  and  push  it  down  towards 
his  centre.  I  found  a  way  that  gave  some  promise  of  re 
sults,  and  was  about  to  move  the  command,  when  he  rode 

*  Rebellion  Record. 

25  385 


386  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

over  after  sunrise  and  gave  his  orders.  His  plan  was  to 
assault  the  enemy's  left  centre  by  a  column  to  be  com 
posed  of  McLaws's  and  Hood's  divisions  reinforced  by 
Pickett's  brigades.*  I  thought  that  it  would  not  do ;  that 
the  point  had  been  fully  tested  the  day  before,  by  more 
men,  when  all  were  fresh ;  that  the  enemy  was  there  look 
ing  for  us,  as  we  heard  him  during  the  night  putting  up 
his  defences ;  that  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood 
were  holding  a  mile  along  the  right  of  my  line  against 
twenty  thousand  men,  who  would  follow  their  withdrawal, 
strike  the  flank  of  the  assaulting  column,  crush  it,  and  get 
on  our  rear  towards  the  Potomac  River  ;  that  thirty  thou 
sand  men  was  the  minimum  of  force  necessary  for  the 
work ;  that  even  such  force  would  need  close  co-operation 
on  other  parts  of  the  line ;  that  the  column  as  he  pro 
posed  to  organize  it  would  have  only  about  thirteen  thou 
sand  men  (the  divisions  having  lost  a  third  of  their  num 
bers  the  day  before)  ;  that  the  column  would  have  to 
march  a  mile  under  concentrating  battery  fire,  and  a  thou 
sand  yards  under  long-range  musketry ;  that  the  condi 
tions  were  different  from  those  in  the  days  of  Napoleon, 
when  field  batteries  had  a  range  of  six  hundred  yards 
and  musketry  about  sixty  yards. 

He  said  the  distance  was  not  more  than  fourteen  hundred 
yards.  General  Meade's  estimate  was  a  mile  or  a  mile 
and  a  half  (Captain  Long,  the  guide  of  the  field  of  Get 
tysburg  in  1888,  stated  that  it  was  a  trifle  over  a  mile). 
He  then  concluded  that  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and 
Hood  could  remain  on  the  defensive  line ;  that  he  would 
reinforce  by  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  and  Pickett's 
brigades,  and  stated  the  point  to  which  the  march  should 
be  directed.  I  asked  the  strength  of  the  column.  He 
stated  fifteen  thousand.  Opinion  was  then  expressed  that 
the  fifteen  thousand  men  who  could  make  successful  as- 


*  "  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,"  W.  H.  Taylor,  page  103. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  387 

sault  over  that  field  had  never  been  arrayed  for  battle ; 
but  he  was  impatient  of  listening,  and  tired  of  talking, 
and  nothing  was  left  but  to  proceed.  General  Alexander 
was  ordered  to  arrange  the  batteries  of  the  front  of  the 
First  and  Third  Corps,  those  of  the  Second  were  supposed 
to  be  in  position  ;  Colonel  Walton  was  ordered  to  see  that 
the  batteries  of  the  First  were  supplied  with  ammunition, 
and  to  prepare  to  give  the  signal-guns  for  the  opening 
combat.  The  infantry  of  the  Third  Corps  to  be  assigned 
were  Heth's  and  Pettigrew's  divisions  and  Wilcox's  bri 
gade. 

At  the  time  of  the  conversation  and  arrangement  of  the 
assault  by  the  Confederate  right,  artillery  fire  was  heard 
on  our  extreme  left.  It  seems  that  General  Lee  had  sent 
orders  to  General  Ewell  to  renew  his  battle  in  the  morn 
ing,  which  was  intended,  and  directed,  as  a  co-operation  of 
the  attack  he  intended  to  order  on  his  right,  but  General 
Ruger,  anticipating,  opened  his  batteries  against  Ewell 
at  daylight.  The  Union  divisions — Ruger's  and  Gary's — 
were  on  broken  lines,  open  towards  the  trenches  held  by 
the  Confederates,  so  that  assault  by  our  line  would  expose 
the  force  to  fire  from  the  enemy's  other  line.  Ruger  had 
occupied  the  trenches  left  vacant  on  his  right,  and  Gary 
reached  to  his  left  under  Greene,  who  held  his  line  against 
the  attack  of  the  day  before.  It  seems  that  the  Con 
federates  failed  to  bring  artillery  up  to  their  trenches,  and 
must  make  their  fight  with  infantry,  while  on  the  Union 
side  there  were  some  fifteen  or  twenty  guns  playing,  and 
many  more  at  hand  if  needed. 

As  the  Union  batteries  opened,  Johnson  advanced  and 
assaulted  the  enemy's  works  on  his  right  towards  the  centre 
and  the  adjacent  front  of  the  new  line,  and  held  to  that  at 
tack  with  resolution,  putting  in  fresh  troops  to  help  it  from 
time  to  time.  Ruger  put  two  regiments  forward  to  feel  the 
way  towards  Johnson's  left.  They  got  into  hot  engage 
ment  and  were  repulsed ;  Johnson  tried  to  follow,  but  was 


388  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

in  turn  forced  back.  He  renewed  his  main  attack  again, 
but  unsuccessfully,  and  finally  drew  back  to  the  trenches. 
Ruger  threw  a  regiment  forward  from  his  left  which  gained 
the  stone  wall ;  his  division  was  then  advanced,  and  it 
recovered  the  entire  line  of  trenches. 

While  this  contention  was  in  progress  the  troops  ordered 
for  the  column  of  assault  were  marching  and  finding  posi 
tions  under  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  where  they  could  be 
covered  during  the  artillery  combat.  Alexander  put  a 
battery  of  nine  guns  under  the  ridge  and  out  of  the 
enemy's  fire  to  be  used  with  the  assaulting  column. 

General  Lee  said  that  the  attack  of  his  right  was  not 
made  as  early  as  expected, — which  he  should  not  have  said. 
He  knew  that  I  did  not  believe  that  success  was  possible ; 
that  care  and  time  should  be  taken  to  give  the  troops  the 
benefit  of  positions  and  the  grounds ;  and  he  should  have 
put  an  officer  in  charge  who  had  more  confidence  in  his 
plan.  Two-thirds  of  the  troops  were  of  other  commands, 
and  there  was  no  reason  for  putting  the  assaulting  forces 
under  my  charge.  He  had  confidence  in  General  Early, 
who  advised  in  favor  of  that  end  of  the  line  for  battle. 
Knowing  my  want  of  confidence,  he  should  have  given  the 
benefit  of  his  presence  and  his  assistance  in  getting  the 
troops  up,  posting  them,  and  arranging  the  batteries ;  but 
he  gave  no  orders  or  suggestions  after  his  early  designa 
tion  of  the  point  for  which  the  column  should  march. 
Fitzhugh  Lee  claims  evidence  that  General  Lee  did  not 
even  appear  on  that  part  of  the  field  while  the  troops  were 
being  assigned  to  position. 

As  the  commands  reported,  Pickett  was  assigned  on  the 
right,  Kemper's  and  Garnett's  brigades  to  be  supported 
by  Armistead's ;  Wilcox's  brigade  of  the  Third  Corps  in 
echelon  and  guarding  Pickett's  right;  Pettigrew's  di 
vision  on  Pickett's  left,  supported  by  the  brigades  of 
Scales  and  Lane,  under  command  of  General  Trimble. 
The  brigades  of  Pettigrew's  division  were  Archer's,  Pet- 


Brigadier-General  and  Chief  of  Artillery,  First  Corps. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  389 

tigrew's,  Brockenbrough's,  and  Davis's.  (General  Archer 
having  been  taken  prisoner  on  the  1st,  his  brigade  was 
under  command  of  Colonel  Fry ;  General  Scales  being 
wounded  on  the  same  day,  his  brigade  was  commanded 
by  Colonel  Lowrance.)  The  ridge  upon  which  the  com 
mands  were  formed  was  not  parallel  to  that  upon  which 
the  enemy  stood,  but  bending  west  towards  our  left,  while 
the  enemy's  line  bore  northwest  towards  his  right,  so  that 
the  left  of  the  assaulting  column  formed  some  little  dis 
tance  farther  from  the  enemy's  line  than  the  right.  To 
put  the  troops,  under  the  best  cover  during  the  artillery 
combat  they  were  thus  posted  for  the  march,  but  directed 
to  spread  their  steps  as  soon  as  the  march  opened  the 
field,  and  to  gain  places  of  correct  alignment. 

Meanwhile,  the  enemy's  artillery  on  his  extreme  right 
was  in  practice  more  or  less  active,  but  its  meaning  was 
not  known  or  reported,  and  the  sharp-shooters  of  the 
command  on  the  right  had  a  lively  fusillade  about  eleven 
o'clock,  in  which  some  of  the  artillery  took  part.  The 
order  was  that  the  right  was  to  make  the  signal  of  battle. 
General  Lee  reported  that  his  left  attacked  before  due 
notice  to  wait  for  the  opening  could  be  given,  which  was 
a  mistake,  inasmuch  as  the  attack  on  his  left  was  begun 
by  the  Federals,  which  called  his  left  to  their  work. 
General  Meade  was  not  apprehensive  of  that  part  of  the 
field,  and  only  used  the  two  divisions  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  Shaler's  brigade  of  the  Sixth,  and  six  regiments  of 
the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  in  recovering  the  trenches 
of  his  right,  holding  the  other  six  corps  for  the  battle  of 
his  centre  and  left.  He  knew  by  the  Confederate  troops 
on  his  right  just  where  the  strong  battle  was  to  be. 

The  director  of  artillery  was  asked  to  select  a  position 
on  his  line  from  which  he  could  note  the  effect  of  his 
practice,  and  to  advise  General  Pickett  when  the  enemy's 
fire  was  so  disturbed  as  to  call  for  the  assault.  General 
Pickett's  was  the  division  of  direction,  and  he  was  ordered 


390  FROM    MAKASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

to  have  a  staff-officer  or  courier  with  the  artillery  director 
to  bear  notice  of  the  moment  to  advance. 

The  little  affair  between  the  skirmish  lines  quieted  in  a 
short  time,  and  also  the  noise  on  our  extreme  left.  The 
quiet  filing  of  one  or  two  of  our  batteries  into  position 
emphasized  the  profound  silence  that  prevailed  during 
our  wait  for  final  orders.  Strong  battle  was  in  the  air, 
and  the  veterans  of  both  sides  swelled  their  breasts  to 
gather  nerve  and  strength  to  meet  it.  Division  com 
manders  were  asked  to  go  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  and 
take  a  careful  view  of  the  field,  and  to  have  their  officers 
there  to  tell  their  men  of  it,  and  to  prepare  them  for  the 
sight  that  was  to  burst  upon  them  as  they  mounted  the 
crest. 

Just  then  a  squadron  of  Union  cavalry  rode  through 
detachments  of  infantry  posted  at  intervals  in  rear  of  my 
right  division.  It  was  called  a  charge,  but  was  probably 
a  reconnoissance. 

Colonel  Black  had  reported  with  a  hundred  of  the  First 
South  Carolina  Cavalry,  not  all  mounted,  and  a  battery 
of  horse  artillery,  and  was  put  across  the  Emmitsburg 
road,  supported  by  infantry,  in  front  of  Merritt's  brigade 
of  cavalry. 

When  satisfied  that  the  work  of  preparation  was  all 
that  it  could  be  with  the  means  at  hand,  I  wrote  Colonel 
Walton,  of  the  Washington  Artillery, — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  July  3,  1863. 

"  COLONEL, — Let  the  batteries  open.  Order  great  care  and 
precision  in  firing.  When  the  batteries  at  the  Peach  Orchard 
cannot  be  used  against  the  point  we  intend  to  attack,  let  them 
open  on  the  enemy's  on  the  rocky  hill. 

"Most  respectfully, 

"  JAMES  LONGSTREET, 
* '  Lieutenant-  General,  Commanding. ' > 

At  the  same  time  a  note  to  Alexander  directed  that 
Pickett  should  not  be  called  until  the  artillery  practice 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  391 

indicated  fair  opportunity.  Then  I  rode  to  a  woodland 
hard  by,  to  lie  down  and  study  for  some  new  thought 
that  might  aid  the  assaulting  column.  In  a  few  minutes 
report  came  from  Alexander  that  he  would  only  be  able  to 
judge  of  the  effect  of  his  fire  by  the  return  of  that  of  the 
enemy,  as  his  infantry  was  not  exposed  to  view,  and  the 
smoke  of  the  batteries  would  soon  cover  the  field.  He 
asked,  if  there  was  an  alternative,  that  it  be  carefully 
considered  before  the  batteries  opened,  as  there  was  not 
enough  artillery  ammunition  for  this  and  another  trial  if 
this  should  not  prove  favorable. 

He  was  informed  that  there  was  no  alternative ;  that  I 
could  find  no  way  out  of  it ;  that  General  Lee  had  con 
sidered  and  would  listen  to  nothing  else ;  that  orders  had 
gone  for  the  guns  to  give  signal  for  the  batteries ;  that  he 
should  call  the  troops  at  the  first  opportunity  or  lull  in 
the  enemy's  fire. 

The  signal-guns  broke  the  silence,  the  blaze  of  the  second 
gun  mingling  in  the  smoke  of  the  first,  and  salvoes  rolled 
to  the  left  and  repeated  themselves,  the  enemy's  fine  metal 
spreading  its  fire  to  the  converging  lines,  ploughing  the 
trembling  ground,  plunging  through  the  line  of  batteries, 
and  clouding  the  heavy  air.  The  two  or  three  hundred 
guns  seemed  proud  of  their  undivided  honors  and  organ 
ized  confusion.  The  Confederates  had  the  benefit  of 
converging  fire  into  the  enemy's  massed  position,  but  the 
superior  metal  of  the  enemy  neutralized  the  advantage  of 
position.  The  brave  and  steady  work  progressed. 

Before  this  the  Confederates  of  the  left  were  driven 
from  their  captured  trenches,  and  hope  of  their  effective 
co-operation  with  the  battle  of  the  right  was  lost,  but  no 
notice  of  it  was  sent  to  the  right  of  the  battle.  They  made 
some  further  demonstrations,  but  they  were  of  little  effect. 
Merritt's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  in  rear  of  my  right, 
threatening  on  the  Emmitsburg  road.  Farnsworth's  bri 
gade  took  position  between  Merritt's  and  close  on  my  right 


392  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

rear.  Infantry  regiments  and  batteries  were  broken  off 
from  my  front  line  and  posted  to  guard  on  that  flank  and 
rear. 

Not  informed  of  the  failure  of  the  Confederates  on  the 
left  and  the  loss  of  their  vantage-ground,  we  looked  with 
confidence  for  them  to  follow  the  orders  of  battle. 

General  Pickett  rode  to  confer  with  Alexander,  then  to 
the  ground  upon  which  I  was  resting,  where  he  was  soon 
handed  a  slip  of  paper.  After  reading  it  he  handed  it  to 
me.  It  read : 

"  If  you  are  coming  at  all,  come  at  once,  or  I  cannot  give  you 
proper  support,  but  the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened  at  all.  At 
least  eighteen  guns  are  still  firing  from  the  cemetery  itself. 

"  ALEXANDER." 

Pickett  said,  "  General,  shall  I  advance  ?" 
The  effort  to  speak  the  order  failed,  and  I  could  only 
indicate  it  by  an  affirmative  bow.  He  accepted  the  duty 
with  seeming  confidence  of  success,  leaped  on  his  horse, 
and  rode  gayly  to  his  command.  I  mounted  and  spurred 
for  Alexander's  post.  He  reported  that  the  batteries  he 
had  reserved  for  the  charge  with  the  infantry  had  been 
spirited  away  by  General  Lee's  chief  of  artillery  ;  that  the 
ammunition  of  the  batteries  of  position  was  so  reduced 
that  he  could  not  use  them  in  proper  support  of  the  in 
fantry.  He  was  ordered  to  stop  the  march  at  once  and 
fill  up  his  ammunition-chests.  But,  alas !  there  was  no 
more  ammunition  to  be  had. 

The  order  was  imperative.  The  Confederate  commander 
had  fixed  his  heart  upon  the  work.  Just  then  a  num 
ber  of  the  enemy's  batteries  hitched  up  and  hauled  off, 
which  gave  a  glimpse  of  unexpected  hope.  Encour 
aging  messages  were  sent  for  the  columns  to  hurry  on, 
— and  they  were  then  on  elastic  springing  step.  The 
officers  saluted  as  they  passed,  their  stern  smiles  express 
ing  confidence.  General  Pickett,  a  graceful  horseman,  sat 


GETTYSBUKG THIRD    DAY.  393 

lightly  in  the  saddle,  his  brown  locks  flowing  quite  over 
his  shoulders.  Pettigrew's  division  spread  their  steps  and 
quickly  rectified  the  alignment,  and  the  grand  march 
moved  bravely  on.  As  soon  as  the  leading  columns 
opened  the  way,  the  supports  sprang  to  their  alignments. 
General  Trimble  mounted,  adjusting  his  seat  and  reins 
with  an  air  and  grace  as  if  setting  out  on  a  pleasant  after 
noon  ride.  When  aligned  to  their  places  solid  march  was 
made  down  the  slope  and  past  our  batteries  of  position. 

Confederate  batteries  put  their  fire  over  the  heads  of  the 
men  as  they  moved  down  the  slope,  and  continued  to  draw 
the  fire  of  the  enemy  until  the  smoke  lifted  and  drifted  to 
the  rear,  when  every  gun  was  turned  upon  the  infantry 
columns.  The  batteries  that  had  been  drawn  off  were  re 
placed  by  others  that  were  fresh.  Soldiers  and  officers 
began  to  fall,  some  to  rise  no  more,  others  to  find  their 
way  to  the  hospital  tents.  Single  files  were  cut  here  and 
there,  then  the  gaps  increased,  and  an  occasional  shot  tore 
wider  openings,  but,  closing  the  gaps  as  quickly  as  made, 
the  march  moved  on.  The  divisions  of  McLaws  and 
Hood  were  ordered  to  move  to  closer  lines  for  the  enemy 
on  their  front,  to  spring  to  the  charge  as  soon  as  the  breach 
at  the  centre  could  be  made.  The  enemy's  right  over 
reached  my  left  and  gave  serious  trouble.  Brockenbrough's 
brigade  went  down  and  Davis's  in  impetuous  charge.  The 
general  order  required  further  assistance  from  the  Third 
Corps  if  needed,  but  no  support  appeared.  General  Lee 
and  the  corps  commander  were  there,  but  failed  to  order 
help. 

Colonel  Latrobe  was  sent  to  General  Trimble  to  have 
his  men  fill  the  line  of  the  broken  brigades,  and  bravely 
they  repaired  the  damage.  The  enemy  moved  out  against 
the  supporting  brigade  in  Pickett's  rear.  Colonel  Sorrel 
was  sent  to  have  that  move  guarded,  and  Pickett  was 
drawn  back  to  that  contention.  McLaws  was  ordered  to 
press  his  left  forward,  but  the  direct  fire  of  infantry  and 


394  FROM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

cross-fire  of  artillery  was  telling  fearfully  on  the  front. 
Colonel  Fremantle  ran  up  to  offer  congratulations  on  the 
apparent  success,  but  the  big  gaps  in  the  ranks  grew  until 
the  lines  were  reduced  to  half  their  length.  I  called 
his  attention  to  the  broken,  struggling  ranks.  Trimble 
mended  the  battle  of  the  left  in  handsome  style,  but  on 
the  right  the  massing  of  the  enemy  grew  stronger  and 
stronger.  Brigadier  Garnett  was  killed,  Kemper  and 
Trimble  were  desperately  wounded ;  Generals  Hancock 
and  Gibbon  were  wounded.  General  Lane  succeeded 
Trimble,  and  with  Pettigrew  held  the  battle  of  the  left 
in  steady  ranks. 

Pickett's  lines  being  nearer,  the  impact  was  heaviest 
upon  them.  Most  of  the  field  officers  were  killed  or 
wounded.  Colonel  Whittle,  of  Armistead's  brigade,  who 
had  been  shot  through  the  right  leg  at  Williamsburg 
and  lost  his  left  arm  at  Malvern  Hill,  was  shot  through 
the  right  arm,  then  brought  down  by  a  shot  through  his 
left  leg. 

General  Armistead,  of  the  second  line,  spread  his  steps 
to  supply  the  places  of  fallen  comrades.  His  colors  cut 
down,  with  a  volley  against  the  bristling  line  of  bayonets, 
he  put  his  cap  on  his  sword  to  guide  the  storm.  The 
enemy's  massing,  enveloping  numbers  held  the  struggle 
until  the  noble  Armistead  fell  beside  the  wheels  of  the 
enemy's  battery.  Pettigrew  was  wounded,  but  held  his 
command. 

General  Pickett,  finding  the  battle  broken,  while  the 
enemy  was  still  reinforcing,  called  the  troops  off.  There 
was  no  indication  of  panic.  The  broken  files  marched 
back  in  steady  step.  The  effort  was  nobly  made,  and 
failed  from  blows  that  could  not  be  fended.  Some  of  the 
files  were  cut  off  from  retreat  by  fire  that  swept  the  field 
in  their  rear.  Officers  of  my  staff,  sent  forward  with 
orders,  came  back  with  their  saddles  and  bridles  in  their 
arms.  Latrobe's  horse  was  twice  shot. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  395 

Looking  confidently  for  advance  of  the  enemy  through 
our  open  field,  I  rode  to  the  line  of  batteries,  resolved  to 
hold  it  until  the  last  gun  was  lost.  As  I  rode,  the  shells 
screaming  over  my  head  and  ploughing  the  ground  under 
my  horse,  an  involuntary  appeal  went  up  that  one  of  them 
might  take  me  from  scenes  of  such  awful  responsibility ; 
but  the  storm  to  be  met  left  no  time  to  think  of  one's  self. 
The  battery  officers  were  prepared  to  meet  the  crisis,— 
no  move  had  been  made  for  leaving  the  field.  My  old 
acquaintance  of  Sharpsburg  experience,  Captain  Miller, 
was  walking  up  and  down  behind  his  guns,  smoking  his 
pipe,  directing  his  fire  over  the  heads  of  our  men  as  fast 
as  they  were  inside  of  the  danger-line ;  the  other  officers 
equally  firm  and  ready  to  defend  to  the  last.  A  body  of 
skirmishers  put  out  from  the  enemy's  lines  and  advanced 
some  distance,  but  the  batteries  opened  severe  fire  and 
drove  it  back.  Our  men  passed  the  batteries  in  quiet 
walk,  and  would  rally,  I  knew,  when  they  reached  the 
ridge  from  which  they  started. 

General  Lee  was  soon  with  us,  and  with  staff-officers 
and  others  assisted  in  encouraging  the  men  and  getting 
them  together. 

As  the  attack  failed,  General  Kilpatrick  put  his  cavalry 
brigade  under  General  Farnsworth  on  the  charge  through 
the  infantry  detachment  in  rear  of  my  right  division. 
The  regiments  of  G.  T.  Anderson's  brigade  had  been 
posted  at  points  in  rear  as  guards  against  cavalry,  and  the 
First  Texas,  Fourth  and  Fifteenth  Alabama,  and  Bach- 
man's  and  Reilly's  batteries  were  looking  for  that  adven 
ture.  Farnsworth  had  a  rough  ride  over  rocks  and  stone 
fences,  but  bore  on  in  spite  of  all,  cutting  and  slashing 
when  he  could  get  at  the  skirmishers  or  detachments.  He 
made  a  gallant  ride  along  the  rear  of  our  right,  but 
was  obliged  to  come  under  the  infantry  and  artillery  fire 
at  several  points.  He  fell,  pierced,  it  is  said,  by  five 
mortal  wounds.  Calls  for  him  to  surrender  were  made, 


396  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

but  the  cavalry  were  not  riding  for  that.  The  command 
lost  heavily,  but  claimed  captives  equal  to  their  loss. 

Kilpatrick's  mistake  was  in  not  putting  Farnsworth  in 
on  Merritt's  left,  where  he  would  have  had  an  open  ride, 
and  made  more  trouble  than  was  ever  made  by  a  cavalry 
brigade.  Had  the  ride  been  followed  by  prompt  advance 
of  the  enemy's  infantry  in  line  beyond  our  right  and 
pushed  with  vigor,  they  could  have  reached  our  line  of 
retreat.  General  Meade  ordered  his  left,  but  delay  in 
getting  the  orders  and  preparing  to  get  through  the  rough 
grounds  consumed  time,  and  the  move  was  abandoned. 
The  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  were  in  convenient  position, 
and  would  have  had  good  ground  for  marching  after  get 
ting  out  of  the  rocky  fastnesses  of  Round  Top. 

As  we  had  no  cavalry  on  our  right,  the  Union  cavalry 
was  held  on  their  right  to  observe  the  Confederates  under 
Stuart,  except  Kilpatrick's  division  (and  Custer's  brigade 
of  that  division  was  retained  on  their  right).  A  little 
while  after  the  repulse  of  our  infantry  column,  Stuart's 
cavalry  advanced  and  was  met  by  Gregg's,  and  made  one 
of  the  severest  and  most  stubborn  fights  of  cavalry  on 
record.  General  Wade  Hampton  was  severely  wounded. 
The  Union  forces  held  the  field. 

When  affairs  had  quieted  a  little,  and  apprehension  of 
immediate  counter-attack  had  passed,  orders  were  sent  the 
divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood  to  draw  back  and  occupy 
the  lines  from  which  they  had  advanced  to  engage  the 
battle  of  the  second.  Orders  sent  Benning's  brigade  by 
the  division  staff  were  not  understood,  and  Benning,  under 
the  impression  that  he  was  to  relieve  part  of  McLaws's 
division,  which  he  thought  was  to  be  sent  on  other  service, 
ordered  the  Fifteenth  Georgia  Regiment  to  occupy  that 
position.  When  he  received  the  second  order  he  sent  for 
his  detached  regiment.  Meanwhile,  the  enemy  was  feeling 
the  way  to  his  front,  and  before  Colonel  DuBose  received 
his  second  order,  the  enemy  was  on  his  front  and  had 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  397 

passed  his  right  and  left  flanks.  The  moment  he  received 
the  final  order,  Colonel  DuBose  made  a  running  fight  and 
escaped  with  something  more  than  half  his  men. 

In  regard  to  this,  as  to  other  battles  in  which  the  First 
Corps  was  concerned,  the  knights  of  peaceful  later  days 
have  been  busy  in  search  of  points  on  which  to  lay  charges 
or  make  innuendoes  of  want  of  conduct  of  that  corps. 
General  Early  has  been  a  picturesque  figure  in  the  combi 
nation,  ready  to  champion  any  reports  that  could  throw  a 
shadow  over  its  record,  but  the  charge  most  pleasing  to 
him  was  that  of  treason  on  the  part  of  its  commander. 
The  subject  was  lasting,  piquant,  and  so  consoling  that 
one  is  almost  inclined  to  envy  the  comfort  it  gave  him  in 
his  latter  days. 

Colonel  Taylor  and  members  of  the  staff  claim  that 
General  Lee  ordered  that  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and 
Hood  should  be  a  part  of  the  assaulting  column.  Of  this 
General  Lee  says,— 

u  General  Longstreet  was  delayed  by  a  force  occupying  the 
high,  rocky  hill  on  the  enemy's  extreme  left,  from  which  his 
troops  conld  be  attacked  from  reverse  as  they  advanced.  His 
operations  had  been  embarrassed  the  day  previously  from  the 
same  cause,  and  he  now  deemed  it  necessary  to  defend  his  flank 
and  rear  with  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws.  He  was  there 
fore  reinforced  by  Heth's  division  and  two  brigades  of  Fender's, 
to  the  command  of  which  Major-General  Trimble  was  assigned. 
General  Hill  was  directed  to  hold  his  line  with  the  rest  of  the  com 
mand,  to  afford  General  Longstreet  further  assistance  if  required, 
and  to  avail  himself  of  any  success  that  might  be  gained." 

Colonel  Taylor  says, — 

"As  our  extreme  right  was  comparatively  safe,  being  well 
posted,  and  not  at  all  threatened,  one  of  the  divisions  of  Hood 
and  McLaws,  and  a  greater  part  of  the  other,  could  be  moved  out 
of  the  lines  and  be  made  to  take  part  in  the  attack." 

On  this  point  I  offer  the  evidence  of  General  Warren 
before  the  Committee  of  Investigation : 


398  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"  General  Meade  had  so  arranged  his  troops  on  our  left  during 
the  third  day  that  nearly  one-half  of  our  army  was  in  reserve  in 
that  position.  It  was  a  good,  sheltered  position,  and  a  convenient 
one  from  which  to  reinforce  other  points  of  the  line,  and  when  the 
repulse  of  the  enemy  took  place  on  that  day,  General  Meade  in 
tended  to  move  forward  all  the  forces  he  could  get  in  hand  and 
assault  the  enemy  in  line.  He  ordered  the  advance  of  the  Fifth 
Corps,  but  it  was  carried  so  slowly  that  it  did  not  amount  to  much, 
if  anything." 

General  Hancock's  evidence  on  that  point  is : 

"  General  Meade  told  me  before  the  fight  that  if  the  enemy  at 
tacked  me,  he  intended  to  put  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  on  the 
enemy's  flank.77 

From  which  it  is  evident  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  di 
visions  of  my  right,  to  be  put  in  the  column  of  assault, 
would  have  been  followed  by  those  corps  swinging  around 
and  enveloping  the  assaulting  columns  and  gaining  Lee's 
line  of  retreat. 

Colonel  Venable  thinks  it  a  mistake  to  have  put  Heth's 
division  in  the  assaulting  column.  He  says, — 

' '  They  were  terribly  mistaken  about  Heth'  s  division  in  this 
planning.  It  had  not  recuperated,  having  suffered  more  than  was 
reported  on  the  first  day.77 

But  to  accept  for  the  moment  Colonel  Taylor's  prem 
ises,  the  two  divisions  referred  to  would  have  swelled  the 
columns  of  assault  to  twenty-three  thousand  men.  We 
were  alone  in  the  battle  as  on  the  day  before.  The  enemy 
had  seventy-five  thousand  men  on  strong  ground,  with 
well-constructed  defences.  The  Confederates  would  have 
had  to  march  a  mile  through  the  blaze  of  direct  and 
cross  fire  and  break  up  an  army  of  seventy-five  thousand 
well-seasoned  troops,  well  defended  by  field-works ! 

A  rough  sketch  of  the  positions  of  the  forces  about  my 
right  and  rear  will  help  to  show  if  it  "  was  comparatively 
safe,  and  not  at  all  threatened." 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY. 


399 


I  !!*M"<f  f*  J^>^ 

MCCANOLESS'  ___ -.     -^       »..   ^.          ^"  ~      i  ^/'iS       5 

—  —"",.  BRIGADE  <H  H"*  £5ll"    jSr'^Sr  |!°      C 

SEMMES  WOFFORO'S  \  S       X  S       f     ,     £-  i  ^     K^x  ".O^  •  JE     « 

—  —  —  —  _—      \     «    5       fe»^5'-\'-"^''o*'»'  £g 

-^T.j.ws^-^  \  '••-'  •*l</\>-'     '      „.         po 


GETTYSBURG,  PA. 

July  3rd,  1863 
federals  i 1  Confederates 


General  Gibbon's  testimony  in  regard  to  the  assaulting 
columns  of  the  3d  : 

"I  was  wounded  about  the  time  I  suppose  the  enemy's  second 
line  got  into  our  batteries, — probably  a  little  before  that.  As 
described  to  me  afterwards,  the  result,  I  think,  will  carry  out  my 
idea  in  regard  to  it,  because  the  enemy  broke  through,  forced 
back  my  weakest  brigade  under  General  Webb,  got  into  our  bat 
teries,  and  the  men  were  so  close  that  the  officers  on  each  side  were 
using  their  pistols  on  each  other,  and  the  men  frequently  clubbed 
their  muskets,  and  the  clothes  of  men  on  both  sides  were  burned 
by  the  powder  of  exploding  cartridges.  An  officer  of  my  staff, 
Lieutenant  Haskell,  had  been  sent  by  me,  just  previously  to  the 
attack,  to  General  Meade  with  a  message  that  the  enemy  were 
coming.  He  got  back  on  the  top  of  the  hill  hunting  for  me,  and 
was  there  when  this  brigade  was  forced  back,  and,  without  wait 
ing  orders  from  me,  he  rode  off  to  the  left  and  ordered  all  the 
troops  of  the  division  there  to  the  right.  As  they  came  up  helter- 
skelter,  everybody  for  himself,  with  their  officers  among  them, 
they  commenced  firing  upon  these  rebels  as  they  were  coming 
into  our  lines." 

Had  the  column  been  augmented  by  the  divisions  of 
my  right,  it  is  probable  that  its  brave  men  would  have 
penetrated  far  enough  to  reach  Johnson's  Island  as  pris 
oners  ;  hardly  possible  that  it  could  have  returned  to 
General  Lee  by  any  other  route. 

When  engaged  collecting  the  broken  files  after  the  re 
pulse,  General  Lee  said  to  an  officer  who  was  assisting, 
"  It  is  all  my  fault." 


400  FKOM    MAN  ASS  AS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

A  letter  from  Colonel  W.  M.  Owen  assures  me  that 
General  Lee  repeated  this  remark  at  a  roadside  fire  of 
the  Washington  Artillery  on  the  5th  of  July.  A  letter 
from  General  Lee  during  the  winter  of  1863-64  repeated 
it  in  substance. 

And  here  is  what  Colonel  T.  J.  Goree,  of  Texas,  has  to 
say  upon  the  subject : 

"I  was  present,  however,  just  after  Pickett's  repulse,  when 
General  Lee  so  magnanimously  took  all  the  blame  of  the  disaster 
upon  himself.  Another  important  circumstance,  which  I  dis 
tinctly  remember,  was  in  the  winter  of  1863-64,  when  you  sent 
me  from  East  Tennessee  to  Orange  Court-House  with  some  de 
spatches  to  General  Lee.  Upon  my  arrival  there,  General  Lee 
asked  me  into  his  tent,  where  he  was  alone,  with  two  or  three 
Northern  papers  on  the  table.  He  remarked  that  he  had  just 
been  reading  the  Northern  reports  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  ; 
that  he  had  become  satisfied  from  reading  those  reports  that  if  he 
had  permitted  you  to  carry  out  your  plan,  instead  of  making  the  attack 
on  Cemetery  Hill,  he  would  have  been  successful." 

Further  testimony  to  this  effect  comes  from  another 
source  : 

"In  East  Tennessee,  during  the  winter  of  1863-64,  you  called 
me  into  your  quarters,  and  asked  me  to  read  a  letter  just  received 
from  General  Lee  in  which  he  used  the  following  words :  i  Oh, 
general,  had  I  but  followed  your  advice,  instead  of  pursuing  the 
course  that  I  did,  how  different  all  would  have  been  P  You  wished 
me  to  bear  this  language  in  mind  as  your  correspondence  might 

be  lost. 

11  ERASMUS  TAYLOR. 
"  ORANGE  COUNTY,  VA." 

A  contributor  to  Blaclcwood's  Magazine  reported, — 

"But  Lee's  inaction  after  Fredericksburg  was,  as  we  have 
called  it,  an  unhappy  or  negative  blunder.  Undoubtedly  the  great 
est  positive  blunder  of  which  he  was  ever  guilty  was  the  unneces 
sary  onslaught  which  he  gratuitously  made  against  the  strong 
position  into  which,  by  accident,  General  Meade  fell  back  at  Get 
tysburg.  We  have  good  reason  for  saying  that  during  the  five 
years  of  calm  reflection  which  General  Lee  passed  at  Lexington, 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  American  war,  his  maladroit  manipu- 


GETTYSBURG — THIRD    DAY.  401 

lation  of  the  Confederate  army  during  the  Gettysburg  campaign 
was  to  him  a  matter  of  ceaseless  self  reproach. 

"  *  If,'  said  he,  on  many  occasions,  1 1  had  taken  General  Long- 
street's  advice  on  the  eve  of  the  second  day  of  the  battle  of  Get 
tysburg,  and  filed  off  the  left  corps  of  my  army  behind  the  right 
corps,  in  the  direction  of  Washington  and  Baltimore,  along  the 
Erninitsburg  road,  the  Confederates  would  to-day  be  a  free 
people.7  "  * 

It  should  be  stated  that  kindest  relations  were  main 
tained  between  General  Lee  arid  myself  until  interrupted 
by  politics  in  1867. 

It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  these  facts  with  the  reports 
put  out  after  his  death  by  members  of  his  family  and  of 
his  staff,  and  post-bellum  champions,  that  indicate  his  later 
efforts  to  find  points  by  which  to  so  work  up  public  opin 
ion  as  to  shift  the  disaster  to  my  shoulders. 

Some  of  the  statements  of  the  members  of  the  staff 
have  been  referred  to.  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  claims  evi 
dence  that  General  Lee  said  that  he  would  have  gained 
the  battle  if  he  had  had  General  Jackson  with  him.  But 
he  had  Jackson  in  the  Sharpsburg  campaign,  which  was 
more  blundering  than  that  of  Gettysburg.^  In  another 
account  Fitzhugh  Lee  wrote  of  General  Lee, — 

"He  told  the  father  of  the  writer,  his  brother,  that  he  was  con 
trolled  too  far  by  the  great  confidence  he  felt  in  the  fighting 
qualities  of  his  people,  and  by  assurances  of  most  of  his  higher 
officers." 

*  .Eclectic  Magazine,  May,  1872. 

f  At  Sharpsburg,  General  Jackson  left  the  field  at  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning  and  did  not  return  until  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, when  he 
was  ordered  with  his  command  and  the  cavalry  to  turn  and  strike  down 
against  the  Union  right.  He  started  to  execute  the  order,  then  gave  it 
up  without  even  asking  permission.  He  made  a  brave  and  gallant  fight 
in  the  morning,  losing  1601  officers  and  men.  But  D.  H.  Hill  was  there 
from  the  first  to  the  last  gun,  losing  from  his  division  1872  officers  and 
men.  Jackson  had  the  greater  part  of  two  divisions.  But  Hill  was  not  a 
Virginian,  and  it  would  not  do  to  leave  the  field  for  refreshments.  The 
figures  include  Jackson's  losses  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  Sharpsburg ; 
Hill's  at  South  Mountain  and  Sharpsburg. 

26 


402  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

No  assurances  were  made  from  officers  of  the  First 
Corps,  but  rather  objections.  The  only  assurances  that 
have  come  to  light,  to  be  identified,  are  those  of  General 
Early,  who  advised  the  battle,  but  from  the  other  end  of 
the  line  from  his  command,  which  should  have  given 
warning  that  it  did  not  come  from  the  heart  of  a  true 
soldier. 

And  this  is  the  epitome  of  the  Confederate  battle.  The 
army  when  it  set  out  on  the  campaign  was  all  that  could 
be  desired,  (except  that  the  arms  were  not  all  of  the  most 
approved  pattern),  but  it  was  despoiled  of  two  of  its  finest 
brigades,  Jenkins's  and  Corse's  of  Pickett's  division,  and 
was  fought  out  by  detail.  The  greatest  number  engaged 
at  any  one  time  was  on  the  first  day,  when  twenty-six 
thousand  engaged  twenty  thousand  of  the  First  and  part 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  second 
day  about  seventeen  thousand  were  engaged  on  the  right, 
and  at  night  about  seven  thousand  on  the  left ;  then 
later  at  night  about  three  thousand  near  the  centre.  On 
the  third  day  about  twelve  thousand  were  engaged  at  day 
light  and  until  near  noon,  and  in  the  afternoon  fifteen 
thousand, — all  of  the  work  of  the  second  and  third  days 
against  an  army  of  seventy  thousand  and  more  of  veteran 
troops  in  strong  position  defended  by  field-works. 

General  Lee  was  on  the  field  from  about  three  o'clock 
of  the  afternoon  of  the  first  day.  Every  order  given 
the  troops  of  the  First  Corps  on  that  field  up  to  its 
march  on  the  forenoon  of  the  2d  was  issued  in  his  pres 
ence.  If  the  movements  were  not  satisfactory  in  time  and 
speed  of  moving,  it  was  his  power,  duty,  and  privilege 
to  apply  the  remedy,  but  it  was  not  a  part  of  a  com 
mander's  duty  or  privilege  to  witness  things  that  did  not 
suit  him,  fail  to  apply  the  remedy,  and  go  off  and 
grumble  with  his  staff-officers  about  it.  In  their  efforts  to 
show  culpable  delay  in  the  movements  of  the  First  Corps 
on  the  2d,  some  of  the  Virginia  writers  endeavor  to  show 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  403 

that  General  Lee  did  not  even  give  me  a  guide  to  lead  the 
way  to  the  field  from  which  his  battle  was  to  be  opened. 
He  certainly  failed  to  go  and  look  at  it,  and  assist  in  se 
lecting  the  ground  and  preparing  for  action. 

Fitzhugh  Lee  says  of  the  second  day,  "  Longstreet  was 
attacking  the  Marye's  Hill  of  the  position."  *  At  Fred- 
ericksburg,  General  Burnside  attacked  at  Marye's  Hill  in 
six  or  more  successive  assaults  with  some  twenty  or  thirty 
thousand  against  three  brigades  under  McLaws  and  Ran 
som  and  the  artillery ;  he  had  about  four  hundred  yards 
to  march  from  his  .  covered  ways  about  Fredericksburg  to 
Marye's  Hill.  When  his  last  attack  was  repulsed  in 
the  evening,  he  arranged  and  gave  his  orders  for  the  at 
tack  to  be  renewed  in  the  morning,  giving  notice  that  he 
would  lead  it  with  the  Ninth  Corps,  but  upon  reports  of 
his  officers  abandoned  it.  General  Lee's  assaulting  col 
umns  of  fifteen  or  twenty  thousand  had  a  march  of  a  mile 
to  attack  double  their  numbers,  better  defended  than  were 
the  three  brigades  of  Confederates  at  Marye's  Hill  that 
drove  back  Burnside.  The  enemy  on  Cemetery  Hill  was 
in  stronger  position  than  the  Confederates  at  Marye's 
Hill. 

Fitzhugh  Lee  writes  in  the  volume  already  quoted, — 

"Over  the  splendid  scene  of  human  courage  and  human  sacri 
fice  at  Gettysburg  there  arises  in  the  South  an  apparition,  like 
Banquo's  ghost  at  Macbeth' s  banquet,  which  says  the  battle  was 
lost  to  the  Confederates  because  some  one  blundered." 

Call  them  Banquo,  but  their  name  is  Legion.  Weird 
spirits  keep  midnight  watch  about  the  great  boulders, 
while  unknown  comrades  stalk  in  ghostly  ranks  through 
the  black  fastnesses  of  Devil's  Den,  wailing  the  lament, 
"  Some  one  blundered  at  Gettysburg  !  Woe  is  me,  whose 
duty  was  to  die  !" 

*"  General  Lee,"  by  Fitzhugh  Lee.    Marye's  Hill  was  the  strong 
hold  at  Fredericksburg. 


404  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Fitzhugh  Lee  makes  his  plans,  orders,  and  movements 
to  suit  his  purpose,  and  claims  that  they  would  have  given 
Gettysburg  to  the  Confederates,  but  he  is  not  likely  to 
convince  any  one  outside  of  his  coterie  that  over  the 
heights  of  Gettysburg  was  to  be  found  honor  for  the 
South. 

General  Meade  said  that  the  suggestion  to  work  towards 
his  line  of  communication  was  sound  "military  sense." 
That  utterance  has  been  approved  by  subsequent  fair 
judgment,  and  it  is  that  potent  fact  that  draws  the  spiteful 
fire  of  latter-day  knights. 

Forty  thousand  men,  unsupported  as  we  were,  could 
not  have  carried  the  position  at  Gettysburg.  The  enemy 
was  there.  Officers  and  men  knew  their  advantage,  and 
were  resolved  to  stay  until  the  hills  came  down  over  them. 
It  is  simply  out  of  the  question  for  a  lesser  force  to  march 
over  broad,  open  fields  and  carry  a  fortified  front  occupied 
by  a  greater  force  of  seasoned  troops. 

Referring  to  the  proposed  move  around  the  Union  left 
to  cut  the  line  of  communication,  a  parallel  in  the  Franco- 
German  war  is  appropriate.  When  the  manoeuvres  of 
the  campaign  had  pushed  Marshal  MacMahon's  army 
back  to  the  road  between  Paris  and  Metz,  the  latter  forti 
fied  and  occupied  by  the  army  under  Marshal  Bazaine, 
MacMahon  hesitated  between  Paris  and  Metz,  and  was 
manoeuvred  out  of  position  to  a  point  north  of  the  line. 
Von  Moltke  seized  the  opportunity  and  took  position  on 
the  line,  which  gave  him  shorter  routes  east  and  west.  So 
that  MacMahon,  to  reach  either  point,  must  pass  the  Ger 
man  forces  under  Von  Moltke.  He  made  a  brave  effort 
to  reach  Metz,  and  Von  Moltke,  to  maintain  his  advan 
tage,  was  called  to  skilful  manoeuvre  and  several  gallant 
affairs,  but  succeeded  in  holding  his  advantage  that  must 
call  MacMahon  to  general  engagement  or  surrender.  Out- 
generalled,  and  with  a  demoralized  army,  he  thought  the 
latter  his  proper  alternative. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  405 

The  relative  conditions  of  the  armies  were  similar.  The 
Union  army,  beaten  at  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellors- 
ville,  and  drawn  from  its  aggressive  campaign  to  defen 
sive  work  in  Pennsylvania,  had  met  disaster  in  its  battle 
of  the  1st.  If  it  had  been  outgeneral  led,  and  dislodged 
of  position  without  further  attack,  it  would  have  been  in 
poor  condition  to  come  in  aggressive  battle  against  its 
adversary  in  well-chosen  defensive  grounds. 

Again,  in  our  own  war,  when  the  Union  army  carried 
the  Confederate  works  west  of  Petersburg  on  the  2d  of 
April,  1865,  General  Meade  got  his  army  together  and 
was  about  to  march  east  to  finish  his  work  by  the  capture 
of  Petersburg.  General  Grant  objected, — that  the  Con 
federates  would  retreat  during  the  night ;  at  Petersburg 
he  would  be  behind  them ;  in  his  then  position  he  would 
be  alongside  of  them,  and  have  an  even  start,  with  better 
prospect  to  strike  across  their  march  and  force  them  to 
general  battle  or  surrender ;  and  he  ordered  arrangements 
for  the  march  west  at  daylight. 

Even  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  the  first  in  the  science  and 
greatest  in  the  execution  of  the  art  of  war,  finally  lost 
grasp  of  his  grandest  thought: 

"  In  war  men  are  nothing ;  a  man  is  everything."  * 

The  Confederate  chief  at  Gettysburg  looked  something 
like  Napoleon  at  Waterloo. 

Fitzhugh  Lee  quotes  evidence  of  Governor  Carroll,  of 
Maryland,  that  General  Lee  said,  "  Longstreet  is  the 
hardest  man  to  move  in  my  army." 

It  does  not  look  like  generalship  to  lose  a  battle  and  a 
cause  and  then  lay  the  responsibility  upon  others.  He  held 
command  and  was  supported  by  his  government.  If  his 
army  did  not  suit  him,  his  word  could  have  changed  it  in 
a  minute.  If  he  failed  to  apply  the  remedy,  it  was  his 

*  Vide  "The  French  under  the  First  and  Last  Bonaparte;"  the 
Second  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  under  Stonewall  Jack 
son  in  1862,  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  and  J.  A.  Early  in  1864. 


406  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

fault.  Some  claim  that  his  only  fault  as  a  general  was 
his  tender,  generous  heart.  BUG  a  heart  in  the  right 
place  looks  more  to  the  cause  intrusted  to  its  care  than 
for  hidden  ways  by  which  to  shift  its  responsibility 
to  the  shoulders  of  those  whose  lives  hang  upon  his 
word. 

When  he  set  out  on  his  first  campaign  (Chickahominy) 
with  the  army,  the  key  of  the  campaign  was  intrusted  to 
General  Jackson,  who  named  the  hour  for  the  opening 
and  failed  to  meet  his  own  appointment.  At  the  time 
he  appointed,  A.  P.  Hill's,  D.  H.  Hill's,  and  Long- 
street's  commands  were  in  position  waiting.  About 
eight  hours  after  his  time  he  was  up,  but  deliberately 
marched  past  the  engagement  and  went  into  camp,  a  mile 
or  more  behind  the  hot  battle.  He  remained  in  his  camp 
next  morning,  and  permitted  the  enemy,  dislodged  of  his 
position  of  the  day  before,  to  march  by  him  to  a  strong 
position  at  Gaines's  Mill.  When  his  column  reached  that 
position,  his  leading  division  (D.  H.  Hill's)  engaged  the 
enemy's  right  without  orders.  He  called  the  division  off 
and  put  his  command  in  position  to  intercept  the  enemy's 
retreat  towards  the  Pamunkey,  from  which  he  was  after 
wards  called  to  his  part  in  the  general  engagement.  The 
next  day  he  had  the  cavalry  and  part  of  his  infantry  in 
search  of  the  enemy's  next  move.  At  my  head-quarters 
were  two  clever  young  engineers  who  were  sent  to  find 
what  the  enemy  was  about.  They  were  the  first  to  report 
the  enemy's  retreat  towards  James  River.  Orders  were 
given  for  Jackson  to  follow  on  the  direct  line  of  retreat, 
also  Magruder  and  Huger.  My  command  was  ordered 
around  through  the  outskirts  of  Richmond  by  the  Darby- 
town  road  to  interpose  between  McClellan's  army  and  the 
James  River,  about  twenty  miles  ;  the  other  troops  march 
ing  by  routes  of  about  nine  miles.  We  were  in  position 
on  the  evening  of  the  29th  of  June,  and  stood  in  front^f 
the  enemy  all  of  the  30th,  fighting  a  severe  battle  in  the 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  407 

afternoon.  Magruder  and  Huger  got  up  after  night,  and 
Jackson  on  the  morning  of  the  1st.  After  the  battle  of 
the  1st,  Jackson,  Magruder,  and  Huger  were  ordered  in 
direct  pursuit  along  the  route  of  retreat,  my  command  by 
the  longer  route  of  Nance's  Store.  Jackson's  column 
and  mine  met  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  near  Westover, 
the  enemy's  new  position. 

At  the  Second  Manassas  my  command  relieved  the 
pressure  against  Jackson.  He  called  on  me  for  relief  by 
a  route  that  would  have  taken  an  hour  or  an  hour  and  a 
half.  A  way  was  found  by  which  he  was  relieved  in 
about  thirty  minutes.  When  relieved,  he  left  the  battle 
on  my  hands.  I  was  at  Sharpsburg  all  day  ;  Jackson 
only  about  two  and  a  half  hours.  At  Fredericksburg, 
anticipating  the  move  against  him,  half  of  my  command 
was  ordered  to  swing  off  from  my  right  and  join  in  his 
battle. 

But  General  Lee's  assertion  seems  to  refer  to  the  opera 
tions  at  Gettysburg,  after  Jackson  had  found  his  Happy 
Home.  Let  us  see  how  far  this  assertion  is  supported  by 
events.  General  Lee  reported, — 

"The  advance  of  the  enemy  to  the  latter  place  (Gettysburg) 
was  unknown,  and,  the  weather  being  inclement,  the  march  was 
conducted  with  a  view  to  the  comfort  of  the  troops." 

When,  on  the  forenoon  of  the  2d,  he  decided  upon  his 
plan,  the  Second  Corps  was  deployed  in  the  immediate  front 
of  the  enemy's  line  on  our  left,  except  two  brigades  sent 
off  by  General  Early.  One  division  of  the  Third  was 
close  on  the  right  of  the  Second,  all  within  thirty  minutes' 
march  of  the  enemy's  lines.  Two  divisions  of  the  Third 
Corps  and  two  of  the  First  were  on  Seminary  Ridge. 
When  the  order  was  announced  the  divisions  on  Seminary 
Ridge  had  to  find  their  positions  and  deploy  to  the  right. 
By  the  route  ordered  for  the  march  it  was  five  or  six  miles 
to  the  point  at  which  the  battle  was  to  be  opened.  The 


408  FEOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

troops  of  the  Third  had  a  shorter  route.  The  march  of 
the  First  was  made  in  time  for  prompt  deployment  on  the 
right  of  the  Third. 

We  were  left  to  our  own  resources  in  finding  ground 
upon  which  to  organize  for  battle.  %  The  enemy  had 
changed  position  somewhat  after  the  march  was  ordered, 
but  as  we  were  not  informed  of  his  position  before  the 
march,  we  could  not  know  of  the  change.  The  Confed 
erate  commander  did  not  care  to  ride  near  us,  to  give  in 
formation  of  a  change,  to  assist  in  preparing  for  attack, 
nor  to  inquire  if  new  and  better  combinations  might  be 
made. 

Four  brigades  of  the  right  of  the  Third  Corps  were  as 
signed  as  part  of  my  command.  The  engagement  was  to 
be  general.  My  artillery  combat  was  opened  at  three  P.M., 
followed  in  half  an  hour  by  the  infantry,  and  I  made  pro 
gressive  battle  until  sundown.  A  division  of  the  Second 
Corps  attacked  on  our  left  at  nightfall,  and  later  two  bri 
gades.  Other  parts  of  the  Second  and  Third  Corps  did 
not  move  to  the  battle. 

On  the  3d  I  was  ordered  to  organize  the  column  of  as 
sault,  the  other  corps  to  co-operate  and  assist  the  battle. 
There  was  an  affair  on  the  Confederate  left  before  the  as 
saulting  columns  were  organized,  brought  on  by  attack  of 
the  enemy.  The  assaulting  force  marched  at  one  P.M.  Its 
work  has  been  described,  but  it  is  important  to  note  that 
neither  of  the  other  corps  took  part  in  the  battle  while 
the  Southern  chief  stood  in  view  of  the  attack  and  near 
the  rear  of  those  corps.  So  it  looks  as  if  the  commander 
of  the  First  Corps  was  easier  to  move  than  any  one  in  his 
army,  rather  than  harder,  and  his  chief  left  him  to  fight 
the  battles  alone. 

After  the  retreat,  and  when  resting  on  the  south  banks 
of  the  Eapidan,  reading  of  the  progress  of  the  march 
of  General  Rosecrans's  army  towards  Georgia,  it  seemed 
sinful  to  lie  there  idle  while  our  comrades  in  the  West 


WILLIAM   BLAKE. 
Volunteered  in  the  Eighteenth  Mississippi  at  the  age  of  sixteen.    Lost  a  leg  at  Gettysburg. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  409 

were  so  in  need  of  assistance,  and  I  wrote  the  Secretary 
of  War  suggesting  that  a  detachment  should  be  sent  West 
from  the  idle  army.  General  Lee  objected,  but  the  sug 
gestion  was  ordered  to  be  executed.  In  this  instance  the 
subordinate  was  easier  to  move  than  his  chief,  though  the 
interests  of  the  cause  depended  largely  on  the  movement 
of  the  latter. 

The  forces  engaged  at  Gettysburg  were : 

CONFEDERATE. — According  to  the  latest  official  accounts, 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  on  the  31st  of  May, 
numbered  74,468.  The  detachments  that  joined  numbered 
6400,  making  80,868.  Deducting  the  detachments  left 
in  Virginia, — Jenkins's  brigade,  Pickett's  division,  2300 ; 
Corse's  brigade,  Pickett's  division,  1700 ;  detachments 
from  Second  Corps  and  of  cavalry,  1300,  in  all  5300, — 
leaves  the  actual  aggregate  75,568. 

UNION. — According  to  the  reports  of  the  30th  of  June, 
and  making  allowance  for  detachments  that  joined  in  the 
interim  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle,  the  grand  ag 
gregate  was  100,000  *  officers  and  men. 

The  Confederates  lost  many  men  after  the  battle,  and 
before  they  recrossed  the  Potomac,  from  the  toils  of  the 
march  and  the  continuous  and  severe  harassment  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  which  followed  closely  and  in  great  force. 

The  casualties  were : 

CONFEDERATED 

First  Corps 7,539 

Second  Corps 5,937 

Third  Corps 6,735 

Cavalry 1,426 

Aggregate 21,637 

*  General  Meade's  monthly  return  for  June  30  shows  99,131  "  present 
for  duty,  equipped."  The  Comte  de  Paris  estimates  the  force  actually 
on  the  field,  including  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  was  in  reserve,  at 
82,000. 

f  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxvii. 


410  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 


UNION.* 

First  Corps 6,059 

Second  Corps 4,369 

Third  Corps 4,211 

Fifth  Corps 2,187 

Sixth  Corps 242 

Eleventh  Corps 3,801 

Twelfth  Corps 1,082 

Cavalry 1,094 

Staff  .  4 


Aggregate 23,049 

The  organization  of  the  contending  armies  at  Gettys 
burg  was  as  follows : 

ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  GENERAL  ROBERT  E.  LEE, 

COMMANDING. 

FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET. 

McLAWS's  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Lafayette  McLaws  :—KershawJs  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Kershaw  ;  2d  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  D.  Kennedy,  Lieut.- 
Col.  F.  Gaillard ;  3d  S.  C.,  Maj.  R.  C.  Maffett,  Col.  J.  D.  Nance  ;  7th 
S.  C.,  Col.  D.  Wyatt  Aiken  ;  8th  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  W.  Henagan  ;  15th  S.  C., 
Col.  W.  D.  De  Saussure,  Maj.  William  M.  Gist ;  3d  S.  C.  Battn.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  W.  G.  Rice.  Barksdale's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Barksdale, 
Col.  B.  G.  Humphreys  ;  13th  Miss.,  Col.  J.  W.  Carter  ;  17th  Miss.,  Col. 
W.  D.  Holder,  Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  Fiser ;  18th  Miss.,  Col.  T.  M.  Griffin, 
Lieut.- Col.  W.  H.  Luse  ;  21st  Miss.,  Col.  B.  G.  Humphreys.  Semmes's 
Brigade,}  Brig.-Gen.  P.  J.  Semmes,  Col.  Goode  Bryan  ;  10th  Ga.,  Col. 
John  B.  Weems  ;  50th  Ga,,  Col.  W.  R.  Manning  ;  51st  Ga.,  Col.  E.  Ball ; 
53d  Ga.,  Col.  James  P.  Simms.  Wofford's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  W.  T. 
Wofford  ;  16th  Ga.,  Col.  Goode  Bryan  ;  18th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  Z.  Ruff; 
24th  Ga.,  Col.  Robert  McMillan  ;  Cobb's  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  Luther 
J.  Glenn ;  Phillips  (Ga.)  Legion,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  S.  Barclay.  Artillery, 
Col.  H.  C.  Cabell ;  1st  N.  C.  Art.,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  B.  C.  Manly  ;  Pulaski 
(Ga.)  Art.,  Capt.  J.  C.  Fraser,  Lieut.  W.  J.  Furlong  ;  1st  Richmond 
Howitzers,  Capt,  E.  S.  McCarthy  ;  Troup  (Ga.)  Art.,  Capt.  H.  H.  Carl- 
ton,  Lieut,  C.  W.  Motes. 

PICKETT'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  George  E.  Pickett : — Oarnetfs  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  B.  Garnett,  Maj.  C.  S.  Peyton  ;  8th  Va.,  Col.  Eppa 
Hunton  ;  18th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  A.  Carrington  ;  19th  Va,,  Col.  Henry 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxxvii.   part  i.  p.  187. 

f  No  reports  on  file  for  this  brigade.  Bryan  was  in  command  July  7, 
and  was  probably  Semmes's  immediate  successor.  The  commanders  of 
the  Tenth,  Fifty-first,  and  Fifty-third  Georgia  are  given  as  reported  for 
June  22  and  July  31.  Manning  reported  in  command  of  Fiftieth  Georgia, 
June  22.  No  commander  reported  on  return  for  July  31. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  411 

Gantt,  Lieut.-Col.  John  T.  Ellis;  28th  Va.,  Col.  R.  C.  Allen,  Lieut-Col. 
William  Watts  ;  56th  Va.,  Col.  W.  D.  Stuart,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  P.  Slaughter. 
Kempcr's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  L.  Kemper,  Col.  Joseph  Mayo,  Jr.  ;  1st 
Va.,  Col.  Lewis  B.  Williams,  Lieut.-Col.  F.  G.  Skinner;  3d  Va.,  Col. 
Joseph  Mayo,  Jr.,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  D.  Callcote  ;  7th  Va.,  Col.  W.  T.  Patton, 
Lieut.-Col.  C.  C.  Flowerree ;  llth  Va.,  Maj.  Kirkwood  Otey  ;  24th  Va., 
Col.  William  R.  Terry.  Armistead's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  L.  A.  Armi- 
stead,  Col.  W.  R.  Aylett ;  9th  Va.,  Maj.  John  C.  Owens ;  14th  Va.,  Col. 
James  G.  Hodges,  Lieut.-Col.  William  White  ;  38th  Va.,  Col.  E.  C. 
Edmonds,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  B.  Whittle  ;  53d  Va.,  Col.  W.  R,  Aylett ;  57th  Va., 
Col.  John  Bowie  Magruder.  Artillery,  Maj.  James  Bearing  ;  Fauquier 
(Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  R.  M.  Stribling  ;  Hampden  (Va.)  Art,,  Capt.  W.  H. 
Caskie ;  Richmond  Fayette  Art.,  Capt.  M.  C.  Macou  ;  Virginia  Batt., 
Capt.  Joseph  G.  Blount. 

HOOD'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  John  B.  Hood,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  M.  Law  :— 
Law's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  E.  M.  Law,  Col.  James  L.  Sheffield  ;  4th  Ala., 
Lieut.-Col!  L.  H.  Scruggs  ;  15th  Ala.,  Col.  William  C.  Gates,  Capt.  B.  A. 
Hill ;  44th  Ala.,  Col.  William  F.  Perry  ;  47th  Ala,,  Col.  James  W.  Jack 
son,  Lieut.-Col.  M.  J.  Bulger,  Maj.  J.  M.  Campbell ;  48th  Ala.,  Col. 
James  L.  Sheffield,  Capt.  T.  J.  Eubanks.  Robertson's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  J.  B.  Robertson  ;  3d  Ark.,  Col.  Van  H.  Manning,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  S. 
Taylor;  1st  Tex.,  Lieut.-Col.  P.  A.  Work  ;  4th  Tex.,  Col.  J.  C.  G.  Key, 
Maj.  J.  P.  Bane  ;  5th  Tex.,  Col.  R.  M.  Powell,  Lieut.-Col.  K.  Bryan,  Maj. 
J.  C.  Rogers.  Anderson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  T.  Anderson, 
Lieut.-Col.  William  Luffman  ;  7th  Ga.,  Col.  W.  W.  White  ;  8th  Ga.,  Col. 
John  R.  Towers  ;  9th  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  Mouuger,  Maj.  W.  M. 
Jones,  Capt,' George  Hillyer  ;  llth  Ga.,  Col.  F.  H.  Little,  Lieut.-Col.  Wil 
liam  Luffman,  Maj.  Henry  D.  McDaniel,  Capt.  William  H.  Mitchell  ; 
59th  Ga.,  Col.  Jack  Brown,  Capt.  M.  G.  Bass.  Bcnnimfs  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Henry  L.  Benning  ;  2d  Ga.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  T.  Harris,  Maj.  W. 
S.  Shepherd  ;  15th  Ga.,  Col.  D.  M.  DuBose  ;  17th  Ga,,  Col.  W.  C.  Hodges  ; 
20th  Ga,,  Col.  John  A.  Jones,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  D.  Waddell.  Artillery,  Maj. 
M.  W.  Henry  ;  Branch  (N.  C.)  Art.,  Capt.  A.  C.  Latham  ;  German  (S.C.) 
Art.,  Capt.  William  K.  Bachman  ;  Palmetto  (S.  C.)  Light  Art.,  Capt. 
Hugh  R.  Garden  ;  Rowan  (N.  C.)  Art.,  Capt.  James  Reilly. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE,  Col.  J.  B.  WTalton  '—Alexander's  Battalion, 
Col.  E.  P.  Alexander;  Ashland  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt,  P.  Woolfolk,  Jr.,  Lieut. 
James  Woolfolk  ;  Bedford  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  T.  C.Jordan  ;  Brooks  (S.  C.) 
Art,,  Lieut.  S.  C.  Gilbert ;  Madison  (La.)  Light  Art.,  Capt.  George  V. 
Moody  ;  Va.  Batt.,  Capt.  W.  W.  Parker  ;  Va.  Batt.,  Capt.  O.  B.  Taylor. 
Washington  (La.}  Artillery,  Maj.  B.  F.  Eshleman  ;  First  Co.,  Capt.  C.  W. 
Squires  ;  Second  Co.,  Capt.  J.  B.  Richardson  ;  Third  Co.,  Capt.  M.  B. 
Miller  ;  Fourth  Co.,  Capt.  Joe  Norcom,  Lieut.  H.  A.  Battles. 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  RICHARD  S.  EWELL. 
Escort,  Randolph's  Company  Virginia  Cavalry,  Capt.  William  F. 
Randolph. 

EARLY'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Jubal  A.  Early  :—HaysJs  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Harry  T.  Hays ;  5th  La.,  Maj.  Alexander  Hart,  Capt.  T.  H. 
Biscoe  ;  6th  La.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  Hanlon  ;  7th  La.,  Col.  D.  B.  Penn ; 


412  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

8th  La.,  Col.  T.  D.  Lewis,  Lieut-Col.  A.  de  Blanc,  Maj.  G.  A.  Lester  ;  9th 
La.,  Col.  Leroy  A.  Stafford.  Smith1  s  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Smith  ; 
31st  Va.,  Col.  John  S.  Hoffman  ;  49th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  Catlett  Gibson  ; 
52d  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  H.  Skinner.  Hake's  Brigade,  Col.  Isaac  E. 
Avery,  Col.  A.  C.  Godwin  ;  6th  N.  C.,  Maj.  S.  McD.  Tate  ;  21st  N.  C., 
Col.  W.  W.  Kirkland  ;  57th  N.  C.,  Col.  A.  C.  Godwin.  Gordon's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Gordon  ;  13th  Ga.,  Col.  James  M.  Smith ;  26th  Ga.,  Col. 
E.N.  Atkinson  ;  31st  Ga.,  Col.  Clement  A.  Evans  ;  38th  Ga,,  Capt.  Wil 
liam  L.  McLeod  ;  60th  Ga.,  Capt.  W.  B.  Jones  ;  61st  Ga.,  Col.  John  H. 
Lamar.  Artillery,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  P.  Jones;  Charlottesville  (Va.)  Art., 
Capt.  James  McD.  Carrington  ;  Courtney  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  W.  A.  Tan 
ner  ;  Louisiana  Guard  Art.,  Capt.  C.  A.  Green  ;  Staunton  (Va.)  Art., 
Capt.  A.  W.  Gar  be  r. 

JOHNSON'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Edward  Johnson  -—SteuarVs  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  H.  Steuart ;  1st  Md.  Battn.  Inf.,  Lieut.-Col.  J. 
R.  Herbert,  Maj.  W.  W.  Goldsborough,  Capt.  J.  P.  Crane  ;  1st  N.  C.,  Lieut. 
Col.  H.  A.  Brown  ;  3d  N.  C.,  Maj.  W.  M.  Parsley ;  10th  Va.,  Col.  E.  T. 
H.  Warren  ;  23d  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  T.  Walton  ;  37th  Va.,  Maj.  H.  C. 
Wood.  Stonewall  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  A.  Walker  ;  2d  Va.,  Col. 
J.  Q,  A.  Nadenbousch  ;  4th  Va.,  Maj.  William  Terry  ;  5th  Va,,  Col.  J.  H. 
S.  Funk  ;  27th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  D.  M.  Shriver  ;  33d  Va.,  Capt.  J.  B.  Gol- 
laday.  Nicholas  Brigade,*  Col.  J.  M.  Williams;  1st  La.,  Capt/E.  D. 
Willett ;  2d  La.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  E.  Burke  ;  10th  La,,  Maj.  T.  N.  Powell  ; 
14th  La.,  Lieut.-Col.  David  Zable  ;  15th  La.,  Maj.  Andrew  Brady. 
Jones's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  John  M.  Jones,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  H.  Dungan  ; 
21st  Va,,  Capt,  W.  P.  Moseley  ;  25th  Va.,  Col.  J.  C.  Higginbotham,  Lieut.- 
Col.  J.  A  Robinson  ;  42d  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  R.  W.  Withers,  Capt.  S.  H. 
Saunders  ;  44th  Va.,  Maj.  N.  Cobb,  Capt.  T.  R.  Buckner  ;  48th  Va.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  R.  H.  Dungan,  Maj.  Oscar  White  ;  50th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  L.  H.  N. 
Salyer.  Artillery,  Maj.  J.  W.  Latimer,  Capt.  C.  I.  Raine  ;  1st  Md.  Batt., 
Capt  William  F.  Dement ;  Alleghany  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt,  J.  C.  Carpenter  ; 
Chesapeake  (Md.)  Art.,  Capt.  William  D.  Brown  ;  Lee  (Va.)  Batt.,  Capt. 
C.  I.  Raine,  Lieut.  William  W.  Hardwicke. 

RODES'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes  : — Daniel's  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Junius  Daniel ;  32d  N.  C.,  Col.  E.  C.  Brabble  ;  43d  N.  C.,  Col.  T.  S. 
Kenan,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  G.  Lewis;  45th  N.  C.,  Lieut.-Col.  S.  H.  Boyd, 
Maj.  John  R.  Winston,  Capt.  A.  H.  Gallaway,  Capt.  J.  A.  Hopkins  ;  53d 
N.  C.,  Col.  W.  A.  Owens  ;  2d  N.  C.  Battn.,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  L.  Andrews, 
Capt.  Van  Brown.  Doles's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  Doles  ;  4th  Ga., 
Lieut.-Col.  D.  R.  E.  Winn,  Maj.  W.  H.  Willis  ;  12th  Ga.,  Col.  Edward 
Willis;  21st  Ga.,  Col.  John  T.  Mercer;  44th  Ga.,  Col.  S.  P.  Lumpkin, 
Maj.  W.  H.  Peebles.  Iverson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Iverson  ;  5th 
N.  C.,f  Capt.  Speight  B.  West,  Capt.  Benjamin  Robinson  ;  12th  N.  C., 


*  The  regimental  commanders  are  given  as  reported  for  June  14. 

f  The  four  captains  present  (West,  Robinson,  James  M.  Taylor,Thomas 
N.  Jordan)  were  reported  as  wounded  July  1 ;  Robinson  and  Taylor  as 
having  rejoined  July  2,  but  it  does  not  appear  who  commanded  during 
Robinson's  absence. 


GETTYSBURG THIKD    DAY.  413 

Lieut.-Col.  W.  S.  Davis  ;  20th  N.  C.,*  Lieut.-Col.  Nelson  Slough,  Capt. 
Lewis  T.  Hicks ;  23d  N.  C.,t  Col.  D.  H.  Christie,  Capt.  William  H. 
Johnston.  Ramseur's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  S.  D.  Ramseur ;  2d  N.  C., 
Maj.  D.  W.  Hurtt,  Capt.  James  T.  Scales  ;  4th  N.  C.,  Col.  Bryan  Grimes ; 
14th  N.  C.,  Col.  R.  Tyler  Bennett,  Maj.  Joseph  H.  Lambeth  ;  30th  N.  C., 
Col.  Francis  M.  Parker,  Maj.  W.  W.  Sillers.  O'NeaVs  Brigade,  Col.  E. 
A.  O'Neal;  3d  Ala.,  Col.  C.  A.  Battle  ;  5th  Ala,,  Col.  J.  M.  Hall ;  6th 
Ala.,  Col.  J.  N.  Lightfoot,  Capt,  M.  L.  Bowie ;  12th  Ala.,  Col.  S.  B. 
Pickens ;  26th  Ala.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  Goodgame.  Artillery,  Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas  H.  Carter;  Jetf  Davis  (Ala.)  Art.,  Capt.  W.  J.  Reese;  King 
William  (Va.)  Art,,  Capt.  W.  P.  Carter ;  Morris  (Va.)  Art,,  Capt.  R.  C. 
M.  Page  ;  Orange  (Va.)  Art,  Capt,  C.  W.  Fry.  Artillery  Reserve,  Col.  J. 
Thompson  Brown  ;  1st  Va.  Art.,  Capt,  Willis  J.  Dance  ;  2d  Richmond 
(Va.)  Howitzers,  Capt.  David  Watson  ;  3d  Richmond  (Va.)  Howitzers, 
Capt,  B.  H.  Smith,  Jr. ;  Powhatan  (Va.)  Art,  Lieut.  John  M.  Cunning 
ham  ;  Rockbridge  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt.  A.  Graham  ;  Salem  (Va.)  Art.,  Lieut. 
C.  B.  Griffin  ;  Nelson's  Battn.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  Nelson  ;  Amherst 
(Va.)  Art,  Capt.  T.  J.  Kirkpatrick ;  Fluvanna  (Va.)  Art,  Capt  J.  L. 
Massie  ;  Ga.  Batt,  Capt.  John  Milledge,  Jr. 

THIRD  ARMY  CORPS,  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  AMBROSE  P.  HILL. 

ANDERSON'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  R.  H.  Anderson  :—  Wttcox's  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Cadmus  M.  Wilcox  ;  8th  Ala.,  Lieut-Col.  Hilary  A. 
Herbert ;  9th  Ala.,  Capt.  J.  H.  King  ;  10th  Ala'.,  Col.  William  H.  Forney, 
Lieut.-Col.  James  E.  Shelley  ;  llth  Ala.,  Col.  J.  C.  C.  Sanders,  Lieut.-Col. 
George  E.  Tayloe  ;  14th  Ala.,  Col.  L.  Pinckard,  Lieut-Col.  James  A. 
Broome.  Mahone's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Mahone  ;  6th  Va.,  Col. 
George  T.  Rogers ;  12th  Va.,  Col.  D.  A.  Weisiger  ;  16th  Va.,  Col.  Joseph 
H.  Ham  ;  41st  Va.,  Col.  William  A.  Parharn  ;  61st  Va.,  Col.  V.  D.  Groner. 
WrigM s  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.R.Wright,  Col.  William  Gibson  ;  3d  Ga., 
Col.  E.  J.  Walker ;  22d  Ga.,  Col.  Joseph  Wasden,  Capt.  B.  C.  McCurry  ; 
48th  Ga.,  Col.  William  Gibson,  Capt  M.  R.  Hall ;  2d  Ga,  Battn.,  Maj. 
George  W.  Ross,  Capt  Charles  J.  Moffett  Perry1  s  Brigade,  Col.  David 
Lang  ;  2d  Fla.,  Maj.  W.  R.  Moore  ;  5th  Fla.,  Capt  R.  N.  Gardner  ;  8th 
Fla.,  Col.  David  Lang.  Posey's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Carnot  Posey  ;  12th 
Miss.,  Col.  W.  H.  Taylor  ;  16th  Miss.,  Col.  Samuel  E.  Baker  ;  19th  Miss., 
Col.  N.  H.  Harris  ;  48th  Miss.,  Col.  Joseph  M.  Jayne.  Artillery  (Samter 
Battalion),  Maj.  John  Lane  ;  Co.  A,  Capt  Hugh  M.  Ross  ;  Co.  B,  Capt 
George  M.  Patterson  ;  Co.  C,  Capt  John  T.  Wingfield. 

HETH'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Henry  Heth,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  J.  Pettigrew  : 
—First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  J.  Pettigrew,  Col.  J.  K.  Marshall  ;  llth 
N.  C.,  Col.  Collett  Leventhorpe  ;  26th  N.  C.,  Col.  Henry  K.  Burgwyn, 
Jr.,  Capt  H.  C.  Albright ;  47th  N.  C.,  Col.  G.  H.  Faribault ;  52d  N.  C., 
Col.  J.  K.  Marshall,  Lieut-Col.  Marcus  A.  Parks.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 

*  Lieutenant-Colonel  Slough  and  Major  John  S.  Brooks  reported  as 
wounded  at  four  P.M.,  July  1. 

f  Colonel  Christie,  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  D.  Johnston,  Major  C.  C. 
Blacknall,  and  the  senior  captain  (Abner  D.  Pearce)  reported  as 
wounded  early  in  the  fight,  July  1. 


414  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

J.  M.  Brockenbrough  ;  40th  Va.,  Capt.  T.  E.  Betts,  Capt.  R.  B.  Davis ; 
47th  Va,,  Col.  Robert  M.  Mayo  ;  55th  Va.,  Col.  W.  S.  Christian  ;  22d  Va. 
Battn.,  Maj.  John  S.  Bowles.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  J.  Ar 
cher,  Col.  B.  D.  Fry,  Lieut-Col.  S.  G.  Shepard ;  13th  Ala.,  Col.  B.  D. 
Fry  ;  5th  Ala.  Battn.,  Maj.  A.  S.  Van  de  Graaff;  1st  Term,  (provisional 
army),  Maj.  Felix  G.  Buchanan  ;  7th  Tenn.,  Lieut-Col.  S.  G.  Shepard  ; 
14th  Tenn.,  Capt.  B.  L.  Phillips.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  R. 
Davis ;  2d  Miss.,  Col.  J.  M.  Stone ;  llth  Miss.,  Col.  F.  M.  Green  ;  42d 
Miss.,  Col.  H.  R.  Miller ;  55th  N.  C.,  Col.  J.  K.  Connally.  Artillery, 
Lieut.-Col.  John  J.  Garnett ;  Donaldsonville  (La.)  Art,  Capt  V.  Mau- 
rin  ;  Huger  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt  Joseph  D.  Moore  ;  Lewis  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt. 
John  W.  Lewis  ;  Norfolk  Light  Art  Blues,  Capt.  C.  R.  Grandy. 

FENDER'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  William  D.  Fender,  Maj. -Gen.  I.  R. 
Trimble,  Brig.-Gen.  James  H.  Lane : — First  Brigade,  Col.  Abner  Per- 
rin  ;  1st  S.  C.  (provisional  army),  Maj.  C.  W.  McCreary  ;  1st  S.  C.  Rifles, 
Capt  William  M.  Hadden  ;  12th  S.  C.,  Col.  John  L.  Miller  ;  13th  S.  C., 
Lieut-Col.  B.  T.  Brockman  ;  14th  S.  C.,  Lieut-Col.  Joseph  N.  Brown. 
Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  James  H.  Lane,  Col.  C.  M.  Avery ;  7th 
N.C.,  Capt.  J.  McLeod  Turner,  Capt  James  G.  Harris  ;  18th  N.C.,  Col. 
John  D.  Barry  ;  28th  N.  C.,  Col.  S.  D.  Lowe,  Lieut.-Col.  W.  H.  A.  Speer  ; 
33d  N.  C.,  Col.  C.  M.  Avery  ;  37th  N.  C.,  Col.  W.  M.  Barbour.  Third 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Edward  L.  Thomas  ;  14th,  35th,  45th,  and  49th  Ga., 
Col.  S.  T.  Player.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  M.  Scales,  Lieut.-Col. 
G.  T.  Gordon,  Col.  W.  Lee  J.  Lowrance  ;  13th  N.  C.,  Col.  J.  H.  Hyman, 
Lieut-Col.  H.  A.  Rogers;  16th  N.  C.,  Capt  L.  W.  Stowe ;  22d  N.  C., 
Col.  James  Conner  ;  34th  N.  C.,  Col.  William  Lee  J.  Lowrance,  Lieut.- 
Col.  G.  T.  Gordon  ;  38th  N.  C.,  Col.  W.  J.  Hoke,  Lieut-Col.  John  Ash- 
ford.  Artillery,  Maj.  William  T.  Poague ;  Albemarle  (Va.)  Art.,  Capt. 
James  W.  Wyatt ;  Charlotte  (N.  C.)  Art,  Capt.  Joseph  Graham  ;  Madi 
son  (Miss.)  Light  Art,  Capt  George  Ward  ;  Virginia  Batt,  Capt  J.  V. 
Brooke. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE,  Col.  R.  Lindsay  Walker  : — Mclntosh's  Battal 
ion,  Maj.  D.  G.  Mclntosh  ;  Danville  (Va.)  Art,  Capt  R.  S.  Rice  ;  Harda- 
way  (Ala.)  Art,  Capt  W.  B.  Hurt ;  2d  Rockbridge  (Va.)  Art.,  Lieut 
Samuel  Wallace  ;  Virginia  Batt.,  Capt.  M.  Johnson.  Pegram's  Battal 
ion,  Maj.  W.  J.  Pegram,  Capt.  E.  B.  Brunson  ;  Crenshaw  (Va.)  Batt. ; 
Fredericksburg  (Va.)  Art,  Capt.  E.  A.  Marye  ;  Letcher  (Va.)  Art,  Capt 
T.  A.  Brander ;  Pee  Dee  (S.  C.)  Art.,  Lieut  William  E.  Zimmerman  ; 
Purcell  (Va.)  Art,  Capt  Joseph  McGraw. 

CAVALRY. 

STUART'S  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  -.—Hampton's  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Wade  Hampton,  Col.  L.  S.  Baker  ;  1st  N.  C.,  Col.  L.  S.  Baker  ; 
1st  and  2d  S.  C. ;  Cobb's  (Ga.)  Legion,  Jeff.  Davis  Legion,  Phillips  (Ga.) 
Legion.  Robertson's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Beverly  H.  Robertson  ;  *  4th 
N.  C.,  Col.  D.  D.  Ferebee  ;  5th  N.  C.  Fitzhugh  Lee's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
Fitzhugh  Lee  ;  1st  Md.  Battn. ,f  Maj.  Harry  Gilrnor,  Maj.  Ridgely  Brown  ; 

*  Commanded  his  own  and  W.  E.  Jones's  brigade, 
f  Serving  with  Ewell's  corps. 


GETTYSBURG THIKD    DAY.  415 

1st  Va.,  Col.  James  H.  Drake  ;  2d  Va.,  Col.  T.  T.  Munford  ;  3d  Va.,  Col. 
Thomas  H.  Owen  ;  4th  Va.,  Col.  William  C.  Wickham  ;  5th  Va.,  Col.  T. 
L.  Rosser.  Jenkins's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  G.  Jenkins,  Col.  M.  J.  Fer 
guson  ;  14th,  16th,  and  17th  Va. ;  34th  Va.  Battn.,  Lieut.-Col.  V.  A. 
Witcher  ;  36th  Va.  Battn. ;  Jackson's  ( Va.)  Batt.,  Capt.  Thomas  E.  Jack 
son.  Jones's  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  E.  Jones  ;  6th  Va.,  Maj.  C.  E. 
Flournoy ;  7th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  Marshall ;  llth  Va,,  Col.  L.  L. 
Lomax.  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  Brigade,  Col.  J.  R.  Chambliss,  Jr.  ;  2d  N.  C. ; 
9th  Va.,  Col.  B.  L.  T.  Beale ;  10th  Va.,  Col.  J.  Lucius  Davis  ;  13th  Va. 
Stuart's  Horse  Artillery,  Maj.  R.  F.  Beckham  ;  Breathed's  (Va.)  Batt., 
Capt.  James  Breathed  ;  Chew's  (Va.)  Batt.,  Capt.  R.  P.  Chew  ;  Griffin's 
(Md.)  Batt.,  Capt.  W.  H.  Griffin  ;  Hart's  (S.  C.)  Batt.,  Capt.  J.  F.  Hart ; 
McGregor's  (Va.)  Batt.,  Capt.  W.  M.  McGregor  ;  Moorman's  (Va.)  Batt, 
Capt,  M.  N.  Moorman. 

IMBODEN'S  COMMAND,*  Brig.-Gen.  J.  D.  Imboden  ;  18th  Va.  Cav.,  Col. 
George  W.  Imboden  ;  62d  Va.  Inf.  (mounted),  Col.  George  H.  Smith  ; 
Virginia  Partisan  Rangers,  Capt.  John  H.  McNeill ;  Virginia  Batt.,  Capt. 
J.  H.  McClanahan. 

ARTILLERY,!  Brig.-Gen.  W.  N.  Pendleton. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  U.  S. 
ARMY,  COMMANDING. 

GENERAL  HEAD-QUARTERS  : — Commando/  the  Provost- Marshal-Gen 
eral,  Brig.-Gen eral  Marsena  R.  Patrick  ;  93d  N.  Y.,|  Col.  John  S. 
Crocker ;  8th  U.  S.  (8  cos.),t  Capt.  Edwin  W.  H.  Reed  ;  2d  Pa.  Cav.,  Col. 
R.  Butler  Price  ;  6th  Pa.  Cav.,  Cos.  E  and  I,  Capt.  James  Starr  ;  Regular 
Cav.  (detachments  from  1st,  2d,  5th,  and  6th  Regiments). 

SIGNAL  CORPS,  Capt.  Lemuel  B.  Norton. 

GUARDS  AND  ORDERLIES,  Oneida  (N.  Y.)  Cav.,  Capt.  Daniel  P.  Mann. 

ARTILLERY,  g  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  J.  Hunt, 

ENGINEER  BRIGADE, ||  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  W.  Benham  :— 15th  N.  Y. 
(3  cos.),  Maj.  Walter  L.  Cassiu  ;  50th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  H.  Pettes ; 
U.  S.  Battn.,  Capt.  George  H.  Mendell. 

FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,^[  MAJOR-GENERAL  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  MAJOR- 
GENERAL  JOHN  NEWTON.     General  Head-quarters,  1st  Me.  Cav., 
Co.  L,  Capt.  Constantine  Taylor. 
FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  James  S.  Wadsworth  -.—First  Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen.  Solomon  Meredith,  Col.  William  W.  Robinson  ;  19th   Ind., 

*  Mounted. 

f  See  battalions  attached  to  corps  and  cavalry.  J  Not  engaged. 

$  See  artillery  brigades  attached  to  army  corps  and  the  reserves. 

||  Not  engaged.  With  exception  of  the  regular  battalion,  it  was,  July 
1,  and  while  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  Md.,  ordered  to  Washington,  D.  C., 
where  it  arrived  July  3. 

T[  Major-General  John  F.  Reynolds,  of  this  corps,  was  killed  July  1, 
while  in  command  of  the  left  wing  of  the  army  ;  General  Doubleday 
commanded  the  corps  July  1,  and  General  Newton,  who  was  assigned 
to  that  command  on  the  1st,  superseded  him  July  2. 


416  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Col.  Samuel  J.  Williams  ;  24th  Mich.,  Col.  Henry  A.  Morrow,  Capt.  Al 
bert  M.  Edwards  ;  2d  Wis.,  Col.  Lucius  Fairchild,  Maj.  John  Mansfield, 
Capt.  George  H.  Otis  ;  6th  Wis.,  Lieut.-Col.  Rufus  R.  Dawes  ;  7th  Wis., 
Col.  William  W.  Robinson,  Maj.  Mark  Fiunicum.  Second  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Lysander  Cutler  ;  7th  Ind.,  Col.  Ira  G.  Grover  ;  76th  N.  Y., 
Maj.  Andrew  J.  Grover,  Capt.  John  E.  Cook  ;  84th  N.  Y.  (14th  Militia), 
Col.  Edward  B.  Fowler ;  95th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  H.  Biddle,  Maj.  Ed 
ward  Pye ;  147th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  C.  Miller,  Maj.  George  Har- 
ney  ;  56th  Pa.  (9  cos.),  Col.  J.  William  Hofmann. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Robinson  -.—First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Gabriel  R.  Paul,  Col.  Samuel  H.  Leonard,  Col.  Adrian  R. 
Root,  Col.  Richard  Coulter,  Col.  Peter  Lyle  ;  16th  Me.,  Col.  Charles 
W.  Tilden,  Maj.  Archibald  D.  Leavitt ;  13th  Mass.,  Col.  Samuel  H. 
Leonard,  Lieut.-Col.  N.  Walter  Batchelder  ;  94th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Adrian  R. 
Root,  Maj.  Samuel  A.  Moffett ;  104th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Gilbert  G.  Prey  ;  107th 
Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  MacThomson,  Capt.  Emanuel  D.  Roath.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  Baxter  ;  12th  Mass.,  Col.  James  L.  Bates, 
Lieut.-Col.  David  Allen,  Jr. ;  83d  N.  Y.  (9th  Militia),  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph 
A.  Moesch  ;  97th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Charles  Wheelock,  Maj.  Charles  North- 
rup  ;  llth  Pa.,*  Col.  Richard  Coulter,  Capt.  Benjamin  F.  Haihes,  Capt. 
John  V.  Overmyer,  88th  Pa.,  Maj.  Benezet  F.  Foust,  Capt.  Henry  White- 
side  ;  90th  Pa.,. Col.  Peter  Lyle,  Maj.  Alfred  J.  Sellers. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  A.  Rowley,  Maj. -Gen.  Abner 
Doubleday  : — First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  A.  Rowley,  Col.  Chap 
man  Biddle ;  80th  N.  Y.  (20th  Militia),  Col.  Theodore  B.  Gates ;  121st 
Pa.,  Maj.  Alexander  Biddle,  Col.  Chapman  Biddle  ;  142d  Pa.,  Col. 
Robert  P.  Cummins,  Lieut.-Col.  A.  B.  McCalmont ;  151st  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  George  F.  McFarland,  Capt.  Walter  L.  Owens,  Col.  Harrison 
Allen.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Roy  Stone,  Col.  Langhorne  Wister,  Col. 
Edmund  L.  Dana;  143d  Pa.,  Col.  Edmund  L.  Dana,  Lieut.-Col.  John 
D.  Musser ;  149th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Walton  Dwigbt,  Capt.  James  Glenn  ; 
150th  Pa.,  Col.  Langhorne  Wister,  Lieut.-Col.  H.  S.  Huidekoper,  Capt. 
Cornelius  C.  Widdis.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  George  J.  Stannard, 
Col.  Francis  V.  Randall  ;  12th  Vt.,t  Col.  Asa  P.  Blunt;  13th  Vt.,  Col. 
Francis  V.  Randall,  Maj.  Joseph  J.  Boyuton,  Lieut.-Col.  William  D. 
Munson;  14th  Vt.,  Col.  William  T.  Nichols;  15th  Vt.,f  Col.  Redfield 
Proctor;  16th  Vt,,  Col.  Wheelock  G.  Veazey.  Artillery  Brigade,  Col. 
Charles  S.  Wainwright ;  Me.  Light,  2d  Batt.  B,  Capt.  James  A.  Hall ; 
Me.  Light,  5th  Batt.  E,  Capt.  Greenleaf  T.  Stevens,  Lieut.  Edward  N. 
Whittier  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  L,t  Capt.  Gilbert  H.  Reynolds,  Lieut. 
George  Breck  ;  1st  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  B,  Capt.  James  H.  Cooper  ;  4th  U.  S., 
Batt.  B,  Lieut.  James  Stewart. 

*  Transferred,  in  the  afternoon  of  July  1,  to  the  First  Brigade. 

f  Guarding  trains,  and  not  engaged  in  the  battle. 

J  Battery  E,  First  New  York  Light  Artillery,  attached. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  417 

SECOND  ARMY  CORPS,*  MAJOR-GENERAL  WINFIELD  S.  HANCOCK, 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  JOHN  GIBBON.  General  Head-quarters,  6th 
N.  Y.  Cav.,  Cos.  D  and  K,  Capt.  Kiley  Johnson. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Caldwell  -.—First  Brigade,  Col. 
Ed  ward  E.  Cross,  Col.  H.  Boyd  McKeen  ;  5th  N.  H.,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles 
E.  Hapgood  ;  61st  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  K.  Oscar  Broady ;  81st  Pa.,  Col.  H. 
Boyd  McKeen,  Lieut.-Col.  Amos  Stroh  ;  148th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Robert 
McFarlane.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Patrick  Kelly ;  28th  Mass.,  Col.  R. 
Byrnes;  63d  N.  Y.  (2  cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  Richard  C.  Bentley,  Capt. 
Thomas  Touhy ;  69th  N.  Y.  (2  cos.),  Capt.  Richard  Moroney,  Lieut. 
James  J.  Smith  ;  88th  N.  Y.  (2  cos.),  Capt.  Denis  F.  Burke  ;  116th  Pa. 
(4  cos.),  Maj.  St.  Clair  A.  Mulhollaud.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Sam 
uel  K.  Zook,  Lieut.-Col.  John  Fraser  ;  52d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  C.  G.  Freu- 
denberg,  Capt.  William  Scherrer  ;  57th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Alford  B. 
Chapman  ;  66th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Orlando  H.  Morris,  Lieut.-Col.  John  S. 
Hammell,  Maj.  Peter  Nelson  ;  140th  Pa,,  Col.  Richard  P.  Roberts,  Lieut.- 
Col.  John  Fraser.  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  John  R.  Brooke  ;  27th  Conn. 
(2 cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  Henry  C.  Mervvin,  Maj.  James  H.  Coburn  ;  2d  Del., 
Col.  William  P.  Baily,  Capt.  Charles  H.  Chrjstman ;  64th  N.  Y.,  Col. 
Daniel  G.  Bingham,  Maj.  Leman  W.  Bradley  ;  53d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Rich 
ards  McMichael ;  145th  Pa.  (7  cos.),  Col.  Hiram  L.  Brown,  Capt.  John 
W.  Reynolds,  Capt.  Moses  W.  Oliver. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Gibbon,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Har 
row  '.—First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  William  Harrow,  Col.  Francis  E. 
Heath  ;  19th  Me.,  Col.  Francis  E.  Heath,  Lieut.-Col.  Henry  W.  Cun 
ningham  ;  15th  Mass.,  Col.  George  H.  Ward,  Lieut.-Col.  George  C.  Jos- 
lin  ;  1st  Minn. ,|  Col.  William  Colvill,  Jr.,  Capt.  Nathan  S.  Messick,  Capt. 
Henry  C.  Coates ;  82d  N.  Y.  (2d  Militia),  Lieut.-Col.  James  Huston, 
Capt.  John  Darrow.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  S.  Webb  ; 
69th  Pa.,  Col.  Dennis  O'Kane,  Capt,  William  Davis  ;  71st  Pa.,  Col.  Rich 
ard  Penn  Smith  ;  72d  Pa.,  Col.  DeWitt  C.  Baxter,  Lieut.-Col.  Theodore 
Hesser  ;  106th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  L.  Curry.  Third  Brigade,  Col. 
Norman  J.  Hall ;  19th  Mass.,  Col.  Arthur  F.  Devereux  ;  20th  Mass.,  Col. 
Paul  J.  Revere,  Lieut.-Col.  George  N.  Macy,  Capt.  Henry  L.  Abbott ; 
7th  Mich.,  Lieut-Col.  Amos  E.  Steele,  Jr.,  Maj.  Sylvanus  W.  Curtis ; 
42d  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  E.  Mallon  ;  59th  N.  Y.  (4  cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  Max 
A.  Thoman,  Capt.  William  McFadden.  Unattached,  Mass.  Sharp 
shooters,  1st  Co.,  Capt.  William  Plumer,  Lieut.  Emerson  L.  Bicknall. 

*  After  the  death  of  General  Reynolds,  General  Hancock  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  all  the  troops  on  the  field  of  battle,  relieving  Gen 
eral  Howard,  who  had  succeeded  General  Reynolds.  General  Gibbon, 
of  the  Second  Division,  assumed  command  of  the  corps.  These  assign 
ments  terminated  on  the  evening  of  July  1.  Similar  changes  in  com 
manders  occurred  during  the  battle  of  the  2d,  when  General  Hancock 
was  put  in  command  of  the  Third  Corps,  in  addition  to  that  of  his  own. 
He  was  wounded  on  the  3d,  and  Brigadier-General  William  Hays  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  corps. 

f  2d  Company  Minnesota  Sharp-shooters  attached. 

27 


418  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Hays :— First  Brigade,  Col. 
Samuel  S.  Carroll;  14th  Ind.,  Col.  John  Coons;  4th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Leonard  W.  Carpenter  ;  8th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  Sawyer  ;  7th  W. 
Va.,  Lieut.  Col.  Jonathan  H.  Lockwood.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Thomas 
A.  Smyth,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  E.  Pierce ;  14th  Conn.,  Maj.  Theodore  G. 
Ellis  ;  1st  Del.,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  P.  Harris,  Capt.  Thomas  P.  Hizar, 
Lieut.  William  Smith,  Lieut.  John  T.  Dent ;  12th  N.  J.,  Maj.  John  T. 
Hill ;  10th  N.  Y.  (Battn.),  Maj.  George  F.  Hopper ;  108th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Francis  E.  Pierce.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  George  L.  Willard,  Col. 
Eliakim  Sherrill,  Lieut.-Col.  James  M.  Bull ;  39th  N.  Y.  (4  cos.),  Maj. 
Hugo  Hildebraudt;  lllth  N.  Y.,  Col.  Clinton  D.  McDougall,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Isaac  M.  Lusk,  Capt.  Aaron  P.  Seeley ;  125th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Levin  Crandell ;  126th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Eliakim  Sherrill,  Lieut.-Col.  James 
M.  Bull.  Artillery  Brigade,  Capt,  John  G.  Hazard  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light, 
Batt.  B,*  Lieut.  Albert  S.  Sheldon,  Capt.  James  McKay  Rorty,  Lieut. 
Robert  E.  Rogers  ;  1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  William  A.  Arnold  ; 
1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt.  B,  Lieut.  T.  Fred.  Brown,  Lieut.  Walter  S.  Per- 
rin  ;  1st  U.  S.,  Batt.  I,  Lieut.  George  A.  Woodruff,  Lieut.  Tully  Mc- 
Crea;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  A,  Lieut.  Alonzo  H.  Gushing,  Sergt.  Frederick 
Fuger. 

THIRD  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL.  DANIEL  E.  SICKLES,  MAJOR- 
GENERAL  DAVID  B.  BIRNEY. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  David  B.  Birney,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  Hobart 
Ward  : — First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  K.  Graham,  Col.  Andrew  H. 
Tippin  ;  57th  Pa.  (8  cos.),  Col.  Peter  Sides,  Capt.  Alanson  H.  Nelson  ;  63d 
Pa.,  Maj.  John  A.  Banks  ;  68th  Pa.,  Col.  Andrew  H.  Tippin,  Capt.  Mil 
ton  S.  Davis(?),  105th  Pa.,  Col.  Calvin  A.  Craig ;  114th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Frederick  F.  Cavada,  Capt.  Edward  R.  Bowen  ;  141st  Pa.,  Col.  Henry 
J.  Madill.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  Hobart  Ward,  Col.  Hiram 
Berdan ;  20th  Ind.,  Col.  John  Wheeler,  Lieut.-Col.  William  C.  L.  Tay 
lor  ;  3d  Me.,  Col.  Moses  B.  Lakeman  ;  4th  Me.,  Col.  Elijah  Walker,  Capt. 
Edwin  Libby  ;  86th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Benjamin  L.  Higgins ;  124th  N. 
Y.,  Col.  A.  Van  Home  Ellis,  Lieut.-Col.  Francis  M.  Cummins  ;  99th  Pa., 
Maj.  John  W.  Moore;  1st  U.  S.  Sharp-shooters,  Col.  Hiram  Berdan, 
Lieut.-Col.  Caspar  Trepp  ;  2d  U.  S.  Sharp-shooters  (8  cos.),  Maj.  Homer 
R.  Stoughton.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  P.  Regis  de  Trobriand  ;  17th  Me., 
Lieut.-Col.  Charles  B.  Merrill ;  3d  Mich.,  Col.  Byron  R.  Pierce,  Lieut.- 
Col.  Edwin  S.  Pierce  ;  5th  Mich.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  Pulford  ;  40th  N.  Y., 
Col.  Thomas  W.  Egan;  110th  Pa.  (6  cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  David  M.  Jones, 
Maj.  Isaac  Rogers. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Andrew  A.  Humphreys : — First  Bri 
gade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  B.  Carr ;  1st  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  Clark  B.  Bald 
win ;  llth  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  Porter  D.  Tripp ;  16th  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Waldo  Merriam,  Capt.  Matthew  Donovan ;  12th  Mass.,  Capt.  John 
F.  Langley  ;  llth  N.  J.,  Col.  Robert  McAllister,  Capt.  Luther  Martin, 


*  Transferred  from  Artillery  Reserve,  July  1 ;  Fourteenth  New  York 
Battery  attached. 


GETTYSBURG — THIRD    DAY.  419 

Lieut.  John  Schoonover,  Capt.  William  H.  Lloyd,  Capt.  Samuel  T. 
Sleeper ;  26th  Pa.,  Maj.  Robert  L.  Bodine  ;  84th  Pa.,*  Lieut.-Col.  Mil 
ton  Opp.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  William  R.  Brewster ;  70th  N.  Y., 
Col.  J.  Egbert  Farnum  ;  71st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Henry  L.  Potter  ;  72d  N.  Y., 
Col.  John  S.  Austin,  Lieut.-Col.  John  Leonard  ;  73d  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Mi 
chael  W.  Burns ;  74th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Thomas  Holt ;  120th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Cornelius  D.  Westbrook,  Maj.  John  R.  Tappen.  Third  Bri 
gade,  Col.  George  C.  Burling ;  2d  N.  H.,  Col.  Edward  L.  Bailey ;  5th 
N.  J.,  Col.  William  J.  Sewell.  Capt.  Thomas  C.  Godfrey,  Capt.  Henry  H. 
Woolsey  ;  6th  N.  J.,  Lieut.-Col.  Stephen  R.  Gilkyson  ;  7th  N.  J.,  Col. 
Louis  R.  Francine,  Maj.  Frederick  Cooper  ;  8th  N.  J.,  Col.  John  Ramsey, 
Capt.  John  G.  Langston  ;  115th  Pa.,  Maj.  John  P.  Dunne.  Artillery 
Brigade,  Capt.  George  E.  Randolph,  Capt.  A.  Judson  Clark  ;  N.  J.  Light, 
2d  Batt.,  Capt.  A.  Judson  Clark,  Lieut.  Robert  Sims ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light, 
Batt.  D,  Capt.  George  B.  Winslovv  ;  N.  Y.  Light,  4th  Batt,  Capt.  James 
E.  Smith  ;  1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt,  E,  Lieut.  John  K.  Bucklyn,  Lieut.  Ben 
jamin  Freeborn  ;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  K,  Lieut.  Francis  W.  Seeley,  Lieut. 
Robert  James. 

FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  GEORGE  SYKES.  General 
Head-quarters,  12th  N.  Y.  Inf.,  Cos.  D  and  E,  Capt,  Henry  W.  Rider  ; 
17th  Pa.  Cav.,  Cos.  D  and  H,  Capt.  William  Thompson. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  James  Barnes  : — First  Brigade,  Col.  Wil 
liam  S.  Tilton;  18th  Mass.,  Col.  Joseph  Hayes;  22d  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas  Sherwin,  Jr.  ;  1st  Mich.,  Col.  Ira  C.  Abbott,  Lieut.-Col.  William 
A.  Throop  ;  118th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  Gwyn.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Jacob  B.  Sweitzer ;  9th  Mass.,  Col.  Patrick  R.  Guiney ;  32d  Mass.,  Col. 
G.  L.  Prescott ;  4th  Mich.,  Col.  Harrison  H.  Jeffords,  Lieut.-Col.  George 
W.  Lumbard  ;  62d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  C.  Hull.  Third  Brigade,  Col. 
Strong  Vincent,  Col.  James  C.  Rice  ;  20th  Me.,  Col.  Joshua  L.  Cham 
berlain  ;  16th  Mich.,  Col.  Norval  E.  Welch  ;  44th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  C. 
Rice,  Lieut.-Col.  Freeman  Conner  ;  83d  Pa.,  Capt.  Orpheus  S.  Woodward. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Romeyn  B.  Ayres  : — First  Brigade,  Col. 
Hannibal  Day  ;  3d  U.  S.  (6  cos.),  Capt.  Henry  W.  Freedley,  Capt.  Rich 
ard  G.  Lay  ;  4th  U.  S.  (4  cos.),  Capt.  Julius  W.  Adams,  Jr. ;  6th  U.  S.  (5 
cos.),  Capt.  Levi  C.  Bootes ;  12th  U.  S.  (8  cos.),  Capt.  Thomas  S.  Dunn  ; 
14th  U.  S.  (8  cos.),  Maj.  Grotius  R.  Giddings.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Sid 
ney  Burbank  ;  2d  U.  S.  (6  cos.),  Maj.  Arthur  T.  Lee,  Capt.  Samuel  A. 
McKee  ;  7th  U.  S.  (4  cos.),  Capt.  David  P.  Hancock  ;  10th  U.  S.  (3  cos.), 
Capt.  William  Clinton  ;  llth  U.  S.  (6  cos.),  Maj.  De  Lancey  Floyd-Jones  ; 
17th  U.  S.  (7  cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  J.  Durell  Greene.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  Stephen  H.  Weed,  Col.  Kermer  Garrard  ;  140th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Patrick 
H.  O'Rorke,  Lieut.-Col.  Louis  Ernst ;  146th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Kenner  Garrard, 
Lieut.-Col.  David  T.  Jenkins  ;  91st  Pa,,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  H.  Sinex  ; 
155th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  H.  Cain. 

THIRD  DIVISION,!  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel  W.  Crawford  : — First  Brigade, 

*  Guarding  corps  trains,  and  not  engaged  in  the  battle. 
f  Joined  corps  June  28.     The  Second  Brigade  left  in  the  Department 
of  Washington. 


420  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Col.  William  McCandless ;  1st  Pa.  Reserves  (9  cos.),  Col.  William  C. 
Talley  ;  2d  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.-Col.  George  A.  Woodward  ;  6th  Pa.  Re 
serves,  Lieut-Col.  Wellington  H.  Ent ;  13th  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  Charles 
F.  Taylor,  Maj.  William  R.  Hartshorne.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Joseph 
W.  Fisher  ;  5th  Pa.  Reserves,  Lieut.-Col.  George  Dare  ;  9th  Pa.  Reserves, 
Lieut.-Col.  James  McK.  Snodgrass  ;  10th  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  Adoniram 
J.  Warner ;  llth  Pa.  Reserves,  Col.  Samuel  M.  Jackson  ;  12th  Pa,  Re 
serves  (9  cos.),  Col.  Martin  D.  Hardin.  Artillery  Brigade,  Capt.  Augus 
tus  P.  Martin;  Mass.  Light,  3d  Batt.  C,  Lieut.  Aaron  F.  Walcott ;  1st 
N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt.  Almont  Barnes ;  1st  Ohio  Light,  Batt.  L, 
Capt.  Frank  C.  Gibbs  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt,  D,  Lieut.  Charles  E.  Hazlett, 
Lieut.  Benjamin  F.  Rittenhouse  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  I,  Lieut.  Malbone  F. 
Watson,  Lieut.  Charles  C.  MacConnell. 

SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  SEDGWICK.  General 
Head-quarters,  1st  N.  J.  Cav.,  Co.  L,  1st  Pa.  Cav.,  Co.  H,  Capt.  Wil 
liam  S.  Craft. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Horatio  G.  Wright :— Provost  Guard,  4th 
N.  J.  (3  cos.),  Capt,  William  R.  Maxwell.  First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  A. 
T.  A.  Torbert ;  1st  N.  J.,  Lieut-Col.  William  Henry,  Jr.  ;  2d  N.  J.,Lieut- 
Col.  Charles  Wiebecke  ;  3d  N.  J.,  Col.  Edward  L.  Campbell ;  15th  N.  J., 
Col.  William  H.  Penrose,  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph  J.  Bart- 
lett  ;*  5th  Me.,  Col.  Clark  S.  Edwards  ;  121st  N.  Y.,  Col.  Emory  Upton  ; 
95th  Pa.,  Lieut-Col.  Edward  Carroll ;  96th  Pa.,  Maj.  William  H.  Lessig. 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  David  A.  Russell  ;  6th  Me.,  Col.  Hiram  Burn- 
ham  ;  49th  Pa,  (4  cos.),  Lieut-Col.  Thomas  M.  Hillings  ;  119th  Pa.,  Col. 
Peter  C.  Ellmaker  ;  6th  Wis.,  Col.  Thomas  S.  Allen. 

SECOND  DIVISION,!  Brig.-Gen.  Albion  P.  Howe : — Second  Brigade, 
Col.  Lewis  A.  Grant ;  2d  Vt,  Col.  James  H.  Walbridge  ;  3d  Vt,  Col. 
Thomas  O.  Seaver  ;  4th  Vt.,  Col.  Charles  B.  Stoughton  ;  5th  Vt.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  John  R.  Lewis;  6th  Vt,  Col.  Elisha  L.  Barney.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  H.  Neill ;  7th  Me.  (6  cos.),  Lieut-Col.  Selden  Con 
nor  ;  33d  N.  Y.  (detachment),  Capt.  Henry  J.  Gifford  ;  43d  N.  Y.,  Lieut- 
Col.  John  Wilson;  49th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Daniel  D.  Bidwell ;  77th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Winsor  B.  French  ;  61st  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  George  F.  Smith. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Maj  .-Gen.  John  Newton,  J  Brig.-Gen.  Frank  Wheaton: 
—First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Alexander  Shaler ;  65th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Joseph 
E.  Hamblin  ;  67th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Nelson  Cross  ;  122d  N.  Y.,  Col.  Silas  Titus  ; 
23d  Pa.,  Lieut-Col.  John  F.  Glenn  ;  82d  Pa.,  Col.  Isaac  C.  Bassett.  Sec 
ond  Brigade,  Col.  Henry  L.  Etistis ;  7th  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  Franklin  P. 
Harlow;  Tenth  Mass.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  B.  Parsons  ;  37th  Mass.,  Col. 
Oliver  Edwards  ;  2d  R.  L,  Col.  Horatio  Rogers,  Jr.  Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Frank  Wheaton,  Col.  David  J.  Nevin  ;  62d  N.  Y.,  Col.  David 
J.  Nevin,  Lieut.-Col.  Theodore  B.  Hamilton;  93d  Pa.,  Maj.  John  I. 
Nevin  ;  98th  Pa.,  Maj.  John  B.  Kohler  ;  102d  Pa.,g  Col.  John  W.  Pat- 

*  Also  in  command  of  the  Third  Brigade,  Third  Division,  on  July  3. 
f  No  First  Brigade  in  division.  t  See  foot-note  (ff),  p.  415. 

§  Guarding  wagon-train  at  Westminster,  and  not  engaged  in  the 
battle. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  421 

terson  ;  139th  Pa.,  Col.  Frederick  H.  Collier,  Lieut.-Col.  William  H. 
Moody.  Artillery  Brigade,  Col.  Charles  H.  Tompkins  ;  Mass.  Light, 
1st  Batt.  (A),  Capt.  William  H.  McCartney  ;  N.  Y.  Light,  1st  Batt., 
Capt.  Andrew  Cowan  ;  N.  Y.  Light,  3d  Batt.,  Capt.  William  A.  Harn  ; 
1st  R.  I.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt.  Richard  Waterman  ;  1st  R.  I.  Light, 
Batt.  G,  Capt.  George  W.  Adams  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batt.  D,  Lieut.  Edward  B. 
Williston  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batt.  G,  Lieut,  John  H.  Butler  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt, 

F,  Lieut.  Leonard  Martin. 

ELEVENTH  ARMY  CORPS,*  MAJOR-GENERAL  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD. 
General  Head-quarters,  1st  Ind.  Cav.,  Cos.  I  and  K,  Capt.  Abrum 
Sharra  ;  8th  N.  Y.  Inf.  (1  co.),  Lieut.  Herman  Foerster. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Francis  C.  Barlow,  Brig.-Gen.  Adelbert 
Ames: — First  Brigade,  Col.  Leopold  von  Gilsa ;  41st  N.  Y.  (9  cos.), 
Lieut.-Col.  Detleo  von  Einsiedel  ;  54th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  Stephen  Kovacs, 
Lieut.  Ernst  Poth(?) ;  68th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Gotthilf  Bourry  ;  153d  Pa,,  Maj. 
John  F.  Frueauff.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Adelbert  Ames,  Col. 
Andrew  L.  Harris  ;  17th  Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  Douglas  Fowler,  Maj.  Allen 

G.  Brady  ;  25th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Jeremiah  Williams  ;  Capt.  Nathaniel 
J.  Manning,  Lieut,  William  Maloney,  Lieut.  Israel  White  ;  75th  Ohio, 
Col.  Andrew  L.  Harris,  Capt.  George  B.  Fox  ;  107th  Ohio,  Col.  Seraphim 
Meyer,  Capt,  John  M.  Lutz. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Adolph  von  Steinwehr  -.—First  Bri 
gade,  Col.  Charles  R.  Coster  ;  134th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Allan  H.  Jack 
son  ;  154th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  D.  B.  Allen  ;  27th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  Lorenz 
Cantador;  73d  Pa.,  Capt.  D.  F.  Kelley.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Orland 
Smith  ;  33d  Mass.,  Col.  Adin  B.  Underwood  ;  136th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James 
Wood,  Jr.  ;  55th  Ohio,  Col.  Charles  B.  Gambee  ;  73d  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col. 
Richard  Long. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Maj.-Gen.  Carl  Schurz  -.—First  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
Alex.  Schimmelfenriig,  Col.  George  von  Amsberg  ;  82d  111.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Edward  S.  Salomon  ;  45th  N.  Y.,  Col.  George  von  Amsberg ;  Lieut.-Col. 
Adolphus  Dobke  ;  157th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Philip  P.  Brown,  Jr.  ;  61st  Ohio, 
Col.  Stephen  J.  McGroarty  ;  74th  Pa.,  Col.  Adolph  von  Hartung ; 
Lieut.-Col.  Alexander  von  Mitzel,  Capt.  Gustav  Schleiter,  Capt.  Henry 
Krauseneck.  Second  Brigade,  Col.W.  Krzyzanowski ;  58th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  August  Otto,  Capt.  Emil  Koenig  ;  119th  N.  Y.,  Col.  John  T.  Lock- 
man,  Lieut.-Col.  Edward  F.  Lloyd  ;  82d  Ohio,  Col.  James  S.  Robinson, 
Lieut.-Col.  David  Thomson  ;  75th  Pa.,  Col.  Francis  Mahler,  Maj.  August 
Ledig;  26th  Wis.,  Lieut.-Col.  Hans  Boebel,  Capt.  John  W.  Fuchs.  Artil 
lery  Brigade,  Maj.  Thomas  W.  Osborn  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  I,  Capt. 
Michael  Wiedrich  ;  N.  Y.  Light,  13th  Batt.,  Lieut.  William  Wheeler  ;  1st 
Ohio  Light,  Batt.  L,  Capt,  Hubert  Dilger ;  1st  Ohio  Light,  Batt.  K, 

*  During  the  interval  between  the  death  of  General  Reynolds  and  the 
arrival  of  General  Hancock,  on  the  afternoon  of  July  1,  all  the  troops 
on  the  field  of  battle  were  commanded  by  General  Howard,  General 
Schurz  taking  command  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and  General  Schim- 
melfennig  of  the  Third  Division. 


422  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Capt.  Lewis  Heckman  ;  4th   U.  S.,  Batt.  G.  Lieut.  Bayard  Wilkeson, 
Lieut.  Eugene  A.  Bancroft. 

TWELFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM,*  BRIGA 
DIER-GENERAL  ALPHEUS  S.  WILLIAMS.  Provost  Guard,  10th  Me. 
(4  cos.),  Capt.  John  D.  Beardsley. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Alpheus  S.  Williams,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas 
H.  Ruger : — First  Brigade,  Col.  Archibald  L.  McDougall ;  5th  Conn., 
Col.  W.  W.  Packer;  20th  Conn.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  B.  Wooster ;  3d 
Md.,  Col.  Jos.  M.  Sudsburg  ;  123d  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  James  C.  Rogers, 
Capt.  Adolphus  H.  Tanner  ;  145th  N.  Y.,  Col.  E.  L.  Price  ;  46th  Pa.,  Col. 
James  L.  Selfridge.  Second  Brigade,^  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  H.  Lockwood  ; 
1st  Md.,  Potomac  Home  Brigade,  Col.  William  P.  Maulsby ;  1st  Md., 
Eastern  Shore,  Col.  James  Wallace  ;  150th  N.  Y.,  Col.  John  H.  Ketcham. 
Third  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  H.  Ruger,  Col.  Silas  Colgrove ;  27th 
Ind.,  Col.  Silas  Colgrove,  Lieut.-Col.  John  R.  Fesler ;  2d  Mass.,  Lieut. 
Col.  Charles  R.  Mudge,  Maj.  Charles  F.  Morse ;  13th  N.  J.,  Col.  Ezra  A. 
Carman;  107th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Nirom  M.  Crane;  3d  Wis.,  Col.  William 
Hawley. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  W.  Geary  -.—First  Brigade,  Col. 
Charles  Candy  ;  5th  Ohio,  Col.  John  H.  Patrick  ;  7th  Ohio,  Col.  William 
R.  Creighton  ;  29th  Ohio,  Capt.  Wilbur  F.  Stevens,  Capt.  Edward  Hayes  ; 
66th  Ohio,  Lieut.-Col.  Eugene  Powell ;  28th  Pa,,  Capt.  John  Flynn  ;  147th 
Pa.  (8  cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  Ario  Pardee,  Jr.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
Thomas  L.  Kane,  Col.  George  A.  Cobham,  Jr. ;  29th  Pa.,  Col.  William 
Rickards,  Jr. ;  109th  Pa.,  Capt.  F.  L.  Gimber  ;  lllth  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas  M.  Walker,  Col.  George  A.  Cobham,  Jr.  Third  Brigade,  Brig.- 
Gen.  George  S.  Greene  ;  60th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Abel  Godard  ;  78th  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Herbert  von.  Hammerstein  ;  102d  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  C.  Lane, 
Capt.  Lewis  R.  Stegman  ;  137th  N.  Y.,  Col.  David  Ireland  ;  149th  N.  Y., 
Col.  Henry  A.  Barnurn,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  B.  Randall.  Artillery  Bri 
gade,  Lieut.  Edward  D.  Muhlenberg  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt.  M,  Lieut. 
Charles  E.  Winegar  ;  Pa.  Light,  Batt.  E,  Lieut.  Charles  A.  Atwell ;  4th 
U.  S.,  Batt.  F,  Lieut.  Sylvanus  T.  Rugg  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  K,  Lieut. 
David  H.  Kinzie. 

CAVALRY  CORPS,  MAJOR-GENERAL  ALFRED  PLEASONTON. 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  John  Buford  : — First  Brigade,  Col.  Wil 
liam  Gamble  ;  8th  111.,  Maj.  John  L.  Beveridge  ;  12th  111.  (4  cos.),  3d 
Ind.  (6  cos.),  Col.  George  H.  Chapman  ;  8th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  William 
L.  Markell.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Thomas  C.  Devin  ;  6th  N.  Y.,  Maj. 
William  E.  Beardsley  ;  9th  N.  Y.,  Col.  William  Sackett  ;  17th  Pa.,  Col. 
J.  H.  Kellogg  ;  3d  W.  Va.  (2  cos.),  Capt.  Seymour  B.  Conger.  Reserve 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Wesley  Merritt ;  6th  Pa.,  Maj.  James  H.  Haseltine  ; 

*  Exercised  command  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army  during  a  part  of 
the  battle. 

t  Unassigned  during  progress  of  battle  ;  afterwards  attached  to  First 
Division,  as  Second  Brigade. 


GETTYSBURG — THIRD    DAY. 


423 


1st  U.  S.,  Capt,  Richard  S.  C.  Lord  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Capt.  T.  F.  Rodenbough  ; 
5th  U.  S.,  Capt.  Julius  W.  Mason  ;  6th  U.  S.,  Maj.  Samuel  H.  Starr, 
Lieut.  Louis  H.  Carpenter,  Lieut.  Nicholas  Nolan,  Capt.  Ira  W.  Claflin. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  David  McM.  Gregg  -.—Head-quarters 
Guard,  1st  Ohio,  Co.  A,  Capt.  Noah  Jones.  First  Brigade,  Col.  John  B. 
Mclntosh ;  1st  Md.  (11  cos.),  Lieut.-Col.  James  M.  Deems ;  Purnell 
(Md.)  Legion,  Co.  A,  Capt.  Robert  E.  Duvall ;  1st  Mass.,*  Lieut.-Col. 
Greely  S.  Curtis  ;  1st  N.  J.,  Maj.  M.  H.  Beaumont ;  1st  Pa.,  Col.  John  P. 
Taylor,  3d  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  S.  Jones  ;  3d  Pa.  Heavy  Art.,  Section  Batt. 
H,f  Capt.  W.  D.  Rank.  Second  Brigade,^  Col.  Pennock  Huey  ;  2d  N.  Y., 
Lieut.-Col.  Otto  Harhaus ;  4th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Augustus  Pruyn  ;  6th 
Ohio  (10  cos.),  Maj.  William  Stedrnan  ;  8th  Pa.,  Capt.  William  A.  Cor- 
rie.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  J.  Irvin  Gregg ;  1st  Me.  (10  cos.),  Lieut.-Col. 
Charles  H.  Smith  ;  10th  N.  Y.,  Maj.  M.  Henry  A  very  ;  4th  Pa.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  William  E.  Doster  ;  16th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  K.  Robison. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Brig.-Gen.  Judson  Kilpatrick  : — Head-quarters 
Guard,  1st  Ohio,  Co.  C,  Capt.  Samuel  N.  Stanford.  First  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  Elon  J.  Farnsworth,  Col.  Nathaniel  P.  Richmond  ;  5th  N.Y., 
Maj.  John  Hammond  ;  18th  Pa.,  Lieut.-Col.  William  P.  Brinton  ;  1st  Vt, 
Lieut.-Col.  Addison  W.  Preston  ;  1st  W.  Va.  (10  cos.),  Col.  Nathaniel  P. 
Richmond,  Maj.  Charles  E.  Capehart.  Second  Brigade,  Brig.-Gen. 
George  A.  Custer ;  1st  Mich.,  Col.  George  H.  Town  ;  5th  Mich.,  Col.  Rus 
sell  A.  Alger;  6th  Mich.,  Col.  George  Gray;  7th  Mich.  (10  cos.),  Col. 
William  D.  Mann. 

HORSE  ARTILLERY  : — First  Brigade,  Capt.  James  M.  Robertson  ;  9th 
Mich.  Batt.,  Capt.  Jabez  J.  Daniels  ;  6th  N.  Y.  Batt.,  Capt.  Joseph  W. 
Martin  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batts.  B  and  L,  Lieut,  Edward  Heaton  ;  2d  U.  S., 
Batt.  M,  Lieut.  A.  C.  M.  Permington,  Jr. ;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  E,  Lieut. 
Samuel  S.  Elder.  Second  Brigade,  Capt.  John  C.  Tidball ;  1st  U.  S., 
Batts.  E  and  G,  Capt.  Alanson  M.  Randol ;  1st  U.  S.,  Batt.  K,  Capt. 
William  M.  Graham  ;  2d  U.  S.,  Batt.  A,  Lieut.  John  H.  Calef ;  3d  U.  S., 
Batt,  C.,  Lieut.  William  D.  Fuller.? 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  O.  Tyler,  Capt.  James  M. 
Robertson.  Head-quarters  Guard,  32d  Mass.  Inf.,  Co.  C,  Capt.  Josiah 
C.  Fuller.  First  Regular  Brigade,  Capt.  Dunbar  R.  Ransom  ;  1st  U.  S., 
Batt.  H,  Lieut.  Chandler  P.  Eakin,  Lieut.  Philip  D.  Mason ;  3d  U.  S., 
Batts.  F  and  K,  Lieut.  John  G.  Turn  bull ;  4th  U.  S.,  Batt.  C,  Lieut. 
Evan  Thomas  ;  5th  U.  S.,  Batt.  C,  Lieut.  Gulian  V.  Weir.  First  Volun 
teer  Brigade,  Lieut.-Col.  Freeman  McGilvery  ;  Mass.  Light,  5th  Batt. 
(E),||  Capt.  Charles  A.  Phillips;  Mass.  Light,  9th  Batt.,  Capt.  John  Bige- 
low,  Lieut.  Richard  S.  Milton;  N.  Y.  Light,  15th  Batt,,  Capt.  Patrick 
Hart ;  Pa.  Light,  Batts.  C  and  F,  Capt.  James  Thompson.  Second  Vol 
unteer  Brigade,  Capt.  Elijah  D.  Taft ;  1st  Conn.  Heavy,  Batt.  B,f  Capt. 
Albert  F.  Brooker  ;  1st  Conn.  Heavy,  Batt.  MJ  Capt.  Franklin  A.  Pratt ; 

*  Served  with  the  Sixth  Army  Corps,  and  on  the  right  flank. 

f  Serving  as  light  artillery. 

I  At  Westminster,  etc.,  and  not  engaged  in  the  battle. 

$  With  Huey's  Cavalry  Brigade,  and  not  engaged  in  the  battle. 

||  Tenth  New  York  Battery  attached.  fl  Not  engaged. 


424  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Conn.  Light,  2dBatt.,  Capt.  John  W.  Sterling;  N.  Y.  Light,  5th  Batt, 
Capt.  Elijah  D.  Taft.  Third  Volunteer  Brigade,  Capt.  James  F.  Hun- 
tington  ;  N.  H.  Light,  1st  Batt.,  Capt.  Frederick  M.  Edgell ;  1st  Ohio 
Light,  Batt.  H,  Lieut.  George  W.  Norton  ;  1st  Pa.  Light,  Batts.  F  and 
G,  Capt.  R.  Bruce  Ricketts  ;  W.  Va.  Light,  Batt.  C,  Capt.  Wallace  Hill. 
Fourth  Volunteer  Brigade,  Capt.  Robert  H.  Fitzhugh  ;  Me.  Light,  6th 
Batt.  (F),  Lieut.  Edwin  B.  Dow ;  Md.  Light,  Batt.  A,  Capt.  James  H. 
Rigby  ;  N.  J.  Light,  1st  Batt.,  Lieut.  Augustus  N.  Parsons;  IstN.Y. 
Light,  Batt,  G,  Capt.  Nelson  Ames  ;  1st  N.  Y.  Light,  Batt,  K,*  Capt. 
Robert  H.  Fitzhugh.  Train  Guard,  4th  N.  J.  Inf.  (7  cos.),  Maj.  Charles 
Ewing. 

PENNSYLVANIA  VOLUNTEERS  AND  MILITIA. 

Called  into  Service  during  the  Gettysburg  Campaign.^ 

Emergency  Militia. — Iiid.  Co.  Cav.  (Murray  Troop),  Capt.  Frank  A. 
Murray  ;  Ind.  Co.  Cav.  (First  Philadelphia  City  Troop),  Capt.  Samuel 
J.  Randall ;  Ind.  Co.  Cav.  (Luzerne  Rangers),  Capt.  Henry  H.  Brown  ; 
Ind.  Co.  Cav.  (Wissahickon  Cav.),  Capt.  Samuel  W.  Comly ;  Ind.  Co. 
Cav.  (Continental  Troop),  Capt.  Alban  H.  Myers  ;  Ind.  Co.  Cav.  (Curtin 
Horse  Guards),  Capt.  John  W.Jones;  Ind.  Batt.,  Capt.  E.  Spencer 
Miller;  Ind.  Batt.,  Capt.  Henry  D.  Landis  ;  20th  Inf.,  Col.  William  B. 
Thomas ;  26th  Inf.,  Col.  William  W.  Jennings  ;  27th  Inf.,  Col.  Jacob 
G.  Frick  ;  28th  Inf.,  Col.  James  Chamberlin  ;  29th  Inf.,  Col.  Joseph  W. 
Hawley ;  30th  Inf.,  Col.  William  N.  Monies  ;  31st  Inf.,  Col.  John  New- 
kumet;  33d  Inf.  (Blue  Reserves),  Col.  William  W.  Taylor  ;  Ind.  Battn. 
Inf.,  Lieut. -Col.  Robert  Litzinger  ;  Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  John  Spear; 
Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  William  B.  Mann  ;  Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  James  B. 
German. 

Ninety-Days'  Militia. — 1st  Battn.  Cav.,  Lieut.-Col.  Richard  F.  Mason  ; 
Ind.  Co.  Cav.,  Capt.  James  M.  Bell ;  Ind.  Co.  Cav.,  Capt.  William  B. 
Dick  ;  Ind.  Co.  Cav.  (Dana  Troop),  Capt.  R.  W.  Hammell ;  Ind.  Batt., 
Capt.  Joseph  M.  Knap  ;  Ind.  Batt.,  Capt.  Benoni  Frishmuth  ;  Ind. 
Batt.,  Capt.  W.  C.  Ermentrout ;  Ind.  Batt.  (2d  Keystone  Batt.),  Capt. 
Edward  Fitzki ;  Ind.  Batt.  (Chester  Co.  Art.),  Capt.  George  R.  Guss ; 
32d  Inf.  (Gray  Reserves),  Col.  Charles  S.  Smith  ;  34th  Inf.,  Col.  Charles 
Albright ;  35th  Inf.,  Col.  Henry  B.  McKean  ;  36th  Inf.,  Col.  Henry  C. 
Alleman  ;  37th  Inf.,  Col.  John  Trout ;  38th  Inf.,  Col.  Melchior  H.  Horn  ; 
39th  Inf.,  Col.  James  Nagle  ;  40th  Inf.  (1st  Coal  Regt.),  Col.  Alfred  Day  ; 
41st  Inf.,  Col.  Edward  R.  Mayer  ;  42d  Inf.,  Col.  Charles  H.  Hunter  ;  43d 
Inf.,  Col.  William  W.  Stott ;  44th  Inf.  (Merchants'  Regt.),  Col.  Enos 
Woodward  ;  45th  Inf.,  Col.  James  T.  Clancy  ;  46th  Inf.,  Col.  John  J. 
Lawrence  ;  47th  Inf.,  Col.  James  P.  Wickersham  ;  48th  Inf.,  Col.  John 
B.  Embich  ;  49th  Inf.  (2d  Corn  Exchange),  Col.  Alexander  Murphy ; 


*  Eleventh  New  York  Battery  attached. 

t  The  emergency  militia  and  the  six  months'  volunteers  were  mus 
tered  into  the  United  States  service,  and  the  ninety-days'  militia  into 
the  State  service.  Under  act  of  Congress  approved  April  12,  1866,  the 
State  was  reimbursed  by  the  United  States  for  money  expended  in  pay 
ment  of  the  latter  troops. 


GETTYSBURG THIRD    DAY.  425 

50th  Inf.,  Col.  Emlen  Franklin  ;  51st  Inf.  (2d  Coal  Regt,),  Col.  Oliver 
Hopkinson  ;  52d  Inf.  (2d  Union  League),  Col.  William  A.  Gray ;  53d 
Inf.,  Col.  Henry  Royer  ;  54th  Inf.,  Col.  Thomas  F.  Gallagher  ;  55th  Inf., 
Col.  Robert  B.  McComb  ;  56th  Inf.,  Col.  Samuel  B.  Dick  ;  57th  Inf.,  Col. 
James  R.  Porter  ;  58th  Inf.,  Col.  George  H.  Bemus  ;  59th  Inf.  (3d  Union 
League),  Col.  George  P.  McLean  ;  60th  Inf.,  Col.  William  F.  Small ; 
Ind.  Battn.  Inf.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  McKeage  ;  Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  Joseph 
K.  Helmbold  ;  Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  Horace  A.  Beale ;  Ind.  Co.  Inf., 
Capt.  Benjamin  T.  Green;  Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  David  Mitchel ;  Ind. 
Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  Osborn  E.  Stephens ;  Irid.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  William  F. 
Rich. 

Six  Months'  Volunteers.— 20th  Cav.,  Col.  John  E.  Wynkoop  ;  21st  Cav., 
Col.  William  H.  Boyd  ;  22d  Cav.  (Battn.),  Maj.  B.  Mortimer  Morrow  ; 
1st  Battn.  Cav.,  Lieut.-Col.  Richard  C.  Dale  ;  Ind.  Batt.  (Park  Batt.), 
Capt.  Horatio  K.  Tyler ;  Ind.  Batt.,  Capt.  W.  H.  Woodward  ;  Ind. 
Batt.,  Capt.  Robert  J.  Nevin  ;  1st  Battn.  Inf.,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  F. 
Ramsey  ;  2d  Battn.  Inf.,  Lieut.-Col.  John  C.  Lininger  :  3d  Battn.  Inf., 
Lieut.-Col.  T.  Ellwood  Zell ;  Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  Samuel  T.  Griffith  ; 
Ind.  Co.  Inf.,  Capt.  William  M.  Schrock. 


(UNIVERSITY 


CALIFORNIA 


CHAPTER   XXIX. 

THE    WAVE    ROLLS    BACK. 

Confederates  retreat  from  Gettysburg — The  Federals  pursue— Crossing 
the  Potomac  under  Difficulties — Kilpatrick's  Cavalry  Dash  on  Petti- 
grew's  Command — General  Lee  thought  to  rest  his  Army  in  the 
Valley  of  Virginia,  but  Meade  followed  too  fast— Engagements  that 
harassed  the  Retreat — General  Lee  wished  to  be  relieved  of  Com 
mand,  but  President  Davis  would  not  consent  to  the  Appointment  of 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  or  General  Beauregard. 

THE  armies  rested  on  the  "  Fourth," — one  under  the 
bright  laurels  secured  by  the  brave  work  of  the  day  be 
fore,  but  in  profound  sorrow  over  the  silent  forms  of  the 
host  of  comrades  who  had  fallen  during  those  three  fate 
ful  days,  whose  blood  bathed  the  thirsty  fields  of  Get 
tysburg,  made  classic  by  the  most  stupendous  clash  of 
conflict  of  that  long  and  sanguinary  war ;  while  gentle 
rain  came  to  mellow  the  sod  that  marked  the  honored  rest 
of  friend  and  foe ;  the  other,  with  broken  spirits,  turned 
from  fallen  comrades  to  find  safety  away  from  the  fields 
that  had  been  so  promising  of  ennobling  fruits.  The 
enemy  had  cast  his  lines  on  grounds  too  strong  for  lead 
and  steel,  and,  exhausted  alike  of  aggressive  force  and 
means  of  protracted  defence,  there  was  nothing  left  for 
the  vanquished  but  to  march  for  distant  homeward  lines. 

The  cavalry  left  on  the  Blue  Ridge  joined  the  Con 
federate  left  late  on  the  afternoon  of  the  3d.  Orders  for 
retreat  were  issued  before  noon  of  the  4th,  and  trains  of 
wounded  and  other  impedimenta  were  put  in  motion  by 
the  Chambersburg  and  Fairfield  routes,  the  army  to  march 
after  night  by  the  latter, — the  Second  Corps  as  rear-guard, 
the  First  to  follow  the  Third  and  push  on  to  secure  the 
crossings  of  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport  and  Falling 
Waters.  It  was  daylight  of  the  5th  when  the  road  was 

426 


THE    WAVE    ROLLS    BACK.  427 

open  for  the  march  of  the  First,  and  a  later  hour  of  the 
morning  before  the  Second  could  follow. 

Pursuit  was  made  by  the  enemy,  led  by  cavalry  and  the 
Sixth  Corps,  and  the  rear-guard  had  to  deploy  near  Fair- 
field  to  check  it.  Rain  was  helping  us.  Before  the  enemy 
could  get  through  the  mud  and  push  his  batteries  over  the 
boggy  fields,  our  trains  had  reached  the  mountain  gorge, 
and  the  rear-guard  was  on  the  march  following.  Direct 
pursuit  of  the  solid  ranks  was  changed  to  march  down  the 
east  of  the  mountains,  but  the  firmer  broad  road  gave  the 
Confederates  easier  march.  Kilpatrick  got  his  cavalry  in 
on  the  wagon-trains  and  destroyed  a  number,  but  did 
not  delay  the  march  of  the  column. 

On  this  retreat  the  army,  already  crippled  of  its  pride, 
was  met  by  the  dispiriting  news  of  another  defeat  at 
Vicksburg,  which  meant  that  the  Mississippi  was  free  to 
the  Federals  from  its  source  to  the  Gulf.  Diverting  inci 
dents  occurred,  but  we  were  in  poor  mood  for  them.  As 
we  approached  Hagerstown,  two  grotesque  figures  stepped 
into  the  road  about  a  hundred  yards  in  front  of  us, — one 
a  negro  of  six  feet  and  a  hundred  and  eighty  pounds,  the 
other  a  white  man  of  about  five  feet  seven.  The  negro 
was  dressed  in  full  uniform  of  the  Union  infantry,  the 
white  man  in  travel-stained  butternut  dry-goods.  The 
negro  had  a  musket  on  his  shoulder.  Riding  up  to  them, 
it  was  observed  that  the  musket  was  at  the  cock-notch. 
The  negro  was  reminded  that  it  was  unsoldier-like  to  have 
the  gun  at  a  cock,  but  said  that  he  wanted  to  be  ready  to 
save  and  deliver  his  prisoner  to  the  guard ;  it  was  his 
proudest  capture  during  the  march,  and  he  wanted  credit 
for  it.  The  man  was  a  recruit  lately  from  abroad,  and 
did  not  seem  to  care  whether  or  not  he  was  with  his  com 
rades.  However,  there  were  doubts  if  he  understood  a 
word  that  was  said.  The  uniform  was  a  tight  fit,  and 
the  shoes  were  evidently  painful,  but  the  black  man 
said  that  he  could  exchange  them.  He  was  probably 


428  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

i 

the  only  man  of  the  army  who  had  a  proud  story  to  take 
home. 

The  Union  cavalry  came  severely  upon  our  left  flank 
at  Hagerstown,  forcing  Stuart  to  call  for  infantry  support. 
Parts  of  Semmes's  and  G.  T.  Anderson's  brigades  were 
sent,  crossed  the  Antietam,  and  had  uncomfortable  expe 
rience  with  the  horse  artillery  near  Funkstown.  They  had 
dire  complaints  to  make  of  the  way  cavalrymen  put  them 
in  columns  of  fours  against  batteries,  when  they  could 
have  advanced  more  rapidly  and  effectively  in  line  of 
battle  and  saved  half  of  their  men  lost. 

Halting  for  rest  near  Falling  Waters,  a  sudden  alarm 
was  brought  down  the  road  by  a  cavalryman  riding  at 
speed,  who  reported  all  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  a  sweep 
ing  ride  against  us.  The  troops  were  thrown  together  to 
wait,  but  the  cavalry  charge  proved  to  be  a  carriage-load 
of  lady  refugees.  Some  of  the  cavalry  did  get  over  upon 
the  trains  parked  at  Williamsport,  but  there  were  many 
wounded  near  there  who  could  handle  their  muskets, 
many  infantry  up  from  Winchester,  and  some  of  Im- 
boden's  cavalry,  besides  some  batteries  who  held  the 
ground,  and  Stuart  eventually  got  up,  when  the  enemy 
drew  off. 

On  the  6th  and  7th  the  commands  were  up,  and  de 
ployed  their  lines  from  Falling  Waters  to  cover  the  bridge 
and  ford  at  Williamsport.  But  the  river  was  full,  past 
fording  at  Williamsport,  and  a  raiding  party  from  Har 
per's  Ferry  had  partially  destroyed  the  bridge  at  Falling 
Waters.  Infantry  trenches  were  made  along  the  lines, 
batteries  were  put  in  position,  and  we  were  ready  in  a  day 
or  two  to  receive  our  successful  adversary.  He  found 
some  mud  along  his  route,  and  was  not  up  until  the  12th, 
when  he  appeared  and  spread  his  lines  along  the  Confed 
erate  front,  but  positions  were  changed, — he  had  the  longer 
outer  curve,  while  the  Confederates  were  on  the  concen 
trating  inner  lines.  He  made  his  field-works  and  other 


THE    WAVE    ROLLS    BACK.  429 

arrangements,  had  some  reinforcements  since  his  battle, 
and  was  well  organized. 

On  the  forenoon  of  the  13th,  General  Lee  sent  for  me, 
and  announced  that  the  river  was  fordable  and  the  bridge 
repaired,  that  the  trains  would  be  started  at  once,  and  the 
troops  would  follow  when  night  could  conceal  the  move. 
The  First  and  Third  Corps  were  to  cross  by  the  bridge, 
the  Second  by  the  ford.  As  the  lines  were  comfortable, 
the  roads  heavy,  it  occurred  to  me  that  the  hurried  move 
during  a  single  night  would  be  troublesome ;  suggestion 
was  offered  that  the  trains  and  wounded  should  move  over 
during  the  night,  and  give  us  easy  march  the  next  night, 
but  the  waters  on  the  other  side  were  high,  and  only 
enough  mills  running  to  supply  food  from  day  to  day,  and 
the  weather  treacherous,  so  the  general  thought  it  better  to 
hurry  on.  The  march  by  the  Williamsport  crossing  over 
the  firm,  broad  turnpike  was  made  without  trouble.  The 
route  to  the  bridge  was  over  a  new  road  ;  at  the  ends  of 
the  bridge  were  green  willow  poles  to  prevent  the  wheels 
cutting  through  the  mud,  but  the  soil  underneath  was  wet 
and  soggy  under  the  long  season  of  rain,  and  before  night 
rain  again  began  to  fall. 

General  Lee,  worn  by  the  strain  of  the  past  two  weeks, 
asked  me  to  remain  at  the  bridge  and  look  to  the  work 
of  the  night.  And  such  a  night  is  seldom  experienced 
even  in  the  rough  life  of  the  soldier.  The  rain  fell  in 
showers,  sometimes  in  blinding  sheets,  during  the  entire 
night ;  the  wagons  cut  deep  in  the  mud  during  the  early 
hours,  and  began  to  "  stall"  going  down  the  hill,  and  one 
or  two  of  the  batteries  were  "  stalled"  before  they  reached 
the  bridge.  The  best  standing  points  were  ankle-deep  in 
mud,  and  the  roads  half-way  to  the  knee,  puddling  and 
getting  worse.  We  could  only  keep  three  or  four  torches 
alight,  and  those  were  dimmed  at  times  when  heavy  rains 
came.  Then,  to  crown  our  troubles,  a  load  of  the  wounded 
came  down,  missed  the  end  of  the  bridge,  and  plunged 

27 


430  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPQMATTOX. 

the  wagon  into  the  raging  torrent.  Right  at  the  end  of 
the  bridge  the  water  was  three  feet  deep,  and  the  current 
swift  and  surging.  It  did  not  seem  possible  that  a  man 
could  be  saved,  but  every  one  who  could  get  through  the 
mud  and  water  rushed  to  their  relief,  and  Providence  was 
there  to  bring  tears  of  joy  to  the  sufferers.  The  wagon 
was  righted  and  on  the  bridge  and  rolled  off  to  Virginia's 
banks.  The  ground  under  the  poles  became  so  puddled 
before  daylight  that  they  would  bend  under  the  wheels 
and  feet  of  the  animals  until  they  could  bend  no  farther, 
and  then  would  occasionally  slip  to  one  side  far  enough  to 
spring  up  and  catch  a  horse's  foot  and  throw  him  broad 
side  in  the  puddled  mud.  Under  the  trials  and  vexa 
tions  every  one  was  exhausted  of  patience,  the  general  and 
staff  were  ready  for  a  family  quarrel  as  the  only  relief  for 
their  pent-up  trouble,  when  daylight  came,  and  with  it 
General  Lee  to  relieve  and  give  us  opportunity  for  a  little 
repose. 

The  division  of  the  Third  Corps  under  General  Petti- 
grew  formed  the  rear  of  the  infantry  line,  which  was  to 
be  covered  by  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry.  But  the  cavalry 
brigadier  rode  off  and  crossed  the  river,  leaving,  it  is  said, 
a  squadron  for  the  duty,  and  the  squadron  followed  the 
example  of  the  brigadier.  The  consequence  was  that 
when  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  rode  up  it  was  taken  to  be,  the 
Confederates  ordered  for  their  rear-guard.  Instead  of 
friends,  however,  General  Pettigrew  found  a  foe.  He  was 
surprised  by  a  dashing  cavalry  charge,  was  wounded,  and 
died  after  a,  few  days.  Some  artillery,  three  standards  (of 
the  Virginia  infantry),  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners 
were  taken.  General  Meade  claimed  two  thousand. 

General  Lee  thought  to  occupy  the  gaps  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  by  his  cavalry,  and  rest  his  army  in  the  Valley  of 
Virginia,  in  threatening  lines  against  Washington  City,  but 
found  the  Shenandoah  River  full  and  past  fording,  and 
before  the  tide  began  to  recede  General  Meade  crossed  the 


'  an* 


THE    WAVE    ROLLS    BACK.  431 

Potomac  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  began  to  occupy  the 
gaps,  which  called  for  a  southern  march  of  the  Confeder 
ates.  On  the  19th  my  command  was  ordered  to  Millwood 
to  secure,  if  possible,  Ashby's  Gap,  but  as  the  enemy's 
cavalry  was  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  the  waters  were  too 
high  for  us  to  get  over,  we  marched  on  to  Manassas,  then 
for  Chester  Gap.  As  high  up  as  Front  Royal  the  river 
was  found  past  fording,  but  part  of  a  pontoon  bridge  was 
at  hand.  General  Corse,  who  had  joined  us,  hurried  and 
succeeded  in  getting  his  brigade  over  in  time  to  occupy 
Chester  Gap,  and  putting  his  regiment  under  Colonel 
Arthur  Herbert  in  the  west  end  of  Manassas  Gap.  The 
balance  of  Pickett's  men  crossed  by  putting  the  arms  and 
ammunition  in  the  boats,  the  men  swimming,  and  sent  re 
inforcements  to  General  Corse  and  Colonel  Herbert,  when 
the  enemy's  cavalry  withdrew.  One  bridge  was  laid  and 
spliced,  and  the  march  southward  was  resumed. 

The  next  day  another  demonstration  was  made  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry  at  Manassas  Gap,  but  Hood's  division 
was  there  and  McLaws's  was  at  the  Chester  Gap,  where 
another  heavy  body  of  cavalry  approached.  An  effort 
was  made  to  get  behind  the  latter  by  hidden  lines  of 
march,  but  the  plan  of  catching  cavalry  with  infantry  was 
not  successful,  though  General  Wofford  thought  for  a  time 
that  his  trap  was  well  laid.  The  march  was  continued,  and 
the  head  of  the  column  reached  Culpeper  Court-House 
on  the  24th.  Benning's  brigade,  left  on  guard  at  Gaines's 
Cross-Roads  till  the  Third  Corps  could  relieve  him,  was 
attacked  by  a  strong  cavalry  force.  On  the  approach  of 
the  Third  Corps  he  thought  to  organize,  with  General  A. 
P.  Hill,  another  plan  to  entrap  the  cavalry  in  a  thick 
wood,  but  the  riders  found  little  difficulty  in  getting  away. 
General  Ewell  was  detained  a  little,  and  found,  upon  ap 
proaching  Front  Royal,  that  General  Wright's  brigade, 
left  there  to  hold  the  gaps  for  him,  was  engaged  in  skir 
mishing  with  the  enemy's  infantry.  He  reinforced  the 


432  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

brigade,  held  the  enemy  back,  then  changed  his  march 
west,  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  at  Thornton's  Gap,  and 
ordered  Early's  division,  that  was  not  yet  up,  through  the 
Valley  by  Strasburg.  He  reached  Madison  Court-House 
on  the  29th. 

General  Meade  got  his  army  together  near  Warrenton 
on  the  31st  of  July,  and  ordered  a  detachment  of  artil 
lery,  cavalry,  and  infantry  across  the  Rappahannock  at 
Kelly's  Ford  and  the  railroad  bridge.  The  command 
drove  our  cavalry  back  till  it  was  reinforced  by  in 
fantry,  when  the  enemy  was  pushed  back  beyond  Brandy 
Station. 

General  Ewell  was  called  down  from  Madison  Court- 
House,  behind  the  Rapidan,  and  the  First  and  Third 
Corps  were  marched  into  position  behind  the  river  on  the 
3d  of  August,  leaving  the  cavalry  at  Culpeper  Court- 
House. 

General  Lee  suffered  during  the  campaign  from  his  old 
trouble,  sciatica,  and  as  soon  as  he  found  rest  for  his  army 
applied  to  the  authorities  for  a  change  of  commanders. 
The  President  refused,  pleading  that  he  had  no  one  to 
take  his  place.  At  the  time  he  had  two  generals  of  his 
own  choosing  who  were  not  in  authority  adequate  to  their 
rank, — Joseph  E.  Johnston,  the  foremost  soldier  of  the 
South,  who  had  commanded  the  army  from  its  organiza 
tion  until  he  was  wounded  at  Seven  Pines,  and  G.  T. 
Beauregard,  the  hero  of  Sumter  and  the  first  Bull  Run, 
well  equipped  and  qualified  for  high  command.  But  the 
President  was  jealous  of  Johnston,  and  nourished  prejudice 
against  Beauregard. 


CHAPTEE    XXX. 

LONGSTREET    MOVES   TO    GEORGIA. 

The  Author  reverts  to  the  Perils  and  Opportunities  in  the  West— Pro 
poses  to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  reinforce  against  Rosecrans  from  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia — Makes  Plan  known  to  General  Lee — 
The  Move  finally  effected— Difficulties  of  Transportation— A  Round 
about  Route— General  Longstreet  narrowly  escapes  capture  when 
seeking  Bragg's  Head-quarters — General  Bragg  assigns  Longstreet  to 
Command  of  the  Left — Instructions  for  the  Battle  of  Chickamauga — 
The  Armies  in  Position — Federals  in  Command  of  Generals  Rosecrans, 
Crittenden,  McCook,  and  George  H.  Thomas, 

WHILE  the  army  was  lying  idle  on  the  south  bank  of 
the  Rapidan  my  mind  reverted  to  affairs  in  the  West,  and 
especially  to  the  progressive  work  of  the  Union  army 
in  Tennessee  towards  the  northern  borders  of  Georgia. 
Other  armies  of  the  South  were,  apparently,  spectators, 
viewing  those  tremendous  threatenings  without  thought 
of  turning  minds  or  forces  to  arrest  the  march  of  Rose- 
crans. 

To  me  the  emergency  seemed  so  grave  that  I  decided  to 
write  the  Honorable  Secretary  of  War  (excusing  the  in 
formality  under  the  privilege  given  in  his  request  in 
May)  expressing  my  opinion  of  affairs  in  that  military 
zone.  I  said  that  the  successful  march  of  General  Rose- 
crans's  army  through  Georgia  would  virtually  be  the 
finishing  stroke  of  the  war ;  that  in  the  fall  of  Vicksburg 
and  the  free  flow  of  the  Mississippi  River  the  lungs  of  the 
Confederacy  were  lost ;  that  the  impending  march  would 
cut  through  the  heart  of  the  South,  and  leave  but  little 
time  for  the  dissolution  ;  that  to  my  mind  the  remedy  was 
to  order  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  to  defensive  work, 
and  send  detachments  to  reinforce  the  army  in  Tennessee ; 
to  call  detachments  of  other  commands  to  the  same  ser 
vice,  and  strike  a  crushing  blow  against  General  Rose- 

28  433 


434  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

crans  before  he  could  receive  reinforcing  help ;  that  our 
interior  lines  gave  the  opportunity,  and  it  was  only  by  the 
skilful  use  of  them  that  we  could  reasonably  hope  to 
equalize  our  power  to  that  of  the  better-equipped  adver 
sary  ;  that  the  subject  had  not  been  mentioned  to  my 
commander,  because  like  all  others  he  was  opposed  to 
having  important  detachments  of  his  army  so  far  beyond 
his  reach ;  that  all  must  realize  that  our  affairs  were  lan 
guishing,  and  that  the  only  hope  of  reviving  the  waning 
cause  was  through  the  advantage  of  interior  lines. 

A  few  days  after  the  letter  was  despatched  the  subject 
happened  up  while  discussing  affairs  with  General  Lee, 
when  I  felt  warranted  in  expressing  my  views  and  re 
lieving  my  mind  of  the  serious  apprehensions  that  haunted 
me.  He  inquired  if  I  was  willing  to  go  West  and  take 
charge  there.  To  that  I  consented,  provided  the  change 
could  be  so  arranged  as  to  give  me  an  opportunity,  by 
careful  handling  of  the  troops  before  accepting  battle,  to 
gain  their  confidence ;  providing,  at  the  same  time,  that 
means  could  be  arranged  for  further  aggressive  march  in 
case  of  success. 

At  that  time  the  railway  passing  our  camps  on  the 
Rapidan  through  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee  to  Chatta 
nooga  was  open  and  in  good  working  order.  General 
Bragg's  army  was  near  Chattanooga,  General  Buckner's  in 
East  Tennessee,  near  Knoxville,  General  Samuel  Jones's 
army,  or  parts  of  an  army,  in  Southwest  Virginia.  There 
was  but  one  railway, — from  Cincinnati  via  Louisville  and 
Nashville  to  Chattanooga.  On  that  road  General  Rose- 
crans  was  marching  against  General  Bragg.  On  the 
direct  route  to  East  Tennessee  over  the  Cumberland 
Mountains  General  Burnside  was  moving  into  East  Ten 
nessee  against  General  Buckner's  forces. 

A  few  days  after  the  conversation  with  General  Lee,  he 
was  called  clown  to  Richmond.  In  the  course  of  a  week 
he  wrote,  viz. : 


LONGSTKEET    MOVES    TO    GEOKGIA.  435 

"  [Confidential.] 

"RICHMOND,  August  31,  1863. 
"  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET, 

"  Head- quarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  : 
"  GENERAL, — I  have  wished  for  several  days  past  to  return  to 
the  army,  but  have  been  detained  by  the  President.  He  will  not 
listen  to  my  proposition  to  leave  to-morrow.  I  hope  you  will  use 
every  exertion  to  prepare  the  army  for  offensive  operations,  and 
improve  the  condition  of  our  men  and  animals.  I  can  see  nothing 
better  to  be  done  than  to  endeavor  to  bring  General  Meade  out 
and  use  our  efforts  to  crush  his  army  while  in  its  present  con 
dition. 

********* 
"  Very  respectfully  and  truly  yours, 

"K.  E.  LEE, 

"  General." 

REPLY. 

"  HE  AD-  QUARTERS,  September  2,  1863. 
"GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

* (  Commanding : 

"  GENERAL,—  Your  letter  of  the  31st  is  received.  I  have  ex 
pressed  to  Generals  Ewell  and  Hill  your  wishes,  and  am  doing 
all  that  can  be  done  to  be  well  prepared  with  niy  own  command. 
Our  greatest  difficulty  will  be  in  preparing  our  animals.  I  do 
not  see  that  we  can  reasonably  hope  to  accomplish  much  by  of 
fensive  operations,  unless  you  are  strong  enough  to  cross  the 
Potomac.  If  we  advance  to  meet  the  enemy  on  this  side  he  will 
in  all  probability  go  into  one  of  his  many  fortified  positions. 
These  we  cannot  afford  to  attack. 

"I  know  but  little  of  the  condition  of  our  affairs  in  the  West, 
but  am  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  our  best  opportunity  for  great 
results  is  in  Tennessee.  If  we  could  hold  the  defensive  here  with 
two  corps  and  send  the  other  to  operate  in  Tennessee  with  that 
army,  I  think  that  we  could  accomplish  more  than  by  an  advance 
from  here. 

********* 
"I  remain,  general,  very  respectfully, 

"Your  obedient  servant, 

"JAMES  LONGSTREET, 

1 '  Lieutenant-  General. ' > 

General  Lee  next  wrote  to  inquire  as  to  the  time  neces 
sary  for  the  movement  of  my  corps  into  Tennessee.  As 


436  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

there  were  but  two  divisions,  McLaws's  and  Hood's,  and 
Alexander's  batteries,  two  days  was  supposed  to  be  ample 
time.  The  transportation  was  ordered  by  the  quarter 
master's  department  at  Richmond,  and  the  divisions  were 
made  ready  to  board  the  trains  as  soon  as  they  could 
reach  us. 

The  success  of  the  plan  was  thought  from  the  first  to 
depend  upon  its  prompt  and  vigorous  execution,  and  it 
was  under  those  conditions  that  General  Lee  agreed  to  re 
inforce  the  army  in  Tennessee,  together  with  the  assurance 
that  vigorous  pursuit,  even  to  the  Ohio  River,  should  fol 
low  success.  The  onward  march  was  repeatedly  urged, 
not  only  in  return  for  the  use  of  part  of  the  army,  but  to 
relieve  General  Lee  of  apprehension  from  the  army  in 
front  of  him ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  9th  of  September 
that  the  first  train  came  to  Orange  Court-House  to  start 
with  its  load  of  troops.  Meanwhile,  General  Buckner 
had  left  his  post  in  East  Tennessee  and  marched  south  to 
draw  nearer  the  army  under  General  Bragg  about  Chat 
tanooga,  leaving  nothing  of  his  command  in  East  Ten 
nessee  except  two  thousand  men  at  Cumberland  Gap, 
under  General  Frazer,  partially  fortified.  General  Burn- 
side  had  crossed  the  mountains,  and  was  not  only  in  East 
Tennessee,  but  on  that  very  day  General  Frazer  surren 
dered  to  him  his  command  at  Cumberland  Gap  without  a 
fight. 

These  facts  were  known  to  the  Richmond  authorities  at 
the  time  of  our  movements,  but  not  to  General  Lee  or 
myself  until  the  move  was  so  far  advanced  as  to  prevent 
recall.  So  that  we  were  obliged  to  make  the  circuit 
through  the  Carol  inas  to  Augusta,  Georgia,  and  up  by  the 
railroad,  thence  through  Atlanta  to  Dalton  and  Ringgold. 
It  was  the  only  route  of  transit  left  us.  There  were  two 
routes  between  Richmond  and  Augusta,  one  via  Wilming 
ton,  the  other  through  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  but  only 
a  single  track  from  Augusta  to  Chattanooga.  The  gauges 


LONGSTREET    MOVES    TO    GEORGIA.  437 

of  the  roads  were  not  uniform,  nor  did  the  roads  connect 
at  the  cities  (except  by  drays  and  other  such  conveyances) . 
The  roads  had  not  been  heavily  worked  before  the  war, 
so  that  their  rolling  stock  was  light  and  limited. 

Instead  of  two  days  of  moving,  it  was  not  until  the  25th 
that  our  artillery  joined  us  near  Chattanooga.  Hood's 
division  was  first  shipped,  and  three  brigades,  or  the 
greater  part  of  three,  were  landed  at  the  railroad  station, 
and  joined  General  Bragg's  army  on  the  18th  and  19th 
of  September,  but  that  army  had  been  manoeuvred  and 
flanked  out  of  Chattanooga,  Buckner's  out  of  East  Ten 
nessee,  and  both  were  together  down  below  the  borders  of 
Georgia. 

As  I  left  General  Lee's  tent,  after  bidding  him  good- 
by,  he  walked  out  with  me  to  my  horse.  As  my  foot  was 
in  the  stirrup  he  said  again,  "  Now,  general,  you  must 
beat  those  people  out  in  the  West."  Withdrawing  my 
foot  to  respectful  position  I  promised,  "  If  I  live  ;  but  I 
would  not  give  a  single  man  of  my  command  for  a  fruit 
less  victory."  He  promised  again  that  it  should  be  so ; 
said  that  arrangements  had  been  made  that  any  success 
that  we  had  would  be  followed ;  that  orders  to  that  effect 
had  been  given  ;  that  transportation  was  also  ordered  to 
be  prepared,  and  the  orders  would  be  repeated. 

While  the  troops  were  in  transit,  Jenkins's  South  Caro 
lina  brigade  was  transferred  to  Hood's  division,  so  that  we 
had  two  South  Carolina  and  four  Georgia  brigades  of  the 
two  divisions,  which  gave  us  some  little  trouble  in  keeping 
our  men  on  the  cars  passing  by  their  homes.  The  people 
crowded  every  station  to  give  us  their  all  in  most  accept 
able  rations,  and  to  cheer  us  with  wishes  for  a  happy  issue. 

The  train  upon  which  I  rode  reached  Catoosa  about  two 
o'clock  of  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  of  September.  That 
upon  which  our  horses  were  came  up  at  four  o'clock.  Only 
part  of  the  staff  of  the  corps  was  with  me,  and  General 
Alexander  was  with  his  batteries  far  away  in  South  Caro- 


438  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

lina.  As  soon  as  our  horses  could  be  saddled  we  started, 
Lieutenant-Colonels  Sorrel  and  Manning  and  myself,  to 
find  the  head-quarters  of  the  commanding  general.  We 
were  told  to  follow  the  main  road,  and  did  so,  though  there 
were  many  men  coming  into  that  road  from  our  right 
bearing  the  wounded  of  the  day's  battle ;  the  firing  was 
still  heard  off  to  the  right,  and  wagons  were  going  and 
coming,  indicating  our  nearness  to  the  field.  Nothing 
else  occurring  to  suggest  a  change  of  the  directions  given 
us,  we  followed  the  main  road. 

It  was  a  bright  moonlight  night,  and  the  woodlands  on 
the  sides  of  the  broad  highway  were  quite  open,  so  that 
we  could  see  and  be  seen.  After  a  time  we  were  chal 
lenged  by  an  outlying  guard,  "  Who  comes  there?" 
We  answered,  "  Friends."  The  answer  was  not  alto 
gether  satisfying  to  the  guard,  and  after  a  very  short 
parley  we  asked  what  troops  they  were,  when  the  answer 
gave  the  number  of  the  brigade  and  of  the  division.  As 
Southern  brigades  were  called  for  their  commanders  more 
than  by  their  numbers,  we  concluded  that  these  friends 
were  the  enemy.  There  were,  too,  some  suspicious  ob 
structions  across  the  road  in  front  of  us,  and  altogether 
the  situation  did  not  look  inviting.  The  moon  was  so 
bright  that  it  did  not  seem  prudent  to  turn  and  ride  back 
under  the  fire  that  we  knew  would  be  opened  on  us,  so  I 
said,  loudly,  so  that  the  guard  could  hear,  "  Let  us  ride 
down  a  little  way  to  find  a  better  crossing."  Riding  a 
few  rods  brought  us  under  cover  and  protection  of  large 
trees,  sufficiently  shading  our  retreat  to  enable  us  to  ride 
quietly  to  the  rear  and  take  the  road  over  which  we  had 
seen  so  many  men  and  vehicles  passing  while  on  our  first 
ride. 

We  reached  General  Bragg's  head-quarters  at  eleven 
o'clock,  reported,  and  received  orders,  which  he  had  pre 
viously  given  other  commanders,  for  attack  early  in  the 
morning.  Our  bivouac  was  made  near  the  general  head- 


JjQNGSTREET    MOVES   TO    GEORGIA.  439 

quarters,  and  we  rode  at  daylight  to  find  the  troops. 
Hood's  brigades  that  had  arrived  before  us  had  been  at 
work  with  the  left  of  the  army,  which  was  assigned  as  my 
command.  Lieutenant-General  Polk  was  commanding 
the  right  wing. 

Two  brigades  of  McLaws's  division,  Kershaw's  and 
Humphreys's,  came  in  the  afternoon,  and  marched  during 
the  night  and  across  the  Chickamauga  River. 

The  army  had  forced  its  way  across  the  Chickamauga 
under  severe  skirmishes,  little  less  than  a  battle,  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  19th,  and  some  of  the  commands 
had  been  engaged  on  the  18th  working  on  the  same  plan. 

The  written  order  giving  the  plan  was  issued  on  the 
18th.  In  general  terms,  it  was  to  cross  the  Chickamauga, 
strike  the  enemy's  left,  and  roll  it  back  on  his  right  by  a 
wheel  to  the  left  so  as  to  come  in  between  the  enemy  and 
Chattanooga,  The  work  had  been  so  persistent  and  as 
siduous  during  part  of  the  18th  and  all  of  the  19th,  that 
General  Rosecrans  came  to  understand  the  plan  as  well 
as  his  adversary,  and  to  arrange  accordingly. 

With  my  instructions  for  the  20th  the  commanding 
general  gave  me  a  map  showing  prominent  topographical 
features  of  the  grounds  from  the  Chickamauga  River  to 
Mission  Ridge,  and  beyond  to  the  Lookout  Mountain 
range. 

At  early  dawn  I  found  the  left  wing.  It  was  composed 
of  Buckner's  corps  (Stewart's  and  Preston's  divisions),  a 
new  division  under  General  Bushrod  R.  Johnson,  the 
division  of  General  T.  C.  Hindman,  and  three  of  Hood's 
brigades.  Buckner's  corps  had  been  cut  in  two.  His 
division  on  the  right  of  the  left  wing  was  under  General 
Stewart,  while  Preston's  division,  on  the  extreme  left, 
on  the  bank  of  the  Chickamauga,  was  assigned,  by  the 
order  for  battle,  as  the  pivot  upon  which  the  battle  should 
wheel.  The  commands  stood :  Stewart's,  Johnson's,  Hind- 
man's,  and  Preston's  divisions ;  Hood's  brigades  in  rear 


440  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

of  Johnson's  line.  General  Buckner  reported  his  artillery 
as  amounting  to  about  thirty  guns.  Three  batteries  were 
reported,  of  four  guns  each,  with  Hindman's  division, 
Johnson's  and  Hood's  commands  being  without  artillery. 
The  brigades  of  Kershaw  and  Humphreys  were  ordered, 
with  Hood's,  to  be  used  as  a  column  of  assault,  by  bri 
gades,  at  a  hundred  paces  interval. 

As  the  battle  was  ordered  for  daylight,  it  seemed  too 
late  to  draw  Buckner's  divisions  into  reciprocal  relations, 
and  we  had  yet  to  find  the  right  wing.  As  it  was  not  in 
touch  or  sight,  General  Stewart  was  ordered  to  find  it. 
He  marched  about  half  a  mile  to  his  right  and  found  that 
he  was  nearly  half  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  right  wing.  His 
move  made  place  for  Hood's  column,  which  was  called  to 
the  line,  and  General  Stewart  broke  his  right  to  rear  to 
guard  that  flank  until  the  right  wing  could  get  to  the 
front.  The  divisions  were  formed  in  two  lines,  two  bri 
gades  on  the  front  line,  others  of  the  second  line  in  support, 
except  Hood's  five  brigades  in  column.  General  McLaws 
and  two  of  his  brigades,  two  of  Hood's,  and  Alexander's 
artillery  were  on  the  rails,  speeding  for  the  battle  as  fast 
as  steam  could  carry  them,  but  failed  to  reach  it.  When 
organized  for  battle  the  left  wing  stood  about  three  hun 
dred  yards  east  of  the  Lafayette-Chattanooga  dirt  road. 
As  the  battle  was  ordered  for  wheel  to  the  left  on  Pres 
ton's  division  as  pivot,  his  (Trigg's)  brigade  was  echeloned 
on  the  left  of  Hindman's  division.  The  purpose  of  the 
commander  in  ordering  the  wheel  on  the  left  as  pivot  was 
to  push  in,  from  the  start,  between  the  enemy  and  his  new 
base  at  Chattanooga. 

No  chief  of  artillery  for  the  command  reported,  and  a 
brief  search  failed  to  find  one.  The  field,  so  far  as  it  could 
be  surveyed,  however,  was  not  a  field,  proper,  but  a  heavy 
woodland,  not  adapted  to  the  practice  of  artillery.  The 
hour  of  battle  was  at  hand,  but  the  right  wing  was  not 
yet  organized.  Some  of  the  troops  were  without  rations, 


LONGSTREET    MOVES   TO    GEORGIA.  441 

their  wagons,  having  lost  the  lines  of  march  through  the 
woodlands,  failing  to  reach  them  until  after  daylight,  when 
they  were  further  delayed  cooking  their  food. 

The  right  wing  was  formed  of  D.  H.  Hill's  corps,  Breck- 
enridge's  and  Cleburne's  divisions,  W.  H.  T.  Walker's 
corps  of  Walker's  and  Liddell's  divisions,  Cheatham's 
division  of  Folk's  corps,  artillery  battalions  of  Majors 
Melancthon  Smith,  T.  R.  Hotchkiss,  and  R.  E.  Groves, 
and  batteries  of  Lieutenant  R.  T.  Beauregard,  Captain 
E.  P.  Howell,  Captain  W.  H.  Fowler,  and  Lieutenant 
Shannon. 

As  it  formed  it  stood  with  D.  H.  Hill's  corps  on  the 
right,  Breckenridge's  and  Cleburne's  divisions  from  right 
to  left,  Cheatham's  division  on  the  left  of  Cleburne's  rear, 
and  Walker's  reserve  corps  behind  HilPs  corps ;  but  when 
arranged  for  battle  it  was  about  half  a  mile  in  rear  of 
the  line  upon  which  the  left  wing  was  established.  The 
Confederate  commander  rode  early  in  the  morning  to  hear 
the  opening  of  the  battle.  As  the  sounds  failed  to  reach 
him,  he  became  anxious,  sent  orders  of  inquiry  for  the 
cause  of  delay,  and  repeated  his  orders  for  attack,  and 
finally  rode  to  his  right  wing  and  gave  peremptory  orders. 

Marching  through  the  woods  to  line  up  on  the  left  wing, 
the  left  of  the  right  wing  was  found  to  overlap  my  di 
vision  on  the  right,  yet  our  extreme  right  was  found 
to  overreach  the  left  of  the  enemy's  field-works  by  two 
brigades,  and  reconnoissance  found  the  road  between  the 
enemy  and  Chattanooga  open  and  free  of  obstructions  or 
troops  to  defend  it.  On  the  right  of  Breckenridge's  di 
vision  was  Armstrong's  division  of  cavalry  dismounted,  and 
beyond  his  right  was  Forrest's  other  division  of  cavalry, 
Pegram's.  Some  miles  off  from  our  left  was  Wheeler's 
division  of  cavalry,  under  Wharton  and  Martin. 

The  Union  army  from  left  to  right  was  :  first  the  Four 
teenth  Corps,  General  George  H.  Thomas  commanding, 
four  divisions, — Baird's  division  on  the  left,  then  Reynolds's 


442  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  Brannan's,  the  latter  retired  to  position  of  reserve,  and 
Negley's.  (The  last  named  had  been  left,  on  the  night  of 
the  19th,  on  guard  near  the  Glen  House,  but  was  ordered 
early  on  the  20th  to  join  General  Thomas,  and  one  of  the 
brigades  did  move  promptly  under  the  order ;  the  other 
brigades  (two)  failed  to  receive  the  order.)  Then  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  three  divisions, — Jefferson  C.  Davis's,  R. 
W.  Johnson's,  and  P.  H.  Sheridan's, — on  the  right,  General 
A.  McD.  McCook  commanding  the  corps.  Next  was  the 
Twenty-first  Corps,  three  divisions, — T.  J.  Wood's,  J.  M. 
Palmer's,  and  H.  P.  Van  Cleve's,— General  T.  L.  Critten- 
den  commanding  the  corps.  It  was  in  position  on  the  east 
slope  of  Mission  Ridge,  ordered  to  be  prepared  to  support 
the  corps  of  the  right  or  left,  or  both ;  one  of  its  brigades 
had  been  left  to  occupy  Chattanooga.  Wilder's  mounted  in 
fantry,  on  the  right  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  was  ordered  to 
report  to  the  commander  of  that  corps  for  the  day's  work. 
A  reserve  corps  under  General  Gordon  Granger  was  off  the 
left  of  the  Union  army  to  cover  the  gap  in  Mission  Ridge 
at  Rossville  and  the  road  from  the  Union  left  to  that  gap. 
Minty's  cavalry  was  with  this  corps,  and  posted  at  Mission 
Mills.  General  Granger  had  Steedman's  division  of  two 
brigades  and  a  brigade  under  Colonel  D.  McCook.  General 
R.  B.  Mitchell,  commanding  Union  cavalry,  was  on  their 
right  at  Crawfish  Springs,  with  orders  to  hold  the 
crossings  of  the  Chickamauga  against  the  Confederate 
cavalry. 

It  seems  that  parts  of  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first 
Corps,  Johnson's  and  Van  Cleve's  divisions,  were  under 
General  Thomas  in  the  fight  of  his  left  on  the  19th,  and 
remained  with  him  on  the  20th.  The  purpose  of  the  post 
ing  of  the  Union  army  was  to  hold  open  its  routes  for 
Chattanooga  by  the  Rossville  and  Dry  Valley  roads.  As 
before  stated,  the  Confederate  commander's  design  was  to 
push  in  between  the  Union  army  and  Chattanooga,  re 
cover  his  lost  ground,  and  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  supplies. 


LONGSTREET    MOVES   TO    GEORGIA.  443 

The  commanders  of  the  armies  were  on  the  field  early 
on  the  20th.  The  failure  of  the  opening  of  the  Confed 
erates  at  daylight  gave  opportunity  for  a  reconnoissance  by 
light  of  day,  by  which  it  was  learned  that  the  road  from 
the  Union  left  was  open,  not  guarded  nor  under  close  ob 
servation  ;  but  the  commander  ordered  direct  assault  under 
the  original  plan, — his  back  to  the  river,  the  Union  army 
backing  on  Mission  Ridge.  The  Chickamauga  River, 
rising  from  the  mountains  south,  flows  in  its  general 
course  a  little  east  of  north  to  conflux  with  the  Tennessee 
River.  The  Ridge  runs  nearly  parallel  with  the  river,  and 
opens  up  a  valley  a  mile  wide.  It  is  a  bold  outcropping 
of  limestone  about  one  hundred  feet  above  the  valley, 
with  occasional  passes,  or  gaps,  that  are  strong  points  of 
guard  for  defence.  Four  miles  northwest  from  the  Union 
left  was  the  gap  at  Rossville,  called  for  the  old  Cherokee 
chief.  On  its  right  was  the  pass  of  the  Dry  Valley  road, 
and  immediately  in  its  rear  was  the  McFarland  Gap. 
The  line  of  the  Lafayette  road  lies  about  parallel  with 
the  Ridge  to  within  a  mile  of  the  Union  left,  when  it  bends 
westward  and  leads  to  the  Rossville  Gap.  The  Dry  Val 
ley  road  crosses  the  Chickamauga  at  Glass's  Mills,  courses 
along  the  east  slope  of  the  Ridge,  crosses  it,  and  joins 
on  the  west  the  road  that  crosses  at  the  McFarland 
Gap. 

The  Union  left  was  east  of  the  Chattanooga-Rossville 
road,  but  crossed  the  road  to  the  west  and  formed  in 
broken  front.  The  left  and  right  of  Thomas's  line  was 
retired  or  broken  to  the  rear.  The  Union  commander 
rode  over  his  lines  on  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  and 
ordered  his  front  covered  by  such  field-works  as  could 
be  constructed  during  the  night. 

General  Thomas  covered  his  lines  by  log  and  rail  ob 
structions.  The  corps  of  Rosecrans's  right  formed  two 
lines  of  rail  defences  for  infantry.  The  batteries  had  the 
ascending  slopes  of  the  Ridge  for  positions,  and  their  field 


444  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

was  more  favorable  otherwise  for  artillery  practice  than 
was  that  of  the  Confederates  advancing  from  the  valley 
and  more  densely  timbered  forests.  They  had  two  hun 
dred  and  forty-six  guns.  The  records  do  not  give  satis 
factory  accounts  of  the  number  of  Confederate  guns,  but 
they  probably  numbered  not  less  than  two  hundred. 


CHAPTEE  XXXI. 

BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA. 

Tactical  Features— The  Battle  opened  by  Direct  Attack  on  the  Federals 
in  the  Early  Morning  of  September  20— Repeated  and  Determined 
Front  Assaults— Brigadiers  Helm  killed  and  Adams  wounded— The 
Union  Commands  lay  behind  Defences— Hood's  Brigades  surged 
through  the  Forest  against  the  Covered  Infantry  and  Artillery- 
Hood  wounded— Longstreet  suggests  a  Plan  for  Progressive  Action- 
Halting  Tactics  at  High  Tide  of  Success— The  Confederate  Left 
fought  a  Separate  Battle— General  Thomas  retreats— First  Confed 
erate  Victory  in  the  West,  and  one  of  the  Bloodiest  Battles  of  the 
War — Forces  engaged — Losses. 

SATISFIED  that  the  opening  of  the  battle  was  to  be  the 
attack  against  his  left,  the  Union  commander  ordered 
Negley's  division  out  from  its  position  near  the  Glen 
House  to  report  to  General  Thomas  and  assist  in  meeting 
the  attack,  but  only  Beattie's  brigade  was  in  time  for  that 
service,  the  other  brigades  waiting  to  be  relieved  from 
their  positions  in  line.  Meanwhile,  Baird's  left  had  been 
extended  by  Dodge's  brigade  of  Johnson's  division  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps. 

Before  the  Confederate  commander  engaged  his  battle 
he  found  the  road  between  the  enemy's  left  and  Chatta 
nooga  open,  which  gave  him  opportunity  to  interpose  or 
force  the  enemy  from  his  works  to  open  battle  to  save  his 
line.  But  he  preferred  his  plan  of  direct  attack  as  the 
armies  stood,  and  opened  his  battle  by  attack  of  the  right 
wing  at  9.30  A.M.  of  the  20th.  He  was  there,  and  put 
the  corps  under  Lieutenant-General  D.  H.  Hill  to  the 
work.  Breckenridge's  and  Cleburne's  divisions,  Brecken- 
ridge  on  the  right,  overreached  the  enemy's  left  by  two 
brigades,  Stovall's  and  Adams's,  but  the  other  brigade, 
Helm's,  was  marched  through  the  wood  into  front  assault 
of  the  enemy  behind  his  field-works.  This  brigade  made 

445 


446  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

desperate  repeated  and  gallant  battle  until  the  commander, 
Benjamin  H.  Helm,  one  of  the  most  promising  brigadiers, 
was  killed,  when  its  aggressive  work  was  suspended. 

The  other  brigades  crossed  the  Chattanooga  road, 
changed  front,  and  bore  down  against  the  enemy's  left. 
This  gave  them  favorable  ground  and  position.  They 
made  resolute  attack  against  Baird's  left,  threatening  his 
rear,  but  he  had  troops  at  hand  to  meet  them.  They  had 
a  four-gun  battery  of  Slocum's  of  the  Washington  Artil 
lery,*  and  encountered  Dodge's  brigade  and  parts  of  Wil- 
lick's,  Berry's,  and  Stanley's,  and  superior  artillery.  In 
the  severe  contention  General  Adams  fell  seriously  hurt, 
and  the  brigades  were  eventually  forced  back  to  and  across 
the  road,  leaving  General  Adams  on  the  field. 

A  separate  attack  was  then  made  by  Cleburne's  division, 
the  brigades  of  Polk  and  Wood  assaulting  the  breast-works 
held  by  the  divisions  of  Johnson  and  Palmer.  These 
brigades,  after  severe  fight,  were  repulsed,  and  their  posi 
tions  were  covered  by  Deshler's  brigade.  General  Deshler 
received  a  mortal  wound  from  a  fragment  of  shell,  leaving 
the  brigade  in  the  hands  of  the  gallant  Colonel  Roger  Q. 
Mills  (our  afterwards  distinguished  statesman).  General 
Thomas  called  repeatedly  for  reinforcements,  and  received 
assurances  that  they  were  coming,  even  to  include  the 
army  if  necessary  to  hold  the  left. 

Johnson's  brigade  of  Cheatham's  division  was  ordered 
to  support  the  brigade  under  Colonel  Mills,  and  the  re 
serve  corps  under  General  W.  H.  T.  Walker  (Gist's  and 
Liddell's  divisions)  was  ordered  into  the  Breckenridge 
battle,  Gist's  brigade  against  the  left  angle  of  the  breast 
works,  and  Walthall's  to  the  place  of  Cleburne's  division. 
The  other  brigade  of  Gist's  division  supported  the  battle 
of  his  own  brigade,  and  General  Liddell  was  ordered  with 
Govan's  brigade  to  advance,  passing  beyond  the  enemy's 

*  That  company  did  not  go  with  the  battalion  to  Virginia. 


BATTLE  OF 

CHICKAMAUGA 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMATJGA.  447 

left  to  the  Chattanooga  road,  and  wheel  to  the  left  against 
his  left  rear.  The  troops,  without  exception,  made  a  brave, 
desperate  fight,  but  were  unsuccessful,  and  forced  to  sus 
pend  aggressive  work. 

As  the  grand  wheel  to  the  left  did  not  progress,  I  sent, 
at  eleven  o'clock,  to  say  to  General  Bragg  that  my  column 
of  attack  could  probably  break  the  enemy's  line  if  he 
cared  to  have  it  go  in.  Before  answer  came,  General 
Stewart,  commanding  my  right  division,  received  a  mes 
sage  from  General  Bragg  to  go  in  and  attack  by  his  divi 
sion,  and  reported  that  the  Confederate  commander  had 
sent  similar  orders  to  all  division  commanders.  He  ad 
vanced,  and  by  his  severe  battle  caused  the  Union  reserve 
division  under  General  Brannan  to  be  drawn  to  the  sup 
port  of  that  front,  and  this  attack,  with  that  of  the  divisions 
of  our  right  against  those  of  Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  and 
Reynolds,  so  disturbed  General  Thomas  that  other  rein 
forcements  were  called  to  support  his  defence. 

General  Stewart  was  in  hot  engagement  before  word 
reached  me  that  the  battle  had  been  put  in  the  hands  of 
division  commanders ;  but  my  orders  reached  General 
Hood  in  time  to  hold  him  and  commanders  on  his  left 
before  he  received  notice  from  the  commanding  general, 
and  the  brigades  of  Kershaw  and  Humphreys  were  or 
dered  nearer  the  rear  of  his  column.  The  divisions  of  B. 
R.  Johnson  and  Hindman  were  ordered  to  follow  in  close 
echelon  on  Hood's  left.  Buckner's  pivoting  division  under 
Preston  was  left  to  the  position  to  which  the  Confederate 
chief  had  assigned  it. 

In  our  immediate  front  were  the  parts  of  the  Twentieth 
and  Twenty-first  Corps  in  two  lines  covered  by  rail  de 
fences  and  well-posted  batteries.  At  the  early  surging  of 
his  lines  through  the  forest,  General  Hood  came  under 
the  fire  of  this  formidable  array  of  artillery  and  infantry, 
and  found  his  lines  staggering  under  their  galling  missiles, 
and  fast  losing  strength  as  the  fire  thickened.  His  lead- 


448  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ing  brigade  was  decimated,  but  his  others  pushed  to  the 
front  to  take  and  pursue  the  assault.  The  divisions  of  B. 
R.  Johnson  and  Hindman  were  pressed  hard  on  Hood's 
left,  and  the  brigades  of  Kershaw  and  Humphreys  closed 
to  his  support,  when  a  bold  push  gave  us  the  first  line  of 
the  enemy  and  a  large  number  of  his  guns ;  but  General 
Hood  was  fearfully  wounded,  supposed  to  be  fatally  ;  Gen 
eral  Benning,  .of  his  "  Rock  Brigade,"  lost  his  horse,  and 
thought  General  Hood  was  killed.  He  cut  a  horse  loose 
from  a  captured  gun,  mounted,  and  using  part  of  a  rope 
trace  as  his  riding  whip,  rode  to  meet  me  and  report 
disaster.  He  had  lost  his  hat  in  the  melee,  and  the  bri 
gade  disappeared  under  the  steady  crushing  fire  so  quickly 
that  he  was  a  little  surprised.  He  reported,  "  General 
Hood  killed,  my  horse  killed,  my  brigade  torn  to  pieces, 
and  I  haven't  a  man  left."  I  asked  if  he  didn't  think  he 
could  find  one  man.  The  question  or  the  manner  seemed 
to  quiet  somewhat  his  apprehensions  and  brought  affirma 
tive  answer,  when  he  was  told  to  collect  his  men  and  join 
us  at  the  front ;  that  we  had  broken  and  carried  the  first 
line ;  that  Johnson's  division,  on  his  left,  was  then  in  the 
breach  and  pushing  on,  with  Hindman  on  his  left,  spread 
ing  battle  to  the  enemy's  limits  ;  that  Stewart's  division 
would  hold  it  on  our  right,  and  the  brigades  of  Kershaw 
and  Humphreys  then  on  the  quick  step  would  be  with  us 
in  a  minute  and  help  restore  the  battle  to  good  organiza 
tion.  Just  then  these  two  brigades  burst  through  the 
brush  in  cheerful,  gallant  march,  and  brought  him  back 
to  his  usual  courageous,  hopeful  confidence. 

As  we  approached  a  second  line,  Johnson's  division  hap 
pened  to  strike  it  while  in  the  act  of  changing  position  of 
some  of  the  troops,  charged  upon  and  carried  it,  capturing 
some  artillery,  Hood's  and  Hindman's  troops  pressing  in 
close  connection.  This  attack  forced  the  parts  of  the 
Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Corps  from  that  part  of  the 
field,  back  over  Missionary  Ridge,  in  disordered  retreat, 


BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  449 

and  part  of  Negley's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
by  the  same  impulsion.  As  our  right  wing  had  failed 
of  the  progress  anticipated,  and  had  become  fixed  by  the 
firm  holding  of  the  enemy's  left,  we  could  find  no  prac 
ticable  field  for  our  work  except  by  a  change  of  the  order 
of  battle  from  wheel  to  the  left,  to  a  swing  to  the  right 
on  my  division  under  General  Stewart.  The  fire  of  the 
enemy  off  my  right  readily  drew  Hood's  brigades  to  that 
bearing.  Johnson's  and  Hindman's  divisions  were  called 
to  a  similar  move,  and  Buckner's  pivotal  division  under 
General  Preston,  but  General  Buckner  objected  to  having 
his  left  "  in  the  air." 

Presently  a  discouraging  account  came  from  General 
Hindman,  that  in  the  progress  of  his  battle  his  left  and 
rear  had  been  struck  by  a  formidable  force  of  cavalry ; 
that  Manigault's  brigade  was  forced  back  in  disorder,  and 
his  other  brigades  exposed  on  their  open  left  could  not  be 
handled.  I  wrote  him  a  note  commending  the  brave 
work  of  his  division,  and  encouraging  renewed  efforts ; 
urged  him  to  have  his  brigades  in  hand,  and  bring  them 
around  to  close  connection  on  Johnson's  left. 

On  the  most  open  parts  of  the  Confederate  side  of  the 
field  one's  vision  could  not  reach  farther  than  the  length 
of  a  brigade.  Trigg's  brigade  was  ordered  to  the  relief 
of  Manigault's,  which  had  been  forced  back  to  the  La 
fayette  road,  and  the  balance  of  Preston's  division  was 
ordered  to  follow,  if  necessary,  to  support  that  part  of  the 
field,  and  our  cavalry  far  away  from  my  left  was  called 
to  clean  it  up  and  pursue  the  retreating  columns.  It 
seems  that  Wilder's  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  had 
struck  Manigault's  left  and  put  it  back  in  disorder,  and 
a  brigade,  or  part  of  a  brigade,  of  cavalry  coming  against 
the  rear,  increased  the  confusion  and  drove  it  back  to  the 
Lafayette  road,  when  Trigg's  brigade  advanced  to  its  re 
lief.  The  two  put  the  attacking  forces  back  until  they 
found  it  necessary  to  retire  beyond  the  ridge  and  cover  the 

29 


450  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

withdrawal  of  trains  left  exposed  by  the  retreat  of  troops 
of  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Corps.  General  Hind- 
man  gathered  his  forces  and  marched  for  the  left  of  John 
son's  division,  and  Preston's  brigade  under  General  Trigg 
was  returned  to  the  point  of  its  first  holding. 

Our  front,  cleared  of  opposing  forces,  was  soon  changed 
forward,  and  formed  at  right  angle  to  its  first  line  to  seek 
the  enemy's  line  standing  against  our  right  wing.  Calls 
were  repeated  for  the  cavalry  to  ride  in  pursuit  of  the  re 
treating  forces,  and  guard  the  gaps  of  the  ridge  behind 
the  enemy  standing  in  front  of  our  right  wing.  In  the 
new  position  of  the  left  wing  its  extreme  left  encountered 
the  enemy  rallying  in  strong  position  that  was  heavily 
manned  by  field  batteries.  At  the  same  time  my  left  was 
approaching  the  line  of  fire  of  one  of  our  batteries  of  the 
right  wing. 

General  Johnson  thought  that  he  had  the  key  of  the 
battle  near  Snodgrass  Hill.  It  was  a  key,  but  a  rough 
one.  He  was  ordered  to  reorganize  his  own  brigades  and 
those  of  Hindman's  division  for  renewed  work ;  to  ad 
vance  a  line  of  skirmishers,  and  give  time  to  the  troops 
for  refreshment,  while  I  rode  along  the  line  to  observe 
the  enemy  and  find  relations  with  our  right  wing. 

It  was  after  one  o'clock,  and  the  hot  and  dry  and  dusty 
day  made  work  fatiguing.  My  lunch  was  called  up  and 
ordered  spread  at  some  convenient  point  while  I  rode 
with  General  Buckner  and  the  staffs  to  view  the  changed 
conditions  of  the  battle.  I  could  see  but  little  of  the 
enemy's  line,  and  only  knew  of  it  by  the  occasional  ex 
change  of  fire  between  the  lines  of  skirmishers,  until  we 
approached  the  angle  of  the  lines.  I  passed  the  right 
of  our  skirmishers,  and,  thinking  I  had  passed  the 
enemy's,  rode  forward  to  be  accurately  assured,  when  I 
suddenly  found  myself  under  near  fire  of  his  sharp 
shooters  concealed  behind  the  trees  and  under  the 
brush.  I  saw  enough,  however,  to  mark  the  ground 


Chief  of  Subsistence  Department,  First  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  451 

line  of  his  field-works  as  they  were  spread  along  the 
front  of  the  right  wing,  and  found  that  I  was  very  for 
tunate  in  having  the  forest  to  cover  the  ride  back  until 
out  of  reach  of  their  fire.  In  the  absence  of  a  chief 
of  artillery,  General  Buckner  was  asked  to  establish  a 
twelve-gun  battery  on  my  right  to  enfilade  the  enemy's 
works  and  line  standing  before  our  right  wing,  and  then 
I  rode  away  to  enjoy  my  spread  of  Nassau  bacon  and 
Georgia  sweet  potatoes.  We  were  not  accustomed  to  pota 
toes  of  any  kind  in  Virginia,  and  thought  we  had  a  luxury, 
but  it  was  very  dry,  as  the  river  was  a  mile  and  more  from 
us,  and  other  liquids  were  over  the  border.  Then,  before 
we  had  half  finished,  our  pleasures  were  interrupted  by  a 
fragment  of  shell  that  came  tearing  through  the  woods, 
passed  through  a  book  in  the  hands  of  a  courier  who  sat 
on  his  horse  hard  by  reading,  and  struck  down  our  chief 
of  ordnance,  Colonel  P.  T.  Manning,  gasping,  as  was  sup 
posed,  in  the  struggles  of  death.  Friends  sprang  forward 
to  look  for  the  wound  and  to  give  some  aid  and  relief. 
In  his  hurry  to  enjoy  and  finish  his  lunch  he  had  just 
taken  a  large  bite  of  sweet  potato,  which  seemed  to  be  suf 
focating  him.  I  suggested  that  it  would  be  well  to  first 
relieve  him  of  the  potato  and  give  him  a  chance  to 
breathe.  This  done,  he  revived,  his  breath  came  freer, 
and  he  was  soon  on  his  feet  ready  to  be  conveyed  to  the 
hospital.  In  a  few  days  he  was  again  on  duty. 

After  caring  for  and  sending  him  off,  and  before  we 
were  through  with  our  lunch,  General  Bragg  sent  for  me. 
He  was  some  little  distance  in  rear  of  our  new  position. 
The  change  of  the  order  of  battle  was  explained,  and  the 
necessity  under  which  it  came  to  be  made.  We  had  taken 
some  thirty  or  more  field-pieces  and  a  large  number  of 
small-arms,  and  thought  that  we  had  cut  off  and  put  to 
disorder  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Corps  that  had 
retreated  through  the  pass  of  the  Ridge  by  the  Dry 
Valley  road.  He  was  informed  of  orders  given  General 


452  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Johnson  for  my  left,  and  General  Buckner  for  a  battery 
on  the  right.  I  then  offered  as  suggestion  of  the  way  to 
finish  our  work  that  he  abandon  the  plan  for  battle  by 
our  right  wing,  or  hold  it  to  defence,  draw  off  a  force 
from  that  front  that  had  rested  since  the  left  wing  took 
up  the  battle,  join  them  with  the  left  wing,  move  swiftly 
down  the  Dry  Valley  road,  pursue  the  retreating  forces, 
occupy  the  gaps  of  the  Ridge  behind  the  enemy  standing 
before  our  right,  and  call  that  force  to  its  own  relief. 

He  was  disturbed  by  the  failure  of  his  plan  and  the 
severe  repulse  of  his  right  wing,  and  was  little  prepared 
to  hear  suggestions  from  subordinates  for  other  moves 
or  progressive  work.  His  words,  as  I  recall  them,  were : 
"  There  is  not  a  man  in  the  right  wing  who  has  any 
fight  in  him."  From  accounts  of  his  former  operations 
I  was  prepared  for  halting  work,  but  this,  when  the  battle 
was  at  its  tide  and  in  partial  success,  was  a  little  sur 
prising.  His  humor,  however,  was  such  that  his  subor 
dinate  was  at  a  loss  for  a  reopening  of  the  discussion. 
He  did  not  wait,  nor  did  he  express  approval  or  dis 
approval  of  the  operations  of  the  left  wing,  but  rode  for 
his  head-quarters  at  Reed's  Bridge. 

There  was  nothing  for  the  left  wing  to  do  but  work 
along  as  best  it  could.  The  right  wing  ceased  its  active 
battle  as  the  left  forced  the  enemy's  right  centre,  and  the 
account  of  the  commanding  general  was  such  as  to  give 
little  hope  of  his  active  use  of  it  in  supporting  us.  After 
his  lunch,  General  Johnson  was  ordered  to  make  ready 
his  own  and  Hindman's  brigades,  to  see  that  those  of 
Hood's  were  in  just  connection  with  his  right,  and  await 
the  opening  of  our  battery.  Preston's  division  was  pulled 
away  from  its  mooring  on  the  river  bank  to  reinforce  our 
worn  battle.*  The  battery  not  opening  as  promptly  as 
expected,  General  Johnson  was  finally  ordered  into  strong, 

*  This  was  my  first  meeting  with  the  genial,  gallant,  lovable  William 
Preston. 


BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  453 

steady  battle.  He  pushed  through  part  of  the  woodland, 
drove  back  an  array  of  artillery  and  the  supporting  in 
fantry,  and  gained  other  elevated  ground.  The  sound  of 
battle  in  his  rear,  its  fire  drawing  nearer,  had  attracted 
the  attention  of  General  Granger  of  the  reserve  corps, 
and  warned  him  that  it  was  the  opportunity  for  his  com 
mand.  He  marched,  without  orders,  towards  the  noise, 
and  passed  by  the  front  of  Forrest's  cavalry  and  the 
front  of  our  right  wing,  but  no  report  of  his  march  was 
sent  us.  Day  was  on  the  wane.  Night  was  advancing. 
The  sun  dipped  to  the  palisades  of  Lookout  Mountain, 
when  Lieutenant-Colonel  Claiborne  reported  that  the 
cavalry  was  not  riding  in  response  to  my  calls.  He  was 
asked  to  repeat  the  order  in  writing,  and  despatched  as 

follows : 

"BATTLE-FIELD,  September  20,  1863,  5.09  P.M. 
"  GENERAL  WHEELER  : 

"  Lieutenant-  General  Longstreet  orders  you  to  proceed  down 
the  road  towards  the  enemy's  right,  and  with  your  artillery  en 
deavor  to  enfilade  his  line,  with  celerity. 

"By  order  of  Lieutenant- General  Longstreet. 

"THOMAS  CLAIBORNE, 
' i  Lieutenant-  Colonel  Cavalry. J  ? 

Then  our  foot-scouts  reported  that  there  was  nothing  on 
the  road  taken  by  the  enemy's  retreating  columns  but 
squads  of  footmen.  Another  written  order  for  the  cav 
alry  was  despatched  at  5.30.* 

General  Preston  reinforced  us  by  his  brigade  under 
Gracie,  pushed  beyond  our  battle,  and  gained  a  height 
and  intervening  dell  before  Snodgrass  Hill,  but  the 
enemy's  reserve  was  on  the  hill,  and  full  of  fight,  even 
to  the  aggressive.  We  were  pushed  back  through  the 
valley  and  up  the  slope,  until  General  Preston  suc 
ceeded  in  getting  his  brigade  under  Trigg  to  the  sup 
port.  Our  battery  got  up  at  last  under  Major  Williams 

*  Rebellion  Record. 


454  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  opened  its  destructive  fire  from  eleven  guns,  which 
presently  convinced  General  Thomas  that  his  position 
was  no  longer  tenable.  He  drew  Reynolds's  division 
from  its  trenches  near  the  angle,  for  assignment  as  rear 
guard.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sorrel,  of  the  staff,  reported 
this  move,  and  was  sent  with  orders  to  General  Stewart 
to  strike  down  against  the  enemy's  moving  forces.  It 
seems  that  at  the  same  time  Liddell's  division  of  the 
extreme  right  of  our  right  wing  was  ordered  against  the 
march  of  the  reserves.  Stewart  got  into  part  of  Rey 
nolds's  line  and  took  several  hundred  prisoners.  Mean 
while,  Reynolds  was  used  in  meeting  the  attack  and 
driving  back  the  division  of  General  Liddell.  That  ac 
complished,  he  was  ordered  to  position  to  cover  the  re 
treat.  As  110  reports  came  to  the  left  from  the  com 
manding  general  or  from  the  right  wing,  the  repulse  of 
Liddell's  division  was  thought  to  indicate  the  strong 
holding  of  the  enemy  along  his  intrenched  front  line, 
and  I  thought  that  we  should  wait  to  finish  the  battle  on 
the  morrow. 

The  direct  road  ^to  Chattanooga  was  practically  closed. 
McFarland  Gap,  the  only  debouche,  was  supposed  to 
be  occupied  by  the  cavalry.  Another  blind  road  was  at 
the  base  of  the  mountain  on  its  east  side.  During  the 
artillery  practice  the  fire  of  some  of  the  guns  of  our 
battery  was  turned  to  the  contest  at  Snodgrass  Hill, 
which  disturbed  part  of  our  infantry  fiercely  struggling 
for  that  ground,  and  they  complained,  but  the  fire  was 
effective.  As  the  woods  were  full  of  the  enemy,  a  shot 
would  find  a  mark. 

The  intrenched  line  was  crumbling  faster  than  we  sup 
posed,  and  their  reserve  was  engaged  in  hot  defensive 
battle  to  hold  secure  the  Gap  while  yet  there  were  two 
hours  of  daylight.  Had  the  four  brigades  of  Cheatham's 
division  that  had  not  been  in  action  gone  in  at  the  same 
time  as  Liddell's  division,  it  is  hardly  possible  that  the 


BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  455 

Confederate  commander  could  have  failed  to  find  the 
enemy's  empty  lines  along  the  front  of  his  right  wing, 
and  called  both  wings  into  a  grand  final  sweep  of  the 
field  to  the  capture  of  Thomas's  command ;  but  he  was 
not  present,  and  the  condition  of  affairs  was  embarrassing 
to  the  subordinate  commanders. 

A  reconnoissance  made  just  before  the  first  strokes  of 
the  morning  engagement  discovered  an  open  way  around 
the  enemy's  left  by  turning  his  intrenched  line  in  reverse, 
which  General  Hill  thought  to  utilize  by  change  of  tac 
tics,  but  General  Bragg  present,  and  advised  of  the  oppor 
tunity,  preferred  his  tactics,  and  urged  prompt  execution. 
At  the  later  hour  when  LiddelPs  division  was  passed 
beyond  the  enemy's  intrenchments  to  strike  at  his  rein 
forcing  march  under  General  Granger,  the  subordinate 
of  the  right  wing  could  not  see  how  he  was  to  be  justified 
in  using  a  greater  force  in  that  direction,  affairs  of  the 
wing  being  similar  to  those  of  the  opening,  while  the  re 
lations  of  the  right  and  left  were  in  reverse  of  tactical 
orders ;  but  a  vigilant  chief  present  and  caring  for  the 
weaker  part  of  his  battle,  advised  that  the  enemy  was  on 
his  last  legs,  with  his  reserves  could  well  have  sprung  the 
right  wing  into  the  opening  beyond  his  right,  securing 
crushing  results.  Earlier  in  the  afternoon  he  did  send  an 
order  for  renewed  efforts  of  the  right  wing  under  his  plan 
of  parallel  assault,  but  the  troops  had  tested  the  lines  in 
their  first  battle,  and  were  not  in  condition  for  a  third 
effort,  at  parallel  battle. 

The  contention  by  our  left  wing  was  maintained  as  a 
separate  and  independent  battle.  The  last  of  my  re 
serve,  Trigg's  brigade,  gave  us  new  strength,  and  Preston 
gained  Snodgrass  Hill.  The  trampled  ground  and  bushy 
woods  were  left  to  those  who  were  too  much  worn  to  es 
cape  the  rapid  strides  of  the  heroic  Confederates.  The 
left  wing  swept  forward,  and  the  right  sprang  to  the  broad 
Chattanooga  highway.  Like  magic  the  Union  army  had 


456  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

melted  away  in  our  presence.  A  few  hundred  prisoners 
were  picked  up  by  both  wings  as  they  met,  to  burst 
their  throats  in  loud  huzzas.  The  Army  of  Tennessee 
knew  how  to  enjoy  its  first  grand  victory.  The  dews  of 
twilight  hung  heavy  about  the  trees  as  if  to  hold  down 
the  voice  of  victory ;  but  the  two  lines  nearing  as  they 
advanced  joined  their  continuous  shouts  in  increasing 
volume,  not  as  the  burstings  from  the  cannon's  mouth, 
but  in  a  tremendous  swell  of  heroic  harmony  that  seemed 
almost  to  lift  from  their  roots  the  great  trees  of  the  forest. 

Before  greetings  and  congratulations  upon  the  success 
had  passed  it  was  night,  and  the  mild  beams  of  the  quar 
tering  moon  were  more  suggestive  of  Venus  than  of  Mars. 
The  haversacks  and  ammunition  supplies  were  ordered  re 
plenished,  and  the  Confederate  army  made  its  bivouac  on 
the  ground  it  had  gained  in  the  first  pronounced  victory 
in  the  West,  and  one  of  the  most  stubbornly  contested 
battles  of  the  war. 

Our  cavalry  had  failed  to  close  McFarland  Gap,  and 
through  that  General  Thomas  made  his  march  for  the 
stand  at  Rossville  Gap. 

It  has  been  stated  that  this  retreat  was  made  under  the 
orders  of  the  Union  commander.  General  Thomas  did,  in 
fact,  receive  a  message  from  his  chief  a  little  after  four 
o'clock,  saying  that  he  was  riding  to  Chattanooga  to  view 
the  position  there ;  that  he,  General  Thomas,  was  left  in 
command  of  all  of  the  organized  forces,  and  should  seek 
strong  and  threatening  position  at  Rossville,  and  send  the 
other  men  back  to  Chattanooga  to  be  reorganized.  This 
was  a  suggestion  more  than  an  order,  given  under  the  con 
viction  that  the  Confederates,  having  the  Dry  Valley  road, 
would  pass  the  ridge  to  the  west  side,  cut  General  Thomas 
off,  and  strike  his  rear  at  pleasure.  The  order  to  command 
of  the  troops  in  action,  and  the  conditions  referring  to 
duties  at  Chattanooga,  carried  inferential  discretion.  That 
General  Thomas  so  construed  it  was  evidenced  by  his 


BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  457 

decision  to  hold  "  until  nightfall  if  possible."  But  di 
rectly,  under  the  practice  of  our  enfilading  battery,  he 
became  convinced  that  it  was  not  possible,  changed  his 
purpose,  and  at  5.30  gave  orders  for  -his  commanders  to 
prepare  to  retire,  and  called  Reynolds's  division  from  its 
trenches  to  be  posted  as  rear-guard  to  cover  the  retreat. 

General  Granger  was  then  engaged  in  severe  conten 
tion  against  my  left  at  Snodgrass  Hill.  His  march  along 
the  front  of  our  cavalry  and  right  wing  suggested  the 
advance  of  Liddell's  division  to  the  Chattanooga  road  to 
try  to  check  it.  The  withdrawal  of  Reynolds's  division 
was  in  season  to  aid  in  driving  LiddelFs  division  back  to 
its  former  ground.  Reynolds  was  posted  on  eminent 
ground  as  rear-guard,  and  organized  retreat  followed.  It 
was  not  until  after  sunset  that  Rosecrans's  order  for  re 
treat  was  issued,  as  appears  from  the  letter  written  from 
Rossville  by  General  James  A.  Garfield,  chief  of  staff, 
dated  8.40,  three  hours  and  more  after  the  move  was  taken 
up,  viz. : 

"  Your  order  to  retire  to  this  place  was  received  a  little  after 
sunset  and  communicated  to  Generals  Thomas  and  Granger.  The 
troops  are  now  moving  back,  and  will  be  here  in  good  shape  and 
strong  position  before  morning."  * 

So  events  and  the  evidence  seem  conclusive  that  it  was 
our  artillery  practice  that  made  the  confusion  of  Chicka- 
mauga  forests  unbearable,  and  enforced  retreat  before 
Rosecrans  order  was  issued. 

The  Union  army  and  reserve  had  been  fought,  and  by 
united  efforts  we  held  the  position  at  Snodgrass  Hill,  which 
covered  McFarland  Gap  and  the  retreat.  There  were 
yet  five  brigades  of  Confederates  that  had  not  been  in 
active  battle.  The  Confederate  commander  was  not  present, 
and  his  next  in  rank  thought  night  pursuit  without  au 
thority  a  heavy,  unprofitable  labor,  while  a  flank  move, 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxx.  part  i.  p.  144. 


458  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

after  a  night's  rest,  seemed  promising  of  more  impor 
tant  results.  The  Confederate  chief  did  not  even  know 
of  his  victory  until  the  morning  of  the  21st,  when,  upon 
riding  to  his  extreme  right,  he  found  his  commander 
at  that  point  seeking  the  enemy  in  his  immediate  front, 
and  commended  the  officer  upon  his  vigilance, — twelve 
hours  after  the  retreat  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

The  forces  engaged  and  their  respective  casualties 
follow  : 

General  Bragg's  returns  of  the  20th  of  August— the 
last  of  record— reported  his  aggregate  of  all  arms  .  43,866 

Reinforced  from  J.  E.  Johnston's  army  in  August .   .     9,000 

Reinforced  from  J.  E.  Johnston's  army  in  September 

(Gregg  and  McNair) 2,500 

Reinforced  from  General  Lee's  army,  September  18 
and  19  (a  large  estimate) 5,000 

Total 60,366 

Losses  on  the  18th  and  19th 1,124 

Aggregate  for  battle  on  the  20th 59,242 

General  Rosecrans's  return   of   September  20,  1863, 

showed  :  Aggregate  of  infantry,  equipped 46,561 

Aggregate  of  cavalry,  equipped 10,114 

Aggregate  of  artillery,  equipped 4,192 

Total 60,867 

Confederate  losses  (estimated  ;  returns  imperfect)   .   .  17,800 
Union  losses  by  returns  (infantry,  artillery,  and  cav 
alry)     16,550 

The  exceeding  heaviness  of  these  losses  will  be  better 
understood,  and  the  desperate  and  bloody  character  of  the 
Chickamauga  battle  more  fully  appreciated,  upon  a  little 
analysis.  The  battle,  viewed  from  the  stand-point  of  the 
Union  losses,  was  the  fifth  greatest  of  the  war,  Gettys 
burg,  Spottsylvania,  the  Wilderness,  and  Chancellorsville 
alone  exceeding  it,  but  each  of  these  battles  were  of  much 
longer  time.  Viewed  by  comparison  of  Confederate  losses, 
Chickamauga  occupies  similar  place — fifth — in  the  scale 
of  magnitude  among  the  battles  of  the  war. 

But  the  sanguinary  nature  of  the  contention  is  best 


BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  459 

illustrated  by  a  simple  suggestion  of  proportions.  Official 
reports  show  that  on  both  sides  the  casualties — killed, 
wounded,  and  missing — embraced  the  enormous  proportion 
of  thirty-three  per  cent,  of  the  troops  actually  engaged. 

On  the  Union  side  there  were  over  a  score  of  regiments 
in  which  the  losses  in  this  single  fight  exceeded  49.4  per 
cent.,  which  was  the  heaviest  loss  sustained  by  a  German 
regiment  at  any  time  during  the  Franco-German  war.  The 
"  charge  of  the  Light  Brigade"  at  Balaklava  has  been 
made  famous  in  song  and  history,  yet  there  were  thirty 
Union  regiments  that  each  lost  ten  per  cent,  more  men  at 
Chickamauga,  and  many  Confederate  regiments  whose 
mortality  exceeded  this. 

Longstreet's  command  in  less  than  two  hours  lost  nearly 
forty-four  per  cent,  of  its  strength,  and  of  the  troops  op 
posed  to  a  portion  of  their  splendid  assaults,  Steedman's 
and  Brannan's  commands  lost  respectively  forty-nine  and 
thirty-eight  in  less  than  four  hours,  and  single  regiments 
a  far  heavier  percentage. 

Of  the  Confederate  regiments  sustaining  the  heaviest 
percentages  of  loss  (in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing, — the 
last  a  scarcely  appreciable  fraction)  the  leading  ones  were  : 

Regiment.  Per  cent. 

Tenth  Tennessee 68.0 

Fifth  Georgia 61.1 

Second  Tennessee 60.2 

Fifteenth  and  Thirty-seventh  Tennessee 59.9 

Sixteenth  Alabama 58.6 

Sixth  and  Ninth  Tennessee 57.9 

Eighteenth  Alabama 56.3 

Twenty-second  Alabama ...  55.2 

Twenty-third  Tennessee 54.1 

Twenty-ninth  Mississippi 52.7 

Fifty-eighth  Alabama 51.7 

Thirty-seventh  Georgia 50.1 

Sixty-third  Tennessee 49.7 

Forty-first  Alabama 48.6 

Thirty-second  Tennessee 48.3 

Twentieth  Tennessee 48.0 

First  Arkansas 45.1 

Ninth  Kentucky 44.3 


460  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

These  are  only  a  few  of  the  cases  in  which  it  was  pos 
sible  to  compute  percentages  of  casualties,  the  number  of 
effectives  taken  into  battle  not  having  been  mentioned,  but 
they  serve  to  illustrate  the  sanguinary  severity  of  the  fight 
and  the  heroism  of  the  troops. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

FAILURE   TO   FOLLOW   SUCCESS. 

Lougstreet  differs  with  General  Bragg  as  to  Movements  of  Pursuit— 
The  Confederates  on  Lookout  Mountain — Federals  gain  Comfortable 
Positions  around  it— Superior  Officers  of  Bragg's  Command  call  for 
his  Removal— Bragg  seeks  Scapegoats— President  Davis  visits  the 
Army— Tests  the  Temper  of  the  Officers  towards  Bragg— He  offers 
the  Command  to  Longstreet— He  declines— His  Reasons— General 
Bragg  ignores  Signal-Service  Reports  and  is  surprised— General  Joe 
Hooker's  Advance— Night  Attack  beyond  Lookout  Mountain— Colonel 
Brattori's  Clever  Work— Review  of  the  Western  Movement  and  Com 
bination—It  should  have  been  effected  in  May  instead  of  September- 
Inference  as  to  Results  had  the  First  Proposition  been  promptly  acted 
upon. 

ABOUT  sunrise  of  the  next  morning,  General  Bragg 
rode  to  my  bivouac,  when  report  was  made  to  him  of 
orders  of  the  night  before,  to  replenish  supplies  and  pre 
pare  to  take  up  pursuit  at  daylight.  He  asked  my  views 
of  the  next  step  to  be  taken,  explaining  that  there  were 
some  defensive  works  about  Chattanooga  to  cover  the 
enemy  in  that  position. 

I  knew  nothing  of  the  country  except  of  its  general 
geographical  features,  but  the  hunt  was  up  and  on  the  go, 
when  any  move  towards  his  rear  was  safe,  and  a  speedy 
one  encouraging  of  great  results.  I  suggested  that  we 
cross  the  Tennessee  River  north  of  Chattanooga  and 
march  against  the  line  of  the  enemy's  rear ;  that  if,  after 
so  threatening  as  to  throw  General  Rosecrans  to  full 
retreat,  we  found  it  inconvenient  to  pursue  him,  we  turn 
back  with  part  of  the  army  and  capture  or  disperse  the 
Union  army  in  East  Tennessee  under  General  Burnside. 
He  stated  that  he  would  follow  that  course,  ordered  the 

461 


462  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

right  wing  to  march,*  and  the  left  wing  to  follow  as 
soon  as  the  way  was  clear, — the  left  to  care  for  the  dead 
and  wounded  during  the  wait.  As  it  was  night  when  the 
rear  of  the  right  wing  stretched  out  on  the  road,  my  march 
was  not  taken  up  until  the  morning  of  the  22d.  General 
McLaws  joined  me  on  the  21st  with  his  other  brigades, 
and  General  Jenkins  joined  Hood's  division.  Afterwards 
G.  T.  Anderson's  brigade  joined  the  latter.  When  our 
inarch  reached  General  Bragg's  head-quarters  and  re 
ported  on  the  22d,  he  gave  me  orders  to  direct  a  division 
from  the  line  of  march  to  follow  the  enemy  towards  Chat 
tanooga. 

When  asked  if  he  had  abandoned  the  course  upon 
which  his  march  was  ordered,  he  said  the  people  would  be 
greatly  gratified  to  know  that  his  army  was  marching 
through  the  streets  of  Chattanooga  with  bands  of  music 
and  salutations  of  the  soldiers.  I  thought,  and  did  not 
fail  to  say,  that  it  would  give  them  greater  pleasure  to 
know  that  he  had  passed  the  Tennessee  River,  turned  the 
enemy  out  of  Chattanooga  in  eager  flight,  to  save  his  rear 
ward  lines,  whilst  we  marched  hammering  against  the 
broken  flanks  of  his  columns.  But  the  cavalry  had  re 
ported  that  the  enemy  was  in  hurried  and  confused  retreat, 
his  trains  crossing  the  river  and  passing  over  the  nose  of 
Lookout  Mountain  in  disorder. 

The  praise  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  city  so  recently  aban 
doned  to  the  enemy,  and  a  parade  through  its  streets  with 
bands  of  music  and  flaunting  banners,  were  more  alluring 
to  a  spirit  eager  for  applause  than  was  the  tedious  march 
for  fruition  of  our  heavy  labors. 

General  Rosecrans  prepared,  no  doubt,  to  continue  his 
retreat,  anticipating  our  march  towards  his  rear,  but  finding 


*  In  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  General  Bragg  denies  that  his 
march  of  the  21st  was  for  the  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  River  ;  refers  to 
the  proposition  as  visionary,  and  says  of  the  country,  "Affording  no 
subsistence  for  men  or  animals." — Rebellion  Record. 


FAILURE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  463 

that  we  preferred  to  lay  our  lines  in  front  of  him,  con 
cluded  that  it  WL  aid  be  more  comfortable  to  rest  at  Chat 
tanooga,  reinforc  \  repair  damages,  and  come  to  meet  us 
when  ready  for  a  new  trial. 

When  General  Bragg  found  that  the  enemy  had  changed 
his  mind,  and  was  not  inclined  to  continue  his  rearward 
march,  he  stretched  his  army  in  a  semicircle  of  six  miles 
along  the  southeast  front  of  Chattanooga,  from  the  base 
of  Lookout  Mountain  on  his  left,  to  his  right  resting  on 
the  Tennessee  River,  and  ordered  Alexander's  batteries 
to  the  top  of  the  mountain,  my  command,  McLaws's, 
Hood's,  and  Walker's  divisions,  occupying  the  left  of  his 
line  of  investment.  His  plan  was  to  shell  the  enemy 
from  his  works  by  field  batteries,  but  the  works  grew 
stronger  from  day  to  day  on  all  sides  of  the  city.  Our 
infantry  was  posted  along  the  line,  as  supports  for  the 
batteries,  with  orders  not  to  assault  unless  especially  or 
dered. 

The  northern  point  of  Lookout  Mountain,  upon  which 
Alexander's  batteries  were  posted,  abuts  upon  the  Ten 
nessee  River.  The  city  lies  east  of  the  abutment  and 
nestles  close  under  it.  The  base  of  the  mountain  has  a 
steep,  rugged  grade  of  five  hundred  feet  above  the  plateau, 
and  from  its  height  the  mountain  crops  out  into  palisades 
of  seven  hundred  feet.  General  Alexander  managed  to 
drop  an  occasional  shell  or  shot  about  the  enemy's  lines 
by  lifting  the  trails  of  his  guns,  but  the  fire  of  other  bat 
teries  was  not  effective. 

At  the  end  of  a  week's  practice  the  Confederate  com 
mander  found  the  enemy  getting  more  comfortable  in  his 
works,  and  thought  to  break  him  up  by  a  grand  cavalry 
raid.  On  the  30th  he  ordered  General  Wheeler  to  or 
ganize  a  force  of  his  effective  mounts,  cross  the  river,  and 
ride  against  the  railway  and  such  depots  and  supply- 
trains  as  he  could  reach.  The  cavalry  destroyed  some 
wagon-trains  and  supplies,  and  gave  the  enemy  more 


464  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

trouble  than  the  artillery  practice,  yet  failed  to  convince 
him  that  it  was  time  to  abandon  his  position,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  satisfied  him  that  he  was  safe  from  further 
serious  trouble. 

At  that  time  the  shortest  line  of  the  enemy's  haul  of 
provisions  from  the  depot  at  Stevenson  was  along  the 
road  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  The  Confederate 
chief  conceived,  as  our  cavalry  ride  had  failed  of  effect, 
that  a  line  of  sharp-shooters  along  the  river  on  our  side 
could  break  up  that  line  of  travel,  and  ordered,  on  the  8th 
of  October,  a  detail  from  my  command  for  that  purpose. 
As  the  line  was  over  the  mountain  about  seven  miles  beyond 
support,  by  a  rugged  road  not  practicable  for  artillery,  I 
ordered  a  brigade  of  infantry  detailed  to  go  over  and  pro 
tect  the  sharp-shooters  from  surprise  or  capture.  The 
detail  fell  upon  Law's  brigade.  The  line  for  this  practice 
extended  from  the  east  side  of  Lookout  Creek  some  ten 
miles  down  the  river.  The  effect  of  the  fire  was  about 
like  that  of  the  cavalry  raid.  It  simply  put  the  enemy 
on  shorter  rations  until  he  could  open  another  route  for 
his  trains. 

But  more  to  be  deplored  than  these  novel  modes  of  in 
vestment  was  the  condition  of  the  Confederate  army. 
After  moving  from  Virginia  to  try  to  relieve  our  comrades 
of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  we  thought  that  we  had  cause 
to  complain  that  the  fruits  of  our  labor  had  been  lost,  but 
it  soon  became  manifest  that  the  superior  officers  of  that 
army  themselves  felt  as  much  aggrieved  as  we  at  the  halt 
ing  policy  of  their  chief,  and  were  calling  in  letters  and 
petitions  for  his  removal.  A  number  of  them  came  to 
have  me  write  the  President  for  them.  As  he  had  not 
called  for  my  opinion  on  military  affairs  since  the 
Johnston  conference  of  1862,  I  could  not  take  that 
liberty,  but  promised  to  write  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  to  General  Lee,  who  I  thought  could  excuse  me 
under  the  strained  condition  of  affairs.  About  the  same 


FAILURE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  465 

time  they  framed  and  forwarded  to  the  President  a  peti 
tion  praying  for  relief. *  It  was  written  by  General  D.  H. 
Hill  (as  he  informed  me  since  the  war). 

While  the  superior  officers  were  asking  for  relief,  the 
Confederate  commander  was  busy  looking  along  his  lines 
for  victims.  Lieutenant-General  Polk  was  put  under 
charges  for  failing  to  open  the  battle  of  the  20th  at  day 
light  ;  Major-General  Hindman  was  relieved  under 
charges  for  conduct  before  the  battle,  when  his  conduct 
of  the  battle  with  other  commanders  would  have  relieved 
him  of  any  previous  misconduct,  according  to  the  customs 
of  war,  and  pursuit  of  others  was  getting  warm. 

On  the  Union  side  the  Washington  authorities  thought 
vindication  important,  and  Major-Generals  McCook  and 
Crittenden,  of  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Corps,  were 
relieved  and  went  before  a  Court  of  Inquiry ;  also  one  of 
the  generals  of  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps. 

The  President  came  to  us  on  the  9th  of  October  and 
called  the  commanders  of  the  army  to  meet  him  at  Gen 
eral  Bragg's  office.  After  some  talk,  in  the  presence  of 
General  Bragg,  he  made  known  the  object  of  the  call, 
and  asked  the  generals,  in  turn,  their  opinion  of  their 
commanding  officer,  beginning  with  myself.  It  seemed 
rather  a  stretch  of  authority,  even  with  a  President,  and 
I  gave  an  evasive  answer  and  made  an  effort  to  turn  the 
channel  of  thought,  but  he  would  not  be  satisfied,  and 
got  back  to  his  question.  The  condition  of  the  army  was 
briefly  referred  to,  and  the  failure  to  make  an  effort  to 
get  the  fruits  of  our  success,  when  the  opinion  was  given, 
in  substance,  that  our  commander  could  be  of  greater 
service  elsewhere  than  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  Ten 
nessee.  Major-General  Buckner  was  called,  and  gave 
opinion  somewhat  similar.  So  did  Major-General  Cheat- 
ham,  who  was  then  commanding  the  corps  recently  com- 


Rebellion  Record. 
30 


466  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

manded  by  Lieutenant-General  Polk,  and  General  D.  H. 
Hill,  who  was  called  last,  agreed  with  emphasis  to  the 
views  expressed  by  others. 

The  next  morning  the  President  called  me  to  private 
conference,  and  had  an  all  day  talk.  He  thought  to  as 
sign  me  to  command,  but  the  time  had  passed  for  hand 
ling  that  army  as  an  independent  force.  Regarding  this 
question,  as  considered  in  Virginia,  it  was  understood 
that  the  assignment  would  be  made  at  once,  and  in  time 
for  opportunity  to  handle  the  army  sufficiently  to  gain 
the  confidence  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  before  offering 
or  accepting  battle.  The  action  was  not  taken,  a  battle 
had  been  made  and  won,  the  army  was  then  seriously  en 
tangled  in  a  quasi  siege,  the  officers  and  soldiers  were  dis 
appointed,  and  disaffected  in  morale.  General  Grant  was 
moving  his  army  to  reinforce  against  us,  and  an  impor 
tant  part  of  the  Union  army  of  Virginia  was  moving  to 
the  same  purpose. 

In  my  judgment  our  last  opportunity  was  lost  when  we 
failed  to  follow  the  success  at  Chickamauga,  and  capture 
or  disperse  the  Union  army,  and  it  could  not  be  just  to 
the  service  or  myself  to  call  me  to  a  position  of  such  re 
sponsibility.  The  army  was  part  of  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston's  department,  and  could  only  be  used  in  strong 
organization  by  him  in  combining  its  operations  with  his 
other  forces  in  Alabama  and  Mississippi.  I  said  that 
under  him  I  could  cheerfully  work  in  any  position/1' 
The  suggestion  of  that  name  only  served  to  increase  his 
displeasure,  and  his  severe  rebuke. 

I  recognized  the  authority  of  his  high  position,  but 
called  to  his  mind  that  neither  his  words  nor  his  manner 
were  so  impressive  as  the  dissolving  scenes  that  foreshad 
owed  the  dreadful  end.  He  referred  to  his  worry  and 
troubles  with  politicians  and  non-combatants.  In  that 

*  Later  on  he  offered  the  command  to  Lieutenant-General  Hardee, 
who  declined  it. 


FAILUKE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  467 

connection,  I  suggested  that  all  that  the  people  asked  for 
was  success ;  with  that  the  talk  of  politicians  would  be  as 
spiders'  webs  before  him.  And  when  restored  to  his  usual 
gracious  calm  I  asked  to  have  my  resignation  accepted, 
to  make  place  for  some  one  who  could  better  meet  his 
ideas  of  the  important  service.  He  objected  that  my 
troops  would  not  be  satisfied  with  the  change.  I  sug 
gested  a  leave  of  absence,  as  winter  was  near,  when  I 
would  go  to  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  and  after 
the  troops  were  accustomed  to  their  new  commander,  send 
in  my  written  resignation,  from  Texas,  but  he  was  not 
minded  to  accept  that  solution  of  the  premises. 

Finally,  I  asked  his  aid  in  putting  the  divisions  that 
were  with  me  in  more  efficient  working  order,  by  assign 
ing  a  major-general  to  command  Hood's  division.  He 
had  been  so  seriously  crippled  that  he  could  not  be  in 
condition  to  take  the  field  again  even  if  he  recovered,  and 
a  commander  for  the  division  was  essential  to  its  proper 
service.  As  he  had  no  one,  or  failed  to  name  any  one,  for 
the  place,  I  suggested  the  promotion  of  the  senior  briga 
dier  then  in  command  of  it,  General  M.  Jenkins,  who 
was  a  bright,  gallant,  and  efficient  officer  of  more  than 
two  years'  experience  in  active  warfare,  loved  by  his 
troops,  and  all  acquaintances  as  well.  He  had  been  trans 
ferred,  recently,  by  the  War  Department  to  the  division, 
upon  application  of  General  Hood,  and  in  consequence 
there  was  some  feeling  of  rivalry  between  him  and  Briga 
dier-General  Law,  the  next  in  rank,  who  had  served  with 
the  division  since  its  organization,  and  had  commanded 
it  at  Gettysburg  after  General  Hood  was  wounded,  and 
after  his  taking  off  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  The 
President  referred  to  the  services  of  General  Law  with  the 
division,  but  failed  to  indicate  a  preference.  I  thought 
it  unwise  and  not  military  to  choose  a  junior  for  assign 
ment  to  command  over  his  senior  officers,  and  prejudicial 
to  the  esprit  de  corps  and  morale  of  any  army,  except  under 


468  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

most  eminent  services,  and  in  this  instance  where  service, 
high  military  character,  and  equipment  were  on  the  side 
of  the  senior  it  was  more  objectionable,  but  consented  that 
it  would  be  better  to  have  General  Law  promoted,  and 
the  feeling  of  rivalry  put  at  rest ;  General  Jenkins's 
heart  was  in  the  service,  and  could  submit  to  anything  that 
seemed  best  for  its  interests  ;  but  the  President  was  pleased 
to  remain  negative,  and  failed  to  assign  a  commander. 

The  interview  was  exciting,  at  times  warm,  but  con 
tinued  until  Lookout  Mountain  lifted  above  the  sun  to 
excuse  my  taking  leave.  The  President  walked  as  far  as 
the  gate,  gave  his  hand  in  his  usual  warm  grasp,  and 
dismissed  me  with  his  gracious  smile ;  but  a  bitter  look 
lurking  about  its  margin,  and  the  ground-swell,  admon 
ished  me  that  clouds  were  gathering  about  head-quarters 
of  the  First  Corps  even  faster  than  those  that  told  the 
doom  of  the  Southern  cause. 

A  day  or  two  after  this  interview  the  President  called 
the  commanders  to  meet  him  again  at  General  Bragg's 
head-quarters.  He  expressed  desire  to  have  the  army  pulled 
away  from  the  lines  around  Chattanooga  and  put  to  active 
work  in  the  field,  and  called  for  suggestions  and  plans  by 
which  that  could  be  done,  directing  his  appeal,  apparently, 
to  me  as  first  to  reply. 

I  suggested  a  change  of  base  to  Rome,  Georgia,  a 
march  of  the  army  to  the  railway  bridge  of  the  Tennes 
see  River  at  Bridgeport,  and  the  crossing  of  the  river  as 
an  easy  move, — one  that  would  cut  the  enemy's  rearward 
line,  interrupt  his  supply  train,  put  us  between  his  army 
at  Chattanooga  and  the  reinforcements  moving  to  join 
him,  and  force  him  to  precipitate  battle  or  retreat. 

General  Bragg  proposed  that  we  march  up  and  cross 
the  river  and  swing  around  towards  the  enemy's  rear  and 
force  him  out  by  that  means.  No  other  plans  were  offered, 
nor  did  other  officers  express  preference  for  either  of  the 
plans  that  were  submitted. 


FAILURE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  469 

Maps  were  called  for  and  demonstrations  given  of  the 
two  plans,  when  the  President  ordered  the  move  to  be 
made  by  the  change  of  base  to  Rome,  and  in  a  day  or  two 
took  leave  of  us.  He  had  brought  General  Pemberton 
with  him  to  assign  to  the  corps  left  by  General  Polk,  but 
changed  his  mind.  General  D.  H.  Hill  was  relieved  of 
duty ;  after  a  time  General  Buckner  took  a  leave  of 
absence,  and  General  Hardee  relieved  General  Cheatham 
of  command  of  the  corps  left  to  him  by  General  Polk. 

About  this  time  General  Lee  wrote  me,  alluding  to  the 
presence  of  the  President,  the  questions  under  considera 
tion,  my  proposition  for  him  to  leave  the  army  in  Virginia 
in  other  hands  and  come  West  to  grander,  more  im 
portant  fields,  to  his  purpose  in  sending  me  West  to  be 
assigned  to  command  them,  and  expressing  anticipation 
of  my  return  to  Virginia.* 

*  "CAMP  RAPPAHANNOCK,  October  26,  1863. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL,— I  have  received  your  three  letters,  September 
26,  October  6,  and  October  11.  The  first  was  received  just  as  I  was 
about  to  make  a  move  upon  General  Meade,  to  prevent  his  detaching 
reinforcements  to  Rosecrans.  The  second  when  I  had  gone  as  far  as  I 
thought  I  could  advantageously  go ;  and  the  third  since  my  return  to 
this  place.  I  have  read  them  all  with  interest  and  pleasure,  but  have 
not  had  time  to  reply  till  now. 

"I  rejoice  at  your  great  victory  deeply.  It  seemed  to  me  to  have 
been  complete.  I  wish  it  could  have  been  followed  up  by  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Federal  army.  As  regards  your  proposition  as  to  myself,  I 
wish  that  I  could  feel  that  it  was  prompted  by  other  reasons  than  kind 
feelings  to  myself.  I  think  that  you  could  do  better  than  I  could.  It 
was  with  that  view  I  urged  your  going.  The  President,  being  on  the 
ground,  I  hope  will  do  all  that  can  be  done.  He  has  to  take  a  broad 
view  of  the  whole  ground,  and  must  order  as  he  deems  best.  I  will 
cheerfully  do  anything  in  my  power. 

"  In  addition  to  other  infirmities,  I  have  been  suffering  so  much  from 
rheumatism  in  my  back  that  I  could  scarcely  get  about.  The  first  two 
days  of  our  march  I  had  to  be  hauled  in  a  wagon,  and  subsequently 
every  motion  of  my  horse,  and  indeed  of  my  body,  gave  much  pain.  I 
am  rather  better  now,  though  I  still  suffer.  We  could  not  come  up 
with  Meade.  We  had  to  take  circuitous  and  by-roads,  while  he  had 
broad  and  passable  routes  on  either  side  of  the  railroad.  We  struck 
his  rear-guards  three  times, — the  last  at  Bristoe,  where  Hill  with  his 
advance  of  two  brigades  fell  too  precipitately  on  one  of  his  corps, — 
suffered  a  repulse  and  loss.  He  was  finally  driven  beyond  Bull  Run.  I 


470  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  President  left  the  army  more  despondent  than  he 
found  it.  General  Pemberton's  misfortune  at  Yicksburg 
gave  rise  to  severe  prejudice  of  the  people  and  the  army, 
and  when  the  troops  heard  of  the  purpose  of  the  Presi 
dent  to  assign  him  to  command  of  Polk's  corps,  parts  of 
the  army  were  so  near  to  mutiny  that  he  concluded  to  call 
General  Hardee  to  that  command.  A  few  days  after  he 
left  us  a  severe  season  of  rain  set  in,  and  our  commander 
used  the  muddy  roads  to  excuse  his  failure  to  execute  the 
campaign  that  the  President  had  ordered. 

Late  on  the  20th  of  September  and  during  the  21st, 
General  Rosecrans  reported  his  condition  deplorable, 
and  expressed  doubt  of  his  holding  at  Chattanooga,  and 
called  to  General  Burnside  in  East  Tennessee,  to  whom 
he  looked  for  aid ;  but  finding  only  feeble  efforts  to  fol 
low  our  success  he  recovered  hope,  prepared  defensive 
works,  and  was  looking  to  renewal  of  his  aggressive  work 
when  he  was  relieved. 

From  accounts  made  public  since  the  war  it  appears 
that  his  animals  were  so  reduced  from  want  of  forage  at 

saw  he  could  easily  get  behind  his  intreochments  in  front  of  Alexan 
dria.  Our  men  were  dreadfully  off  for  shoes,  blankets,  and  clothes. 
One  division  alone  had  over  a  thousand  barefooted  men.  We  had  failed 
to  take  any,  and  I  fear  had  failed  to  manage  as  well  as  we  might.  The 
country  was  a  perfect  waste.  A  northeast  storm  broke  upon  us.  There 
was  neither  shelter  nor  food  for  man  or  beast.  I  saw  no  real  good  I  could 
accomplish  by  manoeuvring.  The  enemy  had  destroyed  the  bridge 
over  the  Rappahannock  and  blown  up  one  of  the  piers.  The  freshet 
after  we  left  the  Rapidan  carried  away  the  railroad  bridge  over  that 
river.  I  therefore  withdrew  to  the  Rappahannock,  destroying  the  rail 
road  from  Cub  Run  (this  side  Manassas  Junction)  to  the  Rappahannock 
River. 

"We  inflicted  some  punishment  upon  the  enemy, — captured  upward 
of  two  thousand  four  hundred  prisoners. 

"But  I  missed  you  dreadfully,  and  your  brave  corps.  Your  cheerful 
face  and  strong  arms  would  have  been  invaluable.  I  hope  you  will 
soon  return  to  me.  I  trust  we  may  soon  be  together  again.  May  God 
preserve  you  and  all  with  you. 

"Very  truly  yours, 

"R.  E.  LEE. 

"  GENERAL  LONGSTREET." 


FAILURE   TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  471 

the  time  of  the  October  rains  that  General  Rosecrans 
could  not  move  his  artillery  over  the  muddy  roads,  which 
suggests  mention  that  the  campaign  ordered  by  the  Presi 
dent  for  the  change  of  base  could  have  forced  him  from 
his  works  in  his  crippled  condition,  and  given  us  com 
fortable  operations  between  him  and  his  reinforcements 
coming  from  Virginia  and  Mississippi. 

In  his  official  account,  General  Bragg  said  that  the  road 
on  the  south  side  was  left  under  my  command,  which  is 
misleading.  My  command — three  divisions — was  on  his 
line  of  investment,  east  of  the  city  and  of  the  mountain ; 
the  road  was  west  of  the  mountain  from  six  to  twenty 
miles  from  the  command.  We  were  in  support  of  his  bat 
teries,  to  be  ready  for  action  at  the  moment  his  artillery 
practice  called  for  it.  We  held  nearly  as  much  of  his 
line  as  the  other  eight  divisions.  None  of  the  com 
manders  had  authority  to  move  a  man  from  the  lines  until 
the  8th  of  October,  when  he  gave  orders  for  posting  the 
sharp-shooters  west  of  the  mountain.  The  exposure  of 
this  detachment  was  so  serious  that  I  took  the  liberty  to 
send  a  brigade  as  a  rallying  force  for  it,  and  the  exposure 
of  these  led  me  to  inquire  as  to  the  assistance  they  could 
have  from  our  cavalry  force  operating  on  the  line  from 
the  mountain  to  Bridgeport,  some  eight  or  ten  miles  be 
hind  them.  The  cavalry  was  not  found  as  watchful  as 
the  eyes  of  an  army  should  be,  and  I  reported  them  to 
the  general,  but  he  thought  otherwise,  assured  me  that  his 
reports  were  regular,  daily  and  sometimes  oftener. 

Nevertheless,  prudence  suggested  more  careful  guard, 
and  I  ordered  Captain  Manning,  who  brought  from  Vir 
ginia  part  of  my  signal  force,  to  establish  a  station  in 
observation  of  Bridgeport  and  open  its  communication 
with  my  head-quarters.  General  Bragg  denied  all  re 
ports  sent  him  of  the  enemy  from  my  signal  party,  treated 
them  with  contempt,  then  reported  that  the  road  was 
under  my  command. 


472  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

His  report  is  remarkable  in  that  he  failed  to  notice  the 
conduct  of  his  officers,  except  of  the  killed  and  wounded 
and  one  division  commander  whom  he  found  at  daylight 
of  the  21st  advancing  his  line  of  skirmishers  in  careful 
search  of  the  enemy  who  had  retreated  at  early  twilight 
the  evening  before  under  shouts  from  the  Confederate 
army  that  made  the  heavy  wood  reverberate  with  resound 
ing  shouts  of  victory.  That  officer  he  commended  as  the 
"  ever  vigilant."  He  gave  due  credit  to  his  brave  soldiers 
for  their  gallant  execution  of  his  orders  to  charge  and 
continue  to  charge  against  the  enemy's  strongholds,  as  he 
knew  that  they  would  under  his  orders  until  their  efforts 
were  successful,  but  the  conduct  of  the  battle  in  all  of  its 
phases  discredits  this  claim.  When  the  right  wing  of 
his  army  stepped  into  the  Lafayette-Rossville  road  the 
enemy's  forces  were  in  full  retreat  through  McFarland 
Gap,  and  all  fighting  and  charging  had  ceased,  except  the 
parting  blows  of  Preston's  division  with  Granger's  re 
serve  corps.  A  peculiar  feature  of  the  battle  was  the  early 
ride  of  both  commanders  from  the  field,  leaving  the  battle 
to  their  troops.  General  Rosecrans  was  generous  enough 
to  acknowledge  that  he  left  his  battle  in  other  hands. 
General  Bragg  claimed  everything  for  himself,  failing  to 
mention  that  other  hands  were  there. 

While  General  Rosecrans  was  opening  a  route  beyond 
reach  of  our  sharp-shooters,  his  chief  engineer,  General 
W.  F.  Smith,  was  busy  upon  a  plan  for  opening  the  line 
of  railway  on  the  south  side,  and  his  first  step  was  to 
break  up  the  line  of  sharp-shooters.  On  the  19th  he 
made  a  survey  of  the  river  below  Chattanooga.  On  the 
same  day  General  Rosecrans  was  superseded  in  command 
by  General  George  H.  Thomas.  A  day  or  two  after  that 
my  signal  party  reported  some  stir  about  the  enemy's 
camps  near  Bridgeport,  and  the  cavalry  reported  a  work 
ing  force  at  Nicojack  Cave. 

The  cavalry  was  put  under  my  orders  for  a  reconnois- 


FAILURE   TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  473 

sance,  and  I  was  ordered  to  send  a  brigade  of  infantry 
scouting  for  the  working  party.  Nothing  was  found  at 
the  Cave  or  by  the  reconnoissance,  and  the  cavalry  ob 
jected  to  my  authority.  On  the  25th  orders  came  to  me 
to  hold  the  mountain  by  a  brigade  of  infantry.  After 
ordering  the  brigade,  I  reported  a  division  necessary  to 
make  possession  secure,  suggesting  that  the  enemy's  best 
move  was  from  Bridgeport  and  along  the  mountain  crest ; 
that  we  should  assume  that  he  would  be  wise  enough  to 
adopt  it,  unless  we  prepared  against  it.  But  our  com 
mander  was  disturbed  by  suggestions  from  subordinates, 
and  thought  them  presumptuous  when  they  ventured  to 
report  of  the  probable  movements  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th  of  October,  General  Smith 
moved  to  the  execution  of  his  plan  against  our  line  of 
sharp-shooters.  He  put  fifty  pontoon-boats  and  two  flat- 
boats  in  the  river  at  Chattanooga,  the  former  to  take 
twenty-five  men  each,  the  latter  from  forty  to  seventy- 
five, — the  boats  to  float  quietly  down  the  river  eight  miles 
to  Brown's  Ferry,  cross  and  land  the  troops.  At  the 
same  time  a  sufficient  force  was  to  march  by  the  highway 
to  the  same  point,  to  be  in  readiness  for  the  boats  to  carry 
them  over  to  their  comrades.  The  sharp-shooters  had 
been  posted  for  the  sole  purpose  of  breaking  up  the  haul 
along  the  other  bank,  and  not  with  a  view  of  defending 
the  line,  nor  was  it  defensible,  while  the  enemy  had  every 
convenience  for  making  a  forced  crossing  and  lodge 
ment. 

The  vigilant  foe  knew  his  opportunity,  and  only  waited 
for  its  timely  execution.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  Gen 
eral  Smith  had  little  trouble  in  establishing  his  point. 
He  manned  his  boats,  floated  them  down  to  the  crossing, 
landed  his  men,  and  soon  had  the  boats  cross  back  for  his 
other  men,  pushed  them  over,  and  put  them  at  work  in 
trenching  the  strong  ground  selected  for  their  holding. 
By  daylight  he  was  comfortably  intrenched,  and  had  his 


474  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

artillery  on  the  other  side  in  position  to  sweep  along  the 
front. 

The  Confederate  commander  did  not  think  well  enough 
of  his  line  when  he  had  it  to  prepare  to  hold  it,  but  when 
he  found  that  the  enemy  proposed  to  use  it,  he  thought  to 
order  his  infantry  down  to  recover  the  ground  just  demon 
strated  as  indefensible,  and  ordered  me  to  meet  him  on  the 
mountain  next  morning  to  learn  his  plans  and  receive  his 
instructions  for  the  work. 

That  afternoon  the  signal  party  reported  the  enemy  ad 
vancing  from  Bridgeport  in  force, — artillery  and  infantry. 
This  despatch  was  forwarded  to  head-quarters,  but  was  dis 
credited.  It  was  repeated  about  dark,  and  again  forwarded 
and  denied. 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th  I  reported  as  ordered.  The 
general  complained  of  my  party  sending  up  false  alarms. 
The  only  answer  that  I  could  make  was  that  they  had 
been  about  two  years  in  that  service,  and  had  not  made 
such  mistakes  before. 

While  laying  his  plans,  sitting  on  the  point  of  Lookout 
rock,  the  enemy  threw  some  shells  at  us,  and  succeeded  in 
bursting  one  about  two  hundred  feet  below  us.  That  an 
gered  the  general  a  little,  and  he  ordered  Alexander  to 
drop  some  of  his  shells  about  their  heads.  As  this  little 
practice  went  on,  a  despatch  messenger  came  bursting 
through  the  brushwood,  asking  for  General  Longstreet, 
and  reported  the  enemy  marching  from  Bridgeport  along 
the  base  of  the  mountain, — artillery  and  infantry.  Gen 
eral  Bragg  denied  the  report,  and  rebuked  the  soldier  for 
sensational  alarms,  but  the  soldier  said,  "  General,  if  you 
will  ride  to  a  point  on  the  west  side  of  the  mountain  I 
will  show  them  to  you."  We  rode  and  saw  the  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  Corps  under  General  Hooker,  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  marching  quietly  along  the  valley  towards 
Brown's  Ferry.  The  general  was  surprised.  So  was  I. 
But  my  surprise  was  that  he  did  not  march  along  the 


FAILURE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  475 

mountain  top,  instead  of  the  valley.  It  could  have  been 
occupied  with  as  little  loss  as  he  afterwards  had  and  less 
danger.  He  had  marched  by  our  line  of  cavalry  without 
their  knowing,  and  General  Bragg  had  but  a  brigade  of 
infantry  to  meet  him  if  he  had  chosen  to  march  down 
along  the  top  of  the  mountain,  and  that  was  posted 
twenty  miles  from  support. 

My  estimate  of  the  force  was  five  thousand.  General 
Bragg  thought  it  not  so  strong,  and  appearance  from  the 
elevation  seemed  to  justify  his  estimate.  Presently  the 
rear-guard  came  in  sight  and  made  its  bivouac  imme 
diately  in  front  of  the  point  upon  which  we  stood.  The 
latter  force  was  estimated  at  fifteen  hundred,  and  halted 
about  three  miles  in  rear  of  the  main  body. 

A  plan  was  laid  to  capture  the  rear-guard  by  night  at 
tack.  He  proposed  to  send  me  McLaws's  and  Jenkins's 
divisions  for  the  work,  and  ordered  that  it  should  be  done 
in  time  for  the  divisions  to  withdraw  to  the  point  of  the 
mountain  before  daylight,  left  me  to  arrange  details  for  at 
tack,  and  rode  to  give  orders  for  the  divisions,  but  changed 
his  mind  without  giving  me  notice,  and  only  ordered  Jen 
kins's  division.  After  marching  his  command,  General 
Jenkins  rode  to  the  top  of  the  mountain  and  reported. 

The  route  over  which  the  enemy  had  marched  was 
along  the  western  base  of  a  series  of  lesser  heights,  offer 
ing  strong  points  for  our  troops  to  find  positions  of  de 
fence  between  his  main  force  and  his  rear-guard.  After 
giving  instructions  to  General  Jenkins,  he  was  asked  to 
explain  the  plan  of  operations  to  General  McLaws  in  case 
the  latter  was  not  in  time  to  view  the  position  from  the 
mountain  before  night.  A  point  had  been  selected  and 
ordered  to  be  held  by  one  of  Jenkins's  brigades  supported 
by  McLaws's  division,  while  General  Jenkins  was  to  use 
his  other  brigades  against  the  rear-guard,  which  rested  in 
the  edge  of  a  woodland  of  fair  field  of  approach.  The 
point  at  which  Law's  brigade  rested  after  being  forced 


476  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

from  its  guard  of  the  line  of  sharp-shooters  was  near  the 
northern  base  of  the  mountain  about  a  mile  east  of  the 
route  of  the  enemy's  line  of  march.  As  General  Law's 
detached  service  had  given  him  opportunity  to  learn  some 
thing  of  the  country,  his  brigade  was  chosen  as  the  brigade 
of  position  between  the  parts  of  the  enemy's  forces.  Gen 
eral  Law  was  to  move  first,  get  into  position  by  crossing 
the  bridge  over  Lookout  Creek,  to  be  followed  by  Jen 
kins's  other  brigades,  when  McLaws's  division  was  to  ad 
vance  to  position  in  support  of  Law's  brigade. 

I  waited  on  the  mountain,  the  only  point  from  which 
the  operations  could  be  seen,  until  near  midnight,  when, 
seeing  no  indications  of  the  movements,  I  rode  to  the 
point  that  had  been  assigned  for  their  assembly,  found  the 
officers  in  wait  discussing  the  movements,  and,  upon  in 
quiry,  learned  that  McLaws's  division  had  not  been  or 
dered.  Under  the  impression  that  the  other  division 
commander  understood  that  the  move  had  miscarried,  I 
rode  back  to  my  head-quarters,  failing  to  give  counter 
manding  orders. 

The  gallant  Jenkins,  however,  decided  that  the  plan 
should  not  be  abandoned,  and  went  to  work  in  its  execu 
tion  by  his  single  division.  To  quiet  the  apprehensions 
of  General  Law  he  gave  him  Robertson's  brigade  to  be 
posted  with  his  own,  and  Benning's  brigade  as  their  sup 
port,  and  ordered  his  own  brigade  under  Colonel  Bratton 
to  move  cautiously  against  the  rear-guard,  and  make  the 
attack  if  the  opportunity  was  encouraging. 

As  soon  as  Colonel  Bratton  engaged,  the  alarm  spread, 
the  enemy  hastened  to  the  relief  of  his  rear,  encountered 
the  troops  posted  to  receive  them,  and  made  swift,  severe 
battle.  General  Law  claimed  that  he  drove  off  their  fight, 
and,  under  the  impression  that  Colonel  Bratton  had  fin 
ished  his  work  and  recrossed  the  bridge,  withdrew  his 
command,  leaving  Colonel  Bratton  at  the  tide  of  his  en 
gagement.  General  Jenkins  and  Colonel  Bratton  were 


FAILUKE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  477 

left  to  their  own  cool  and  gallant  skill  to  extricate  the 
brigade  from  the  swoop  of  numbers  accumulating  against 
them,  and,  with  the  assistance  of  brave  Benning's  Kock 
brigade,  brought  the  command  safely  over,  Benning's  bri 
gade  crossing  as  Bratton  reached  the  bridge. 

The  conduct  of  Bratton 's  forces  was  one  of  the  cleverest 
pieces  of  work  of  the  war,  and  the  skill  of  its  handling 
softened  the  blow  that  took  so  many  of  our  gallant  officers 
and  soldiers. 

Colonel  Bratton  made  clever  disposition  of  his  regi 
ments,  and  handled  them  well.  He  met  gallant  resist 
ance,  and  in  one  instance  had  part  of  his  command  forced 
back,  but  renewed  the  attack,  making  his  line  stronger, 
and  forced  the  enemy  into  crowded  ranks  and  had  him 
under  converging  circular  fire,  with  fair  prospects,  when 
recalled  under  orders  to  hasten  to  the  bridge.  So  urgent 
was  the  order  that  he  left  the  dead  and  some  of  the 
wounded  on  the  field. 

General  Law  lost  of  his  own  brigade  (aggregate)  ...  43 
General  Robertson  (1  wounded  and  8  missing)  ....  9 
Colonel  Bratton  lost  (aggregate) 356 

Confederate  loss 408 

Union  loss  (aggregate) 420 

It  was  an  oversight  of  mine  not  to  give  definite  orders 
for  the  troops  to  return  to  their  camps  before  leaving 
them. 

General  Jenkins  was  ordered  to  inquire  into  the  con 
duct  of  the  brigades  of  position,  and  reported  evidence 
that  General  Law  had  said  that  he  did  not  care  to  win 
General  Jenkins's  spurs  as  a  major-general.  He  was  or 
dered  to  prepare  charges,  but  presently  when  we  were 
ordered  into  active  campaign  in  East  Tennessee  he  asked 
to  have  the  matter  put  off  to  more  convenient  time. 

We  may  pause  here  to  reflect  upon  the  result  of  the 
combination  against  Rosecrans's  army  in  September,  after 
our  lines  of  transit  were  seriously  disturbed,  and  after  the 


478  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

severe  losses  in  Pennsylvania,  Mississippi,  and  Tennessee ; 
and  to  consider  in  contrast  the  probable  result  of  the  com 
bination  if  effected  in  the  early  days  of  May,  when  it  was 
first  proposed  (see  strategic  map). 

At  that  time  General  Grant  was  marching  to  lay  siege 
upon  Vicksburg.  The  campaign  in  Virginia  had  been 
settled,  for  the  time,  by  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
Our  railways  were  open  and  free  from  Virginia  through 
East  Tennessee,  Georgia,  Alabama,  to  Central  Missis 
sippi.  The  armies  of  Kosecrans  and  Bragg  were  stand 
ing  near  Murfreesboro'  and  Shelbyville,  Tennessee.  The 
Richmond  authorities  were  trying  to  collect  a  force  at 
Jackson,  Mississippi,  to  drive  Grant's  army  from  the  siege. 
Two  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  were  marching  from  Suffolk  to  join  General 
Lee  at  Fredericksburg.  Under  these  circumstances,  posi 
tions,  and  conditions,  I  proposed  to  Secretary  Seddon,  and 
afterwards  to  General  Lee,  as  the  only  means  of  relief 
for  Vicksburg,  that  Johnston  should  be  ordered  with  his 
troops  to  join  Bragg's  army ;  that  the  divisions  marching 
for  Fredericksburg  should  be  ordered  to  meet  Johnston's, 
the  transit  over  converging  lines  would  give  speedy  com 
bination,  and  Johnston  should  be  ordered  to  strike  Rose- 
crans  in  overwhelming  numbers  and  march  on  to  the 
Ohio  River. 

As  the  combination  of  September  and  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga  drew  General  Grant's  army  from  its  work  in  Mis 
sissippi  to  protect  the  line  through  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky,  and  two  Federal  corps  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  the  inference  is  fair  that  the  earlier,  more  pow 
erful  combination  would  have  opened  ways  for  grand 
results  for  the  South,  saved  the  eight  thousand  lost  in 
defending  the  march  for  Vicksburg,  the  thirty-one  thou 
sand  surrendered  there,  Port  Hudson  and  its  garrison 
of  six  thousand,  and  the  splendid  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  the  twenty  thousand  lost  at  Gettysburg.  And 


FAILURE    TO    FOLLOW    SUCCESS.  479 

who  can  say  that  with  these  sixty-five  thousand  soldiers 
saved,  and  in  the  ranks,  the  Southern  cause  would  not 
have  been  on  a  grand  ascending  grade  with  its  bayonets 
and  batteries  bristling  on  the  banks  of  the  Ohio  River 
on  the  4th  day  of  July,  1863 ! 

The  elections  of  1862  were  not  in  support  of  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation.  With  the  Mississippi  River 
still  closed,  and  the  Southern  army  along  the  banks  of 
the  Ohio,  the  elections  of  1864  would  have  been  still 
more  pronounced  against  the  Federal  policy,  and  a  new 
administration  could  have  found  a*  solution  of  the  politi 
cal  imbroglio.  "  Blood  is  thicker  than  water." 


CHAPTEK   XXXIII. 

THE    EAST   TENNESSEE   CAMPAIGN. 

General  Bragg's  Infatuation — General  Grant  in  Command  of  the  Fed 
eral  Forces— Longstreet  ordered  into  East  Tennessee — His  Plans  for 
the  Campaign — Poorly  supported  by  his  Superior — Foraging  for  Daily 
Rations — General  Burnside's  Forces  —  Advance  upon  Kuoxville — 
Affairs  at  Lenoir's  and  Campbell's  Stations— Engagement  near  Knox- 
ville  an  Artillery  Combat — Reprehensible  Conduct  of  Officers — Allege- 
ment  that  One  was  actuated  by  Jealousy— Federals  retire  behind  their 
Works— Laying  the  Confederate  Lines  about  Knoxville. 

ABOUT  the  1st  of  November  it  was  rumored  about  camp 
that  I  was  to  be  ordered  into  East  Tennessee  against  Gen 
eral  Burnside's  army.  At  the  moment  it  seemed  impos 
sible  that  our  commander,  after  rejecting  a  proposition  for 
a  similar  move  made  just  after  his  battle,  when  flushed 
with  victory  and  the  enemy  discomfited,  could  now  think 
of  sending  an  important  detachment  so  far,  when  he  knew 
that,  in  addition  to  the  reinforcements  that  had  joined  the 
Union  army,  another  strong  column  was  marching  from 
Memphis  under  General  Sherman,  and  must  reach  Chat 
tanooga  in  fifteen  or  twenty  days.  But  on  second  thoughts 
it  occurred  to  me  that  it  might,  after  all,  be  in  keeping  with 
his  peculiarities,  and  then  it  occurred  to  me  that  there  are 
many  ways  to  compass  a  measure  when  the  spirit  leads. 
So  I  set  to  work  to  try  to  help  his  plans  in  case  the  report 
proved  true. 

After  a  little  reflection  it  seemed  feasible  that  by  with 
drawing  his  army  from  its  lines  about  Chattanooga  to 
strong  concentration  behind  the  Chickamauga  River,  and 
recalling  his  detachment  in  East  Tennessee  (the  latter  to 
give  the  impression  of  a  westward  move),  and  at  the  mo 
ment  of  concentration  sending  a  strong  force  for  swift 
march  against  General  Burnside. — strong  enough  to  crush 

480 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE   CAMPAIGN.  481 

him, — and  returning  to  Chattanooga  before  the  army  under 
General  Sherman  could  reach  there  (or,  if  he  thought 
better,  let  the  detachment  strike  into  Kentucky  against  the 
enemy's  communications),  something  worth  while  could 
be  effected. 

Presently  I  was  called,  with  Lieutenant-General  Hardee 
and  Major-General  Breckenridge,  the  other  corps  com 
manders,  to  learn  his  plans  and  receive  his  orders.  He 
announced  his  purpose  in  general  terms  to  send  me  into 
East  Tennessee,  then  paused  as  if  inviting  the  opinions 
of  others,  when  I  stated  that  the  move  could  be  made, 
but  it  would  be  hazardous  to  make  a  detachment  strong 
enough  for  rapid  work  while  his  army  was  spread  along 
a  semicircle  of  six  miles,  with  the  enemy  concentrated  at 
the  centre,  whence  he  could  move  in  two  or  three  threat 
ening  columns,  to  hold  his  line  to  its  extension,  and  give 
his  real  attack  such  power  that  it  must  break  through  by 
its  weight.  Then  I  suggested  the  operations  herein  just 
mentioned. 

He  ordered  the  move  to  be  made  by  my  two  divisions, 
Alexander's  and  Leydon's  artillery,  and  Wheeler's  cav 
alry  and  horse  artillery.  We  had  the  promise  of  a  force, 
estimated  from  three  to  five  thousand,  that  was  to  come 
from  Southwest  Virginia  and  meet  us,  but  that  com 
mand  was  to  start  from  a  point  two  hundred  miles  from 
our  starting,  march  south  as  we  marched  north,  and  meet 
us  at  Knoxville.  General  Bragg  estimated  General  Burn- 
side's  force  south  of  Knoxville  at  fifteen  thousand.  I 
repeated  the  warning  that  the  move  as  ordered  was  not 
such  as  to  give  assurances  of  rapid  work,  saying  that  my 
march  and  campaign  against  the  enemy's  well-guarded 
positions  must  be  made  with  care,  and  that  would  consume 
so  much  time  that  General  Grant's  army  would  be  up, 
when  he  would  organize  attack  that  must  break  through 
the  line  before  I  could  return  to  him.  His  sardonic  smile 
seemed  to  say  that  I  knew  little  of  his  army  or  of  himself 


482  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

in  assuming  such  a  possibility.  So  confident  was  he  of 
his  position  that  I  ventured  to  ask  that  my  column  should 
be  increased  to  twenty  thousand  infantry  and  artillery, 
but  he  intimated  that  further  talk  was  out  of  order. 

General  Grant  had  in  the  mean  time  joined  the  army 
and  assumed  command  on  the  22d  of  October,  and  it  was 
known  that  General  Sherman  was  marching  to  join  him. 

On  the  20th  of  October  General  Burnside  reported  by 
letter  *  to  General  Grant  an  army  of  twenty-two  thousand 
three  hundred  men,  with  ninety-odd  guns,  but  his  returns 
for  November  show  a  force  of  twenty-five  thousand  two 
hundred  and  ninety  and  over  one  hundred  guns.  Eight 
thousand  of  his  men  were  on  service  north  of  Knoxville 
and  about  Cumberland  Gap. 

To  march,  and  capture  or  disperse  this  formidable  force, 
fortified  at  points,  I  had  McLaws's  and  Hood's  divisions  of 
infantry,  Colonel  Alexander's  and  Major  Ley  don's  artil 
lery,  and  four  brigades  of  General  Wheeler's  cavalry. 
Kershaw's,  Humphreys's,  WofTord's,  and  Bryan's  brigades 
constituted  McLaws's  division.  Hood's  division,  which 
was  commanded  during  the  campaign  by  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  M.  Jenkins,  was  made  up  of  Jenkins's,  Anderson's, 
Benning's,  Law's,  and  Robertson's  brigades.  General 
Wheeler's  cavalry  was  organized  into  two  divisions  of  two 
brigades  each, — General  John  T.  Morgan's  Alabama  and 
Colonel  Cruse's  Georgia  brigades,  under  Major-General 
W.  T.  Martin ;  Colonels  G.  G.  Dibbrell's  Tennessee  and 
Thomas  Harrison's  Texas  brigades,  under  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Frank  Armstrong.  This  made  about  fifteen  thousand 
men,  after  deducting  camp  guards  and  foraging  parties. 
The  remote  contingent  that  was  to  come  from  Southwest 
Virginia  was  an  unknown  quantity,  not  to  be  considered 
until  it  could  report  for  service. 

As  soon  as  the  conference  at  head-quarters  adjourned 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxxi.  part  i.  p.  680. 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  483 

orders  were  issued  for  Alexander's  artillery  to  be  with 
drawn  from  Lookout  Mountain/ and  General  McLaws  was 
ordered  to  withdraw  his  division  from  the  general  line 
after  night.  Both  commands  were  ordered  to  Tyner's 
Station  to  take  the  cars  for  Sweet  water  on  the  4th. 

Control  of  the  trains  was  under  General  Bragg's  quar 
termaster,  who  had  orders  for  the  cars  to  be  ready  to 
transport  the  troops  on  their  arrival,  but  the  trains  were 
not  ready  until  the  5th.  The  brigades  arrived  at  Sweet- 
water  on  the  6th,  7th,  and  8th.  Alexander's  batteries 
were  shipped  as  soon  as  cars  were  ready.  To  expedite 
matters,  his  horses  and  wagons  were  ordered  forward  by 
the  dirt  road ;  the  batteries  found  cars,  the  last  battery 
getting  to  Sweetwater  on  the  10th.  Jenkins's  division  L 
and  Leydon's  batteries  were  drawn  from  the  lines  on  the 
5th  and  ordered  to  meet  the  cars  at  the  tunnel  through 
Missionary  B-idge.  They  reached  the  station  in  due  sea 
son,  but  the  cars  were  not  there.  After  waiting  some 
days,  the  battery  horses  and  horses  of  mounted  officers 
were  ordered  by  the  wagon  road.  Tired  of  the  wait,  I 
advised  the  troops  to  march  along  the  road  and  find  the 
cars  where  they  might  have  the  good  fortune  to  meet 
them,  the  officers,  whose  horses  had  been  sent  forward, 
marching  with  the  soldiers. 

General  Bragg  heard  of  the  delay  and  its  cause,  but 
began  to  urge  the  importance  of  more  rapid  movements. 
His  effort  to  make  his  paper  record  at  my  expense  was 
not  pleasing,  but  I  tried  to  endure  it  with  patience.  He 
knew  that  trains  and  conductors  were  under  his  exclusive 
control,  but  he  wanted  papers  that  would  throw  the  respon 
sibility  of  delay  upon  other  shoulders. 

On  the  8th  and  9th  the  infantry  marched  as  far  as 
Cleveland,  about  thirty  miles,  where  the  train-masters 
gave  notice  that  the  trains  could  meet  them,  but  it  was 
not  until  the  12th  that  the  last  of  the  brigades  reached 
Sweetwater. 


484  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

While  waiting  for  transportation,  I  wrote  some  of  my 
friends  to  excuse  my  failure  to  stop  and  say  good-by.  The 
letter  written  to  General  Buckner  was  returned  to  me 
some  months  after,  endorsed  by  him  as  having  important 
bearing  upon  events  as  they  transpired, — viz. : 

"  WEDNESDAY,  November  5,  1863. 

"MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — I  start  to-day  for  Tyner's  Station,  and 
expect  to  get  transportation  to-morrow  for  Sweetwater.  The 
weather  is  so  bad,  and  I  find  myself  so  much  occupied,  that  I 
shall  not  be  able  to  see  you  to  say  good-by. 

i  i  When  I  heard  the  report  around  camp  that  I  was  to  go  into 
East  Tennessee,  I  set  to  work  at  once  to  try  and  plan  the  means 
for  making  the  move  with  security  and  the  hope  of  great  results. 
As  every  other  move  had  been  proposed  to  the  general  and  re 
jected  or  put  off  until  time  had  made  them  inconvenient,  I  came 
to  the  conclusion,  as  soon  as  the  report  reached  me,  that  it  was  to 
be  the  fate  of  our  army  to  wait  until  all  good  opportunities  had 
passed,  and  then,  in  desperation,  seize  upon  the  least  favorable 
movement. 

1  i  As  no  one  had  proposed  this  East  Tennessee  campaign  to  the 
general,  I  thought  it  possible  that  we  might  accomplish  some 
thing  by  encouraging  his  own  move,  and  proposed  the  following 
plan, — viz.  :  to  withdraw  from  our  present  lines  and  our  forces  in 
East  Tennessee  (the  latter  to  be  done  in  order  to  give  the  impres 
sion  to  the  enemy  that  we  were  retiring  from  East  Tennessee  and 
concentrating  near  him  for  battle  or  for  some  other  movement) 
and  place  our  army  in  a  strong  concentrated  position  behind 
Chickamauga  Eiver.  The  moment  the  army  was  together,  to 
make  a  detachment  of  twenty  thousand  to  move  rapidly  against 
Burnside  and  destroy  him  ;  and  by  continued  rapid  movements  to 
threaten  the  enemy's  rear  and  his  communications  to  the  extent 
that  might  be  necessary  to  draw  him  out  from  his  present  posi 
tion.  This,  at  best,  is  but  a  tedious  process,  but  I  thought  it 
gave  promise  of  some  results,  and  was,  therefore,  better  than 
being  here  destroying  ourselves.  The  move,  as  I  proposed  it, 
would  have  left  this  army  in  a  strong  position  and  safe,  and 
would  have  made  sure  the  capture  of  Burnside, — that  is,  the 
army  could  spare  twenty  thousand,  if  it  were  in  the  position 
that  I  proposed,  better  than  it  can  spare  twelve,  occupying  the 
lines  that  it  now  does.  Twenty  thousand  men,  well  handled, 
could  surely  have  captured  Burnside  and  his  forces.  Under 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  485 

present  arrangements,  however,  the  lines  are  to  be  held  as  they 
now  are  and  the  detachment  is  to  be  of  twelve  thousand.  We 
thus  expose  both  to  failure,  and  really  take  no  chance  to  our 
selves  of  great  results.  The  only  notice  my  plan  received  was  a 
remark  that  General  Hardee  was  pleased  to  make,  '  I  don' t  think 
that  that  is  a  bad  idea  of  Longstreet's.'  I  undertook  to  explain 
the  danger  of  having  such  a  long  line  under  fire  of  the  enemy's 
batteries,  and  he  concentrated,  as  it  were,  right  in  our  midst,  and 
within  twenty  minutes'  march  of  any  portion  of  our  line.  But  I 
was  assured  that  he  would  not  disturb  us.  I  repeated  niy  ideas, 
but  they  did  not  even  receive  notice.  It  was  not  till  I  had 
repeated  them,  however,  that  General  Hardee  noticed  me.  Have 
you  any  maps  that  you  can  give  or  lend  me  ?  I  shall  need  every 
thing  of  the  kind.  Do  you  know  any  reliable  people,  living  near 
and  east  of  Knoxville,  from  whom  I  might  get  information  of  the 
condition,  strength,  etc.,  of  the  enemy?  I  have  written  in  such 
hurry  and  confusion  of  packing  and  striking  camp  (in  the  rain 
and  on  the  head  of  an  empty  flour  barrel)  that  I  doubt  if  I  have 
made  myself  understood.  I  remain 

' '  Sincerely  your  friend, 

UJ.  LONGSTREET, 

* i  Lieutenant-  General. 
"  To  MAJOR-GENERAL  S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

"  Commanding  Division." 

Three  months  thereafter    General   Buckner   returned 
the  letter  with  the  following  : 

(Endorsement. ) 

"MORRISTOWN,  TENN.,  February  1,  1864. 
"  GENERAL, — It  seems  to  me,  after  reading  this  letter  again, 
that  its  predictions  are  so  full  a  vindication  of  your  judgment 
of  the  movements  then  ordered,  that  it  should  remain  in  your 
possession,  with  a  view  that  at  some  future  day  it  may  serve  to 
*  vindicate  the  truth  of  history.'  I  place  it  at  your  disposal  with 
that  view. 

"  Truly  your  friend, 

"S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

"  Major-  General. 
"To  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET." 

I  asked  at  general  head-quarters  for  maps  and  informa 
tion  of  the  country  through  which  I  was  to  operate,  for  a 


486  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

quartermaster  and  commissary  of  subsistence  who  knew 
of  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  for  an  engineer  officer 
who  had  served  with  General  Buckner  when  in  command 
of  that  department.  Neither  of  the  staff-officers  was  sent, 
nor  a  map,  except  one  of  the  topographical  outlines  of  the 
country  between  the  Hiawassee  and  Tennessee  Rivers, 
which  was  much  in  rear  of  the  field  of  our  proposed 
operations.  General  Buckner  was  good  enough  to  send 
me  a  plot  of  the  roads  and  streams  between  Loudon  and 
Knoxville. 

We  were  again  disappointed  at  Sweetwater.  We  were 
started  from  Chattanooga  on  short  rations,  but  comforted 
by  the  assurance  that  produce  was  abundant  at  that  point, 
and  so  it  proved  to  be ;  but  General  Stevenson,  command 
ing  the  outpost,  reported  his  orders  from  the  commanding 
general  were  to  ship  all  of  his  supplies  to  his  army,  and 
to  retire  with  his  own  command  and  join  him  upon  our 
arrival.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  we  were  recently  from  Virginia, — coming  at  the 
heated  season, — where  we  left  most  of  our  clothing  and 
blankets  and  all  of  our  wagon  transportation  ;  and  by  this 
time,  too,  it  was  understood  through  the  command  that 
the  Richmond  authorities  were  holding  thunder-clouds 
over  the  head  of  the  commander,  and  that  General  Bragg 
was  disposed  to  make  them  more  portentous  by  his  press 
ing  calls  for  urgency. 

Thus  we  found  ourselves  in  a  strange  country,  not  as 
much  as  a  day's  rations  on  hand,  with  hardly  enough  land 
transportation  for  ordinary  camp  equipage,  the  enemy  in 
front  to  be  captured,  and  our  friends  in  rear  putting  in 
their  paper  bullets.  This  sounds  more  like  romance  than 
war,  but  I  appeal  to  the  records  for  the  facts,  including 
reports  of  my  chiefs  of  quartermaster  and  subsistence 
departments  and  General  Alexander's  account  of  the  con 
dition  of  some  of  the  battery  horses  and  ammunition. 

Our  foraging  parties  were  lively,  and  we  lost  but  a  day 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  487 

and  part  of  another  in  gathering  in  rations  for  a  start. 
Anticipating  proper  land  transportation,  plans  were  laid 
for  march  across  the  Little  Tennessee  above  its  confluence 
with  the  greater  river,  through  Marysville  to  the  heights 
above  Knoxville  on  the  east  bank,  by  forced  march.  This 
would  have  brought  the  city  close  under  fire  of  our  field 
batteries  and  forced  the  enemy  into  open  grounds.  A 
guide  had  been  secured  who  claimed  to  be  familiar  with 
the  country,  and  was  useful  in  laying  our  plans.  But 
when  our  pontoon  bridge  came  up  it  was  without  a  train 
for  hauling.  So  our  plan  must  be  changed. 

Fortunately,  we  found  a  point  in  a  bend  of  the  river 
near  the  railroad  at  which  we  could  force  a  crossing.  At 
dark  the  cars  were  rolled  up  to  that  point  by  hand,  and 
we  learned  that  the  Little  Tennessee  River  above  us  was 
fordable  for  cavalry.  General  Wheeler  had  been  ordered 
to  have  vedettes  along  the  river  from  Loudon  to  some 
distance  below  Kingston,  where  a  considerable  body  of 
Union  troops  occupied  the  north  bank.  He  was  ordered 
with  his  other  troops  to  prepare  for  orders  to  cross  the 
Little  Tennessee  at  its  fords,  ride  to  Marysville,  capture 
the  enemy's  cavalry  outpost  at  that  point,  ride  up  the 
east  side  of  the  river  to  Knoxville,  and  seize  the  heights 
overlooking  the  city ;  or,  finding  that  not  feasible,  to 
endeavor  to  so  threaten  as  to  hold  the  enemy's  forces  there 
to  their  works,  while  we  marched  against  the  troops  of  the 
west  side ;  but  when  he  found  his  service  on  that  side 
ceased  to  be  effective  or  co-operative  with  our  movements, 
to  cross  the  river  and  join  the  main  column. 

As  just  now  explained,  the  failure  of  wagons  for  our 
pontoon  bridge  forced  us  to  cross  at  Loudon,  and  to  make 
direct  march  upon  Knoxville  by  that  route. 

Weary  of  the  continual  calls  of  General  Bragg  for 
hurried  movements,  it  seemed  well  to  make  cause  for  him 
to  assign  another  commander  or  to  move  him  to  discontinue 
his  work  at  a  paper  record  ;  so  I  wired  to  remind  him  that 


488  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

he  assured  me  before  sending  me  away  that  he  was  safe  in 
his  position,  and  that  he  was  told  before  my  leaving  that 
the  command  was  not  strong  enough  to  excuse  any  but  a 
careful,  proper  campaign  ;  that  he  had  since  been  informed 
that  all  delays  of  our  movements  were  due  to  his  ineffi 
cient  staff  corps,  and  that  we  were  dependent  upon  for 
aging  for  our  daily  rations  for  men  and  animals.  It  began 
to  look  more  like  a  campaign  against  Longstreet  than 
against  Burnside. 

As  General  Burnside's  orders  were  to  hold  Knoxville, 
he  decided  to  act  on  the  defensive.  Leaving  the  troops  in 
the  northern  district  of  his  department  in  observation  of 
that  field,  he  withdrew  his  division  on  the  south  side  of 
Tennessee  River  as  we  marched  for  London,  took  up  his 
pontoon  bridge,  and  broke  up  the  railroad  bridge. 

Orders  were  issued  on  the  12th  for  the  general  move  of 
my  cavalry  by  Marysville,  the  infantry  and  artillery  along 
the  railroad  route.  Pains  were  taken  to  have  the  bridge 

o 

equipments  carried  by  hand  to  the  river,  and  skirmishing 
parties  put  in  the  boats  and  drifted  to  the  opposite  bank. 
The  troops  in  rear  were  marched  during  the  night  to  the 
vicinity  of  London  and  held  in  readiness  in  case  the 
enemy  came  to  oppose  our  crossing.  The  bridge  was  laid 
under  the  supervision  of  General  Alexander  and  Major 
Clark,  our  chief  engineer,  at  Huff 's  Ferry,  without  serious 
resistance. 

A  few  miles  east  of  London  the  Holston  *  and  Little 
Tennessee  Rivers  come  together,  making  the  Tennessee 
River,  which  flows  from  the  confluence  west  to  Kingston, 
where  it  resumes  its  general  flow  southwest.  The  Holston 
rises  in  the  mountains  north  and  flows  south  to  the  junction. 
The  Little  Tennessee  rises  in  the  mountains  east  and  flows 
west  to  the  junction.  The  railroad  crosses  the  main  river 
at  London,  thirty  miles  from  Knoxville,  and  runs  about 

*  Since  those  days  the  name  of  Holston  has  been  changed  to  the  Ten' 
nessee. 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  489 

parallel  to  the  Holston  River,  and  near  its  west  bank. 
West  of  the  railroad  and  parallel  is  a  broken  spur  of  the 
Clinch  Mountain  range,  with  occasional  gaps  or  passes  for 
vehicles,  and  some  other  blind  wagon-roads  and  cattle- 
trails.  West  of  this  spur,  and  near  its  base,  is  the  main 
wagon-road  to  Knoxville,  as  far  as  Campbell  Station, 
about  seventeen  miles,  where  it  joins  the  Kingston  road, 
passes  a  gap,  and  unites  with  the  wagon-road  that  runs 
with  the  railroad  east  of  the  mountain  spur  at  Camp 
bell  Station.  South  of  this  gap,  about  eleven  miles,  is 
another  pass  at  Lenoir's  Mill,  and  three  miles  south  of 
that  another  pass,  not  used. 

A  detail  of  sharp-shooters  under  Captain  Foster,  of 
Jenkins's  brigade,  manned  the  first  boats  and  made  a  suc 
cessful  lodging,  after  an  exchange  of  a  few  shots  with  the 
enemy's  picket-guard  on  the  north  bank.  They  intended 
to  surprise  and  capture  the  picket  and  thus  secure  quick 
and  quiet  passage,  but  in  that  they  were  not  successful. 
The  north  bank  was  secured,  however,  without  loss,  and 
troops  were  passed  rapidly  over  to  hold  it,  putting  out  a 
good  skirmish  line  in  advance  of  the  bridge-head.  As  we 
advanced  towards  London,  the  part  of  General  White's 
Union  division  that  had  been  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the 
river  was  withdrawn  to  Lenoir's  Station. 

During  the  13th  and  14th  the  command  was  engaged 
in  making  substantial  fastenings  for  the  bridge  and  con 
structing  its  defences.  General  Vaughn's  regiments  and 
a  battery  of  Major  Ley  don's  (with  broken-down  horses) 
were  assigned  to  guard  the  bridge. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  the  enemy  appeared  on 
our  front  in  strong  force,  drove  our  skirmish  line  back, 
and  seemed  prepared  to  give  battle.  As  we  were  then 
waiting  the  return  of  our  foraging  wagons,  we  could  only 
prepare  to  receive  him.  Some  of  the  provisions  looked 
for  came  in  during  the  night,  and  we  advanced  on  the 
15th,  finding  that  the  enemy  had  retired.  The  force  that 


490  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

came  back  to  meet  us  on  the  loth  was  part  of  White's  di 
vision  (Chapin's  brigade)  sent  by  General  Burnside,  and 
General  Potter,  commanding  the  Ninth  Corps,  sent  Gen 
eral  Ferrero  with  his  division.  The  move  was  intended 
probably  to  delay  our  march.  It  was  Chapin's  brigade 
that  made  the  advance  against  our  skirmishers,  and  it  prob 
ably  suffered  some  in  the  affair.  We  lost  not  a  single  man. 

General  Wheeler  crossed  the  Little  Tennessee  River  at 
Motley's  Ford  at  nightfall  on  the  13th,  and  marched  to 
cut  off  the  force  at  Marysville.  He  came  upon  the  com 
mand,  only  one  regiment,  the  Eleventh  Kentucky  Cav 
alry,  that  was  advised  in  time  to  prepare  for  him.  He 
attacked  as  soon  as  they  came  under  fire,  dispersed  them 
into  small  parties  that  made  good  their  escape,  except  one 
hundred  and  fifty  taken  by  DibbrelPs  brigade.  Colonel 
Wolford  brought  up  the  balance  of  his  brigade  and  made 
strong  efforts  to  support  his  broken  regiment,  but  was 
eventually  forced  back,  and  was  followed  by  the  Eightli 
and  Eleventh  Texas  and  Third  Arkansas  Cavalry  and 
General  John  T.  Morgan's  brigade.  The  next  day  he 
encountered  Sanders's  division  of  cavalry  and  a  battery, 
and,  after  a  clean  cavalry  engagement  of  skilful  manoeu 
vres  on  both  sides,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  vicinity  of 
the  city  of  Knoxville,  but  found  it  too  well  guarded  to 
admit  of  any  very  advantageous  work. 

On  the  15th  our  advance  was  cautiously  made  by  Hood's 
division  and  Alexander's  artillery  leading ;  McLaws's  di 
vision  and  Leydon's  artillery  following.  All  along  the 
route  of  the  railroad  the  valley  between  the  mountain 
and  the  river  is  so  narrow  and  rough  that  a  few  thousand 
men  can  find  many  points  at  which  they  can  make  success 
ful  stands  against  great  odds.  Our  course  was  taken  to 
turn  all  of  those  points  by  marching  up  the  road  on  the 
west  side  of  the  mountain.  A  few  miles  out  from  our 
bridge  we  encountered  a  skirmishing  party  near  the  lower 
gap  of  the  mountain,  which,  when  pressed  back,  passed 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  491 

through  the  gap.  General  Jenkins  continued  his  march — 
leaving  a  guard  at  the  gap  till  it  could  be  relieved  by 
General  McLaws — to  Lenoir's  Station. 

The  enemy  was  looking  for  us  to  follow  through  the 
lower  gaps  and  attack  his  strong  front,  and  was  a  little 
surprised  to  find  us  close  on  his  right  flank.  He  was  well 
guarded  there,  however,  against  precipitate  battle  by  the 
mountain  range  and  narrow  pass  and  the  heavy,  muddy 
roads  through  which  our  men  and  animals  had  to  pull. 
Arrangements  were  made  for  a  good  day's  work  from 
early  morning. 

Our  guide  promised  to  lead  part  of  our  men  through  a 
blind  route  during  the  night  by  which  we  could  cut  off  the 
enemy's  retreat,  so  that  they  would  be  securely  hemmed 
in.  Generals  Jenkins  and  McLaws  came  up  during  the 
night.  The  former  was  ordered  to  advance  part  of  his 
command  to  eligible  points  at  midnight  and  hold  them 
ready  for  use  at  daylight.  The  guide  was  sent  with  a 
brigade  to  the  point  which  was  to  intercept  the  enemy's 
retreat.  McLaws  was  held  on  the  road,  ready  for  use  east 
or  west  of  the  ridge.  Jenkins  was  ordered  to  have  parties 
out  during  the  night  to  watch  that  the  enemy  did  not 
move,  and  report.  As  no  report  came  from  them,  all 
things  were  thought  to  be  properly  adjusted,  when  we  ad 
vanced  before  daylight.  In  feeling  our  way  through  the 
weird  gray  of  the  morning,  stumps  seen  on  the  road 
side  were  taken  to  be  sharp-shooters,  but  we  were  surprised 
that  no  one  shot  at  us,  when,  behold !  before  it  was  yet 
quite  light,  we  came  upon  a  park  of  eighty  wagons,  well 
loaded  with  food,  camp  equipage,  and  ammunition,  with  the 
ground  well  strewn  with  spades,  picks,  and  axes.*  The  ani- 

*  Writing  of  these  operations  since  the  war,  General  E.  M.  Law,  in  an 
article  in  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Press  of  July  18,  1888,  said,— 

"  During  the  night  the  sounds  of  retreat  continued,  and  when  day 
light  came  the  valley  about  Lenoir  presented  the  scene  of.  an  encamp 
ment  deserted  with  ignominious  haste." 

But  he  did  not  take  the  trouble  to  report  the  retreat  until  nearly 


492  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

mals  had  been  taken  from  the  wagons  to  double  their  teams 
through  the  mud.  General  Potter  had  sent  the  division 
under  General  Hartranft  back  to  the  Campbell  Station 
Pass  to  occupy  the  junction  of  his  line  of  retreat  with  the 
Kingston  road  and  the  road  upon  which  we  were  march 
ing,  and  was  well  on  the  march  with  the  balance  of  the 
Ninth  Corps,  Ferrero's  division  and  his  cavalry,  before  we 
knew  that  there  was  an  opening  by  which  he  could  escape. 

Our  guide,  who  promised  to  post  the  brigade  so  as  to 
command  the  road  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  so  far  missed  his 
route  as  to  lead  the  brigade  out  of  hearing  of  the  enemy's 
march  during  the  night. 

Hart's  cavalry  brigade  that  was  left  in  observation  near 
Kingston  had  been  called  up,  and  with  McLaws's  division 
advanced  on  the  roads  to  Campbell  Station,  while  General 
Jenkins  followed-  the  direct  line  of  retreat  on  double  time, 
and  right  royally  did  his  skirmishers  move.  He  brought 
the  rear  to  an  occasional  stand,  but  only  leaving  enough 
to  require  him  to  form  line  for  advance,  when  the  enemy 
again  sped  away  on  their  rearward  march  at  double  time. 
General  Jenkins  made  the  march  before  noon,  but  the 
enemy  had  passed  the  gap  and  the  junction  of  the  roads, 
and  was  well  posted  in  battle  array  in  rear  of  them. 
General  McLaws  was  not  up.  He  was  not  ordered  on 
double  time,  as  it  was  thought  to  first  bring  the  enemy  to 
bay  on  the  east  road,  when  some  of  his  infantry  could  be 
called  over  the  mountain  on  the  enemy's  flank.  General 
Ferrero,  who  covered  the  retreat,  reported  that  it  was 
necessary  to  attach  from  sixteen  to  twenty  animals  to  a 
piece  to  make  the  haul  through  the  mud. 

The  retreat  was  very  cleverly  conducted,  and  was  in 
time  to  cover  the  roads  into  Campbell's  Station,  forming 
into  line  of  battle  to  meet  us.  Jenkins's  division,  being 
in  advance,  was  deployed  on  the  right  with  Alexander's 

tweny-five  years  after  the  war.  Had  he  done  so  at  the  proper  time 
the  work  at  Campbell's  Station  would  have  been  in  better  season. 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  493 

battalion.  As  soon  as  the  line  was  organized  the  batteries 
opened  practice  in  deliberate,  well-timed  combat,  but  Gen 
eral  Alexander  had  the  sympathy  of  his  audience.  His 
shells  often  exploded  before  they  reached  the  game,  and 
at  times  as  they  passed  from  the  muzzles  of  his  guns,  and 
no  remedy  could  be  applied  that  improved  their  fire. 

As  General  McLaws  came  up  his  division  was  put  upon 
our  left  with  the  other  batteries,  and  Hart's  brigade  of 
cavalry  was  assigned  in  that  part  to  observe  the  enemy's, 
farther  off.  It  was  not  yet  past  meridian.  We  had  ample 
time  to  make  a  battle  with  confident  hope  of  success,  by 
direct  advance  and  the  pressing  in  on  the  enemy's  right 
by  McLaws's  left,  but  our  severe  travel  and  labor  after 
leaving  Virginia  were  not  to  find  an  opportunity  to  make 
a  simply  successful  battle.  As  the  rear  of  the  enemy  was 
open  and  could  be  covered,  success  would  have  been  a 
simple  victory,  and  the  enemy  could  have  escaped  to  his 
trenches  at  Knoxville,  leaving  us  crippled  and  delayed  ; 
whereas  as  he  stood  he  was  ours.  How  we  failed  to  make 
good  our  claim  we  shall  presently  see. 

McLaws  was  ordered  to  use  one  of  his  brigades  well 
out  on  his  left  as  a  diversion  threatening  the  enemy's 
right,  and  to  use  Hart's  cavalry  for  the  same  purpose, 
while  General  Jenkins  was  ordered  to  send  two  of  his 
brigades  through  a  well-covered  way  off  our  right  to 
march  out  well  past  the  enemy's  left  and  strike  down 
against  that  flank  and  rear.  General  Law,  being  his 
officer  next  in  rank,  was  ordered  in  charge  of  his  own 
and  Anderson's  brigades.  General  Jenkins  rode  with 
the  command,  and  put  it  in  such  position  that  the  left 
of  this  line  would  strike  the  left  of  the  enemy's,  thus 
throwing  the  weight  of  the  two  brigades  past  the  enemy's 
rear.  I  rode  near  the  brigades,  to  see  that  there  could  be 
no  mismove  or  misconception  of  orders.  After  adjusting 
the  line  of  the  brigades,  and  giving  their  march  the  points 
of  direction,  General  Jenkins  rode  to  his  brigades  on  the 


494  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

front  to  handle  them  in  direct  attack.  I  remained  near 
the  front  of  the  flanking  brigades  for  complete  assurance 
of  the  adjustment  of  their  march,  and  waited  until  they 
were  so  near  that  it  was  necessary  to  ride  at  speed,  close 
under  the  enemy's  line,  to  reach  our  main  front,  to  time 
its  advance  with  the  flanking  move.  The  ride  was  made 
alone,  as  less  likely  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire,  the  staff 
riding  around. 

As  I  approached  the  front,  the  men  sprang  forward 
without  orders  to  open  the  charge,  but  were  called  to 
await  the  appearance  of  the  flanking  move  of  our  right. 
But  General  Law  had  so  changed  direction  as  to  bring  his 
entire  force  in  front  instead  of  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
left.  This  gave  him  opportunity  to  change  position  to 
strong  ground  in  rear,  which  made  other  movements 
necessary  in  view  of  the  objective  of  the  battle.  There 
was  yet  time  for  successful  battle,  but  it  would  have  been 
a  fruitless  victory.  Before  other  combinations  suited  to 
our  purpose  could  be  made  it  was  night,  and  the  enemy 
was  away  on  his  march  to  the  fortified  grounds  about 
Knoxville. 

The  demonstration  of  our  left  under  General  McLaws 
was  successful  in  drawing  the  enemy's  attention,  and  in 
causing  him  to  change  front  of  part  of  his  command  to 
meet  the  threatening. 

In  his  official  account  General  Jenkins  reported, — 

"In  a  few  minutes,  greatly  to  my  surprise,  I  received  a  mes 
sage  from  General  Law  that  in  advancing  his  brigades  he  had 
obliqued  so  much  to  the  left  as  to  have  gotten  out  of  its  line  of 
attack.  This  careless  and  inexcusable  movement  lost  us  the  few 
moments  in  which  success  from  this  point  could  be  attained."  * 

Apropos  of  this  the  following  memorandum  of  a  staff- 
officer  is  interesting  and  informative : 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxxi.  part  i.  p.  526. 


THE    EAST    TENNESSEE    CAMPAIGN.  495 

i  i  I  know  at  the  time  it  was  currently  reported  that  General 
Law  said  he  might  have  made  the  attack  successfully,  but  that 
Jenkins  would  have  reaped  the  credit  of  it,  and  hence  he  de 
layed  until  the  enemy  got  out  of  the  way.'7 

This  has  been  called  a  battle,  by  the  other  side,  but  it 
was  only  an  artillery  combat,  little,  very  little,  musket 
ammunition  being  burnt.  The  next  day  the  enemy  was 
safely  behind  his  works  about  Knoxville,  except  his 
cavalry  under  General  Sanders  and  his  horse  artillery  left 
to  delay  our  march.  McLaws's  division  reached  the 
suburbs  of  the  city  a  little  after  noon,  and  was  deployed 
from  near  the  mouth  of  Third  Creek  as  his  right,  the 
enemy  holding  a  line  of  dismounted  cavalry  skirmishers 
about  a  thousand  yards  in  advance  of  his  line  of  works. 
Alexander's  artillery  was  disposed  near  McLaws's  deploy 
ment.  Jenkins  got  up  before  night  and  was  ordered  to 
deploy  on  McLaws's  left  as  far  as  the  Tazewell  road,  pre 
ceded  by  Hart's  cavalry,  which  was  to  extend  the  line 
north  to  the  Holston  River.  General  Wheeler  came  up 
later  and  was  assigned  to  line  with  Colonel  Hart. 

The  city  stands  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Holston 
River,  on  a  plateau  about  one  and  a  half  miles  in  width 
and  extending  some  miles  down  south.  At  Knoxville 
the  plateau  is  one  hundred  and  twenty  feet  above  the 
river,  and  there  are  little  streams  called  First,  Second, 
and  Third  Creeks,  from  the  upper  to  the  lower  suburbs 
of  the  city, — First  Creek  between  the  city  and  East 
Knoxville,  or  Temperance  Hill ;  Second  Creek  between 
the  city  and  College  Hill;  Third  Creek  below  and 
outside  the  enemy's  lines  of  defence.  The  plateau 
slopes  down  to  the  valley  through  which  the  railway 
passes,  and  west  of  the  valley  it  rises  to  the  usual  eleva 
tion.  The  Confederates  were  posted  on  the  second  pla 
teau,  with  their  batteries  of  position.  The  line  of  the 
enemy's  works,  starting  at  its  lower  point  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  river,  was  just  above  the  mouth  of  Second 


496  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Creek,  lying  at  right  angles  to  the  river.  It  ran  to  a  fort 
constructed  by  the  Confederates,  when  occupied  by  them 
years  before,  called  Fort  Loudon,  above  the  Kingston 
road,  and  about  a  thousand  yards  in  front  of  the  college. 
East  from  that  point  it  was  about  parallel  with  the  river, 
reaching  to  Temperance  Hill,  to  Mabry's  Hill,  and  to  the 
Holston,  below  the  glass-works.  An  interior  line  ex 
tended  from  Temperance  Hill  to  Flint  Hill  on  the  east, 
and  another  on  the  west,  between  the  outer  line  and  Sec 
ond  Creek.  Dams  were  built  across  First  and  Second 
Creeks,  flooding  and  forming  formidable  wet  ditches  over 
extensive  parts  of  the  line.  Abatis,  chevaux-de-frise,  and 
wire  entanglements  were  placed  where  thought  to  be  ad 
vantageous  for  the  defenders. 

The  heights  on  the  northeast  across  the  river  are  much 
more  elevated  than  the  plateaux  of  the  city  side,  and  com 
mand  all  points  of  the  west  bank.  These  were  defended 
at  some  points  by  earthworks  well  manned.  From  the 
lower  point  of  the  enemy's  line  the  Confederates  extended 
to  his  right  at  the  river,  conforming  to  his  defensive  lines. 
The  part  of  our  line  occupied  by  the  cavalry  wras  a  mere 
watch-guard. 

Our  move  was  hurried,  and  our  transportation  so  lim 
ited  that  we  had  only  a  few  tools  in  the  hands  of  small 
pioneer  parties,  and  our  wagons  were  so  engaged  in  col 
lecting  daily  rations  that  we  found  it  necessary  to  send 
our  cavalry  down  to  Lenoir's  for  the  tools  captured  there 
for  use  in  making  rifle-pits  for  our  sharp-shooters. 

When  General  Burnside  rode  to  the  front  to  meet  us 
at  Lenoir's  he  left  General  Parke  in  command  at  Knox- 
ville,  and  he  and  Captain  Poe,  of  the  engineers,  gave  at 
tention  to  his  partially-constructed  works. 

Upon  laying  our  lines  about  Knoxville,  the  enemy's 
forces  in  the  northeast  of  his  department  were  withdrawn 
towards  Cumberland  Gap,  but  we  had  no  information  of 
the  troops  ordered  to  meet  us  from  Southwest  Virginia. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

BESIEGING    KNOXVILLE. 

Closing  on  the  Enemy's  Lines — A  Gallant  Dash — The  Federal  Positions 
— Fort  Loudon,  later  called  Fort  Sanders — Assault  of  the  Fort  care 
fully  planned — General  McLaws  advises  Delay — The  Order  reiterated 
and  emphasized — Gallant  Effort  by  the  Brigades  of  Generals  Wofford, 
Humphreys,  and  Bryan  at  the  Appointed  Time — A  Recall  ordered, 
because  carrying  the  Works  was  reported  impossible — General  Long- 
street  is  ordered  by  the  President  to  General  Bragg's  Relief— Losses 
during  the  Assault  and  the  Campaign. 

THE  enemy's  line  of  sharp-shooters  and  Fort  Sanders 
stood  in  our  direct  line  of  advance, — the  fort  manned  by 
the  heaviest  and  best  field  guns.  Benjamin's  battery,  an 
old  familiar  acquaintance  who  had  given  us  many  hard 
knocks  in  our  Eastern  service,  opened  upon  us  as  soon  as 
we  were  in  its  reach.  It  was  not  until  night  of  the  17th 
that  our  line  was  well  established,  and  then  only  so  as  to 
enclose  the  enemy's  front,  leaving  the  country  across  the 
river  to  be  covered  when  the  troops  from  Virginia  should 
join  us. 

When  General  McLaws  advanced  on  the  morning  of 
the  18th  he  found  the  enemy's  line  of  skirmishers — cav 
alry  dismounted — behind  a  line  of  heavy  rail  defences. 
General  Alexander  was  ordered  to  knock  the  rails  about 
them  and  drive  them  out,  and  was  partially  successful,  but 
the  enemy  got  back  before  our  infantry  could  reach  them, 
so  we  had  to  carry  the  line  by  assault.  Part  of  our  line 
drove  up  in  fine  style,  and  was  measurably  successful,  but 
other  parts,  smarting  under  the  stiff  musket  fire,  hesitated 
and  lay  down  under  such  slight  shelter  as  they  could  find, 
but  close  under  fire, — so  close  that  to  remain  inactive  would 
endanger  repulse.  Captain  Winthrop,  of  Alexander's  staff, 
appreciating  the  crisis,  dashed  forward  on  his  horse  and 
led  the  halting  lines  successfully  over  the  works.  In  his 

32  497 


498  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

gallant  ride  he  received  a  very  severe  hurt.  Neither  our 
numbers  nor  our  condition  were  such  as  to  warrant  further 
aggressive  action  at  the  moment,  nor,  in  fact,  until  the 
column  from  Virginia  joined  us.  Our  sharp-shooters 
were  advanced  from  night  to  night  and  pitted  before 
daylight,  each  line  being  held  by  new  forces  as  the  ad 
vance  was  made.  The  first  line  occupied  was  a  little 
inside  of  the  rail  piles. 

It  seemed  probable,  upon  first  examination  of  the  line 
along  the  northwest,  that  we  might  break  through,  and 
preparations  were  made  for  that  effort,  but,  upon  closer 
investigation,  it  was  found  to  be  too  hazardous,  and  that 
the  better  plan  was  to  await  the  approach  of  the  other 
forces. 

When  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  works, 
our  lines  well  pitted,  it  seemed  safe  to  establish  a  battery 
on  an  elevated  plateau  on  the  east  (or  south)  side  of  the 
river.  Some  of  our  troops  were  sent  over  in  flat-boats, 
and  the  reconnoissance  revealed  an  excellent  point  com 
manding  the  city  and  the  enemy's  lines  of  works,  though 
parts  of  his  lines  were  beyond  our  range.  Some  of  our 
best  guns  were  put  in  position,  and  our  captured  pontoon 
bridges  down  at  Lenoir's  were  sent  for,  to  be  hauled  up 
along  the  river,  but  impassable  rapids  were  found,  and  we 
were  obliged  to  take  part  of  our  supply-train  to  haul  them. 
They  were  brought  up,  and  communication  between  the 
detachment  and  main  force  was  made  easy.  The  brigades 
/  of  Law  and  Robertson  were  left  on  the  east  (or  south) 
side  as  guard  for  that  battery. 

The  Union  forces  were  posted  from  left  to  right, — the 
Ninth  Corps,  General  R.  D.  Potter  commanding.  Gen 
eral  Ferrero's  division  extended  from  the  river  to  Second 
Creek ;  General  Hartranft's  along  part  of  the  line  be 
tween  Second  and  First  Creeks ;  Chapin's  and  Reilly's 
brigades  over  Temperance  Hill  to  near  Bell's  house,  and 
the  brigades  of  Hoskins  and  Casement  to  the  river.  The 


BESIEGING    KNOXVILLE.  499 

interior  line  was  held  by  regiments  of  loyal  Tennesseeans 
recently  recruited.  The  positions  on  the  south  (or  east) 
side  of  the  river  were  occupied  by  Cameron's  brigade  of 
Hascall's  division  and  Shackelford's  cavalry  (dismounted) , 
Reilly's  brigade  in  reserve, — two  sections  of  Wilder's  bat 
tery  and  Konkle's  battery  of  four  three-inch  rifle  guns. 

The  batteries  of  the  enemy's  front  before  the  city  were 
Homer's  four  three-inch  rifles  at  the  university,  Benjamin's 
four  twenty-pound  Parrotts  and  Beecher's  six  twelve- 
pound  Napoleons  (at  the  fort),  Gittings's  four  ten-pound 
Parrotts,  Fifteenth  Indiana  Battery  of  six  rifle  guns 
(three-inch),  James's  (Indiana)  Battery  of  six  rifle  guns, 
Henshaw's  battery  of  two  (James's)  rifle  guns  and  four 
six-pounders,  Shields's  battery  of  six  twelve-pound  Napo 
leons,  and  one  section  of  Wilder's  three-inch  rifle  guns, 
extending  the  line  from  the  fort  to  the  river  on  the 
north. 

In  his  official  account,  General  Burnside  reported 
"about  twelve  thousand  effective  men,  exclusive  of  the 
recruits  and  loyal  Tennesseeans."  He  had  fifty-one  guns 
of  position,  including  eight  on  the  southeast  side. 

Fort  Loudon,  afterwards  called  for  the  gallant  Sanders, 
who  fell  defending  it,  was  a  bastion  earthwork,  built  upon 
an  irregular  quadrilateral.  The  sides  were,  south  front, 
one  hundred  and  fourteen  yards ;  west  front,  ninety-five 
yards ;  north  front,  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  yards ; 
east  front,  eighty-five  yards.  The  eastern  front  was  open, 
intended  to  be  closed  by  a  stockade.  The  south  front  was 
about  half  finished;  the  western  front  finished,  except 
cutting  the  embrasures,  and  the  north  front  nearly  fin 
ished.  The  bastion  attacked  was  the  only  one  that  was 
finished.  The  ditch  was  twelve  feet  wide,  and  generally 
seven  to  eight  feet  deep.  From  the  fort  the  ground  sloped 
in  a  heavy  grade,  from  which  the  trees  had  been  cut  and 
used  as  abatis,  and  wire  net-work  was  stretched  between 
the  stumps. 


500  FKOM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

General  Burnside  reported, — 

"Many  citizens  and  persons  who  had  been  driven  in  by  the 
enemy  volunteered  to  work  on  the  trenches  and  did  good  service, 
while  those  who  were  not  inclined  from  disloyalty  to  volunteer 
were  pressed  into  service.  The  negroes  were  particularly  efficient 
in  their  labors  during  the  siege.  On  the  20th  of  November  our 
line  was  in  such  condition  as  to  inspire  the  entire  command  with 
confidence." 

General  Poe  reported, — 

"The  citizens  of  the  town  and  all  contrabands  within  reach 
were  pressed  into  service  and  relieved  the  almost  exhausted  sol 
diers,  who  had  no  rest  for  more  than  a  hundred  hours.  Many  of 
the  citizens  were  Confederates  and  worked  with  a  very  poor  grace, 
which  blistered  hands  did  not  tend  to  improve." 

On  the  22d,  General  McLaws  thought  his  advance  near 
enough  the  works  to  warrant  assault.  He  was  ordered 
to  it  with  assaulting  columns  supported  by  the  division. 
General  Jenkins  was  also  ordered  up,  and  General 
Wheeler  was  ordered  to  push  his  troops  and  his  horse 
artillery  forward  as  McLaws's  attack  opened,  so  that  the 
entire  line  would  engage  and  hold  to  steady  work  till  all 
the  works  were  carried.  After  consulting  his  officers, 
General  McLaws  reported  that  they  preferred  to  have 
daylight  for  their  work.  On  the  23d  reports  came  of  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy  at  Kingston  advancing.  Gen 
eral  Wheeler  was  sent  with  his  main  force  of  cavalry  to 
look  after  them.  He  engaged  the  enemy  on  the  24th, 
and  after  a  skirmish  withdrew.  Soon  afterwards,  re 
ceiving  orders  from  General  Bragg  to  join  him,  leaving 
his  cavalry  under  command  of  Major-General  Martin,  he 
rode  to  find  his  commander.  General  Martin  brought 
the  brigades  back  and  resumed  position  on  our  left.  Colo 
nel  Hart,  who  was  left  at  Kingston  with  his  brigade, 
reported  that  there  were  but  three  regiments  of  cavalry 
and  a  field  battery,  that  engaged  General  Wheeler  on  the 
24th. 


BESIEGING    KNOXVILLE.  501 

On  the  night  of  the  24th  the  enemy  made  a  sortie  v 
against  a  point  of  General  Wofford's  line  which  broke 
through,  but  was  speedily  driven  back  with  a  loss  of  some 
prisoners  and  a  number  of  killed  and  wounded.    General 
Wofford's  loss  was  five  wounded,  two  mortally. 

Our  cavalry,  except  a  brigade  left  at  Kingston,  resumed 
its  position  on  the  left  of  our  line  on  the  26th.  On  the 
23d  a  telegram  came  from  General  Bragg  to  say  that  the 
enemy  had  moved  out  and  attacked  his  troops  at  Chatta 
nooga.  Later  in  the  day  he  announced  the  enemy  still  in 
front  of  him,  but  not  engaging  his  forces. 

On  the  25th  I  had  a  telegram  from  General  Bushrod 
R.  Johnson  at  London,  who  was  marching  with  two  bri 
gades  to  reinforce  us,  saying  that  the  enemy  was  throwing 
his  cavalry  forward  towards  Charleston.  This,  in  connec 
tion  with  the  advance  of  the  enemy  towards  General 
Bragg,  reported  by  his  despatch  of  the  23d,  I  took  to  be 
an  effort  to  prevent  reinforcements  coming  to  us,  or  to  cut 
in  and  delay  their  march. 

That  night  General  Leadbetter,  chief  engineer  of  Gen 
eral  Bragg's  army,  reported  at  head-quarters  with  orders  ' 
from  General  Bragg  that  we  should  attack  at  Knoxville, 
and  very  promptly.  I  asked  him  to  make  the  reconnois- 
sance  and  designate  the  assailable  points.  At  the  same  time 
he  was  asked  to  consider  that  the  troops  from  Virginia  were 
on  the  march  and  would  join  us  in  eight  or  ten  days,  when 
our  investment  could  be  made  complete ;  that  the  enemy 
was  then  on  half  rations,  and  would  be  obliged  to  surren 
der  in  two  weeks  ;  also  whether  we  should  assault  fortifi 
cations  and  have  the  chance  of  repulse,  rather  than  wait 
for  a  surrender.  From  his  first  reconnoissance  he  pro 
nounced  Fort  Sanders  the  assailable  point,  but,  after  riding 
around  the  lines  with  General  Jenkins  and  General  Alex 
ander,  he  pronounced  in  favor  of  assault  from  our  left  at 
Mabry's  Hill.  On  the  27th,  after  more  thorough  recon 
noissance  in  company  with  my  officers,  he  came  back  to 


502  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

liis  conclusion  in  favor  of  assault  at  Fort  Sanders.  I 
agreed  with  him  that  the  field  at  Mabry's  Hill  was  too  wide, 
and  the  march  under  fire  too  long,  to  warrant  attack  at 
that  point.  He  admitted  that  the  true  policy  was  to  wait 
and  reduce  the  place  by  complete  investment,  but  claimed 
that  the  crisis  was  on,  the  time  imperative,  and  that  the 
assault  must  be  tried. 

Meanwhile,  rumors  reached  us,  through  the  telegraph 
operator,  of  a  battle  at  Chattanooga,  but  nothing  official, 
though  outside  indications  were  corroborative.  In  the 
afternoon  Colonel  Giltner,  of  the  command  from  Virginia, 
reported  with  his  cavalry,  and  next  day  (28th)  General 
W.  E.  Jones,  of  that  command,  reported  with  his  cavalry. 
The  brigades  from  Chattanooga  under  General  B.  R. 
Johnson  were  at  hand,  but  not  yet  up.  The  artillery  and 
infantry  coming  from  Virginia  were  five  or  six  days' 
march  from  us  ;  but  General  Leadbetter  was  impatient. 

General  McLaws  was  ordered  to  double  his  force  of 
sharp-shooters  and  their  reserve,  advance  during  the 
night  and  occupy  the  line  of  the  enemy's  pickets,  and 
arrange  for  assault.  The  artillery  was  to  open  on  the 
fort  as  soon  as  the  weather  cleared  the  view.  After  ten 
minutes'  practice  the  assaulting  column  was  to  march,  but 
the  practice  was  to  hold  until  the  near  approach  of  the 
storming  party  to  the  Fort.  The  assault  was  to  be  made 
by  three  of  McLaws's  brigades,  his  fourth,  advancing  on 
his  right,  to  carry  the  line  of  works  in  its  front  as  soon 
as  the  fort  was  taken.  Three  brigades  of  Jenkins's  divi 
sion  were  to  follow  in  echelon  on  the  left  of  McLaws's 
column,  G.  T.  Anderson's,  of  his  right,  leading  at  two 
hundred  yards'  interval  from  McLaws's,  Anderson  to  as 
sault  the  line  in  his  front,  and  upon  entering  to  wheel  to 
his  left  and  sweep  up  that  line,  followed  by  Jenkins's 
and  Benning's  brigades ;  but,  in  case  of  delay  in  Mc 
Laws's  assault,  Anderson  was  to  wheel  to  his  right  and 
take  the  fort  through  its  rear  opening,  leaving  the  bri- 


BESIEGING    KNOXVILLE.  503 

gades  of  Jenkins  and  Benning  to  follow  the  other  move 
to  their  left. 

The  ditch  and  parapets  about  the  fort  were  objects  of 
careful  observation  from  the  moment  of  placing  our  lines, 
and  opinions  coincided  with  those  of  reconnoitring  officers 
that  the  former  could  be  passed  without  ladders.  General 
Alexander  and  I  made  frequent  examinations  of  them 
within  four  hundred  yards. 

After  careful  conference,  General  McLaws  ordered, — 

"First.  Wofford's  Georgia  and  Humphreys' s  Mississippi  bri 
gades  to  make  the  assault,  the  first  on  the  left,  the  second  on  the 
right,  this  latter  followed  closely  by  three  regiments  of  Bryan's 
brigade ;  the  Sixteenth  Georgia  Eegiment  to  lead  the  first  and 
the  Thirteenth  Mississippi  the  second  assaulting  column. 

1  i  Second.  The  brigades  to  be  formed  for  the  attack  in  columns 
of  regiments. 

"  Third.  The  assault  to  be  made  with  fixed  bayonets,  and  with 
out  firing  a  gun. 

"  Fourth.  Should  be  made  against  the  northwest  angle  of  Fort 
London  or  Sanders. 

"Fifth.  The  men  should  be  urged  to  the  work  with  a  determi 
nation  to  succeed,  and  should  rush  to  it  without  hallooing. 

"Sixth.  The  sharp-shooters  to  keep  up  a  continuous  fire  into 
the  embrasures  of  the  enemy's  works  and  along  the  fort,  so  as  to 
prevent  the  use  of  the  cannon,  and  distract,  if  not  prevent,  the 
fire  of  all  arms." 

General  B.  R.  Johnson  was  in  time  to  follow  the  main 
attack  by  General  McLaws  with  his  own  and  Gracie's 
brigades  (two  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty-five  ef 
fectives)  . 

The  order  was  given  for  the  28th,  but  the  weather  be 
came  so  heavy  and  murky  as  to  hide  the  fort  from  view 
of  our  artillery,  so  operations  were  put  off  until  the  29th. 

On  the  28th  reports  were  brought  of  an  advance  of 
Union  troops  from  the  direction  of  Cumberland  Gap. 
The  cavalry  under  General  W.  E.  Jones  was  sent  to  arrest 
their  march  pending  operations  ordered  for  the  29th,  and 


504  FEOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

he  was  authorized  to  call  the  artillery  and  infantry  march 
ing  from  Virginia  to  his  assistance  if  the  force  proved 
formidable. 

After  arranging  his  command,  General  McLaws  wrote 
me  as  follows : 


' i  HEAD  -  QUARTERS  Di  VISION, 

"  November  28,  1863. 


"  GENERAL, — It  seems  to  be  a  conceded  fact  that  there  has  been 
a  serious  engagement  between  General  Bragg' s  forces  and  those 
of  the  enemy  j  with  what  result  is  not  known  so  far  as  I  have 
heard.  General  Bragg  may  have  maintained  his  position,  may 
have  repulsed  the  enemy,  or  may  have  been  driven  back.  If  the 
enemy  has  been  beaten  at  Chattanooga,  do  we  not  gain  by  delay 
at  this  point  ?  If  we  have  been  defeated  at  Chattanooga,  do  we 
not  risk  our  entire  force  by  an  assault  here  ?  If  we  have  been 
defeated  at  Chattanooga,  our  communications  must  be  made  with 
Virginia.  We  cannot  combine  again  with  General  Bragg,  even 
if  we  should  be  successful  in  our  assault  on  Knoxville.  If  we 
should  be  defeated  or  unsuccessful  here,  and  at  the  same  time 
General  Bragg  should  have  been  forced  to  retire,  would  we  be  in 
condition  to  force  our  way  to  the  army  in  Virginia  ?  I  present 
these  considerations,  and  with  the  force  they  have  on  my  mind  I 
beg  leave  to  say  that  I  think  we  had  better  delay  the  assault  until 
we  hear  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  The  enemy  may 
have  cut  our  communication  to  prevent  this  army  reinforcing 
General  Bragg,  as  well  as  for  the  opposite  reason, — viz.,  to  pre 
vent  General  Bragg  from  reinforcing  us,  and  the  attack  at  Chat 
tanooga  favors  the  first  proposition.* 

"Very  respectfully, 

"L.  McLAWS, 

1  i  Major-  General. ' ' 

In  reply  I  wrote, — 

"  HE  AD  -QUARTERS,  November  28,  1863. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL   McL/AWS  : 

"GENERAL, — Your  letter  is  received.  I  am  not  at  all  confi 
dent  that  General  Bragg  has  had  a  serious  battle  at  Chattanooga, 
but  there  is  a  report  that  he  has,  and  that  he  has  fallen  back  to 
Tunnel  Hill.  Under  this  report  I  am  entirely  convinced  that  our 
only  safety  is  in  making  the  assault  upon  the  enemy's  position 
'  to-morrow  at  daylight,  and  it  is  the  more  important  that  I  should 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxxi.  part  i.  p.  491. 


BESIEGING    KNOXVILLE.  505 

have  the  entire  support  and  co-operation  of  the  officers  in  this 
connection  ;  and  I  do  hope  and  trust  that  I  may  have  your  entire 
support  and  all  the  force  you  may  be  possessed  of  in  the  execu 
tion  of  my  views.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  there  is 
any  safety  for  us  in  going  to  Virginia  if  General  Bragg  has  been 
defeated,  for  we  leave  him  at  the  mercy  of  his  victors,  and  with 
his  army  destroyed  our  own  had  better  be,  for  we  will  be  not 
only  destroyed,  but  disgraced.  There  is  neither  safety  nor  honor 
in  any  other  course  than  the  one  I  have  chosen  and  ordered. 
"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  JAMES  LONGSTREET, 
"Lieutenant- General  Commanding. 

"P.S. — The  assault  must  be  made  at  the  time  appointed,  and 
must  be  made  with  a  determination  which  will  insure  success." 

After  writing  the  letter  it  occurred  to  me  to  show  it  to 
General  Leadbetter,  who  was  stopping  at  our  head-quar 
ters,  when  he  suggested  the  postscript  which  was  added. 

The  assault  was  made  by  the  brigades  of  Generals  Wof- 
ford,  Humphreys,  and  Bryan  at  the  appointed  time  and 
in  admirable  style.  The  orders  were,  that  not  a  musket 
should  be  discharged  except  by  the  sharp-shooters,  who 
should  be  vigilant  and  pick  off  every  head  that  might 
appear  above  the  parapets  until  the  fort  was  carried.  The 
troops  marched  steadily  and  formed  regularly  along  the 
outside  of  the  works  around  the  ditch.  I  rode  after  them 
with  the  brigades  under  General  B.  R.  Johnson  until 
within  five  hundred  yards  of  the  fort,  whence  we  could  see 
our  advance  through  the  gray  of  the  morning.  A  few 
men  were  coming  back  wounded.  Major  Goggin,  of  Gen 
eral  McLaws's  staff,  who  had  been  at  the  fort,  rode  back, 
met  me,  and  reported  that  it  would  be  useless  for  us  to  go 
^Hi ;  that  the  enemy  had  so  surrounded  the  fort  with  net 
work  of  wire  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  men  to  get  in 
without  axes,  and  that  there  was  not  an  axe  in  the  com 
mand.  Without  a  second  thought  I  ordered  the  recall,  l 
and  ordered  General  Johnson  to  march  his  brigades  back 
to  their  camps.  He  begged  to  be  allowed  to  go  on,  but, 


506  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

giving  full  faith  to  the  report,  I  forbade  him.  I  had 
known  Major  Goggin  many  years.  He  was  a  class 
mate  at  West  Point,  and  had  served  with  us  in  the  field 
in  practical  experience,  so  that  I  had  confidence  in  his 
judgment. 

Recall  was  promptly  sent  General  Jenkins  and  his  ad 
vance  brigade  under  General  Anderson,  but  the  latter, 
seeing  the  delay  at  the  fort,  changed  his  direction  outside 
the  enemy's  works  and  marched  along  their  front  to  the 
ditch,  and  was  there  some  little  time  before  he  received 
the  order.  In  his  march  and  countermarch  in  front  of 
the  enemy's  line  he  lost  four  killed  and  thirty-three 
wounded. 

As  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  assaulting  columns,  our 
troops  on  the  south  side  were  ordered  to  a  simultaneous 
attack,  and  to  get  in  on  that  side  if  the  opportunity  oc 
curred.  They  were  reinforced  by  Russell's  brigade  of 
Morgan's  division  of  cavalry,  and  Harrison's  brigade  of 
Armstrong's  division,  dismounted,  General  Morgan  com 
manding.  This  demonstration  had  the  effect  anticipated 
in  detaining  troops  to  hold  on  that  side  that  were  intended 
as  reserve  for  the  fort. 

Just  after  the  troops  were  ordered  back  it  occurred  to 
me  that  there  must  be  some  mistake  about  the  wire  net 
work,  for  some  of  our  men  had  been  seen  mounting  and 
passing  over  the  parapets,  but  it  was  too  late  to  reorganize 
and  renew  the  attack,  and  I  conceived  that  some  of  the 
regimental  pioneers  should  have  been  at  hand  prepared 
to  cut  the  wires,  but  all  had  been  armed  to  help  swell  our 
ranks. 

Since  reading  the  accounts  of  General  Poe,  the  engineer 
in  charge  of  the  works,  I  am  convinced  that  the  wires 
were  far  from  being  the  serious  obstacle  reported,  and  that 
we  could  have  gone  in  without  the  use  of  axes ;  and  from 
other  accounts  it  appears  that  most  of  the  troops  had  re 
tired  from  the  fort,  leaving  about  a  hundred  and  fifty 


BESIEGING   KNOXVILLE.  507 

infantry  with  Benjamin's  battery.  Our  muskets  from 
the  outside  of  the  parapet  could  have  kept  the  infantry 
down,  and  the  artillery  practice,  except  the  few  hand- 
grenades,  prepared  at  the  time  by  the  artillerists.  John 
son's  brigades  would  have  been  at  the  ditch  with  me  in 
ten  minutes,  when  we  would  have  passed  over  the  works. 
Hence  it  seems  conclusive  that  the  failure  was  due  to  the 
order  of  recall.  It  is  not  a  part  of  my  nature  to  listen  to 
reports  that  always  come  when  stunning  blows  are  felt, 
but  confidence  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  was  broken,  and 
with  it  the  tone  and  spirit  for  battle  further  impaired  by 
the  efforts  of  those  in  authority  to  damage,  if  not  prevent, 
the  success  of  work  ordered  in  their  own  vital  interest : 
a  poor  excuse  for  want  of  golden  equipoise  in  one  who 
presumes  to  hold  the  lives  of  his  soldiers,  but  better  than 
to  look  for  ways  to  shift  the  responsibility  of  a  wavering 
spirit  that  sometimes  comes  unawares. 

After  the  repulse,  General  Burnside  was  so  considerate  \ 
as  to  offer  a  "  flag  of  truce"  for  time  to  remove  our  killed 
and  wounded  about  his  lines. 

About  half  an  hour  after  the  repulse,  and  while  yet  on 
the  slope  leading  up  to  the  fort,  Major  Branch,  of  Major- 
General  Ransom's  staff,  came  with  a  telegram  from  the 
President  informing  me  that  General  Bragg  had  been 
forced  back  by  superior  numbers,  and  ordering  me  to 
proceed  to  co-operate  with  his  army. 

Orders  were  issued  at  once  for  our  trains  to  move  south,  ^ 
and  preparations  were  begun  for  a  move  of  the  troops 
after  nightfall.  In  the  afternoon  word  came  from  General 
Wheeler,  authorized  by  General  Bragg,  that  I  should  join 
him,  if  practicable,  at  Ringgold.  But  our  first  step  was 
to  be  relieved  of  the  threatening  from  the  direction  of 
Cumberland  Gap.  General  Martin  was  sent  to  reinforce 
General  Jones,  with  orders  to  hurry  his  operations,  and 
return  in  time  to  cover  anticipated  movements.  His  bri 
gades  which  had  done  their  clever  work  on  the  south  side 


508  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

were  withdrawn  to  go  with  him.  When  he  came  up  with 
Jones,  the  latter  was  severely  engaged,  but  it  was  then 
night,  too  late  for  other  operations. 

Their  arrangements  were  made  during  the  night  and 
battle  renewed  at  early  dawn  and  severely  contested,  the 
Union  troops  giving  from  point  to  point  until  they  crossed 
the  ford  at  Walker's  and  were  beyond  further  threatening. 
They  lost  some  fifty  killed  and  wounded  and  one  company 
captured  at  Colonel  Graham's  camp. 

Generals  Martin  and  Jones  joined  us  in  good  season 
after  their  affair  of  the  morning.  Their  loss  was  slight, 
but  not  detailed  in  separate  reports. 

Confederate  loss  in  the  assault 822 

Union  loss  in  the  assault 673 

Confederate  losses  during  the  campaign 1296 

Union  losses  during  the  campaign 1481 


CHAPTEK  XXXV. 

CUT    OFF    FROM    EAST    AND    WEST. 

Impracticability  of  joining  General  Bragg— Wintering  in  East  Tennes 
see — General  Longstreet  given  Discretionary  Authority  over  the  De 
partment  by  President  Davis — Short  Rations— Minor  Movements  of 
Hide-and-Seek  in  the  Mountains— Longstreet's  Position  was  of  Stra 
tegic  Importance— That  Fact  fully  appreciated  by  President  Lincoln, 
Secretary  Stan  ton,  and  Generals  Halleck  and  Grant— "  Drive  Long- 
street  out  of  East  Tennessee  and  keep  him  out" — Generals  Robertson 
and  McLaws— The  Charges  against  them  and  Action  taken— Honor 
able  Mention  for  Courage  and  Endurance— The  Army  finally  fares 
sumptuously  on  the  Fat  Lands  of  the  French  Broad. 

As  General  Wheeler's  note  indicated  doubt  of  the  feasi 
bility  of  the  move  towards  General  Bragg,  it  occurred  to 
me  that  our  better  course  was  to  hold  our  lines  about 
Knoxville,  and  in  that  way  cause  General  Grant  to  send 
to  its  relief,  and  thus  so  reduce  his  force  as  to  stop,  for  a 
time,  pursuit  of  General  Bragg. 

Under  this  impression,  I  ordered  our  trains  back,  and 
continued  to  hold  our  lines.  The  superior  officers  were 
called  together  and  advised  of  affairs,  and  asked  for  sug 
gestions.  The  impression  seemed  to  be  that  it  would  not 
be  prudent  to  undertake  to  join  General  Bragg.  At  the 
same  time  reports  came  from  him  to  inform  me  that  he 
had  retired  as  far  as  Dalton,  and  that  I  must  depend  upon 
my  own  resources. 

We  were  cut  off  from  communication  with  the  army  at 
Dalton,  except  by  an  impracticable  mountain  route,  and 
the  railway  to  the  north  was  broken  up  by  the  removal 
of  bridges  and  rails  for  a  distance  of  a  hundred  miles 
and  more. 

Deciding  to  remain  at  Knoxville,  I  called  on  General 
Ransom  to  join  us  with  his  main  force,  to  aid  in  reinvest 
ing  it,  or  to  hold  it  while  we  could  march  against  a  suc- 

509 


510  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

coring  force  if  the  numbers  should  warrant.  On  the  1st 
of  December,  Colonel  Giltner,  commanding  one  of  Gen 
eral  Ransom's  cavalry  brigades,  reported  that  he  had 
orders  to  join  General  Ransom  with  his  brigade.  On  the 
same  day  a  courier  going  from  General  Grant  to  General 
Burnside  was  captured,  bearing  an  autograph  letter  for 
the  latter,  stating  that  three  columns  were  advancing  for 
his  relief, — one  by  the  south  side  under  General  Sherman, 
one  by  Decherd  under  General  Elliott,  the  third  by  Cum 
berland  Gap  under  General  Foster. 

When  General  Leadbetter  left  us  on  the  29th  of  Novem 
ber,  he  was  asked  to  look  after  affairs  at  Loudon,  and  to 
order  General  Vaughn  to  destroy  such  property  as  he 
could  not  haul  off,  and  retire  through  the  mountains  to 
General  Bragg's  army.  Finding  that  General  Vaughn 
had  not  been  moved,  he  was  ordered  on  the  1st  of  Decem 
ber  to  cross  the  river  to  our  side  with  everything  that  he 
could  move,  and  to  be  ready  to  destroy  property  that  he 
must  leave,  and  march  to  join  us  as  soon  as  the  pressure 
from  General  Sherman's  force  became  serious.  At  the 
same  time  an  order  came  from  General  Bragg  that  his 
cavalry  be  ordered  back  to  his  army.  As  I  had  relieved 
the  pressure  against  him  in  his  critical  emergency,  and 
affairs  were  getting  a  little  complicated  about  my  position, 
I  felt  warranted  in  retaining  the  cavalry  for  the  time. 

Reports  coming  at  the  same  time  of  reinforcements 
for  the  enemy  at  Kingston,  pressing  towards  General 
Vaughn  at  Loudon,  he  was  ordered  to  join  us.  As  he 
had  no  horses  for  the  battery,  he  tumbled  it  from  the 
bridge  into  the  middle  of  the  Tennessee  River,  burned 
the  bridge,  and  marched. 

Under  the  circumstances  there  seemed  but  one  move  left 
for  us, — to  march  around  Knoxville  to  the  north  side,  up 
the  Holston,  and  try  to  find  the  column  reported  to  be 
marching  down  from  Cumberland  Gap,  the  mountain 
ranges  and  valleys  of  that  part  of  the  State  offering  beau- 


CUT    OFF    FKOM    EAST    AND    WEST.  511 

tiful  fields  for  the  manoeuvre  of  small  armies.  The  order 
was  issued  December  2.  Trains  were  put  in  motion  on  the 
3d,  and  ordered  up  the  railroad  route  under  escort  of  Law's 
and  Robertson's  brigades  and  one  of  Alexander's  bat 
teries.  On  the  night  of  the  4th  the  troops  were  marched 
from  the  southwest  to  the  north  side  of  the  city,  and  took 
up  the  march  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Holston.  Gen 
eral  Martin,  with  his  own  and  General  W.  E.  Jones's 
cavalry,  was  left  to  guard  the  rear  of  our  march  and  pick 
up  weak  men  or  stragglers.  He  was  ordered  to  cross  part 
of  his  cavalry  to  the  east  bank  at  Strawberry  Plains  and 
march  up  on  that  side,  and  General  W.  E.  Jones  to  follow 
on  our  rear  with  his  and  the  balance  of  Martin's  corps. 
As  we  were  not  disturbed,  we  reached  Blain's  Cross-roads 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  where  we  met  General  Ran 
som  with  his  infantry  and  the  balance  of  his  artillery. 
On  the  6th  we  marched  to  Rutledge,  halting  two  days 
to  get  food  and  look  for  the  succoring  column  by  Cum 
berland  Gap,  which  failed  to  appear.  However,  it  was 
time  for  us  to  be  looking  for  better  fields  of  food  for  men 
and  animals,  who  had  not  had  comfortable  rations  for 
weeks.  It  seemed,  too,  that  General  Bragg's  call  for  his 
cavalry  could  not  be  longer  left  in  abeyance.  To  get 
away  from  convenient  march  of  the  enemy  we  went  up 
the  river  as  far  as  Rogersville,  where  we  might  hope  to 
forage  under  reduced  cavalry  force.  We  marched  on  the 
8th,  ordering  our  cavalry,  except  Giltner's  brigade,  across 
the  Holston  near  Bean's  Station,  General  Ransom's  com 
mand  to  cover  our  march,  General  Bragg's  cavalry  to  go 
by  an  eastern  route  through  the  mountains  to  Georgia. 
We  halted  at  Rogersville  on  the  9th,  where  we  were  en 
couraged  to  hope  for  full  rations  for  a  few  days,  at  least ; 
but  to  be  sure  of  accumulating  a  few  days'  extra  supply 
(the  mills  being  only  able  to  grind  a  full  day's  rations 
for  us),  every  man  and  animal  was  put  on  short  rations 
until  we  could  get  as  much  as  three  days'  supply  on  hand. 


512  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

On  the  7th  of  December  the  Union  army,  under  Major- 
General  John  G.  Parke,  took  the  field  along  the  rear  of 
our  march,  and  reached  Rutledge  on  the  9th,  the  enemy's 
cavalry  advancing  as  far  as  Bean's  Station.  The  object 
was  supposed  to  be  the  securing  of  the  forage  and  subsist 
ence  stores  of  the  country  ;  but  of  these  movements  we 
were  not  fully  advised  until  the  llth.  On  the  10th  of 
December,  General  Morgan's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  at 
tacked  at  Russellville  while  engaged  in  foraging,  but  got 
force  enough,  and  in  time,  to  drive  the  enemy  away. 

On  the  10th  a  telegram  from  the  President  gave  me 
discretionary  authority  over  the  movements  of  the  troops 
of  the  department,  and  I  ordered  the  recall  of  General 
Martin,  and  put  his  command  between  us  and  the  enemy. 
On  the  12th  we  had  information  that  General  Sherman 
had  taken  up  his  march  for  return  to  General  Grant's 
army  with  the  greater  part  of  his  troops.  At  the  same 
time  we  had  information  of  the  force  that  had  followed 
our  march  as  far  as  Rutledge  and  Blain's  Cross-roads, 
under  General  Parke,  who  had  posted  a  large  part  of  the 
force  of  artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry  at  Bean's  Station, 
a  point  between  the  Clinch  Mountain  and  the  Holston 
River.  The  mountain  there  is  very  rugged,  and  was  re 
ported  to  be  inaccessible,  except  at  very  rough  passes. 
The  valley  between  it  and  the  river  is  about  two  miles 
wide,  at  some  places  less. 

I  thought  to  cut  off  the  advance  force  at  Bean's  Sta 
tion  by  putting  our  main  cavalry  force  east  of  the  river, 
the  other  part  west  of  the  mountain  (except  Giltner's),  so 
as  to  close  the  mountain  pass  on  the  west,  and  bar  the 
enemy's  retreat  by  my  cavalry  in  his  rear, — which  was  to 
cross  the  Holston  behind  him, — then  by  marching  the 
main  column  down  the  valley  to  capture  this  advance  part 
of  the  command.  My  column,  though  complaining  a  little 
of  short  rations  and  very  muddy  roads,  made  its  march 
in  good  season.  So  also  did  Jones  on  the  west  of  the 


CUT    OFF    FROM    EAST    AND    WEST.  513 

mountain,  and  Martin  on  the  other  side  of  the  Holston ; 
but  the  latter  encountered  a  brigade  at  May's  Ford,  which 
delayed  him  and  gave  time  for  the  enemy  to  change  to  a 
position  some  four  miles  to  his  rear. 

As  we  approached  the  position  in  front  of  the  Gap, 
Giltner's  cavalry  in  advance,  General  B.  R.  Johnson  met 
and  engaged  the  enemy  in  a  severe  fight,  but  forced  him 
back  steadily.  As  we  were  looking  for  large  capture 
more  than  fight,  delay  was  unfortunate.  I  called  Ker- 
shaw's  brigade  up  to  force  contention  till  we  could  close 
the  west  end  of  the  Gap.  The  movements  were  nicely 
executed  by  Johnson  and  Kershaw,  but  General  Martin 
had  not  succeeded  in  gaining  his  position,  so  the  rear 
was  not  closed,  and  the  enemy  retired.  At  night  I 
thought  the  army  was  in  position  to  get  the  benefit  of 
the  small  force  cut  off  at  the  Gap,  as  some  reward  for 
our  very  hard  work.  We  received  reports  from  General 
Jones,  west  of  the  mountain,  that  he  was  in  position  at 
his  end  of  the  Gap,  and  had  captured  several  wagon-loads 
of  good  things.  As  his  orders  included  the  capture  of  the 
train,  he  had  failed  of  full  comprehension  of  them,  and 
after  nightfall  had  withdrawn  to  comfortable  watering- 
places  to  enjoy  his  large  catch  of  sugar  and  coffee,  and 
other  things  seldom  seen  in  Confederate  camps  in  those 
days.  Thus  the  troops  at  the  Gap  got  out  during  the 
night,  some  running  over  the  huge  rocks  and  heavy  wood 
tangles  along  the  crest,  by  torch-light,  to  their  comrades, 
some  going  west  by  easier  ways.  So  when  I  sent  up  in 
the  morning,  looking  for  their  doleful  surrender,  my  men 
found  only  empty  camp-kettles,  mess-pans,  tents,  and 
a  few  abandoned  guns,  and  twelve  prisoners,  while  the 
Yankees  were,  no  doubt,  sitting  around  their  camp-fires 
enjoying  the  joke  with  the  comrades  they  had  re 
joined. 

During  our  march  and  wait  at  Rogersville,   General 
Foster  passed   down  to  Knoxville  by  a  more  southern 

33 


514  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

route  and  relieved  General  Burnside  of  command  of  the 
department  on  the  12th. 

General  Jenkins  was  ordered  to  follow  down  the  valley 
to  the  new  position  of  the  enemy.  His  brigades  under 
Generals  Law  and  Robertson  had  been  detached  guarding 
trains.  General  Law,  commanding  them,  had  been  or 
dered  to  report  to  the  division  commander  on  the  13th,  but 
at  night  of  the  14th  he  was  eight  miles  behind.  Orders 
were  sent  him  to  join  the  division  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment  on  the  15th.  He  reported  to  the  division  com 
mander  between  two  and  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
If  he  started  at  the  hour  he  should  have  marched,  six 
A.M.  at  the  latest,  he  was  about  eight  hours  making  as 
many  miles. 

Meanwhile,  the  enemy  had  been  reinforced  by  a  con 
siderable  body  of  infantry,  and  later  it  appeared  that  he 
was  advancing  to  offer  battle.  General  McLaws  was  or 
dered  to  reinforce  our  front  by  a  brigade.  He  sent  word 
that  his  men  had  not  yet  received  their  bread  rations. 
He  sent  Kershaw's  brigade,  however,  that  had  captured 
rations  the  day  before,  but  then  it  was  night,  and  the 
appearance  of  General  Martin's  cavalry  on  or  near  the 
enemy's  flank  caused  a  change  of  his  plans.  Daring  the 
night  he  retreated,  and  we  occupied  his  trenches.  I  could 
have  precipitated  an  affair  of  some  moment,  both  at  this 
point  and  at  Bean's  Station  Gap,  but  my  purpose  was, 
when  I  fought,  to  fight  for  all  that  was  on  the  field.  The 
time  was  then  for  full  and  glorious  victory ;  a  fruitless 
one  we  did  not  want. 

The  enemy  retired  to  Blain's  Cross-roads,  where  Gen 
eral  Foster,  after  reinforcing  by  the  Fourth  Corps,  de 
cided  to  accept  battle.  He  reported  his  force  as  twenty- 
six  thousand,  and  credited  the  Confederates  with  equal 
numbers,  but  twenty  thousand  would  have  been  an  over 
estimate  for  us.  He  assigned  the  true  cause  of  our  failure 
to  follow  up  and  find  him  : 


CUT    OFF    FROM    EAST    AND    WEST.  515 

"General  Longstreet,  however,  did  not  attack,  in  consequence, 
probably,  of  the  very  inclement  weather,  which  then  set  in  with 
such  severity  as  to  paralyze  for  a  time  the  efforts  of  both  armies." 

And  now  the  weather  grew  very  heavy,  and  the  roads, 
already  bad,  became  soft  and  impracticable  for  trains  and 
artillery.  The  men  were  brave,  steady,  patient.  Occa 
sionally  they  called  pretty  loudly  for  parched  corn,  but 
always  in  a  bright,  merry  mood.  There  was  never  a  time 
when  we  did  not  have  enough  of  corn,  and  plenty  of  wood 
with  which  to  keep  us  warm  and  parch  our  corn.  At  this 
distance  it  seems  almost  incredible  that  we  got  along  as  we 
did,  but  all  were  then  so  healthy  and  strong  that  we  did 
not  feel  severely  our  really  great  hardships.  Our  serious 
trouble  was.  in  the  matter  of  clothing  and  shoes.  As 
winter  had  broken  upon  us  in  good  earnest,  it  seemed 
necessary  for  us  to  give  up  the  game  of  war  for  the  time, 
seek  some  good  place  for  shelter,  and  repair  railroads  and 
bridges,  to  open  our  way  back  towards  Richmond. 

General  Bragg  had  been  relieved  from  command  of  the 
army  at  Dalton  by  Lieutenant-General  W.  J.  Hardee, 
who  declined,  however,  the  part  of  permanent  commander, 
to  which,  after  a  time,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was 
assigned. 

On  his  return  from  Knoxville,  General  Sherman  pro 
posed  to  General  Grant  to  strike  at  General  Hardee  and 
gain  Rome  and  the  line  of  the  Oostenaula.  He  wrote, — 

"  Of  course  we  must  fight  if  Hardee  gives  us  battle,  but  he  will 
not.  Longstreet  is  off  and  cannot  do  harm  for  a  month.  Lee,  in 
Virginia,  is  occupied,  and  Hardee  is  alone." 

But  General  Halleck  was  much  concerned  about  the 
Confederate  army  in  East  Tennessee,  the  only  strategic 
field  then  held  by  Southern  troops.  It  was  inconveniently 
near  Kentucky  and  the  Ohio  River,  and  President  Lin 
coln  and  his  War  Secretary  were  as  anxious  as  Halleck 


516  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

on  account  of  its  politico-strategic  bearing.  General 
Halleck  impressed  his  views  upon  General  Grant,  and 
despatched  General  Foster  that  it  was  of  first  importance 
to  "  drive  Longstreet  out  of  East  Tennessee  and  keep  him 
out."  General  Grant  ordered,  "  Drive  Longstreet  to  the 
farthest  point  east  that  you  can."  And  he  reported  to  the 
authorities, — 

"  If  Longstreet  is  not  driven  out  of  the  valley  entirely  and  the 
road  destroyed  east  of  Abingdon,  I  do  not  think  it  unlikely  that 
the  last  great  battle  of  the  war  will  be  fought  in  East  Tennessee. 
Eeports  of  deserters  and  citizens  show  the  army  of  Bragg  to  be 
too  much  demoralized  and  reduced  by  desertions  to  do  anything 
this  winter.  I  will  get  everything  in  order  here  in  a  few  days 
and  go  to  Nashville  and  Louisville,  and,  if  there  is  still  a  chance 
of  doing  anything  against  Longstreet,  to  the  scene  of  operations 
there.  I  am  deeply  interested  in  moving  the  enemy  beyond  Salt 
ville  this  winter,  so  as  to  be  able  to  select  my  own  campaign  in 
the  spring,  instead  of  having  the  enemy  dictate  it  to  me." 

Referring  to  his  orders,  General  Foster  reported  his 
plan  to  intrench  a  line  of  infantry  along  Bull's  Gap  and 
Mulberry  Gap,  and  have  his  cavalry  ready  for  the  ride 
against  Saltville,  but  the  Confederates  turned  upon  him, 
and  he  despatched  General  Grant  on  the  llth, — 

"  Longstreet  has  taken  the  offensive  against  General  Parke, 
who  has  fallen  back  to  Blain's  Cross-roads,  where  Granger  is 
now  concentrating  his  corps.  I  intend  to  fight  them  if  Longstreet 
comes." 

The  failure  to  follow  has  been  explained. 

The  summing  up  of  the  plans  laid  for  General  Hardee 
and  Saltville  is  brief.  Hardee  was  not  disturbed.  The 
ride  towards  Saltville,  made  about  the  last  of  the  month, 
was  followed  by  General  W.  E.  Jones  and  came  to  grief, 
as  will  be  elsewhere  explained. 

Upon  relinquishing  command  of  his  army,  General 
Bragg  was  called  to  Richmond  as  commander-in-chief 
near  the  President. 


CUT    OFF    FROM    EAST    AND    WEST.  517 

Before  General  Hood  was  so  seriously  hurt  at  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  he  made  repeated  complaints  of  want 
of  conduct  on  the  part  of  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  Rob 
ertson.  After  the  fiasco  in  Lookout  Valley  on  the  night 
of  the  28th  of  October,  I  reported  to  General  Bragg  of 
the  representations  made  by  General  Hood,  and  of  want 
of  conduct  on  the  part  of  General  Robertson  in  that  night 
attack,  when  General  Bragg  ordered  me  to  ask  for  a 
board  of  officers  to  examine  into  the  merits  of  the  case. 
The  board  was  ordered,  and  General  Robertson  was  re 
lieved  from  duty  by  orders  from  General  Bragg's  head 
quarters,  "  while  the  proceedings  and  actions  of  the  exam 
ining  board  in  his  case  were  pending." 

On  the  8th,  without  notice  to  my  head-quarters,  Gen 
eral  Bragg  ordered,  "  Brigadier-General  Robertson  will  re 
join  his  command  until  the  board  can  renew  its  session." 

On  the  18th  of  December  the  division  commander  pre 
ferred  "  charges  and  specifications"  against  Brigadier- 
General  Robertson,  in  which  he  accused  him  of  calling 
the  commanders  of  his  Texas  regiments  to  him  and  saying 
there  were  but 

* '  Three  days'  rations  on  hand,  and  God  knows  where  more  are 
to  come  from  ;  that  he  had  no  confidence  in  the  campaign  ;  that 
whether  we  whipped  the  enemy  in  the  immediate  battle  or  not,  we 
would  be  compelled  to  retreat,  the  enemy  being  believed  by  citi 
zens  and  others  to  be  moving  around  us,  and  that  we  were  in  dan 
ger  of  losing  a  considerable  part  of  our  army  ;  that  our  men  were  in 
no  condition  for  campaigning  ;  that  General  Longstreet  had  prom 
ised  shoes,  but  how  could  they  be  furnished  ?  that  we  only  had  com 
munication  with  Eichmond,  and  could  only  get  a  mail  from  there 
in  three  weeks ;  that  he  was  opposed  to  the  movement ;  would 
require  written  orders,  and  would  obey  under  protest." 

General  Robertson  was  ordered  to  Bristol  to  await  the 
action  of  the  Richmond  authorities,  who  were  asked  for  a 
court-martial  to  try  the  case. 


*  Rebellion  Record. 


518  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

On  the  17th  the  following  orders  concerning  General 
McLaws  were  issued  : 

" HEAD- QUARTERS  NEAR  BEAN'S  STATION, 

"  December  17,  1863. 
"  SPECIAL  ORDERS  No.  27. 

"Major- General  L.  McLaws  is  relieved  from  further  duty  with 
this  army,  and  will  proceed  to  Augusta,  Georgia,  from  which  place 
he  will  report  by  letter  to  the  adjutant-  and  inspector-general. 
He  will  turn  over  the  command  of  the  division  to  the  senior  brig 
adier  present. 

"By  command  of  Lieutenant-General  Longstreet. 

1 '  G.  MOXLEY  SORREL, 

* '  Lieutenant-  Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-  General. 
"  MAJOR-  GENERAL  McLAws, 

"  Confederate  States  Army." 

On  the  same  day  he  wrote, — 

"  CAMP  ON  BEAN'S  STATION  GAP  KOAD, 

"December  17,  1863. 
"  LIEUTENANT- COLONEL  SORREL, 

1 '  Assistant  Adjutant-  General : 

i '  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Special  Or 
ders  No.  27,  from  your  head- quarters,  of  this  date,  relieving  me 
from  further  duty  with  this  army.  If  there  is  no  impropriety  in 
making  inquiry,  and  I  cannot  imagine  there  is,  I  respectfully  re 
quest  to  be  informed  of  the  particular  reason  for  the  order. 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"L.  McLAws, 

1  i  i  Major-  General. ' ' 

In  reply  the  following  was  sent : 

"  HEAD- QUARTERS  NEAR  BEAN'S  STATION, 

"December  17,  1863. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  McLAws, 

"  Confederate  States  Army : 

"GENERAL, — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  note  of  to-day,  asking  for  the  particular  reason  for  the  issue 
of  the  order  relieving  you  from  duty  with  this  army.  In  reply  I 
am  directed  to  say  that  throughout  the  campaign  on  which  we  are 
engaged  you  have  exhibited  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  efforts 
and  plans  which  the  commanding  general  has  thought  proper  to 


Chief  of  Staff,  First  Corps ;  promoted  to  Brigadier-General,  1864. 


a, 


-  f-O..-?'i 


CUT    OFF    FROM    EAST    AND    WEST.  519 

adopt,  and  he  is  apprehensive  that  this  feeling  will  extend  more 
or  less  to  the  troops  under  your  command.  Under  these  circum 
stances  the  commanding  general  has  felt  that  the  interest  of  the 
public  service  would  be  advanced  by  your  separation  from  him, 
and  as  he  could  not  himself  leave,  he  decided  upon  the  issue  of 
the  order  which  you  have  received. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  with  great  respect, 

"G.  MOXLEY  SOKREL, 

" Lieutenant- Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant- General." 

On  the  19th,  General  Law  handed  in  his  resigna 
tion  at  head-quarters,  and  asked  leave  of  absence  on  it. 
This  was  cheerfully  granted.  Then  he  asked  the  privi 
lege  of  taking  the  resignation  with  him  to  the  adjutant- 
general  at  Richmond.  This  was  a  very  unusual  request, 
but  the  favor  he  was  doing  the  service  gave  him  some 
claim  to  unusual  consideration,  and  his  request  was 
granted. 

The  Law  disaffection  was  having  effect,  or  seemed  to 
be,  among  some  of  the  officers,  but  most  of  them  and  all 
of  the  soldiers  were  true  and  brave,  even  through  all  of 
the  hardships  of  the  severest  winter  of  the  four  years  of 
war.  Marching  and  fighting  had  been  almost  daily  occu 
pation  from  the  middle  of  January,  1863,  when  we  left 
Fredericksburg  to  move  down  to  Suffolk,  Virginia,  until 
the  16th  of  December,  when  we  found  bleak  winter  again 
breaking  upon  us,  away  from  our  friends,  and  dependent 
upon  our  own  efforts  for  food  and  clothing.  It  is  difficult 
for  a  soldier  to  find  words  that  can  express  his  high  ap 
preciation  of  conduct  in  officers  and  men  who  endured  so 
bravely  the  severe  trials  they  were  called  to  encounter. 

Orders  were  given  to  cross  the  Holston  River  and 
march  for  the  railroad,  only  a  few  miles  away.  Before 
quitting  the  fields  of  our  arduous  labors  mention  should 
be  made  of  General  Bushrod  R.  Johnson's  clever  march 
of  sixteen  miles,  through  deep  mud,  to  Bean's  Station  on 
the  13th,  when  he  and  General  Kershaw  attacked  and 
pushed  the  enemy  back  from  his  front  at  the  Gap  before 


520  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

he  could  get  out  of  it.  Honorable  mention  is  also  due 
General  Jenkins  for  his  equally  clever  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  at  Lenoir's  Station  ;  Brigadier-General  Humphreys 
and  Bryan  for  their  conduct  at  the  storming  assault; 
Colonel  Ruff,  who  led  Wofford's  brigade,  and  died  in  the 
ditch  ;  Colonel  McElroy,  of  the  Thirteenth  Mississippi 
Regiment,  and  Colonel  Thomas,  of  the  Sixteenth  Georgia, 
who  also  died  in  the  ditch  ;  Lieutenant  Gumming,  adju 
tant  of  the  Sixteenth  Georgia  Regiment,  who  overcame 
all  obstacles,  crowned  the  parapet  with  ten  or  a  dozen 
men,  and,  entering  the  fort  through  one  of  the  embra 
sures,  was  taken  prisoner;  and  Colonel  Fiser,  of  the 
Eighteenth  Mississippi,  who  lost  an  arm  while  on  the 
parapet.  •  Not  the  least  of  the  gallant  acts  of  the  cam 
paign  was  the  dash  of  Captain  Winthrop,  who  led  our 
once  halting  lines  over  the  rail  defences  at  Knoxville. 

The  transfer  of  the  army  to  the  east  bank  of  the  river 
was  executed  by  diligent  work  and  the  use  of  such  flat- 
boats  and  other  means  of  crossing  as  we  could  collect  and 
construct.  We  were  over  by  the  20th,  and  before  Christ 
mas  were  in  our  camps  along  the  railroad,  near  Morris- 
town.  Blankets  and  clothes  were  very  scarce,  shoes  more 
so,  but  all  knew  how  to  enjoy  the  beautiful  country  in 
which  we  found  ourselves.  The  French  Broad  River  and 
the  Holston  are  confluent  at  Knoxville.  The  country  be 
tween  and  beyond  them  contains  as  fine  farming  lands  and 
has  as  delightful  a  climate  as  can  be  found.  Stock  and 
grain  were  on  all  farms.  Wheat  and  oats  had  been  hidden 
away  by  our  Union  friends,  but  the  fields  were  full  of 
maize,  still  standing.  The  country  about  the  French 
Broad  had  hardly  been  touched  by  the  hands  of  foragers. 
Our  wagons  immediately  on  entering  the  fields  were  loaded 
to  overflowing.  Pumpkins  were  on  the  ground  in  places 
like  apples  under  a  tree.  Cattle,  sheep,  and  swine,  poultry, 
vegetables,  maple-sugar,  honey,  were  all  abundant  for  im 
mediate  wants  of  the  troops. 


CUT   OFF   FEOM    EAST   AND    WEST.  521 

When  the  enemy  found  we  had  moved  to  the  east 
bank,  his  cavalry  followed  to  that  side.  They  were  almost 
as  much  in  want  of  the  beautiful  foraging  lands  as  we, 
but  we  were  in  advance  of  them,  and  left  little  for  them. 
With  all  the  plenitude  of  provisions  and  many  things 
which  seemed  at  the  time  luxuries,  we  were  not  quite 
happy.  Tattered  blankets,  garments,  and  shoes  (the  latter 
going — many  gone)  opened  ways,  on  all  sides,  for  piercing 
winter  blasts.  There  were  some  hand-looms  in  the  coun 
try  from  which  we  occasionally  picked  up  a  piece  of  cloth, 
and  here  and  there  we  received  other  comforts,  some  from 
kind  and  some  from  unwilling  hands,  which  nevertheless 
could  spare  them.  For  shoes  we  were  obliged  to  resort  to 
the  raw  hides  of  beef  cattle  as  temporary  protection  from 
the  frozen  ground.  Then  we  began  to  find  soldiers  who 
could  tan  the  hides  of  our  beeves,  some  who  could  make 
shoes,  some  who  could  make  shoe-pegs,  some  who  could 
make  shoe-lasts,  so  that  it  came  about  that  the  hides  passed 
rapidly  from  the  beeves  to  the  feet  of  the  soldiers  in  the 
form  of  comfortable  shoes.  Then  came  the  opening  of  the 
railroad,  and  lo  and  behold  !  a  shipment  of  three  thousand 
shoes  from  General  Lawton,  quartermaster-general ! ,  Thus 
the  most  urgent  needs  were  supplied,  and  the  soldier's  life 
seemed  passably  pleasant, — that  is,  in  the  infantry  and  ar 
tillery.  Our  cavalry  were  looking  at  the  enemy  all  of  this 
while,  and  the  enemy  was  looking  at  them,  both  frequently 
burning  powder  between  their  lines. 

General  Sturgis  had  been  assigned  to  the  cavalry  of  the 
other  side  to  relieve  General  Shackelford,  and  he  seemed 
to  think  that  the  dead  of  winter  was  the  time  for  cavalry 
work ;  and  our  General  Martin's  orders  were  to  have  the 
enemy  under  his  eye  at  all  hours.  Both  were  vigilant, 
active,  and  persevering. 

About  the  20th  of  December  a  raid  was  made  by  Gen 
eral  Averill  from  West  Virginia  upon  a  supply  depot  of 
General  Sam  Jones's  department,  at  Salem,  which  was  par- 


522  FROM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

tially  successful,  when  General  Grant,  under  the  impres 
sion  that  the  stores  were  for  troops  of  East  Tennessee, 
wired  General  Foster,  December  25,  "  This  will  give  you 
great  advantage,"  and  General  Foster  despatched  General 
Parke,  commanding  his  troops  in  the  field,  December  26, 
"  Longstreet  will  feel  a  little  timid  now,  and  will  bear  a 
little  pushing." 

Under  the  fierce  operations  of  General  Sturgis's  cav 
alry  against  General  Martin's  during  the  latter  days  of 
December,  General  W.  E.  Jones's  cavalry  was  on  guard 
for  my  right  and  rear  towards  Cumberland  Gap.  While 
Sturgis  busied  himself  against  our  front  and  left,  a 
raiding  party  rode  from  Cumberland  Gap  against  the 
outposts  of  our  far-off  right,  under  Colonel  Pridemore. 
As  W.  E.  Jones  was  too  far  to  support  Martin's  cavalry, 
he  was  called  to  closer  threatenings  against  Cumberland 
Gap,  that  he  might  thus  draw  some  of  Sturgis's  cavalry 
from  our  front  to  strengthen  the  forces  at  the  Gap.  Upon 
receipt  of  orders,  General  Jones  crossed  Clinch  River  in 
time  to  find  the  warm  trail  of  the  raiders  who  were  fol 
lowing  Pridemore.  He  sent  around  to  advise  him  of  his 
ride  in  pursuit  of  his  pursuers,  and  ordered  Pridemore, 
upon  hearing  his  guns,  to  turn  and  join  in  the  attack  upon 
them. 

The  very  cold  season  and  severe  march  through  the 
mountain  fastnesses  stretched  Jones's  line  so  that  he  was 
in  poor  condition  for  immediate  attack  when  he  found  the 
enemy's  camp  at  daylight  on  the  3d  of  January ;  but  he 
found  a  surprise :  not  even  a  picket  guard  out  in  their 
rear.  He  dashed  in  with  his  leading  forces  and  got  the 
enemy's  battery,  but  the  enemy  quickly  rallied  and  made 
battle,  which  recovered  the  artillery,  and  got  into  strong 
position  about  some  farm-houses  and  defended  with  des 
perate  resolution.  Finding  the  position  too  strong,  Jones 
thought  to  so  engage  as  to  make  the  enemy  use  his  bat 
tery  until  his  ammunition  was  exhausted,  and  then  put  in 


CUT   OFF   FROM    EAST   AND    WEST.  523 

all  of  his  forces  in  assault.  Towards  night  the  enemy 
found  himself  reduced  to  desperate  straits  and  tried  to 
secure  cover  of  the  mountains,  but  as  quick  as  he  got 
away  from  the  farm-houses  Jones  put  all  of  his  forces  in, 
capturing  three  pieces  of  artillery,  three  hundred  and 
eighty  prisoners,  and  twenty-seven  wagons  and  teams  of 
the  Sixteenth  Illinois  Cavalry  and  Twenty-second  Ohio 
Light  Artillery.  A  number  of  the  men  got  away  through 
the  mountains. 


CHAPTEE  XXXVI. 

STRATEGIC    IMPORTANCE    OF    THE    FIELD. 

Longstreet  again  considers  Relief  from  Service— General  Grant  at 
Knoxville — Shoeless  Soldiers  leave  Bloody  Trails  on  Frozen  Roads — 
A  Confederate  Advance— Affair  at  Dandridge — Federals  retreat — Suc 
cession  of  Small  Engagements— General  Grant  urges  General  Foster's 
Army  to  the  Offensive — General  Foster  relieved— General  Schofield  in 
Command  of  Federals — General  Grant's  Orders — General  Halleck's 
Estimate  of  East  Tennessee  as  a  Strategic  Field — Affair  of  Cavalry — 
Advance  towards  Knoxville— Longstreet's  Command  called  back  to 
Defensive  for  Want  of  Cavalry. 

DURING  the  last  few  days  of  the  year  1863  the  cold  of 
the  severest  winter  of  the  war  came  on,  and  constantly 
increased  until  the  thermometer  approached  zero,  and  on 
New  Year's  dropped  below,  hanging  near  that  figure  for 
about  two  weeks.  The  severe  season  gave  rest  to  every 
one.  Even  the  cavalry  had  a  little  quiet,  but  it  was  cold 
comfort,  for  their  orders  were  to  keep  the  enemy  in  sight. 

The  season  seemed  an  appropriate  one  for  making  an 
other  effort  to  be  relieved  from  service, — that  service 
in  which  the  authorities  would  not  support  my  plans  or 
labors, — for  now  during  the  lull  in  war  they  would  have 
ample  time  to  assign  some  one  to  whom  they  could  give 
their  confidence  and  aid.  But  this  did  not  suit  them,  and 
the  course  of  affairs  prejudicial  to  order  and  discipline 
was  continued.  It  was  difficult  under  the  circumstances 
to  find  apology  for  remaining  in  service. 

The  President  asked  Congress  to  provide  for  another 
general  officer  when  he  had  five  on  his  rolls, — one  of 
whom  was  not  in  command  appropriate  to  his  rank, — and 
appointed  Lieutenant-General  Smith,  of  the  Trans-Mis 
sissippi  Department,  of  lower  rank  than  mine,  to  hold 
rank  above  me.  A  soldier's  honor  is  his  all,  and  of 
that  they  would  rob  him  and  degrade  him  in  the  eyes  of 

524 


STRATEGIC    IMPORTANCE    OF   THE    FIELD.  525 

his  troops.  The  occasion  seemed  to  demand  resignation, 
but  that  would  have  been  unsoldierly  conduct.  Dispas 
sionate  judgment  suggested,  as  the  proper  rounding  of  the 
soldier's  life,  to  stay  and  go  down  with  faithful  comrades 
of  long  and  arduous  service. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  picture  affairs  were  bright  and 
encouraging.  The  disaffected  were  away,  and  with  them 
disappeared  their  influence.  The  little  army  was  bright 
and  cheerful  and  ready  for  any  work  to  which  it  could  be 
called. 

General  Grant  made  his  visit  to  Knoxville  about  New 
Year's,  and  remained  until  the  7th.  He  found  General 
Foster  in  the  condition  of  the  Confederates, — not  properly 
supplied  with  clothing,  especially  in  want  of  shoes.  So 
he  authorized  a  wait  for  the  clothing,  then  in  transit  and 
looked  for  in  a  week ;  and  that  little  delay  was  a  great 
lift  for  the  Confederates.  We  were  not  timid,  but  were 
beginning  to  think  ourselves  comfortable  and  happy,  and 
were  expectant  of  even  better  condition.  We  were  re 
ceiving  a  hundred  pairs  of  shoes  a  day  of  our  own  make, 
the  hand-looms  of  the  farmers  were  giving  help  towards 
clothing  our  men,  promises  from  Richmond  were  encour 
aging,  and  we  were  prepared  to  enjoy  rest  that  we  had 
not  known  for  a  twelvemonth.  The  medical  inspector  of 
the  Cis-Mississippi  District  came  to  see  us,  and  after  care 
ful  inspection  told  us  that  the  army  was  in  better  health 
and  better  heart  than  the  other  armies  of  the  district. 

Before  leaving  General  Foster,  General  Grant  ordered 
him  on  the  receipt  of  the  clothing  to  advance  and  drive 
us  "  at  least  beyond  Bull's  Gap  and  Red  Bridge."  And 
to  prepare  for  that  advance  he  ordered  the  Ninth  and 
Twenty-third  Corps  to  Mossy  Creek,  the  Fourth  Corps  to 
Strawberry  Plains,  and  the  cavalry  to  Dandridge. 

The  Union  army — equipped — marched  on  the  14th  and 
15th  of  January. 

The  Confederate  departments  were  not  so  prompt  in 


526  FKOM   MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

filling  our  requisitions,  but  we  had  hopes.  The  bitter 
freeze  of  two  weeks  had  made  the  rough  angles  of  mud  as 
firm  and  sharp  as  so  many  freshly-quarried  rocks,  and  the 
poorly  protected  feet  of  our  soldiers  sometimes  left  bloody 
marks  along  the  roads. 

General  Sturgis  rode  in  advance  of  the  army,  and  occu 
pied  Dandridge  by  Elliott's,  Wolford's,  and  Garrard's 
divisions  of  cavalry  and  Mott's  brigade  of  infantry.  The 
Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  followed  the  cavalry, 
leaving  the  Ninth  Corps  to  guard  at  Strawberry  Plains. 

General  Martin  gave  us  prompt  notice  that  the  march 
was  at  Dandridge,  and  in  force.  The  move  was  construed 
as  a  flanking  proceeding,  but  it  was  more  convenient  to 
adopt  the  short  march  and  meet  it  at  Dandridge  than  to 
leave  our  shoe  factory  and  winter  huts  and  take  up  the 
tedious  rearward  move.  The  army  was  ordered  under 
arms,  the  cavalry  was  ordered  concentrated  in  front  of 
General  Sturgis,  and  the  divisions  of  Jenkins  and  B.  R. 
Johnson  and  Alexander's  batteries  were  marched  to  join 
General  Martin.  McLaws's  division  under  General 
Wofford,  and  Hansom's  under  General  Carr,  with  such 
batteries  as  they  could  haul,  were  assigned  to  positions  on 
the  Morristown  (Strawberry  Plains)  road,  to  strike  for 
ward  or  reinforce  at  Dandridge  as  plans  developed.  The 
men  without  shoes  were  ordered  to  remain  as  camp  guards, 
but  many  preferred  to  march  with  their  comrades. 

I  rode  in  advance  to  be  assured  that  our  cavalry  had 
not  mistaken  a  strong  cavalry  move  for  one  by  the  enemy. 
We  found  General  Martin  on  the  Bull's  Gap  road  sharply 
engaged  with  the  enemy,  both  sides  on  strong  defensive 
grounds  and  using  their  horse  batteries,  but  no  infantry 
was  in  sight.  General  Martin  was  ordered  to  push  on, 
gain  the  opposing  plateau,  and  force  the  enemy  to  show 
his  infantry. 

He  found  the  enemy  in  strong  fight,  but  got  the  pla 
teau,  when  the  enemy  deployed  in  stronger  force ;  but  his 


STRATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  FIELD.      527 

infantry  did  not  appear.  When  asked  to  take  the  next 
hill,  he  thought  it  could  not  be  done  without  infantry,  but 
my  idea  was  to  save  the  infantry  the  trying  march,  if  pos 
sible,  and  to  that  end  it  was  necessary  to  push  with  the 
cavalry.  He  was  called  to  send  me  a  detachment  of  his 
troopers,  and  about  six  hundred  came, — Harrison's  bri 
gade,  as  I  remember. 

We  rode  away  from  the  enemy's  left,  concealing  our 
march  under  traverse  of  an  elevated  woodland,  while 
General  Martin  engaged  their  front  attention.  At  a  se 
cluded  spot,  a  little  beyond  the  enemy's  left,  the  men  dis 
mounted,  leaving  their  animals  under  guards,  moved  under 
cover  to  good  position,  deployed  into  single  line,  and 
marched  for  the  second  plateau.  Part  of  the  march  was 
over  a  small  opening,  near  a  farm-house.  The  exposure 
brought  us  under  fire  of  some  sharp-shooters,  but  we 
hadn't  time  to  stop  and  shoot.  As  our  line  marched,  a 
chicken,  dazed  by  the  formidable  appearance,  crouched  in 
the  grass  until  it  was  kicked  up,  when  it  flew  and  tried  to 
clear  the  line,  but  one  of  the  troopers  jumped  up,  knocked 
it  down  with  the  end  of  his  gun,  stooped,  picked  it  up, 
put  it  in  his  haversack,  and  marched  on  without  losing 
his  place  or  step  and  without  looking  to  his  right  or  left,  as 
though  it  was  as  proper  and  as  much  an  every-day  part  of 
the  exercise  of  war  as  shooting  at  the  enemy.  Presently  we 
got  up  the  hill,  and  General  Martin  advanced  his  mounts 
to  meet  us.  We  lost  but  two  men, — wounded, — an  officer 
and  a  soldier.  The  officer  was  at  my  side,  and,  hearing 
the  thud  of  the  blow,  I  turned  and  asked  if  he  was  much 
hurt.  He  said  it  was  only  a  flesh-wound,  and  remained 
with  his  command  until  night.  From  that  point  we  saw 
enough  to  tell  that  a  formidable  part  of  the  army  was  be 
fore  us,  and  orders  were  sent  for  the  command  to  speed 
their  march  as  much  as  they  could  without  severe  trial. 

When  General  Martin  made  his  bold  advance  General 
Sturgis  thought  to  ride  around  by  a  considerable  detour 


528  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  strike  at  his  rear,  but  in  his  ride  was  surprised  to  en 
counter  our  marching  columns  of  infantry,  and  still  more 
surprised  when  he  saw  a  thousand  muskets  levelled  and 
sending  whistling  bullets  about  his  men,  and  our  batteries 
preparing  something  worse  for  him.  His  troopers  got 
back  faster  than  they  came.  In  trying  by  a  rapid  ride  to 
find  position  for  handling  his  men  he  lost  a  number  of  his 
staff,  captured,  and  narrowly  escaped  himself. 

It  was  near  night  when  the  command  got  up  skirmish 
ers  from  the  advance  division,  reinforced  the  cavalry,  and 
pushed  the  enemy  back  nearer  the  town. 

Dandridge  is  on  the  right  bank  of  the  French  Broad 
River,  about  thirty  miles  from  Knoxville.  Its  topo 
graphical  features  are  bold  and  inviting  of  military  work. 
Its  other  striking  characteristic  is  the  interesting  character 
of  its  citizens.  The  Confederates — a  unit  in  heart  and 
spirit — were  prepared  to  do  their  share  towards  making 
an  effective  battle,  and  our  plans  were  so  laid. 

At  the  time  ordered  for  his  advance,  General  Foster 
was  suffering  from  an  old  wound,  and  General  Parke  be 
came  commander  of  the  troops  in  the  field.  The  latter 
delayed  at  Strawberry  Plains  in  arranging  that  part  of 
his  command,  and  General  Sheridan,  marching  with  the 
advance,  became  commander,  until  superseded  by  the 
corps  commander,  General  Gordon  Granger. 

Our  plans  were  laid  before  the  army  was  all  up.  Our 
skirmish  line  was  made  stronger  and  relieved  the  cavalry 
of  their  dismounted  service.  A  narrow  unused  road, 
practicable  for  artillery,  was  found,  that  opened  a  way  for 
us  to  reach  the  enemy's  rearward  line  of  march.  Sharp 
shooters  were  organized  and  ordered  forward  by  it,  to  be 
followed  by  our  infantry  columns.  It  was  thought  better 
to  move  the  infantry  alone,  as  the  ringing  of  the  iron 
axles  of  the  guns  might  give  notice  of  our  purpose ;  the 
artillery  to  be  called  as  our  sharp-shooters  approached  the 
junction  of  the  roads.  The  head  of  the  turning  force 


STKATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  FIELD.      529 

encountered  a  picket-guard,  some  of  whom  escaped  with 
out  firing,  but  speedily  gave  notice  of  our  feeling  towards 
their  rear.  General  Granger  decided  to  retire,  and  was 
in  time  to  leave  our  cross-road  behind  him,  his  rear-guard 
passing  the  point  of  intersection  before  my  advance  party 
reached  it  about  midnight. 

The  weather  moderated  before  night,  and  after  dark 
a  mild,  gentle  rain  began  to  fall. 

When  I  rode  into  Dandridge  in  the  gray  of  the  morn 
ing  the  ground  was  thawing  and  hardly  firm  enough  to 
bear  the  weight  of  a  horse.  When  the  cavalry  came  at 
sunrise  the  last  crust  of  ice  had  melted,  letting  the  animals 
down  to  their  fetlocks  in  heavy  limestone  soil.  The  mud 
and  want  of  a  bridge  to  cross  the  Holston  made  pursuit 
by  our  heavy  columns  useless.  The  cavalry  was  ordered 
on,  and  the  troops  at  Morristown,  on  the  Strawberry 
Plains  road,  were  ordered  to  try  that  route,  but  the  latter 
proved  to  be  too  heavy  for  progress  with  artillery. 

While  yet  on  the  streets  of  Dandridge,  giving  directions 
for  such  pursuit  as  we  could  make,  a  lady  came  out  upon 
the  sidewalk  and  invited  us  into  her  parlors.  When  the 
orders  for  pursuit  were  given,  I  dismounted,  and  with 
some  members  of  my  staff  walked  in.  After  the  compli 
ments  of  the  season  were  passed,  we  were  asked  to  be 
seated,  and  she  told  us  something  of  General  Granger 
during  the  night  before.  She  had  never  heard  a  person 
swear  about  another  as  General  Granger  did  about  me. 
Some  of  the  officers  proposed  to  stop  and  make  a  battle, 
but  General  Granger  swore  and  said  it  "  was  no  use  to 
stop  and  fight  Longstreet.  You  can't  whip  him.  It  don't 
make  any  difference  whether  he  has  one~  man  or  a  hundred 
thousand."  Presently  she  brought  out  a  flask  that  Gen 
eral  Granger  had  forgotten,  and  thought  that  I  should 
have  it.  It  had  about  two  refreshing  inches  left  in  it. 
Though  not  left  with  compliments,  it  was  accepted.  Al 
though  the  weather  had  moderated,  it  was  very  wet  and 

34 


530  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

nasty,  and  as  we  had  taken  our  coffee  at  three  o'clock,  it 
was  resolved  to  call  it  noon  and  divide  the  spoils.  Colonel 
Fairfax,  who  knew  how  to  enjoy  good  things,  thought  the 
occasion  called  for  a  sentiment,  and  offered,  "  General 
Granger — may  his  shadow  never  grow  less." 

The  cavalry  found  the  road  and  its  side-ways  so  cut  up 
that  their  pursuit  was  reduced  to  labored  walk.  The  pre 
vious  hard  service  and  exposure  had  so  reduced  the  animals 
that  they  were  not  in  trim  for  real  effective  cavalry  service. 
They  found  some  crippled  battery  forges  and  a  little  of 
other  plunder,  but  the  enemy  passed  the  Holston  and 
broke  his  bridges  behind  him.  Our  army  returned  to 
their  huts  and  winter  homes. 

Part  of  our  cavalry  was  ordered  to  the  south  side  of 
the  French  Broad,  and  General  .Martin  was  ordered  to 
press  close  on  the  enemy's  rear  with  the  balance  of  his 
force.  General  Armstrong  followed  the  line  of  retreat, 
and  by  the  use  of  flat-boats  passed  his  cavalry  over  the 
Holston  and  rode  to  the  vicinity  of  Knoxville.  He 
caught  up  with  some  stragglers,  equipments,  ammunition, 
and  remains  of  some  caissons,  and  at  last  made  a  grand 
haul  of  a  herd  of  eight  hundred  beef  cattle  and  thirty- 
one  wagons. 

Upon  getting  his  cavalry  back  to  Knoxville,  General 
Foster  crossed  them  over  the  bridge  at  the  city  below  the 
French  Broad  to  foraging  grounds  about  Louisville,  and 
called  his  Dandridge  march  a  foraging  excursion,  saying 
that  he  was  building  a  bridge  to  cross  to  the  south  side 
when  we  bore  down  against  him.  But  the  strategy  of  his 
tedious  march  by  our  front  to  find  a  crossing  point  at 
Dandridge  and  build  a  bridge  in  our  presence,  when  he 
could  have  crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  French  Broad 
by  his  bridge  at  Knoxville  and  reached  those  foraging 
grounds  unmolested,  was  not  like  Napoleon.  He  claimed 
that  he  recovered  two  hundred  of  the  lost  herd  of  beef 
cattle.  In  that  our  reports  do  not  agree.  It  is  possible 


STKATEGIC    IMPORTANCE   OF    THE    FIELD.  531 

that  his  officers  may  have  confounded  that  adventure 
with  another.  My  explanation  of  the  discrepancy — from 
memory — is  that  another  of  our  parties  undertook  to  get 
in  a  herd  of  swine,  with  which  there  was  a  smaller  herd 
of  beef  cattle ;  that  all  of  the  latter  herd  were  recov 
ered,  and  the  reports  of  the  two  adventures  were  con 
founded. 

On  the  14th,  General  Vance  came  down  from  the 
mountains  of  North  Carolina  on  a  raid  towards  Sevierville. 
He  captured  a  number  of  wagons,  but  was  promptly  pur 
sued  by  the  enemy,  his  prize  recovered,  and  he  and  a 
number  of  his  staff  were  taken  prisoners,  with  the  loss  of 
a  hundred  or  more  horses  and  equipments.  They  were 
not  a  part  of  my  command,  and  failed  to  give  us  notice 
of  their  ride.  The  first  intimation  we  had  of  them  was 
of  their  unfortunate  adventure. 

On  the  21st  orders  came  from  Richmond  to  send  Corse's 
brigade  back  to  Petersburg,  in  Virginia.  It  was  so  or 
dered,  and  Hodges's  brigade  was  ordered  to  us  from  the 
department  of  West  Virginia,  in  place  of  Corse's. 

To  seek  some  of  the  fruits  of  our  advantage  at  Dan- 
dridge,  the  roads  being  a  little  firmer,  our  leading  division, 
under  General  Jenkins,  was  ordered  on  the  21st  to  pre 
pare  to  march  towards  Strawberry  Plains,  and  the  Rich 
mond  authorities  were  asked  to  send  us  a  pontoon  bridge, 
tools  of  construction,  and  to  hurry  forward  such  shoes  as 
they  could  send. 

On  the  24th,  as  the  Official  Records  show,  General 
Grant  sent  word  to  General  Halleck  of  our  return  to 
wards  Knoxville,  that  he  had  ordered  General  Foster  to 
give  battle,  if  necessary,  and  that  he  would  send  General 
Thomas  with  additional  troops  to  insure  that  we  would  be 
driven  from  the  State.  He  also  directed  General  Thomas 
to  go  in  person  and  take  command,  and  said,  "  I  want 
Longstreet  routed  and  pursued  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
State  of  Tennessee."  And  he  ordered  General  Foster  to 


532  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

put  his  cavalry  on  a  raid  from  Cumberland  Gap  to  cut  in 
upon  our  rear. 

On  the  26th  we  were  advised  of  the  advance  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  up  the  south  side  of  the  French  Broad 
to  some  of  the  fords  above  Dandridge.  General  Martin 
was  ordered  to  cross  in  force  below  it,  get  in  rear  of  the 
enemy,  and  endeavor  to  put  him  to  confusion.  He 
crossed  with  Morgan's  division,  and  called  Armstrong's 
to  follow,  but  the  enemy,  finding  opportunity  to  put  his 
force  against  the  division,  advanced  and  made  a  severe 
battle  on  the  27th,  which  became  desperate  as  developed 
until,  in  their  successive  gallant  charges,  our  ranks  were 
broken  to  confusion,  when  the  enemy  made  a  dash  and 
got  two  of  our  guns  and  two  hundred  prisoners,  driving 
us  towards  the  river. 

General  Armstrong  crossed  pending  these  operations 
and  received  the  enemy's  attack  on  the  28th.  General 
B.  R.  Johnson's  infantry  division  had  been  ordered  near 
Dandridge,  and  crossed  while  Armstrong's  command  held 
the  enemy.  The  latter  was  caught  in  battle  from  which 
there  was  no  escape  but  to  fight  it  out.  Johnson's  in 
fantry  crossed  in  time  to  march  towards  the  enemy's  rear 
before  he  could  dislodge  Armstrong.  I  rode  a  little  in 
advance  of  Johnson's  command.  The  enemy,  advised 
of  the  approach  of  infantry,  made  his  final  charge  and 
retired  south  towards  Marysville.  In  his  last  effort  one 
of  his  most  reckless  troopers  rode  in  upon  head-quarters, 
but  Colonel  Fairfax  put  spurs  into  his  horse,  dashed  up 
against  him,  had  his  pistol  at  his  head,  and  called  "  sur 
render"  before  the  man  could  level  his  gun.  The  trooper 
was  agreeably  surprised  to  find  it  no  worse.  The  enemy's 
move  to  Marysville  left  us  in  possession  of  the  foraging 
grounds. 

On  the  30th,  General  Grant  urged  General  Foster's 
army  to  the  offensive,  and  called  for  the  cavalry  raid 
through  the  Powell  River  Valley  and  Cumberland  Gap 


STRATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  FIELD.      533 

towards  our  rear,  and  General  Foster  called  on  General 
Thomas  for  a  force  of  ten  thousand  infantry  and  working 
details  to  repair  the  railroad  and  bridges  between  Knox- 
ville  and  Chattanooga.  General  Thomas  was  willing  to 
respond  to  the  call  for  troops,  but  asked  timely  notice  so 
that  he  could  call  Sherman's  forces  from  Mississippi  to  re 
place  those  to  be  sent  and  make  a  co-operative  move  against 
General  Johnston  at  Dalton.  At  the  same  time  General 
Foster  called  for  a  pontoon  bridge  to  make  his  crossing 
of  the  Holston  at  Strawberry  Plains,  which  was  ordered. 

General  Sturgis  could  not  approve  the  ride  through 
Powell  River  Valley,  and  expressed  preference  for  a 
route  through  the  mountains  of  North  Carolina  towards 
Asheville,  to  find  our  rear.  General  Grant  had  suggested 
raids  from  both  these  points  on  the  24th  of  January,  but 
General  Foster  decided  against  the  raid  from  Cumberland 
Gap,  explaining  that  General  Jones  was  at  Little  War 
Gap  to  intercept  a  column  that  might  ride  from  that  point. 
He  found,  too,  upon  counting  his  effectives  for  the  raid, 
that  he  could  only  mount  fifteen  hundred  men,  and  that 
our  guards  at  weak  points  had  been  doubled. 

Our  railroad  was  in  working  order  on  the  26th  of  Janu 
ary,  and  the  part  of  the  pontoon  bridge  ordered  for  us 
was  on  the  road.  General  Jenkins  was  ordered  with  the 
leading  division  down  towards  Strawberry  Plains  to  col 
lect  such  material  as  he  could,  and  be  prepared  to  throw  the 
bridge  across  the  Holston  as  soon  as  it  was  up  and  ready  for 
us.  Notice  was  given  General  A.  E.  Jackson  of  indica 
tions  of  raids ;  to  Captain  Osborn,  commanding  scouts ; 
to  General  Wharton ;  to  Bucker's  Cavalry  Legion  and 
Jones's  cavalry  ;  and  General  Vaughn  was  ordered  to  col 
lect  his  command  at  Bogersville,  to  be  prepared  to  threaten 
Cumberland  Gap  if  the  forces  there  should  be  reduced. 

Due  notice  was  sent  our  outlying  parties  and  scouts  to 
be  on  the  watch  for  the  reported  raiding  parties,  and  the 
guards  of  bridges  in  our  rear  were  reinforced. 


534  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

On  the  6th  of  February,  General  Grant  reported  from 
Nashville, — 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  General-in-Chief: 

1 l I  am  making  every  effort  to  get  supplies  to  Knoxville  for  the 
support  of  a  large  force — large  enough  to  drive  Longstreet  out. 
The  enemy  have  evidently  fallen  back  with  most  of  their  force 
from  General  Thomas's  front,  some  going  to  Mobile.  Has  there 
been  any  movement  in  that  direction  by  our  troops  ? 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 
1 l  Major-  General,  Commanding. ' ' 

"MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS: 

"Beports  of  scouts  make  it  evident  that  Joe  Johnston  has  re 
moved  most  of  his  force  from  your  front,  two  divisions  going  to 
Longstreet.  Longstreet  has  been  reinforced  by  troops  from  the 
East.  This  makes  it  evident  the  enemy  intends  to  secure  East 
Tennessee  if  they  can,  and  I  intend  to  drive  them  out  or  get 
whipped  this  month.  For  this  purpose  you  will  have  to  detach 
at  least  ten  thousand  men  besides  Stanley's  division  (more  will  be 
better).  I  can  partly  relieve  the  vacuum  at  Chattanooga  by 
troops  from  Logan's  command.  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  take 
artillery  or  wagons  to  Knoxville,  but  all  the  serviceable  artillery 
horses  should  be  taken  to  use  on  artillery  there.  Six  mules  to 
each  two  hundred  men  should  also  be  taken,  if  you  have  them  to 
spare.  Let  me  know  how  soon  you  can  start. 

"  GRANT, 
1 '  Major-  General. ' ' 

On  the  9th,  Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield  arrived  at 
Knoxville,  and  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio. 

General  Grant  reported  on  the  llth, — 

i  i  MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

1 1  General-in-  Chief : 

"  I  expect  to  get  off  from  Chattanooga  by  Monday  next  a  force 
to  drive  Longstreet  out  of  East  Tennessee.  It  has  been  impossible 
heretofore  to  subsist  the  troops  necessary  for  this  work. 

UTJ.  S.  GRANT, 

'  *  Major-  General. J ' 


STRATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  FIELD.      535 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

' l  Enoxville,  Tenn.  : 

"I  deem  it  of  the  utmost  importance  to  drive  Longstreet  out 
immediately,  so  as  to  furlough  the  balance  of  our  veterans,  and 
to  prepare  for  a  spring  campaign  of  our  own  choosing,  instead  of 
permitting  the  enemy  to  dictate  it  for  us.  Thomas  is  ordered  to 
start  ten  thousand  men,  besides  the  remainder  of  Granger's  corps, 
at  once.  He  will  take  no  artillery,  but  will  take  his  artillery 
horses,  and  three  mules  to  one  hundred  men.  He  will  probably 
start  next  Monday. 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 

1 '  Major-  General. '  > 

General  Scliofield  ordered  preparations  for  the  eastern 
raid  continued,  but  to  await  further  orders  of  execution, 
and  reported  that  its  execution  would  require  all  of  his 
effective  mounts,  break  his  animals  down,  and  leave  him 
without  cavalry. 

General  Grant  wired  these  several  despatches  from 
Nashville  on  February  12  : 

11  MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS: 

"  Conversation  with  Major-General  Foster  has  undecided  me 
as  to  the  propriety  of  the  contemplated  move  against  Longstreet. 
Schofield  telegraphs  the  same  views.  I  will  take  the  matter  into 
consideration  during  the  day,  after  further  talk  with  Foster,  and 
give  you  the  conclusion  arrived  at.  If  decided  that  you  do  not 
go  I  will  instruct  Schofield  to  let  Granger  send  off  his  veterans  at 
once. 

"Should  you  not  be  required  to  go  into  East  Tennessee,  could 
you  not  make  a  formidable  reconnoissance  towards  Dalton,  and, 
if  successful  in  driving  the  enemy  out,  occupy  that  place  and 
complete  the  railroad  up  to  it  this  winter  ? 

"  GRANT, 
1  c  Major-  General. ' ' 
" MAJOR- GENERAL  THOMAS: 

"Logan's  troops  started  yesterday  morning.  If  I  decide  not 
to  make  the  move  at  present  into  East  Tennessee,  I  will  send 
them  back,  unless  you  require  them  to  aid  in  advance  on  Dalton. 
(See  my  telegram  of  this  morning.) 

"  GRANT, 
1  i  Major-  General. ' ' 


536  FEOM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"  MAJOR- GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD  : 

u~No  movement  will  be  made  against  Longstreet  at  present. 
Give  your  men  and  animals  all  the  rest  you  can  preparatory  to 
early  operations  in  the  spring.  Furlough  all  the  veterans  you 
deem  it  prudent  to  let  go. 

"U.S.  GRANT, 

6 '  Major-  General. ' J 

"MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

i  i  KnoxwUe,  Tenn. : 

"You  need  not  attempt  the  raid  with  the  cavalry  you  now 
have.  If  that  in  Kentucky  can  recruit  up  it  may  do  hereafter  to 
send  it  on  such  an  expedition.  I  have  asked  so  often  for  a  co 
operative  movement  from  the  troops  in  West  Virginia  that  I 
hardly  expect  to  see  anything  to  help  us  from  there.  General 
Halleck  says  they  have  not  got  men  enough.  Crook,  however, 
has  gone  there,  and  may  undertake  to  strike  the  road  about  New 
Eiver. 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 

'  'Major-  General. J  ? 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK, 

1  i  General-in-  Chief,  Washington : 

u  GENERAL, — I  have  got  General  Thomas  ready  to  move  a  force 
of  about  fourteen  thousand  infantry  into  East  Tennessee  to  aid  the 
force  there  in  expelling  Longstreet  from  the  State.  He  would 
have  started  on  Monday  night  if  I  had  not  revoked  the  order. 
My  reasons  for  doing  this  are  these  :  General  Foster,  who  is  now 
here  (or  left  this  morning),  says  that  our  possession  of  the  portion 
of  East  Tennessee  is  perfectly  secure  against  all  danger.  The  con 
dition  of  the  people  within  the  rebel  lines  cannot  be  improved 
now  after  losing  all  they  had.  Longstreet,  where  he  is,  makes 
more  secure  other  parts  of  our  possessions.  Our  men,  from  scanty 
clothing  and  short  rations,  are  not  in  good  condition  for  an 
advance.  There  are  but  very  few  animals  in  East  Tennessee  in 
condition  to  move  artillery  or  other  stores.  If  we  move  against 
Longstreet  with  an  overwhelming  force  he  will  simply  fall  back 
towards  Virginia  until  he  can  be  reinforced  or  take  up  an  im 
pregnable  position.  The  country  being  exhausted,  all  our  sup 
plies  will  have  to  be  carried  from  Knoxville  the  whole  distance 
advanced.  We  would  be  obliged  to  advance  rapidly  and  return 
soon  whether  the  object  of  the  expedition  was  accomplished  or 
not.  Longstreet  could  return  with  impunity  on  the  heels  of  our 
returning  column,  at  least  as  far  down  the  valley  as  he  can  supply 


STRATEGIC    IMPORTANCE    OF    THE    FIELD.  537 

himself  from  the  road  in  his  rear.  Schofield  telegraphs  to  the 
same  effect.  All  these  seem  to  be  good  reasons  for  abandoning 
the  movement,  and  I  have  therefore  suspended  it.  Now  that  our 
men  are  ready  for  an  advance,  however,  I  have  directed  it  to  be 
made  on  Dalton,  and  hope  to  get  possession  of  that  place  and  hold 
it  as  a  step  towards  a  spring  campaign.  Our  troops  in  East  Ten 
nessee  are  now  clothed ;  rations  are  also  accumulating.  When 
Foster  left  most  of  the  troops  had  ten  days'  supplies,  with  five 
hundred  barrels  of  flour  and  forty  days'  meat  in  store,  and  the 
quantity  increasing  daily. 

"I  am,  general,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 

' i  Major-  General.'' ' 

Later  despatches  from  General  Grant  and  Commander- 
in-Chief  Halleck  were  as  follows : 

"  NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  February  13,  1864. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"General-in-Chief: 

"  Despatches  just  received  from  General  Schofield  and  conver 
sation  with  General  Foster,  who  is  now  here,  have  determined  me 
against  moving  immediately  against  Longstreet.  I  will  write 
more  fully.  No  danger  whatever  to  be  apprehended  in  East 

Tennessee. 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 

i  i  Major-  General. ' ' 

"KNOXVILLE,  February  15,  1864,  6.30  P.M. 
" MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS: 

"In  consequence  of  Longstreet' s  movement  in  this  direction  I 
have  ordered  one  division  of  Granger's  corps  to  this  place.  I 
think  Stanley  should  move  up  as  far  as  Athens  and  Sweet  Water 
so  as  to  protect  the  railroad.  Longstreet  has  not  advanced  farther 
than  Strawberry  Plains.  No  further  news  from  him  to-day. 

"  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  • 

i '  Major-  General. ' ' 
"[Confidential.] 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  February  17,  1864. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  GRANT, 

"Nashville,  Tenn. : 

"GENERAL, — Your  letter  of  the  12th  instant  is  just  received. 
I  fully  concur  with  you  in  regard  to  the  present  condition  of 


538  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

affairs  in  East  Tennessee.  It  certainly  is  very  much  to  be  re 
gretted  that  the  fatal  mistake  of  General  Burnside  has  permitted 
Longstreet's  army  to  winter  in  Tennessee.  It  is  due  to  yourself 
that  a  full  report  of  this  matter  should  be  placed  on  file,  so  that 
the  responsibility  may  rest  where  it  properly  belongs. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  General-in-Chief" 

The  raids  ordered  north  and  south  of  us  were  now  given 
over.  General  Thomas  made  his  advance  towards  Dai- 
ton,  and  retired,  unsuccessful. 

General  Halleck  was  right  in  his  estimate  of  East  Ten 
nessee  as  a  strategic  field  essential  to  the  Union  service, 
the  gate-way  to  Kentucky,  to  the  Union  line  of  communi 
cation,  and  the  Ohio  River ;  but  General  Grant  found  it 
so  far  from  his  lines  of  active  operations  that  it  could  not 
be  worked  without  interrupting  plans  of  campaigns  for 
the  summer,  and  giving  his  adversary  opportunity  to  dic 
tate  the  work  of  the  year.  He  thought  it  better  to  de 
pend  upon  the  conservative  spirit  that  controlled  at  the 
South,  to  draw  the  army  in  East  Tennessee  off  to  meet 
threatenings  in  Virginia  and  Georgia,  when  he  was  pre 
pared  for  them. 

On  the  10th  of  February,  General  Jenkins  was  ordered 
with  his  division  at  Strawberry  Plains  to  use  the  pontoon 
and  flat-boats  in  bridging  the  Holston  River.  Other 
columns  were  ordered  to  approximate  concentration,  in 
cluding  Wharton's  brigade  from  Bull's  Gap,  and  Hodges's 
brigade  coming  from  the  Department  of  West  Virginia. 
Rucker's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  Blain's  Cross-roads  on 
the  ^Test  bank,  and  outlying  forces  were  advised  of  the 
advance.  General  Jenkins  was  ordered  to  put  some  of 
the  cavalry  over  to  be  in  observation  towards  Knoxville, 
and  a  brigade  of  infantry  as  supporting  force  ;  batteries  on 
the  hither  bank  to  cover  the  troops  and  the  bridge  in  case 
the  enemy  was  disposed  to  dispute  our  crossing,  and  await 
my  arrival  and  further  orders.  The  army  being  ready 


STKATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  FIELD.      539 

for  the  crossing  and  move  for  Knoxville,  inquiry  was 
made  of  General  Johnston  as  to  the  condition  of  affairs 
with  the  enemy  at  Chattanooga.  In  answer  he  said, — 

"Our  scouts  report  that  troops  have  been  sent  from  Chatta 
nooga  to  Loudon.  They  could  not  learn  the  number." 

On  the  17th  I  asked  the  Richmond  authorities  for  ten 
thousand  additional  men,  and  General  Lee,  approving  our 
work,  asked  to  have  Pickett's  division  sent,  and  other  de 
tachments  to  make  up  the  number. 

On  the  19th  I  was  informed  from  General  Johnston's 
head-quarters  that  "  eight  trains  loaded  with  troops  went 
up  from  Chattanooga  on  the  night  of  the  17th."  A  tele 
gram  came  on  the  19th  from  Richmond  to  say  that  the 
additional  troops  called  for  could  not  be  sent,  and  on  the 
same  day  a  telegram  from  the  President  ordered  me  to 
send  General  Martin  with  his  cavalry  to  General  Johns 
ton.  In  reply  I  reported  that  the  order  depriving  me  of 
the  cavalry  would  force  me  to  abandon  the  move,  then  in 
progress,  against  Knoxville,  and  draw  the  troops  back  to 
wards  Bristol.  Then  came  other  despatches  from  General 
Johnston  that  the  enemy  was  still  drawing  forces  from 
Chattanooga,  but  no  authority  came  from  Richmond  au 
thorizing  me  to  retain  the  cavalry,  so  we  were  obliged  to 
draw  back  to  fields  that  could  be  guarded  by  smaller 
commands. 

Referring  to  the  proposed  advance,  General  Grant  said, 
"  Longs treet  cannot  afford  to  place  his  force  between 
Knoxville  and  the  Tennessee."  It  was  not  so  intended, 
but  to  put  the  army  alongside  of  Knoxville  to  hold  the 
enemy  to  his  intrenched  lines,  while  the  troops  asked  for 
would  be  employed  in  breaking  the  railroad  and  bridges 
between  that  point  and  Chattanooga.  It  was  thought  that 
the  army  at  Chattanooga  could  not  afford  sufficient  de 
tachments  to  drive  me  from  that  work  without  exposing 
that  position  to  danger  from  General  Johnston  at  Dal  ton, 


540  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

but  upon  inquiry  of  General  Johnston  if  he  could  avail 
himself  of  such  opportunity,  he  replied  that  he  was  or 
dered  to  reinforce  General  Polk,  who  was  operating  in 
Mississippi  in  front  of  General  Sherman.  Instead  of  re 
inforcing  General  Polk,  the  latter  should  have  been  or 
dered  to  General  Johnston.  That  would  have  drawn 
General  Sherman  to  General  Thomas,  but  Polk,  having 
interior  lines  of  transit,  could  have  been  in  time  for 
Johnston  to  strike  and  break  up  the  road  and  bridge  be 
hind  Thomas  before  Sherman  could  reach  him.  The 
break  could  have  forced  Thomas  to  care  for  his  own  posi 
tion,  and  the  want  of  the  bridge  behind  him  might  have 
forced  him  to  abandon  it,  in  search  of  safe  communication 
with  his  supplies.  But  the  authorities  could  not  be  in 
duced  to  abandon  the  policy  of  placing  detachments  to 
defend  points  to  which  the  enemy  chose  to  call  us.  We 
had  troops  enough  in  Tennessee,  Georgia,  Alabama,  and 
Mississippi,  if  allowed  to  use  them  in  co-operative  combi 
nation,  to  break  the  entire  front  of  the  Federal  forces  and 
force  them  back  into  Kentucky  before  the  opening  of  the 
spring  campaign,  when  we  might  have  found  opportunity 
to  "  dictate"  their  campaign.  The  enemy  was  in  no  con 
dition  for  backward  move  at  the  time  of  my  advance  upon 
Knoxville,  so  simultaneous  advance  of  our  many  columns 
could  have  given  him  serious  trouble,  if  not  confusion. 

The  order  for  the  return  of  Martin's  cavalry  to  Geor 
gia,  and  the  notice  that  other  troops  could  not  be  sent  me, 
called  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  command  east,  where  we 
could  find  safer  lines  of  defence  and  good  foraging.  The 
order  to  retire  was  issued,  and  the  march  was  taken  up 
on  the  22d  of  February,  Jenkins's  division  and  the  cav 
alry  to  cover  the  march.  He  was  ordered  to  reship  the 
pontoon-boats,  destroy  trestlings,  flat-boats,  the  railroad 
bridge,  and  march  in  advance  of  the  cavalry.  He  in 
quired  if  he  should  cut  the  wires  and  crossings  of  small 
streams,  but  was  ordered  to  leave  them  undisturbed,  as  the 


STRATEGIC    IMPORTANCE   OF   THE    FIELD.  541 

enemy  would  not  be  so  likely  to  trouble  us  when  he  found 
we  were  disposed  to  be  accommodating. 

The  march  was  not  seriously  disturbed.  The  enemy's 
cavalry,  reduced  by  severe  winter  service,  was  in  poor 
condition  to  follow,  and  the  roads  we  left  behind  us  were 
too  heavy  for  artillery.  A  good  position  was  found  be 
hind  Bull's  Gap,  and  the  army  was  deployed  to  comfort 
able  camps  from  the  Holston  River  on  the  right  to  the 
Nolachucky  on  the  left. 

The  prime  object  of  the  second  advance  upon  Knox- 
ville  was  to  show  the  strategic  strength  of  the  field,  and 
persuade  the  authorities  that  an  army  of  twenty  thou 
sand  in  that  zone  could  be  of  greater  service  than  double 
that  force  on  the  enemy's  front  or  elsewhere,  but  they 
could  not  or  would  not  hear  of  plans  that  proposed  to 
take  them  from  the  settled  policy  of  meeting  the  enemy 
where  he  was  prepared  for  us. 


CHAPTEE  XXXVII. 

LAST    DAYS    IN    TENNESSEE. 

Longstreet's  Army  at  Bull's  Gap — U.  S.  Grant  made  Lieutenant-Gen 
eral — Richmond  Authorities  awake  to  the  Gravity  of  the  Situation — 
Longstreet's  Proposition  for  Campaign— Approved  by  General  Lee — 
Richmond  Authorities  fail  to  adopt  it — General  Bragg's  Plan — A 
Memorable  and  Unpleasant  Council  at  the  Capital— Orders  from 
President  Davis — The  Case  of  General  Law— Longstreet  ordered  to 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia— Resolutions  of  Thanks  from  Con 
federate  Congress. 

IT  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  country  more  inviting  in 
agriculture  and  horticulture  than  East  Tennessee,  arid  its 
mineral  resources  are  as  interesting,  but  for  those  whose 
mission  was  strategic,  its  geographical  and  topographical 
features  were  more  striking.  Our  position  at  Bull's  Gap 
was  covered  by  a  spur  of  the  mountains  which  shoots  out 
from  the  south  side  of  the  Holston  River  towards  the 
north  bend  of  the  Nolachucky,  opening  gaps  that  could 
be  improved  by  the  pick  and  shovel  until  the  line  became 
unassailable.  In  a  few  days  our  line  was  strong  enough, 
and  we  looked  for  the  enemy  to  come  and  try  our  metal, 
until  we  learned  that  he  was  as  badly  crippled  of  the  cav 
alry  arm  as  we.  General  Martin  was  ordered  with  his 
division  to  General  Johnston  in  Georgia,  and  Colonel 
Gary  with  his  legion  was  ordered  to  South  Carolina  to 
be  mounted  for  cavalry  service. 

The  armies  under  General  Lee.  in  Virginia  and  General 
Johnston  in  Georgia  were  in  defensive  positions,  with  little 
prospect  of  striking  by  their  right  or  left  flanks  in  search 
of  a  way  to  break  their  bounds,  and  the  army  in  East 
Tennessee  had  been  called  back  to  the  defensive  for  want 
of  cavalry,  but  the  latter  still  covered  gate-ways  through 
the  mountains  that  offered  routes  to  Kentucky  for  strategic 

542 


LAST    DAYS    IN    TENNESSEE.  543 

manoeuvres.     The  Trans-Mississippi  Department  was  an 
open  field  of  vast  opportunities,  but  was  lying  fallow. 

An  officer  of  the  Union  service  had  worked  his  way 
during  three  years  of  severe  field  service  from  obscure 
position  with  a  regiment,  to  command  of  armies,  and  had 
borne  his  banners  in  triumph  through  battle  and  siege, 
over  the  prejudice  of  higher  officers,  until  President  Lin 
coln's  good  judgment  told  him  that  Grant  was  the  man 
for  the  times.  Congress  provided  the  place,  and  the 
President  sent  his  commission  as  lieutenant-general  to  the 
United  States  Senate,  where  it  was  promptly  confirmed, 
and  the  lieutenant-general  was  presently  assigned  as  com 
mander  over  half  a  million  of  men,  to  the  surprise  of 
many,  more  than  all  to  the  bureau  general-in-chief.  He 
was  soon  at  work  arranging  his  combination  for  the  cam 
paign  of  the  coming  year.  He  was  a  West  Point  boy, 
and  we  had  been  together  during  three  years  of  academic 
service,  then  two  years  in  the  United  States  Fourth  Regi 
ment  of  Infantry,  and  later  in  Worth's  division  in 
Mexico. 

Forced  to  extremities,  the  Richmond  authorities  began 
to  realize  the  importance  of  finding  a  way  out  of  our  pent- 
up  borders  before  the  Union  commander  could  complete 
his  extensive  arrangements  to  press  on  with  his  columns. 
They  called  upon  General  Lee,  General  Johnston,  and 
myself  for  plans  or  suggestions  that  could  anticipate  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  disconcert  his  plans,  and  move 
him  to  new  combinations.  In  front  of  General  Lee  and 
on  his  right  and  left  the  country  had  been  so  often  foraged 
by  both  Union  and  Confederate  armies  that  it  was  denuded 
of  supplies.  Besides,  a  forced  advance  of  Lee's  army 
could  only  put  the  enemy  back  a  few  miles  'to  his  works 
about  Washington.  General  Johnston's  opportunities 
were  no  better,  and  in  addition  to  other  difficulties,  he 
was  working  under  the  avowed  displeasure  of  the  authori 
ties,  more  trying  than  his  trouble  with  the  enemy. 


544  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

I  was  under  the  impression  that  we  could  collect  an 
army  of  twenty  thousand  men  in  South  Carolina  by  strip 
ping  our  forts  and  positions  of  all  men  not  essential  for 
defence ;  that  that  army  could  be  quietly  moved  north  by 
rail  through  Greenville  to  the  borders  of  North  Carolina, 
and  promptly  marched  by  Abingdon,  Virginia,  through 
the  mountain  passes,  while  my  command  covered  the 
move  by  its  position  in  East  Tennessee.  That  army 
passing  the  mountains,  my  command  could  drop  off  by 
the  left  to  its  rear  and  follow  into  Kentucky, — the  whole 
to  march  against  the  enemy's  only  line  of  railway  from 
Louisville,  and  force  him  to  loose  his  hold  against  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  front,  and  give  the  latter  opportunity  to 
advance  his  army  and  call  all  of  his  troops  in  Alabama 
and  Mississippi  to  like  advance,  the  grand  junction  of  all 
of  the  columns  to  be  made  on  or  near  the  Ohio  River, — 
General  Beauregard  to  command  the  leading  column, 
with  orders  not  to  make  or  accept  battle  until  the  grand 
junction  was  made.  That  General  Johnston  should  have 
like  orders  against  battle  until  he  became  satisfied  of 
fruitful  issues.  The  supplies  and  transportation  for 
Beauregard  to  be  collected  at  the  head  of  the  railroad, 
in  advance  of  the  movement  of  troops,  under  the  osten 
sible  purpose  of  hauling  for  my  command.  The  arrange 
ments  perfected,  the  commander  of  the  leading  column 
to  put  his  troops  on  the  rail  at  or  near  Charleston  and 
march  with  them  as  they  arrived  at  the  head  of  the  road. 

With  this  proposition  I  went  to  Virginia  and  submitted 
it  to  General  Lee.  He  approved,  and  asked  me  to  take 
it  to  the  Richmond  authorities.  I  objected  that  the  mere 
fact  of  its  coming  from  me  would  be  enough  to  cause  its 
rejection,  and  asked,  if  he  approved,  that  he  would  take  it 
and  submit  it  as  his  own.  He  took  me  with  him  to  Rich 
mond,  but  went  alone  next  morning  to  see  the  President. 
He  met,  besides  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
General  Bragg.  Conference  was  held  during  the  fore- 


LAST    DAYS   IN    TENNESSEE.  545 

noon,  but  was  not  conclusive.     In  the  afternoon  he  called 
me  with  him  for  further  deliberation. 

At  the  opening  of  the  afternoon  council  it  appeared 
that  General  Bragg  had  offered  a  plan  for  early  spring 
campaign,  and  that  it  had  received  the  approval  of  the 
President, — viz.  : 

"  General  Johnston  to  march  his  army  through  the  mountains 
of  Georgia  and  East  Tennessee  to  the  head-waters  of  Little  Ten 
nessee  Eiver  ;  my  command  to  march  through  the  mountains  east 
of  Knoxville  to  join  General  Johnston.  The  commands  united, 
to  march  west,  cross  the  river  into  Middle  Tennessee,  and  march 
for  the  enemy's  line  of  supplies  about  Nashville." 

When  asked  an  opinion  of  this,  I  inquired  as  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  attitude  towards  it,  and  was  told  that  he 
objected;  that  he  thought  the  sparsely-settled  country 
of  the  mountains  through  which  he  would  move  could  not 
supply  his  army  ;  that  he  would  consume  all  that  he  could 
haul  before  turning  westward  for  the  middle  country,  and 
would  be  forced  to  active  foraging  from  his  first  step  be 
tween  the  two  armies  of  the  enemy. 

General  Lee  inquired  if  General  Johnston  had  ma 
turely  considered  the  matter.  I  thought  that  he  had, 
and  that  the  objections  of  the  officer  who  was  to  conduct 
the  campaign  were,  of  themselves,  reasons  for  overruling 
it ;  but  its  advocates  were  not  ready  to  accept  a  summary 
disposal  of  their  plans,  and  it  began  to  transpire  that  the 
President  had  serious  objections  to  General  Beauregard 
as  a  commander  for  the  field. 

But  General  Lee  called  us  back  to  business  by  asking 
if  there  was  anything  more  to  be  added  than  General 
Johnston's  objections.  I  called  attention  to  General 
Bragg's  official  account  of  the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
in  which  he  reported  that  a  similar  move  had  been  pro 
posed  for  him  through  Middle  Tennessee  towards  the 
enemy's  line  of  communication  at  Nashville  early  on 


546  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  morning  after  the  battle ;  that  he  rejected  it,  reported 
it  "  visionary" ;  said  that  it  would  leave  his  rear  open  to 
the  enemy,  and  alluded  to  the  country  through  which 
the  march  was  proposed  as  "  affording  no  subsistence  to 
men  or  animals."  This  at  harvest  season,  too !  the  enemy 
demoralized  by  the  late  battle,  and  the  Confederates  in 
the  vigor  of  success !  Now,  after  a  winter  of  foraging  by 
the  Union  armies,  the  country  could  not  be  so  plethoric 
of  supplies  as  to  support  us,  while  an  active  army  was  on 
each  flank,  better  prepared  to  dispute  our  march. 

General  Lee  wore  his  beard  full,  but  neatly  trimmed. 
He  pulled  at  it  nervously,  and  more  vigorously  as  time 
and  silence  grew,  until  at  last  his  suppressed  emotion  was 
conquered.  The  profound  quiet  of  a  minute  or  more 
seemed  an  hour.  When  he  spoke,  it  was  of  other  matters, 
but  the  air  was  troubled  by  his  efforts  to  surrender  hopeful 
anticipations  to  the  caprice  of  empirics.  He  rose  to  take 
leave  of  the  august  presence,  gave  his  hand  to  the  Presi 
dent,  and  bowed  himself  out  of  the  council  chamber. 
His  assistant  went  through  the  same  forms,  and  no  one 
approached  the  door  to  offer  parting  courtesy. 

I  had  seen  the  general  under  severe  trial  before,  espe 
cially  on  his  Pennsylvania  campaign  when  he  found  the 
cavalry  under  General  Imboden  had  halted  for  rest  at 
Hancock,  at  the  opening  of  an  aggressive  movement.  My 
similar  experience  with  the  President  in  the  all-day  talk, 
on  Missionary  Ridge,  six  months  before,  had  better  pre 
pared  me  for  the  ordeal,  and  I  drew  some  comfort  from 
the  reflection  that  others  had  their  trials.  General  Lee 
took  the  next  train  for  his  army  on  the  Rapidan,  and  I 
that  by  the  direct  route  to  my  command  by  the  Southside 
Railway. 

When  ordered  from  Virginia  in  September  my  wife  re 
mained  in  Petersburg  with  her  good  friend  Mrs.  Dunn. 
On  the  20th  of  October  following  a  son  was  born,  and 
christened  Robert  Lee.  After  continuous  field  service 


LAST    DAYS    IN    TENNESSEE.  547 

since  the  1st  of  July,  1861,  I  thought  to  avail  myself  of 
the  privilege  as  department  commander  to  take  a  two 
days'  leave  of  absence  to  see  the  precious  woman  and  her 
infant  boy.  While  there  it  occurred  to  me  to  write  to  the 
President,  and  try  to  soften  the  asperities  of  the  Eichmond 
council ;  also  to  find  a  way  to  overcome  the  objections  to 
General  Beauregard.  I  suggested,  too,  that  General  Lee 
be  sent  to  join  us,  and  have  command  in  Kentucky.  In 
reply  the  President  sent  a  rebuke  of  my  delay. 

On  my  return  to  head-quarters  at  Greenville  the  other 
division  of  General  Johnston's  cavalry  was  ordered  to  him 
through  the  mountains.  Just  then  a  severe  snow-storm 
came  upon  us  and  blocked  all  roads.  Meanwhile,  the 
enemy  had  mended  his  ways,  secured  munitions,  and 
thought  to  march  out  from  Mossy  Creek  as  far  as  Morris- 
town.  Orders  were  given  for  a  march  to  meet  him,  but 
we  found  ourselves  in  need  of  forage,  so  we  rested  in  posi 
tion,  and  presently  learned  that  the  enemy  had  retired 
towards  his  works. 

Our  reduced  cavalry  force  made  necessary  a  change  of 
position  behind  the  Holston  Eiver,  where  a  small  force 
could  at  least  observe  our  flanks,  and  give  notice  of  threat- 
enings  on  either  side. 

A  letter  from  the  President  under  date  of  the  25th  or 
dered  that  we  be  prepared  to  march  to  meet  General 
Johnston  for  the  campaign  through  Middle  Tennessee. 
He  was  informed  that  we  were  ready,  only  needing  sup 
plies  for  the  march  and  his  orders ;  that  I  had  cared  for 
the  bridges  in  that  direction,  so  that  there  was  no  reason 
with  us  for  delay. 

On  the  7th  of  April  I  was  ordered,  with  the  part  of  my 
command  that  had  originally  served  with  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  back  to  service  with  General  Lee  on 
the  Eapidan.  The  move  was  made  as  soon  as  cars  could 
be  had  to  haul  the  troops,  halting  under  orders  at  Char- 
lottesville  to  meet  a  grand  flanking  move  then  antici- 


548  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

pated.  On  the  22d  we  were  ordered  down  as  far  as 
Mechanics ville,  five  miles  west  of  Gordonsville,  watching 
-  there  for  a  lesser  flank  move.  On  the  29th,  General  Lee 
came  out  and  reviewed  the  command. 

Referring  to  the  general  officers  who  had  been  put 
under  charges  while  in  East  Tennessee,  General  Robert 
son  had  been  sentenced  to  suspension,  and  an  excellent 
officer,  General  Gregg,  had  been  sent  to  report,  and  was 
assigned  to  the  Texas  brigade.  In  the  case  of  General 
McLaws,  the  court-martial  ordered  official  reprimand, 
but  the  President  disapproved  the  proceedings,  passing 
reprimand  upon  the  court  and  the  commanding  general, 
and  ordered  the  officer  to  be  restored  to  duty,  which  was 
very  gratifying  to  me,  who  could  have  taken  several  repri 
mands  to  relieve  a  personal  friend  of  embarrassing  posi 
tion.  General  McLaws  was  a  classmate,  and  had  been  a 
warm  personal  friend  from  childhood.  I  had  no  desire  to 
put  charges  against  him,  and  should  have  failed  to  do  so 
even  under  the  directions  of  the  authorities.  I  am  happy 
to  say  that  our  personal  relations  are  as  close  and  interest 
ing  as  they  have  ever  been,  and  that  his  heart  was  big 
enough  to  separate  official  duties  and  personal  rela 
tions. 

Charges  had  been  preferred  against  Brigadier- General 
E.  M.  Law  for  surreptitiously  disposing  of  an  official 
communication  to  the  War  Department  that  had  been 
intrusted  to  his  care,  in  which  was  enclosed  his  pretended 
resignation  from  the  Confederate  army.  The  President 
refused  to  entertain  the  charges,  and  ordered  the  officer 
released  from  arrest  and  restored  to  his  command. 

Of  the  paper  that  was  improperly  disposed  of,  General 
Cooper,  adjutant  and  inspector-general  of  the  army,  re 
ported, — 

"The  resignation  within  referred  to  never  came  to  the  office. 
It  appears  from  inquiry  at  the  War  Department  that  it  was  pre 
sented  by  a  friend  of  General  Law,  unofficially,  to  the  Secretary 


LAST    DAYS    IN    TENNESSEE.  549 

of  War,    and  never  came  through  the  regular  channels  as  an 
official  paper.'7  * 

General  Lee  wrote  to  the  Department  of  the  charges, — 

1  i  I  examined  the  charges  against  General  Law  and  find  them 
of  a  very  grave  character.  I  think  it  due  to  General  Law,  as  well 
as  to  the  interest  of  the  service,  that  they  should  be  investigated 
and  his  innocence  or  guilt  should  be  declared  by  a  court-martial. 
There  have  been  instances  of  officers  obtaining  indulgences  on  not 
true  grounds,  which  I  think  discreditable  and  prejudicial  to 
military  discipline,  and  should  be  stopped."  f 

The  indorsement  of  General  Cooper  shows  that  the 
paper  was  fraudulently  handled.  The  letter  of  General 
Lee  shows  the  offence  a  high  crime  and  misdemeanor. 

General  Lee  wrote  to  inform  me  that  the  authorities  at 
Richmond  had  ordered  General  Law  to  be  restored  to 
duty  with  his  command.  The  limit  of  endurance  had  thus 
been  reached  and  passed.  I  ordered  the  rearrest  of  Gen 
eral  Law  upon  his  appearance  within  the  limits  of  the 
command.  To  hold  me  at  the  head  of  the  command  while 
encouraging  mutinous  conduct  in  its  ranks  was  beyond  all 
laws  and  customs  of  war,  and  I  wrote  General  Lee  that 
my  orders  were  out  to  have  General  Law  again  put  under 
arrest,  and  that  the  case  should  be  brought  before  a  mili 
tary  tribunal,  or  I  must  be  relieved  of  duty  in  the  Con 
federate  States  service.  The  authorities  then  thought  to 
find  their  way  by  transferring  me  to  another  command, 
but  on  that  point  General  Lee  became  impatient,  and  in 
clined  to  serious  thought  and  action.  The  commander  of 
the  army  was  involved  as  well  as  the  commander  of  the 
First  Corps,  and  both  or  neither  must  be  relieved.  The 
authorities  halted,  and  that  was  the  last  that  I  heard  of 
General  Law  until  his  newspaper  articles  began  to  appear, 
years  after  the  surrender. 

The  following  vote  of  thanks  given  by  the  Congress  at 

*  Rebellion  Record.  f  Ibid. 


550  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

this  juncture  affords  a  remarkable  commentary  upon  the 
conduct  of  the  authorities,  as  well  as  constituting  a  com 
pliment  most  heartily  appreciated  by  the  recipients : 

"  THANKS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS  TO  LIEUTENANT- 
GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET  AND  HIS  COMMAND.* 

"No.  42. — JOINT  EESOLUTIONS  of  thanks  to  Lieutenant- General 
Longstreet  and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command. 

"  Resolved  by  the  Congress  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America, 
That  the  thanks  of  Congress  are  due,  and  hereby  cordially  ten 
dered,  to  Lieutenant- General  James  Longstreet  and  the  officers 
and  men  of  his  command,  for  their  patriotic  services  and  brilliant 
achievements  in  the  present  war,  sharing  as  they  have  the  ardu 
ous  fatigues  and  privations  of  many  campaigns  in  Virginia, 
Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  Georgia,  and  Tennessee,  and  partici 
pating  in  nearly  every  great  battle  fought  in  those  States,  the 
commanding  general  ever  displaying  great  ability,  skill,  and  pru 
dence  in  command,  and  the  officers  and  men  the  most  heroic 
bravery,  fortitude,  and  energy,  in  every  duty  they  have  been 
called  upon  to  perform. 

"Resolved,  That  the  President  be  requested  to  transmit  a  copy 
of  the  foregoing  resolution  to  Lieutenant- General  Longstreet  for 
publication  to  his  command. 

"  Approved  February  17,  1864." 

*  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xxxi.  part  i.  p.  549. 


CHAPTER     XXXVIII. 

BATTLE    OF    THE    WILDERNESS. 

Campaign  of  1864— General  Grant  in  the  Field— Strength  of  the  Armies — 
Their  Positions— Description  of  the  Wilderness— The  Battle  opened— A 
Brisk  Day's  Fighting— Longstreet's  Command  faces  Hancock's  on  the 
Morning  of  the  Second  Day — An  Effective  Flank  Movement— General 
Wadsworth  mortally  wounded— General  Jenkins  falls  under  Fire  of 
Friends,  and  Longstreetis  seriously  wounded — Carried  from  the  Field 
on  a  Litter— Tribute  to  General  Jenkins— Criticism  and  Controversy. 

AFTER  reporting  the  return  of  my  command  to  service 
with  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  I  took  the  earliest 
opportunity  to  suggest  that  the  preliminaries  of  the  cam 
paign  should  be  carefully  confined  to  strategic  manoeuvre 
until  we  could  show  better  generalship.  That  accom 
plished,  I  argued,  the  enemy's  forces  would  lose  confidence 
in  the  superiority  of  their  leader's  skill  and  prowess ;  that 
both  armies  were  composed  of  intelligent,  experienced 
veterans,  who  were  as  quick  to  discover  the  better  hand 
ling  of  their  ranks  as  trained  generals ;  that  by  such  suc 
cessful  manoeuvres  the  Confederates  would  gain  confidence 
and  power  as  the  enemy  began  to  lose  prestige ;  that  then 
we  could  begin  to  look  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to  call 
the  enemy  to  aggressive  work,  while  immediate  aggression 
from  us  against  his  greater  numbers  must  make  our  labors 
heavy  and  more  or  less  doubtful ;  that  we  should  first 
show  that  the  power  of  battle  is  in  generalship  more  than 
in  the  number  of  soldiers,  which,  properly  illustrated, 
would  make  the  weaker  numbers  of  the  contention  the 
stronger  force. 

In  this  connection  I  refer  to  the  policy  of  attrition 
which  became  a  prominent  feature  during  part  of  the 
campaign,  and  showed  that  the  enemy  put  his  faith  in 
numbers  more  than  in  superior  skill  and  generalship. 

551 


552  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Grant  made  his  head-quarters  near  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  in  Culpeper  County,  Virginia,  com 
manded  by  Major-General  George  G.  Meade.  It  had 
been  organized  into  three  corps,  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth, 
commanded  respectively  by  Major-General  W.  S.  Han 
cock,  Major-General  G.  K.  Warren,  and  Major-General 
John  Sedgwick,  all  in  cantonment  near  Culpeper  Court- 
House.  The  Ninth  Corps  was  a  distinct  body  reorganized 
under  Major-General  A.  E.  Burnside,  and  posted  in  co 
operative  position  near  the  railroad  bridge  over  the  Rap- 
pahannock  River.  The  aggregate  of  the  two  commands 
was  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  men,  classified 
as  follows : 

Army  of  the  Potomac  : 

Infantry  present  for  duty,  equipped  (aggregate)    .   .  73,390 

Cavalry  (aggregate) 12,424 

Artillery  and  engineers 2,764 

Quartermaster's,  subsistence,  and   medical   depart 
ments,  extra-duty  men,  and  engineer  brigade    .   .  19,183 
Ninth  Corps,  present  for  duty,  equipped 19,486 

Total 127,247 

But  deducting  extra-duty  men,  claimed  as  non-com 
batants 19,183 

Leaves 108,064 

These  figures  are  from  Major-General  A.  A.  Hum 
phreys,  chief  of  staff  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  But 
General  Badeau,  in  his  "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant," 
p.  94,  gives  as  the  exact  numbers  put  into  battle  (after 
deducting  a  division  of  colored  troops,  not  then  used  for 
battle  service)  the  following : 

Army  of  the  Potomac 97,273 

Ninth  Corps 22,708 

Total 119,981 

From  which  he  deducts  the  division  of  colored  troops      3,095 

Leaving H6,886 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  stood  on  the  west  side 
of  Eapidan  Kiver,  Mine  Run  on  its  right,  extending 


BATTLE   OF    THE    WILDERNESS.  553 

north,  the  left  division,  R.  H.  Anderson's,  looking  to 
wards  Madison  Court-House ;  the  Second  and  Third 
Corps,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Generals  R.  S.  Ewell 
and  A.  P.  Hill ;  two  divisions  and  Alexander's  artillery  of 
Longstreet's  (First)  corps  being  held  at  Mechanicsville. 

Colonel  Taylor,  chief  of  staff  with  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  gives  the  strength  of  the  army  at  the  open 
ing  of  the  campaign,  from  the  returns  of  April  20,  the 
latest  up  to  date,  as  follows  :  * 

Second  Corps 17,093 

Third  Corps 22,199 

Unattached  commands,  Maryland  Line,  etc 1,125 

14  A  liberal  estimate,"  as  he  calls  it,  of  my  command  .  10,000 

Total 50,417 

Cavalry 8,727 

Artillery  corps 4,854 

Making  a  total  of 63,998 

But  General  Badeau  objects,  on  authority  of  a  letter 
from  General  Bragg  to  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
stating  that  I  had  fourteen  thousand  men  in  my  command. 
If  General  Bragg's  letter  referred  to  my  command  in 
East  Tennessee  it  was  accurate  enough.  But  Buckner's 
division  of  that  command,  the  cavalry,  and  other  detach 
ments  were  left  in  East  Tennessee.  General  Badeau 
claims,  besides,  six  thousand  furloughed  men  and  con 
scripts  as  joining  the  army  between  the  20th  of  April  and 
the  4th  of  May.  Of  this  there  is  no  official  record,  and  it  is 
more  than  probable  that  new  cases  of  sick  and  furloughed 
men  of  that  interval  were  as  many  at  least  as  the  frag 
mentary  parties  that  joined  us.  General  Humphreys 
reported  me  as  having  fifteen  thousand  men.  If  he  in 
tended  those  figures  as  the  strength  of  the  First  Corps,  he 
is  accurate  enough,  but  Pickett's  division  of  that  corps 
was  not  with  it,  nor  did  it  return  to  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  until  late  in  the  campaign.  So  I  find  no 

*  "  Four  Years  with  General  Lee." 


554  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

good  reason  for  changing  the  figures  of  Colonel  Taylor, 
except  so  far  as  to  add  Johnson's  brigade  of  Rodes's  di 
vision,  which  is  reported  to  have  j  oined  the  Second  Corps 
on  the  6th  of  May, — estimated  at  1500,  which,  added  to 
63,998,  would  make  the  total  65,498.  But  General 
Ewell's  official  account  of  numbers  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  of  May  puts  his  force  at  15,500,  which  is  better  au 
thority  than  Colonel  Taylor's  from  the  return  of  April  20, 
or  General  Badeau's  computation.  To  these  figures  should 
be  added  Johnson's  brigade,  that  reported  later  of  the 
day,  estimated  by  General  Badeau  at  1500,  which  makes 
the  aggregate  of  the  Second  Corps  17,000,  and  brings 
that  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  back  to  65,405. 

However,  the  numerical  strength  of  armies  should  not 
be  considered  as  of  exclusive  bearing  upon  the  merits  of 
the  campaign.  The  commanders  had  chosen  their  battle 
after  mature  deliberation.  They  knew  of  each  other's 
numbers  and  resources  before  they  laid  their  plans,  and 
they  had  even  known  each  other  personally  for  more  than 
twenty  years.  Each  had  the  undivided  support  and  confi 
dence  of  his  government  and  his  army,  and  it  was  time 
now  to  leave  the  past  and  give  attention  to  the  future. 

General  Lee  had  acquired  fame  as  a  strategist  in  his 
two  years'  service  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
General  Grant,  by  his  three  years'  service  in  the  West, 
had  come  to  be  known  as  an  all-round  soldier,  seldom  if 
ever  surpassed  ;  but  the  biggest  part  of  him  was  his  heart. 
They  were  equally  pugnacious  and  plucky, — Grant  the 
more  deliberate. 

Six  months  before  the  opening  of  the  impending  cam 
paign,  in  November,  1863,  General  Meade,  essaying  a 
blow  at  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  crossed  the  Rap- 
idan  below  General  Lee's  right,  and  deployed  along  the 
south  side  of  Mine  Run,  but  found  Lee's  line  so  strong 
and  so  improved  by  field-works  that  he  felt  constrained  to 
withdraw  without  making  battle. 


BATTLE   OF    THE    WILDERNESS.  555 

As  the  purpose  of  this  writing  is  to  convey  ideas  of 
personal  observations  and  experience,  it  will  be  confined, 
as  far  as  practicable,  to  campaigns  or  parts  of  them  with 
which  I  was  directly  or  indirectly  connected.  So,  when 
participants  and  partisans  have  passed  away,  I  shall 
have  contributed  my  share  towards  putting  the  historian 
in  possession  of  evidence  which  he  can  weigh  with  that 
of  other  actors  in  the  great  drama. 

At  midnight  of  the  3d  of  May,  1864,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  took  its  line  of  march  for  the  lower  crossings  of 
the  Rapidan  River  at  Germania  and  Ely's  Fords,  the  Fifth 
and  Sixth  Corps  for  the  former,  the  Second  for  the  latter, 
Wilson's  division  of  cavalry  leading  the  first,  Gregg's  the 
second  column.  The  cavalry  was  to  secure  the  crossings 
and  lay  bridges  for  the  columns  as  they  came  up.  Wilson's 
cavalry  crossed  at  Germania  ford,  drove  off  the  Confed 
erate  outpost,  and  began  the  construction  of  a  bridge  at 
daylight.  Gregg  also  was  successful,  and  the  bridges  were 
ready  when  the  solid  columns  came.  Warren's  (Fifth 
Corps)  crossed  after  Wilson's  cavalry,  marching  westward 
as  far  as  Wilderness  Tavern.  Sedgwick's  corps  followed 
and  pitched  camp  near  the  crossing.  Hancock's  corps 
followed  Gregg's  cavalry,  and  made  camp  at  Chancellors- 
ville.  Generals  Grant  and  Meade  went  over  after  War 
ren's  column  and  established  head-quarters  near  the  cross 
ing.  General  Grant  despatched  for  Burnside's  corps  to 
come  and  join  him  by  night  march.  Sheridan  was  ex 
pected  to  engage  Stuart's  cavalry  at  Hamilton's  Crossing 
near  Fredericksburg. 

General  Grant  had  no  fixed  plan  of  campaign  beyond 
the  general  idea  to  avoid  the  strong  defensive  line  occu 
pied  by  General  Lee  behind  Mine  Run,  and  find  a  way  to 
draw  him  out  to  open  battle. 

The  Wilderness  is  a  forest  land  of  about  fifteen  miles 
square,  lying  between  and  equidistant  from  Orange  Court- 
House  and  Fredericksburg.  It  is  broken  occasionally  by 


556  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

small  farms  and  abandoned  clearings,  and  two  roads, — 
the  Orange  Plank  road  and  the  turnpike,  which  are 
cut  at  right  angles  by  the  Germania  road, — in  general 
course  nearly  parallel,  open  ways  through  it  between 
Fredericksburg  and  the  Court-House.  The  Germania 
Ford  road  joins  the  Brock  road,  the  strategic  line  of 
the  military  zone,  and  crosses  the  turnpike  at  Wilderness 
Tavern  and  the  Plank  road  about  two  miles  south  of 
that  point. 

Though  the  march  was  set  on  foot  at  midnight  it  was 
soon  made  known  to  General  Lee,  and  its  full  purport 
was  revealed  by  noon  of  the  4th,  and  orders  were  sent  the 
different  commanders  for  their  march  to  meet  the  enemy, 
—the  Second  Corps  (Swell's),  consisting  of  Rodes's, 
Johnson's,  and  Early's  divisions,  by  the  Orange  Turn 
pike  ;  the  Third  (A.  P.  Hill's)—  R  H.  Anderson's,  Heth's, 
and  Wilcox's  divisions — by  the  Orange  Plank  road. 

General  Lee's  signals  were  interpreted  and  sent  to 
General  Grant,  who  so  far  modified  his  plans  as  to  pre 
pare  for  immediate  battle.  The  commands  of  the  First 
Corps,  Field's  and  Kershaw's  divisions  and  Alexander's 
batteries,  were  stationed,  Field's  north  of  Gordonsville, 
where  he  had  been  posted  on  the  1st  of  May  in  anticipa 
tion  of  a  move  around  our  left,  the  other  commands  near 
Mechanicsville.  We  were  ordered  forward  by  the  Plank 
road  to  Parker's  Store ;  the  order  was  received  after  one 
o'clock,  and  sent  out  for  information  of  the  commanders, 
who  were  ordered  to  prepare  and  march.  But  I  asked 
for  and  received  authority  to  march  by  a  shorter  route 
that  would  at  the  same  time  relieve  the  Plank  road  of 
pressure  of  troops  and  trains  (for  we  had  been  crowded 
off  the  road  once  before  by  putting  too  many  troops  upon 
a  single  track).  By  the  same  despatch  I  asked  and 
subsequently  obtained  leave  to  go  on  to  the  Brock  road, 
where  we  could  look  for  and  hope  to  intercept  the  enemy's 
march,  and  cause  him  to  develop  plans  before  he  could 


BATTLE  OF 

THE  WILDERNESS,    VA. 

May  5th,  6th  and  7th,  1864. 
Confederates Federals    ^~ 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  557 

get  out  of  the  Wilderness.  We  marched  at  four  o'clock 
by  the  Lawyer's  road.  Our  chief  quartermaster,  Colonel 
Taylor,  whose  home  was  between  Orange  Court-House  and 
the  Wilderness,  had  been  ordered  to  secure  the  services 
of  the  most  competent  guide  to  be  found.  We  halted 
at  Brock's  Bridge  for  rest,  and  there  Colonel  Taylor 
brought  up  our  guide,  James  Robinson,  who  had  been 
for  several  years  the  sheriff  of  the  county,  and  whose 
whole  life  had  been  spent  in  the  Wilderness.  The  march 
was  resumed,  and  continued  with  swinging  step,  with 
occasional  rests,  until  we  reached  Richard's  Shops,  at  five 
P.M.  of  the  5th.  There  we  overtook  Rosser's  cavalry, 
engaged  in  severe  encounter  with  part  of  Sheridan's.  The 
enemy  abandoned  the  contest  and  rode  away,  leaving  his 
dead  with  some  of  ours  on  the  field. 

The  distance  of  march  was  twenty-eight  miles.  Soon 
after  my  arrival  at  the  shops,  Colonel  Venable,  of  general 
head-quarters  staff,  came  with  orders  for  a  change  of  direc 
tion  of  the  column  through  the  wood  to  unite  with  the 
troops  of  the  Third  Corps  on  the  Plank  road.  The  rear 
of  my  column  closed  up  at  dark,  and  orders  were  sent  to 
prepare  to  resume  march  at  twelve  o'clock.  The  accounts 
we  had  of  the  day's  work  were  favorable  to  the  Confeder 
ates  ;  but  the  change  of  direction  of  our  march  was  not 
reassuring. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  plan  of  turning  the 
Confederate  right  without  touching  our  intrenched  line 
along  Mine  Run,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  put 
in  motion  early  on  the  5th,  the  Second  Corps  towards 
Shady  Grove  Church  by  the  Todd's  Tavern  road,  the 
Fifth  by  the  dirt  road  towards  Parker's  Store  on  the 
Plank  road,  the  Sixth  on  the  right,  to  follow  the  Fifth 
as  movements  developed.  General  Warren  moved  with 
three  divisions,  leaving  Griffin's  on  the  turnpike.  Pres 
ently,  after  taking  up  his  march  towards  Parker's  Store, 
the  Confederates  were  discovered  on  the  Plank  road,  and 


558  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Meade  ordered  the  corps  made  ready  for  battle. 
The  Sixth,  except  Getty's  division,  was  ordered  to  make 
connection  on  the  right  of  the  Fifth  by  wood  roads,  and 
prepare  for  the  battle.  Getty's  division  was  ordered  to 
the  Plank  road  at  the  Brock  road  crossing,  to  hold  that 
point  at  all  hazards  until  the  Second  Corps  could  join  it, 
the  latter  being  recalled  from  Todd's  Tavern  for  that 
holding  and  developments  there  indicated. 

At  noon  General  Warren  was  prepared  on  the  turn 
pike  and  attacked  with  Griffin's  and  Wadsworth's  di 
visions. 

General  Lee's  orders  were  against  a  general  engagement 
until  his  forces  were  in  hand,  but  the  troops  had  met  and 
action  could  not  wait.  Warren's  attack  had  some  suc 
cess,  as  by  his  orders  General  Ewell  felt  called  upon  to 
delay  battle,  but  a  sudden  dash  of  the  enemy  broke  into 
disorder  his  brigade  under  J.  M.  Jones,  also  Battle's  bri 
gade  ;  but  other  of  his  troops  joined  them,  recovered  his 
ground,  drove  off  the  attacking  forces,  taking  two  guns, 
and  called  Warren's  corps  to  better  concentration.  The 
Sixth  was  to  be  with  Warren,  but  was  delayed  by  the 
narrow,  tangled  roads  till  night.  General  Ewell  pre 
pared  for  the  next  day  by  intrenching  his  front. 

Meanwhile,  General  Hill  had  pushed  the  divisions 
under  Heth  and  Wilcox  along  the  Plank  road  until  they 
were  near  the  Brock  road  crossing,  occupied  by  Getty's 
division  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

General  Getty  was  in  time  to  drive  back  a  few  of  our 
men  who  had  reached  the  Brock  road  in  observation,  and 
Hancock's  corps  joined  him  at  two  P.M.,  fronting  his  di 
visions — Birney's,  Mott's,  Gibbon's,  and  Barlow's — along 
the  Brock  road,  on  the  left  of  Getty's.  His  artillery  was 
massed  on  his  left,  near  Barlow,  except  a  battery  nearer 
the  Plank  road,  and  one  section  at  the  crossing.  He  or 
dered  his  line  intrenched. 

As  soon  as  he  found  his  troops  in  hand  at  the  cross- 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDEKNESS.  559 

roads,  General  Meade  ordered  them  into  action.  Getty's 
division,  supported  by  the  Second  Corps,  was  to  drive  Hill 
back,  occupy  Parker's  Store,  and  connect  with  Warren's 
line.  He  afterwards  learned  of  the  repulse  of  Warren  on 
the  turnpike,  but  repeated  his  orders  for  the  advance  on 
the  Plank  road.  At  4.15  Getty's  division  advanced,  and 
met  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox  a  few  hundred 
yards  in  advance  of  their  trenches. 

In  the  fierce  engagement  that  followed,  Birney's  and 
Mott's  divisions  were  engaged  on  Getty's  left,  and  later 
the  brigades  of  Carroll  and  Owen,  of  Gibbon's  division. 
Wadsworth's  division  and  Baxter's  brigade  of  the  Fifth 
Corps  were  put  in  to  aid  Getty's  right.  The  combination 
forced  Heth  and  Wilcox  back  about  half  a  mile,  when 
the  battle  rested  for  the  night.  Hancock  reinforced  his 
front  by  Webb's  brigade  of  Gibbon's  division,  and  was 
diligently  employed  at  his  lines  during  the  night  putting 
up  field-works. 

About  eleven  o'clock  in  the  night  the  guide  reported 
from  General  Lee  to  conduct  my  command  through  the 
wood  across  to  the  Plank  road,  and  at  one  o'clock  the 
march  was  resumed.  The  road  was  overgrown  by  the 
bushes,  except  the  side-tracks  made  by  the  draft  animals 
and  the  ruts  of  wheels  which  marked  occasional  lines  in 
its  course.  After  a  time  the  wood  became  less  dense,  and 
the  unused  road  was  more  difficult  to  follow,  and  presently 
the  guide  found  that  there  was  no  road  under  him ;  but 
no  time  was  lost,  as,  by  ordering  the  lines  of  the  divisions 
doubled,  they  were  ready  when  the  trail  was  found,  and 
the  march  continued  in  double  line.  At  daylight  we 
entered  the  Plank  road,  and  filed  down  towards  the  field 
of  strife  of  the  afternoon  of  the  5th  and  daylight  of 
the  6th. 

R.  H.  Anderson's  division  of  the  Third  Corps,  march 
ing  on  the  Plank  road,  had  rested  at  Yerdierville  during 
the  night,  and  was  called  to  the  front  in  the  morning. 


560  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox  rested  during  the  night 
of  the  5th  where  the  battle  of  that  day  ceased,  but  did 
not  prepare  ammunition  nor  strengthen  their  lines  for 
defence,  because  informed  that  they  were  to  be  relieved 
from  the  front.  Both  the  division  commanders  claim  that 
they  were  to  be  relieved,  and  that  they  were  ordered  not 
to  intrench  or  replenish  supplies.  So  it  seems  that  they 
were  all  night  within  hearing  of  the  voices  of  Hancock's 
men,  not  even  reorganizing  their  lines  so  as  to  offer  a 
front  of  battle  !  General  Heth  has  stated  that  he  proposed 
to  arrange  for  battle,  but  was  ordered  to  give  his  men 
rest.  While  Hancock  was  sending  men  to  his  advanced 
line  during  the  night  and  intrenching  there  and  on  his 
second  line,  the  Confederates  were  all  night  idle. 

Hancock  advanced  and  struck  the  divisions  before  sun 
rise,  just  as  my  command  reported  to  General  Lee.  My 
line  was  formed  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Plank  road, 
Kershaw  on  the  right,  Field  on  the  left.  As  the  line 
deployed,  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox  came  back 
upon  us  in  disorder,  more  and  more  confused  as  their  steps 
hurried  under  Hancock's  musketry.  As  my  ranks  formed 
the  men  broke  files  to  give  free  passage  for  their  comrades 
to  the  rear.  The  advancing  fire  was  getting  brisk,  but 
not  a  shot  was  fired  in  return  by  my  troops  until  the 
divisions  were  ready.  Three  of  Field's  brigades,  the 
Texas,  Alabama,  and  Benning's  Georgia,  were  formed  in 
line  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  three  of  Kershaw's  on 
the  right.  General  Lee,  appalled  at  the  condition  of 
affairs,  thought  to  lead  the  Texas  brigade  alone  into 
desperate  charge,  before  my  lines  were  well  formed.  The 
ordeal  was  trying,  but  the  steady  troops,  seeing  him  off 
his  balance,  refused  to  follow,  begged  him  to  retire,  and 
presently  Colonel  Venable,  of  his  staff,  reported  to  me 
General  Lee's  efforts  to  lead  the  brigade,  and  suggested 
that  I  should  try  to  call  him  from  it.  I  asked  that  he 
would  say,  with  my  compliments,  that  his  line  would  be 


BATTLE    OF    THE    WILDERNESS.  561 

recovered  in  an  hour  if  he  would  permit  me  to  handle  the 
troops,  but  if  my  services  were  not  needed,  I  would  like 
to  ride  to  some  place  of  safety,  as  it  was  not  quite  com 
fortable  where  we  were. 

As  full  lines  of  battle  could  not  be  handled  through  the 
thick  wood,  I  ordered  the  advance  of  the  six  brigades  by 
heavy  skirmish  lines,  to  be  followed  by  stronger  support 
ing  lines.  Hancock's  lines,  thinned  by  their  push  through 
the  wood,  and  somewhat  by  the  fire  of  the  disordered 
divisions,  weaker  than  my  line  of  fresh  and  more  lively 
skirmishers,  were  checked  by  our  first  steady,  rolling  fire, 
and  after  a  brisk  fusillade  were  pushed  back  to  their 
intrenched  line,  when  the  fight  became  steady  and  very 
firm,  occasionally  swinging  parts  of  my  line  back  and 
compelling  the  reserves  to  move  forward  and  recover  it. 

General  Lee  sent  General  M.  L.  Smith,  of  the  engi 
neers,  to  report  to  me.  He  was  ordered  through  the  wood 
on  my  right  to  the  unfinished  railroad  to  find  a  way 
around  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line,  while  we  engaged  his 
front.  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  of  the  Third  Corps 
came  up  about  eight  o'clock  and  was  ordered  to  report  to 
me. 

Hancock's  early  advance  was  under  a  general  order  in 
cluding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  Ninth  Corps 
that  had  been  called  up  reported  to  General  Grant,  and 
was  ordered  in  between  the  Plank  and  Turnpike  roads. 
At  eight  o'clock  Hancock  was  reinforced  by  Stevenson's 
division  of  the  Ninth,  and  Wadsworth  of  the  Fifth  was 
put  under  his  orders.  At  nine  o'clock  he  attacked  with 
Wadsworth's,  Birney's,  Stevenson's,  and  Mott's  divisions, 
and  the  brigades  of  Webb,  Carroll,  and  Owen,  of  Gibbon's 
division,  making  as  formidable  battle  as  could  be  organ 
ized  in  the  wood,  but  the  tangle  thinned  his  lines  and  our 
fire  held  him  in  desperate  engagement. 

Two  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  at  the  same  time 
marching  for  Parker's  Store,  were  encountered  between 

3t> 


562  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  Plank  and  Turnpike  roads  by  our  Second  Corps 
(Swell's).  Under  this  combination  the  forces  struggled 
an  hour  at  the  extreme  tension  of  skill  and  valor. 

About  ten  o'clock  General  Smith  returned  and  reported 
favorably  of  his  reconnoissance :  that  the  heavy  woodland 
concealed  the  route  of  the  proposed  flank  march,  and  that 
there  was  no  force  of  the  enemy  in  observation.  Han 
cock's  left  on  the  Brock  road  was  in  strong,  well-guarded 
position,  but  there  was  room  along  its  front  for  our  troops 
to  march  near  the  unfinished  railroad  beyond  view  of  that 
left  on  the  Brock  road. 

General  Smith  was  then  asked  to  take  a  small  party 
and  pass  beyond  the  Brock  road  and  find  a  way  for  turn 
ing  the  extreme  Union  left  on  that  road.  There  were  two 
brigades  of  Field's  division  and  one  of  Kershaw's  not  on 
the  line  of  battle,  but  on  flank  march  as  supports,  and 
R.  H.  Anderson's  division  of  the  Third  Corps.  Colonel 
Sorrel,  chief  of  staff,  was  ordered  to  conduct  three 
brigades,  G.  T.  Anderson's  of  Field's,  Mahone's  of  R.  H. 
Anderson's,  and  Wofford's  of  Kershaw's  division,  by  the 
route  recommended  by  General  Smith,  have  them  faced 
to  the  left,  and  marched  down  against  Hancock's  left. 
Davis's  brigade  of  the  Third  Corps  also  got  into  this 
command. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  struck  Hancock  his  line  began  to 
break,  first  slowly,  then  rapidly.  Somehow,  as  they 
retreated,  a  fire  was  accidentally  started  in  the  dry  leaves, 
and  began  to  spread  as  the  Confederates  advanced. 
Mahone's  brigade  approached  the  burning  leaves  and 
part  of  it  broke  off  a  little  to  get  around,  but  the  Twelfth 
Virginia  was  not  obstructed  by  the  blaze  and  moved 
directly  on.  At  the  Plank  road  Colonel  Sorrel  rode  back 
to  join  us.  All  of  the  enemy's  battle  on  the  right  of  the 
Plank  road  was  broken  up,  and  General  Field  was  fight 
ing  severely  with  his  three  brigades  on  the  left  against 
Wadsworth  and  Stevenson,  pushing  them  a  little. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  563 

The  Twelfth  Virginia  Regiment  got  to  the  Plank  road 
some  little  time  before  the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade, 
and,  viewing  the  contention  on  the  farther  side  between 
Field's  and  Wadsworth's  divisions,  dashed  across  and 
struck  the  left  of  Wadsworth's  line.  This  relieved  Field 
a  little,  and,  under  this  concentrating  push  and  fire, 
Wadsworth  fell  mortally  wounded.  In  a  little  while  fol 
lowed  the  general  break  of  the  Union  battle.  The  break 
of  his  left  had  relieved  Kershaw's  troops,  and  he  was 
waiting  for  the  time  to  advance,  and  Jenkins's  brigade 
that  had  been  held  in  reserve  and  that  part  of  R.  H. 
Anderson's  division  not  in  use  were  ready  and  anxious 
for  opportunity  to  engage,  and  followed  as  our  battle  line 
pushed  forward. 

General  Smith  then  came  and  reported  a  way  across 
the  Brock  road  that  would  turn  Hancock's  extreme  left. 
He  was  asked  to  conduct  the  flanking  brigades  and  handle 
them  as  the  ranking  officer.  He  was  a  splendid  tactician 
as  well  as  skilful  engineer,  and  gallant  withal.  He  started, 
and,  not  to  lose  'time  or  distance,  moved  by  inversion, 
Wofford's  left  leading,  Wofford's  favorite  manoeuvre.  As 
Wofford's  left  stepped  out,  the  other  troops  moved  down 
the  Plank  road,  Jenkins's  brigade  by  the  road,  Kershaw's 
division  alongside.  I  rode  at  the  head  of  the  column, 
Jenkins,  Kershaw,  and  the  staff  with  me.  After  discuss 
ing  the  dispositions  of  their  troops  for  reopening  battle, 
Jenkins  rode  closer  to  offer  congratulations,  saying,  "  I 
am  happy  ;  I  have  felt  despair  of  the  cause  for  some 
months,  but  am  relieved,  and  feel  assured  that  we  will  put 
the  enemy  back  across  the  Rapidan  before  night."  Little 
did  he  or  I  think  these  sanguine  words  were  the  last  he 
would  utter. 

When  Wadsworth  fell  the  Union  battle  broke  up  in 
hasty  retreat.  Field's  brigades  closed  to  fresh  ranks,  the 
flanking  brigades  drew  into  line  near  the  Plank  road,  and 
with  them  the  other  regiments  of  Mahone's  brigade ;  but 


564  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

the  Twelfth  Regiment,  some  distance  in  advance  of  the 
others,  had  crossed  the  road  to  strike  at  Wadsworth's  left 
before  the  other  regiments  were  in  sight,  and  was  return 
ing  to  find  its  place  in  line.  The  order  for  the  flanking 
brigades  to  resume  march  by  their  left  had  not  moved 
those  brigades  of  the  right.  As  the  Twelfth  Regiment 
marched  back  to  find  its  place  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Plank  road,  it  was  mistaken,  in  the  wood,  for  an  advance 
of  the  enemy,  and  fire  was  opened  on  it  from  the  other 
regiments  of  the  brigade.  The  men  threw  themselves  to 
the  ground  to  let  the  fire  pass.  Just  then  our  party  of 
officers  was  up  and  rode  under  the  fire.  General  Jenkins 
had  not  finished  the  expressions  of  joyful  congratulations 
which  I  have  quoted  when  he  fell  mortally  wounded. 

Captain  Doby  and  the  orderly,  Bowen,  of  Kershaw's 
staff,  were  killed.  General  Kershaw  turned  to  quiet  the 
troops,  when  Jenkins's  brigade  with  levelled  guns  were  in 
the  act  of  returning  the  fire  of  the  supposed  enemy  con 
cealed  in  the  wood,  but  as  Kershaw's  clear  voice  called 
out  "  F-r-i-e-n-d-s  /"  the  arms  were  recovered,  without  a 
shot  in  return,  and  the  men  threw  themselves  down  upon 
their  faces. 

At  the  moment  that  Jenkins  fell  I  received  a  severe 
shock  from  a  minie  ball  passing  through  my  throat  and 
right  shoulder.  The  blow  lifted  me  from  the  saddle,  and 
my  right  arm  dropped  to  my  side,  but  I  settled  back  to  my 
seat,  and  started  to  ride  on,  when  in  a  minute  the  flow  of 
blood  admonished  me  that  my  work  for  the  day  was  done. 
As  I  turned  to  ride  back,  members  of  the  staff,  seeing  me 
about  to  fall,  dismounted  and  lifted  me  to  the  ground. 

Orders  were  given  General  Field,  the  senior  officer 
present,  to  push  on  before  the  enemy  could  have  time  to 
rally.  The  two  lines  marching  along  the  Plank  road, 
southward,  in  pursuit,  and  the  flanking  brigades  to  move 
in  the  other  direction,  were,  for  the  moment,  a  little  per 
plexing,  as  he  was  not  accurately  advised  of  the  combina- 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.          565 

tions,  but  he  grasped  the  situation.  Before  he  was  pre 
pared,  however,  General  R.  H.  Anderson  came  into  com 
mand  as  senior,  and  then  General  Lee  came  up.  The 
plans,  orders,  and  opportunity  were  explained  to  him,  but 
the  woods  concealed  everything  except  the  lines  of  troops 
alongside  the  road.  General  Lee  did  not  care  to. handle  the 
troops  in  broken  lines,  and  ordered  formation  in  a  general 
line  for  parallel  battle.  The  change  in  the  forest  tangle 
consumed  several  hours  of  precious  time,  and  gave  General 
Hancock  time  to  collect  his  men  into  battle  order,  post  his 
heavy  reinforcements,  and  improve  his  intrenchments. 

After  several  hours  of  work  our  new  line  was  finally 
adjusted  and  ordered  forward.  It  approached  the  enemy's 
stronghold  (in  ranks  a  little  thinned  by  the  march  through 
the  wood  and  the  enemy's  fire),  made  desperate  and  re 
peated  charges,  and  Jenkins's  gallant  brigade  mounted 
their  breastworks,  but  the  solid  ranks  behind  them  threw 
it  off,  with  the  lines  that  essayed  to  give  it  support,  and 
the  whole  were  forced  back  from  their  fight.  Thus  the 
battle,  lost  and  won  three  times  during  the  day,  wore 
itself  out. 

General  Ewell  found  opportunity  before  night  to  push 
some  of  his  brigades  around  the  enemy's  right,  and  did 
clever  work  in  taking  a  number  of  prisoners, — Generals 
Seymour  and  Shaler  among  them, — but  it  was  too  late  in 
the  day  to  follow  his  work  with  a  strong  fight.  He  han 
dled  his  troops  with  skill  and  care,  putting  defensive  works 
before  them  whenever  they  halted. 

Like  attention  by  General  Hancock  may  be  noted  ; 
while  in  marked  contrast  was  the  conduct  of  the  Third 
Corps  after  their  affair  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th.  The 
commanders  of  the  leading  divisions  of  the  Third  had 
proposed  to  prepare  their  troops  for  the  next  day,  but 
were  ordered  to  give  their  men  rest,*  and  told  that  they 

*  General  Heth's  personal  account. 


566  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

were  to  be  relieved  and  withdrawn  from  the  battle.  Not 
even  a  line  of  battle  was  formed,  so  that  they  were  in 
disorder  when  they  were  struck  in  the  morning,  and 
speedily  fell  into  confusion. 

My  command,  less  than  ten  thousand,  had  found  the 
battle  on  the  Plank  road  in  retreat,  little  less  than  a 
panic.  In  a  few  hours  we  changed  defeat  to  victory, 
the  broken  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  rallying  in 
their  rear. 

As  my  litter  was  borne  to  the  rear  my  hat  was  placed 
over  my  face,  and  soldiers  by  the  road-side  said,  "  He  is 
dead,  and  they  are  telling  us  he  is  only  wounded."  Hear 
ing  this  repeated  from  time  to  time,  I  raised  my  hat  with 
my  left  hand,  when  the  burst  of  voices  and  the  flying  of 
hats  in  the  air  eased  my  pains  somewhat. 

But  Micah  Jenkins,  who  fell  by  the  same  fire,  was  no 
more.  He  was  one  of  the  most  estimable  characters  of 
the  army.  His  taste  and  talent  were  for  military  service. 
He  was  intelligent,  quick,  untiring,  attentive,  zealous  in 
discharge  of  duty,  truly  faithful  to  official  obligations, 
abreast  with  the  foremost  in  battle,  and  withal  a  humble, 
noble  Christian.  In  a  moment  of  highest  earthly  hope 
he  was  transported  to  serenest  heavenly  joy  ;  to  that  life 
beyond  that  knows  no  bugle  call,  beat  of  drum,  or  clash 
of  steel.  May  his  beautiful  spirit,  through  the  mercy  of 
God,  rest  in  peace  !  Amen  ! 

"  Uaudace,  Vaudace,  toujours  Vaudace."  An  Ameri 
canism  which  seems  an  appropriate  substitute  is,  A  level 
head,  a  level  head,  always  a  level  head.  With  patience  to 
wait  ten  minutes  to  see  my  flanking  brigades  stretched  out 
on  their  march  to  retrieve  my  aplomb,  we  could  have  found 
a  good  battle  against  Hancock's  strong  left,  while  we  broke 
over  his  confused  front.  Fearing  another  change  of  plan, 
I  hurried  on  to  execute  before  it  could  be  ordered. 

There  were  twenty-two  thousand  men  in  the  Third 
Corps.  It  is  not  claiming  too  much,  therefore,  to  say  that 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  567 

that  corps,  carefully  prepared  during  the  night  of  the 
5th,  could  have  held  Hancock's  battle  on  the  morning 
of  the  6th  until  my  attack  of  his  left  could  have  relieved 
them. 

Under  that  plan  events  support  the  claim  that  the 
Third  Corps,  intrenched  in  their  advanced  position,  with 
fresh  supplies  and  orders  to  hold  their  ground,  could  have 
received  and  held  against  Hancock's  early  battle  until 
my  command  could  have  come  in  on  his  left  rear  and 
completed  our  strongly  organized  battle  by  which  we 
could  have  carried  the  Wilderness,  even  down  and  into 
the  classic  Rapidan. 

General  Field  says  in  his  account  of  the  day, — 

"  I  was  at  Longstreet's  side  in  a  moment,  and  in  answer  to  my 
anxious  inquiry  as  to  his  condition,  lie  replied  that  he  would  be 
looked  after  by  others,  and  directed  me  to  take  command  of  the 
corps  and  push  ahead.  Though  at  this  moment  he  could  not  have 
known  the  extent  or  character  of  his  wounds  (that  they  were 
severe  was  apparent),  he  seemed  to  forget  himself  in  the  absorbing 
interest  of  the  movement  he  was  making. 

"Had  our  advance  not  been  suspended  by  this  disaster,  I  have 
always  believed  that  Grant  would  have  been  driven  across  the 
Eapidan  before  night ;  but  General  Lee  was  present,  and  ordered 
that  our  line,  which  was  nearly  a  right  angle  (my  division  being 
the  base,  and  Kershaw's  and  the  other  flanking  force  the  perpen 
dicular),  should  first  be  straightened  out.  The  difficulty  of 
manoeuvring  through  the  brush  made  this  a  tedious  operation,  so 
that  when  we  did  advance  with  large  reinforcements  from  EwelFs 
corps  placed  under  my  orders,  the  enemy  was  found  awaiting  us 
behind  new  breastworks,  thoroughly  prepared." 

Colonel  Fairfax  says, — 

"On  reaching  the  line  of  troops  you  were  taken  off  the  horse 
and  propped  against  a  tree.  You  blew  the  bloody  foam  from 
your  mouth  and  said,  '  Tell  General  Field  to  take  command,  and 
move  forward  with  the  whole  force  and  gain  the  Brock  road,'  but 
hours  were  lost. ' 7  * 


*  Letter  to  the  writer. 


568  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

A  Northern  historian  says, — 

"It  seemed,  indeed,  that  irretrievable  disaster  was  upon  us; 
but  in  the  very  torrent  and  tempest  of  the  attack  it  suddenly 
ceased  and  all  was  still.  What  could  cause  this  surcease  of  effort 
at  the  very  height  of  success  was  then  wholly  unknown  to  us."  * 

Some  years  after  the  affair  on  the  Plank  road,  General 
Hancock  said  to  me, — 

"  You  rolled  me  up  like  a  wet  blanket,  and  it  was  some  hours 
before  I  could  reorganize  for  battle." 

He  explained  that  reinforcements  crowding  up  through 
the  wood,  the  retreating  troops,  and  confusion  caused  by 
mixing  in  with  wagon-trains  and  horses,  made  a  trouble 
some  tangle,  but  it  was  unravelled  and  his  troops  at  rest 
when  the  final  attack  was  made.  He  had  sixty  thousand 
men  in  hand. 

Bad  as  was  being  shot  by  some  of  our  own  troops  in  the 
battle  of  the  Wilderness, — that  was  an  honest  mistake,  one 
of  the  accidents  of  war, — being  shot  at,  since  the  war, 
by  many  officers,  was  worse.  Fitzhugh  Lee  wrote  of  me 
in  the  Southern  Historical  Society  papers,  vol.  v.,  No.  4, 
April,  1878,  saying,  among  other  things,  "  He  lost  his 
way  and  reached  the  Wilderness  twenty-four  hours  behind 
time.'7 

Now,  from  Mechanicsville  to  Parker's  Store  by  our  line 
of  march  was  thirty-four  miles, — by  the  Plank  road, 
thirty-five  ;  from  Parker's  Store  to  the  battle,  three  miles. 
From  the  time  of  our  march  to  going  into  battle  was  thirty- 
six  hours,  including  all  of  two  nights.  Deducting  twenty- 
four  hours  alleged  as  lost  leaves  twelve  hours,  including 
all  night  of  the  4th,  for  the  march  of  thirty-seven  miles ! 

His  logic  and  method  of  injury  remind  one  of  the 
French  teacher  who,  when  out  of  patience  with  the  boys, 
used  to  say,  "  I  will  give  you  zero  and  mark  you  absent." 

*  Decisive  Battles  of  the  War,  Swinton,  p.  378. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.          569 

Another  report  started  by  Fitzhugh  Lee  as  coming  from 
his  cousin,  G.  W.  C.  Lee,  was  that  General  Lee  said  that 
he  "  sent  an  officer  to  Longstreet  to  stay  with  and  show 
him  the  roads." 

This,  like  all  other  reported  sayings  of  General  Lee  in 
regard  to  me,  was  not  published  until  after  General  Lee's 
death.  When  it  was  first  published  I  wrote  General  G. 
W.  C.  Lee  for  the  name  of  the  officer  sent.  He  referred 
me  to  the  members  of  General  Lee's  staff.  Not  one  of 
them  knew  of  the  circumstance  or  the  officer,  but  referred 
me  to  General  Lee's  engineers.  After  long  search  I  found 
the  engineers  and  applied  for  information,  but  not  one  of 
them  knew  anything  of  the  alleged  fact.  I  had  the  letters 
published  as  an  advertisement  for  the  officer  who  was 
claimed  as  my  guide.  No  response  came.  I  inquired  of 
the  members  of  the  staff,  First  Corps ;  not  one  had  seen  or 
heard  of  such  a  person.  The  quartermaster,  Colonel 
Taylor,  who  was  ordered  to  secure  a  competent  guide  at 
the  first  moment  of  receipt  of  orders  to  march,  reported 
of  the  matter  thus  : 

"  MEADOW  FARM,  ORANGE  COURT-HOUSE, 

"July  1,  1879. 
" GENERAL  JAMES  LONGSTREET: 

"DEAR  GENERAL,— Your  favor  of  the  30th  ultimo  is  this  mo 
ment  to  hand,  and  I  reply  at  once.  I  think  General  Fitzhugh 
Lee  entirely  in  error  as  to  any  engineer  or  other  officer  being  sent 
to  guide  you  in  the  spring  of  1864  from  your  camp  near  Gordons- 
ville  to  the  Wilderness.  I  well  remember  your  sending  for  me, 
and  directing  me  to  procure  a  guide  for  you,  which  I  did  after 
some  difficulty  in  the  person  of  Mr.  James  Robinson,  the  then 
sheriff  of  the  county.  I  saw  no  such  person,  nor  can  I  think 
that  any  such  was  at  any  time  at  our  quarters  before  we  broke 
camp. 

* '  Sincerely  yours, 

"ERASMUS  TAYLOR." 

These  efforts  to  secure  one  witness  in  support  of  the 
allegation,  or  rather  to  prove  a  negation,  were  all  that  oc- 


570  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

curred  to  me  at  the  time,  and  now  I  can  think  of  but  one 
more  chance,  which  is  for  Fitzhugh  Lee  to  offer  a  liberal 
reward.  It  is  not  probable  that  he  would  fail  to  find  a 
false  witness  who  could  answer  for  a  time  to  support  the 
false  charges. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  accounts  of  the  march  by 
other  officers  agree  with  mine,  as  already  given.  I 
present  here  a  letter  from  General  Alexander  and  an 
extract  from  one  written  me  by  Colonel  Venable.  The 
former  says, — 

11  AUGUSTA,  GA.,  June  12,  1879. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — Absence  prevented  an  earlier  response 
to  your  favor  of  the  5th.  My  recollection  of  the  events  is  as  fol 
lows  :  My  command,  the  artillery,  got  orders  to  move  about  noon 
on  May  4,  1864,  being  in  camp  near  Mechanicsville,  some  four  or 
five  miles  west  of  Gordonsville.  We  marched  about  four  p.  M.  ,  and 
with  only  short  rests  all  night  and  all  next  day  till  about  five  P.  M. , 
when  we  halted  to  rest  and  bivouac  at  a  point  which  I  cannot  re 
member  ;  but  our  cavalry  had  had  a  skirmish  there  with  the 
enemy's  cavalry  just  before  our  arrival,  and  I  remember  seeing 
some  killed  and  wounded  of  each  side.  Your  whole  corps,  Hood's 
and  McLaws's,  and  the  artillery,  I  think,  was  concentrated  at  that 
point,  and  my  recollection  is  that  we  had  orders  to  move  on 
during  the  night,  or  before  daylight  the  next  morning,  to  get  on 
the  enemy's  left  flank  on  the  Brock  road. 

"But  whatever  the  orders  were,  I  remember  distinctly  that 
during  the  night  news  of  the  fight  on  the  Plank  road  came,  and 
with  it  a  change  of  orders,  and  that  we  marched  at  one  A.M., 
or  earlier,  and  turned  to  the  left  and  struck  the  Plank  road  at 
Parker's  Store,  and  pushed  rapidly  down  it  to  where  the  battle 
had  already  begun.  I  remember,  too,  that  the  march  was  so  hur 
ried  that  at  one  point,  the  head  of  the  leading  division  (I  forget 
which  it  was,  however)  having  lost  a  little  distance  by  taking  the 
wrong  road,  the  rear  division  was  not  allowed  to  halt,  but  pushed 
right  on,  so  that  it  got  abreast  of  the  leading  division,  and  the 
two  came  down  the  road  side  by  side,  filling  the  whole  road  and 
crowding  the  retreating  men  of  the  divisions  which  were  being 
driven  back  into  the  woods  on  each  side. 

"  These  are  facts  as  I  recollect  them,  and  while  I  don't  know 
what  your  orders  were,  I  remember  that  there  was  a  change  in 
them  during  the  night,  according  to  my  understanding,  and  that 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  571 

the  change  was  as  promptly  and  vigorously  and  successfully  car 
ried  out  as  time  and  distance  could  possibly  permit.  There  was 
certainly  no  loss  of  time  from  the  moment  we  received  orders  to  the 
moment  we  went  under  fire  in  the  Wilderness,  as  the  distance 
covered  will  show. 

"  Very  truly  yours, 

"E.  P.  ALEXANDER. 
1  i  GENERAL  LONGSTREET.  ' ' 


Colonel  Venable  writes, — 

"  July  25,  1879. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL,—  .  .  .  Well,  the  morning  came.  The  enemy 
attacked  Wilcox  and  Heth  before  your  arrival.  Disaster  seemed 
imminent.  I  was  sent  to  meet  you  and  hasten  your  march.  I 
met  your  two  divisions  within  less  than  half  a  mile  of  the  battle 
field  coming  up  in  parallel  columns  very  rapidly  (I  was  going  to 
say  in  double-quick)  on  the  Plank  road,  side  by  side,  and  that 
they  came  in  grandly,  forming  line  of  battle,  Kershaw  on  the 
right  and  Field  on  the  left,  restoring  the  battle.  It  was  superb, 
and  my  heart  beats  quicker  to  think  about  it  even  at  this  distance 
of  time.  .  .  . 

1  i  Yours,  very  truly, 

"  CHARLES  S.  VENABLE. 

1 1  GENERAL  LONGSTREET.  '  > 


CHAPTEE  XXXIX. 

AGAIN    IN    FRONT    OF    RICHMOND. 

Longstreet  absent  on  Leave,  nursing  his  Wounds — Hears  of  the  Death 
of  Cavalry  Leader  J.  E.  B.  Stuart — Returns  to  Virginia — Assigned  to 
Command  on  the  North  Side  of  James  River — Affair  on  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  Road — Lee's  Apprehension  of  Grant's  March  into  Rich 
mond — Closing  Scenes  of  the  Campaign  of  1864  about  the  Confederate 
Capital— General  Benjamin  F.  Butler's  Move  against  Fort  Fisher — 
Remote  Effects  on  the  Situation  in  Virginia. 

FROM  the  Wilderness  I  was  taken  to  the  Meadow  Farm 
home  of  my  friend  Erasmus  Taylor,  and  carefully  nursed 
by  his  charming  wife  until  put  on  board  of  a  train  for 
Lynchburg  and  taken  to  my  good  kinswoman,  Mrs.  Car 
oline  Garland,  who  had  lost  her  only  son  and  child,  Gen 
eral  Samuel  Garland,  killed  two  years  before  at  South 
Mountain.  From  her  hospitable  home,  when  strong 
enough  for  a  ride  in  the  fresh  air,  I  was  taken  to  the 
home  of  a  cherished  friend,  Colonel  John  D.  Alexander, 
at  Campbell  Court-House.  But  a  raiding  party  rode 
through  the  village  early  one  morning,  which  suggested  a 
change,  and  I  was  taken  to  my  kinsfolk,  the  Sibleys,  at 
Augusta,  Georgia,  and  after  a  time  to  other  good  friends, 
the  Harts  and  Daniels,  at  and  near  Union  Point,  on  the 
Georgia  Railroad. 

Before  I  was  strong  enough  to  sit  more  than  a  few 
minutes  news  came  of  the  change  of  commanders  in  the 
Army  of  Georgia, — the  superseding  of  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston  by  assignment  of  General  J.  B.  Hood,  and  I 
was  asked  to  take  command  of  the  corps  left  vacant  by 
assignment  of  General  Hood.  Answer  was  made  that 
when  able  for  duty  I  would  be  prepared  to  obey  orders. 

Later  came  sadder  news  from  Virginia  announcing  the 
fall  of  our  Cavalier  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.  The  most  famous 

572 


Chief-Quartermaster  First  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


AGAIN    IN    FRONT    OF    RICHMOND.  573 

American  rider  fell  mortally  wounded  on  the  18th  of 
May,  1864,  near  Yellow  Tavern,  in  a  cavalry  engagement 
with  General  Sheridan,  just  then  budding  into  fame. 
Stuart,  endowed  by  nature  with  the  gifts  that  go  to  make 
a  perfect  cavalryman,  improved  and  cultivated  through 
years  of  active  warfare,  experience,  and  discipline,  was 
the  embodiment  of  all  that  goes  to  make  up  the  ideal  sol 
dierly  character, — the  bold,  dashing  dragoon.  His  death 
was  possibly  a  greater  loss  to  the  Confederate  army  even 
than  that  of  the  swift-moving  General  "  Stonewall"  Jack 
son.  Through  all  the  vicissitudes  of  war  he  held  his 
troopers  beside  him  peerless  in  prowess  and  discipline. 
After  his  fall  their  decline  came  swifter  than  their  up 
building  had  been  accomplished  by  his  magic  hand. 

In  society  he  was  gay,  bright,  and  genial,  abstemious  to 
a  degree.  In  idle  hours  of  week-days  he  was  fond  of  his 
banjo-player,  Sweeny,  but  he  was  devout  withal,  and  to 
him  the  grandest,  sweetest  music  was  "  Rock  of  Ages." 
To  this  day  that  sublime  air  never  fails  to  bring  before 
my  mind's  vision  his  noble  figure.  May  his  great  spirit 
rest  near  "  The  Rock  of  Ages"  always !  Amen  ! 

About  the  1st  of  October  I  was  strong  enough  to  ride 
horseback,  and  after  a  little  practice,  and  having  become 
weary  of  idle  hours,  took  leave  of  wife  and  children, 
and  travelled  back  to  Richmond  to  find  our  great  com 
mander  and  his  noble  followers. 

The  general  seemed  worn  by  past  labor,  besides  suffer 
ing  at  seasons  from  severe  sciatica,  while  his  work  was 
accumulating  and  his  troubles  multiplying  to  proportions 
that  should  have  employed  half  a  dozen  able  men.  The 
military  staff  of  his  head-quarters  was  made  up  of  excel 
lent,  intelligent,  active,  zealous  young  men,  more  than 
anxious  to  anticipate  his  wants  and  to  meet  their  official 
obligations,  and  it  is  a  source  of  gratification  to  write  that 
they  were  efficient,  affectionate,  admirable,  and  polite. 
But  facts  will  not  justify  like  commendation  of  the  pur- 


574  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

veying  department.  Complaints  had  been  made  early  in 
the  war  and  continued  of  our  inefficient  subsistence  de 
partment  at  Richmond.  The  diminishing  resources  of 
the  country  called  for  exceptionally  earnest,  methodical, 
business  faculties  in  these  departments,  especially  that  of 
subsistence,  but,  unfortunately,  as  our  resources  became 
more  circumscribed,  the  officers,  instead  of  putting  forth 
stronger  efforts  in  their  business,  seemed  to  lose  the  energy 
of  their  former  service,  and  General  Lee  found  himself 
called  upon  to  feed  as  well  as  fight  his  army.  Although 
anxious  to  assist  in  his  severe  trials,  and  relieve  him  of 
part  of  his  work,  I  feared  that  he  might  think  a  cripple 
an  additional  incumbrance,  and  wrote  the  chief  of  staff, — 

"KANDOLPH'S  HOUSE, 
"NEAR  RICHMOND,  VA.,  October  18,  1864. 
"COLONEL  W.  H.  TAYLOR, 

' l  Assistant  Adjutant-  General : 

"  SIB,— I  have  not  reported  formally  for  duty,  because  I  doubted 
the  propriety  of  being  assigned,  in  my  crippled  condition,  to  posi 
tion  now  filled  by  officers  of  vigorous  health.  If  I  can  be  of  service 
in  any  position,  I  prefer  to  go  to  duty.  If  there  is  nothing  to 
which  I  can  be  assigned  on  this  side  of  the  Mississippi  Eiver, 
without  displacing  an  efficient  officer,  I  will  cheerfully  accept 
service  in  the  Trans  Mississippi  Department. 

"The  doctors  give  me  little  reason  to  hope  to  recover  the  use 
of  my  arm  even  within  a  year ;  hence  my  desire  to  be  assigned 
for  duty,  or  to  have  an  extended  leave  of  absence. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  J.  LONGSTREET, 

"  Lieutenant- General." 

An  order  came  assigning  me  to  command  on  the  north 
side  of  James  River  and  Drury's  Bluff,  and  Pickett's 
division  on  the  south  side,  along  Bermuda  Hundred  front 
as  far  as  Swift  Creek.  On  the  north  side  were  the  local 
defence  troops  under  Lieutenant-General  Ewell,  and 
Hoke's  and  Field's  divisions  and  Gary's  brigade  of  one 
thousand  cavalry. 


AGAIN    IN    FRONT    OF    RICHMOND.  575 

There  had  been  severe  fighting  on  that  side  a  few  days 
previous,  in  an  attack  of  the  Federals  upon  Fort  Harrison 
of  our  line,  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  fort ;  then 
a  more  desperate  fight  of  the  Confederates  to  recover  it, 
which  was  not  successful.  The  loss  of  Fort  Harrison 
broke  our  line  off  a  little  near  the  river,  and  caused  a 
new  line  to  be  taken  from  that  point  to  our  left,  where  it 
joined  the  line  occupied  in  1862,  when  General  McClellan 
was  against  us.  The  line  of  the  north  side  extended  from 
Chapin's  Bluff  on  the  James  River,  by  Fort  Gilmer, 
across  north  of  White  Oak  Swamp  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
Chickahominy  at  New  Bridge.  Hoke's  and  Field's 
divisions  occupied  the  line  from  Fort  Gilmer,  covering 
Charles  City  road  on  the  left,  and  Gary's  cavalry  had  a 
strong  picket  force  on  the  Nine  Miles  road,  with  vedettes, 
to  guard  and  patrol  the  west  side  of  the  swamp  and 
the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  crossings  of 
the  swamp  were  heavily  obstructed  by  fallen  timber.  The 
batteries  at  Chapin's  and  Drury's  Bluffs  were  manned  by 
officers  of  the  navy  and  sailors,  and  other  organized  artil 
lery  and  infantry,  and  the  local  defence  contingent  lined 
out  towards  Fort  Gilmer.  My  men  had  become  experts 
in  fortifying,  so  that  parapets  and  dams  along  the  front 
grew  apace.  Our  officers  during  their  experience  in  East 
Tennessee  had  become  skilled  as  foragers,  and  soon  began 
to  find  in  nooks  and  corners  of  Northern  Virginia  food 
and  forage  which  relieved  General  Lee  of  the  trouble  of 
supplying  the  men  on  the  north  side,  and  my  troops  were 
beginning  to  feel  comfortable.  But  there  were  more 
serious  embarrassments  on  the  south  side,  and  desertions 
were  becoming  more  numerous  from  day  to  day. 

Towards  the  latter  part  of  October,  General  Grant  con 
ceived  a  plan  by  which  he  proposed  to  extend  and  advance 
his  left,  so  as  to  get  the  Southside  Railroad  and  connect 
this  new  point  with  his  line  of  intrenchments.  At  the 
same  time  he  thought  to  have  General  Butler  on  his  ex- 


576  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

treme  right  break  through  the  lines  on  the  north  side  into 
Kichmond.  For  his  left  attack  he  ordered  the  Second 
Corps,  under  Hancock,  to  be  supported  by  parts  of  the 
Fifth  and  Ninth  Corps.  General  Lee  had  his  Third 
Corps  (A.  P.  Hill's),  Heth's  and  Wilcox's  divisions  and 
Mahone's  in  reserve.  Hancock's  advance  was  met  by 
Mahone's  division,  and  the  entire  march  of  the  different 
commands  was  arrested  after  a  severe  rencounter,  in  which 
Mahone  got  a  number  of  prisoners  and  some  pieces  of 
artillery, — the  latter  not  brought  off,  as  the  enemy  held 
the  bridge. 

According  to  the  reports  of  the  Adjutant-General's  Office 
the  Federal  losses  were  1284.  The  Confederate  losses 
were  not  accurately  accounted  for,  but  the  Federal  accounts 
claimed  two  hundred  prisoners  taken  at  one  time,  and 
other  losses  equal  to  their  own. 

I  was  informed  of  troops  crossing  the  bridge  to  the 
north  side  on  the  25th,  and  that  the  crossings  continued 
at  intervals  till  after  the  night  of  the  26th.  The  plan  of 
operations  contemplated  that  General  Butler  should  have 
"  twenty  thousand  men  north  of  the  James  where  Long- 
street  was  now  in  command."  *  These  were  parts  of  the 
Tenth  and  Eighteenth  Corps,  commanded  by  Generals 
Terry  and  Weitzel.  General  Terry  was  to  make  a  fierce 
demonstration  against  our  front  along  the  Darby  and 
Charles  City  roads  with  the  Tenth,  while  General  Weitzel 
was  to  march  the  Eighteenth  across  White  Oak  Swamp 
and  get  in  the  unoccupied  lines  on  the  Williamsburg  road, 
or  between  that  and  Gary's  cavalry  on  the  Nine  Miles 
road. 

Early  on  the  27th,  General  Terry  moved  out  with  the 
Tenth  Corps  and  made  demonstration  for  formidable  at 
tack,  putting  his  infantry  in  sharp  practice  along  the 
outer  edge  of  our  abatis,  and  his  artillery  in  practice  near 

*  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant.    Badeau. 


•>-      -^ 


Major-General  Commanding  Division  of  First  Corps. 


AGAIN    IN    FKONT    OF    RICHMOND.  577 

the  roads.  Our  sharp-shooters  opened  in  reply  from  be 
hind  their  breastworks  and  held  a  lively  rattle  of  musketry 
for  quite  a  time.  The  delay  in  making  more  serious  work 
told  me  that  some  other  was  the  point  of  danger,  which 
must  mean  the  unoccupied  lines  beyond  White  Oak 
Swamp.  Field  was  ordered  to  pull  his  division  out  of 
the  works  and  march  for  the  Williamsburg  road,  Hoke  to 
cover  the  line  of  Field  by  extending  and  doubling  his 
sharp-shooters. 

When  the  head  of  General  Field's  column  got  to  the 
Williamsburg  road  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  deployed 
and  half-way  across  the  field  approaching  our  line.  Just 
behind  the  trenches  was  a  growth  of  pines  which  con 
cealed  our  troops  until  a  line  of  sharp-shooters  stepped 
into  the  works.  Their  fire  surprised  the  enemy  somewhat, 
as  they  had  seen  nothing  but  part  of  Gary's  cavalry, 
and  their  skirmish  line  gave  up  the  field  for  their  heavy 
infantry. 

The  open  in  front  of  the  breastworks  was  about  six 
hundred  yards  wide  and  twelve  hundred  in  length,  ex 
tending  from  the  York  River  Railroad  on  the  north  to  a 
ditch  draining  towards  the  head  of  White  Oak  Swamp  on 
the  south.  About  midway  of  the  field  is  a  slight  depres 
sion  or  swale  of  five  or  six  feet  depth. 

Quickly  following  the  repulse  of  the  skirmish  line,  and 
just  as  Field  had  adjusted  the  infantry  and  artillery  to 
their  trenches,  came  the  Eighteenth  Corps  bursting  into 
the  open  and  deploying  on  both  sides  of  the  road  in  solid 
ranks.  They  were  at  once  in  fair  canister  range,  and  soon 
under  the  terrific  fire  of  a  solid  line  of  infantry, — in 
fantry  so  experienced  that  they  were  not  likely  to  throw 
as  much  as  one  bullet  without  well-directed  aim.  At  the 
first  fire  they  began  to  drop,  and  they  fell  more  rapidly 
until  they  reached  the  swale,  when  the  entire  line  dropped 
to  the  ground.  They  had  just  enough  cover  there  for 
their  bodies  as  they  spread  themselves  closely  to  the 

37 


578  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

ground,  but  not  enough  to  permit  them  to  load  or  rise  to 
deliver  fire  without  exposing  their  persons  to  our  fire. 
To  attempt  to  retreat  would  have  been  as  disastrous  as 
to  advance ;  so  they  were  entrapped. 

General  Gary  reported  that  the  field  of  the  Nine  Miles 
road  was  clear,  and  was  ordered  to  come  in  on  the  flank 
of  the  entrapped  infantry  and  order  surrender ;  but  before 
he  was  there  another  report  reached  him  of  a  formidable 
force  advancing  against  his  squadron  on  the  Nine  Miles 
road.  He  was  sent  on  a  gallop  to  meet  this.  Meanwhile, 
the  troops  hiding  under  the  swell  of  ground  found  ways 
to  drop  off  on  their  right  under  the  railroad  cut,  and 
many  others  got  away  down  the  dry  ditch  on  their  left, 
until  Captain  Lyle,  of  the  Fifth  South  Carolina  Regiment, 
got  a  force  out  on  the  flank  and  secured  the  surrender  of 
the  remainder.  He  picked  up  about  six  hundred  pris 
oners. 

General  Gary's  guard  on  the  Nine  Miles  road  held  an 
open  work  by  a  section  of  artillery  and  a  squadron  of 
cavalry.  The  advance  against  it  was  so  well  executed, 
and  our  cavalry  so  interested  in  the  operations  on  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  road,  that  the  guard  was  taken  by  surprise  and 
pushed  away  from  its  post  by  the  first  attack,  losing  its 
field-works  and  a  piece  of  artillery.  Gary  soon  made 
amends  for  the  careless  watch  by  dismounting  his  brigade 
and  marching  in  line  of  battle  at  right  angles  to  the  line 
of  the  enemy,  striking  him  in  flank,  recovering  the  lost 
cannon,  and  driving  him  back  the  way  he  came.  Under 
cover  of  the  night  the  Federals  returned  to  their  fortified 
lines,  where  they  were  as  strong  as  were  the  lines  held  by 
the  Confederates  in  their  front. 

The  Confederates  lost :  Field's  division,  45 ;  Gary's 
cavalry,  8;  artillery,  11;  total,  64.  Federal  "losses, 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  1103."  * 

*  Virginia  Campaigns,  1864-65,  by  General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 


AGAIN   IN    FEONT    OF   RICHMOND.  579 

General  Grant  sent  orders  to  have  the  positions  gained 
by  his  left  held  and  intrenched,  but  they  were  abandoned 
because  they  were  weak  in  the  too  extended  line. 

After  the  loss  of  Fort  Harrison,  General  Lee  became 
more  anxious  for  his  line  on  the  north  side,  and  rode  out 
to  witness  the  operations  on  that  front,  under  the  threat 
ening  of  Butler's  forces ;  and  as  our  cavalry  had  made  no 
report  of  the  enemy  crossing  the  swamp,  he  was  not 
quite  satisfied  to  have  the  troops  moved  over  to  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  road,  but  did  not  order  them  retained.  His 
idea  was  that  the  north  side  was  the  easier  route  of  Grant's 
triumphal  march  into  Richmond,  and  that  sooner  or  later 
he  would  make  his  effort  there  in  great  force. 

These  were  the  closing  scenes  between  the  armies  about 
Richmond  and  Petersburg  for  the  year  1864.  The  de 
feat  of  General  Early  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  on  the 
19th  of  October  concluded  active  work  in  that  quarter. 
Most  of  Sheridan's  infantry  was  sent  back  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  the  greater  part  of  Early 's  to  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Kershaw's  division  of  the  First  Corps  had  been  left 
with  General  Early  for  his  battle  of  the  19th  of  October. 
In  his  account  of  the  battle,  General  Early  alludes  to  its 
outcome  and  finality  as  a  causeless  panic  started  by  the 
break  of  his  left  division  under  General  Gordon,  followed 
by  Kershaw's  and  other  troops.  It  is  sufficient  for  this 
writing  to  say  that  the  general  called  the  rout  "  thorough 
and  disgraceful,  mortifying  beyond  measure :  we  had 
within  our  grasp  a  great  and  glorious  victory,  and  lost  it 
by  the  uncontrollable  propensity  of  our  men  for  plun 
der."  * 

Kershaw's  division  was  restored  to  duty  with  the  First 
Corps  in  November. 

Late  in  December  I  was  informed  of  a  move  of  the 

*  General  Early's  official  account. 


580  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

enemy's  land  and  naval  forces  against  Fort  Fisher  in 
Wilmington  harbor.  The  information  was  despatched  to 
General  Lee  at  Petersburg,  and  brought  a  midnight  order 
for  me  to  send  Hoke's  division  to  Wilmington.  Hoke 
was  relieved  and  on  the  move  before  daylight.  General 
Bragg  was  relieved  of  duty  at  Richmond  and  ordered  to 
Wilmington. 

General  Butler  was  in  command  of  the  land  forces  and 
Admiral  Porter  of  the  navy.  Between  them,  or  under 
the  direction  of  one  or  the  other,  was  the  steamer  "  Louis 
iana,"  freighted  with  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  tons  of 
gunpowder  intended  to  blow  up  Fort  Fisher.  But  its  only 
tangible  effect  was  to  relieve  the  commander  of  the  land 
forces  from  further  service  in  the  field. 

In  Georgia,  General  Hood  led  his  army  off  from  the 
front  of  General  Sherman  at  Atlanta,  and  marched  west 
and  north,  and  the  latter  took  up  his  line  of  march  south 
for  Savannah  on  the  16th  of  November. 

These  moves  brought  Sherman's  army  into  remote 
bearing  upon  our  army  at  Richmond,  and  as  a  matter  of 
course  it  began  to  receive  more  careful  attention  from 
General  Lee.  In  order  to  better  guard  our  position  on  the 
north  side,  I  ordered,  in  addition  to  the  timber  obstruc 
tions  over  White  Oak  Swamp,  the  roads  leading  around 
towards  our  left  to  be  broken  up  by  subsoil  ploughs,  so  as 
to  make  greater  delay  of  any  movements  in  that  direction 
during  the  winter  rains,  and  wrote  to  ask  General  Lee  if 
he  could  not  order  the  roads  upon  which  General  Grant 
would  probably  march  against  the  Southside  Railroad 
broken  in  the  same  way ;  also  suggesting  that  the  roads 
in  Georgia  upon  which  General  Sherman  was  marching 
could  be  obstructed  in  this  and  other  ways  so  as  to  delay 
and  annoy  his  march,  with  the  possibility  that  it  might 
eventually  be  broken  up. 

The  pickets  along  our  lines  were  in  more  or  less  prac 
tice  shooting  at  each  other  from  their  rifle-pits  until  I 


AGAIN    IN    FKONT    OF    RICHMOND.  581 

ordered  it  stopped  on  the  north  end  of  the  line,  as  an  an 
noyance,  and  not  a  legitimate  part  of  war  to  carry  on  the 
shooting  of  sentinels  on  guard  duty.  The  example  was 
soon  followed  by  the  army  on  our  front,  so  that  the  men 
on  the  picket  lines  became  friendly,  and  afterwards  came 
to  mutual  agreements  to  give  the  other  side  notice,  in  case 
of  battle,  in  time  for  the  pickets  to  get  to  their  pits  be 
fore  the  batteries  could  open  on  them.  Before  the  winter 
was  half  gone  the  pickets  established  quite  a  bartering 
trade,  giving  tobacco  for  sugar  and  coffee. 

Our  foraging  parties  of  the  north  side  were  fortunate 
in  collecting  supplies,  and  at  times  were  in  condition  to 
aid  our  comrades  of  the  south  side.  But  the  officers 
found  that  they  could  only  get  a  small  portion  of  the  pro 
duce  by  impressment  or  tax  in  kind.  They  were  ordered 
to  locate  all  supplies  that  they  could  not  collect. 

The  chief  of  staff  of  the  First  Corps,  Colonel  Sorrel, 
was  appointed  brigadier-general,  and  relieved  of  his  duties 
by  Colonel  Osman  Latrobe. 

The  Army  of  Tennessee,  under  General  Hood,  pur 
suing  its  march  northward  late  in  November  and  early  in 
December,  came  upon  the  Federal  forces  under  General 
Schofield  at  Franklin,  and  General  Thomas  at  Nash 
ville,  Tennessee,  where  desperate  battles  were  fought, 
until  Hood's  army  was  reduced  to  skeleton  commands 
and  forced  to  retreat.  And  thus  with  Sherman's  pro 
gressive  movements  in  the  extreme  South,  our  own  ill 
success  in  Virginia,  and  an  apparent  general  strengthen 
ing  of  the  Federal  cause,  the  year  1864  drew  to  a  close 
with  little  of  happy  omen  for  the  Confederacy. 


CHAPTER   XL. 

TALK    OF    PEACE. 

Second  Federal  Move  against  Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington  Harbor- 
Confederate  Disaffection — Act  of  Congress  appointing  a  Supreme 
Commander  of  the  Armies — Montgomery  Blair's  Peace  Conference — 
Longstreet  has  a  Meeting  with  General  Ord,  Commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  'James — Military  Convention  proposed — Correspondence  be 
tween  General  Grant  and  General  Lee— Lorigstreet's  Suggestions  for 
Measures  in  the  Critical  Juncture  near  the  Close  of  the  War. 

THE  second  expedition  against  Wilmington  was  sent  in 
January,  1865,  General  Terry  commanding  the  land  and 
Hear-Admiral  Porter  the  naval  forces.  After  very  des 
perate  work  the  fort  and  outworks  were  carried,  the  com 
mander,  General  Whiting,  being  mortally  and  Colonel 
Lamb  severely  wounded.  All  points  of  the  harbor  were 
captured  by  the  enemy,  the  Confederates  losing,  besides 
most  of  the  armaments  of  the  forts,  about  two  thousand 
five  hundred  officers  and  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners.  General  Terry's  loss  was  about  five  hundred. 
A  remarkable  success, — the  storming  of  a  position  fortified 
during  months  and  years  of  labor  and  by  most  approved 
engineering.* 

As  the  first  months  of  1865  passed,  the  Confederate 
Congress  realized  the  extreme  tension  of  affairs,  and  pro 
vided,  among  other  expedients,  for  the  enrollment  of 
negroes  as  Confederate  soldiers.  Other  measures  for 
giving  confidence  and  strength  to  the  cause  were  adopted. 

On  the  21st  of  January  the  Confederate  President  was 
informed  of  disaffection  in  the  Virginia  Legislature,  and, 

*  One  of  our  weeklies  announced,  upon  learning  that  General  Bragg 
was  ordered  there,  "We  understand  that  General  Bragg  is  ordered  to 
Wilmington.    Good-by,  Wilmington  !" 
582 


TALK    OF    PEACE. 


583 


what  was  more  significant,  in  the  Confederate  Congress, 
where  a  resolution  expressive  of  want  of  confidence  in  the 
Chief  Executive  was  under  informal  consideration,  and 
would  undoubtedly  pass  by  a  large  vote  if  introduced. 
At  this  critical  juncture  it  seems  that  a  compromise  was 
effected.  It  was  agreed  that  Congress  should  enact  a 
law  providing  a  supreme  commander  of  the  Confederate 
armies,  this  law  to  be  approved  by  the  President,  who 
should  then  call  General  Lee  to  the  exercise  of  the  func 
tions  of  that  office.  The  intention  was  to  invest  him  with 
dictatorial  power. 

During  the  early  days  of  February,  Hon.  Montgomery 
Blair  visited  Richmond  upon  a  mission  of  peace,  and 
brought  about  a  meeting  at  Hampton  Roads  between 
President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  Seward  and  the  Confed 
erate  Vice-President,  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  and  the 
Hon.  R.  M.  T.  Hunter  and  Judge  J.  A.  Campbell.  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  was  firm  for  the  surrender  of  the  Confed 
erate  armies  and  the  abolition  of  slavery,  which  the  Con 
federate  President  did  not  care  to  consider. 

About  the  15th  of  February,  Major-General  J.  C. 
Breckenridge  was  appointed  Secretary  of  War,  and  Briga 
dier-General  F.  M.  St.  John  was  appointed  commissary- 
general  of  subsistence. 

General  Ord,  commanding  the  Army  of  the  James,  sent 
me  a  note  on  the  20th  of  February  to  say  that  the  bar 
tering  between  our  troops  on  the  picket  lines  was  irregu 
lar  ;  that  he  would  be  pleased  to  meet  me  and  arrange  to 
put  a  stop  to  such  intimate  intercourse.  As  a  soldier  he 
knew  his  orders  would  stop  the  business  ;  it  was  evident, 
therefore,  that  there  was  other  matter  he  would  intro 
duce  when  the  meeting  could  be  had.  I  wrote  in  reply, 
appointing  a  time  and  place  between  our  lines. 

We  met  the  next  day,  and  presently  he  asked  for  a  side 
interview.  When  he  spoke  of  the  purpose  of  the  meeting, 
I  mentioned  a  simple  manner  of  correcting  the  matter, 


584  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

which  he  accepted  without  objection  or  amendment.  Then 
he  spoke  of  affairs  military  and  political. 

Referring  to  the  recent  conference  of  the  Confederates 
with  President  Lincoln  at  Hampton  Roads,  he  said  that 
the  politicians  of  the  North  were  afraid  to  touch  the  ques 
tion  of  peace,  and  there  was  no  way  to  open  the  subject 
except  through  officers  of  the  armies.  On  his  side  they 
thought  the  war  had  gone  on  long  enough  ;  that  we  should 
come  together  as  former  comrades  and  friends  and  talk  a 
little.  He  suggested  that  the  work  as  belligerents  should 
be  suspended ;  that  General  Grant  and  General  Lee 
should  meet  and  have  a  talk  ;  that  my  wife,  who  was  an 
old  acquaintance  and  friend  of  Mrs.  Grant  in  their  girl 
hood  days,  should  go  into  the  Union  lines  and  visit  Mrs. 
Grant  with  as  many  Confederate  officers  as  might  choose 
to  be  with  her.  Then  Mrs.  Grant  would  return  the  call 
under  escort  of  Union  officers  and  visit  Richmond ;  that 
while  General  Lee  and  General  Grant  were  arranging  for 
better  feeling  between  the  armies,  they  could  be  aided  by 
intercourse  between  the  ladies  and  officers  until  terms 
honorable  to  both  sides  could  be  found. 

I  told  General  Ord  that  I  was  not  authorized  to  speak 
on  the  subject,  but  could  report  upon  it  to  General  Lee 
and  the  Confederate  authorities,  and  would  give  notice  in 
case  a  reply  could  be  made. 

General  Lee  was  called  over  to  Richmond,  and  we  met 
at  night  at  the  President's  mansion.  Secretary-of-War 
Breckenridge  was  there.  The  report  was  made,  several 
hours  were  passed  in  discussing  the  matter,  and  finally  it 
was  agreed  that  favorable  report  should  be  made  as  soon 
as  another  meeting  could  be  arranged  with  General  Ord. 
Secretary  Breckenridge  expressed  especial  approval  of  the 
part  assigned  for  the  ladies. 

As  we  separated,  I  suggested  to  General  Lee  that  he 
should  name  some  irrelevant  matter  as  the  occasion  of 
his  call  for  the  interview  with  General  Grant,  and  that 


TALK    OF    PEACE. 


585 


once  they  were  together  they  could  talk  as  they  pleased. 
A  telegram  was  sent  my  wife  that  night  at  Lynchburg 
calling  her  to  Richmond,  and  the  next  day  a  note  was 
sent  General  Ord  asking  him  to  appoint  a  time  for  an 
other  meeting. 

The  meeting  was  appointed  for  the  day  following,  and 
the  result  of  the  conference  was  reported.  General  Ord 
asked  to  have  General  Lee  write  General  Grant  for  an 
interview,  stating  that  General  Grant  was  prepared  to 
receive  the  letter,  and  thought  that  a  way  could  be 
found  for  a  military  convention,  while  old  friends  of 
the  military  service  could  get  together  and  seek  out  ways 
to  stop  the  flow  of  blood.  He  indicated  a  desire  on  the 
part  of  President  Lincoln  to  devise  some  means  or  excuse 
for  paying  for  the  liberated  slaves,  which  might  be  ar 
ranged  as  a  condition  and  part  of  the  terms  of  the  con 
vention,  and  relieve  the  matter  of  political  bearing ;  but 
those  details  were  in  the  form  of  remote  probabilities  to 
be  discussed  when  the  parties  became  advanced  in  their 
search  for  ways  of  settlement. 

On  the  1st  of  March  I  wrote  General  Lee  giving  a 
report  of  the  second  interview,  and  on  the  2d  he  wrote 
General  Grant  as  follows  : 

"  HE  AD  -QUARTERS   CONFEDERATE   STATES  ARMIES, 

"March  2,  1865. 
"  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT, 

"  Commanding  United  States  Armies: 

"  GENERAL,—  Lieutenant- General  Longstreet  has  informed  me 
that,  in  a  recent  conversation  between  himself  and  Major- General 
Ord  as  to  the  possibility  of  arriving  at  a  satisfactory  adjustment 
of  the  present  unhappy  difficulties  by  means  of  a  military  con 
vention,  General  Ord  states  that  if  I  desired  to  have  an  interview 
with  you  on  the  subject  you  would  not  decline,  provided  I  had 
authority  to  act.  Sincerely  desiring  to  leave  nothing  untried 
which  may  put  an  end  to  the  calamities  of  war,  I  propose  to  meet 
you  at  such  convenient  time  and  place  as  you  may  designate,  with 
the  hope  that  upon  an  interchange  of  views  it  may  be  found 


586  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

practicable  to  submit  the  subjects  of  controversy  between  the 
belligerents  to  a  convention  of  the  kind  mentioned.  In  such 
event  I  am  authorized  to  do  whatever  the  result  of  the  pro 
posed  interview  may  render  necessary  or  advisable.  Should 
you  accede  to  this  proposition,  I  would  suggest  that,  if  agree 
able  to  you,  we  meet  at  the  place  selected  by  Generals  Ord 
and  Long-street  for  their  interview,  at  eleven  A.M.  on  Monday 
next. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"B.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

The  letter  was  sent  to  me  open,  with  instructions  to 
read,  seal,  and  forward.  I  rode  into  Richmond  to  ask 
that  some  other  business  should  be  named  as  the  cause  of 
the  call  for  the  interview,  but  he  was  not  disposed  to  ap 
proach  his  purpose  by  diplomacy,  and  ordered  the  letter 
to  be  delivered. 

He  sent  another  letter,  however  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  CONFEDERATE  STATES  ARMIES, 

"  March  2,  1865. 
"  LIEUTENANT-  GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT, 

"  Commanding  United  States  Armies: 

"  GENERAL, — Lieutenant- General  Longstreet  has  informed  me 
that  in  an  interview  with  Major-General  Ord,  that  officer  ex 
pressed  some  apprehension  lest  the  general  terms  used  by  you 
with  reference  to  the  exchange  of  political  prisoners  should  be 
construed  to  include  those  charged  with  capital  offences. 

' l  General  Ord  further  stated  that  you  did  not  intend  to  em 
brace  that  class  of  cases  in  the  agreement  to  exchange.  I  regret 
to  learn  that  such  is  your  interpretation,  as  I  had  hoped  that  by 
exchanging  those  held  under  charges  by  each  party  it  would  be 
possible  to  diminish,  to  some  extent,  the  sufferings  of  both  without 
detriment  to  their  interests.  Should  you  see  proper  to  assent  to 
the  interview  proposed  in  my  letter  of  this  date,  I  hope  it  may 
be  found  practicable  to  arrive  at  a  more  satisfactory  understand 
ing  on  this  subject. 

t '  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"E.  E.  LEE, 
"General." 


TALK    OF    PEACE. 


587 


To  which  General  Grant  replied, — 


11  CITY  POINT,  VIRGINIA, 

"  March  4,  1865. 
11  GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

"  Commanding  Confederate  States  Armies: 
"  Your  two  letters  of  the  2d  instant  were  received  yesterday. 
In  regard  to  any  apprehended  misunderstanding  in  reference  to 
the  exchange  of  political  prisoners,  I  think  there  need  be  none. 
General  Ord  and  General  Longstreet  have  probably  misunder 
stood  what  I  said  to  the  former  on  the  subject,  or  I  may  have 
failed  to  make  myself  understood  possibly.  A  few  days  before 
the  interview  between  Generals  Longstreet  and  Ord  I  had  re 
ceived  a  despatch  from  General  Hoffman,  Commissary-General  of 
Prisoners,  stating  in  substance  that  all  prisoners  of  war  who  were 
or  had  been  in  close  confinement  or  irons,  whether  under  charges 
or  sentence,  had  been  ordered  to  City  Point  for  exchange.  I  for 
warded  the  substance  of  that  despatch  to  Lieutenant- Colonel  Mul- 
ford,  Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange,  and  presumed  it  probable 
that  he  had  communicated  it  to  Colonel  Eobert  Ould.  A  day  or 
two  after,  an  officer  who  was  neither  a  prisoner  of  war  nor  a 
political  prisoner,  was  executed,  after  a  fair  and  impartial  trial, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  war  and  the  usage  of  civilized 
nations.  It  was  in  explanation  of  this  class  of  cases  I  told  Gen 
eral  Ord  to  speak  to  General  Longstreet.  Eeference  to  my  letter 
of  February  16  will  show  my  understanding  on  the  subject  of  re 
leasing  political  or  citizen  prisoners. 

"In  regard  to  meeting  you  on  the  6th  instant,  I  would  state 
that  I  have  no  authority  to  accede  to  your  proposition  for  a  con 
ference  on  the  subject  proposed.  Such  authority  is  vested  in  the 
President  of  the  United  States  alone.  General  Ord  could  only 
have  meant  that  I  would  not  refuse  an  interview  on  any  subject 
on  which  I  have  a  right  to  act,  which,  of  course,  would  be  such 
as  are  purely  of  a  military  character,  and  on  the  subject  of  ex 
changes  which  has  been  intrusted  to  me. 

(Signed)  "  U.  S.  GRANT, 

1  i  Lieutenant-  General. ' ' 

Under  the  impression  that  General  Lee  would  construe 
the  act  of  Congress  in  its  broad  sense  and  proceed  to 
handle  the  Confederate  armies  and  affairs  under  his  own 
good  judgment,  I  wrote,  begging  that  he  would  call  Gen- 


588  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

eral  Joseph  E.  Johnston  back  to  service  and  command, 
and  presently  suggested  and  then  wrote  that  I  was  credibly 
informed  that  there  was  plenty  of  produce  in  the  country 
which  the  farmers  would  cheerfully  deliver  at  Richmond 
or  Petersburg  if  liberal  prices  in  gold  could  be  paid  them ; 
that  the  authority  given  to  impress  bread  and  meat  stuffs 
should  be  applied  as  including  gold ;  that  right  or  wrong 
the  emergency  called  for  it,  and  that  I  would  undertake 
to  secure  the  gold  upon  his  authority.  I  suggested  that 
as  Grant's  combinations  were  looking  to  concentration 
against  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  Richmond, 
we  should  use  the  railways  for  collecting  and  drawing  de 
tachments  from  southern  points,  calling  cavalry  by  the 
dirt  roads,  while  the  farmers  were  bringing  their  produce 
by  private  conveyance.  Furthermore,  I  cited  the  fact 
that  there  were  eight  or  ten  thousand  non-combatants  in 
Richmond  who  could  be  put  in  my  trenches  as  conscripts, 
and  officered  by  the  officers  of  the  department  on  duty 
there,  and  twelve  hundred  in  Lynchburg  that  could  be 
made  similarly  available ;  and  argued  that  using  them  in 
the  trenches  would  enable  him  to  draw  the  First  Corps 
out  for  a  movable  force  to  meet  flanking  efforts  of  his 
adversary,  and  keep  open  his  lines  of  communication.  In 
that  way,  I  continued,  he  could  collect  a  hundred  thou 
sand  men  at  Richmond,  with  a  good  supply  of  rations, 
while  General  Grant  was  drawing  his  two  hundred  thou 
sand  together  to  attack  us  ;  that  when  concentrated  Grant 
would  find  himself  obliged  to  give  speedy  battle,  as  he 
could  not  long  supply  his  large  force ;  that  our  interior 
lines  would  enable  us  to  repel  and  break  up  the  attack 
and  relieve  Richmond. 

The  times  were  heavy  of  events,  Executive  authority 
intended  to  be  suspended,  and  it  seemed  possible  that  the 
use  of  a  little  gold  would  so  manifest  its  power  as  to 
induce  our  people  to  let  cotton  and  tobacco  go  for  foreign 
exchange  which  might  put  us  on  a  gold  basis  for  a 


TALK    OF    PEACE. 


589 


twelvemonth.  This  was  the  expedient  that  offered  light 
and  hope  for  the  future,  and  the  times  called  either  for 
heroic  methods  or  the  giving  over  of  the  forms  of  war. 

General  Lee  agreed  that  the  provisions  were  in  the 
country  and  would  be  delivered  for  gold,  but  did  not 
think  the  gold  could  be  found.  He  made  his  orders  as 
suming  command  of  the  armies,  but  instead  of  exercising 
authority  on  a  scale  commensurate  with  the  views  of  Con 
gress  and  the  call  of  the  crisis,  applied  to  the  Eichmond 
authorities  for  instructions  under  the  new  assignment,  and 
wrote  that  he  would  call  General  Johnston  to  command  if 
he  could  be  ordered  to  report  to  him  for  duty. 

General  Johnston  was  so  ordered,  and  was  assigned  to 
command  of  such  fragments  of  troops  as  he  could  collect 
in  the  Carolinas.  General  Wade  Hampton  was  relieved 
of  duty  as  chief  of  cavalry  in  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  and  ordered  to  join  General  Johnston.  After 
collecting  such  detachments  as  he  could  gather,  General 
Johnston  threw  them  from  time  to  time  along  the  flank 
of  Sherman's  march  from  Georgia  for  Virginia,  and  had 
some  spirited  affairs  with  that  army,  which  was  gathering 
strength  along  the  seaboard  as  it  marched. 


CHAPTEE   XLL 

BATTLE   OF   FIVE   FORKS. 

Various  Affairs  of  the  Closing  Campaign — The  Massing  of  Grant's 
Forces — Sortie  against  Fort  Steadman — Captured  but  quickly  retaken 
— General  Grant's  Move  around  the  Confederate  Right— General  Lee 
anticipates  with  Aggressive  Work — Sheridan  makes  Battle  with  his 
Whole  Force  at  Five  Forks — Desperate  Situation  of  the  Confederates 
— Disparity  of  Numbers — Splendid  Stand  and  Battle  of  Generals 
Pickett  and  Ransom — Colonel  Pegram  mortally  wounded — W.  H.  F. 
Lee,  the  "Noble  Son  of  a  Noble  Sire"— Corse's  Division— Pickett's 
Generalship— Casualties. 

MEANWHILE  General  Grant  was  drawing  forces  from 
the  North  and  West  to  further  strengthen  his  already 
overwhelming  combinations  against  Richmond.  General 
Schofield  was  called  from  Tennessee  to  North  Carolina  to 
guard  and  join  on,  if  necessary,  the  flank  of  Sherman's 
column.  The  cavalry  and  infantry  of  the  Valley  of  Vir 
ginia  were  brought  down  to  the  Union  army  about  Rich 
mond  and  Petersburg, — the  latter  by  transports. 

General  Sheridan  marched  his  cavalry,  ten  thousand 
strong,  from  the  Valley  to  ride  across  James  River,  through 
Lynchburg,  to  join  the  northward  march  of  Sherman's 
column.  His  divisions  were  under  Generals  Custer  and 
Devens  ;  General  Wesley  Merritt  was  his  chief  of  cavalry. 
He  was  to  destroy  railroads,  canals,  bridges,  and  other 
works  of  value  as  he  marched.  At  Staunton  he  decided 
to  take  in  the  balance  of  General  Early's  command  near 
his  route  at  Waynesboro'.  He  found  that  command  posted 
behind  field-works,  but  the  line  did  not  cover  the  left  of 
the  position  near  the  river.  After  some  preliminary 
dashes,  General  Custer  found  his  way  around  General 
Early's  left,  and,  with  part  of  the  cavalry  dismounted, 
made  a  bold,  simultaneous  charge  on  the  front  and  flank, 
breaking  up  the  line  and  capturing  most  of  the  troops. 

690 


BATTLE   OF    FIVE    FOKKS.  591 

Some  of  the  Union  commanders  claimed  that  the  Con 
federates  cheered  them  as  they  surrendered.  This,  how 
ever,  the  Confederates  deny.  The  affair  is  mentioned  in 
the  diary  of  Major  J.  Hoskiss,  the  engineer  of  the  Con 
federate  army  of  the  Valley,  in  not  more  creditable  terms 
than  General  Early  gave  of  his  battle  of  Cedar  Run. 

Pickett's  division,  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry,  and  other 
detachments  were  sent  to  Lynchburg  to  defend  against 
Sheridan's  ride ;  but  the  high  waters  of  James  River  and 
other  obstacles  turned  Sheridan  from  his  southern  course 
to  a  sweep  down  the  north  side. 

Generals  Pickett  and  Fitzhugh  Lee  were  recalled  and 
ordered  to  the  north  side  to  join  me  at  Richmond  for  a 
inarch  to  intercept  Sheridan's  forces.  General  Pickett 
reported  on  the  13th,  and  we  marched  for  Hanover  on 
the  14th.  I  made  requisition  for  a  pontoon  bridge,  and 
was  delayed  a  day  waiting  for  it  and  for  the  cavalry.  The 
bridge  was  not  sent.  As  we  marched  towards  the  Pa- 
munkey  River,  General  Sheridan  heard  of  the  move  and 
crossed  to  the  north  bank  with  his  main  force,  leaving  a 
brigade  to  watch  our  march,  but  presently  drew  the  bri 
gade  after  him. 

General  Rosser  reported  to  me  with  five  hundred  cav 
alry,  one  of  the  remnants  of  General  Early's  army  not 
captured,  and  was  ordered  across  the  Pamunkey  River  to 
follow  Sheridan's  ride.  Our  artillery  and  infantry  were 
delayed  part  of  a  day  and  night  building  a  bridge  from 
the  timbers  of  an  old  barn  that  stood  near  the  bank  of  the 
river,  and  part  of  the  command  crossed  early  in  the  morn 
ing  to  find  a  cold  cavalry  trail,  growing  colder.  As  the 
prospect  of  overhauling  the  march  was  not  encouraging, 
we  retraced  our  steps,  returning  to  Richmond  on  the  18th, 
where  Pickett's  men  rested  until  the  24th. 

As  Sherman's  army  drew  towards  Richmond,  General 
Grant  gave  up  the  thought  of  taking  the  city  by  attack 
of  his  strong  columns  on  the  north  side,  lest  he  should 


592  FROM    MANASSAS    TO   APPOMATTOX. 

leave  open  the  way  of  escape  of  the  Confederate  army, 
and  give  time  for  it  to  combine  with  Johnston's  forces 
before  he  could  overhaul  it.  He  found,  too,  that  the  "  at 
trition"  policy  could  not  be  made  effective,  even  with  his 
superior  numbers,  unless  he  could  so  manoeuvre  as  to  call 
his  adversary  from  his  fortified  grounds  to  make  the  work 
of  attrition  mutual. 

On  the  14th  of  March  he  gave  instructions  of  prepara 
tion  for  a  general  move  by  his  left,  and  on  the  24th  gave 
definite  orders  for  the  move  to  be  made  on  the  29th. 

On  the  24th,  General  Lee  gave  consent  to  the  making 
of  a  sortie  from  his  line  at  Hare's  Hill,  in  front  of  Peters 
burg,  against  Fort  Steadman  of  the  enemy's  works.  The 
distance  between  the  lines  at  that  point  was  one  hundred 
and  fifty  yards,  the  distance  between  the  picket  lines  fifty 
yards.  Union  officers  had  given  out  that  deserters  from 
the  Confederate  army  were  permitted  to  march  into  the 
Union  lines  with  their  arms. 

Under  the  circumstances  it  was  conceived  to  be  practica 
ble  to  gain  Fort  Steadman  by  surprise,  and  the  Confederate 
chief  was  led  to  believe  that  there  were  other  forts  to  the 
rear  of  Steadman  that  could  be  carried  and  held  until  Gen 
eral  Grant  could  be  forced  to  make  a  longer  line  to  reach 
our  southern  communications,  and  give  us  time  to  find  dry 
roads  for  our  march  away,  or  for  reinforcements  to  join 
us.  It  was  a  hazardous  adventure  at  best,  but  his  brave 
heart  usually  went  with  a  proposition  for  a  bold  fight. 

The  Second  Corps,  under  Major-General  Gordon,  was 
assigned  for  the  sortie,  to  be  reinforced  by  other  troops  to 
be  called.  Pickett's  division  of  the  First  Corps,  that 
had  been  resting  on  the  north  side  since  the  18th,  was 
called  to  report  to  General  Lee  at  Petersburg,  without 
intimation  of  the  service  proposed,  but  all  calls  and  orders 
of  the  times  were  looked  upon  as  urgent.  The  quarter 
master  was  despatched  to  Richmond  to  have  the  transpor 
tation  at  the  station  as  soon  as  the  troops  could  reach  the 


BATTLE   OF    FIVE    FORKS.  593 

depot,  and  the  division  was  ordered  to  march  in  anticipa 
tion  of  due  preparation  for  their  transit.  But  the  quar 
termaster  found  that  the  railroad  company  could  furnish 
transportation  for  three  brigades  only.  General  Lee  was 
informed  of  the  fact,  and  I  suggested  that  his  only  way  to 
be  assured  of  the  service  of  a  division  was  to  draw  Ma- 
hone's  from  Bermuda  Hundred  and  have  Pickett's  march 
to  replace  it.  He  preferred  part  of  Pickett's  division, — 
finding  it  could  not  be  used  as  a  division,  as  Pickett,  the 
ranking  officer,  would  be  called  to  command  the  work 
during  the  early  morning,  for  which  he  had  no  opportunity 
to  prepare. 

General  Lee  collected  about  eighteen  thousand  men 
near  the  sallying  field,  ordered  men  selected  to  cut  away 
the  fraise  and  abatis  for  the  storming  column  that  should 
advance  with  empty  guns  (to  avoid  premature  alarms), 
and  ordered  a  squadron  of  cavalry  ready  to  dash  across 
the  lines  to  cut  the  wires  about  General  Grant's  lines. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General  Meade  command 
ing,  was  posted, — the  Ninth  Corps  on  the  right  from 
James  Eiver  to  Fort  Howard,  including  Fort  Steadman, 
General  Parke  commanding ;  next,  on  Parke's  left,  was 
the  Sixth  Corps,  under  General  Wright ;  then  General 
Humphreys  with  the  Second  Corps,  General  Warren  with 
the  Fifth;  General  Sheridan's  cavalry,  armed  with  re 
peating  rifles,  on  the  extreme  left ;  General  Ord,  com 
manding  the  Army  of  the  James,  on  the  north  side, 
Generals  Gibbon  and  Weitzel  commanding  corps, — all 
officers  of  the  highest  attainments  and  veterans  in  service. 
The  armies  of  the  Potomac  and  the  James  and  Sheridan's 
cavalry,  constituting  General  Grant's  immediate  com 
mand,  numbered  one  hundred  and  eleven  thousand 
soldiers.*  Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  chief  of  staff  with 
General  Lee,  reports,  "  Lee  had  at  that  time  only 


*  General  Badeau's  "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant." 
38 


594  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

thirty-nine  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-seven 
available  muskets  for  the  defence  of  Richmond  and 
Petersburg."  * 

The  storm ers  advanced  before  daylight,  gained  quiet 
possession  of  the  enemy's  picket  line,  carried  his  works 
between  Batteries  9  and  10,  moved  to  the  right  and  left, 
captured  Fort  Steadman  and  its  garrison,  and  turned  the 
guns  there  and  at  Battery  10  against  the  enemy.  But  the 
alarm  spread  and  the  enemy  was  afield,  feeling  his  way 
towards  the  assailants,  for  it  was  not  yet  light  enough  to 
see  and  direct  his  artillery  fire  over  his  own  men.  Bat 
teries  11  and  12  were  taken,  and  guides  sent  to  conduct 
the  Confederate  columns  to  forts  reported  to  be  in  rear 
of  Steadman  were  in  search,  but  there  were  no  forts 
there.  Redoubts  constructed  on  the  main  line  had 
commanding  positions  over  Fort  Steadman,  and  a  sweep 
ing  fire  along  its  lines,  in  anticipation  of  a  surprise  attack, 
but  their  fire  was  withheld  for  daylight  to  direct  it. 

Light  broke  and  the  fire  opened.  General  Parke  called 
his  field  artillery  under  Tidball  into  practice  from  high 
ground  over  the  Confederates,  put  the  divisions  of  Hart- 
ranft  and  Wilcox  against  the  Confederate  flanks,  and 
held  them  back  near  the  troops  crowding  in  along  the 
breach,  and  called  for  a  division  from  the  Second  Corps. 

The  Confederate  columns  were  strong  enough  to  repel 
the  attack  of  two  divisions, — were  put  there  for  that  pur 
pose, — but  so  far  from  breaking  up  and  pushing  back  the 
ninety  thousand  men  in  front  of  them,  they  were  not  so 
handled  as  to  check  two  divisions  long  enough  for  the 
forces  to  get  back  to  their  lines. 

The  artillery  fire  not  only  tore  the  Confederate  ranks, 
but  crossed  fire  in  their  rear,  cutting  off  reinforcements 
and  retreat.  Our  side  was  without  artillery,  except  cap 
tured  guns,  which  were  handled  by  infantry.  As  the 

*  Four  Years  with  General  Lee. 


BATTLE    OF    FIVE    FORKS.  595 

sortie  was  noised  along  the  line,  General  Humphreys  and 
General  Wright  advanced  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps 
against  the  Confederate  lines  along  their  fields  to  learn 
if  troops  had  been  drawn  from  their  fronts  to  join  the 
attack.  Batteries  11  and  12  were  recovered  before  eight 
o'clock,  and  General  Parke  ordered  Hartranft's  division 
to  regain  Fort  Steadman  and  Battery  10,  which  was  done 
with  slight  loss  before  nine  o'clock. 

Many  Confederates  got  back  to  their  lines  in  disordered 
flight,  but  1949  prisoners  and  nine  stands  of  colors  were 
taken  by  the  Ninth  Corps. 

The  aggregate  of  Union  losses  was  reported  as  2107. 
Confederate  losses  are  not  reported  in  detail  or  in  num 
bers.  General  Meade's  estimate  of  our  loss  was  5000. 

General  Humphreys  captured  the  intrenched  picket 
line  in  front  of  him,  but  found  the  Confederate  works  in 
front  well  manned.  General  Wright  got  well  in  on  the 
front  of  his  line  to  favorable  position,  from  which  he  as 
saulted  and  carried  the  Confederate  works  on  the  2d  of 
April. 

Corse's  and  Terry's  brigades  of  Pickett's  division  re 
mained  in  wait  under  arms  until  a  late  hour  of  the  25th, 
but  were  not  called  to  take  part  in  the  sortie.* 

The  result  calls  for  little  comment  upon  the  adventure. 
For  an  army  of  forty  thousand  veterans,  without  field 
batteries,  to  dislodge  from  their  well-chosen  and  strongly- 
fortified  lines  an  army  of  ninety  thousand  well-armed  and 
thoroughly-appointed  veterans  was  impossible. 

Pursuant  to  previous  orders,  General  Grant  started  on 
his  move  around  the  Confederate  right  on  the  27th.  Gen 
eral  Ord  was  called  to  the  south  side  with  fourteen  thou 
sand  men  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  leaving  General 
Weitzel  with  twenty  thousand  on  the  north  side.*)*  In 
front  of  that  force  we  had  ten  thousand  men  of  Field's 


*  Diary  of  a  member  of  Corse's  brigade. 
f  Estimated  from  returns. 


596  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

and  Kershaw's  divisions  and  G.  W.  C.  Lee's  division  of 
local  defence  troops  (not  including  Gary's  cavalry,  the 
sailors  and  marines)  holding  the  forts  at  Drury's  and 
Chapin's  farms.  General  Grant's  orders  were  that  his 
troops  at  all  points  should  be  ready  to  receive  orders  for 
assault. 

Duly  informed  of  the  enemy's  movements,  and  under 
standing  his  purpose,  General  Lee  marched  to  his  right 
on  the  29th.  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  was  called  in  ad 
vance  to  march  for  Five  Forks.  General  Lee  marched 
with  fifteen  thousand  infantry,  three  thousand  cavalry 
(including  Fitzhugh  Lee's  division),  and  a  quota  of  artil 
lery,  along  the  White  Oak  road  to  his  right. 

The  purpose  of  the  enemy  was  to  overreach  the  forti 
fied  grounds  and  call  the  Confederates  to  field  work,  and 
General  Lee  thought  to  anticipate  him  by  aggressive 
work  as  soon  as  he  was  in  the  open  field,  and  ordered 
battle  for  the  31st. 

General  Pickett,  with  three  brigades  of  his  division, 
two  of  B.  R.  Johnson's  division  (Ransom's  and  Wal 
lace's),  with  the  cavalry,  was  ordered  to  engage  Sheridan's 
cavalry  at  Five  Forks,  while  General  Lee  attacked,  with 
McGowan's,  Grade's,  Hunton's,  and  Wise's  brigades,  the 
Fifth  Army  Corps,  that  was  between  Pickett  and  our 
line  of  fortifications.  The  opening  of  this  part  of  the 
battle  was  in  favor  of  the  Confederates.  General  Lee 
drove  back  the  advance  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  to  the 
next,  and  pushed  the  two  back  to  concentration  upon  the 
third,  where  that  part  of  the  battle  rested. 

General  Pickett  made  his  part  of  the  battle  by  putting 
W.  H.  F.  Lee's  and  Rosser's  divisions  of  cavalry  on  his 
right,  and  following  that  leading  by  his  infantry  and  ar 
tillery,  leaving  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  division,  under 
General  T.  T.  Mumford,  along  the  right  front  of  Sheri 
dan's  cavalry.  He  pressed  his  separate  battle  by  his  right 
advance  until  night,  forcing  Sheridan  back  to  Dinwiddie 


BATTLE    OF    FIVE    FORKS.  597 

Court-House,  where  the  latter  reported  to  General  Grant 
that  the  force  in  front  of  him  was  too  strong,  and  asked 
for  reinforcements.  Pickett  prepared  to  follow  his  success 
by  early  morning  battle  and  rested  for  the  night,  but 
Miles's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  was  put  against  the 
other  end  of  the  battle,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  rallied  and 
advanced  against  the  brigades  that  were  with  General 
Lee.  They  were  forced  back  to  the  White  Oak  road, 
then  into  their  fortified  lines,  leaving  an  interval  of  five 
miles  behind  Pickett's  left. 

Responding  to  General  Sheridan's  call,  General  Grant 
ordered  the  Fifth  Corps,  under  General  Warren,  fifteen 
thousand  *  strong,  and  Mackenzie's  cavalry  division  (six 
teen  hundred).  The  design  was  that  the  Fifth  Corps 
should  come  in  on  Pickett's  left  rear  and  cut  off  his  re 
treat,  but  heavy  rains  of  the  30th  and  morning  of  the  31st 
had  so  flooded  the  streams  and  roads  that  the  night  march 
was  slow  and  fatiguing,  and  Pickett  receiving  notice 
during  the  night  of  the  projected  move  against  his  rear, 
changed  his  orders  for  battle,  and  directed  the  troops 
withdrawn  for  Five  Forks  before  daylight.  His  retro 
grade  was  made  in  time  to  escape  the  Fifth  Corps,  and 
was  followed  by  Sheridan's  cavalry,  but  no  serious  effort 
was  made  to  delay  his  movements.  He  made  his  march 
of  five  miles  to  Five  Forks,  put  his  troops  in  order  of 
battle  by  nine  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  April, 
and  ordered  his  well-chosen  line  examined  and  put  under 
construction  of  field-works.  Corse's,  Terry's,  and  Steu- 
art's  brigades  of  Pickett's  division,  and  Ransom's  and  Wal 
lace's  brigades  of  B.  R.  Johnson's  division,  were  posted 
from  right  to  left.  Of  Pegram's  artillery,  three  guns 
were  planted  at  the  Forks,  and  three  more  near  his  right ; 
W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division  of  cavalry  on  his  right ;  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee's  division  on  his  left,  — General  T.  T.  Mumford 

*  Estimated  from  general  return  for  March. 


598  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

commanding  the  latter  ;  Rosser's  division  in  rear  guarding 
trains.  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  chief  of  cavalry. 

As  soon  as  the  infantry  line  was  formed,  the  troops  set 
to  work  intrenching  the  position.  The  line  of  battle  was 
parallel  to  and  lay  along  the  White  Oak  road,  the  left 
broken  smartly  to  the  rear,  the  retired  end  in  traverse 
and  flanking  defence.  The  extreme  right  of  the  infantry 
line  was  also  refused,  but  not  so  much.  Four  miles  east 
from  Pickett's  left  was  the  right  of  the  fortified  lines  of 
General  Lee's  army.  On  the  right  and  outside  of  those 
lines  was  a  detachment  of  cavalry  under  General  Roberts. 
The  division  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  was  ordered  to 
cover  the  ground  between  Roberts's  cavalry  and  Pickett's 
left  by  a  line  of  vedettes,  and  his  division  was  posted  on 
that  part  of  the  field. 

W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry  held  strong  guard  on  the 
right,  and  had  the  benefit  of  some  swamp  lands.  His 
lines  formed  and  field-works  under  construction,  General 
Pickett  rode  to  the  rear  for  his  noon  lunch,  and  was  soon 
followed  by  the  cavalry  chief. 

Sheridan's  cavalry  followed  close  on  Pickett's  march, 
but  did  not  attempt  to  seriously  delay  it.  He  made  a 
dash  about  ten  o'clock  to  measure  the  strength  of  the 
works  under  construction,  and  found  them  too  strong  to 
warrant  fierce  adventure.  Delayed  by  the  heavy  roads 
and  flooding  streams,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  not  in  position 
until  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

General  Sheridan  planned  for  battle  to  have  General 
Merritt  display  the  cavalry  divisions  of  Custer  and 
Devens  against  the  Confederate  front  and  right,  to  convey 
the  impression  that  that  was  the  field  from  which  his 
battle  would  be  made,  while  he  drew  up  and  massed  the 
Fifth  Corps  at  the  other  end  of  the  field  for  the  real  fight. 
The  corps  was  arranged,  Crawford's  division  in  column  on 
the  right,  Ayres's  on  Crawford's  left,  Griffin's  division  in 
support,  Mackenzie's  cavalry  division  on  the  right  of  the 


BATTLE    OF    FIVE   FORKS.  599 

infantry  column,  at  the  White  Oak  road.  The  Fifth 
Corps  was  to  wheel  in  close  connection  and  assault  against 
the  face  of  the  return  of  Confederate  works,  while  the 
cavalry  divisions  in  front  were  to  assail  on  that  line  and 
the  right  of  the  works. 

The  march  and  wheel  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  made 
in  tactical  order,  and  the  lines  advanced  in  courageous 
charge,  but  staggered  and  halted  under  the  destructive 
infantry  fire.  The  charge  was  repeated,  but  held  in  check 
until  Crawford's  division  found  a  way  under  cover  of  a 
woodland  beyond  the  Confederate  works,  and  marched  to 
that  advantage. 

Ransom  drew  his  brigade  from  the  intrenched  line  to 
meet  that  march,  but  it  was  one  brigade  against  three — 
and  those  supported  by  part  of  Griffin's  division. 

Ransom's  horse  was  killed,  falling  on  him ;  his  adju 
tant-general,  Captain  Gee,  was  killed,  and  the  brigade 
was  forced  back. 

This  formidable  move  by  open  field  to  Pickett's  rear 
made  his  position  untenable.  Feeling  this,  the  veteran 
soldiers  of  the  left  brigades  realized  that  their  battle  was 
irretrievable.  Those  who  could  find  escape  from  that  end 
of  the  works  fell  back  in  broken  ranks,  while  many  others, 
finding  the  enemy  closing  in  on  their  rear,  thought  it  more 
soldierly  to  surrender  to  Ayres's  brave  assaulting  columns, 
and  not  a  few  were  the  captives  of  Crawford's  division. 

It  was  not  until  that  period  that  General  Pickett  knew, 
by  the  noise  of  battle,  that  it  was  on.  He  rode  through 
the  fire  to  his  command,  but  his  cavalry  chief,  riding  later, 
was  cut  off  from  the  field  and  failed  to  take  part  in  the 
action.  When  Pickett  got  to  the  Forks,  Colonel  Pegram, 
of  the  artillery,  had  been  mortally  wounded,  the  battery 
commander  was  killed,  and  many  of  the  cannoneers  killed 
or  wounded.  He  found  an  artillery  sergeant  and  enough 
men  to  man  one  gun,  and  used  it  with  effect  until  the 
axle  broke. 


600  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  brigades  of  Steuart  and  Terry  changed  front  and 
received  the  rolling  battle.  The  cavalry  assailants  of  the 
front  and  right  had  no  decided  success,  but  the  infantry 
columns  pressing  their  march,  the  Confederate  brigades 
were  pushed  back  to  their  extreme  right,  where  in  turn 
Corse's  brigade  changed  front  to  receive  the  march,  leaving 
W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry  to  look  to  his  right. 

The  Union  cavalry  essayed  to  charge  the  Confederate 
remnants  to  dismay,  but  the  noble  son  of  the  noble  sire 
seized  opportunity  to  charge  against  the  head  of  this 
threatening  column  before  it  could  pass  the  swamp  lands, 
drove  back  its  head  until  Corse's  brigade  got  back  to  cover 
of  woodland,  and  night  came  to  cover  the  disastrous 
field.* 

The  remnants  of  the  command  were  collected  as  soon 
and  as  well  as  they  could  be  in  the  dead  of  night  and 
marched  towards  Exeter  Mills,  where  Pickett  proposed  to 
cross  the  Appomattox  and  return  to  the  army,  but  early 
movements  of  the  next  morning  changed  the  face  of  the 
military  zodiac. 

The  position  was  not  of  General  Pickett's  choosing,  but 
of  his  orders,  and  from  his  orders  he  assumed  that  he 
would  be  reinforced.  His  execution  was  all  that  a  skilful 
commander  could  apply.  He  reported  as  to  his  position 
and  the  movements  of  the  enemy  threatening  to  cut  his 
command  from  the  army,  but  no  force  came  to  guard  his 
right.  The  reinforcements  joined  him  after  night,  when 
his  battle  had  been  lost  and  his  command  disorganized. 
The  cavalry  of  his  left  was  in  neglect  in  failing  to  report 
the  advance  of  the  enemy,  but  that  was  not  for  want  of 
proper  orders  from  his  head-quarters.  Though  taken  by 
surprise,  there  was  no  panic  in  any  part  of  the  command ; 

*  This  account  is  gathered  from  the  evidence  of  officers  of  both  sides, 
given  before  the  Warren  Court  of  Inquiry,  which  vindicated  Warren 
and  Pickett,  though  the  court  was  inclined  to  coquette  with  the 
lieutenant-general,  who,  at  that  late  day,  was  in  high  authority. 


BATTLE    OF    FIVE    FOEKS. 


601 


brigade  after  brigade  changed  front  to  the  left  and 
received  the  overwhelming  battle  as  it  rolled  on,  until 
crushed  back  to  the  next,  before  it  could  deploy  out  to  aid 
the  front, — or  flank  attack, — until  the  last  right  brigade 
of  the  brave  Corse  changed  and  stood  alone  on  the  left 
of  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry,  fronting  at  right  angle  against 
the  enemy's  cavalry  columns. 

It  is  not  claiming  too  much  for  that  grand  division  to 
say  that,  aided  by  the  brigades  of  Ransom  and  Wallace, 
they  could  not  have  been  dislodged  from  their  intrenched 
position  by  parallel  battle  even  by  the  great  odds  against 
them.  As  it  was,  Ayres's  division  staggered  under  the 
pelting  blows  that  it  met,  and  Crawford's  drifted  off  from 
the  blows  against  it,  until  it  thus  found  the  key  of  the 
battle  away  beyond  the  Confederate  limits. 

In  generalship  Pickett  was  not  a  bit  below  the  "  gay 
rider."  His  defensive  battle  was  better  organized,  and 
it  is  possible  that  he  would  have  gained  the  day  if  his 
cavalry  had  been  diligent  in  giving  information  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy.* 


The  losses  are  not  found  in  separate  reports.     Both 
sides  suffered  severely,  Pickett  losing  two  thousand.     He 


*  He  reported  that  he  could  have  gained  the  day  if  the  cavalry  of  his 
left  had  been  as  efficient  as  that  of  his  right. 


602  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

had  nine  thousand  men  of  all  arms.     His  adversary  had 
twenty-six  thousand. 

Reinforcements  of  Hunton's  brigade,  and  Lieutenant- 
General  R.  H.  Anderson  with  the  other  brigades  of  B.  R. 
Johnson,  were  sent  him  too  late,  and  a  telegram  came  for 
vjme  atJBiclimond  to  march  a_division  to  Petersburg  to  re 
port  to  General  Lee.  The  hour  at  which  the  telegram 
was  received  was  not  noted.  As  the  operations  at  Five 
Forks  were  not  decisive  until  after  five  o'clock,  the  tele 
gram  may  have  been  received  about  seven  P.M.  Field's 
division  was  ordered  to  the  railway  station,  and  the  quar 
termaster  was  sent  in  advance  to  have  the  cars  ready  to 
move  it. 

To  give  the  troops  the  benefit  of  our  limited  transpor 
tation  I  rode  with  the  staff  by  the  dirt  road. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

PETERSBURG. 

The  Fierce  Concerted  Assault  by  the  Federals— Death  of  A.  P.  Hill — 
General  Lee  announces  to  Richmond  Authorities  that  he  must  retreat 
—Reception  of  the  News  by  President  Davis  at  Church  Service- 
Federals  take  Forts  Gregg  and  Whitworth— The  Retreat  harassed  by 
Continuous  Fighting— Longstreet  saves  High  Bridge,  a  Vital  Point— 
Ewell  and  Others  compelled  to  surrender— General  Mahorie's  Account 
of  Interesting  Scenes— Magnitude  of  the  Disaster — "  Is  the  Army  dis 
solving?"— General  Reed  mortally  wounded — Panic  occurs,  but  Order 
is  restored— General  Gregg  and  Part  of  his  Cavalry  Command  captured 
by  Rosser  and  Mumford. 

THE  darkness  of  night  still  covered  us  when  we  crossed 
over  James  River  by  the  pontoon  bridge,  but  before  long 
land  and  water  batteries  lifted  their  bombs  over  their  lazy 
curves,  screaming  shells  came  through  the  freighted  night 
to  light  our  ride,  and  signal  sky-rockets  gave  momentary 
illumination.  Our  noble  beasts  peered  through  the  loaded 
air  and  sniffed  the  coming  battle  ;  night-birds  fluttered 
from  their  startled  cover,  and  the  solid  pounding  upon 
Mahone's  defensive  walls  drove  the  foxes  from  their 
lairs.  If  tears  and  prayers  could  have  put  out  the  light 
it  would  not  have  passed  Petersburg, — but  it  passed  by 
twenty  miles.  A  hundred  guns  and  more  added  their 
lightning  and  thunder  to  the  storm  of  war  that  carried 
consternation  to  thousands  of  long-apprehensive  people. 

The  cause  was  lost,  but  the  end  was  not  yet.  The  noble 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  once,  twice  conqueror  of 
empire,  must  bite  the  dust  before  its  formidable  adversary. 

The  impulse  was  to  stop  and  guard  Mahone,  but  some 
of  his  men  had  been  called  to  assist  in  guarding  else 
where,  which,  with  our  imperative  orders,  admonished  us 
that  he  must  be  left  to  his  fate,  and  Weitzel's  fire  upon 
the  lines  we  had  just  left  told  of  his  orders  to  be  prepared 

603 


604  FROM    MAKASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

for  the  grand  enveloping  charge.  But  the  order  for 
Weitzel's  part  in  the  general  charge  was  afterwards  sus 
pended  until  enough  troops  could  be  sent  to  assure  success. 
Had  General  Grant  known  that  Field's  division  was  with 
drawn  during  the  night,  Weitzel's  assault  would  have 
gone  in  the  general  move  of  the  morning  of  the  2d,  and 
Richmond,  with  the  Confederate  authorities,  would  have 
been  taken  before  noon. 

As  morning  approached  the  combat  was  heavier.  The 
rolling  thunder  of  the  heavy  metal  reverberated  along 
the  line,  and  its  bursting  blaze  spread  afar  to  light  the 
doom  of  the  army  once  so  proud  to  meet  the  foe, — match 
less  Army  of  Northern  Virginia ! 

General  Grant  had  ordered  assault  for  four  o'clock,  but 
it  was  near  five  before  there  was  light  enough  for  the  men 
to  see  their  way  across  the  line  and  over  the  works.  Our 
night-ride  was  beyond  range  of  the  enemy's  batteries. 
Crossing  the  Appomattox,  we  rode  through  the  streets  of 
Petersburg  for  General  Lee's  head-quarters,  some  miles 
farther  west.  As  no  part  of  the  command  had  reached 
the  station  when  we  passed,  orders  were  left  for  the  de 
tachments  to  march  as  soon  as  they  landed. 

Before  the  first  rays  of  morning  we  found  general  head 
quarters.  Some  members  of  the  staff  were  up  and  dressed, 
but  the  general  was  yet  on  his  couch.  When  told  of  my 
presence,  he  called  me  to  a  seat  at  his  bedside,  and  gave 
orders  for  our  march  to  support  the  broken  forces  about 
Five  Forks.  He  had  no  censure  for  any  one,  but  men 
tioned  the  great  numbers  of  the  enemy  and  the  superior 
repeating  rifles  of  his  cavalry.  He  was  ill,  suffering  from 
the  rheumatic  ailment  that  he  had  been  afflicted  with  for 
years,  but  keener  trouble  of  mind  made  him  in  a  measure 
superior  to  the  shooting  pains  of  his  disease. 

From  the  line  gained  by  the  Sixth  Corps  on  the  25th 
it  was  a  run  of  but  two  or  three  minutes  across  to  the 
Confederate  works. 


PETERSBURG.  605 

At  4.45,  General  Wright  advanced  as  the  signal  for 
general  assault,  General  Lee  was  not  through  with  his 
instructions  for  our  march  when  a  staff-officer  came  in  and 
reported  that  the  lines  in  front  of  his  head-quarters  were 
broken.  Drawing  his  wrapper  about  him,  he  walked  with 
me  to  the  front  door  and  saw,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  cover 
the  field,  a  line  of  skirmishers  in  quiet  march  towards  us. 
It  was  hardly  light  enough  to  distinguish  the  blue  from 
the  gray. 

General  Wright  drove  in  our  picket  line,  and  in  des 
perate  charges  crowned  the  Confederate  works.  General 
Gibbon  followed  the  move  with  his  divisions  of  the 
Twenty-fourth  and  Twenty-fifth  Corps,  one  of  his  bri 
gades  (Harris's)  carrying  part  of  the  Confederate  works. 
The  troops,  weary  of  their  all-night  watch  and  early 
battle,  halted  to  close  their  ranks  and  wait  for  the 
skirmish  line  to  open  up  the  field.  General  Lee  appealed 
to  have  me  interpose  and  stop  the  march,  but  not  a  man 
of  my  command  was  there,  nor  had  we  notice  that  any 
of  them  had  reached  the  station  at  Petersburg. 

All  staff-officers  mounted  and  rode  to  find  the  parts  of 
Heth's  and  Wilcox's  divisions  that  had  been  forced  from 
their  lines.  The  display  of  officers  riding  in  many  di 
rections  seemed  to  admonish  the  skirmishers  to  delay 
under  cover  of  an  intervening  swale.  The  alarm  reached 
General  A.  P.  Hill,  of  the  Third  Corps,  who  rode  off  to 
find  his  troops,  but  instead  came  suddenly  upon  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  in  their  concealment.  He  wheeled 
and  made  a  dash  to  escape,  but  the  Federal  fire  had  deadly 
effect,  the  gallant  general  fell,  and  the  Southern  service 
lost  a  sword  made  bright  by  brave  work  upon  many  heavy 
fields. 

General  Humphreys,  of  the  Second,  followed  the  move 
of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  General  Parke  assaulted  on  the 
Bermuda  Hundred  front  and  at  Petersburg.  He  had 
partial  success  at  the  former,  but  was  repulsed  when  he 


606  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

met  Mahone's  strong  line.     At  Petersburg  he  had  more 
success,  capturing  twelve  guns! 

General  Sheridan,  reinforced  by  Miles's  division,  was 
ordered  to  follow  up  his  work  on  the  right  bank.  The 
reinforcements  sent  under  Lieutenant-General  Anderson 
joined  General  Pickett  at  night  of  the  1st,  and  the  com 
bined  forces  succeeded  in  getting  out  of  the  way  of  the 
Union  infantry,  and  they  gave  the  cavalry  a  severe  trial 
a  little  before  night  at  Amazon  Creek,  where  the  pursuit 
rested  ;  but  the  Union  forces  made  some  important  cap 
tures  of  artillery  and  prisoners.  The  divisions  of  Heth 
and  Wilcox  moved  to  the  right  and  left  to  collect  their 
broken  files.  General  Wright  wheeled  to  the  right  and 
massed  the  Sixth  Corps  for  its  march  to  Petersburg,  and 
was  joined  by  General  Gibbon. 

Not  venturing  to  hope,  I  looked  towards  Petersburg 
and  saw  General  Benning,  with  his  Rock  brigade,  winding 
in  rapid  march  around  the  near  hill.  He  had  but  six 
hundred  of  his  men.  I  asked  for  two  hundred,  and  led 
them  off  to  the  canal  on  our  right,  which  was  a  weak 
point,  threatened  by  a  small  body  of  skirmishers,  and 
ordered  the  balance  of  his  troops  deployed  as  skirmishers 
in  front  of  the  enemy's  main  force. 

I  rode  then  to  Benning's  line  of  skirmishers,  and  at  the 
middle  point  turned  and  rode  at  a  walk  to  the  top  of  the 
hill,  took  out  my  glasses,  and  had  a  careful  view  of  the 
enemy's  formidable  masses.  I  thought  I  recognized  Gen 
eral  Gibbon,  and  raised  my  hat,  but  he  was  busy  and  did 
not  see  me.  There  were  two  forts  at  our  line  of  works, — 
Gregg  and  Whitworth.  General  Grant  rode  over  the 
captured  works  and  ordered  the  forts  taken.  Upon  with 
drawing  my  glasses  I  looked  to  the  right  and  left,  and 
saw  Benning's  four  hundred  standing  in  even  line  with 
me,  viewing  the  masses  preparing  for  their  march  to 
meet  us. 

During  a  few  moments  of  quiet,  General  Lee  despatched 


PETERSBURG.  607 

to  Richmond  of  affairs  at  Petersburg,  and  to  advise  that 
our  troops  must  abandon  their  lines  and  march  in  retreat 
as  soon  as  night  could  cover  the  move. 

It  was  eleven  o'clock  of  the  morning  when  the  despatch 
reached  Richmond.  It  was  the  Sabbath-day.  The  city 
was  at  profound  worship.  The  President  was  at  St. 
Paul's  Church.  My  wife  was  there  (rest  her  spirit !)  and 
heard  the  pastor,  Mr.  Minnegerode,  read,  "  The  Lord  is 
in  his  holy  temple:  let  all  the  earth  keep  silence  before 
him."  The  full  congregation  rose,  and  the  air  whispered 
silence.  The  solemnity  was  broken  as  a  swift  despatch- 
bearer  entered  the  portals  and  walked  with  quiet  but 
rapid  steps  up  the  aisle  to  the  chancel.  He  handed  the 
President  a  sealed  envelope.  After  reading,  the  Presi 
dent  took  his  hat  and  walked  with  dignity  down  the  aisle. 
Service  was  resumed,  but  presently  came  another  mes 
senger  for  some  of  the  ladies,  then  another,  and  still 
another,  and  in  a  few  moments  the  congregation,  followed 
by  the  minister,  giving  up  the  sacred  service,  passed  out 
and  to  their  homes  to  prepare,  in  silent  resignation,  for 
whatever  was  to  come. 

The  tragic  scenes  of  the  south  side,  in  a  different  way, 
were  as  impressive  as  these.  General  Gibbon  prepared 
his  divisions  under  Foster  and  Turner  for  assault  upon 
Forts  Gregg  and  Whitworth,  and  when  the  Sixth  Corps 
lined  up  with  him,  he  ordered  the  divisions  to  their  work. 
As  they  advanced  the  other  brigades  of  Field's  division 
came  up,  were  aligned  before  the  enemy's  heavy  massing 
forces,  and  ordered  to  intrench.  General  Foster  found 
his  work  at  Fort  Gregg  called  for  all  the  force  and  skill 
that  he  could  apply.  He  made  desperate  assault,  but  was 
checked,  and  charged  again  and  again,  even  to  the  bayonet, 
before  he  could  mount  the  parapets  and  claim  the  fort. 
It  had  been  manned  by  part  of  Harris's  brigade  (Twelfth 
Mississippi  Regiment,  under  Captain  J.  H.  Duncan,  three 
hundred  men  of  Mahone's  division).  Fifty-five  dead 


608  FEOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

were  found  in  the  fort ;  two  hundred  and  fifty,  including 
wounded,  were  prisoners. 

General  Turner  attacked  at  Fort  Whitworth,  and  had 
easier  work.  General  Wilcox,  thinking  it  a  useless  sac 
rifice  to  try  to  hold  it,  ordered  his  troops  withdrawn,  and 
many  got  out  in  time  to  escape  the  heavy  assault,  but 
many  were  taken  prisoners.  General  Gibbon  lost  ten  offi 
cers  and  one  hundred  and  twelve  men  killed,  twenty-seven 
officers  and  five  hundred  and  sixty-five  men  wounded ; 
two  pieces  of  artillery  and  several  colors  were  captured. 

It  was  my  time  next.  General  Meade  called  Miles's 
division  back  to  the  Second  Corps,  and  prepared  to  march 
down  upon  Petersburg,  but  General  Grant  thought  that 
the  work  might  prove  hazardous  of  delay  to  his  plans  for 
the  next  day  ;  that  General  Lee  was  obliged  to  pull  away 
from  his  lines  during  the  night  to  find  escape,  and  standing 
as  he  was  he  would  have  the  start,  while  at  Petersburg  he 
would  be  behind  him.  He  therefore  ordered  all  things  in 
readiness  for  his  march  westward  at  early  light  of  the 
next  morning. 

After  A.  P.  Hill  fell  his  staff  and  corps  were  assigned 
as  part  of  my  command.  Heth's  and  Wilcox's  divisions 
were  much  broken  by  the  losses  of  the  day.  Mahone  had 
repulsed  the  attack  made  upon  his  position,  and  had  his 
division  in  good  order  and  spirits,  except  the  regiment  of 
Harris's  brigade  that  was  at  Fort  Gregg. 

General  Lee's  order  for  retreat  was  out  in  time  to  have 
the  troops  take  up  the  march  as  soon  as  night  came.  The 
troops  at  Petersburg  were  to  cross  the  Appomattox  at  the 
bridge  there,  Mahone's  division  to  march  to  Chesterfield 
Court-House  and  cover  the  march  of  the  troops  from  the 
north  side.  General  Ewell,  commanding  on  the  north  side, 
was  to  cross  his  divisions,  one  at  the  lower  bridge,  the 
other  at  Richmond.  Lieutenant-General  Anderson  and 
Major-General  Pickett,  with  the  cavalry,  were  to  march 
up  the  south  bank  of  the  Appomattox. 


PETERSBURG.  609 

Ffeld's  division  and  parts  of  Heth's  and  Wilcox's 
crossed  the  river  soon  after  dark,  and  were  followed  by 
the  Second  Corps,  which  wrecked  the  bridge  behind  it. 
G.  W.  C.  Lee's  division,  including  the  garrison  at  Chapin's 
Bluff,  crossed  the  James  at  the  lower  bridge,  breaking  it 
when  they  had  passed.  The  sailors  and  marines  at 
Drury's  Bluff,  on  the  south  side,  failed  to  receive  orders, 
but,  under  advice  from  General  Mahone,  got  off  in  good 
season  and  marched  through  Chesterfield  Court-House  to 
join  G.  W.  C.  Lee's  division  in  its  after-march.  General 
Kershaw  crossed  at  Richmond.  As  the  division  came 
over  the  bridge  the  structure  was  fired  (supposedly  by  an 
incendiary),  and  Kershaw  had  to  go  through  the  flames 
at  double-quick  time.  EwelPs  command  was  united  near 
Manchester  and  pursued  its  march.  General  Mahone 
marched  on  his  line  just  mentioned. 

After  a  tramp  of  sixteen  miles  through  mud,  my  column 
halted  for  a  short  rest,  and  marched  to  Goode's  Bridge  on 
the  3d.  Field's  and  Wilcox's  divisions  were  put  across 
the  Appomattox  to  guard  against  threatening  moves  of 
cavalry.  In  the  forenoon  of  the  4th,  Mahone's  division 
crossed, — also  a  part  of  Heth's  that  had  been  cut  off, 
and  had  marched  up  on  the  south  side, — and  our  march 
was  continued  to  Amelia  Court-House,  the  enemy's 
cavalry  constantly  threatening  our  left  flank.  At  the 
Court-House  the  cavalry  was  more  demonstrative  and 
seemed  ready  to  offer  battle.  ^  Field,  Heth,  Wilcox,  and 
the  artillery  were  put  in  position  and  looked  for  oppor 
tunity  to  strike  the  head  of  the  enemy's  column  and 
delay  his  march.  [  But  it  proved  to  be  only  the  purpose 
of  the  cavalry  to  delay  our  march  while  the  enemy  was 
passing  his  heavier  column  by  us  to  Jetersville.  I 

Orders  had  been  sent  for   provisions   to   meet  us  at 

Vthe  Court-House,  but  they  were  not  there,  so  we  lost 
the  greater  part  of  a  day  gathering  supplies  from  the 
farmers. 


610  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Our  purpose  had  been  to  march  through  Burkeville  to 

join  our  forces  to  those  of  General  J.  E.  Johnston  in 

iNorth  Carolina,  but  at  Jetersville,  on  the  5th,  we  found 

the  enemy  square  across  the  route  in  force  and  intrench 

ing,  where  our  cavalry  under  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  en 

gaged  him.     General  Field  put  out  a  strong  line  of  skir 

mishers   to  support   the   cavalry.      Field's,  Heth's,  and 

Wilcox's  divisions  and  artillery  were  prepared  for  action 

and  awaited  orders.     General  Meadewas  in  front  of  us 


withj^e  Sj^  and  Sheridan's  cavalry, 

but  his  Sixth^Qojjis_was_not  up.  General  Titzhugh  Lee 
had  been  sent  by  the  Painesville  road  with  the  balance  of 
his  cavalry  to  guard  the  trains  raided  by  detachments  of 
the  enemy,  which  latter  made  some  important  captures. 

General  Lee  was  with  us  at  Jetersville,  and,  after  care 
ful  reconnoissance,  thought  the  enemy's  position  too  strong 
to  warrant  aggressive  battle.  He  sent  for  some  of  the 
farmers  to  get  more  definite  information  of  the  country 
and  the  strength  of  the  position  in  front  of  us,  but  they 
knew  nothing  beyond  the  roads  and  by-roads  from  place 
to  place,  i  General  Meade,  finding  that  his  Sixth  Corps 
could  not  join  him  till  a  late  hour,  decided  to  wait  till 
next  morning  for  his  attack.  General  Ord  rested  his 
column  for  the  night  at  Burkeville.  I  The  enemy  was  quiet 
at  Jetersville,  except  for  a  light  exchange  of  cavalry  fire. 
No  orders  came,  the  afternoon  was  passing,  further  delay 
seemed  perilous.  I  drew  the  command  off  and  filed  to 
the  right  to  cross  Flat  Creek  to  march  for  Farmville. 
The  other  infantry  and  trains  and  artillery  followed  and 
kept  the  march  until  a  late  hour,  halting  for  a  short  rest 
before  daylight. 

Early  on  the  6th,  General  Meade  advanced  for  battle, 
and,  not  finding  us  at  Jetersville,  started  towards  Amelia 
Court-House  to  look  for  us,  but  General  Humphreys,  of 
his  Second  Corps,  learned  that  our  rear-guard  was  on 
the  north  side  of  Flat  Creek  on  the  westward  march. 


PETEKSBURG.  611 

General  Griffin,  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  also  had  informa 
tion  of  troops  in  march  west,  and  General  Meade,  there 
fore,  changed  direction  to  pursue  with  his  Second  and 
Sixth  Corps,  putting  the  Fifth  on  the  Painesville  road. 
General  Sheridan  despatched  General  Ord  that  we  had 
broken  away  from  him  and  were  marching  direct  for 
Burkeville.  The  latter  prepared  to  receive  us,  but  soon 
learned  that  we  had  taken  another  route.  He  had  pre 
viously  detached  two  regiments  of  infantry  (five  hundred 
men),  under  Colonel  Washburn,  with  orders  to  make 
rapid  march  and  burn  High  Bridge.  To  this  force  he 
afterwards  sent  eighty  cavalrymen,  under  Brigadier- 
General  Theodore  Reed,  of  his  staff,  who  conducted  the 
column,  and  put  his  command  in  march  to  follow  by 
the  road  through  Rice's  Station. 

After  repairing  the  bridge  at  Flat  Creek,  General 
Humphreys  marched  in  hot  pursuit  of  our  rear-guard, 
followed  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  Merritt's  and  Crook's  cav 
alry  moving  on  the  left  of  our  column  as  we  marched. 
General  Humphreys,  in  his  account  of  the  pursuit,  says,— 

"A  sharp  and  running  fight  commenced  at  once  with  Gordon's 
corps  which  was  continued  over  a  distance  of  fourteen  miles,  dur 
ing  which  several  partially-intrenched  positions  were  carried."  * 

My  column  marched  before  daylight  on  the  6th.  The 
design  from  the  night  we  left  Petersburg  was  that  its 
service  should  be  to  head  off  and  prevent  the  enemy's 
infantry  columns  passing  us  and  standing  across  our 
march. 

At  Sailor's  Creek  the  road  "  forks," — one  road  to  the 
High  Bridgejgrossing:  of  Appomattox  River^~the~other  by 
Rice^  Statipn  to  Farmville.  We  had  information  of 
Ord's  column  moving  towards  Rice's  Station,  and  I  was 
ordered  to  that  point  to  meet  it,  the  other  columns  to 
follow  the  trains  over  the  bridge.  At  Rice's  Station  the 


Virginia  Campaigns. 


612  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO   APPOMATTOX. 

command  was  prepared  for  action, — Field's  division  across 
the  road  of  Ord's  march,  Wilcox  on  Field's  right ;  both 
ordered  to  intrench,  artillery  in  battery.  Heth's  division 
was  put  in  support  of  Wilcox,  Mahone  to  support  Field. 
Just  then  I  learned  that  Ord's  detachment  of  bridge- 
burners  had  passed  out  of  sight  when  the  head  of  my 
command  arrived.  I  had  no  cavalry,  and  the  head  of 
Ord's  command  was  approaching  in  sight ;  but  directly 
General  Rosser  reported  withJiis  division-of-cavalry.  He 
was  ordered  to  follow  after  the  bridge-burners  and  capture 
or  destroy  the  detachment,  if  it  took  the  last  man  of  his 
command  to  do  it.  General  Ord  came  on  and  drove  in 
my  line  of  skirmishers,  but  I  rode  to  meet  them,  marched 
them  back  to  the  line,  with  orders  to  hold  it  till  called  in. 
Orel's  force  proved  to  be  the  head  of  his  column,  and  he 
was  not  prepared  to  press  for  general  engagement. 

General  T.  T.  Mumford  reported  with  his  cavalry  and 
was  ordered  to  follow  Rosser,  with  similar  directions. 
Gary's  cavalry  came  and  reported  to  me.  High  Bridge 
was  a  vital  point,  for  over  it  thejrains  werg.  to  pass,  and 
I  wasTTmder  theTmpression  that  General  Lee  was  there, 
passing  wTtliTFieTest'of  his  army,  but  hearing  our  troops 
engaged  at  Rice's  Station,  he  had  ridden  to  us  and  was 
waiting  near  Mahone's  division.  Ord's  command  was  not 
up  till  near  night,  and  he  only  engaged  with  desultory 
fire  of  skirmishers  and  occasional  exchange  of  battery 
practice,  arranging  to  make  his  attack  the  next  morning. 

General  EwelPs  column  was  up  when  we  left  Amelia 
Court-House,  and  followed  Anderson's  by  Amelia  Springs, 
where  he  was  detained  some  little  time  defending  trains 
threatened  by  cavalry ;  at  the  same  time  our  rear-guard 
was  near  him,  followed  by  the  enemy.  jNear  Deatonville 
Crook's  cavalry  got  in  on  our  trains  and  caused  delay  of 
several  hours  to  Anderson's  march,  i  Crook  was  joined  by 
part  of  Merritt's  cavalry  and  repeated  the  attack  on  the 
trains,  but  Ewell  was  up  in  time  to  aid  in  repelling  the 


PETERSBURG.  613 

attack,  and  the  march  was  resumed,  the  enemy's  cavalry 
moving  on  their  left  flank. 

Anderson  crossed  Sailor's  Creek,  closely  followed  by 
Ewell.  The  route  by  which  they  were  to  march  was  by 
High  Bridge,  but  they  were  on  strange  ground,  without 
maps,  or  instructions,  or  commander.  In  the  absence  of 
orders  Anderson  thought  to  march  for  the  noise  of  battle, 
at  Rice's  Station.  They  had  no  artillery  or  cavalry. 
The  chief  of  cavalry  was  there,  but  his  troopers  were 
elsewhere,  and  he  rode  away,  advising  the  force  to  follow 
him.  The  rear-guard  came  up  rapidly  and  essayed  to 
deploy  for  defence,  but  the  close  pursuit  of  Humphreys's 
corps  forced  its  continued  march  for  High  Bridge,  letting 
the  pursuit  in  upon  Ewell's  rear.  As  Anderson  marched 
he  found  Merritt's  cavalry  square  across  his  route.  Hum 
phreys  was  close  upon  Ewell,  but  the  former  awaited 
battle  for  the  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

There  was  yet  a  way  of  escape  from  the  closing  clutches 
of  the  enemy  by  filing  to  their  right  and  marching  to  the 
rear  of  the  command  at  Rice's  Station  ;  but  they  were 
true  soldiers,  and  decided  to  fight,  even  to  sacrifice  their 
commands  if  necessary,  to  break  or  delay  the  pursuit  until 
the  trains  and  rear-guard  could  find  safety  beyond  High 
Bridge. 

Ewell  deployed  his  divisions,  Kershaw's  on  the  right, 
G.  W.  C.  Lee's  on  the  left.  Their  plan  was,  that  An 
derson  should  attack  and  open  the  way  while  Ewell  de 
fended  the  rear.  As  Anderson  attacked,  Wright's  corps 
was  up,  Humphreys  had  matured  his  plans,  and  the  at 
tack  of  Anderson  hastened  that  of  the  enemy  upon  the 
Confederate  rear.  Anderson  had  some  success,  and  Ewell 
received  the  assaults  with  resolute  coolness,  and  at  one 
moment  pushed  his  fight  to  aggressive  return,  but  the 
enemy,  finding  that  there  was  no  artillery  with  the  Con 
federates,  dashed  their  batteries  into  closer  range,  putting 
in  artillery  and  infantry  fire,  front  and  flanks,  until  the 


614  FROM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

Confederate  rear  was  crushed  to  fragments/  General 
Ewell  surrendered ;  so  also  did  General  G.  W.  C.  Lee  with 
his  division.  General  Kershaw  advised  such  of  his  men 
as  could  to  make  their  escape,  and  surrendered  with  his 
division.  General  Anderson  got  away  with  the  greater 
part  of  B.  R.  Johnson's  division,  and  Pickett  with  six 
hundred  men.  Generals  Corse  and  Hunton  and  others 
of  Pickett's  men  were  captured.  About  two  hundred  of 
Kershaw's  division  got  away. 

General  R.  S.  Ewell  and  General  R.  H.  Anderson  are 
barely  known  in  the  retreat,  but  their  stand  and  fight  on 
that  trying  march  were  among  the  most  soldier-like  of 
the  many  noble  deeds  of  the  war. 

While  waiting  near  my  rear,  General  Lee  received  in 
formation,  through  Colonel  Venable,  of  his  staff,  as  to  the 
disaster  at  Sailor's  Creek.  He  drew  Mahone's  division 
away,  and  took  it  back  to  find  the  field.  General  Mahone 
writes  of  the  scenes  that  he  witnessed  as  follows : 

"  As  we  were  moving  up  in  line  of  battle,  General  Lee  riding 
with  me  and  remonstrating  about  the  severity  of  my  note  in  re 
spect  to  Colonel  Marshall's  interference  with  my  division  the 
night  before,  up  rode  Colonel  Venable,  of  General  Lee's  staff,  and 
wanted  to  know  if  he,  General  Lee,  had  received  his  message. 
General  Lee  replied  'No/  when  Colonel  Venable  informed  him 
that  the  enemy  had  captured  the  wagon-trains  at  Sailor's  Creek. 
General  Lee  exclaimed,  '  Where  is  Anderson  ?  Where  is  Ewell  ? 
It  is  strange  I  can't  hear  from  them.'  Then  turning  to  me,  he  said', 
1  General  Mahone,  I  have  no  other  troops,  will  you  take  your  di 
vision  to  Sailor's  Creek  f  and  I  promptly  gave  the  order  by  the 
left  flank,  and  off  we  were  for  Sailor's  Creek,  where  the  disaster  had 
occurred.  General  Lee  rode  with  me,  Colonel  Venable  a  little  in 
the  rear.  On  reaching  the  south  crest  of  the  high  ground  at  the 
crossing  of  the  river  road  overlooking  Sailor's  Creek,  the  disaster 
which  had  overtaken  our  army  was  in  full  view,  and  the  scene 
beggars  description, — hurrying  teamsters  with  their  teams  and 
dangling  traces  (no  wagons),  retreating  infantry  without  guns, 
many  without  hats,  a  harmless  mob,  with  the  massive  columns 
of  the  enemy  moving  orderly  on.  At  this  spectacle  General  Lee 
straightened  himself  in  his  saddle,  and,  looking  more  the  soldier 


PETERSBURG. 


615 


than  ever,  exclaimed,  as  if  talking  to  himself,  <My  God  !  has  the 
army  dissolved?'  As  quickly  as  I  could  control  my  own  voice  I 
replied,  'No,  general,  here  are  troops  ready  to  do  their  duty;' 
when,  in  a  mellowed  voice,  he  replied,  <  Yes,  general,  there  are 
some  true  men  left.  Will  you  please  keep  those  people  back?' 
As  I  was  placing  my  division  in  position  to  '  keep  those  people 
back,'  the  retiring  herd  just  referred  to  had  crowded  around 
General  Lee  while  he  sat  on  his  horse  with  a  Confederate  battle- 
flag  in  his  hand.  I  rode  up  and  requested  him  to  give  me  the 
flag,  which  he  did. 

"It  was  near  dusk,  and  he  wanted  to  know  of  me  how  to  get 
away.  I  replied,  '  Let  General  Longstreet  move  by  the  river  road 
to  Farmville,  and  cross  the  river  there,  and  I  will  go  through  the 
woods  to  the  High  Bridge  (railroad  bridge)  and  cross  there.'  To 
this  he  assented.  I  asked  him  then,  after  crossing  at  the  High 
Bridge,  what  I  should  do,  and  his  reply  was,  to  exercise  my  judg 
ment.  I  wanted  to  know  what  should  be  done  with  the  bridge 
after  crossing  it.  He  said,  'Set  fire  to  it,'  and  I  replied  that  the 
destruction  of  a  span  would  as  well  retard  the  enemy  as  the  de 
struction  of  the  whole  half  mile  of  bridge,  and  asked  him  to  call 
up  Colonel  Talcott,  of  the  Engineers'  Regiment,  and  personally 
direct  him  in  the  matter,  which  he  did." 

General  Mahone  withdrew  at  eleven  o'clock  at  night 
through  the  wood,  found  the  bridge,  had  the  fragments  of 
commands  over  before  daylight,  and  crossed  High  Bridge. 
The  parties  called  to  fire  the  bridge  failed  to  appear.     He 
sent  a  brigade  back  to  do  the  work,  and  had  a  sharp  skir 
mish  in  checking  the  enemy  long  enough  to  start  the  fire, 
after  which  he  withdrew  as  far  as  Cumberland  Church 
and  deployed  for  battle,  Poague's  artillery  on  his  right. 
General  Eosser  got  up  with  the  detachment  sent  to  burn 
the  bridge,  and  attacked.     General  Reed,  seeing  his  ap 
proach,  found  a  defensive   position,    and   arranged   the 
command  to  receive  battle.      General  Mumford   got  up 
and  deployed  his  troopers,  dismounted,  on  Rosser's  left. 
Nothing  daunted,  General  Reed  received  the  attack,  and 
in  gallant  fight  made  one  or  two  counter-charges  with  his 
small  cavalry  force,  but  ere  long  he  was  mortally  wounded, 
as  was  Colonel  Washburn.     Most  of  his  cavalry  officers 


616  FROM    MANASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

and  many  of  his  infantry  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  the 
rest  surrendered.  Reed's  fight  was  as  gallant  and  skilful 
as  a  soldier  could  make,  and  its  noise  in  rear  of  Sailor's 
Creek  may  have  served  to  increase  the  confusion  there. 
The  result  shows  the  work  of  these  remnants  of  Confed 
erate  veterans  as  skilful  and  worthy  of  their  old  chief  who 
fell  at  Yellow  Tavern. 

I  heard  nothing  of  the  affair  at  Sailor's  Creek,  nor  from 
General  Lee,  until  next  morning.  Our  work  at  Rice's 
Station  was  not  very  serious,  but  was  continued  until 
night,  when  we  marched  and  crossed  the  Appomattox  at 
Farmville  without  loss,  some  of  Rosser's  and  Mumford's 
cavalry  following.  We  crossed  early  in  the  morning  and 
received  two  days'  rations, — the  first  regular  issue  since 
we  left  Richmond, — halted  our  wagons,  made  fires,  got 
out  cooking  utensils,  and  were  just  ready  to  prepare  a  good 
breakfast.  We  had  not  heard  of  the  disasters  on  the  other 
route  and  the  hasty  retreat,  and  were  looking  for  a  little 
quiet  to  prepare  breakfast,  when  General  Lee  rode  up  and 
said  that  the  bridges  had  been  fired  before  his  cavalry 
crossed,  that  part  of  that  command  was  cut  off  and  lost, 
and  that  the  troops  should  hurry  on  to  position  at  Cum 
berland  Church. 

I  reminded  him  that  there  were  fords  over  which  his 
cavalry  could  cross,  and  that  they  knew  of  or  would  surely 
find  them.  Everything  except  the  food  was  ordered  back 
to  the  wagons  and  dumped  in. 

Meanwhile,  the  alarm  had  spread,  and  our  teamsters, 
frightened  by  reports  of  cavalry  trouble  and  approaching 
fire  of  artillery,  joined  in  the  panic,  put  whips  to  their 
teams  as  quick  as  the  camp-kettles  were  tumbled  over  the 
tail-boards  of  the  wagons,  and  rushed  through  the  woods 
to  find  a  road  somewhere  in  front  of  them.  The  com 
mand  was  ordered  under  arms  and  put  in  quick  march, 
but  General  Lee  urged  double-quick.  Our  cavalry  was 
then  engaged  near  Farmville,  and  presently  came  a  reck- 


PETERSBURG.  617 

less  charge  of  Gregg's  troopers  towards  parts  of  Rosser's 
and  Mumford's  commands.  Heth's  division  of  infantry 
was  sent  to  support  them.  As  the  balance  of  the  command 
marched,  General  Lee  took  the  head  of  the  column  and 
led  it  on  the  double-quick. 

I  thought  it  better  to  let  them  pass  me,  and,  to  quiet 
their  apprehensions  a  little,  rode  at  a  walk.  General  Ma- 
hone  received  the  attack  of  part  of  the  enemy's  Second 
Corps,  like  Gregg's  cavalry  making  reckless  attack.  The 
enemy  seemed  to  think  they  had  another  Sailor's  Creek 
affair,  and  part  of  their  attack  got  in  as  far  as  Poague's 
battery,  but  Mahone  recovered  it,  and  then  drove  off  an 
attack  against  his  front.  General  Gregg  and  a  con 
siderable  part  of  his  command  were  captured  by  Rosser 
and  Mumford.  At  Cumberland  Church  the  command 
deployed  on  the  right  of  Poague's  battery,  but  Mahone 
reported  a  move  by  part  of  Miles's  division  to  turn  his 
left  which  might  dislodge  him.  G.  T.  Anderson's  bri 
gade  of  Field's  division  was  sent  with  orders  to  get 
around  the  threatening  force  and  break  it  up.  Mahone 
so  directed  them  through  a  woodland  that  they  succeeded 
in  over-reaching  the  threatened  march,  and  took  in  some 
three  hundred  prisoners,*  the  last  of  our  trouble  for  the 
day.  General  Lee  stopped  at  a  cottage  near  my  line, 
where  I  joined  him  after  night ;  the  trains  and  other 
parts  of  his  army  had  moved  on  towards  Appomattox 
Court-House. 

*  General  Mahone  claimed  seven  hundred  in  all. 


CHAPTEE    XLIII. 

APPOMATTOX. 

Some  of  General  Lee's  Officers  say  to  him  that  "Further  Resistance 
is  Hopeless"— Longstreet  does  not  approve— General  Grant  calls  for 
Surrender— "  Not  yet"— The  Confederate  Chieftain  asks  Terms— His 
Response  to  his  Officers  as  represented  by  General  Pendleton — Corre 
spondence  of  Generals  Lee  and  Grant— Morning  of  A^mHl— General 
Lee  rides  to  meet  the  Federal  Commander,  while  Longstreet  forms 
the  Last  Line  of  Battle — Longstreet  endeavors  to  recall  his  Chief, 
hearing  of  a  Break  where  the  Confederate  Troops  could  pass— Custer 
demands  Surrender  of  Longstreet — Reminded  of  Irregularity,  and 
that  he  was  "  in  the  Enemy's  Lines"— Meeting  with  General  Grant- 
Capitulation— Last  Scenes. 

THE  beginning  of  the  end  was  now  at  hand, — not  per 
haps  necessarily,  but,  at  least,  as  the  sequence  of  cause  and 
effect  actually  followed. 

"  An  event  occurred  on  the  7th,"  says  General  Long, 
"which  must  not  be  omitted  from  the  narrative.  Per 
ceiving  the  difficulties  that  surrounded  the  army,  and  be 
lieving  its  extrication  hopeless,  a  number  of  the  principal 
officers,  from  a  feeling  of  affection  and  sympathy  for  the 
commander-in-chief,  and  with  a  wish  to  lighten  his  re 
sponsibility  and  soften  the  pain  of  defeat,  volunteered  to 
inform  him  that,  in  their  opinion,  the  struggle  had  reached 
a  point  where  further  resistance  was  hopeless,  and  that  the 
contest  should  be  terminated  and  negotiations  opened  for 
a  surrender  of  the  army.  The  delivery  of  this  opinion 
was  confided  to  General  Pendleton,  who,  both  by  his 
character  and  devotion  to  General  Lee,  was  well  qualified 
for  such  an  office.  The  names  of  Longstreet  and  some 
others,  who  did  not  coincide  in  the  opinion  of  their  asso 
ciates,  did  not  appear  in  the  list  presented  by  Pendleton."* 

A  little  after  nightfall  a  flag  of  truce  appeared  under 

*  Memoirs  of  General  Lee,  A.  L.  Long. 
618 


APPOMATTOX.  619 

torchlight  in  front  of  Mahone's  line  bearing  a  note  to 
General  Lee : 

/TRE 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

"5P.M.,  April?,  1865. 
"  GENERAL  K.  E.  LEE, 

,  "  Commanding  Confederate  States  Army : 

"GENERAL,— The  results  of  the  last  week  must  convince  you 
of  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  in  this  struggle.  I  feel  that  it  is  so,  and 
regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from  myself  the  responsibility  of  any 
further  effusion  of  blood  by  asking  of  you  the  surrender  of  that 
portion  of  the  Confederate  army  known  as  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant- General ',  Commanding  Armies  of  the  United  States.77 

I  was  sitting  at  his  side  when  the  note  was  delivered. 
He  read  it  and  handed  it  to  me  without  referring  to  its 
contents.  After  reading  it  I  gave  it  back,  saying,  "  Not 
yet." 

General  Lee  wrote  in  reply, — 

"April?,  1865. 

"GENERAL, — I  have  received  your  note  of  this  day.  Though 
not  entertaining  the  opinion  you  express  on  the  hopelessness  of 
further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
I  reciprocate  your  desire  to  avoid  useless  effusion  of  blood,  and 
therefore,  before  considering  your  proposition,  ask  the  terms  you 
will  offer  on  condition  of  its  surrender. 

"E.  E.  LEE, 

"  General. 
"  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GRANT, 

"  Commanding  Armies  of  the  United  States.77 

I  was  not  informed  of  the  contents  of  the  return  note, 
but  thought,  from  the  orders  of  the  night,  it  did  not  mean 
surrender.  General  Lee  ordered  my  command  from  for 
ward-  to  rear-guard,  and  his  cavalry  in  rear  of  the  march. 
The  road  was  clear  at  eleven  o'clock,  and  we  marched  at 
twelve.  The  enemy  left  us  to  a  quiet  day's  march  on  the 


620  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

8th,  nothing  disturbing  the  rear-guard,  and  our  left  flank 
being  but  little  annoyed,  but  our  animals  were  worn  and 
reduced  in  strength  by  the  heavy  haul  through  rain  and 
mud  during  the  march  from  Petersburg,  and  the  troops 
of  our  broken  columns  were  troubled  and  faint  of  heart. 

We  passed  abandoned  wagons  in  flames,  and  limbers 
and  caissons  of  artillery  burning  sometimes  in  the  middle 
of  the  road.  One  of  my  battery  commanders  reported 
his  horses  too  weak  to  haul  his  guns.  He  was  ordered  to 
bury  the  guns  and  cover  their  burial-places  with  old  leaves 
and  brushwood.  Many  weary  soldiers  were  picked  up, 
and  many  came  to  the  column  from  the  woodlands,  some 
with,  many  without,  arms, — all  asking  for  food. 

General  Grant  renewed  efforts  on  the  8th  to  find  a  way 
to  strike  across  the  head  of  our  march  by  his  cavalry  and 
the  Army  of  the  James,  pursuing  our  rear-guard  with  the 
Second  and  Sixth  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

In  the  forenoon,  General  Pendleton  came  to  me  and 
reported  the  proceedings  of  the  self-constituted  council 
of  war  of  the  night  before,  and  stated  that  he  had  been 
requested  to  make  the  report  and  ask  to  have  me  bear 
it  to  General  Lee,  in  the  name  of  the  members  of  the 
council.  Much  surprised,  I  turned  and  asked  if  he  did 
not  know  that  the  Articles  of  War  provided  that  officers 
or  soldiers  who  asked  commanding  officers  to  surrender 
should  be  shot,  and  said, — 

"If  General  Lee  doesn't  know  when  to  surrender  until  I  tell 
him,  he  will  never  know." 

It  seems  that  General  Pendleton  then  went  to  General 
Lee  and  made  the  report.  General  Long's  account  of  the 
interview,  as  reported  by  Pendleton,  is  as  follows : 

"General  Lee  was  lying  on  the  ground.  No  others  heard  the 
conversation  between  him  and  myself.  He  received  my  commu 
nication  with  the  reply,  '  Oh,  no,  I  trust  that  it  has  not  come  to 
that,7  and  added,  'General,  we  have  yet  too  many  bold  men  to 
think  of  laying  down  our  arms.  The  enemy  do  not  fight  with 


APPOMATTOX.  621 

spirit,  while  our  boys  still  do.  Besides,  if  I  were  to  say  a  word 
to  the  Federal  commander,  he  would  regard  it  as  such  a  confes 
sion  of  weakness  as  to  make  it  the  condition  of  demanding  an 
unconditional  surrender,  a  proposal  to  which  I  will  never  listen. 
...  I  have  never  believed  we  could,  against  the  gigantic  com 
bination  for  our  subjugation,  make  good,  in  the  long  run,  our 
independence,  unless  foreign  powers  should,  directly  or  indi 
rectly,  assist  us.  ...  But  such  considerations  really  make  with 
me  no  difference.  We  had,  I  was  satisfied,  sacred  principles  to 
maintain,  and  rights  to  defend,  for  which  we  were  in  duty  bound 
to  do  our  best,  even  if  we  perished  in  the  endeavor.' 

uSuch  were,  as  nearly  as  I  can  recall  them,  the  exact  words  of 
General  Lee  on  that  most  critical  occasion.  You  see  in  them  the 
soul  of  the  man.  Where  his  conscience  dictated  and  his  judgment 
decided,  there  his  heart  was."  * 

The  delicate  affection  that  prompted  the  knights  of 
later  days  to  offer  to  relieve  our  grand  commander  of  his 
official  obligations  and  take  upon  themselves  responsibility 
to  disarm  us  and  turn  us  over  to  the  enemy  is  somewhat 
pathetic,  but  when  to  it  are  applied  the  stern  rules  of  a 
soldier's  duty  upon  a  field  of  emergency,  when  the  com 
mander  most  needs  steady  hands  and  brave  hearts,  their 
proceeding  would  not  stand  the  test  of  a  military  tri 
bunal.  The  interesting  part  of  the  interview  is  that 
in  it  our  great  leader  left  a  sufficient  testimonial  of  his 
regard  as  a  legacy  to  the  soldiers  of  his  column  of  the 
right.  Though  commanders  of  other  columns  were  in 
mutinous  conduct  towards  him,  he  had  confidence  that 
we  were  firm  and  steady  in  waiting  to  execute  his  last 
command. 

During  the  day  General  Grant  wrote  General  Lee  in 
reply  to  his  note  of  the  7th  inquiring  as  to  terms  of  sur 
render, — 

"  April  8,  1865. 
"  GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

"  Commanding  Confederate  States  Army  : 

"  GENERAL, — Your  note  of  last  evening  in  reply  to  mine  of  the 
same  date,  asking  the  conditions  on  which  I  will  accept  surrender 

*  Memoirs  of  Robert  E. 


622  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  is  just  received.  In  reply  I 
would  say  that,  peace  being  my  great  desire,  there  is  but  one  con 
dition  I  would  insist  upon, — namely,  that  the  men  and  officers 
surrendered  shall  be  disqualified  for  taking  up  arms  again  against 
the  government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  exchanged.  I 
will  meet  you,  or  will  designate  officers  to  meet  any  officers  you 
might  name  for  the  same  purpose,  at  any  point  agreeable  to  you, 
for  the  purpose  of  arranging  definitely  the  terms  upon  which  the 
surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  be  received. 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 

"  Lieutenant- General." 
In  reply,  General  Lee  wrote, — 

" :  April  8,  1865. 

"  GENERAL, — I  received  at  a  late  hour  your  note  of  to-day.  In 
mine  of  yesterday  I  did  not  intend  to  propose  the  surrender  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  to  ask  the  terms  of  your 
proposition.  To  be  frank,  I  do  not  think  the  emergency  has 
arisen  to  call  for  the  surrender  of  this  army,  but  as  the  restora 
tion  of  peace  should  be  the  sole  object  of  all,  I  desired  to  know 
whether  your  proposals  would  lead  to  that  end.  I  cannot,  there 
fore,  meet  you  with  a  view  to  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia ;  but  as  far  as  your  proposal  may  affect  the 
Confederate  States  forces  under  my  command  and  tend  to  the 
restoration  of  peace,  I  should  be  pleased  to  meet  you  at  ten  A.M. 
to-morrow  on  the  old  stage  road  to  Eichmond,  between  the  picket 
lines  of  the  two  armies. 

"B.  E.  LEE, 

"General." 

The  enemy's  movements  of  the  day  were  impressive  of 
his  desire  to  get  by  our  left  flank  and  make  a  strong 
stand  across  the  route  of  our  head  of  column.  At  Pros 
pect  Station,  General  Sheridan  was  informed  of  four  trains 
of  cars  at  Appomattox  Station  loaded  with  provisions  for 
General  Lee's  army.  He  gave  notice  to  Merritt's  and 
Crook's  cavalry,  and  rode  twenty-eight  miles  in  time  for 
Ouster's  division  to  pass  the  station,  cut  off  the  trains,  and 
drive  back  the  guard  advancing  to  protect  them.  He 
helped  himself  to  the  provisions,  and  captured  besides 
twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  wagon  and  hospital 
train. 


APPOMATTOX.  623 

At  night  General  Lee  made  his  head-quarters  near  the 
rear-guard,  and  spread  his  couch  about  a  hundred  feet 
from  the  saddle  and  blanket  that  were  my  pillow  and 
spread  for  the  night.  If  he  had  a  more  comfortable  bed 
than  mine  I  do  not  know,  but  I  think  not. 

He  sent  for  his  cavalry  commander,  and  gave  orders  for 
him  to  transfer  his  troopers  from  the  rear  to  the  advanced 
guard,  and  called  General  Gordon,  commanding  in  front, 
for  report  and  orders.  The  advance  was  then  at  Appo- 
mattox  Court-House,  Wallace's  brigade  resting  in  the 
village.  His  orders  were  to  march  at  one  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  the  trains  and  advanced  forces  to  push  through 
the  village  in  time  for  my  column  to  stand  and  prepare 
to  defend  at  that  point  in  case  of  close  pursuit.  General 
Gordon  reported,  as  I  remember,  less  than  two  thousand 
men.  (General  Fitzhugh  Lee  puts  it  at  sixteen  hundred, 
but  he  may  have  overlooked  Wallace's  brigade,  which 
joined  the  advance  on  that  day.)  My  column  was  about 
as  it  was  when  it  marched  from  Petersburg.  Parts  of 
Swell's,  Anderson's,  and  Pickett's  commands  not  captured 
on  the  march  were  near  us,  and  reported  to  me,  except 
Wallace's  brigade. 

On  the  9th  the  rear-guard  marched  as  ordered,  but  soon 
came  upon  standing  trains  of  wagons  in  the  road  and 
still  in  park  alongside.  The  command  was  halted,  de 
ployed  into  position,  and  ordered  to  intrench  against  the 
pursuing  army. 

It  was  five  o'clock  when  the  advance  commands  moved, 
— four  hours  after  the  time  ordered.  To  these  General 
Long's  batteries  of  thirty  guns  were  attached.  They  met 
Sheridan's  cavalry  advancing  across  their  route.  The 
column  was  deployed,  the  cavalry  on  the  right  of  the  ar 
tillery  and  infantry,  as  they  advanced  to  clear  the  way. 
They  reported  some  success,  capturing  two  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  when  General  Ord's  column  came  up.  He  had, 
besides  his  Army  of  the  James,  the  Fifth  Army  Corps. 


624  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

These  commands,  with  the  cavalry,  pushed  the  Confeder 
ates  back  a  little,  while  the  two  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  were  advancing  against  my  rear-guard. 

Of  the  early  hours  of  this,  the  last  day  of  active  ex 
istence  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Colonel  Ven- 
able,  of  General  Lee's  staff,  wrote  thus  : 

u  At  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  that  fatal  day,  General 
Lee  rode  forward,  still  hoping  that  he  might  break  through  the 
countless  hordes  of  the  enemy,  who  hemmed  us  in.  Halting  a 
short  distance  in  rear  of  our  vanguard,  he  sent  me  on  to  General 
Gordon  to  ask  him  if  he  could  break  through  the  enemy.  I  found 
General  Gordon  and  General  Fitz  Lee  on  their  front  line  in  the 
dim  light  of  the  morning,  arranging  our  attack.  Gordon's  reply 
to  the  message  (I  give  the  expressive  phrase  of  the  gallant  Geor 
gian)  was  this  :  '  Tell  General  Lee  I  have  fought  my  corps  to  a 
frazzle,  and  I  fear  I  can  do  nothing  unless  I  am  heavily  supported 
by  Longstreet's  corps.' 

"When  I  bore  the  message  back  to  General  Lee,  he  said, 
1  Then  there  is  nothing  left  me  but  to  go  and  see  General  Grant, 
and  I  would  rather  die  a  thousand  deaths.' 

* '  Convulsed  with  passionate  grief,  many  were  the  wild  words 
which  we  spoke  as  we  stood  around  him.  Said  one,  l  Oh,  gen 
eral,  what  will  history  say  of  the  surrender  of  the  army  in  the 
field  f 

"He  replied,  'Yes,  I  know  they  will  say  hard  things  of  us; 
they  will  not  understand  how  we  are  overwhelmed  by  numbers. 
But  that  is  not  the  question,  colonel;  the  question  is,  "Is  it  right 
to  surrender  this  army  V '  If  it  is  right,  then  I  will  take  all  the 
responsibility !'  "  * 

Presently  General  Lee  called  to  have  me  ride  forward 
to  him.  He  was  dressed  in  a  suit  of  new  uniform,  sword 
and  sash,  a  handsomely  embroidered  belt,  boots,  and  a 
pair  of  gold  spurs.  At  first  approach  his  compact  figure 
appeared  as  a  man  in  the  flush  vigor  of  forty  summers, 
but  as  I  drew  near,  the  handsome  apparel  and  brave 
bearing  failed  to  conceal  his  profound  depression.  He 
stood  near  the  embers  of  some  burned  rails,  received  me 

*  Memoirs  of  Robert  E.  Lee,  A.  L.  Long. 


APPOMATTOX.  625 

with  graceful  salutation,  and  spoke  at  once  of  affairs  in 
front  and  the  loss  of  his  subsistence  stores.  He  remarked 
that  the  advanced  columns  stood  against  a  very  formidable 
force,  which  he  could  not  break  through,  while  General 
Meade  was  at  my  rear  ready  to  call  for  all  the  work  that 
the  rear-guard  could  do,  and,  closing  with  the  expression 
that  it  was  not  possible  for  him  to  get  along,  requested  my 
view.  I  asked  if  the  bloody  sacrifice  of  his  army  could 
in  any  way  help  the  cause  in  other  quarters.  He  thought 
not.  Then,  I  said,  your  situation  speaks  for  itself. 

He  called  up  General  Mahone,  and  made  to  him  a 
similar  statement  of  affairs.  The  early  morning  was  raw 
and  damp.  General  Mahone  was  chilled  standing  in  wait 
without  fire.  He  pushed  up  the  embers  and  said  to  the 
general  he  did  not  want  him  to  think  he  was  scared,  he 
was  only  chilled.  General  Mahone  sometimes  liked  to 
talk  a  little  on  questions  of  moment,  and  asked  several 
questions.  My  attention  was  called  to  messages  from  the 
troops  for  a  time,  so  that  I  failed  to  hear  all  of  the  con 
versation,  but  I  heard  enough  of  it  to  know  that  General 
Mahone  thought  it  time  to  see  General  Grant.  Appeal 
was  made  to  me  to  affirm  that  judgment,  and  it  was 
promptly  approved. 

General  Grant  had  been  riding  with  his  column  in  our 
rear  during  the  correspondence  of  the  7th  and  8th.  So 
General  Lee,  upon  mounting  Traveller,  his  favorite  horse, 
rode  to  our  rear  to  meet  him,  leaving  his  advanced  forces 
engaged  in  a  lively  skirmish.  He  did  not  think  to  send 
them  notice  of  his  intended  ride,  nor  did  he  authorize  me 
to  call  a  truce.  He  passed  my  rear  under  flag,  but  Gen 
eral  Grant's  orders  were  that  his  correspondence  with 
General  Lee  should  not  interrupt  or  delay  the  operations 
of  any  of  his  forces.  Our  advance  troops  were  in  action, 
and  General  Humphreys  was  up  with  the  Second  Corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  preparing  for  action  against 
our  rear-guard.  The  situation  was  embarrassing.  It  was 

40 


626  FROM    MAXASSAS   TO   APPOMATTOX. 

plain  enough  that  I  should  attack  the  Second  Corps  be 
fore  others  could  be  up  and  prepare  for  action,  though  our 
truce  forbade.  It  could  not  prevail,  however,  to  call  me 
to  quiet  while  the  enemy  in  plain  view  was  preparing  for 
attack,  so  we  continued  at  our  work  constructing  our  best 
line  of  defence,  and  when  strong  enough  I  ordered  parts 
of  the  rear-guard  forward  to  support  the  advanced  forces, 
and  directed  General  Alexander  to  establish  them  with 
part  of  his  batteries  in  the  best  position  for  support  or 
rallying  line  in  case  the  front  lines  were  forced  back. 
That  was  the  last  line  of  battle  formed  in  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. 

While  this  formation  was  proceeding,  report  came  from 
our  front  that  a  break  had  been  found  through  which  we 
could  force  passage.  I  called  for  a  swift  courier,  but  not 
one  could  be  found.  Colonel  J.  C.  Haskell  had  a  blooded 
mare  that  had  been  carefully  led  from  Petersburg.  Ap 
preciating  the  signs  of  the  times,  he  had  ordered  her  sad 
dled,  intending  a  desperate  ride  to  escape  impending 
humiliation,  but,  learning  my  need  of  a  swift  courier^  he 
came  and  offered  his  services  and  his  mare.  He  was 
asked  to  take  the  information  just  brought  in  to  General 
Lee,  and  as  he  mounted  was  told  to  kill  his  mare  but 
bring  General  Lee  back.  He  rode  like  the  wind. 

General  Lee  had  passed  out  and  dismounted  beyond  a 
turn  of  the  road,  and  was  not  seen  until  the  gallant  rider 
had  dashed  by  him.  The  steed  swept  onward  some  dis 
tance  before  the  rider  could  pull  up.  As  Colonel  Haskell 
rode  back,  General  Lee  walked  to  meet  him,  exclaiming, 
"  You  have  ruined  your  beautiful  mare  !  why  did  you  do 
so  ?"  The  swift  despatch  was  too  late.  General  Lee's  note 
to  General  Grant  asking  an  interview  had  gone  beyond 
recall. 

As  my  troops  marched  to  form  the  last  line  a  message 
came  from  General  Lee  saying  he  had  not  thought  to  give 
notice  of  the  intended  ride  to  meet  General  Grant,  and 


APPOMATTOX.  627 

asked  to  have  me  send  his  message  to  that  effect  to  Gen 
eral  Gordon,  and  it  was  duly  sent  by  Captain  Sims,  of  the 
Third  Corps  staff,  serving  at  my  head-quarters  since  the 
fall  of  A.  P.  Hill. 

After  delivering  the  message,  Captain  Sims,  through 
some  informality,  was  sent  to  call  the  truce.  The  firing 
ceased.  General  Custer  rode  to  Captain  Sims  to  know 
his  authority,  and,  upon  finding  that  he  was  of  my  staff, 
asked  to  be  conducted  to  my  head-quarters,  and  down 
they  came  in  fast  gallop,  General  Custer's  flaxen  locks 
flowing  over  his  shoulders,  and  in  brusk,  excited  manner, 
he  said, — 

"  In  the  name  of  General  Sheridan  I  demand  the  un 
conditional  surrender  of  this  army." 

He  was  reminded  that  I  was  not  the  commander  of  the 
army,  that  he  was  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy  without 
authority,  addressing  a  superior  officer,  and  in  disrespect 
to  General  Grant  as  well  as  myself;  that  if  I  was  the 
commander  of  the  army  I  would  not  receive  the  message 
of  General  Sheridan. 

He  then  became  more  moderate,  saying  it  would  be  a 
pity  to  have  more  blood  upon  that  field.  Then  I  sug 
gested  that  the  truce  be  respected,  and  said, — 

"  As  you  are  now  more  reasonable,  I  will  say  that  Gen 
eral  Lee  has  gone  to  rneei  General  Grant,  and  it  is  for 
them  to  determine  the  future  of  the  armies." 

He  was  satisfied,  and  rode  back  to  his  command. 

General  Grant  rode  away  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
on  the  morning  of  the  9th  to  join  his  troops  near  Ap- 
pomattox  Court-House,  so  General  Lee's  note  was  sent 
around  to  him.  When  advised  of  the  change,  General 
Lee  rode  back  to  his  front  to  await  there  the  answer  to 
his  note.  While  waiting,  General  Lee  expressed  appre 
hension  that  his  refusal  to  meet  General  Grant's  first 
proposition  might  cause  him  to  demand  harsh  terms. 

I  assured  him  that  I  knew  General  Grant  well  enough 


628  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

to  say  that  the  terms  would  be  such  as  he  would  demand 
under  similar  circumstances,  but  he  yet  had  doubts.  The 
conversation  continued  in  broken  sentences  until  the 
bearer  of  the  return  despatch  approached.  As  he  still 
seemed  apprehensive  of  humiliating  demands,  I  suggested 
that  in  that  event  he  should  break  off  the  interview  and  tell 
General  Grant  to  do  his  worst.  The  thought  of  another 
round  seemed  to  brace  him,  and  he  rode  with  Colonel 
Marshall,  of  his  staff,  to  meet  the  Union  commander. 

The  status  of  affairs  spread  through  the  advance  troops 
of  the  army,  but  the  work  of  preparation  on  my  rear  line 
was  continued.  General  Field  inquired  of  a  passing  officer, 
"  What's  up  ?"  but,  seeing  arrangements  going  on  for  at 
tack  in  our  rear,  he  continued  his  work  of  preparation  to 
receive  it. 

General  Grant  was  found  prepared  to  offer  as  liberal 
terms  as  General  Lee  could  expect,  and,  to  obviate  a  col 
lision  between  his  army  of  the  rear  with  ours,  ordered  an 
officer  sent  to  give  notice  of  the  truce.  A  ride  around  the 
lines  would  consume  time,  and  he  asked  to  have  the  officer 
conducted  through  our  lines.  Colonel  Fairfax  was  sent 
with  him.  When  they  reached  our  rear  line  it  was  still 
at  work  on  the  trenches.  The  officer  expressed  surprise 
at  the  work  of  preparation,  as  not  proper  under  truce. 
Colonel  Fairfax  ordered  the  work  discontinued,  and 
claimed  that  a  truce  between  belligerents  can  only  be 
recognized  by  mutual  consent.  As  the  object  of  the  ride 
was  to  make  the  first  announcement  of  properly  author 
ized  truce,  the  work  of  preparation  between  the  lines  was 
no  violation  of  the  usages  of  war,  particularly  when  it 
was  borne  in  mind  that  the  orders  of  General  Grant  were 
that  the  correspondence  should  not  delay  or  interrupt 
military  operations. 

As  General  Lee  rode  back  to  his  army  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  his  troops  about  the  front  lines  assembled  in 
promiscuous  crowds  of  all  arms  and  grades  in  anxious 


APPOMATTOX.  629 

wait  for  their  loved  commander.  From  force  of  habit  a 
burst  of  salutations  greeted  him,  but  quieted  as  suddenly 
as  they  arose.  The-  road  was  packed  by  standing  troops 
as  he  approached,  the  men  with  hats  off,  heads  and  hearts 
bowed  down.  As  he  passed  they  raised  their  heads  and 
looked  upon  him  with  swimming  eyes.  Those  who  could 
find  voice  said  good-by,  those  who  could  not  speak,  and 
were  near,  passed  their  hands  gently  over  the  sides  of 
Traveller.  He  rode  with  his  hat  off,  and  had  sufficient 
control  to  fix  his  eyes  on  a  line  between  the  ears  of  Trav 
eller  and  look  neither  to  right  nor  left  until  he  reached 
a  large  white-oak  tree,  where  he  dismounted  to  make  his 
last  head-quarters,  and  finally  talked  a  little. 

The  shock  was  most  severe  upon  Field's  division. 
Seasoned  by  four  years  of  battle  triumphant,  the  veterans 
in  that  body  stood  at  Appomattox  when  the  sun  rose  on 
the  9th  day  of  April,  1865,  as  invincible  of  valor  as  on 
the  morning  of  the  31st  of  August,  1862,  after  breaking 
up  the  Union  lines  of  the  second  field  of  Manassas.  They 
had  learned  little  of  the  disasters  about  Petersburg,  less 
of  that  at  Sailor's  Creek,  and  surrender  had  not  had 
time  to  enter  their  minds  until  it  was  announced  accom 
plished  ! 

The  reported  opportunity  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
lines  proved  a  mistake.  General  Mumford,  suspecting 
surrender  from  the  sudden  quiet  of  the  front,  made  a 
dashing  ride,  and  passed  the  enemy's  lines  with  his  di 
vision  of  cavalry,  and  that  caused  the  impression  that 
we  would  be  able  to  march  on. 

Soon  after  General  Lee's  return  ride  his  chief  of  ord 
nance  reported  a  large  amount  of  United  States  currency 
in  his  possession.  In  doubt  as  to  the  proper  disposition 
of  the  funds,  General  Lee  sent  the  officer  to  ask  my  opin 
ion.  As  it  was  not  known  or  included  in  the  conditions 
of  capitulation,  and  was  due  (and  ten  times  more)  to  the 
faithful  troops,  I  suggested  a  pro  rata  distribution  of  it. 


630  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

The  officer  afterwards  brought  three  hundred  dollars  as 
my  part.  I  took  one  hundred,  and  asked  to  have  the 
balance  distributed  among  Field's  division, — the  troops 
most  distant  from  their  homes. 

The  commissioners  appointed  to  formulate  details  of  the 
capitulation  were  assigned  a  room  in  the  McLean  resi 
dence.  The  way  to  it  led  through  the  room  occupied  as 
General  Grant's  head-quarters. 

As  I  was  passing  through  the  room,  as  one  of  the  com 
missioners,  General  Grant  looked  up,  recognized  me,  rose, 
and  with  his  old-time  cheerful  greeting  gave  me  his  hand, 
and  after  passing  a  few  remarks  offered  a  cigar,  which  was 
gratefully  received. 

The  first  step  under  capitulation  was  to  deliver  to  the 
Union  army  some  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  taken  since 
we  left  Petersburg,  not  all  of  them  by  my  infantry,  Ros- 
ser's  and  Mumford's  cavalry  having  taken  more  than  half 
of  them.  Besides  these  I  delivered  to  General  Grant  all 
of  the  Confederate  soldiers  left  under  my  care  by  General 
Lee,  except  about  two  hundred  lost  in  the  affairs  about 
Petersburg,  Amelia  Court-House,  Jetersville,  Rice's  Sta 
tion,  and  Cumberland  Church.  None  were  reported  killed 
except  the  gallant  officers  Brigadier-General  Bearing,  of 
Rosser's  cavalry,  Colonel  Bostan,  of  Mumford's  cavalry, 
and  Major  Thompson,  of  Stuart's  horse  artillery,  in  the 
desperate  and  gallant  fight  to  which  they  were  ordered 
against  the  bridge-burning  party. 

General  Grant's  artillery  prepared  to  fire  a  salute  in 
honor  of  the  surrender,  but  he  ordered  it  stopped. 

As  the  world  continues  to  look  at  and  study  the  grand 
combinations  and  strategy  of  General  Grant,  the  higher 
will  be  his  award  as  a  great  soldier.  Confederates  should 
be  foremost  in  crediting  him  with  all  that  his  admirers  so 
justly  claim,  and  ask  at  the  same  time  that  his  great  ad 
versary  be  measured  by  the  same  high  standards. 

On  the  12th  of  April  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 


APPOMATTOX.  631 

marched  to  the  field  in  front  of  Appomattox  Court-House, 
and  by  divisions  and  parts  of  divisions  deployed  into  line, 
stacked  their  arms,  folded  their  colors,  and  walked  empty- 
handed  to  find  their  distant,  blighted  homes. 

There  were  "  surrendered  and  paroled"  on  the  last  day 
of  our  military  history  over  twenty-eight  thousand  officers 
and  men, — viz.  : 

General  Lee  and  staff 15 

Longstreet's  corps  * 14,833 

Gordon's  corps  f 7,200 

EwelPs  corps 287 

Cavalry  corps 1,786 

.       Artillery 2,586 

Detachments      1,649 

Total 28,356 

* 

In  glancing  backward  over  the  period  of^the  war,  and 
the  tremendous  and  terrible  events  with  which  it  was 
fraught,  the  reflection  irresistibly  arises,  that  it  might 
perhaps  have  been  avoided  and  without  dishonor.  The 
flag  and  the  fame  of  the  nation  could  have  suffered  no  re 
proach  had  General  Scott's  advice,  before .  the  outbreak, 
been  followed, — "  Wayward  sisters,  depart  in  peace."  The 
Southern  States  would  have  found  their  way  back  to  the 
Union  without  war  far  earlier  than  they  did  by  war. 
The  reclaiming  bonds  would  then  have  been  those  only 
of  love,  and  the  theory  of  government*  formulated  by 
George  Washington  would  have  experienced  no  fracture. 
But  the  inflexible  fiat  of  fate  seemingly  went  forth  for 
war ;  and  so  for  four  long  years  the  history  of  this  great 
nation  was  written  in  the  blood  of  its  strong  men. 

*  Including  the  parts  of  the  Third  Corps  attached  after  the  fall  of  A. 
P.  Hill,  and  about  five  thousand  that  reported  on  the  7th,  8th,  and  9th 
in  bands  and  squads  from  the  columns  broken  up  at  Sailor's  Creek. 

t  Including  five  thousand  two  hundred  of  fragments  dispersed  at 
Petersburg  and  during  the  rearward  march,  that  joined  us  in  retreat. 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

POST-BELLUM    PENDANT. 

Old  Friends  and  their  Kindness— General  Grant— His  Characteristic 
Letter  of  Introduction  to  President  Johnson — In  Business  in  New 
Orleans— Political  Unfriendliness— Cause  of  Criticism  of  Military 
Career— Appointed  Surveyor  of  Customs— The  Old  Nurse. 

SOME  weeks  after  the  surrender  the  newspapers  an 
nounced  that  I  was  to  visit  Washington  City.  My  old 
company  commander,  Bradford  K.  Alden,  who  had  re 
signed  from  the  army  some  years  before  the  war,  came 
down  from  New  York  to  meet  me.  Not  finding  me,  he 
wrote  to  tell  me  of  his  trip,  that  he  was  anxious  about 
me,  lest  I  might  be  in  need  of  assistance ;  that  in  that 
event  I  should  draw  on  him  for  such  amount  of  money  as 
I  wanted.  When  ready  to  return  his  favor  he  was  not  in 
the  country,  and  it  was  only  through  a  mutual  friend, 
General  Alvord,  that  his  address  in  Europe  was  found 
and  the  amount  returned.  A  more  noble,  lovable  char 
acter  never  descended  from  the  people  of  Plymouth  Eock. 

About  the  1st  of  November,  1865,  business  of  personal 
nature  called  me  to  Washington.  I  stopped  at  the  Met 
ropolitan  Hotel.  Upon  seeing  the  arrival  in  the  morn 
ing  papers,  General  W.  A.  Nichols,  of  the  United  States 
army,  called  and  insisted  that  my  visit  should  be  with 
him  and  his  family.  The  request  was  declined  with  the 
suggestion  that  the  war-feeling  was  too  warm  for  an  officer 
of  the  army  to  entertain  a  prominent  Confederate,  but  he 
insisted  and  urged  that  his  good  wife  would  not  be  satis 
fied  unless  the  visit  was  made.  So  it  was  settled,  and  I 
became  his  guest.  He  was  on  duty  at  the  time  as  assistant 
adjutant-general  at  the  War  Department.  As  I  was  stop 
ping  with  an  officer  of  the  army,  the  usages  of  military 


632 


POST-BELLUM    PENDANT.  633 

life  required  that  I  should  call  upon  the  commanding 
general. 

The  next  morning  I  walked  with  General  Nichols  to 
make  an  official  call  on  General  Grant.  He  recognized 
us  as  we  entered  his  office,  rose  and  walked  to  meet  us. 
After  the  usual  brief  call,  we  rose  to  take  leave,  when  he 
asked  to  have  us  call  on  his  family  during  the  evening. 
Most  of  those  whom  we  met  during  the  evening  were  old- 
time  personal  friends,  especially  the  father-in-law,  Mr. 
Dent.  When  leaving,  after  a  pleasant  evening,  General 
Grant  walked  with  us  to  the  gate  and  asked  if  I  cared  to 
have  my  pardon.  I  pleaded  not  guilty  of  an  offence  that 
required  pardon.  He  said  that  he  meant  amnesty, — that 
he  wished  to  know  if  I  cared  to  have  it.  I  told  him  that 
I  intended  to  live  in  the  country,  and  would  prefer  to 
have  the  privileges  of  citizenship.  He  told  me  to  call  at 
his  office  at  noon  next  day ;  that  in  the  mean  time  he 
would  see  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President  in 
regard  to  the  matter. 

The  next  day  he  gave  me  a  letter  to  the  President,  and 
said  that  he  had  seen  him  and  thought  the  matter  was  ar 
ranged  ;  that  I  should  first  see  the  Secretary  of  War,  then 
the  President.  His  strong  and  characteristic  letter  to  the 
President  was  as  follows  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

"  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  November  7,  1865. 
"  His  EXCELLENCY  A.  JOHNSON, 

"President: 

"Knowing  that  General  Longstreet,  late  of  the  army  which 
was  in  rebellion  against  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  is  in 
the  city,  and  presuming  that  he  intends  asking  executive  clem 
ency  before  leaving,  I  beg  to  say  a  word  in  his  favor. 

"  General  Longstreet  comes  under  the  third,  fifth,  and  eighth 
exceptions  made  in  your  proclamation  of  the  29th  of  May,  1865. 
I  believe  I  can  safely  say  that  there  is  nowhere  among  the  excep 
tions  a  more  honorable  class  of  men  than  those  embraced  in  the 
fifth  and  eighth  of  these,  nor  a  class  that  will  more  faithfully  ob 
serve  any  obligation  which  they  may  take  upon  themselves. 


634  FROM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

General  Longstreet,  in  my  opinion,  stands  high  among  this  class. 
I  have  known  him  well  for  more  than  twenty-six  years,  first  as  a 
cadet  at  West  Point  and  afterwards  as  an  officer  of  the  army. 
For  five  years  from  my  graduation  we  served  together,  a  portion 
of  the  time  in  the  same  regiment.  I  speak  of  him,  therefore, 
from  actual  personal  acquaintance. 

'  *  In  the  late  rebellion,  I  think,  not  one  single  charge  was  ever 
brought  against  General  Longstreet  for  persecution  of  prisoners 
of  war  or  of  persons  for  their  political  opinions.  If  such  charges 
were  ever  made,  I  never  heard  them.  I  have  no  hesitation, 
therefore,  in  recommending  General  Longstreet  to  your  Excel 
lency  for  pardon.  I  will  further  state  that  my  opinion  of  him  is 
such  that  I  shall  feel  it  as  a  personal  favor  to  myself  if  this  par 
don  is  granted. 

1  i  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 
' '  lieutenant-  General. ' J 

Supported  by  this  generous  endorsement,  I  called  on 
the  Secretary  of  War,  who  referred  me  to  the  President. 
After  a  lengthy  interview  the  President  asked  to  have 
the  matter  put  off  until  next  day,  when  I  should  call  at 
noon.  The  next  day  he  was  still  unprepared  to  make 
decision,  but,  after  a  long,  pleasant  talk,  he  said, — 

"  There  are  three  persons  of  the  South  who  can  never 
receive  amnesty :  Mr.  Davis,  General  Lee,  and  yourself. 
You  have  given  the  Union  cause  too  much  trouble." 

I  replied,  "  You  know,  Mr.  President,  that  those  who 
are  forgiven  most  love  the  most." 

"  Yes,"  he  said,  "  you  have  very  high  authority  for 
that,  but  you  can't  have  amnesty." 

During  a  subsequent  session  of  Congress,  General  Pope 
sent  in  a  list  of  names  from  Georgia  for  whom  he  asked 
relief  from  their  political  disabilities.  General  Grant, 
after  approving  it,  made  request  to  one  of  his  friends  in 
Congress  to  have  my  name  put  on  the  list,  and  I  was 
extended  relief  soon  after  it  was  given  to  General  R.  E. 
Lee. 

In  January,  1866,  I  engaged  in  business  in  New  Or- 


POST-BELLUM    PENDANT. 


635 


leans  with  the  Owen  brothers, — William,  Miller,  and 
Edward,  old  soldiers  of  the  Washington  Artillery,— as 
cotton  factors,  and  speedily  found  fair  prosperity.  Before 
the  year  was  out  I  was  asked  to  take  position  in  an  insur 
ance  company,  but  declined,  and  repeated  applications 
were  refused  under  plea  of  limited  business  experience, 
but,  under  promise  of  ample  and  competent  assistance,  I 
accepted  the  place  with  a  salary  of  five  thousand  dollars, 
and  my  affairs  were  more  than  prosperous  until  I  was 
asked  an  opinion  upon  the  political  crisis  of  1867. 

As  the  whole  animus  of  the  latter-day  adverse  criti 
cisms  upon,  and  uncritical  assertions  in  regard  to,  the 
commander  of  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  had  its  origin  in  this  matter  of  politics,  a  brief 
review  of  the  circumstances  is  in  order. 

As  will  be  readily  recalled  by  my  older  readers  (while 
for  the  younger  it  is  a  matter  of  history),  President  John 
son,  after  the  war,  adopted  a  reconstruction  policy  of  his 
own,  and  some  of  the  States  were  reorganized  under  it 
with  Democratic  governors  and  legislatures,  and  all  would 
have  followed.  But  Congress,  being  largely  Republican, 
was  not  satisfied,  and  enacted  that  the  States  could  not  be 
accepted  unless  they  provided  in  their  new  constitutions  for 
negro  suffrage.  In  case  they  would  not,  the  State  govern 
ments  should  be  removed  and  the  States  placed  in  the 
hands  of  general  officers  of  the  army  as  military  governors, 
who  should  see  that  the  States  were  reorganized  and  re 
stored  to  the  Union  under  the  laws. 

Under  the  severe  ordeal  one  of  the  city  papers  of  New 
Orleans  called  upon  the  generals  of  Confederate  service  to 
advise  the  people  of  the  course  that  they  should  pursue,— 
naming  the  officers.  I  thought  it  better  policy  to  hold 
the  States,  as  they  were  organized,  under  the  President's 
policy,  shape  their  constitutions  as  directed  by  Congress, 
and  have  the  States  not  yet  reorganized  follow  the  same 
course.  My  letter  upon  the  subject  was  as  follows : 


636  FROM    MANASSAS   TO    APPOMATTOX. 

"NEW  ORLEANS,  LA.,  June  3,  1867. 
"  J.  M.  G.  PARKER,  ESQ.  : 

"  DEAR  SIR, — Your  esteemed  favor  of  the  15th  ultimo  was  duly 
received. 

"  I  was  much  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to  hear  Senator 
Wilson,  and  was  agreeably  surprised  to  meet  such  fairness  and 
frankness  from  a  politician  whom  I  had  been  taught  to  believe 
harsh  in  his  feelings  towards  the  people  of  the  South. 

' '  I  have  considered  your  suggestion  to  wisely  unite  in  efforts 
to  restore  Louisiana  to  her  former  position  in  the  Union  i  through 
the  party  now  in  power.'  My  letter  of  the  6th  of  April,  to  which 
you  refer,  clearly  indicates  a  desire  for  practical  reconstruction 
and  reconciliation.  There  is  only  one  route  left  open,  which 
practical  men  cannot  fail  to  see. 

"The  serious  difficulty  arises  from  want  of  that  wisdom  so  im 
portant  for  the  great  work  in  hand.  Still,  I  will  be  happy  to  work 
in  any  harness  that  promises  relief  to  our  discomfited  people  and 
harmony  to  the  nation,  whether  bearing  the  mantle  of  Mr.  Davis 
or  Mr.  Suinner. 

"  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  strongest  laws  are  those  estab 
lished  by  the  sword.  The  ideas  that  divided  political  parties 
before  the  war — upon  the  rights  of  the  States — were  thoroughly 
discussed  by  our  wisest  statesmen,  and  eventually  appealed  to  the 
arbitrament  of  the  sword.  The  decision  was  in  favor  of  the 
North,  so  that  her  construction  becomes  the  law,  and  should  be 
so  accepted. 

"The  military  bill  and  amendments  are  the  only  peace-offerings 
they  have  for  us,  and  should  be  accepted  as  the  starting-point  for 
future  issues. 

"Like  others  of  the  South  not  previously  connected  with 
politics,  I  naturally  acquiesced  in  the  ways  of  Democracy,  but, 
so  far  as  I  can  judge,  there  is  nothing  tangible  in  them,  beyond 
the  issues  that  were  put  to  test  in  the  war  and  there  lost.  As 
there  is  nothing  left  to  take  hold  of  except  prejudice,  which  can 
not  be  worked  for  good  for  any  one,  it  seems  proper  and  right 
that  we  should  seek  some  standing  which  may  encourage  hope 
for  the  future. 

"If  I  appreciate  the  issues  of  Democracy  at  this  moment,  they 
are  the  enfranchisement  of  the  negro  and  the  rights  of  Congress 
in  the  premises,  but  the  acts  have  been  passed,  are  parts  of  the 
laws  of  the  land,  and  no  power  but  Congress  can  remove  them. 

"Besides,  if  we  now  accept  the  doctrine  that  the  States  only  can 
legislate  on  suffrage,  we  will  fix  the  negro  vote  upon  us,  for  he  is 


POST-BELLUM    PENDANT.  637 

now  a  suffragan,  and  his  vote,  with  the  vote  that  will  go  with 
him,  will  hold  to  his  rights,  while,  by  recognizing  the  acts  of 
Congress,  we  may,  after  a  fair  trial,  if  negro  suffrage  proves  a 
mistake,  appeal  and  have  Congress  correct  the  error.  It  will 
accord  better  with  wise  policy  to  insist  that  the  negro  shall  vote 
in  the  Northern  as  well  as  the  Southern  States. 

"If  every  one  will  meet  the  crisis  with  proper  appreciation  of 
our  condition  and  obligations,  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow  on  a 
happy  people.  Our  fields  will  again  begin  to  yield  their  increase, 
our  railways  and  waters  will  teem  with  abundant  commerce,  our 
towns  and  cities  will  resound  with  the  tumult  of  trade,  and  we 
will  be  reinvigorated  by  the  blessings  of  Almighty  God. 
"Very  respectfully  yours, 

"JAMES  LONGSTREET." 

I  might  have  added  that  not  less  forceful  than  the 
grounds  I  gave  were  the  obligations  under  which  we  were 
placed  by  the  terms  of  our  paroles, — "  To  respect  the  laws 
of  Congress," — but  the  letter  was  enough. 

The  afternoon  of  the  day  upon  which  my  letter  was 
published  the  paper  that  had  called  for  advice  published 
a  column  of  editorial  calling  me  traitor !  deserter  of  my 
friends !  and  accusing  me  of  joining  the  enemy  !  but  did 
not  publish  a  line  of  the  letter  upon  which  it  based  the 
charges !  Other  papers  of  the  Democracy  took  up  the 
garbled  representation  of  this  journal  and  spread  it  broad 
cast,  not  even  giving  the  letter  upon  which  they  based 
their  evil  attacks  upon  me. 

Up  to  that  time  the  First  Corps,  in  all  of  its  parts,  in 
all  of  its  history,  was  above  reproach.  I  was  in  successful 
business  in  New  Orleans  as  cotton  factor,  with  a  salary 
from  an  insurance  company  of  five  thousand  dollars  per 
year. 

The  day  after  the  announcement  old  comrades  passed 
me  on  the  streets  without  speaking.  Business  began  to 
grow  dull.  General  Hood  (the  only  one  of  my  old  com 
rades  who  occasionally  visited  me)  thought  that  he  could 
save  the  insurance  business,  and  in  a  few  weeks  I  found 
myself  at  leisure. 


638  FKOM    MANASSAS    TO    APPOMATTOX. 

Two  years  after  that  period,  on  March  4,  1869,  General 
Grant  was  inaugurated  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  in  the  bigness  of  his  generous  heart  called  me  to 
Washington.  Before  I  found  opportunity  to  see  him  he 
sent  my  name  to  the  Senate  for  confirmation  as  surveyor 
of  customs  at  New  Orleans.  I  was  duly  confirmed,  and 
held  the  office  until  1873,  when  I  resigned.  Since  that 
time  I  have  lived  in  New  Orleans,  Louisiana,  and  in 
Gainesville,  Georgia,  surrounded  by  a  few  of  my  old 
friends,  and  in  occasional  appreciative  touch  with  others, 
South  and  North. 

Of  all  the  people  alive  I  still  know  and  meet,  probably 
no  one  carries  me  farther  back  in  recollections  of  my  long 
life  than  does  my  "  old  nurse."  Most  of  the  family  ser 
vants  were  discharged  after  the  war  at  Macon,  Mississippi, 
where  some  of  them  still  reside,  among  them  this  old 
man,  Daniel,  who  still  claims  the  family  name,  but  at 
times  uses  another.  He  calls  promptly  when  I  visit  Macon 
and  looks  for  "  something  to  remember  you  by."  During 
my  last  visit  he  seemed  more  concerned  for  me  than  usual, 
and  on  one  of  his  calls  asked, — 

"  Marse  Jim,  do  you  belong  to  any  church  ?" 

"  Oh,  yes,"  I  said,  "  I  try  to  be  a  good  Christian." 

He  laughed  loud  and  long,  and  said, — 

"  Something  must  have  scared  you  mighty  bad,  to  change 
you  so  from  what  you  was  when  I  had  to  care  for  you." 

In  a  recent  letter  he  sent  a  message  to  say  that  he 
is  getting  to  be  a  little  feeble. 

Blessings  on  his  brave  heart ! 


SL 


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APPENDIX. 


LETTERS  OF  GENERAL  ROBERT  E.  LEE  AND 
GENERAL   LONGSTREET. 

I. 

Lee  to  Anderson  on  Conduct  of  the  First  Corps. 

August  26,  1864. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  E.  H.  ANDERSON, 

Commanding  Longstreef  s  Corps: 

GENERAL, — I  take  great  pleasure  in  presenting  to  you  my 
congratulations  upon  the  conduct  of  the  men  of  your  corps.  I 
believe  that  they  will  carry  anything  they  are  put  against.  We 
tried  very  hard  to  stop  Pickett's  men  from  capturing  the  breast 
works  of  the  enemy,  but  could  not  do  it.  I  hope  his  loss  has 
been  small. 

I  am,  with  respect,  your  obedient  servant , 

E.  E.  LEE, 
General. 

II. 

Lee  to  Longstreet  congratulating  him  on  his  Convalescence  and 
anticipating  Return. 

CAMP  PETERSBURG,  August  29,  1864. 
GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET  : 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — I  received  yesterday  your  letter  of  the 
23d,  and  am  much  gratified  at  your  improvement.  You  will  soon 
be  as  well  as  ever,  and  we  shall  all  be  rejoiced  at  your  return. 
You  must  not,  however,  become  impatient  at  the  gradual  progress 
you  must  necessarily  make,  but  be  content  with  the  steady  ad 
vance  you  are  making  to  health  and  strength.  Your  progress 
will  be  the  more  certain  and  your  recovery  more  confirmed.  Do 
not  let  Sherman  capture  you,  and  I  will  endeavor  to  hold  Grant 
till  you  come.  I  am  glad  to  hear  such  good  accounts  of  my  little 

639 


640  APPENDIX. 

namesake.  Good  lungs  are  a  great  blessing,  and  nothing  expands 
them  better  than  a  full,  hearty  yell.  I  hope  Mrs.  Longstreet  is 
well,  and  that  she  is  enjoying  the  good  peaches  and  melons  of 
Georgia.  We  have  but  little  enjoyment  here.  Our  enemy  is 
very  cautious,  and  he  has  become  so  proficient  in  intrenching 
that  he  seems  to  march  with  a  system  already  prepared.  He 
threatens  dreadful  things  every  day,  but,  thank  God,  he  has  not 
expunged  us  yet. 

All  your  army  friends  inquire  for  you  anxiously,  and  will  be  de 
lighted  to  hear  of  your  improvement.  We  shall  not  object  to 
your  chirography,  so  you  must  practise  it  often,  and  let  me  hear 
of  your  progress  and  well-doing.  Please  present  my  kindest  re 
gards  to  Mrs.  Longstreet,  and  love  to  my  namesake.  The  gentle 
men  of  my  staif  are  very  grateful  for  your  remembrance,  and 
unite  with  me  in  sincere  wishes  for  your  welfare  and  happiness. 
I  am  sure  the  rest  of  this  army  would  join  did  they  know  of  the 
Opportunity. 

With  great  regard,  very  truly  yours, 

E.  E.  LEE. 

III. 
Longstreet  to  Lee. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  CORPS, 

November  24,  1864. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL,  — From  the  report  of  scouts  received  yesterday,  it 
seems  that  the  Tenth  Corps  is  still  on  this  side,  or  if  it  went  over 
to  the  south  side,  has  returned.  The  information,  too,  seems  to 
indicate  the  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Corps  from  the  Valley. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  will  be  necessary  for  me  to  force 
the  enemy  to  develop  the  extent  of  his  move  on  this  side  before 
taking  any  more  of  my  troops  to  the  south  side.  This  I  shall  do, 
of  course,  as  rapidly  as  possible.  I  am  going  to  have  the  roads 
leading  from  White  Oak  Swamp  to  the  Williamsburg  road  well 
broken  up  with  subsoil  ploughs.  I  think  that  the  enemy  will  then 
have  to  build  a  corduroy  there  as  he  moves.  He  surely  will,  if 
I  can  have  a  good  gentle  rain  after  the  roads  are  thoroughly 
ploughed.  Can't  you  apply  this  idea  to  advantage  on  your  side 
on  the  roads  that  General  Grant  will  be  obliged  to  travel  if  he 
goes  to  Burkeville  !  I  don't  know,  however,  but  that  it  would  be 
better  for  us  to  go  to  Burkeville  and  block  the  roads  behind  him. 
If  the  roads  that  General  Sherman  must  travel  to  get  to  Charleston 


APPENDIX.  641 

or  Savannah  can  be  thoroughly  ploughed  and  the  trees  felled  over 
them,  I  think  that  General  Sherman  will  not  be  able  to  get  to  his 
destination  in  fifty  days,  as  the  Northern  papers  expect ;  and  it  is 
not  thought  to  be  possible  that  he  can  collect  more  than  fifty  days' 
rations  before  reaching  the  coast.  If  the  parties  are  properly  or 
ganized,  I  think  that  they  might  destroy  or  injure  all  of  the  roads 
so  as  to  break  down  General  Sherman's  animals,  and  result  in  the 
capture  of  most  of  his  forces. 

I  remain,  very  respectfully,  yours  most  obediently, 

J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 
IV. 

Longstreet  to  Lee  on  Impressment  of  Gold  and  Measures  for  Final 

Campaign. 

[Confidential.] 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  February  14,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL, — Eecent  developments  of  the  enemy's  designs  seem 
to  indicate  an  early  concentration  of  his  armies  against  Eichmond. 
This,  of  course,  would  involve  a  like  concentration  on  our  part, 
or  the  abandonment  of  our  capital.  The  latter  emergency  would, 
I  think,  be  almost  fatal,  — probably  quite  so,  after  our  recent  re 
verses.  To  concentrate  here  in  time  to  meet  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  we  will 'be  obliged  to  use  the  little  of  our  Southern  rail 
road  that  is  left  us  in  transporting  our  troops,  so  that  we  cannot 
haul  provisions  over  that  route.  I  fear,  therefore,  that  we  will  not 
be  able  to  feed  our  troops  unless  we  adopt  extraordinary  efforts 
and  measures.  I  think  that  there  is  enough  of  the  necessaries 
of  life  left  in  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  to  help  us  through  our 
troubles  if  we  can  only  reach  them.  Impressing  officers,  how 
ever,  nor  collectors  of  taxes  in  kind,  nor  any  other  plan  hereto 
fore  employed,  is  likely  to  get  those  supplies  in  time  or  in  quan 
tities  to  meet  our  necessities.  The  citizens  will  not  give  their 
supplies  up  and  permit  their  families  and  servants  to  suffer  for 
the  necessaries  of  life  without  some  strong  inducement.  For 
each  one  may  naturally  think  that  the  little  that  he  would  supply 
by  denying  himself  and  family  would  go  but  little  way  where  so 
much  is  needed.  He  does  not  want  Confederate  money,  for  his 
meat  and  bread  will  buy  him  clothes,  etc.,  for  his  family  more 
readily  and  in  larger  quantities  than  the  money  that  the  govern 
ment  would  pay.  The  only  thing  that  will  insure  our  rations  and 

41 


642  APPENDIX. 

national  existence  is  gold.  Send  out  the  gold  through  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina  and  pay  liberal  prices,  and  my  conviction  is 
that  we  shall  have  no  more  distress  for  want  of  food.  The  winter 
is  about  over,  and  the  families  can  and  will  subsist  on  molasses, 
bread,  and  vegetables  for  the  balance  of  the  year  if  they  can  get 
gold  for  their  supplies.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  meat  and  bread 
inside  the  enemy's  lines  that  our  people  would  bring  us  for  gold  ; 
but  they  won't  go  to  that  trouble  for  Confederate  money.  They 
can  keep  gold  so  much  safer  than  they  can  meat  and  bread,  and  it 
is  always  food  and  clothing. 

If  the  government  has  not  the  gold,  it  must  impress  it,  or  if 
there  is  no  law  for  the  impressment,  the  gold  must  be  taken  with 
out  the  law.  Necessity  does  not  know  or  wait  for  law.  If  we 
stop  to  make  laws  in  order  that  we  may  reach  the  gold  it  will  dis 
appear  the  day  that  the  law  is  mentioned  in  Congress.  To  secure 
it  no  one  should  suspect  that  we  are  after  it  until  we  knock  at  the 
doors  of  the  vaults  that  contain  it,  and  we  must  then  have  guards 
to  be  sure  that  it  is  not  made  away  with. 

It  seems  to  my  mind  that  our  prospects  will  be  brighter  than 
they  have  been  if  we  can  only  get  food  for  our  men  ;  and  I  think 
that  the  plan  that  I  have  proposed  will  secure  the  food. 

There  seem  to  be  many  reasons  for  the  opinion  that  the  enemy 
deems  our  capital  essential  to  him.  To  get  the  capital  he  will 
concentrate  here  everything  that  he  has,  and  we  will  be  better 
able  to  fight  him  when  we  shall  have  concentrated  than  when  we 
are  in  detachments.  The  Army  of  the  Mississippi  will  get  new 
life  and  spirits  as  soon  as  it  finds  itself  alongside  of  this,  and  we 
will  feel  more  comfortable  ourselves  to  know  that  all  are  under 
one  eye  and  one  head  that  is  able  to  handle  them. 

I  remain,  most  respectfully  and  truly,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 
V. 

Lee  to  Long street  on  Plans  for  Campaign. 
[Confidential.] 

HEAD-QUARTERS  CONFEDERATE  STATES  ARMIES, 

February  22,  1865. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET, 

Commanding,  etc.  : 

GENERAL, — Your  letter  of  the  14th  instant  is  received.  It 
arrived  during  my  absence  in  Eichmond,  and  has  not  been  over 
looked.  I  agree  with  you  entirely  in  believing  that  if  we  had 


APPENDIX.  643 

gold  we  could  get  sufficient  supplies  for  our  army,  but  the  great 
difficulty  is  to  obtain  the  gold.  It  is  not  in  the  coffers  of  the  gov 
ernment  or  the  banks,  but  is  principally  hoarded  by  individuals 
throughout  the  country,  and  is  inaccessible  to  us.  I  hope,  under 
the  reorganization  of  the  commissary  department,  if  we  can 
maintain  possession  of  our  communications,  that  the  army  will 
be  better  supplied  than  heretofore,  and  that  we  can  accumulate 
some  provisions  ahead.  As  regards  the  concentration  of  our 
troops  near  the  capital,  the  effect  would  be  to  produce  a  like 
concentration  of  the  enemy,  and  an  increase  of  our  difficulties  in 
obtaining  food  and  forage.  But  this,  whether  for  good  or  evil,  is 
now  being  accomplished  by  the  enemy,  who  seems  to  be  forcing 
Generals  Beauregard  and  Bragg  in  this  direction.  If  Sherman 
marches  his  army  to  Richmond,  as  General  Beauregard  reports  it 
is  his  intention  to  do,  and  General  Schofield  is  able  to  unite  with 
him,  we  shall  have  to  abandon  our  position  on  the  James  River, 
as  lamentable  as  it  is  on  every  account.  The  want  of  supplies 
alone  would  force  us  to  withdraw  when  the  enemy  reaches  the 
Roanoke.  Our  line  is  so  long,  extending  nearly  from  the  Chicka- 
hominy  to  the  Nottoway,  and  the  enemy  is  so  close  upon  us,  that 
if  we  are  obliged  to  withdraw  we  cannot  concentrate  all  our 
troops  nearer  than  some  point  on  the  line  of  railroad  between 
Richmond  and  Danville.  Should  a  necessity,  therefore,  arise,  I 
propose  to  concentrate  at  or  near  Burkeville.  The  route  for  the 
troops  north  of  James  River  would  have  to  be  through  Richmond, 
on  the  road  to  Amelia  Court- House,  the  cavalry  passing  up  the 
north  branch  of  the  river,  and  crossing  at  some  point  above  Rich 
mond.  Pickett's  division  would  take  the  route  through  Chester 
field  Court-House,  crossing  the  Apponiattox  at  Goode's  Bridge. 
With  the  army  concentrated  at  or  near  Burkeville,  our  commu 
nications  north  and  south  would  be  by  that  railroad,  and  west  by 
the  Southside  Railroad.  We  might  also  seize  the  opportunity  of 
striking  at  Grant,  should  he  pursue  us  rapidly,  or  at  Sherman, 
before  they  could  unite.  I  wish  you  to  consider  this  subject,  and 
give  me  your  views.  I  desire  you  also  to  make  every  preparation 
to  take  the  field  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  to  accumulate  all  the 
supplies  you  can.  General  Grant  seems  to  be  preparing  to  move 
out  by  his  left  flank.  He  is  accumulating  near  Hatcher's  Run 
depots  of  supplies,  and  apparently  concentrating  a  strong  force 
in  that  quarter.  Yesterday  and  to-day  trains  have  passed  from 
his  right  to  his  left  loaded  with  troops,  which  may  be  the  body 
of  eight  thousand  which  you  report  having  left  Signal  Hill  yes 
terday.  I  cannot  tell  whether  it  is  his  intention  to  maintain  his 


644  APPENDIX. 

position  until  his  other  columns  approach  nearer,  or  to  anticipate 
any  movement  by  us  which  he  might  suppose  would  then  become 
necessary.  I  wish  you  would  watch  closely  his  movements  on 
the  north  side  of  the  river,  and  try  and  ascertain  whether  he  is 
diminishing  his  force.  If  he  makes  the  move  which  appearances 
now  indicate,  he  may  draw  out  his  whole  force,  abandoning  his 
lines  of  defence,  or  hold  them,  partially  and  move  with  the  re 
mainder  of  his  troops. 

I  should  like  very  much  to  confer  with  you  on  these  subjects, 
but  I  fear  it  will  be  impossible  for  me  to  go  north  of  James  Eiver, 
and  I  do  not  know  that  it  will  be  convenient  for  you  to  come 
here. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

P.S. — Can  you  not  return  Pickett's  brigade  to  him  in  order 
that  I  may  withdraw  Grimes' s  brigade  from  his  line,  its  division 
having  been  ordered  to  our  right  ? 

E.  E.  L. 
VI. 

Longstrect  to  Lee  on  Impressment  of  Men. 
[Confidential.] 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  February  23,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding,  etc.  : 

GENERAL, — Your  letter  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  think  you 
did  not  understand  my  letter  of  the  14th  instant.  My  effort  was 
to  express  conviction  that  Sherman's  move  was  aimed  at  Eich- 
mond,  and  that  Grant's  concentration  here  would  force  us  to  do 
the  same  thing ;  and,  that  we  might  be  able  to  do  so,  it  was  neces 
sary  that  we  should  have  gold,  by  impressment,  to  purchase  our 
produce  supplies.  I  think  that  it  is  not  too  late  yet.  We  can 
surely  get  the  gold  by  sending  impressing  officers  with  guards  to 
the  vaults  in  which  it  is  stored. 

I  understand  that  there  are  twelve  hundred  men  in  Lynchburg 
already  organized,  and  that  we  may  get  eight  or  ten  thousand  men 
in  Eichmond  by  taking  everybody  who  is  able  to  bear  arms.  The 
staff-officers  about  Eichmond  would  be  nearly  enough  to  officer 
this  force.  If  such  a  force  can  be  raised  and  put  in  my  lines,  it 
can  hold  them,  I  think,  and  my  corps  can  move  down  to  the 
relief  of  Beauregard,  or  it  may  be  moved  over  to  our  right,  and 


APPENDIX.  645 

hold  Grant  in  check,  so  that  Sherman  will  be  obliged  to  unite  with 
him  or  seek  a  base  at  New-Berne  or  at  Wilmington.  This  would 
give  Beauregard  and  Bragg  time  to  unite  their  forces  to  meet 
Sherman  and  Schofield  here  or  wherever  they  may  appear.  We 
shall  lose  more  men  by  a  move  than  by  a  battle.  It  is  true  that 
we  may  be  compelled  to  move  after  the  battle,  but  I  think  not, 
If  we  fight  Sherman  as  I  suggest,  we  shall  surely  drive  him  to  the 
water  for  fresh  supplies,  even  if  we  are  not  otherwise  successful. 
Then  we  may  have  time  to  concentrate  as  soon  as  Grant,  and  re 
open  the  line  of  communication  with  the  South. 

The  local  and  other  troops  that  we  may  get  from  Eichmond  and 
Lynchburg  will  have  tolerably  comfortable  huts,  and  there  will 
be  enough  old  soldiers  amongst  them  to  teach  them  picket  duty. 
There  are  also  some  cavalrymen  who  can  aid  them. 

I  should  think  that  Grant,  if  he  moves,  can  only  make  a  partial 
move,  similar  to  his  last,  and  that  would  not  injure  us  very  mate 
rially. 

In  preparing  to  take  the  field,  in  view  of  the  abandonment  of 
Eichmond,  is  it  your  desire  to  keep  our  wagons  about  our  camps 
that  we  may  move  at  once  ?  Oar  wagons  are  out  all  the  time 
gathering  supplies,  and  at  times  some  distance ;  so  that  a  very 
sudden  move  would  leave  them  behind.  Shall  we  continue  to 
send  them  or  keep  them  with  us  ?  .  .  . 

Your  obedient  servant, 

J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 
VII. 

Lee  to  Longstreet 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  February  25,  1865. 

GENERAL, — I  have  received  your  letters  of  the  23d  and  24th 
insts.  I  fear  I  did  not  entirely  comprehend  your  views  ex 
pressed  in  your  letter  of  the  14th.  I  think,  however,  my  reply 
meets  your  supposition,  in  the  event  of  concentration  by  the 
enemy.  I  shall  in  that  case  unite  all  the  forces  possible.  I  think 
you  are  misinformed  as  to  the  number  of  men  in  Lynchburg.  At 
my  last  call  upon  General  Colston,  commissary  there,  he  said  he 
had  not  one  hundred  men,  and  they  were  unarmed.  I  am  very 
glad  to  hear  that  General  Ewell  can  get  force  enough  from  Eich 
mond  to  man  the  lines  north  of  James  Eiver.  I  know  him  to  be 
a  brave  old  soldier,  ready  to  attempt  anything,  but  I  do  not  know 
where  he  will  find  the  men.  Please  see  him  and  get  a  definite 
statement,  for  if  that  can  be  done  it  will  lighten  our  labor  consid- 


646  APPENDIX. 

erably.  You  cannot  afford  to  keep  your  wagons  by  you.  They 
will  have  to  be  kept  collecting  provisions,  forage,  etc.,  or  you  will 
starve.  I  am  making  great  efforts  to  gather  supplies,  and  send 
you  some  documents  which  will  show  what  the  commissary-gen 
eral  is  doing  in  addition  to  the  operations  of  the  officers  of  his  de 
partment.  It  will  be  a  grievous  thing  to  be  obliged  to  abandon  our 
position,  and  I  hope  the  necessity  will  never  arise,  but  it  would 
be  more  grievous  to  lose  our  army.  I  am  fully  alive  to  the  benefits 
of  procuring  gold,  but  fear  it  cannot  be  obtained  in  the  way  you 
suggest ;  still,  I  will  try.  I  am  much  gratified  by  the  earnestness 
and  zeal  you  display  in  our  operations  ;  and  were  our  whole  pop 
ulation  animated  by  the  same  spirit,  we  should  be  invincible. 
The  last  reports  from  S.  C.  indicated  that  Sherman  was  turning 
eastward.  It  may  be  to  reach  the  Pedee  in  search  of  supplies. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  E.  LEE, 

General. 
GENERAL  LONGSTREET, 

Commanding,  etc. 

VIII. 

Longstreet  to  Lee  on  Impressment  of  Gold. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  CORPS, 

February  26,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL, — I  have  just  heard  from  General  Ewell  indirectly 
that  he  can  raise  force  enough  at  Eichmond  to  hold  the  lines  on 
this  side,  so  that  my  corps  may  be  withdrawn  temporarily  to  your 
right,  that  is,  if  you  can  put  a  part  of  the  Second  Corps  in  place 
of  Pickett's  division.  This  arrangement  will  give  you  force 
enough  to  meet  any  move  that  the  enemy  may  make  upon  your 
right.  If  he  makes  no  move,  then  you  can,  when  the  proper  mo 
ment  arrives,  detach  a  force  to  the  aid  of  General  Beauregard, 
and  if  the  enemy  should  then  press  you,  you  can  abandon  Peters 
burg  and  hold  your  line  here,  and  take  up  the  line  of  the  Appo- 
mattox.  But  I  think  that  the  enemy  will  be  forced  to  move  a 
force  south  the  moment  that  he  finds  that  you  are  reinforcing 
against  Sherman,  else  he  will  encounter  the  risk  of  losing  Sherman 
as  well  as  Eichmond.  There  is  some  hazard  in  the  plan,  but 
nothing  can  be  accomplished  in  war  without  risk. 

The  other  important  question  is  provisions.     We  are  doing 


APPENDIX.  647 

tolerably  well  by  hauling  from  the  country  and  paying  market 
prices  in  Confederate  money.  If  you  would  give  us  gold  I  have 
reason  to  believe  that  we  could  get  an  abundant  supply  for  four 
months,  and  by  that  time  we  ought  to  be  able  to  reopen  our  com 
munication  with  the  South.  The  gold  is  here,  and  we  should 
take  it.  We  have  been  impressing  food  and  all  of  the  necessaries 
of  life  from  women  and  children,  and  have  been  the  means  of 
driving  thousands  from  their  homes  in  destitute  conditions. 

O 

Should  we  hesitate,  then,  about  putting  a  few  who  have  made  im 
mense  fortunes  at  our  expense  to  a  little  inconvenience  by  im 
pressing  their  gold  ?  It  is  necessary  for  us,  and  I  do  not  think 
that  we  should  let  our  capital  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands  for  fear 
of  injuring  the  feelings  or  interests  of  a  few  individuals.  We 
have  expended  too  much  of  blood  and  treasure  in  holding  it  for 
the  last  four  years  to  allow  it  to  go  now  by  default.  I  think  that 
it  may  be  saved.  If  it  can,  we  should  not  leave  any  possible 
contingency  untried. 

I  think,  however,  that  the  enemy's  positions  are  so  well  selected 
and  fortified  that  we  must  either  wait  for  an  opportunity  to  draw 
him  off  from  here  or  await  his  attack.  For  even  a  successful  as 
sault  would  cripple  us  so  much  that  we  could  get  no  advantage 
commensurate  with  our  loss. 

I  remain  with  great  respect,  and  truly,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.    LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 
IX. 
Longstreet  to  Lee  on  Ms  "Peace"  Interview  with  General  Or  a. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  1,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL, — I  had  another  interview  with  Major- General  Ord 
yesterday,  and  expressed  the  opinions  that  were  spoken  of  in  our 
interview  at  the  President's  mansion  on  Sabbath  last.  He  ac 
ceded  promptly  to  my  proposition  that  the  war  must  cease  if  we 
are  to  go  to  work  to  try  to  make  peace,  and  to  the  proposal  for  a 
military  convention.  I  further  claimed  that  we  could  not  go  into 
convention  upon  any  more  favorable  basis  than  an  earnest  desire 
to  arrange  plans  for  peace  that  should  be  equally  honorable  for 
both  parties.  To  this  also  I  understood  him  to  give  his  unquali 
fied  consent.  He  says  that  General  Grant  has  the  authority  to 
meet  you  if  you  have  authority  to  appoint  a  military  convention, 


648  APPENDIX. 

and  proposed  that  you  should  indicate  your  desire  to  meet  Gen 
eral  Grant,  if  you  felt  authorized  to  do  so.  As  he  made  this 
proposition  before  mine,  to  the  effect  that  General  Grant  should 
express  his  desire  to  meet  you,  and  as  the  interview  between 
General  Ord  and  myself  had  been  brought  on  at  the  request  of 
General  Ord,  I  did  not  feel  that  I  could  well  do  otherwise  than 
promise  to  write  to  you  of  the  disposition  on  their  part  to  have 
the  interview.  If  you  think  it  worth  your  time  to  invite  General 
Grant  to  an  interview,  it  might  be  upon  some  other  as  the  osten 
sible  grounds,  and  this  matter  might  be  brought  up  incidentally. 
I  presume  that  General  Grant's  first  proposition  will  be  to  go  into 
convention  upon  the  basis  of  reconstruction ;  but  if  I  have  not 
misunderstood  General  Ord's  conversation,  General  Grant  will 
agree  to  take  the  matter  up  without  requiring  any  principle  as  a 
basis  further  than  the  general  principle  of  desiring  to  make  peace 
upon  terms  that  are  equally  honorable  for  both  sides.  I  would 
suggest  that  the  interview  take  place  on  this  side,  and  at  the 
place  of  meeting  between  General  Ord  and  myself ;  because  there 
are  several  little  points  upon  which  you  should  be  posted  before 
the  interview,  and  I  do  not  see  that  I  can  well  do  that  by  writing. 
Besides,  as  "the  ice  has  already  been  broken"  on  this  side,  your 
interview  would  be  relieved  in  a  measure  of  the  formality  incident 
to  such  occasions.  If  it  should  be  on  this  side,  I  hope  that  you 
will  give  me  two  or  three  days'  notice.  General  Stevens  is  of  the 
opinion  that  one  thousand  negro  laborers  on  this  line  during  this 
month  will  so  strengthen  our  position  that  we  will  be  able  to 
spare  a  division,  and  I  am  satisfied  that  we  can  do  so  if  we  can 
have  the  work  completed,  and  can  get  the  aid  that  General  Ewell 
promises  us. 

I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.    LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


Long  street  to  Lee  on  Exchange  of  Political  Prisoners. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  1,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL, — I  neglected  to  mention  in  my  letter  just  finished 
that  General  Ord  expressed  some  apprehension  for  General  Grant 
lest  there  might  be  some  misunderstanding  in  regard  to  the  ex 
change  of  political  prisoners.  The  terms  were  general  for  the 


APPENDIX.  649 

exchange  of  this  class  of  prisoners,  but  were  not  intended  by  him, 
he  says,  to  include  such  as  were  under  charges  for  capital  offences. 
General  Grant  desired  that  you  should  be  advised  of  this  con 
struction  of  the  terms. 

I  remain,  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant, 

J.    LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

XL 

Lee  to  Longstreet  on  Interview  with  General  Grant. 

HEADQUARTERS, 

March  2,  1865. 

GENERAL, — I  have  received  to-day  your  letter  of  the  1st  in 
stant,  and  concluded  to  propose  an  interview  to  General  Grant. 
As  you  desired  to  have  two  or  three  days'  notice,  I  have  appointed 
Monday  next,  6th  instant,  at  eleven  A.M.,  at  the  point  suggested 
by  you.  Will  you  send  my  letter  to  General  Grant,  and  arrange 
with  General  Ord  for  the  interview  ?  If  you  will  ride  in  to  my 
quarters  on  Saturday  next,  4th  instant,  by  ten  A.M.,  in  Richmond, 
I  shall  be  happy  to  see  you,  when  you  can  enlighten  me  on  the 
points  you  referred  to  in  your  letter. 

I  hope  some  good  may  result  from  the  interview. 

Very  truly  yours, 

E.  E.  LEE, 

General. 
GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET, 

Commanding,  etc.  : 

p.g. — Seal  the  letter  to  General  Grant  before  transmitting. 

E.  E.  L. 


XII. 

Longstreet  to  Lee  urging  Use  of  Gold. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  7,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL, — I  received  a  letter  yesterday  from,  a  friend  in  the 
interior  of  North  Carolina  assuring  me  that  there  are  large 
quantities  of  provisions  in  the  State ;  that  many  have  two  and 
three  years'  supply  on  hand,  and  that  gold  will  bring  anything 


650  APPENDIX. 

that  we  need  to  our  armies.  The  gold  is  in  the  country,  and  most 
of  it  is  lying  idle.  Let  us  take  it  at  once  and  save  Eichmond, 
and  end  the  war.  If  we  hold  Eichmond  and  keep  our  cotton,  the 
war  cannot  last  more  than  a  year  longer.  If  we  give  up  Eich 
mond  we  shall  never  be  recognized  by  foreign  powers  until  the 
government  of  the  United  States  sees  fit  to  recognize  us.  If  we 
hold  Eichmond  and  let  the  enemy  have  our  cotton,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  shall  furnish  him  the  means  to  carry  on  the  war  against 
us.  It  looks  to  me  as  though  the  enemy  had  found  that  our  policy 
of  destroying  the  cotton  rather  than  let  it  fall  into  their  hands 
would  break  them  down,  and  that  it  has  forced  them  to  the 
policy  of  sending  on  here  to  make  a  contract  to  feed  and  clothe 
our  armies  in  order  that  they  may  get  the  means  of  carrying  on 
the  war  of  subjugation.  If  we  will  keep  our  cotton  and  use  our 
gold  our  work  will  be  comparatively  easy. 

I  remain,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


XIII. 

Longstreet  to  Lee  on  guarding  the  Danville  Railroad. 

HEAD- QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  20,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding : 

GENERAL, — I  presume  that  the  enemy's  next  move  will  be  to 
raid  against  the  Danville  Eailroad,  and  think  that  it  would  be  well 
if  we  begin  at  once  to  make  our  arrangements  to  meet  it.  In  order 
that  we  may  get  the  troops  that  may  be  necessary  to  meet  such  a 
move,  would  suggest  that  we  collect  all  the  dismounted  men  of 
Generals  Fitz  Lee,  Eosser,  and  Lomax,  and  put  them  behind  our 
strongest  lines,  and  draw  out  a  corps  of  infantry  and  hold  it  in 
readiness  for  the  raid.  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  dismounts  might 
also  be  used  behind  our  works  to  great  advantage.  With  a  cav 
alry  force  of  two  or  three  thousand  men  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check,  I  think  that  our  infantry  may  be  able  to  overtake  the 
raiding  column.  If  we  can  get  a  large  cavalry  force  I  think  that 
we  would  surely  be  able  to  destroy  the  raiding  force. 
I  remain  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


APPENDIX. 


XIV. 


651 


Longstreet  to  Assistant  Adjutant-  General  Taylor  on  Suppression  of 

Desertion. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  25,  1865. 

LIEUTENANT- COLONEL  W.  H.  TAYLOR, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General : 

The  impression  prevails  amongst  the  Georgia  troops  of  this 
command  that  persons  at  home  having  authority  to  raise  local 
organizations  are  writing  and  sending  messages  to  the  men  in  the 
ranks  here,  offering  inducements  to  them  to  quit  our  ranks  and  go 
home  and  join  the  home  organizations.    The  large  and  increasing 
number  of  desertions,  particularly  amongst  the  Georgia  troops, 
induces  me  to  believe  that  some  such  outside  influence  must  be 
operating  upon  our  men.     Nearly  all  of  the  parties  of  deserters 
seem  to  go  home,  and  it  must  be  under  the  influence  of  some 
promise,  such  as  being  received  in  the  local  forces.    I  would  sug 
gest,  therefore,  the  publication  of  a  general  order  warning  all 
officers  or  persons  authorized  to  raise  local  organizations  against 
receiving  such  deserters   or   in   any  way  harboring  them,   and 
cautioning  all  such  parties  that  they  shall  be  punished  for  such 
crimes  under  the  twenty-second  and  twenty-third  Articles  of 
War.     It  may  be  well  to  publish  the  articles  in  the  order,  and  to 
send  the  order  South  to  be  published  in  all  the  Southern  papers. 
If  the  order  is  published,  I  would  suggest  that  copies  be  sent  to 
the  Southern  papers  by  special  messenger  or  by  parties  going 
South  who  will  take  pains  to  have  it  published,  otherwise  I  fear 
it  may  miscarry  or  be  delayed  by  our  irregular  mails.     Another 
growing  evil  seems  to  trouble  us  now  in  the  shape  of  applications 
to  raise  negro  companies,  regiments,  brigades,  etc.     The  desire 
for  promotion  seems  to  have  taken  possession  of  our  army,  and  it 
seems  that  nearly  all  the  officers  and  men  think  that  they  could 
gain  a  grade  or  more  if  allowed  to  go  home.     I  presume  that 
many  may  try  to  go  merely  because  they  get  furloughs.     I  would 
suggest,  therefore,  that  some  regulation  be  published  upon  this 
subject,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  it  should  require  the  companies 
to  be  mustered  in  as  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates  by 
the  enrolling  officers,  and  that  all  of  the  officers  (general,  field, 
and  company)  shall  be  selected  from  the  officers,  non-commis 
sioned  officers,  and  privates  on  duty  with  the  armies  of  the  Con- 


652  APPENDIX. 

federacy.     If  these  matters  are  not   speedily  taken  hold  of  by  a 
firm  hand,  I  fear  that  we  shall  be  seriously  damaged  by  them. 
I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 

XV. 

Longstreet  to  Lee  on  Sheridan's  Operations. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  28,  1865. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Commanding,  etc.  : 

Your  telegram  asking  if  we  can  spare  General  Pickett's  di 
vision  as  a  supporting  force  to  our  cavalry  is  received.  I  sug 
gested  that  it  should  be  sent  on  that  service  because  I  was  appre 
hensive  that  our  railroad  would  be  in  danger  of  being  broken  up 
behind  us,  leaving  us  without  supplies  sufficient  to  hold  Eich- 
mond  until  our  communications  south  could  be  re-established,  or 
in  case  Sheridan  went  to  N.  C.,  his  mounted  force  would  be  too 
formidable  for  that  of  General  Johnston's,  and  that  General 
Johnston  would  be  in  great  danger  if  we  shall  not  reinforce  him. 
I  do  not  think  that  we  can  well  spare  the  division.  But  I  think 
that  we  would  choose  a  lesser  risk  by  sparing  it  in  case  Sheri 
dan's  cavalry  makes  either  of  these  moves  contemplated  than 
we  would  by  holding  him  here  to  await  the  result  of  these  opera 
tions.  The  enemy  seems  now  to  count  upon  taking  Eichmond  by 
raiding  upon  our  lines  of  communication,  and  not  by  attacking 
our  lines  of  work.  I  think,  therefore,  we  should  endeavor  to  put 
a  force  in  the  field  that  can  contend  against  that  of  the  enemy. 
If  Grant  sends  off  his  cavalry,  he  can  hardly  intend  to  make  any 
general  move  of  his  main  army  until  its  return.  In  every  aspect 
of  affairs,  so  far  as  I  am  advised,  I  think  that  the  greater  danger 
is  from  keeping  too  close  within  our  trenches.  If  we  can  remain 
where  we  are  independently  of  the  railroad,  and  if  General 
Johnston  would  be  safe  with  such  a  force  as  Sheridan's  operating 
against  him,  in  addition  to  Sherman's,  we  had  better  keep  the 
division  here.  You  know  much  more  about  all  those  points  than 
I  do,  and  are  much  better  able  to  decide  upon  them.  My  supply 
train  is  in  from  Northern  Neck,  and  starts  back  to-morrow  for 
other  provisions.  If  there  is  any  impropriety  in  sending  it  back, 
please  telegraph  me  as  soon  as  you  receive  this,  that  I  may  recall 
it.  We  have  about  one  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  meat  near 


APPENDIX. 


653 


Dublin  and  eighteen  thousand  at  New  Boston.     The  C.  S.  com 
plains  that  the  railroad  agents  will  not  ship  the  meat  unless  it  is 
boxed.     This  cannot  always  be  done.     If  you  can  in  any  way  aid 
us  in  this  matter,  we  shall  do  very  well  for  some  time  to  come. 
I  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


XVI. 

Longstreet  to  Adjutant- General  Taylor  on  Policy  towards  New 
Organizations. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS, 

March  30,  1865. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  W.  H.  TAYLOR, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General  : 

Your  letter  expressing  the  views  of  the  commander- in- chief  in 
reference  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  in  raising  negro  troops  is  re 
ceived.  I  am  apprehensive  that  we  shall  have  applications  and 
evidence  enough  to  take  from  us  more  men  than  we  can  well  spare 
at  this  critical  moment  in  our  affairs.  It  seems  to  me  that  any 
person  who  has  the  influence  to  raise  a  company  or  a  regiment  by 
going  home  could  do  so  as  well  by  letters  to  his  friends  at  home. 
If  I  am  right  in  this  opinion,  an  order  announcing  that  the  offi 
cers  of  the  companies  and  regiments  of  colored  troops  would  be 
appointed  from  the  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  pri 
vates  on  duty  with  our  armies  would  have  the  effect  of  bringing 
back  more  absentees  than  we  should  lose  by  making  the  appoint 
ments.  If  we  may  judge  of  our  future  success  in  getting  up  new 
organizations  by  the  past,  we  may  rely  upon  it  that  many  will 
furnish  the  necessary  evidence,  and  go  home  and  there  remain  for 
eight  and  ten  and  twelve  months.  I  think  it  would  be  well  to  pub 
lish  a  general  order,  explaining  more  clearly  the  policy  indicated 
in  your  letter,  in  order  that  a  better  general  understanding  may 
exist  amongst  the  parties  who  may  desire  to  furnish  evidence  of 
their  ability  to  get  up  new  organizations.  Otherwise  I  may  adopt 
rules  which  would  not  be  as  favorable  to  the  officers  and  men  of 
this  command  as  those  of  other  commands. 

I  remain  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  J.  LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant-  General. 


654  APPENDIX. 


XVII. 

Lee  to  Longstreet  on  Proposed  Publication  of  a  History  of  Virginia 

Campaigns. 

LEXINGTON,  VA.,  January  19,  1866. 
GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET  : 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — Upon  my  return  from  Eichmond,  where 
I  have  been  for  a  week  on  business  connected  with  Washington 
College,  I  found  your  letter  of  the  26th  ultimo.  I  regret  very 
much  that  you  never  received  my  first  letter,  as  you  might  then, 
perhaps,  have  given  me  the  information  I  desired,  with  more  ease 
to  yourself  and  with  more  expedition  than  now.  I  did  not  know 
how  to  address  it,  but  sent  it  to  a  friend  in  Eichmond,  who  gave 
it  to  one  of  our  officers  going  south,  who  transferred  it  to  another, 
etc.,  and  after  travelling  many  weary  miles,  has  been  recently 
returned  to  me.  I  start  it  again  in  pursuit  of  you,  though  you 
did  not  tell  me  how  to  address  you.  I  have  almost  forgotten 
what  it  contained,  but  I  hope  it  will  inform  you  of  my  purpose  in 
writing  a  history  of  the  campaigns  in  Virginia,  and  of  the  object 
that  I  have  in  view,  so  that  you  may  give  me  all  the  information 
in  your  power.  I  shall  be  in  no  hurry  in  publishing,  and  will  not 
do  so  until  I  feel  satisfied  that  I  have  got  the  true  story,  as  my 
only  object  is  to  disseminate  the  truth.  I  am  very  sorry  to  hear 
that  your  records  were  destroyed  too  ;  but  I  hope  Sorrel  and  La- 
trobe  will  be  able  to  supply  you  with  all  you  require.  I  wish  to 
relate  the  acts  of  all  the  corps  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
wherever  they  did  duty,  and  do  not  wish  to  omit  so  important  a 
one  as  yours.  I  will  therefore  wait  as  long  as  I  can. 

I  shall  be  very  glad  to  receive  anything  you  may  give  to  Mr. 
Washington  McLean,  as  I  know  you  recommend  no  one  but  those 
who  deserve  your  good  opinion. 

I  am  delighted  to  hear  that  your  arm  is  still  improving,  and 
hope  it  will  soon  be  restored.  You  are,  however,  becoming  so  ac 
complished  with  your  left  hand  as  not  to  need  it.  You  must  re 
member  me  very  kindly  to  Mrs.  Longstreet  and  all  your  children. 
I  have  not  had  an  opportunity  yet  to  return  the  compliment  she 
paid  me.  I  had,  while  in  Eichmond,  a  great  many  inquiries  after 
you,  and  learned  that  you  intended  commencing  business  in 
New  Orleans.  If  you  become  as  good  a  merchant  as  you  were  a 
soldier,  I  shall  be  content.  No  one  will  then  excel  you,  and  no 
one  can  wish  you  more  success  and  more  happiness  than  I.  My 


APPENDIX.  655 

interest  and  affection  for  you  will  never  cease,  and  my  prayers  are 
always  offered  for  your  prosperity. 

I  am  most  truly  yours, 

E.  E.  LEE. 

XVIII. 

Lee  to  Longstreet — Congratulations. 

LEXINGTON,  VA.,  January  26,  1866. 

LONGSTREET,  OWEN  &  Co., 

New  Orleans: 

GENTLEMEN,— I  am  much  obliged  to  you  for  your  business  card, 
and  the  pleasure  it  has  afforded  me  to  know  that  you  have  en 
tered  into  partnership.  I  know  you  will  do  your  work  well,  arid 
please  myself,  therefore,  with  the  prospect  of  your  great  success. 

I  wrote  to  your  senior  a  few  days  since,  at  Macon,  Mississippi, 
and  hope  he  will  receive  my  letter.  I  do  not  consider  my  partner 
ship  with  him  yet  dissolved,  and  shall  not  let  go  him  during  life. 

Wishing  you  all  happiness  and  prosperity,  I  am,  with  great 
affection,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  E.  LEE. 


XIX. 

Lee  to  Longstreet,  suggesting  the  Preparation  of  his  Memoirs. 

LEXINGTON,  VA.,  March  9,  1866. 
GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET  : 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — Your  son  Garland  handed  me  a  few  days 
since  your  letter  of  the  15th  of  January,  with  the  copies  of  your 
reports  of  operations  in  East  Tennessee,  Wilderness,  Virginia,  and 
of  some  of  my  official  letters  to  you.  I  hope  you  will  be  able  to 
send  me  a  report  of  your  operations  around  Suffolk  and  Eich- 
mond  previous  to  the  evacuation  of  that  city,  and  of  any  of  my 
general  orders  which  you  may  be  able  to  collect. 

Can  you  not  occupy  your  leisure  time  in  preparing  your  memoirs 
of  the  war  1  Every  officer  whose  position  and  character  would 
give  weight  to  his  statements  ought  to  do  so.  It  is  the  only  way 
in  which  we  may  hope  that  fragments  of  truth  will  reach  pos 
terity.  Mrs.  Longstreet  will  act  as  your  amanuensis.  I  arn  very 
sorry  that  your  arm  improves  so  slowly.  I  trust  it  will  be  eventu 
ally  restored  to  you.  You  must  present  my  kindest  regards  to 
Mrs.  Longstreet.  I  hope  your  home  in  New  Orleans  will  be 


656  APPENDIX. 

happy  ;  that  your  life,  which  is  dear  to  me,  may  be  long  and 
prosperous. 

Most  truly  yours, 

E.  E.  LEE. 


Longstreet  to  Lee  on  Battle  of  Games' s  Mill. 

NEW  ORLEANS,  LA.,  March  20,  1866. 
GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE, 

Lexington,  Va. : 

MY  DEAR.  GENERAL, — Your  favor  of  the  9th  instant  is  re 
ceived.      The  papers  or  copies  sent  by  Garland  contain  every 
thing  that  I  have  or  can  get  in  the  shape  of  your  letters  and 
orders.     I  shall  be  able  to  give  you  an  account  of  movements, 
etc.,  connected  with  the  Suffolk  campaign  and  the  siege  of  Eich- 
mond  when  I  can  get  our  diaries, —that  is,  Sorrel's,  Latrobe's, 
and  my  own.     But  I  fear  that  I  shall  not  be  able  to  do  so  in  time 
to  meet  your  desires.     I  shall  send  all  that  I  can  gather  together 
to  your  house  as  soon  as  I  can.     I  have  sometimes  thought  that  I 
would  make  the  effort  to  write  at  some  future  time,  but  begin  to 
despair  of  my  arm.     It  is  too  much  labor  to  write  with  my  left 
hand,  and  it  gives  me  inconvenience,  indeed  pain,  to  keep  my  right 
hand  in  the  constrained  position  necessary  in  writing.    Our  busi 
ness  affairs  occupy  my  days  from  nine  till  four  P.M.,  so  I  am  glad 
to  give  my  arm  rest  after  that  time.     Mrs.  Longstreet  would  be 
rather  a  poor  amanuensis  in  the  evening,  niy  only  spare  time,  as 
her  two  little  boys,  Lee  and  Jim,  occupy  most  of  her  time.     She 
is  trying  to  get  a  picture  of  Lee  to  send  you.     I  delivered  your 
message  that  you  "  regretted  that  you  had  not  been  able  to  return 
the  compliment."     To  go  back  to  history  and  the  war.     There  is 
one  portion  of  our  records  as  written  that  I  should  like  cor 
rected,— the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill.     Your  report  of  that  battle 
does  not  recognize  the  fact  that  the  line  in  my  front,  that  is,  the 
enemy's  line,  was   broken  by  the   troops  that   were  under  my 
orders  and  handling.    A  part  of  Jackson's  command,  being  astray, 
reported  to  me  just  as  I  was  moving  my  column  of  attack  for 
ward,— Whiting's  division, — and  I  put  it  in  my  column  of  attack, 
as  stated  in  my  report.     I  think  that  you  must  have  overlooked 
my  report  on  this  point,  and  have  been  guided  by  Jackson's. 
Jackson  knew  nothing  of  the  matter  of  my  having  his  troops,  I 
suppose,  and  merely  made  his  report  from  riding  over  the  ground 
after  the  battle.     I  presume  that  he  was  not  within  one  mile  of 


APPENDIX.  657 

the  division  when  I  put  it  in,  and  had  no  idea  of  its  whereabouts. 
General  Whiting  reported  to  me  that  he  had  lost  his  way/  and 
did  not  know  where  to  find  General  Jackson,  and  offered  his 
troops  if  I  had  use  for  them.  I  was  then  moving  to  assault,  and 
put  Whiting  in  a  little  behind  Pickett's  brigade.  The  commands 
made  the  assault  together,  and  broke  the  enemy's  line.  Ander 
son's  brigade  followed  and  secured  it,  the  assaulting  columns 
being  somewhat  broken  in  making  the  charge.  Just  after  break 
ing  his  lines  the  enemy  made  a  severe  attack,  and  would  have 
recovered  his  position,  I  think,  but  for  the  timely  support  of 
Anderson's  and  Keniper's  brigades  at  this  point.  Another  fact 
should  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  this  connection.  A.  P.  Hill  had 
made  several  formidable  attacks  at  the  same  point,  and  had  fought 
manfully  against  it  for  several  hours,  and  though  not  entirely  suc 
cessful,  he  must  have  made  a  decided  impression,  and  have  injured 
the  enemy  as  much  as  he  was  himself  injured,  and  thus  weakened 
the  enemy's  lines  so  as  to  enable  us  to  break  them.  It  is  quite 
common  to  give  those  credit  only  who  show  results,  but  it  fre 
quently  happens,  as  in  this  case,  that  there  are  others  who  merit 
as  much  who  are  not  known  by  results, — that  is,  who  are  not  seen 
by  others  than  those  on  the  ground. 

If  you  can  come  across  my  son  when  you  have  an  idle  moment, 
I  hope  that  you  will  give  him  a  few  words  of  kindly  advice  and 
encouragement.    He  is  taught  to  look  up  to  you  as  superior  to 
others.     Mrs.  Longstreet  joins  me  in  affectionate  salutations. 
,  I  remain  very  truly  yours, 

J.  LONGSTREET. 

XXI. 

Lee  to  Longstreet — Situation  and  Prospects. 

LEXINGTON,  VA.,  May  25,  1866. 
GENERAL  J.  LONGSTREET  : 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — I  was  very  glad  to  receive  your  letter 
of  the  18th,  but  you  t^old  me  so  little  of  yourself  that  I  presume 
you  intend  writing  to  me  again  shortly.  But  what  you  did  say 
was  very  satisfactory,  and  I  am  much  pleased  to  know  that  your 
prospects  in»a  commercial  point  of  view  are  good  and  progressive. 
I  hope  they  may  regularly  and  surely  advance.  I  feel  much 
obliged  by  your  kind  proposition  as  regards  myself.  For  the 
present  I  must  remain  where  I  am.  When  I  see  that  I  have  done 
all  the  good  that  I  can  accomplish  for  Washington  College  I  may 
find  it  necessary  to  do  something  that  will  enable  me  to  procure  a 

42 


658  APPENDIX. 

competence  for  my  family.  I  will  then  turn  my  hand  to  whatever 
may  offer.  For  myself  I  want  nothing  but  my  food  and  clothes. 
I  send  in  compliance  with  your  request  a  number  of  autographs, 
enough,  I  should  think,  to  last  for  all  time  5  but  if  they  will  be  of 
any  service  to  you  I  will  send  more.  Mr.  Lowe  has  not  yet 
reached  Lexington.  It  will  give  me  pleasure  to  see  him  when  he 
does,  as  he  comes  from  you.  As  you  did  not  mention  your  arm, 
I  hope  that  is  improving  too.  You  must  never  omit  to  mention 
it,  Mrs.  Longstreet,  and  your  children  when  you  write.  I  see 
Garland  very  often  in  my  walks,  but  very  rarely  at  my  house.  .  . 
All  unite  in  kindest  regards  to  yourself  and  family. 

Most  truly  yours, 

E.  E.  LEE. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Adams,  General,  wounded  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  446. 

Alden,  Bradford  R.,  at  Jefferson  Bar 
racks,  17;  friendliness  of,  to  Long- 
street,  632. 

Alexander,  General  E.  P.,  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  311,  316;  at  Gettysburg, 
389,  390,  391  ;  notifies  Pickett  to  ad 
vance,  392  ;  goes  to  Tennessee  with 
Longstreet,  437  ;  on  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  463;  at  Campbell's  Station, 
493  ;  at  Knoxville,  497  ;  at  Mechan- 
icsville  (1864),  553;  letter  of,  to 
Longstreet,  on  affairs  at  Wilderness, 
570,  571. 

Amazon  Creek,  engagement  at,  606. 

Amusement  of  soldiers,  325,  326. 

Anderson,  General  G.  B.,  at  Seven 
Pines,  94;  at  South  Mountain,  222; 
mortally  wounded  at  Sharpsburg, 
249. 

Anderson,  General  G.  T.,  at  Sharps- 
burg,  242,  247;  wounded  at  Get 
tysburg,  372 ;  brigade  of,  receives 
Farnsworth's  cavalry  charge,  395  ;  in 
retreat  from  Gettysburg,  428 ;  joins 
Hood's  division  in  Tennessee,  462 ; 
in  assault  of  Fort  Sanders,  502,  503, 
505,  506 ;  at  Wilderness,  562  ;  cap 
tures  prisoners  at  Farmville,  617. 

Anderson,  Lieutenant-Gerieral  R.  H., 
at  Williamsburg,  72,  75,  76;  at 
Seven  Pines,  94;  at  Sharpsburg, 
247,  249 ;  report  of  interview  with 
General  Lee  at  Gettysburg,  357; 
in  fight  at  Little  Round  Top,  372; 
in  command  of  left  division  on 
Rapidan  (1864),  553;  division  of,  in 


the  Wilderness,  559,  562;  succeeds 
Longstreet,  wounded,  565;  at  Five 
Forks,  602 ;  in  engagement  at  Ama 
zon  Creek,  606 ;  makes  attack  at 
Rice's  Station,  613 ;  letter  to,  from 
General  Lee,  639. 

Antietam,  battle  of.     See  Sharpsburg. 

Appendix,  639. 

Appomattox,  surrender  at,  officers  urge 
negotiations  for  surrender,  618  ;  Gen 
eral  Grant  asks  surrender,  619  ;  Gen 
eral  Lee  replies,  asking  terms,  619 ; 
interview  of  General  Pendleton  with 
General  Lee,  620,  621 ;  General  Grant 
states  terms  for  surrender,  622  ;  Gen 
eral  Lee  proposes  meeting  with  Gen 
eral  Grant,  622;  Sheridan's  decisive 
action,  622  ;  General  Lee  gives  orders 
for  march  to  Appomattox  Court- 
House,  623 ;  an  account  of  last 
scenes  of  activity,  624 ;  General  Lee 
confers  with  Longstreet  and  Mahone, 
624,  625 ;  General  Lee  rides  to  meet 
General  Grant,  625 ;  Longstreet  en 
deavors  to  recall  Lee,  626 ;  General 
Caster's  demand  of  surrender  from 
Longstreet,  627  ;  truce  ordered,  628  ; 
sympathy  of  soldiers  for  General  Lee, 
629  ;  Generals  Grant  and  Longstreet 
meet.  630 ;  details  of  capitulation  ar 
ranged,  630 ;  number  of  troops  sur 
rendered  and  paroled,  631. 

Archer,  General,  at  Shepherdstown, 
264  ;  at  Fredericksburg,  309 ;  cap 
tured  at  Gettysburg,  354,  389. 

Arista,  General,  in  command  of  Mex 
ican  forces,  22. 

Armies.  See  Confederate,  Federal, 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. 

659 


660 


INDEX. 


Armistead,  General,  at  Malvern  Hill, 
143  ;  killed  beside  Federal  battery  in 
Pickett's  charge  (Gettysburg),  394. 
Armstrong,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 
441 ;  makes  great  capture  of  cattle, 
530;  in  sharp   engagement   on   the 
French  Broad,  532. 
Army  corps.     See  Corps. 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  losses  of, 
in    Maryland   campaign,    266,    267; 
condition  of,  on  entering  Maryland, 
284;    reorganized  in  October,  1862, 
290 ;  strength  of,  at  Fredericksburg, 
305 ;    strength  and   organization  of, 
at  Fredericksburg,  317  et  seq. ;  di 
vided  into  three  corps,  332  ;  in  readi 
ness  for  Gettysburg  campaign,  334 ; 
organization  of,  in  Gettysburg,  410 ; 
in   retreat  from   Gettysburg,    426  et 
seq. ;  strength  of,  in  1864,  552-554 ; 
capitulation  of,  at  Appomattox,  631. 
Army  of  Observation,  18. 
Army  of  Occupation,  19. 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  organization  of, 
in    Maryland   campaign,    209,  271 ; 
strength  of,  at  Antietam,  265  ;  losses 
of,  at  Antietam,  266  ;  reorganized  by 
General  Burnside,  292 ;  strength  of, 
at  Fredericksburg,  305  ;  in  false  posi 
tion  at  Fredericksburg,  323;  before 
Gettysburg,    335;     Meade    succeeds 
Hooker  in  command  of,  348;  organ 
ization     of,     at     Gettysburg,     415; 
strength  of,  in  1864,  552 ;  crosses  the 
Kapidan,  555;  posting  of,  at   Five 
Forks,  593. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  first  victory 
of  the,  456  ;  Longstreet  offered  com 
mand  of,  466 ;  Hardee  offered  com 
mand  of,  466  (note). 
Army    of   Virginia    organized,    153; 

strength  of,  153,  157. 
"  Attrition,"  policy  of,  551. 
Averill,  General,  makes  raid  from  West 
Virginia   into  East  Tennessee,  521, 
522. 

Avery,  Colonel,  death   of,   at  Gettys 
burg,  375. 

Ayres,  General,   at  Five   Forks,   598, 
599,  601. 


B. 

Badeau,  General,  quoted  on  strength 
of  Army  of  Potomac  in  1864,  552, 
553. 

Baird,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  441. 
Baker,  E.  D.,  61. 
Ball's  Bluff,  engagement  at,  61. 
Banks,  General  N.  P.,  in  command  of 
Second    Corps,    Army  of   Virginia, 
153;    his  battle  against  Jackson  at 
Slaughter  Mountain,  157. 
Barksdale,  General,  at  Fredericksburg, 
301,   303;    takes   battery  at  Gettys 
burg,    370;    guiding    spirit  of   the 
battle,  371 ;  mortally  wounded,  372. 
Barlow,    General,    at  Antietam,    250; 
fall    of,    252,    266;    at    Gettysburg, 
355. 
Baxter,   Colonel,   crosses   the   river  at 

Fredericksburg  under  fire,  303. 
Beauregard,  General  G.  T.,  at  West 
Point,  16;  at  Manassas,  33,  35;  in 
structions  to  commanders,  36  ;  order 
for  battle,  44 ;  order  miscarries,  46 ; 
in  charge  of  left,  49 ;  brave  charge 
by,  50 ;  ordered  West,  64 ;  proposal 
to  bring,  into  Gettysburg  campaign, 
336 ;  prejudice  against,  of  Davis, 
432,  545;  Longstreet  writes  Presi 
dent  Davis  in  favor  of,  547. 
Beauregard,  Lieutenant  K.  T.,  at 

Chickamauga,  441. 
Beaver  Dam  Creek.     See   Mechanics- 

ville. 

Bee,  General  Bernard  E.,  at  Manassas, 
46,  48;  gives  name  of  "  Stonewall" 
to  Jackson,  49. 

Bennings,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  370, 
396  ;  in  retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431 ; 
at  Chickamauga,  448 ;  at  Peters 
burg,  606. 

Bermuda  Hundred,  Pickett's  division 
assigned    to,    574 ;    assault    on,    by 
Parke  (Petersburg),  605. 
Berry,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  309. 
Birney,    General,    at    Fredericksburg, 
309 ;  at  Gettysburg,  account  of  affair 
at  Peach  Orchard,  366 ;  at  Wilder 
ness,  559. 


INDEX. 


661 


Blackburn's  Ford,  engagement  at,  38. 
See  Manassas,  First. 

Blair,  Hon.  Montgomery,  peace  mission 
of,  583. 

Bonham,  General  M.  S.,  at  Manassas, 
52. 

Bostan,  Colonel,  killed,  G30. 

Boteler's  Ford,  264.  See  Shepherds- 
town. 

Bowen,  Orderly,  killed  at  Wilderness, 
564. 

Bragg,  General  Braxton,  at  West  Point, 
17;  threatening  near  Chattanooga, 
434,  436  ;  Longstreet  at  head-quarters 
of,  438 ;  plan  of,  for  Chickamauga, 
439  ;  gives  orders  to  Longstreet's  di 
vision  commanders,  447 ;  disturbed  by 
plan  of  battle,  452 ;  absence  of,  from 
field,  455,  457  ;  order  for  retreat,  456, 
457  ;  did  not  know  result  of  Chicka 
mauga  until  next  day,  458  ;  receives 
report  of  battle  from  Longstreet,  461 ; 
refuses  to  pursue  the  enemy,  462, 
463  ;  officers  call  for  removal  of,  464  ; 
puts  Generals  Polk  and  Hindman 
under  charges,  465 ;  inquiry  in  re 
gard  to,  by  President  Davis,  465 ;  on 
affairs  subsequent  to  Chickamauga, 
471 ;  criticism  upon,  472 ;  ignores 
signal  service  reports  and  is  surprised, 
474,  475 ;  plans  to  capture  Hooker's 
rear-guard  by  night  attack,  475; 
orders  Longstreet  into  East  Tennes 
see,  481  ;  urges  Longstreet  to  make 
rapid  movement,  483  ;  orders  speedy 
attack  of  Knoxville  by  Longstreet, 
501 ;  orders  Longstreet  to  co-opera 
tion  with  his  army  after  defeat  at 
Chattanooga,  507 ;  relieved  of  com 
mand  by  General  Hardee,  515 ;  called 
to  Richmond  as  commander-in-chief, 
516 ;  suggestions  of,  before  authori 
ties  at  Richmond,  545 ;  action  of, 
after  Chickamauga  criticised  by 
Longstreet  before  authorities  at 
Richmond,  546;  ordered  to  Wil 
mington,  580;  comment  on,  by  Con 
federate  newspaper,  582  (note). 

Branch,  General  L.  O'B.,  report  of,  on 
march  to  Mechanicsville,  123. 


Brandy  Station,  cavalry  engagement 
at,  between  Stuart  and  Pleasonton, 
338. 

Branrian,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 
442. 

Bratton,  Colonel,  in  attack  on  Hooker's 
rear-guard  near  Lookout  Mountain, 
476,  477. 

Breckenridge,  Major-General  J.  C  ,  at 
Chickamauga,  441  ;  in  assault,  445, 
446 ;  appointed  Secretary  of  War, 
583,  584. 

Bristoe  Station,  engagement  at*  between 
Ewell  and  Hooker,  170. 

Brockenbrough,  General,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  307  ;  at  Gettysburg,  354. 

Bryan,  General,  in  assault  on  Fort 
Sanders,  505,  520. 

Buckner,  General  Simon,  at  Chicka 
mauga,  439 ;  gives  opinion  adverse 
to  Bragg,  465  ;  letter  to,  from  Long- 
street,  484,  485. 

Buford,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  351, 
352,  353. 

Bull  Run.    See  Manassas. 

Bull's  Gap,  Longstreet's  army  at,  542. 

Burnside,  General  A.  E.,  ordered  to 
Fredericksburg  to  aid  Pope,  159 ; 
begins  work  at  "  Burnside's  bridge," 
244 ;  continuance  of,  254,  256,  257, 
258;  McClellan's  orders  to,  for  taking 
bridge,  258;  effects  crossing,  260; 
battle  concentrates  against,  261  ; 
his  advance  arrested,  262  ;  assigned 
to  command  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
291 ;  reorganizes  army  in  three 
"Grand  Divisions,"  292;  submits 
plan  to  President  Lincoln,  292;  plan 
of,  for  crossing  Rappahannock  at 
Fredericksburg,  301  ;  plan  of,  for  bat 
tle,  304;  orders  that  Marye's  Hill 
must  be  carried  before  night,  312  ; 
orders  of,  to  Franklin  criticised,  315  ; 
memorandum  of,  for  renewal  of  at 
tack  on  Marye's  Hill,  captured,  316  ; 
abortive  moves  by,  322  et  seq. ;  in 
East  Tennessee,  434,  436,  480,  481 ; 
has  army  of  twenty-five  thousand 
men  north  of  Knoxville,  482 ;  acts 
on  defensive  at  Knoxville,  488  ;  sends 


662 


INDEX. 


troops  to  Little  Tennessee  River,  490  ; 
report  of,  on  condition  at  Knox 
ville,  499,  500  ;  relieved  of  command 
at  Knoxville  by  General  Foster,  514  ; 
in  command  of  Ninth  Corps  in  Vir 
ginia,  552. 

Burnside's  bridge.  See  Burnside,  Gen 
eral  A.  E.,  and  Sharpsburg. 

Butler,  General  Benjamin  F.,  in  front 
of  Richmond,  575,  576;  move  on 
Fort  Fisher,  580. 


C. 

Campaign  in  far  South,  consideration 
of,  540. 

Campaign  of  1864,  551  et  seq. 

Campbell,  Judge  J.  A.,  583. 

Campbell's  Station,  engagement  at, 
492,  494. 

Cannon-shots,  remarkable,  254,  255. 

Capitulation.  See  Appomattox,  surren 
der  at. 

Carr,  General,  at  Dandridge,  526. 

Cash  town,  Lee  calls  for  concentration 
at,  348. 

Chambersburg,  Confederates  at,  351. 

Chancellorsville,  losses  at,  327;  criti 
cism  upon,  329,  330. 

Chantilly,  battle  of,  193;  killing  of 
Kearny  and  Stevens  at,  194. 

Charles  City  Cross-Roads.  See  Fray- 
ser's  Farm. 

Chattanooga,  Federal  army  at,  462  et 
seq. 

Cheatham,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 
441 ;  gives  opinion  adverse  to  General 
Bragg,  465. 

Chester  Gap,  Longstreet's  command  at, 
in  retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431. 

Chickahominy  River,  McClellan  ad 
vances  to,  82  (see  Seven  Pines) ; 
fighting  along  the,  in  summer  of 
1862,  120  et  seq. ;  McClellan  changes 
base  from,  to  James  River,  132. 

Chickamauga,  battle  of  (see  Westward 
movement),  Longstreet  arrives  at 
Bragg 's  head-quarters,  438  ;  plan  for, 
439 ;  Confederate  purpose  to  push 
between  enemy  and  his  base  at 


Chattanooga,  440  ;  Confederate  posi 
tions,  440,  441 ;  Union  positions, 
441,  442  ;  General  Bragg  orders  direct 
assault,  443,  445;  battle  opened  by 
advance  of  General  D.  H.  Hill's 
corps,  445;  General  Helm  killed, 
446;  attack  by  Cleburne,  446; 
Longstreet's  troops  assault,  447 ; 
wounding  of  General  Hood,  448; 
Federals  driven  back,  448,  449; 
change  in  plan  by  Longstreet,  450 ; 
right  wing  ceases  active  battle,  452 ; 
contention  by  left  wing  as  indepen 
dent  battle,  455;  the.  Union  army 
melts  away,  455,  456 ;  rejoicings  of 
Confederates,  456 ;  General  Thomas 
marches  for  Rossville  Gap,  456; 
retreat  was  made  before  issue  of 
Rosecrans's  order,  457  ;  Confederates 
hold  Snodgrass  Hill,  457 ;  losses, 
458  ;  heavy  losses  by  regiments,  459  ; 
Longstreet  urges  pursuit  of  the  Fed 
erals,  461  et  seq. ;  absence  of  both 
commanders  from  the  field,  472 ; 
action  of  Bragg  after  close  of,  re 
ferred  to  at  Richmond  by  Longstreet, 
546. 

Cleburne,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 
441,  446. 

Cobb,  General,  attacked  by  Franklin 
at  Crampton's  Pass,  229,  230;  at 
Fredericksburg,  303  ;  killing  of,  311. 

Colgrove,  Colonel  Silas,  finds  Lee's 
"lost  order,"  213. 

Confederate  army,  organization  and 
strength  of,  at  Manassas  (First),  57  ; 
strength  of,  at  Sharpsburg,  265,  266  ; 
losses  of,  at  Sharpsburg,  266  ;  condi 
tion  of,  on  entering  Maryland,  284 ; 
reorganized,  290 ;  strength  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  305 ;  numbers  and 
organization  of,  at  Fredericksburg, 
317  et  seq.;  divided  into  three  corps, 
332;  ready  for  Gettysburg  campaign, 
334  ;  organization  of,  at  Gettysburg, 
410  ;  in  retreat  from  Gettysburg,  426 
et  seq. ;  strength  and  losses  of,  at 
Chickamauga,  458 ;  losses  of,  at 
Knoxville,  508;  strength  of,  1864, 
552  ;  capitulation  of,  630. 


INDEX. 


663 


Confederate  flag.     See  Flag. 
Confederate  soldier,   tributes   to,    200, 

288 ;  amusement  of,  325. 
Congress,  Confederate,  tenders  vote  of 
thanks  to  General   Longstreet,  550  ; 
expresses  want  of  confidence  in  Pres 
ident  Davis,  583  ;  passes  law  for  ap 
pointment     of    commander-in-chief, 
583. 
Cooke,    Colonel,   at  Sharpsburg,    250, 

267. 

Corps,  army,  two  provisional,  organized 
by  McClellan  on  Chickahominy,  82 ; 
First  (Confederate), losses  of,at  Sharps- 
burg,  2G6;  First  (Confederate),  firm 
ness  of,  334;  Second  (Confederate), 
leading  on  march  into  Pennsylvania, 
340;  First  (Confederate),  on  march 
into  Pennsylvania.  341  ;  Third  (Con 
federate),  march  of,  to  Gettysburg, 
344;  First  (Confederate),  at  Gettys 
burg,  397  et  seq. ;  vote  of  thanks  to 
First  (Confederate),  in  Congress,  550 ; 
Ninth  (Federal),  under  Burnside, 
552 ;  General  Lee  on  services  of  First 
(Confederate),  639. 

Corpus  Christi,  army  concentrates  at,  19. 
Corse,    General,    at   Five   Forks,   595, 

600,  601  ;  captured,  614. 
Couch,  General  D.  N.,  at  Seven  Pines, 
95,  98 ;  at  Harper's  Ferry,  229,  232. 
Councils  of  war,  at  Richmond,  April, 
1862,  66;  Johnston's,  before   Seven 
Pines,    85,    86;  by  General  G.  W. 
Smith,  at  Seven  Pines,  107;  of  Lee 
and  his  officers,  June,  1862,  121 ;  in 
spring  of  1864,  at  Richmond,  543- 
595. 

Cox,  General  J.  D.,  with  Pleasonton 
opens     battle    of   South   Mountain, 
221,    223;    at   Burnside's  bridge  in 
command  of  Ninth  Corps,  258. 
Crampton's  Pass,  description  of,  206  : 
General  Franklin  ordered  to,  by  Mc 
Clellan,  217  ;  Hampton's  cavalry  at, 
229 ;  Franklin  and  Cobb  have  engage 
ment  at,  229,  230. 

Crittenden,  General  T.  L.,  at  Chicks 
mauga,  442;  goes  before  court  of 
inquiry,  465. 


Irook,  General,  at  Burnside's  bridge 
(Antietam),  259 ;  attacks  Confederate 
trains,  612. 

Dross,  Colonel,  at  Antietam,  266. 

Cullen,  J.  S.  D.,  letter  of,  to  General 
Longstreet  on  second  day  at  Gettys 
burg,  383  (note). 

Cumberland  Church,  engagement  at, 
615. 

Cumberland  Gap,  engagement  at,  513. 

Gumming,  Lieutenant,  bravery  of,  at 
Fort  Sanders,  520. 

Curtin,  Andrew  G.,  Governor  of  Penn 
sylvania,  letter  of,  to  General  Mc 
Clellan,  282. 

Custer,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  396; 
defeats  and  captures  most  of  Early 's 
command  at  Waynesboro',  590;  at 
Five  Forks,  598  ;  division  of,  at  Ap- 
pomattox,  622;  demands  and  is  re 
fused  surrender  of  Longstreet,  627. 

D. 

Dandridge,  affair  at,  528  et  seq. 

Danville  Railroad,  Longstreet  on  guard 
ing  of,  650. 

Davis,  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.,  escapes 
with  command  from  Harper's  Ferry, 
231. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  President,  in  council, 
April,  1862,  66  ;  high  opinion  of  Mc 
Clellan,  66  ;  on  battle-field  (Frayser's 
Farm),  134;  letter  to,  from  General 
Lee,  relative  to  peace  proposition, 
204;  prejudice  of,  against  Johnston 
and  Beauregard,  432;  visits  Army 
of  Tennessee  and  makes  inquiry  as 
to  General  Bragg,  465 ;  proffers  com 
mand  to  Longstreet,  466 ;  urges  pro 
motion  of  General  Law,  467  ;  holds 
second  conference  with  commanders 
at  Bragg's  head-quarters,  468  ;  favors 
Longstreet 's  suggestion  for  change 
of  base  to  Rome,  Georgia,  469  ;  leaves 
army  more  despondent  than  he 
found  it,  470;  orders  Longstreet 
to  march  to  Bragg 's  relief,  507  ;  gives 
Longstreet  discretionary  authority 
over  troops  in  the  department,  511 ; 


664 


INDEX. 


orders  Longstreet  to  send  Martin's 
cavalry  to  Johnston,  539  ;  in  council 
with  Generals  Lee,  Longstreet,  and 
Bragg,  545,  546  ;  want  of  confidence 
in,  expressed  by  Congress,  583 ;  re 
ceives  news  of  defeat  at  Petersburg 
in  church  at  Eichmond,  607. 

Davis,  General  Jefferson  C.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  442. 

Dearing,  General,  killed,  630. 

Dent,  Frederick,  home  of,  18. 

Dent,  Miss  Julia,  meets  Lieutenant 
Grant,  18. 

Dent,  Marshall,  maternal  grandfather 
of  author,  13. 

Dent,  Mary  Ann,  mother  of  author,  14. 

Desertion,  Longstreet  on  suppression 
of,  651. 

Deshler,  General,  mortally  wounded 
at  Chickamauga,  446. 

Devens,  General,  590.  598. 

Doby,  Captain,  killed  at  Wilderness, 
564. 

Doubleday,  General  Abner,  in  engage 
ment  against  Jackson  at  Groveton, 
176,  177  ;  at  Antietam,  241 ;  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  309 ;  in  command  of  a 
corps  at  Gettysburg,  353,  355. 

Douglas,  Colonel,  killed  at  Sharpsburg, 
243. 

Dranesville,  engagement  at,  62. 

Duncan,  Captain  J.  IL,  defends  Fort 
Gregg  (Petersburg),  607. 

Duryea,  Colonel,  charge  of,  at  Burn- 
side's  bridge  (Antietam),  259. 


E. 


Early,  General  Jubal  A.,  at  Manassas, 
39  ;  at  Williamsburg,  78  ;  at  Sharps- 
burg,  242,  245 ;  appointment  of,  as 
lieutenant-general,  332;  on  march 
to  Gettysburg,  344;  in  battle,  374, 
375 ;  charges  of,  against  Longstreet 
and  First  Corps,  397;  comment  on, 
402  ;  defeat  in  the  Valley,  579  ;  com 
mand  of,  captured  by  Custer  at 
Waynesboro',  590. 

East  Tennessee  campaign,  Longstreet 
ordered  to,  480,  481 ;  organization 


of  Confederate  command  for,  482; 
move  to  Sweetwater,  483  ;  transpor 
tation  under  Bragg's  quartermaster, 
483  ;  letter  of  General  Longstreet  to 
General  Buckner  on  delays,  etc., 
484,  485 ;  Buckner's  endorsement, 
485  ;  on  short  rations,  486  ;  orders  to 
General  Wheeler,  487 ;  "  looked  like 
campaign  against  Longstreet  instead 
of  Burnside,"  488;  description  of 
country,  488,  489 ;  engagement  on  the 
Little  Tennessee  River,  490  ;  engage 
ment  at  Campbell's  Station,  492- 
495 ;  Federals  behind  their  works  at 
Knoxville,  495 ;  gallant  assault  on 
Fort  Loudon  repulsed,  497  ;  Long- 
street  reinforced  by  General  Bushrod 
R.  Johnson,  501 ;  McLaws's  orders 
to  his  command  for  assault  of  Fort 
Sanders,  503  ;  McLaws  urges  delay 
because  of  report  of  Bragg's  defeat, 
504  ;  reply  to,  by  Longstreet,  504  ; 
the  assault  made,  505,  506  ;  troops  re 
called  on  a  misconception,  506,  507  ; 
Bragg  orders  Longstreet  to  co-operate 
with  his  army  after  defeat  at  Chatta 
nooga,  507  ;  losses  at  Knoxville,  508  ; 
Longstreet  finds  it  impracticable  to 
join  Bragg,  509  ;  columns  advancing 
for  relief  of  Burnside,  510 ;  Long- 
street  marches  up  the  Holston  Val 
ley,  511 ;  he  is  followed  by  General 
Parke,  512  ;  engagement  at  Cumber 
land  Gap,  513  ;  want  of  clothing  and 
shoes,  515,  521 ;  presence  of  Long- 
street  causes  concern  to  Federal 
authorities  and  General  Grant,  515, 
516  ;  charges  against  General  Robert 
son,  517 ;  General  McLaws  ordered 
relieved  from  duty,  518;  General 
Law  resigns  under  privilege,  519 ; 
honorable  mention  of  officers,  520 ; 
the  army  revels  in  plenty  on  the 
French  Broad,  520,  521 ;  brilliant 
achievement  of  General  W.  E.  Jones 
at  Cumberland  Gap,  522,  523; 
strategic  importance  of  the  field,  524, 
538  ;  Foster  advances  against  Long- 
street,  525  ;  Union  army  makes  stand 
at  Dandridge,  526 ;  affair  at,  528  et 


INDEX. 


665 


seq.  ;  Longstreet  drinks  to  health  of 
Granger,  529 ;  General  Foster  calls 
Dandridge's  expedition  "a  foraging 
excursion,"  530;  General  Grant 
orders  Foster  to  offensive  against 
Longstreet,  532  ;  despatches  on  Long- 
street  from  General  Grant  to  Generals 
Halleck,  Thomas,  and  Schofield,  535- 
538  ;  Longstreet  asks  for  ten  thousand 
additional  troops,  539;  Longstreet's 
purpose  towards  close  of  campaign, 
539 ;  withdrawal  eastward  of  Long- 
street's  command,  540;  authorities 
would  not  support  campaign,  541 ; 
Longstreet  and  his  original  command 
from  Virginia  rejoins  General  Lee  on 
the  Eapidan,  547  ;  vote  of  thanks  to 
General  Longstreet  and  First  Corps 
by  Confederate  Congress,  550. 

Ed  wards 's  Ferry.     See  Ball's  Bluff. 

Elections  of  1862,  1864,  479. 

Elzey,  General,  arrives  at  Manassas, 
49  ;  succeeds  Kirby  Smith,  50. 

Emancipation  Proclamation,  issue  of, 
made  practicable  by  victory  at  Antie- 
tam,  288,  289 ;  elections  of  1862  not 
in  support  of,  479. 

Ewell,  General  E.  S.,  at  West  Point, 
17 ;  engagement  of,  with  Hooker,  at 
Bristoe  Station,  170 ;  loses  a  leg  at 
Groveton,  177 ;  appointed  to  com 
mand  of  Second  Corps  on  death  of 
Jackson,  332;  engages  Milroy  at 
"Winchester,  339 ;  march  of,  to  Get 
tysburg,  344 ;  captures  beeves  and 
flour,  345  ;  in  fight  on  Cemetery  Hill, 
355,  356  ;  attacked  by  Euger,  387  ;  in 
retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431,  432  ; 
in  command  of  Second  Corps  on 
Eapidan  (1864),  553;  becomes  en 
gaged  in  Wilderness,  558,  562  ;  takes 
several  officers  prisoners,  565 ;  in  re 
treat  from  Petersburg,  612,  613; 
brave  stand  and  final  surrender  of, 
614. 

F. 

Fairfax,  Colonel,  at  Sharpsburg,  250 ; 
takes  scout  to  Longstreet,  345 ;  letter 
from,  to  General  Longstreet  on  in 


terview  with  General  Lee,  "sunrise 
order,"  etc.,  380,  381  (note) ;  drinks 
with  Longstreet  to  health  of  Gordon 
Granger,  530 ;  captures  a  trooper  on 
the  French  Broad,  532  ;  on  delay  at 
Wilderness  after  wounding  of  Long- 
street,  567. 

Fair  Oaks.    See  Seven  Pines. 

Falling  Waters,  Confederates  at,  in  re 
treat  from  Gettysburg,  428,  429. 

Farmville,  panic  of  Confederate  team 
sters  at,  616 ;  engagement  at,  616,617. 

Farns worth,  General,  charge  of,  at  Get 
tysburg,  395 ;  killed,  395. 

Federal  army,  organization  and 
strength  of,  at  Manassas  (First)  57, 
58  ;  strength  and  losses  of,  at  Antie- 
tam,  265,  266 ;  reorganized  by  Burn- 
side,  292  ;  strength  of,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  305 ;  in  false  position,  323  ; 
before  Gettysburg,  335  ;  Meade  suc 
ceeds  Hooker  in  command  of,  348  ; 
organization  of,  at  Gettysburg,  415  ; 
strength  and  losses  of,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  458  ;  losses  of,  at  Knoxville, 
508  ;  strength  of,  in  1864,  552  ;  how 
posted  at  Five  Forks,  593, 

Ferrero,  General,  at  Burnside's  Bridge 
(Antietam),  259  ;  in  East  Tennessee 
campaign,  490;  covers  retreat,  492. 

Field,  General,  at  Wilderness,  562- 
564 ;  gives  account  of  battle,  567  ; 
before  Eichmond,  577;  division  of, 
withdrawn,  604;  division  of,  at 
Appomattox,  629. 

Fiser,  Colonel,  wounded  in  assault  on 
Fort  Sanders,  520. 

Fisher,  Fort,  move  against,  580. 

Fitzhugh,  Captain,  captured  and  loses 
despatch,  160. 

Five  Forks,  battle  of,  General  Grant's 
move  around  the  Confederate  right, 
595 ;  General  Lee  endeavors  to  antici 
pate,  596 ;  opening  of,  favorable  to 
Confederates,  596;  General  Grant 
orders  Fifth  Corps  into  battle,  597 ; 
Sheridan's  strategic  plan,  598;  the 
battle  irretrievable  for  Confederates, 
599 ;  Pickett's  battle,  599-602 ;  losses, 
601,  602  ;  General  Lee  on,  604. 


666 


INDEX. 


Plug,  Confederate,  origin  of,  56. 

"Foot  Cavalry"  of  Virginia,  146. 

Forrest,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  441. 

Foster,  General  JohnG.,  reaches  Knox- 
ville  and  relieves  Burnside  of  com 
mand  at,  518,  514  ;  at  Blain's  Cross- 
Roads,  514  ;  assigns  true  cause  for 
Longstreet's  failure  to  follow,  515 ; 
plans  to  intrench  at  Bull's  Gap,  516  ; 
army  of,  advances  against  Longstreet, 
occupying  Dandridge,  526  ;  suffering 
from  an  old  wound,  gives  command  to 
General  Parke,  528;  calls  Dandridge 
expedition  a  "foraging  excursion," 
530 ;  urged  to  offensive  by  General 
Grant,  531,  532  ;  assaults  Fort  Gregg 
(Petersburg),  607. 

Fowler,  Captain  W.  H.,  at  Chicka 
mauga,  441. 

Franklin,  William  B.,  given  command 
of  Sixth  Corps,  82 ;  encounters  Jack 
son  at  White  Oak  Swamp,  133  ;  ar 
rives  at  Centreville  to  reinforce  Pope, 
190 ;  ordered  by  McClellan  to  Cramp- 
ton's  Pass,  217;  engages  General 
Cobb  of  McLaws's  command,  229, 
230,  232 ;  report  by,  257 ;  placed  in 
command  of  Left  Grand  Division 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  292 ;  arrives 
before  Fredericksburg,  297 ;  troops 
of,  enter  Fredericksburg,  304  ;  orders 
to,  by  Burnside,  criticised,  315. 

Frayser's  Farm,  battle  at,  Longstreet 
encounters  main  force  of  McClellan's 
army  at,  133;  President  Davis  has 
narrow  escape  on  the  field,  134;  Jen 
kins  captures  Randol's  battery,  pre 
cipitating  battle,  135;  Heintzelman's 
report  of  fight,  135;  McCall's  report, 
136  ;  General  Holmes's  account,  137  ; 
General  Kearny's  account,  137 ;  cap 
ture  of  General  McCall,  138,  139. 

Frederick,  Md.,  Confederates  in,  201, 
202,  205  ;  McClellan's  army  at,  213. 
See  Maryland  campaign. 

Fredericksburg,  battle  and  campaign 
of,  Burnside's  plans  for,  submitted  to 
President  Lincoln,  292  ;  Union  army 
on  march  to,  293 ;  General  Sumner 
calls  on  civil  authorities  for  surrender 


of  town,  293  ;  reply  of  the  mayor, 
294-296 ;  citizens  of,  move  beyond 
danger,  296 ;  description  of  field  of, 
297-299  ;  signal  for  battle,  301 ;  plans 
of  Federals  for  crossing  the  river, 
301,  302  ;  work  of  General  Hunt  and 
Colonel  Hall,  302 ;  Federals  occupy 
eastern  part  of  town,  303  ;  Sumner's 
and  Franklin's  troops  occupy  city, 
304;  plan  of  Federal  commander, 
304 ;  strength  of  the  armies,  305 ; 
mist  veils  the  confronting  armies, 
306;  Confederate  positions,  307; 
General  Meade's  advance,  308 ;  the 
opening  against  the  Confederate  left, 
309;  killing  of  General  Cobb,  311 ; 
destructive  work  of  artillery,  311  ; 
desperate  charges  by  Griflin  and 
Humphreys,  312;  before  the  stone 
wall  on  Marye's  Hill,  313  ;  compari 
son  of  charges  by  Federals  with  those 
of  Pickett,  Pettigrew,  and  Trimble 
at  Gettysburg,  314 ;  criticism  of  or 
ders  to  Franklin,  315 ;  losses  in  battle, 
315,  316 ;  Burnside  plans  to  renew 
attack,  316 ;  strength  of  armies  in 
battle,  317;  organization  of  Confed 
erate  army,  317  et  seq. 

Fremantle,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  of  the 
Coldstream  Guards,  as  guest  of  Lee 
and  Longstreet,  343  ;  congratulations 
of,  to  Longstreet  on  Pickett's  charge, 
394. 

French,  General  William  H.,  at  Fred 
ericksburg,  309,  310. 


G. 


Gaines's  Mill,  battle  at,  the  Hills  attack 
Fitz-John  Porter,  126  ;  Longstreet's 
reserve  engages,  127 ;  Anderson, 
Pickett,  and  Hood's  charges,  129 ; 
letter  of  Longstreet  upon,  to  Gen 
eral  Lee,  656. 

Garfield,  General  James  A.,  commu 
nication  of,  on  Rosecrans's  order  to 
retreat  from  Chickamauga,  457. 

Garland,  General  Samuel,  at  Seven 
Pines,  94 ;  killed  at  South  Mountain, 
221 ;  allusion  to,  223. 


INDEX. 


667 


Garnett,  K.  B.,  at  West  Point,  16,  17  ; 
killed  in  Pickett's  charge  (Gettys 
burg),  394. 

Gary,  General,  in  affair  on  Williams- 
burg  road,  578. 

Gee,  Captain,  killed  at  Five  Forks, 
599. 

Generalship,  power  of  battle  in,  rather 
than  in  numbers,  551. 

Getty,  General,  in  opening  of  battle 
of  Wilderness,  558 ;  advance  of,  559. 

Gettysburg,  battle  and  campaign  of, 
first  mentioned,  331,  334;  Confeder 
ate  plan  of  campaign,  335,  336 ; 
Hooker  discovers  Federal  withdrawal 
from  Fredericksburg,  337 ;  cavalry 
engagement  in  rear  of  the  march, 
338 ;  confusion  in  regard  to  cavalry 
orders,  342  ;  municipal  authorities  of 
Gettysburg  and  York  surrender  to 
General  John  B.  Gordon,  345  ;  Long- 
street  suggests  change  in  direction  of 
march,  347  ;  Federal  corps'  locations, 
347,  348 ;  General  George  G.  Meade 
succeeds  Hooker  in  command  of 
Federals,  348 ;  positions  of  armies 
June  30,  349,  350  ;  Confederate  cav 
alry  not  at  hand,  351 ;  description 
of  field,  352  et  seq.  ;  preliminary 
fighting,  353,  354 ;  the  battle  opens, 
354;  General  John  F.  Keynolds 
killed,  354;  fight  on  Cemetery 
Hill,  355,  356;  Federals  retreat 
through  town,  356 ;  Howard  forms 
new  lines,  357 ;  forces  engaged  (on 
first  day),  357  ;  Lee  had  not  intended 
to  deliver  general  battle,  358;  Lee 
seriously  affected  by  absence  of  cav 
alry,  359  ;  commands  of  Longstreet's 
corps  hurried  forward,  359 ;  second 
day's  battle,  362;  front  of  Meade's 
position,  363  ;  march  of  Sixth  Corps 
(Federal),  364;  position  of  Confeder 
ates.  364  ;  Lee  settles  on  attack  by  his 
right,  365;  advance  of  First  Corps 
(Confederate),  366;  time  of  reaching 
position,  366 ;  Hood  reports  advan 
tage  of  move  to  the  right,  367 ;  re 
news  appeal,  368 ;  opportunity  for 
Confederate  right  seen  by  Halleck  in 


Washington,  368 ;  Barksdale  of  Mc- 
Laws's  opens  the  fight  and  takes  bat 
tery,  370 ;  Little  Eound  Top  the  cit 
adel  of  the  field,  371  ;  fight  at  the 
hill  and  Brick  Church,  371  ;  many 
officers  killed  or  wounded,  371,  372; 
Longstreet  with  Wofford's  brigade  on 
Little  Bound  Top,  372  ;  Meade  rein 
forces  against  Longstreet,  373  ;  losses 
of  Longstreet  and  Meade  on  second 
day,  373  ;  late  arrival  of  cavalry,  373; 
Federals  draw  artillery  from  their 
right  against  Longstreet's  battle, 
374  ;  "  man  on  the  left  who  did  not 
care  to  make  battle  win,"  375  ;  Gen 
eral  Pendleton  on  the  order  for  ' '  bat 
tle  at  sunrise,"  377  et  seq.  ;  refuta 
tion  of,  378-384 ;  losses  on  second 
day,  376,  377  ;  third  day's  battle,  385 
et  seq.  ;  Lee's  plans,  386 ;  lluger 
opens  against  Ewell,  387  ;  Longstreet 
did  not  approve  attack  as  made,  388, 
but  he  prepared  carefully  for  the  as 
sault,  389,  390 ;  Confederates  on  the 
left  driven  from  their  trenches,  391 ; 
Longstreet  assents  to  Pickett's  ad 
vance,  392  ;  Pickett's,  Trimble's,  and 
Pettigrew's  charge,  394;  Farns- 
worth's  cavalry  charge,  395;  the 
Confederate  First  Corps,  397  ;  Lee's 
acknowledgment  of  fault,  400  ;  epit 
ome  of  battle,  402  ;  Cemetery  Hill 
and  Marye's  Hill  compared,  403  ;  im 
possibility  of  taking  Cemetery  Hill, 
404 ;  forces  engaged  and  losses  in 
battle,  409 ;  organization  of  Confed 
erate  army,  410  et  seq. ;  organization 
of  Federal  army,  415  et  seq. ;  Con 
federate  retreat,  426. 

Gibbon,  General,  in  engagement  with 
Jackson  at  Groveton,  176;  at  South 
Mountain,  224;  at  Antietam,  241, 
266  ;  at  Fredericksburg,  309  ;  wound 
ed  in  front  of  Pickett's  charge  (Get 
tysburg),  394  ;  on  assaulting  columns, 
on  the  3d,  at  Gettysburg,  399 ;  at  the 
Wilderness,  558,  559  ;  at  Petersburg, 
606-608. 

Gist,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  446. 

Glendale.     See  Frayser's  Farm. 


668 


INDEX. 


Goggin,  Major,  reports  taking  of  Fort 
Sanders  impossible,  505,  506. 

Gold,  price  of,  reaches  200,  317  ;  Long- 
street  advocates  impressment  of,  588, 
641,  646,  649. 

Gordon,  General  John  B.,  authorities 
of  Gettysburg  and  York  surrender 
to,  345 ;  corps  of,  assigned  for  sortie 
against  Fort  Steadman,  592;  at  Ap- 
pomattox,  623,  624. 

Goree,  Colonel  T.  J.,  47;  on  repulse 
of  Pickett  at  Gettysburg,  400. 

"  Grand  Divisions,"  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  organized  in,  292. 

Granger,  General  Gordon,  covers  gap 
in  Mission  .Ridge  at  Chickamauga, 
442 ;  in  severe  contention  against 
Longstreet's  left,  457 ;  in  command 
of  Federals  at  Dandridge,  528 ;  on 
Longstreet,  529. 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  at  "West 
Point,  17  ;  joins  Fourth  Regiment  in 
Missouri  as  lieutenant,  18;  takes 
part  in  theatricals,  20;  operations  of, 
at  Vicksburg,  478 ;  assumes  com 
mand  of  armies  in  Tennessee,  482 ; 
orders  Longstreet  driven  out  of  East 
Tennessee,  516 ;  visits  Knoxville, 
525;  wants  Longstreet  driven  from 
Tennessee,  531  ;  urges  General  Foster 
to  the  offensive,  532 ;  despatches  of, 
to  Generals  Halleck,  Thomas,  and 
Schofield,  on  plans  to  drive  Long- 
street  from  Tennessee,  534-536  ;  finds 
Longstreet  too  far  from  his  line  of 
operations  to  properly  engage  against, 
538 ;  assigned  as  commander-in-chief, 
543  ;  with  Army  of  the  Potomac,  552 ; 
had  no  general  plan  for  campaign 
(May,  1864),  555;  prepares  for  im 
mediate  battle  (Wilderness),  556; 
orders  Ninth  Corps  into  battle,  561 ; 
plan  of,  for  left  attack  in  front  of 
Richmond,  575,  576;  letters  to,  from 
General  Lee,  on  military  peace  con 
vention,  585,  586 ;  draws  from  East 
and  West  to  strengthen  combination 
against,  590  et  seq.  (see  Five  Forks, 
battle  of) ;  gives  up  attack  of  Rich 
mond  by  north  side  of  James,  591 ; 


gives  orders  for  grand  move  by  his 
left,  592 ;  number  of  troops  in  com 
mand  of,  593  ;  movement  by  left  be 
gun,  595;  purpose  of  the  latter,  596  ; 
orders  concerted  assault  at  Peters 
burg,  604  ;  rides  over  captured  works, 
606 ;  asks  surrender  of  General  Lee, 
619;  letter  to,  from  General  Lee, 
asking  terms  for  surrender,  619;  re 
news  efforts  to  strike  across  head 
of  Confederate  march,  620;  writes 
General  Lee  as  to  terms  of  sur 
render,  621,  622;  letter  to,  from 
General  Lee,  proposing  meeting,  622  ; 
arranges  details  of  capitulation,  630; 
tribute  to,  630 ;  gives  General  Long- 
street  letter  to  President  Johnson, 
633 ;  inaugurated  President,  638 ; 
appoints  Longstreet  surveyor  of  cus 
toms  at  New  Orleans,  638 ;  General 
Lee  on  interview  with,  649. 

Grant,  Mrs.  Ulysses  S.,  proposed  meet 
ing  of,  with  Mrs.  Longstreet  to  bring 
about  peace,  584. 

Grapevine  Bridge.    See  Mechanicsville. 

Greene,  General.  George  S.,  at  Gettys 
burg,  374. 

Gregg,  Fort  (Petersburg),  606,  607. 

Gregg,  General  D.  McM.,  at  Gettys 
burg,  stubborn  fight  of,  396. 

Gregg,  General  Maxcy,  killed  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  309 ;  captured  with  part 
of  command  by  Rosser  and  Mum- 
ford,  617. 

Griffin,  General,  attack  of,  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  312. 

Groves,  Major  R.  E.,  at  Chickamauga, 
441. 

Groveton,  engagement  at,  between 
Jackson  and  Pope's  troops,  175.  See 
Manassas,  Second. 

Gunboats,  McClellan's  facetious  re 
mark  concerning,  151. 

H. 

Hagerstown,  Confederates  at,  on  retreat 
from  Gettysburg,  427,  428. 

Hall,  Colonel  Norman  J.,  in  command 
of  troops  attempting  to  cross  river  at 
Fredericksburg,  302  ;  report  of,  303. 


INDEX. 


669 


Halleck,  General  Henry  Wager,  at 
West  Point,  17  ;  assumes  command 
as  general-in-chief  of  Federal  armies, 
153  ;  thinks  the  capital  in  peril,  214  ; 
letter  to,  on  affairs  in  Maryland,  214- 
216;  Meade  communicates  purpose 
to,  349  ;  suggests  to  Meade  that  Lee 
may  turn  his  left,  360;  sees  oppor 
tunity  for  Confederate  right  at  Gettys 
burg,  368;  concern  of,  over  Long- 
street's  presence  in  East  Tennessee, 
515,  516 ;  despatch  to,  from  General 
Grant,  on  Longstreet,  534-536 ;  de 
spatch  of,  to  General  Grant,  537 ; 
right  in  estimate  of  strategic  im 
portance  of  Longstreet's  presence  in 
Tennessee,  538. 

Hampton  Koads  conference,  583. 
Hampton,  Wade,  at  Manassas,  48; 
wounded  at  Seven  Pines,  98;  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  229 ;  wounded  at 
Gettysburg,  396;  ordered  to  join 
Johnston  in  the  Carolinas,  589. 
Hancock,  Winfield  Scott,  takes  two 
redoubts  at  Williamsburg,  77  ;  chris 
tened  "The  Superb,"  80;  takes 
command  of  Kichardson's  brigade 
at  Antietam,  251 ;  makes  well-organ 
ized  advance  at  Fredericksburg,  310  ; 
assumes  Federal  command  under 
special  assignment  on  field  of  Gettys 
burg  (first  day),  356;  wounded  in 
Pickett's  charge,  394;  on  Meade's 
intentions  on  third  day  at  Gettys 
burg,  398;  in  command  of  Second 
Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  552; 
intrenches  at  night  along  front  in 
Wilderness,  558 ;  advance  of,  in  morn 
ing,  560 ;  movement  against  left  of, 
by  Longstreet,  562 ;  on  Longstreet's 
advance,  568. 

Hardee,  General,  commissioned  lieu 
tenant-general,  290;  offered  and 
declines  command  of  Army  of  Ten 
nessee,  466;  succeeds  Cheatham  in 
command  of  corps,  469. 
Hardie,  General,  at  Fredericksburg, 

307. 

Harper's   Ferry,  capture   of,  proposed 
by   Lee,  201 ;    plan   for  movement 


against,  202;  description  of,  207; 
situation  at,  228 ;  McLaws  at,  231 ; 
Colonel  Davis  escapes  from,  231 ; 
Colonel  Miles'  commandant  of,  mor 
tally  wounded,  232  ;  surrendered  by 
General  White,  232 ;  holding  of,  not 
of  strategic  value,  286 ;  let  alone  in 
Gettysburg  campaign,  287 ;  aban 
doned  by  Federals,  339. 
Harrison,  Fort,  captured  by  Federals, 

575. 

Harrison,   scout,   employed  by   Long- 
street,    324;    sent    out    with    secret 
orders,  333  ;  makes  report,  346. 
Harrison's  Landing,  McClellan's  army 

at,  145. 

Hartranft,  General,  at  Campbell  Sta 
tion,  492,  520;  at  Fort  Steadman, 
594,  595. 

Haskell,  Colonel  J.  C.,  rides  to  recall 
General  Lee  from  meeting  General 
Grant  at  Appomattox,  626. 
Hatton,  General,  killed  at  Seven  Pines, 

98. 
Hayes,    Kutherford    B.,    wounded    at 

South  Mountain,  223 
Hays,  General  H.  T.,  at  Gettysburg, 

374. 
Hazlett,  Captain,  battery  of,  on  Little 

Kound  Top,  371 ;  killed,  372. 
Heintzelman,  General,  in  command  of 
left  wing  on  Chickahominy,  84 ;  re 
port  of,  on  Frayser's  Farm  fight,  135. 
Helm,  General  Benjamin  H.,  killed  at 

Chickamauga,  446. 

Heth,  General,  at  Wilderness,  556,  558, 
560;  on  failure  to  intrench,  565;  at 
Petersburg,  605,  609 ;  at  Farmville, 
617. 

Hill,  Lieutenant-General  A.  P.,  pro 
moted  major-general,  85 ;  at  Me- 
chanicsville,  123  et  seq.  ;  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  1*26 ;  intercepts  orders  of  Gen 
eral  Pope,  172;  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
231 ;  arrives  from  Harper's  Ferry  in 
time  to  assist  at  Sharpsburg,  261 ; 
makes  strong  battle  against  Burnside, 
262 ;  at  Shepherdstown,  264 ;  tacti 
cal  moves  by,  at  Antietam,  266 ; 
appointed  to  command  of  Third 


670 


INDEX. 


Corps,  332  ;  marches  towards  Gettys 
burg,  350,  353;  in  fight,  355,  356; 
in  retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431 ;  in 
command  of  Third  Corps  on  Rapidan 
(1864),  553  ;  death  of,  at  Petersburg, 
605. 

Hill,  General  D.  H.,  at  Williamsburg, 
74 ;  asks  permission  to  attack  Han 
cock's  redoubts,  77 ;  the  movement 
made  with  heavy  loss,  78;  humor 
of,  113;  letter  to  Longstreet  deny 
ing  proposed  abandonment  of  Rich- 
mond  when  Lee  took  command,  115, 
116 ;  in  conference  with  Lee  on  at 
tacking  McClellan,  121 ;  at  Mechan- 
icsville,  124;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  126; 
at  South  Mountain,  221,  222,  224; 
explains  to  General  Lee  the  situation 
at  South  Mountain,  227 ;  at  Sharps- 
burg,  241,  242,  251,  253;  horse  shot 
under,  by  a  cannon-ball,  254  ;  "  like 
a  game-cock"  at  Sharpsburg,  266; 
record  of,  332  (note)  ;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  in  right  wing,  441 ;  opens 
battle  by  front  assault,  445;  urges 
change  of  tactics,  455  ;  writes  petition 
for  relief  from  Bragg,  465 ;  gives 
President  Davis  opinion  adverse  to 
Bragg,  466  ;  relieved  of  duty,  469. 

Hindman,  General  T.  C.,  in  left  wing 
at  Chickamauga,  439;  advance  of, 
448 ;  relieved  under  charges  by 
Bragg,  465. 

Hoke,  General,  in  front  of  Kichmond, 
574,  575 ;  in  affair  on  Williamsburg 
road,  577  ;  sent  to  Wilmington,  580. 

Holmes,  General,  on  fight  at  Frayser's 
Farm,  137;  commissioned  lieutenant- 
general,  290. 

Hood,  General  J.  B  ,  at  Gaines's  Mill, 
128,  129  ;  report  on  fight  at  Frayser's 
Farm,  137;  advance  of,  at  Turkey 
Bridge,  139 ;  at  Second  Manassas, 
188,  189;  at  South  Mountain,  222; 
at  Sharpsburg,  242,  266 ;  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  306,  317;  march  of,  from 
Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg,  361  ; 
reports  on  advantage  of  move  to  the 
right  (Gettysburg,  second  day), 
367;  renews  appeal,  368;  seriously 


wounded,  370;  division  of,  in  third 
day's  fight  (Gettysburg),  393,  396; 
in  retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431 ; 
division  of,  starts  for  Tennessee,  437  ; 
arrival  at  Chickamauga,  439;  bri 
gades  of,  in  left  wing,  439,  440  ;  leads 
advance,  447;  wounding  of,  448; 
successor  for,  considered,  467 ;  division 
of,  in  engagement  on  Little  Tennes 
see,  490;  supersedes  Johnston  in 
command  of  Army  of  Georgia,  572  ; 
army  of,  reduced  to  a  skeleton,  581. 

Hooker,  General  Joseph,  at  Williams 
burg,  73,  75 ;  at  Frayser's  Farm,  138  ; 
engagement  of,  with  Ewell  at  Bris  - 
toe  Station,  170;  at  South  Mountain, 
223;  at  Antietam,  241;  heavy  loss 
in  troops  of,  243  ;  wounding  of,  245  ; 
given  command  of  Centre  Grand  Di 
vision,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under 
Burnside,  292  ;  arrives  at  Hartwood, 
near  Fredericksburg,  297 ;  marches 
for  fords  of  the  upper  Rappahannock, 
326 ;  at  Chancellorsville,  328J  329 ; 
discovers  abandonment  of  Fredericks- 
burg  by  Confederates,  337 ;  succeeded 
by  Meade,  348 ;  in  Tennessee,  474. 

Hoskiss,  Major  J.,  on  capture  of  Early 's 
command,  591. 

Hotchkiss,  Major  T.  R,,  at  Chicka 
mauga,  441. 

Howard,  General  O.  O.,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  310;  approach  to  Gettysburg, 
355 ;  retreats  to  Cemetery  Hill,  356 ; 
forms  new  lines  after  retreat,  357. 

Howell,  Captain  E.  P.,  at  Chicka 
mauga,  441. 

Huger,  General,  Johnston's  orders  to, 
for  Seven  Pines,  89. 

Humphreys,  Major-General  A.  A., 
desperate  attack  by,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  312  ;  account  by,  of  fight  before 
the  stone  wall,  313;  at  Gettysburg, 
367,  373;  at  Chickamauga,  440; 
spirited  advance  of,  448;  in  assault 
of  Fort  Sanders,  505 ;  honorably 
mentioned,  520;  as  chief  of  staff 
gives  strength  of  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  1864,  552 ;  quoted  on  affair 
on  Williamsburg  road.  578 ;  at  Fort 


INDEX. 


671 


Steadman,  595;  at  Petersburg,  606; 

in  pursuit  of  Confederates,  611  ;  in 

engagement  at  Rice's  Station,  614. 
Hunt,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  302. 
Hunter,  Colonel    David,   wounded   at 

Manassas,  46. 

Hunter,  Hon.  R.  M.  T,,  583. 
Hunton,  General,  capture  of,  614. 


I. 


Imboden's  cavalry,  halt  of,  at  Hancock 
vexes  General  Lee,  359. 

Impressment  of  gold,  urged  by  Long- 
street,  588,  641,  646;  of  men,  urged 
by  Longstreet,  644. 


Jackson,  Lieutenant-General  Thomas 
Jonathan,  at  Manassas,  46;  chris 
tened  "Stonewall,"  49;  order  to, 
from  General  Lee,  June  11,  1862,  for 
movement  against  McClellan,  114; 
reinforced  by  Lawton  and  Whiting 
for  that  purpose,  115;  in  conference 
with  Lee  and  Longstreet,  June,  1862, 
121 ;  lateness  of,  at  Mechanicsville, 
123;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  126;  encoun 
ters  Franklin  at  White  Oak  Swamp, 
133 ;  ordered  to  follow  McClellan 's 
retreat  from  Malvern  Hill,  146;  fails 
to  support  Magruder,  149,  150 ;  en 
gages  with  Pope's  forces  at  Slaugh 
ter  Mountain,  156,  157  ;  move  of,  on 
Manassas  Junction,  167,  168;  en 
gages  King's  division  at  Groveton, 
175,  177 ;  sustains  attack  at  Manas 
sas,  180,  182 ;  in  heavy  battle  with 
Fitz-John  Porter,  187  ;  some  charac 
teristics  of,  191,  192 ;  hard  pressed  by 
Stevens  at  Chantilly,  193 ;  comment 
on  move  of,  to  Manassas  Junction, 
197,  198;  ordered  by  Lee  to  move 
against  Harper's  Ferry,  202,  231, 
232 ;  leaves  Harper's  Ferry  to  rejoin 
Lee,  233 ;  arrives  on  field  of  Sharps- 
burg,  236  ;  division  oi,  receives  attack 
of  Hooker  at  Sharpsburg,  241 ;  with 


draws,  242  ;  ordered  by  General  Lee 
to  turn  Federal  right,  257;  com 
missioned  lieutenant-general,  290  ; 
called  by  Lee  towards  Fredericks- 
burg,  299,  309 ;  loses  opportunity  for 
advance,  313;  severely  wounded  at 
Chancellors ville,  328 ;  death  of,  332  ; 
comment  on,  at  Sharpsburg,  401 
(note)  ;  comment  on,  in  Chickahom- 
iny  campaign,  406  ;  at  Second  Manas 
sas,  407. 

James  River,  Confederate  troops  on,  in 
April,  1862,  67  ;  McClellan  changes 
base  to,  from  the  Chickahonliny,  132 ; 
Longstreet  assigned  to  command 
north  of,  574. 

Jenkins,  General  Micah,  at  Seven 
Pines,  95,  100;  at  Frayser's  Farm, 
135;  at  Fredericksburg,  311;  ordered 
to  Chambersburg  with  cavalry  bri 
gade,  340 ;  brigade  of,  transferred  to 
Hood's  division  and  goes  to  Tennes 
see,  437;  joins  Hood's  division  after 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  462 ;  Long- 
street  urges  appointment  of,  to  com 
mand  of  Hood's  division,  467;  en 
gages  in  attack  on  Hooker's  rear 
guard,  475-477  ;  at  Lenoir's  Station, 
491  ;  at  Campbell's  Station,  494 ;  be 
fore  Knoxville,  495  ;  at  Dandridge, 
526;  ordered  to  Strawberry  Plains, 
531 ;  ordered  to  bridge  the  Holston 
River,  538  ;  takes  part  in  flank  move, 
563,  and  riding  with  Longstreet  ex 
presses  high  hopes,  563;  mortally 
wounded,  564  ;  tribute  to,  566. 

Jetersville,  Confederates  halted  at,  610. 

Johnson,  General  Bushrod  R.,  at 
Chickamauga,  439  ;  before  Snodgrass 
Hill,  450 ;  in  assault  on  Fort  Sanders, 
505 ;  severely  engages  Federals  at 
Cumberland  Gap,  513 ;  honorable 
mention  of,  for  march  to  Bean  Sta 
tion,  519 ;  in  aifair  near  Dandridge, 
532 ;  at  Five  Forks,  596,  597  ;  divi 
sion  of,  mostly  escapes  in  retreat  from 
Petersburg,  614. 

Johnson,  Major-General  Edward,  ad 
vance  at  Gettysburg  (evening  of 
second  day),  374.  387. 


672 


INDEX. 


Johnson,  President,  letter  to,  from 
General  Grant  on  Longstreet,  633, 
634  ;  reconstruction  policy  of,  635. 

Johnson,  General  K.  W.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  442. 

Johnston,  General  Joseph  Eggleston, 
position  of,  before  Manassas,  35,  41, 
43  ;  forces  arrive  at  Manassas,  44  ;  on 
field,  49;  called  to  Kichmond  for 
council  with  War  Department,  65  ;  at 
Williamsburg,  79  ;  compliment  of,  to 
Longstreet,  80 ;  prepares  to  attack 
McClellan  before  McDowell  can 
reach  him,  85 ;  calls  council  before 
Seven  Pines,  85,  86 ;  orders  to  Gen 
erals  Smith  and  Huger,  89;  orders 
troops  to  sleep  on  their  lines,  100; 
wounded  at  close  of  Seven  Pines, 
100;  high  regard  for,  in  army,  112; 
President  Davis  jealous  of,  432; 
plan  for  campaign  of,  suggested  by 
General  Bragg,  545 ;  superseded  by 
Hood,  572 ;  Longstreet  asks  for  re 
call  of,  to  service,  588  ;  assigned  to 
command  in  the  Carolinas,  589. 

Jones,  General  D.  K.,  at  Savage  Sta 
tion,  132;  at  Antietam,  260;  over 
come  by  the  killing  of  his  brother-in- 
law,  Colonel  Kingsbury,  262. 

Jones,  General  J.  M.,  at  Gettysburg, 
374  ;  in  opening  of  WHderness,  558. 

Jones,  General  J.  K.,  wounded  at 
Sharpsburg,  243. 

Jones,  General  Samuel,  raid  against,  at 
Salem,  by  General  Averill,  521,  522. 

Jones,  General  W.  E.,  sent  to  arrest 
Union  advance  at  Cumberland  Gap, 
503  ;  fights  engagement  at  Walker's 
Ford,  508;  brilliant  achievement  of, 
at  Cumberland  Gap,  522,  523. 


K. 


Kearny,  General  Philip,  at  Williams- 
burg,  75 ;  at  Seven  Pines,  96  ;  report 
of,  on  battle,  99  ;  report  of,  on  fight  at 
Frayser's  Farm,  137  ;  orders  to,  from 
Pope,  on  eve  of  Manassas  (Second), 
178 ;  opens  against  Jackson's  left  at 


Manassas,  182;  at  Chantilly,  193; 
killed,  194. 

Kemper,  General,  wounded  in  Pickett's 
charge,  394. 

Kershaw,  General,  at  Elk  Kidge,  208 ; 
at  Sharpsburg,  245;  at  Gettysburg 
(opening  of  second  day),  370;  at 
Chickamauga,  440 ;  charge  of,  448 ; 
at  Cumberland  Gap,  513  ;  honorably 
mentioned,  519 ;  in  Wilderness,  563, 
564 ;  with  Early  in  the  Valley,  579  ; 
crosses  a  fired  bridge  at  Kichmond, 
609;  surrenders  at  Kice's  Station, 
614. 

Keyes,  General  E.  D.,  on  battle  of 
Seven  Pines,  110. 

Kilpatrick,  General  J.,  at  Gettysburg, 
395,  396 ;  follows  Confederate  retreat, 
427,  428,  430. 

Kingsbury,  Colonel,  killed  at  Burn- 
side's  Bridge  (Antietam),  259;  kill 
ing  of,  overcomes  General  D.  K. 
Jones,  his  brother-in-law,  262. 

Knoxville,  siege  of,  description  of  town 
and  Federal  works,  495;  a  gallant 
dash  repulsed,  497 ;  Federal  posi 
tions,  498,  499;  Fort  Loudon  (or 
Sanders)  described,  499 ;  McLaws 
ordered  to  assault  fort,  500  ;  General 
Bushrod  K.  Johnson  marches  to  re 
inforce  Longstreet,  501 ;  McLaws's 
orders  to  his  command  for  assault  of 
Fort  Sanders,  503  ;  McLaws  urges 
delay  because  of  Bragg 's  reported 
defeat,  504;  Longstreet's  answer 
thereto,  504,  505 ;  the  assault  made, 
505,  506  ;  troops  recalled  under  a  mis 
conception,  506,  507 ;  Bragg  orders 
Longstreet  to  co-operate  with  his 
army,  507  ;  losses  in,  508. 


Lamb,    Colonel,     wounded    at    Fort 

Fisher,  582. 
Lane,  General,  at  Fredericksburg,  309 ; 

succeeds    Pickett    in    command    of 

charge  at  Gettysburg,  394. 
Latane,  Captain,  killed  on  Stuart's  raid, 

118. 


INDEX. 


673 


Latrobe,  Colonel,  at  Fredericksburg, 
316. 

Law,  General  E.  M.,  march  of,  to 
Gettysburg,  365 ;  succeeds  to  com 
mand  of  Hood's  division  at  Gettys 
burg,  370;  in  Chattanooga  cam 
paign,  464;  claims  of,  for  promotion, 
urged  by  President  Davis,  467  ;  takes 
part  in  night  attack  on  Hooker's  rear 
guard,  476,  477  ;  order  for  preferring 
charges  against,  477  ;  late  report  on 
Federal  retreat  from  Lenoir's  Station, 
491  (note) ;  at  Campbell's  Station, 
494 ;  charge  against,  that  he  withheld 
attack  improperly,  495 ;  slow  march 
of,  514  ;  resigns  under  privilege,  519  ; 
action  of  President  Davis  towards, 
548 ;  rearrest  ordered  by  General 
Longstreet,  549. 

Lawton,  General,  ordered  by  Lee  to  re 
inforce  Jackson,  115 ;  wounded  at 
Sharpsburg,  243. 

Leadbetter,  General,  makes  reconnois- 
sance  at  Knoxville,  501 ;  favors  attack 
of  Fort  Sanders,  502  ;  adds  postscript 
to  General  Longstreet's  letter  urging 
determined  assault  of  Fort  Sanders, 
505. 

Lee,  General  Fitzhugh,  left  in  com 
mand  of  cavalry  by  Stuart,  160 ; 
failure  to  comply  with  instructions, 
160;  consequences  of  that  failure, 
196  ;  attacked  by  Pleasonton  at  South 
Mountain,  229 ;  on  General  R.  E. 
Lee  at  Gettysburg,  401  ;  on  Long- 
street,  405 ;  charges  that  Longstreet 
lost  his  way  in  Wilderness,  568,  569  ; 
recalled  to  join  Longstreet  at  Rich 
mond,  591  ;  at  Five  Forks,  597,  598; 
in  retreat  from  Petersburg,  610. 

Lee,  General  G.  W.  C.,  on  Longstreet 
at  Wilderness,  569 ;  at  Five  Forks, 
596;  at  Rice's  Station,  613,  614. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  assigned  to 
command  at  Seven  Pines,  109;  im 
pression  of,  in  the  army,  112,  113; 
established  in  confidence,  114  ;  plans 
simultaneous  attack  on  front  and  rear 
of  McClellan,  115  ;  adopts  suggestion 
of  Longstreet  making  change  in 


plans  against  McClellan,  120  ;  orders 
Longstreet's  reserve  into  action  at 
Gaines's  Mill,  127  ;  at  Frayser's  Farm 
with  President  Davis,  134  ;  abandons 
his  original  plan  at  Malvern  Hill, 
144  ;  campaign  of,  against  McClellan 
reviewed,  147  et  seq. ;  momentary 
facetiousness,  149 ;  letter  of,  to  Gen 
eral  Magruder,  150;  original  plan 
for  pursuit  of  McClellan,  152 ;  enjoys 
increased  esteem  of  his  army,  158  ; 
plans  of,  for  striking  Pope,  159 ; 
witnesses  retreat  of  Pope,  162 ;  on 
field  of  Manassas,  181,  182;  decides 
to  cross  Bull  Run  and  reach  Pope's 
rear,  186 ;  joins  Longstreet  on  field 
and  rides  under  fire,  189 ;  injury  to, 
in  stampede,  192;  letters  of,  to  Gen 
eral  Pope  on  killing  of  Kearny,  194  ; 
decides  to  enter  Maryland,  200 ; 
orders  of,  for  Maryland  campaign, 
203 ;  address  of,  to  people  of  Mary 
land,  280 ;  letter  of,  to  Jefferson 
Davis,  suggesting  peace  proposition. 
204  ;  celebrated  "  lost  order"  of,  203, 
212,  213 ;  receives  information  of 
Federal  advance  at  South  Mountain, 
219 ;  prefers  stand  at  Turner's  Pass, 
220 ;  orders  withdrawal  of  troops 
from  South  Mountain,  228;  with 
Longstreet  and  Hill  on  field  at 
Sharpsburg,  254 ;  orders  flank  move 
by  Jackson,  257 ;  sends  for  brigades 
left  at  Harper's  Ferry,  261;  calls 
Longstreet  his  old  war-horse,  262 ; 
in  contempt  of  Federal  army  disperses 
forces,  284 ;  description  of,  285 ;  re 
organizes  army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
290;  on  retirement  of  McClellan, 
291 ;  advice  of,  to  citizens  of  Fred 
ericksburg,  299  ;  orders  of,  at  opening 
of  battle,  308;  narrowly  escapes 
death  or  injury  from  a  shell,  312; 
goes  to  Richmond,  317  ;  orders  Long- 
street  to  return  from  Suffolk,  326  ; 
grief  of,  over  loss  of  Stonewall  Jack 
son,  328 ;  his  conduct  of  battle  of 
Chancellorsville,  329 ;  falls  on  plan 
of  Northern  invasion,  331 ;  plans  of, 
for  Gettysburg,  335,  336;  caution 


43 


674 


INDEX. 


of,  in  revealing  plans  to  Richmond 
authorities,  336,  337 ;  orders  of,  to 
cavalry  chief,  341  ;  issues  orders  for 
march  of  army  to  Harrisburg,  344  ; 
refuses  to  credit  information  of  Scout 
Harrison,  347 ;  changes  direction  of 
march,  348  ;  order  for  concentration 
at  Cashtown,  348,  351  ;  mind  dis 
turbed  by  absence  of  cavalry,  351  ; 
calls  Lorigstreet  to  ride  with  him 
towards  Gettysburg,  351  ;  expresses 
regret  at  absence  of  cavalry,  357  ;  on 
field  of  Gettysburg  at  close  of  first 
day,  357 ;  had  not  intended  deliver 
ing  general  battle,  358  ;  gives  discre 
tionary  order  for  Second  Corps  to 
attack  Cemetery  Hill,  359;  official 
report  of,  on  first  day's  battle,  359 
(note) ;  settles  on  making  the  open 
ing  (second  day)  by  his  right,  365  ; 
alleged  order  of,  to  Longstreet  for  bat 
tle  at  sunrise,  377  et  seq. ;  excitement 
of,  384  ;  on  battle  of  Gettysburg,  third 
day,  385 ;  plans  of,  386 ;  claimed 
attack  was  not  made  early  enough, 
388  ;  on  the  field  with  the  right,  395  ; 
official  report  of,  on  Longstreet's 
battle  on  the  right,  397 ;  acknowl 
edges  fault  at  Gettysburg,  399,  400  ; 
comments  upon,  400,  401  ;  on  field 
and  responsible  for  Gettysburg,  402, 
405 ;  review  of  campaigns  of,  406 ; 
review  of  orders  of,  for  Gettysburg, 
407  et  seq.;  "harder  to  move  than 
his  lieutenant,"  409;  in  the  retreat 
from  Gettysburg,  429,  430;  desires 
retirement,  432  ;  Longstreet  mentions 
westward  movement  to,  434 ;  goes 
to  Richmond,  434;  letter  from,  to 
Longstreet,  435 ;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  435  ;  parting  with  Long- 
street,  437 ;  letter  from,  to  Long- 
street,  469,  470  (note)  ;  favors  sending 
Pickett's  division  to  Longstreet,  539  ; 
Longstreet's  suggestion  to,  of  plans 
for  continuance  of  war,  544 ;  goes 
to  Richmond  to  confer  with  author 
ities,  544  ;  suppressed  excitement  of, 
in  council  with  Richmond  author 
ities,  546 ;  becomes  impatient  in 


Longstreet- Law  affair,  549 ;  com 
pared  with  General  Grant,  554  ;  gives 
orders  against  general  engagement, 
558 ;  endeavors  to  lead  a  brigade  in 
charge,  560 ;  assumes  command  on 
field  after  Longstreet  is  wounded, 
565 ;  delays  advance,  565,  567 ;  al 
leged  saying  of,  concerning  Long- 
street,  569 ;  hard  labors  of,  573 ; 
becomes  anxious  about  line  on  north 
side  of  the  James,  579 ;  hears  from 
Longstreet  proposition  of  General 
Ord  for  peace  meeting,  584 ;  letters 
of,  to  General  Grant  on  military 
peace  convention,  585,  586  ;  reply  to, 
from  General  Grant,  587  ;  consents 
to  sortie  against  Fort  Steadman,  592  ; 
strength  of,  for  defence  of  Richmond, 
593,  594 ;  endeavors  to  anticipate 
Grant's  move  around  his  right,  596 ; 
at  Petersburg,  604,  605 ;  gives  orders 
for  retreat,  608 ;  at  Jetersville,  610 ; 
realizes  fulness  of  disaster  at  Rice's 
Station  and  Sailor's  Creek,  614,  615; 
at  Farmville,  616 ;  urged  by  officers 
to  negotiate  for  surrender,  618  ;  letter 
to,  from  General  Grant,  asking  sur 
render,  619  ;  replies  to,  asking  terms, 
619 ;  letter  to,  from  General  Grant, 
stating  terms  of  surrender,  621 ; 
writes  General  Grant,  proposing 
meeting,  622;  gives  orders  for  ad 
vance  to  Appomattox  Court-House, 
623 ;  still  hopes  to  break  through 
the  Federal  cordon,  624  ;  confers  with 
Longstreet  and  Mahone,  624,  625 ; 
rides  to  meet  General  Grant,  625, 
626,  628 ;  sympathy  for,  of  troops, 
629;  letter  of,  to  General  R.  H. 
Anderson,  639 ;  letter  of,  to  General 
Longstreet,  congratulating  him  on 
convalescence,  639;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  640 ;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  on  impressment  of  gold, 
641 ;  letter  from,  to  Longstreet,  642  ; 
letter  to,  from  Longstreet,  on  im 
pressment  of  men,  644  ;  letter  from, 
to  Longstreet,  645;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  on  impressment  of  gold, 
646 ;  letter  to,  from  Longstreet,  on 


INDEX. 


675 


interview  with  General  Ord,  647 ; 
letter  to,  from  Longstreet,  on  ex 
change  of  prisoners,  648 ;  letter  of, 
to  Longstreet,  on  interview  with 
General  Grant,  649;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  on  use  of  gold,  649; 
letter  to,  from  Longstreet,  on  guard 
ing  Danville  Railroad,  650;  letter 
to,  from  Longstreet,  on  Sheridan's 
operations,  652 ;  letter  of,  to  Long- 
street,  on  proposed  history,  654  ;  let 
ter  of,  to  Longstreet,  suggesting  prep 
aration  of  memoirs,  656 ;  letter  to, 
from  Longstreet,  on  battle  of  Gaines's 
Mill,  656 ;  letter  of,  to  Longstreet, 
on  prospects,  etc.,  657. 
Lee,  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  D.,  at 

Sharpsburg,  243. 

Lee,  General  W.  H.  F.,  at  Five  Forks, 
596,    597,    598;    in    engagement    at 
Jetersville,  610 
Leesburg,  Confederate  army  at,  on  the 

way  to  Maryland,  201. 
Lenoir's   Station,    Federal    retreat   at, 

491. 
Letters.     See  Lee,  Longstreet,  Grant, 

etc. 
Lewinsville,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  disperses 

Federals  at,  60. 
Liddell,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  441, 

446. 

Lincoln,  President,  telegrams  from,  on 
Lee  in  Maryland,  209  ;  letter  to,  from 
McClellan,  on  prospect  in  Maryland, 
214 ;  issues  emancipation  proclama 
tion,  288,  289 ;  General  Burnside  sub 
mits  plans  to,  292  ;  humorous  advice 
of,  to  Hooker,  329 ;  position  in  Hamp 
ton  Koads  conference,  583;  desire 
attributed  to,  for  devising  means  for 
payment  of  slaves,  585. 
Long,  General  A.  L.,  letter  of,  to  Gen 
eral  Longstreet,  on  order  for  u  battle 
at  sunrise"  (Gettysburg),  380  (note) ; 
gives  account  of  appeal  of  Lee's  offi 
cers  for  surrender,  618  ;  on  interview 
of  Generals  Lee  and  Pendleton  about 
surrender,  620. 

Longstreet,  Lieutenant-General  James, 
birth  of,  13  ;  appointed  to  West  Point, 


15 ;  assigned  to  duty  as  brevet  lieu 
tenant  at  Jefterson  Barracks,  Mis 
souri,  16;  goes  to  Louisiana,  18;  to 
Florida,  18;  assigned  lieutenant,  18; 
goes  to  Corpus  Christi,  19 ;  at  Palo 
Alto,  25 ;  at  Eesaca  de  la  Palma,  27, 
28 ;  at  outbreak  of  civil  war,  29 ; 
leaves  Albuquerque,  30;  arrives  at 
Richmond,  32  ;  appointed  brigadier- 
general,  33;  reports  to  Beauregard 
at  Manassas  Junction,  33 ;  stays  re 
treat  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  39 ;  ad 
vance  of,  at  Manassas,  44 ;  orders  bat 
teries  to  fire  on  Federal  retreat,  52 ; 
criticism  of,  on  McDowell.  54 ;  on  Ty 
ler's  reconnoissance,  55 ;  on  Beaure 
gard,  56  ;  invited  to  dine  with  the  en 
emy,  60;  promoted  major-general, 
61 ;  marches  to  Culpeper  Court-House, 
65 ;  meets  President  Davis  and  Gen 
eral  Lee  in  war  council  at  Richmond, 
66  ;  on  McClellan,  66  ;  at  "Williams- 
burg,  72,  74 ;  opposes  attack  on  Han 
cock's  redoubts,  77 ;  estimates  forces 
engaged  at  Williamsburg,  79  ;  John 
ston's  testimonial  to,  80  ;  in  command 
of  right  wing  from  James  River  to 
White  Oak  Swamp,  81  ;  to  strike 
against  Federal  right  at  Seven  Pines, 
85;  in  council  with  Johnston,  86; 
ordered  to  Williamsburg  road,  86 ; 
tactical  handling  there  left  to  him, 
88;  complaint  against,  by  General 
Smith,  90 ;  endeavors  to  harmonize 
with  Huger,  92;  his  battle  on  the 
Williamsburg  road,  96;  plans  for 
resuming  battle  of  Seven  Pines  at 
daylight,  103 ;  asks  for  reinforce 
ments  and  a  diversion,  108;  makes 
appeal  for  ten  thousand  men  to  renew 
fight  at  Seven  Pines,  109;  meets 
General  Lee,  112;  suggests  to  Lee 
movement  against  McClellan's  right 
flank,  114  ;  letter  to,  from  D.  H.  Hill, 
115,  116;  suggestion  of,  for  method 
of  attack  on  McClellan  adopted  by 
Lee,  120 ;  in  conference  with  Lee 
and  others,  121 ;  at  Mechanicsville, 
124;  puts  his  reserve  into  action  at 
Gaines's  Mill,  127  et  seq.  ;  encounters 


676 


INDEX. 


main  force  of  McClellan  at  Fray- 
ser's  Farm,  133 ;  on  the  field  with 
President  Davis  and  General  Lee, 
134;  at  Malvern  Hill,  142,  145;  re 
view  by,  of  campaign,  147  ;  ordered 
to  G-ordonsville  with  ten  brigades, 
158;  proposes  move  against  Pope's 
right,  159  ;  rides  with  Lee  to  Clarke's 
Mountain,  161 ;  orders  arrest  of 
Toombs,  161,  and  release  of,  166; 
reaches  Thoroughfare  Gap,  en  route 
for  Manassas,  173 ;  arrival  on  field 
of  Manassas,  180  ;  makes  reconnois- 
sance  and  reports  against  attack,  182  ; 
right  flank  of,  ordered  attacked  by 
Porter,  184  ;  orders  batteries  to  attack 
Porter,  for  Jackson's  relief,  187  ;  ar 
rives  on  field  of  Chantilly,  194;  ob 
jects  to  movement  against  Harper's 
Ferry,  201,  202  ;  orders  to,  for  Mary 
land  campaign,  203  ;  march  of,  206  ; 
expresses  to  General  Lee  preference 
for  concentration  at  Antietam  rather 
than  at  Turner's  Pass,  219 ;  at  South 
Mountain,  222 ;  estimate  of  troops  of, 
at  South  Mountain,  226  ;  position  of, 
in  the  line,  preparatory  to  battle  of 
Sharpsburg,  234 ;  advance  against 
his  left  by  Hooker,  236 ;  troops  of, 
enter  fight,  242;  sustains  strong  at 
tack  of  General  Richardson,  249;  j 
ride  of,  with  General  Lee  and  D.  H. 
Hill  on  field  of  Sharpsburg,  254; 
orders  McLaws  and  Walker  to  pre 
pare  to  assault,  256  ;  called  by  General 
Lee  his  "  old  war-horse,"  262;  criti 
cism  of,  on  Maryland  campaign,  279 
et  seg.  ;  commissioned  lieutenant- 
general  ;  290  ;  marches  to  Culpeper 
Court-House,  291  ;  marches  for  Fred- 
ericksburg,  293  ;  on  the  heights,  293  ; 
position  of  troops  of,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  305 ;  views  his  lines  preparatory 
to  battle,  306;  differs  with  General 
Jackson  as  to  the  enemy's  purpose, 

323  ;  covers  route  to  Richmond,  323  ; 
ordered  to  south  side  of  James  Eiver, 

324  ;  employs  one  Harrison  as  scout, 
324;     ordered   to    rejoin    Lee,    326; 
criticism  of,  on  battle  of  Chancellors- 


ville,  329,  330 ;  proposes  measures  to 
General  Lee  for  relief  of  Vicksburg, 
331  ;  urges  that  campaign  in  Penn 
sylvania  should  be  one  of  defensive 
tactics/  331 ;  sends  Scout  Harrison  out 
with  secret  orders,  333 ;  takes  up 
march  for  Gettysburg,  337 ;  direc 
tions  to  Stuart  for  movement  of  cav 
alry,  342 ;  orders  treated  with  con 
tumely,  343  ;  entertains  Colonel  Fre- 
mantle,  343  ;  Harrison,  the  scout,  re 
ports  to,  346 ;  suggests,  on  information 
received,  change  of  march  eastward, 
347  ;  rides  with  General  Lee  towards 
Gettysburg,  351  ;  proposes  to  General 
Lee  move  around  the  Federal  left, 
358 ;  orders  columns  of  First  Corps 
hurried  forward  for  battle,  359 ;  ad 
vances  with  command,  366  ;  rides 
with  Wofford's  brigade  into  fight  at 
Little  Round  Top,  372 ;  losses  of  (on 
second  day),  373,  376,  377;  alleged 
order  to,  for  "battle  at  sunrise,"  377 
et  seq.  ;  letter  to,  from  Colonel  Tay 
lor,  379;  letter  to,  from  Colonel 
Venable,  379;  letter  to,  from  Gen 
eral  Long,  380 ;  letter  to,  from 
Charles  Marshall,  380;  letter  to, 
from  Colonel  Fairfax,  380,  381 ;  letter 
to,  from  J.  S.  D.  Cullen,  383,  384  ; 
losses  of,  on  third  day,  385  et  seq. ; 
sends  scouts  to  find  way  for  striking 
the  enemy's  left,  385  ;  interview  with 
General  Lee,  386  ;  did  not  believe  in 
attack  as  made,  388 ;  carefully  pre 
pares  for  making  assault,  389,  390 ; 
not  advised  of  failure  of  Confederate 
left,  392;  rides  to  batteries,  395; 
testimony  to  claims  of,  at  Gettys 
burg,  400;  Fitzhugh  Lee  upon, 
403 ;  Franco-German  war  affords 
parallel  for  suggestion  of,  for  move 
around  Federal  left,  404;  refuta 
tion  of  the  statement  that  he  was 
"hard  to  move,"  405  et  seq.;  re 
sume  of  action  of,  at  Gettysburg, 
407  et  seq.  ;  in  the  retreat  from 
Gettysburg,  429,  430;  urges  on  Sec 
retary  of  War  Seddon  a  westward 
movement,  433,  434 ;  mentions  the 


INDEX. 


677 


matter  to  G-eneral  Lee,  434  ;  letter  to, 
from  General  Lee,  435;  letter  from, 
to  G-eneral  Lee,  435 ;  transportation 
ordered  for  movement  of,  to  Tennes 
see,  436 ;  route  of,  on  westward 
movement,  436,  437;  parting  with 
Lee,  437;  reaches  General  Bragg's 
head-quarters,  438;  placed  in  com 
mand  of  General  Bragg's  left  wing, 
439 ;  orders  to  division  commanders 
of,  from  General  Bragg,  447  ;  orders 
Hood's  division  to  assault,  447  ;  rides 
with  General  Buckner  and  comes 
under  fire  of  the  enemy,  450 ;  lunches 
on  the  field,  451 ;  reports  to  General 
Bragg  on  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
and  urges  pursuit  of  enemy,  461 ; 
gives  opinion  to  President  Davis 
against  Bragg,  465 ;  declines  assign 
ment  to  command  of  Army  of  Ten 
nessee,  466 ;  offers  resignation  to 
President,  who  declines  it,  467  ;  urges 
appointment  of  General  Micah  Jen 
kins  to  command  of  Hood's  division, 
467 ;  suggests  change  of  base  to 
Kome,  Georgia,  468 ;  letter  to,  from 
General  Lee,  469,  470  (note) ;  calls  a 
signal  force  from  Virginia  to  Tennes 
see,  471 ;  defends  position,  472,  473  ; 
arranges  night  attack  on  Hooker's 
rear-guard,  475,  476 ;  reviews  effects 
and  possibilities  of  Western  move, 
478,  479;  ordered  on  campaign  in 
East  Tennessee,  480,  481 ;  organ 
ization  of  command  of,  482 ;  letter 
of,  to  General  Buckner  on  East  Ten 
nessee  campaign,  484,  485;  troops 
of,  on  short  rations,  486  ;  orders  of, 
to  General  Wheeler,  487  ;  command 
of,  in  engagement  on  Little  Tennes 
see,  490 ;  orders  McLaws  to  assault 
fort  at  Knoxville,  500  ;  reinforced  by 
General  Bushrod  K.  Johnson,  501  ; 
ordered  by  Bragg  to  attack  Knox 
ville,  501 ;  orders  of,  to  McLaws  for 
assault  of  Fort  Sanders,  502 ;  letter 
to,  from  McLaws,  urging  delay  in  at 
tack  on  Fort  Sanders,  504 ;  answer 
of,  thereto,  504  ;  recalls  troops  and 
gives  reasons  for,  505-507 ;  ordered 


by  Bragg  to  co-operate  with  his 
army  after  defeat  at  Chattanooga, 
507  ;  finds  conformance  to  order  im 
practicable,  509 ;  marches  up  the 
Holston  Valley,  511  ;  presence  of,  in 
East  Tennessee  causes  concern  to 
Lincoln,  515,  and  to  Grant,  516; 
orders  relief  of  General  McLaws, 
518;  makes  honorable  mention  of 
officers,  520 ;  renews  effort  to  be  re 
lieved  from  service,  524  ;  marches  to 
Dandridge,  526 ;  enters  Dandridge 
and  drinks  to  General  Gordon  Gran 
ger,  529  ;  General  Grant  gives  orders 
that  he  be  driven  from  Tennessee, 
531 ;  Foster  ordered  to  offensive 
against,  532  ;  despatches  concerning, 
from  General  Grant  to  Generals  Hal- 
leek,  Thomas,  and  Schofield,  535- 

537  ;  orders  concentration  of  forces, 

538  ;  asks  for  ten  thousand  additional 
troops,  539  ;  purpose  of,  in  latter  part 
of  campaign,  539  ;  on  campaign  in  the 
far  South,  540 ;  withdrawal  of  com 
mand  eastward  made  necessary,  540  ; 
asked   by  Richmond   authorities  for 
suggestions,  543  ;  ideas  of,  on  prose 
cution  of  the  war,  544  ;  goes  to  Vir 
ginia  and  submits  plans  to  General 
Lee,  544 ;  criticism  of,  on  Bragg  be 
fore  Richmond  authorities,  546  ;  visits 
wife  at  Petersburg,  546 ;  returns  to 
Tennessee,  547 ;  rejoins  General  Lee 
on   the  Rapidan,  547 ;  receives  vote 
of  thanks  in  Congress,  550  ;  in  com 
mand  of  First  Corps  on  the  Rapidan 
(1864),    553 ;    takes    short  route   of 
march  to  field  of  battle  (Wilderness), 
556,  557,  559;  troops  of,  form  under 
fire,    560;    repulses   Hancock,    561; 
makes  flanking  movement  on  Han 
cock's  left,  562 ;  rides  with  flanking 
party,  563  ;  severely  wounded,  564  ; 
borne  to  the  rear,  566  ;  Northern  his 
torian  and  General  Hancock  on  ad 
vance  of,  568  ;  Fitzhugh  Lee  upon, 
568 ;  letter  to,  from  Colonel  Taylor 
on  controversy  as  to  guide  at  Wilder 
ness,    569 ;  letter  to,    from    General 
Alexander  on  same  subject,  570,  571 ; 


678 


INDEX. 


letter  to,  from  Colonel  Venable  on 
same,  571;  absent  on  leave,  572; 
again  at  front,  and  meets  General  Lee, 
573;  letter  of,  to  Colonel  Taylor, 
574 ;  assigned  to  command  on  north 
side  of  James  Kiver,  574  ;  orders  roads 
broken  with  ploughs,  580  ;  puts  stop 
to  picket-firing,  581 ;  meets  General 
E.  O.  C.  Ord  and  hears  proposition 
for  peace  convention,  583,  584 ;  dis 
claims  authority  to  speak  on,  584  ; 
communicates  proposition  for  meet 
ing,  to  General  Lee,  584  ;  advocates 
impressment  of  gold  and  men,  588  ; 
starts  in  pursuit  of  Sheridan,  592; 
visits  General  Lee  at  Petersburg, 
604;  receives  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  as 
part  of  his  command,  608  ;  on  retreat 
from  Kichmond,  609 ;  marches  for 
Farmville,  pressed  by  the  enemy, 
610 ;  saves  High  Bridge,  612 ;  crosses 
Appomattox  at  Farmville,  615;  not 
among  those  of  Lee's  officers  who 
urged  surrender,  618;  says  "not 
yet"  in  regard  to  surrender,  619  ;  re 
fuses  to  bear  to  General  Lee  report 
of  officers  favoring  surrender,  620; 
calls  for  interview  with  General 
Lee,  624  ;  endeavors  to  recall  General 
Lee  from  ride  to  General  Grant,  626  ; 
forms  last  line  of  battle,  626  ;  refuses 
to  surrender  to  General  Custer,  627  ; 
meets  General  Grant,  630  ;  formally 
surrenders  command,  630,  631  ;  visits 
Washington,  632;  calls  on  General 
Grant,  633 ;  receives  letter  to  Presi 
dent  Johnson,  633;  interview  of, 
with  the  President,  634 ;  is  relieved 
from  political  disabilities,  634;  en 
gages  in  business  in  New  Orleans, 
634,  635 ;  favors  holding  States  under 
the  President's  reconstruction  policy, 
035;  letter  of,  on  the  subject  to  J. 
M.  G.  Parker,  Esq.,  636,  637;  at 
tacked  by  New  Orleans  press,  637 ; 
appointed  surveyor  of  customs,  638  ; 
tribute  of,  to  his  old  nurse,  638  ;  letter 
to,  from  General  Lee,  congratulating 
on  convalescence,  639;  letter  from, 
to  General  Lee,  640;  letter  of,  to 


General  Lee,  on  impressment  of  gold, 
641  ;  letter  to,  from  General  Lee,  on 
policy  of  campaign,  642;  letter  of, 
to  General  Lee,  on  impressment  of 
men,  644;  letter  to,  from  General 
Lee,  645 ;  letter  of,  to  General  Lee, 
on  impressment  of  gold,  646 ;  letter 
of,  to  General  Lee,  on  "peace"  in 
terview  with  General  Ord,  647 ;  let 
ter  of,  to  General  Lee,  on  exchange 
of  political  prisoners,  648  ;  letter  to, 
from  General  Lee,  on  interview  with 
General  Grant,  649;  letter  of,  to 
General  Lee,  urging  use  of  gold,  649  ; 
letter  of,  to  General  Lee,  on  guard 
ing  Danville  Railroad,  650  ;  letter  of, 
to  A.  A.  General  Taylor,  on  suppres 
sion  of  desertion,  651 ;  letter  of,  to 
General  Lee,  on  Sheridan's  opera 
tions,  652 ;  letter  of,  to  General  Tay 
lor,  on  policy  towards  new  organiza 
tions,  653 ;  letter  to,  from  General 
Lee,  on  proposed  history,  654  ;  letter 
of  congratulation  from  General  Lee, 
655  ;  letter  to,  from  General  Lee,  sug 
gesting  preparation  of  memoirs,  655 ; 
letter  of,  to  General  Lee,  on  battle 
of  Gaines's  Mill,  656  ;  letter  to,  from 
General  Lee,  on  prospects,  etc.,  657. 

Longstreet,  Mrs.  James,  proposed  meet 
ing  with  Mrs.  Grant  to  bring  about 
peace,  584  ;  in  church  at  Richmond, 
hears  news  of  defeat  at  Petersburg, 
607. 

Longstreet,  Owen  &  Co.,  letter  to,  from 
General  Lee,  655 

Longstreet,  Richard,  settles  in  America, 
13. 

Longstreet,  Robert  Lee  (son  of  General 
Longstreet),  birth  of,  546. 

Longstreet,  William,  applies  steam  to 
navigation,  1787,  14;  letter  to  Gov 
ernor  Telfair,  14. 

Lookout  Mountain,  Confederates  upon, 
463 ;  attack  near,  on  Hooker's  rear 
guard,  476,  477. 

Lost  orders,  Lee's  to  Stuart,  capturrd 
by  Pope,  160,  196;  Lee's  "General 
Order  No.  191,"  in  Maryland  cam 
paign,  203,  212,  282,  283." 


INDEX. 


679 


Loudon,  Fort.     See  Sanders,  Fort. 
Lubbock,  Colonel,  48. 
Lyle,  Captain,  in  affair  on  Williams- 
burg  road,  578. 

M. 

McCall,  General  John  A.,  joins  Army 
of  Potomac,  122 ;  at  Mechanicsville, 
124;  at   Gaines's   Mill,    126;  report 
of,  on  Frayser's  Farm,  136  ;  captured 
at  close  of  battle  (Frayser's  Farm), 
138;  his  tenacity  of  battle,  139. 
McClellan,    General    George    B.,    61  ; 
called    "the  young  Napoleon,"  63; 
delay  in  marching  against  Johnston 
at  Centreville,  64  ;  concentrates  army 
on  the  James  River,  65;  President 
Davis's  high  opinion  of,  66 ;  not  on 
field  of  Williamsburg  until  late  in 
the  day,  80;  at  White  House,  82; 
organizes     two     provisional      army 
corps,   82  ;  orders  troops  withdrawn 
from     Mechanicsville,    125;    orders 
change  of  base  to  James  River,  132  ; 
main  force  of,  encounters  Longstreet 
at   Frayser's   Farm,    133 ;    masterly 
retreat  of,  132-140,  151 ;  strength  of 
his  position   at  Malvern  Hill,  141 ; 
shows  himself  well  equipped  in  sci 
ence  of  war,  151 ;  on  a  gunboat  on 
the  James,  151  ;  reaches  Alexandria, 
171 ;  marches  in  slow  pursuit  of  Lee 
in    Maryland,    208;    report    of,    on 
march,    209;    receives    Lee's    "lost 
order,"   213;  writes  President   Lin 
coln  of  prospects  in  Maryland,  214  ; 
writes  General  Halleck  on  same,  214- 
216;     "makes   haste    slowly"    after 
receiving    the    "lost    order,"    216; 
orders   for    advance    of    commands, 
217;  prisoners  claimed  by,  at  South 
Mountain,  225 ;  army  of,  in  position 
at    Antietam,    234;    on    field    with 
Hooker,  237 ;  disapproves  of  attack 
by  Franklin,  257  ;    orders  Burnside 
to  take  bridge  over  Antietam,  258; 
neither  plan  nor  execution  of,  strong 
at  Antietam,  267  ;  letter  to,  from  Gov 
ernor   Curtin,  282 ;    slow  march  of, 


after  Lee  in  Maryland,  282  ;  his  posi 
tion  at  opening  of  Maryland  cam 
paign,  284,  285 ;  opinion  of,  against 
holding  Harper's  Ferry,  286 ;  de 
scription  of,  285 ;  compared  and  con 
trasted  with  Lee,  285;  crosses  the 
Potomac,  south  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
290  ;  relieved  from  command,  291. 
McCook,  General  A.  McD.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  442 ;  goes  before  court  of 
inquiry,  465. 
McCook,  Colonel  D.,  at  Chickamauga, 

442. 

McDowell,    General    Trvin,    at  West 
Point,  16 ;  in  the  field,  35 ;  at  Cen 
treville,  37 ;   plan  for  battle   at  Ma- 
nassas,  43  ;  pushes  battle  by  artillery 
arm,  49 ;  gallant  effort  of,  to  recover 
lost  power,  50  ;  criticism  of,  54,  56  ;  in 
command  of  Third  Corps,  Army  of 
Virginia,  1 53  ;  march  of,  to  Manas- 
sas    intercepted    by    Jackson,    176, 
177;  at  Manassas,  190. 
McElroy,  Colonel,  death  of,  520. 
McLaws,  Major-General   L.,  at  Wil 
liamsburg,  70;  at  Seven  Pines,  107, 
108;    march  of,  in  Maryland  cam 
paign,    207,    208;    orders    from,    at 
Crampton's  Pass,  230 ;   at  Maryland 
Heights,  231  ;  arrives  at  Sharpsburg, 
244;    brigades  of,  enter  battle,  245, 
247  ;    losses  of  Lee's  army  in,  266  ; 
at   Fredericksburg,   307   et  seq. ;    at 
Gettysburg,  370,  393,  396,  397;    in 
retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431 ;    bri 
gades    of,    start    with    Longstreet's 
command   for  Tennessee,  437;    two 
brigades  of,  arrive  at  Chickamauga, 
439  ;  but  commander  and  other  bri 
gades   too    late,    440;    finally    joins 
Longstreet,  462  ;  posts  army  in  semi 
circle   near  Chattanooga,   463 ;    en 
gages  in   attack   on   Hooker's   rear 
guard,  476,  477 ;  in  engagement  on 
Little  Tennessee,  490  ;  reaches  Knox- 
ville,  495 ;  advance  of,  497 ;  ordered 
to  assault  of  fort,  500  ;  again  ordered 
to  assault,  502;    orders  of,  to  com 
mand  for  assault,  503 ;  letter  of,  to 
General  Longstreet,  urging  delay  of 


680 


INDEX. 


assault,  504 ;  letter  to,  from  General 
Longstreet,  504 ;  makes  assault,  505, 
506;  relief  of,  ordered  by  General 
Longstreet,  518  ;  inquires  cause  there 
for,  518  ;  is  restored  to  duty,  548. 

Magruder,  Fort,  at  Williamsburg,  68 ; 
attack  on,  73. 

Magruder,  General  J.  B.,  66;  rein 
forced  by  Huger  and  Early,  67 ; 
builds  fortifications  at  Williamsburg, 
68;  engages  with  Sumner  at  Allen's 
Farm  and  Savage  Station,  132. 

Mahone,  General  William,  in  battle  of 
Wilderness,  562 ;  arrests  advance  of 
Hancock  before  Richmond,  576  ;  at 
Petersburg,  606 ;  describes  General 
Lee's  reception  of  disaster  in  retreat 
to  Appomattox,  614,  615  ;  fires  High 
Bridge,  615  ;  at  Cumberland  Church, 
615;  at  Farmville,  617;  in  confer 
ence  with  General  Lee  at  Appomat 
tox,  625. 

Malvern  Hill,  battle  of,  141  ;  positions 
of  troops  on  field  of,  141,  142;  Con 
federates  make  poor  use  of  artillery, 
143  ;  General  Lee  abandons  his  origi 
nal  plan,  144 ;  battle  begun  by  ad 
vance  of  the  Confederate  right,  144  ; 
Confederates  repulsed,  144  ;  Federals 
march  to  Harrison's  Landing,  145 ; 
Jackson  ordered  to  follow  retreat, 
146  ;  casualties,  151. 

Manassas  (or  Bull  Kun),  first  battle  of, 
field  chosen  by  Beauregard,  33  ;  de 
scription  of,  34;  Beauregard's  plan 
of  battle,  36;  McDowell's  arrival, 
35,  37  ;  opening  of  battle,  38,  46  ; 
forces  available,  41  ;  McDowell's  ad 
vance  driven  back,  46  ;  Terry's  and 
Lubbock's  reconnoissance,  45,  48  ; 
fight  assumes  large  proportions,  48  ; 
Jackson  christened  "  Stonewall,"  49  ; 
Beauregard  in  command  on  left,  49  ; 
Kirby  Smith's  forces  arrive,  50;  Mc 
Dowell  makes  effort  to  recover  lost 
power,  50 ;  flight  of  Federals,  51  ; 
Longstreet's  order  to  fire  on  retreat 
countermanded  by  General  Bonham, 
52  ;  pursuit  revoked,  53  ;  losses,  53  ; 
criticism  of  McDowell,  54,  56  ;  Ty 


ler's  reconnoissance,  55 ;  Confederate 
battle-flag,  56  ;  organization  of  forces, 
57,  58. 

Manassas  (or  Bull  Kun),  second  battle 
of,  making  ready  for,  163  et  seq. ; 
strength  of  confronting  armies,  169  ; 
advance  of  Pope  to,  170 ;  Jackson 
first  on  the  field,  171;  Pope  reaches 
the  Junction,  172 ;  first  passage  of 
arms  on  field,  172  ;  Longstreet  at 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  173, 174  ;  engage 
ment  at,  175,  176  ;  Jackson  attacks 
King's  division  at  Groveton,  175, 
176;  Pope's  orders  to  Porter,  178, 
179;  battle  opened  by  Federals 
against  Jackson's  right,  180 ;  posi 
tions  of  troops,  181  ;  Kearny  opens 
against  Jackson's  left,  182;  Long- 
street  reports  against  attack,  182 ;  Lee 
returns  to  first  plan  of  battle,  183  ; 
Confederate  advance  anticipated  by 
Federals,  184  ;  Pope  on  his  orders  to 
Porter,  185  ;  Pope  mistakenly  thinks 
Confederates  retreating,  185,  186; 
Porter  ordered  against  Jackson's 
front,  186 ;  Longstreet  orders  batter 
ies  against  Porter,  187 ;  charge  of 
Longstreet's  troops,  187 ;  Lee  rides 
under  fire,  189;  action  of  United 
States  regulars,  190  ;  Federals  retreat, 
190  ;  Jackson  and  Stuart  ordered  in 
pursuit,  191  ;  forces  engaged,  and 
losses,  195  ;  retreat  covered  by  Sum 
ner,  196;  review  of  campaign,  196, 
197. 

Manassas  Junction,  Longstreet  reports 
at,  to  Beauregard,  33 ;  raid  on,  by 
Stuart  and  Trimble,  167 ;  engage 
ment  at,  169. 

Manning,  Colonel  P.  T.,  wounded 
while  lunching  with  Longstreet  on 
field  of  Chickamauga,  451. 

Mansfield,  Major-General  Joseph  K. 
F.,  crosses  the  Antietam  prepara 
tory  to  battle,  237  ;  mortally  wounded 
at  Antietam,  242. 

Marshall,  Colonel,  letter  of,  to  Gen 
eral  Longstreet,  on  alleged  order  by 
General  Lee  for  battle  "  at  sunrise," 
380  (note). 


INDEX. 


681 


Martin,    Major-Gen  eral,    441  ;    super 
sedes  Wheeler  in  command  of  Con 
federate  cavalry  at  Knoxville,  500; 
operations  against  Sturgis's  cavalry, 
522;    in   affair   at    Dandridge,    526, 
527 ;  in  affair  near  Dandridge,  532 ; 
President   Davis   orders   cavalry  of, 
sent  to  Johnston,  539  ;  leaves  Long- 
street  for  Georgia,  542. 
Marye,  Captain,  at  Manassas,  40. 
Maryland  campaign,  the,   199    et  seq. 
(see    Harper's    Ferry,    Sharpsburg, 
etc.)  ;  review  of,  279  et  seq. 
Mason,  George  T.,  killed  on  the  Rio 

Grande,  23. 

Matamoras,  Taylor's  army  at,  22. 
May,  Charles,  heroism  of,  at  Resaca  de 

la  Palma,  28. 

Meade,  General  George  G  ,  at  South 
Mountain,  223-225;  at  Antietam, 
241  ;  handsome  advance  of,  at 
Fredericksburg,  308,  309;  succeeds 
Hooker  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  348;  wires  General 
Halleck  of  plans,  349  ;  suggestion  to, 
by  General  Halleck  that  Lee  may 
turn  his  left,  360;  position  of,  on 
second  day  at  Gettysburg,  363 ; 
recognizes  and  fears  move  by  Con 
federate  right,  368  ;  holds  council  on 
night  of  second  day,  376  ;  not  appre 
hensive  of  Lee's  left,  389 ;  attempts 
to  bring  his  left  against  Longstreet's 
battle,  396 ;  on  suggestion  of  Long- 
street  to  work  towards  his  line  of 
communications,  404;  concentrates 
army  at  Warrenton,  432;  before 
the  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  552 ; 
orders  his  troops  into  action,  559  ;  at 
Petersburg,  608;  follows  retreat, 
610,  611. 

Mechanicsville,  battle  of,  attack  by  A. 
P.  Hill,  123,  124;  losses  of  first  day, 
124;  McClellan  orders  withdrawal, 
125. 

Memoirs  of  General  Longstreet,   sug 
gested  by  General  Lee,  655. 
Merritt,    General  Wesley,   Sheridan's 

chief  of  cavalry,  590,  598. 
"Mexican  war,  beginning  of,  18;    pre 


cipitated  by  movement  to  the  Rio 
Grande,  21,  22;  first  hostilities,  23; 
Palo  Alto,  25  ;  Resaca  de  la  Palma, 
26. 

Miles,  Colonel  Dixon  H.,  mentioned  by 
McClellan,  215;  mortally  wounded 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  232 ;  orders  to, 
from  General  Wool,  286. 

Miles,  General,  at  Petersburg,  608. 

Miller,  Captain,  at  Gettysburg,  395. 

Mills,  Colonel  Roger  Q.,  commands 
brigade  at  Chickamauga,  446. 

Milroy,  General,  fights  severe  engage 
ment  with  Ewell  at  Winchester,  339. 

Minnegerode,  Rev.,  pastor  of  church  in 
Richmond,  607. 

Mitchell,  General  R.  B.,  at  Chicka 
mauga,  442. 

Moore,  Colonel,  killed  at  Seven  Pines, 
99. 

Morgan,  General  John  T.,  in  engage 
ment  on  Little  Tennessee  River,  490  ; 
in  affair  near  Dandridge,  532. 

"Mud  March,"  the,  323. 

Mumford,  General  T.  T.,  at  Five  Forks, 
596,  597 ;  ordered  by  Longstreet 
against  Ord's  bridge-burners,  612; 
at  Cumberland  Church,  615;  cap 
tures  part  of  Gregg's  cavalry,  617; 
at  Appomattox,  629. 

N. 

Naglee,  General,  at  Burnside's  Bridge 
(Antietam),  259. 

Napoleon,  quotation  from,  405. 

Negley,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  442. 

Negroes,  Confederate  Congress  pro 
vides  for  enrolment  of,  as  soldiers, 
582  ;  suffrage  of,  636. 

Nichols,  General  W.  A.,  at  Gettysburg, 
374 ;  extends  hospitality  to  Long- 
street,  632,  633. 

North  Carolina,  Fifth  Regiment, 
slaughter  in  ranks  of,  at  Williams- 
burg,  78. 

Nurse,  the  old,  638. 

O. 

Ord,  General  E.  O.  C.,62;  meets  Gen 
eral  Longstreet,  583  ;  proposes  meet- 


682 


INDEX. 


ing  of  commanders  in  interest  of 
peace,  584  ;  called  by  General  Grant 
to  south  side  of  the  James,  595  ;  fol 
lowing  Confederate  retreat  from 
Petersburg,  610 ;  orders  burning  of 
High  Bridge,  611 ;  at  Appomattox, 
623,  624 ;  interview  with,  described 
by  Longstreet,  647. 

Orders,  lost.     See  Lost  orders. 

Owen,  Edward,  635. 

Owen,  Miller,  635. 

Owen,  William,  635. 


P. 

Palmer,  General  J.  M.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  442. 

Palo  Alto,  24. 

Parke,  General  John  G.,  in  command 
at  Knoxville,  496;  takes  the  field 

.  along  the  rear  of  Longstreet's  march, 
512  ;  assumes  command  of  Federals 
in  field  on  march  to  Dandridge,  528 ; 
at  Fort  Steadman,  594,  595;  at 
Petersburg,  605,  606. 

Parker,  J.  M.  G.,  letter  to,  from  Gen 
eral  Longstreet,  636,  637. 

Patrick,  General,  at  Antietam,  266; 
carries  Sumner's  demand  for  sur 
render  of  Fredericksburg  to  civil 
authorities  and  General  Longstreet, 
294  ;  in  attack,  309. 

Patterson,  Kobert,  opposing  Johnston 
in  the  Valley,  42,  53. 

Peace,  propositions  for,  by  General 
Lee,  204 ;  to  be  secured  because  gold 
had  gone  up  to  200,  317  ;  talk 
of,  582 ;  mission  of  Hon.  Mont 
gomery  Blair,  583 ;  proposition  of 
General  Ord  to  Longstreet  for  meet 
ing  of  commanders  in  interest  of, 
583,  584  ;  proposed  meeting  of  wives 
of  Generals  Grant  and  Longstreet 
in  interest  of,  584 ;  correspondence 
of  Generals  Lee  and  Grant,  585,  586  ; 
General  Grant  disclaims  authority  to 
act  upon,  587;  Longstreet  on  inter 
view  with  General  Ord,  547. 

Pegram,  Colonel,  at  Five  Forks,  597; 
mortally  wounded,  599. 


Pegram,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 
441. 

Pemberton,  General,  commissioned 
lieutenant-general,  290;  with  Presi 
dent  Davis  before  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  469  ;  troops  threaten  mutiny 
when  they  hear  Davis 's  purpose  to 
assign  him  to  command  of  Polk's 
corps,  470. 

Pender,  General,  at  Shepherdstown, 
264 ;  at  Fredericksburg,  307 ;  at 
Gettysburg,  354. 

Pendleton,     General,     at     Shepherds- 
town,  264 ;  saw  opportunity  for  the 
right   at    Gettysburg,    368 ;    charges 
of,  against  First  Corps,  377 ;  delivers 
to   General   Lee   opinion  of  officers 
favorable   to   surrender,   618;   inter- 
'view  with  General  Lee  on  proposi- 
1       tion  for  surrender,  620,  621. 

Peninsula,  the,  68. 

Peninsular  campaign  (see  Chicka- 
hominy,  Seven  Pines,  Mechanics- 
ville,  Gaines's  Mill,  Malvern  Hill, 
etc.),  losses  in,  151. 

Pennsylvania,  invasion  of,  331,  334. 
See  Gettysburg. 

Perry,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  371. 

Petersburg,  battle  of,  Confederates 
cross  the  James,  603;  General 
Grant's  concerted  assault,  604  ;  Gen 
eral  Wright  makes  opening  assault, 
605 ;  death  of  General  A.  P.  Hill, 
605 ;  General  Grant  rides  over  cap 
tured  works,  606 ;  news  of,  received 
by  President  Davis  in  church  at 
Richmond,  607 ;  fierce  assaults  on 
Fort  Gregg,  607  ;  heavy  losses  at  Fort 
Whitworth,  608 ;  Lee  gives  orders 
for  retreat,  608  ;  Lee  purposed  to  join 
Johnston  in  North  Carolina,  610. 

Pettigrew,  General,  wounded  and  cap 
tured  at  Seven  Pines,  98  ;  charge  of, 
at  Gettysburg,  compared  with  those 
of  Meade's  divisions  at  Fredericks 
burg,  314;  at  Gettysburg,  352;  posi 
tion  of,  on  third  day  (Gettysburg), 
388  ;  famous  charge,  393  ;  wounding 
of,  394 ;  attacked  by  Kilpatrick  in 
retreat  from  Gettysburg,  430. 


INDEX. 


683 


Pickett,  General  George  E.,  at  Seven 
Pines,  108;  at  Gaines's  Mill,  127, 
128 ;  at  opening  of  Fredericksburg, 
309 ;  his  charge  at  Gettysburg  com 
pared  with  that  of  Meade's  division 
at  Fredericksburg,  314 ;  position  of, 
on  third  day,  388 ;  Alexander  gives 
notice  to,  and  Longstreet  affirms 
order  for  advance  of,  392  ;  General 
Lee  favors  sending  division  of,  to 
Longstreet,  in  Tennessee,  539;  re 
called,  to  join  Longstreet,  591  ; 
ordered  to  join  Lee  at  Petersburg, 
592 ;  opens  battle  of  Five  Forks,  596, 
597  ;  rides  under  fire  to  his  command, 
599 ;  position  at  Five  Forks  not  of 
his  choosing,  600 ;  generalship  of, 
601 ;  reinforced  too  late,  599,  602 ; 
in  engagement  at  Amazon  Creek, 
606;  escapes  capture  at  Rice's  Sta 
tion,  614. 

Pleasonton,  General  Alfred,  in  Mary 
land  campaign,  209,  210;  pushes 
Confederate  cavalry  back  from  the 
Maryland  mountains,  216;  opens 
battle  of  South  Mountain,  221  ; 
crosses  bridge  No.  2  (Antietam),  252  ; 
in  command  of  cavalry  division 
under  Burnside's  reorganization,  292  ; 
engages  Stuart's  cavalry  at  Brandy 
Station,  338 ;  drives  Stuart  back  to 
Ashby's  Gap,  341. 

Poe,  Captain,  constructs  Federal  earth 
works  at  Knoxville,  496 ;  report  on 
work  by  citizens  and  contrabands, 
500. 

Political  prisoners,  General  Lee  upon 
exchange  of,  586 ;  General  Grant 
upon,  587 ;  Longstreet  on  exchange 
of,  648. 

Polk,  General  Leonidas  (Bishop),  com 
missioned  lieutenant-general,  290; 
in  command  of  right  wing  at  Chick- 
amauga,  439  ;  put  under  charges  by 
General  Bragg,  465. 
Pope,  Major-General  John,  in  com 
mand  of  Army  of  Virginia,  153  ;  dis 
plays  bold  front  as  a  diversion,  154 ; 
injudicious  orders  of,  154;  "  Genera 
Orders  No.  11,"  155;  his  attitude 


towards  non-combatants  contrasted 
with  Scott's  in  Mexico,  155,  156; 
engages  with  Jackson  at  Slaughter 
Mountain,  157;  increases  strength 
of  his  army,  159;  captures  one  of 
Lee's  orders  and  officers,  160;  puts 
army  in  retreat  across  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  160;  head-quarters  of,  raided 
by  Stuart,  165  ;  forms  plan  to  attack 
Lee,  166  ;  concentrates  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  at  Warrenton,  168  ;  orders  for 
advance  and  concentration  at  Manas- 
sas,  171 ;  reaches  Manassas  Junction, 
172;  orders  to  Porter,  178,  179; 
orders  for  attack  at  Manassas,  180; 
orders  Porter  to  attack  Longstreet's 
right,  184;  his  report  upon,  185; 
mistakenly  supposes  Confederates 
retreating,  185,  186 ;  letter  to,  from 
General  Lee,  on  death  of  Kearny, 
194;  criticism  of,  in  Manassas  cam 
paign,  197. 

Porter,  Major-General  Fitz-John,  in 
command  of  Fifth  Corps,  82;  at 
Mechanicsville,  122;  at  Gaines's 
Mill,  126;  at  Malvern  Hill,  141; 
ordered  by  Pope  to  Manassas,  171  ; 
march  of,  delayed,  171  ;  Pope's  orders 
to,  for  Manassas,  178  ;  ordered  to  at 
tack  Longstreet's  right  flank,  184; 
receives  order  too  late,  185 ;  ordered 
to  attack  Jackson's  front,  186;  hard 
battle  against,  by  Jackson  and  Long- 
street,  187,  188;  at  Antietam,  234; 
ordered  ready  to  enter  battle, 
252. 

Porter,    Theoderic,    in    theatricals    on 
Mexican  frontier,  20;  killed  on  the 
Rio  Grande,  23. 
Potomac,  Army  of.     See  Army  of  the 

Potomac. 

Potter,  General  R.  D.,  in  East  Tennes 
see  campaign,  490,  492. 
Powell,    William    H.,   report    of,    on 

Second  Manassas,  190. 
Preston,  General  William,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  439,  450  (note)  ;  gains  Snod- 
grass  Hill,  455. 

Provisional  Army  Corps,  two  organized 
by  McClellan,  82. 


684 


INDEX. 


R. 

Kains,  G-eneral,  leaves  percussion  shells 

at  Williamsburg,  79. 
Kansom,    General,  at   Fredericksburg, 
309,  310,  313;  at  Five  Forks,   596, 
598  ;  horse  killed,  599. 
Heed,     General     Theodore,     mortally 
wounded    in    engagement  at   Cum 
berland  Church,  615. 
Eegulars,  United  States,  at  First  Manas- 
sas,  37,  51  ;  at  Second  Manassas,  189, 
190. 

Eeno,  General  Jesse,  division  of,  joins 
Pope    at    Culpeper,    159  ;    captures 
signal  station,  161;  killed  at  South 
Mountain,  223. 
Eesaca  de  la  Palma,  26-28. 
Ketreats,  the  great  (McClellan's),  132- 
152;      from      Gettysburg,      426     et 
seq. 

Keynolds,  General  John  F.,  at  Me- 
chanicsville,  126 ;  ordered  to  attack 
at  Manassas  (Second),  180;  in  com 
mand  of  right  wing  of  Union  army 
at  Gettysburg,  353  ;  death  of,  354. 
Eeynolds,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 

441. 
Eice's   Station,   611  ;    engagement  at, 

613,  614. 

Eichardson,  General  I.  B  ,  at  Sharps- 
burg,  244,  247 ;  brave  advance  of, 
against  Confederate  centre,  248,  250  ; 
occupies  Piper  House  at  Antietam, 
251  ;  mortally  wounded,  251. 
Eichardson,  Colonel  John  B.,  at  Sec 
ond  Manassas,  188;  at  Sharpsburg, 
258,  269;  at  Fredericksburg,  319; 
at  Gettysburg,  411. 

Eichmond,  apprehended  advance  on, 
64  ;  practicable  routes  to,  64  ;  D.  H. 
Hill's  denial  of  reported  proposed 
abandonment  of,  when  Lee  assumed 
command,  115,  116;  Burnside's 
march  for,  293  ;  route  to,  covered  by 
Longstreet  after  Fredericksburg  bat-  | 
tie,  323,  324 ;  armies  again  in  front 
of,  572  et  seq.  (see  Eichmond,  cam 
paign  of,  in  1864) ;  news  of  Peters 
burg  received  at,  607. 


"Eichmond     authorities,"     forced    to 
extremity,  call  for  suggestions  as  to 
conduct  of  the  war,  543;    Lee  and 
Longstreet   confer   with,    544.       See 
Eichmond,  campaign  against. 
Eichmond,  campaign  against,  in  1864, 
fall  of  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  573 ; 
Longstreet    assigned     to    command 
north  of  the  James,  574  ;  Confeder 
ate   positions,    575;    General   Grant 
conceives  plan  for  left  attack,  575, 
576 ;    Mahone    arrests    advance    of 
Hancock,  576;    affair  on   the  Wil 
liamsburg    road,    576-578;     closing 
scenes   of    (1864),    579;    Sherman's 
movements  come  into  remote  bearing 
upon  affairs  around  the  capital,  580 ; 
Longstreet  orders  roads   broken   up 
with   ploughs,  580;    General   Grant 
strengthens      combination      against 
Eichmond,  590;    General  Grant  or 
ders  a  grand  move  by  his  left,  592 ; 
General  Lee  gives  consent  to  sortie 
against   Fort   Steadman,  592;    posi 
tions  and  strength  of  Federal  army, 
593;    General   Lee's   strength,    593, 
594 ;    storming   of    Fort   Steadman, 
594;  losses  at  Fort  Steadman,  595; 
General     Grant    begins     movement 
around   the  Confederate  right,  595; 
General  Lee  endeavors  to  anticipate 
the  movement,  596  (see  Five  Forks, 
battle  of,  Petersburg,  battle  of,  etc.) ; 
Longstreet    in   retreat    marches    for 
Farmville,    610;     General    Meade's 
pursuit,    610,    611  ;     movements    of 
Generals  Ord   and  Longstreet,   611, 
612 ;    High  Bridge  saved  by  Long- 
street,    612 ;    engagement   at   Eice's 
Station,  613,   614;    Confederate  dis 
aster,  614;   General  Lee's  reception 
of  the    news   described   by   General 
Mahone,   614,   615;    engagement  at 
Cumberland     Church,    615 ;     panic 
among     Confederate     teamsters     at 
Farmville,     615;      engagement     at 
Farmville,    616,    617.        See   Appo- 
mattox,  surrender  at. 
Eidgely,    Eandolph,    heroism    of,    at 
Eesaca  de  la  Palma,  27. 


INDEX. 


685 


Ripley,  General,  wounded  at  Sharps- 
burg,  243. 

Kobertson,  General  J.  B.,  in  engage 
ment  at  Lookout  Valley,  476,  477 ; 
charges  and  specifications  against, 
517  ;  sentenced  to  suspension,  548. 

Kobinson,  James,  Longstreet's  guide 
in  Wilderness,  548. 

"Rock  Brigade,"  at  Chickamauga, 
448  ;  at  Petersburg,  606. 

Rodes,  General  R.  E.,  takes  Federal 
redoubt  and  battery  at  Seven  Pines, 
94;  at  South  Mountain,  224;  at 
Sharpsburg,  247  ;  at  Gettysburg,  355, 
374. 

Rosecrans,  General  W.  S.,  threatening 
of,  in  Georgia,  433;  understood 
Bragg's  plan  for  Chickamauga,  439  ; 
rides  along  Union  lines  on  eve  of 
battle,  443;  at  Chattanooga,  463; 
reports  condition  of  army  deplora 
ble,  470;  superseded  in  command 
by  General  George  H.  Thomas,  472. 
Rosser,  Colonel,  on  the  Rappahannock, 
164,  218,  221 ;  General,  saves  portion 
of  Early's  command  and  reports  to 
Longstreet,  591;  at  Five  Forks, 
596;  ordered  by  Longstreet  against 
Ord's  bridge-burners,  612  ;  at  Cum 
berland  Church,  615;  captures  part 
of  Gregg's  cavalry,  617. 
Ruff,  Colonel,  honorably  mentioned, 

and  death  of,  520. 

Ruger,  General,  opens   against   Ewell 
(Gettysburg,  third  day),  387,  388. 


S. 

Sailor's  Creek,  Confederate  disaster  at 
613-615. 

St.    John,    Brigadier-General    F.    M. 
appointed  commissary-general  of  sub 
sistence,  583. 

Sanders,  Fort,  assault  on,  by  Genera 
McLaws,  505,  506. 

Scales,    General,    wounded   at   Gettys 
burg,  389. 

Scammon,  Colonel,  at  Burnside's  Bridge 
(Antietam),  259. 


Schofield,  General  J.  M.,  despatch  to, 
from  General  Grant,  on  driving 
Longstreet  out  of  Tennessee,  535, 
536  ;  despatch  of,  to  General  Thomas, 
537. 
Schurz,  General  Carl,  at  Gettysburg, 

355. 

Scott,  General  Winfield,  37  ;  treatment 
of  non-combatants  in  Mexican  war, 
156  ;  advice  of,  as  to  "  wayward  sis 
ters,"  631. 

Scout   Harrison    employed    by   Long- 
street,    324;    reports    to    Longstreet 
before  Gettysburg,  346. 
Seddon,  Secretary  of  War,  sends  scouts 
to  Longstreet,  324  ;  Longstreet  calls 
on,  and    makes  proposition   to,   for 
Western  movement,  327,  409  ;  West 
ern  movement  again  urged  on,  by 
Longstreet,  433,  434. 
Sedgwick,  General,  division  of,   leads 
Sumner's    advance    at    Sharpsburg, 
244,  245  ;  encounters  heavy  fire,  246  ; 
in  command  of  Sixth  Corps,  552. 
Semmes,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  370; 

mortally  wounded,  371. 
Seven  Days'  Retreat,  McClellan's,  132, 

152. 

Seven  Pines  (or  Fair  Oaks) ,  battle  of,  81  ; 
new  line  of  defence,  81  ;  McClellan 
advances  to  the  Chickahominy,  82 ; 
preliminary  affairs,  82  ;  positions  of 
the  armies,  83,  84  ;  Johnston  seeks  to 
strike  McClellan  before  McDowell 
can  reach  him,  85;  Johnston  holds 
council,  85,  86 ;  Longstreet  ordered 
to  Williamsburg  road,  86 ;  tactical 
handling  there  left  to  him,  88 ;  ter 
rific  storm  on  eve  of  battle,  88  ;  John 
ston's  orders  for  Generals  Smith  and 
Huger,  89  ;  lack  of  harmony  between 
Longstreet,  Smith,  and  Huger,  90, 
92 ;  hour  of  opening  battle,  93  ; 
Garland  and  the  two  Andersons 
strongly  engage,  94;  Rodes  takes 
Federal  redoubt  and  battery,  94; 
Longstreet's  battle  on  the  Williams- 
burg  road,  96;  McClellan  orders 
Sumner's  corps  to  the  fight,  97; 
Sumner's  reports  quoted,  98  ;  Gen- 


686 


INDEX. 


eral  Smith  beaten,  98 ;  General 
Johnston  orders  troops  to  sleep  on 
their  lines,  100 ;  Johnston  wounded, 
100 ;  summary  of  forces  and  losses, 
101,  102;  Longstreet  plans  for  re 
suming  battle  at  daylight,  103  ;  the 
second  day's  battle,  105;  General 
Smith  holds  a  council,  107;  Long- 
street  asks  for  reinforcements  and  a 
diversion,  108  ;  Pickett's  brave  stand, 
108  ;  losses,  110 ;  criticism  on  General 
Smith,  110,  111;  the  battle  should 
not  have  been  lost  by  the  Confeder 
ates,  110;  Keyes'scorroboration,  110. 
Seward,  Secretary,  583. 
Seymour,  General,  taken  prisoner  at 

Wilderness,  565. 

Shaler,  General,  captured  at  "Wilder 
ness,  565. 
Shannon,  Lieutenant,  at  Chickamauga, 

441. 

Sharpsburg  (or  Antietam),  battle  of, 
preliminaries,  227  et  scq. ;  head  of 
Lee's  army  reaches  the  Antietam, 
233  ;  Union  army  on  the  field,  234  ; 
McClellan  makes  reconnoissance, 
234;  description  of  the  field,  235; 
Hooker  advances  against  Longstreet, 
236 ;  Jackson  arrives  from  Harper's 
Ferry,  236;  General  Mansfield 
crosses  the  Antietam,  237;  the, 
•  bloodiest  single  day  of  the  war,  239  ; 
comparison  with  other  battles,  240; 
battle  opens,  241  ;  fall  of  General 
Mansfield,  242;  heavy  losses  in 
General  Walker's,  Hood's,  and  Hill's 
commands,  243  ;  Federals  in  heavy 
columns  cross  the  Antietam,  244; 
Sumner's  advance,  245,  247;  Rich- 
ardson's  march  against  the  Con 
federate  centre1,  248 ;  Longstreet's 
battle  on  the  Hagerstown  pike,  249 ; 
fall  of  G.  B.  Anderson,  249;  Rich 
ardson  mortally  wounded,  251  ;  at 
tack  against  Confederate  centre  re 
duced  to  defensive,  252  ;  Pleasonton 
crosses  bridge  No  2,  252 ;  his  threat 
ening  demonstration  checked,  253  ; 
D.  H.  Hill's  horse  shot  under  him, 
254 ;  Jackson  ordered  to  turn  Fed 


eral  right,  257;  McClellan 's  orders 
to  Burnside  to  take  bridge,  258  ; 
charge  of  Colonel  Duryea,  259 ;  ad 
vance  against  Longstreet's  right, 
260;  arrival  of  General  A.  P.  Hill, 
261 ;  Burnside 's  progress  arrested, 
262  ;  meeting  of  Lee  and  Longstreet 
after  close  of  battle,  262 ;  Lee  with 
draws  across  the  Potomac,  263  (see 
Shepherdstown)  ;  strength  of  armies, 
265;  losses,  266;  McClellan 's  plan 
and  execution  not  strong,  267  ;  Con 
federate  troops  engaged  in,  267 ; 
Federal  troops  engaged  in,  271 ; 
full  significance  of  battle,  288  ;  com 
ments  on  Stonewall  Jackson  at,  401 
(note). 

Shepherdstown,  Lee's  army  crosses 
Potomac  at,  263 ;  engagement  at, 
264,  265. 

Sheridan,  General  P.  H.,  at  Chicka 
mauga,  442;  in  command  of  Fed 
erals  of  Foster's  army  on  march  to 
Dandridge,  528 ;  in  fight  at  Yellow 
Tavern,  573 ;  marches  cavalry  from 
the  valley  to  join  Sherman,  590 ;  in 
battle  of  Five  Forks,  596,  597,  598 ; 
at  Petersburg,  606  ;  at  Appomattox, 
622 ;  Longstreet  on  operations  of, 
x652. 

/Sherman,  General  William  T.,  at  West 
Point,  17;  advance  of,  at  Manassas, 
48  ;  marching  on  Chattanooga,  480  ; 
proposes  to  strike  Hardee,  515 ;  move 
ments  of,  come  into  remote  bearing 
upon  matters  around  Richmond,  580  ; 
progressive  movements  of,  581. 
Sickles,  General  Daniel,  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  309;  in  affair  at  the  Peach 
Orchard  (Gettysburg),  366,  371 ; 
wounded,  371. 

Sigel,  General,  in  command  ©f  First 
Corps,  Army  of  Virginia,  153  ;  or 
dered  by  Pope  to  attack  at  Manassas 
(Second),  180. 

Sims,  Captain,  at  Appomattox,  627. 
Slaughter  Mountain,  battle  at,  157. 
Slaughter,    M.,   mayor  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  reply  of,  to  General  Sumner's 
demand  for  surrender,  294-296. 


INDEX. 


687 


Slocum,  General  Henry  W.,  at  Cramp- 
ton's  Pass,  229  ;  at  Gettysburg,  356. 

Smith,  General  E.  K.,  commissioned 
lieutenant-general,  290. 

Smith,  Major-General  G.  W.,  reports 
for  duty  with  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  60  ;  called  to  Kichmond  for 
council  with  War  Department,  65; 
Johnston's  orders  to,  for  Seven  Pines, 

89  ;  complaint  of,  against  Longstreet, 

90  ;  beaten  at  Seven  Pines,  98  ;  com 
mand   devolved  upon,  temporarily, 
after  Johnston  was  wounded,    100; 
standing  of,  103  ;  holds  council,  107  ; 
criticism  upon,  110,  111 ;  resignation 
of,  111. 

Smith,  General  Kirby,  arrives  on  field 
of  Manassas,  49 ;  is  wounded,  50. 

Smith,  General  M.  L.,  in  "Wilderness, 
561 ;  makes  reconnoissance  and  leads 
flanking  force,  562,  563. 

Smith,  Major  Melancthon,  at  Chicka-  I 
mauga,  441. 

Smith,  General  W.  F.,  at  Crampton's 
Pass,  229 ;  opens  line  of  railway  on 
the  Tennessee,  472  ;  move  of,  against 
Confederate  sharp-shooters,  473. 

Soldiers,  the  Confederate,  tributes  to, 
200,  288  ;  amusement  of,  325. 

Sorrel,  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  M.,  47; 
goes  with  Longstreet  to  Chicka- 
mauga,  438 ;  communicates  to  Gen 
eral  McLaws  order  of  relief  from 
General  Longstreet,  518  ;  leads  divi 
sions  in  flanking  party  in  Wilderness, 
562;  appointed  brigadier,  581. 

South  Mountain,  description  of,  218; 
advance  of  Union  forces  to,  219 ; 
battle  of,  opened  by  Generals  Pleas- 
onton  and  Cox,  221 ;  General  Gar 
land  killed,  221 ;  Federals  in  superior 
strength  numerically,  222  ;  General 
Keno  killed,  223  ;  the  strong  battle 
against  General  Rodes,  224  ;  exhaus 
tion  of  the  troops,  225 ;  losses,  225  ; 
Lee  orders  withdrawal  of  troops  from, 
228. 

Staif  of  General  Lee,  573. 
Steadman,  Fort,  sortie  against,  592  et 
seq. 


Steamboat  invented  by  William  Long- 
street,  14. 

Steedman,  General,  at  Chickamauga, 
442. 

Stephens,  Hon.  Alex.  H.,  583. 

Steuart,  General  George  H.,  marches 
through  McConnellsburg  and  Car 
lisle,  345;  at  Gettysburg,  374;  at 
Five  Forks,  600. 

Stevens,  General  I.  I.,  at  West  Point, 
17  ;  division  of,  joins  Pope  on  Rap- 
pahannock,  161 ;  at  Manassas  (Sec 
ond),  182;  killed  at  Chantilly,  194; 
tribute  to,  195. 

Stewart,  General,  at  Cbickamauga, 
439;  makes  strong  advance  and 
assault,  447. 

Strawberry  Plains.     See  Dandridge. 

Stribling's  battery,  captured  at  Suffolk, 
325. 

Stuart,  General  J.  E.  B.,  disperses 
Federals  at  Lewinsville,  60 ;  at 
Dranesville,  62 ;  opposes  Hooker  on 
the  Hampton  and  Yorktown  roads, 
68,  69  ;  at  Williamsburg,  75  ;  recon 
noissance  by,  around  McClellan's 
army,  116-119;  cuts  off  Stoneman's 
cavalry  at  Savage  Station,  130;  at 
Erlington  Heights,  146;  raids  Gen 
eral  Pope's  head-quarters,  165,  166; 
captures  supplies,  etc.,  at  Manassas 
Junction,  167;  cavalry  of,  in  first 
passage  of  arms  on  field  of  Manassas, 
172;  takes  a  map  on  the  field,  183; 
in  pursuit  of  Pope's  retreat,  193 ;  at 
Maryland  Heights,  229  ;  rides  around 
Union  army  at  Sharpsburg  and  Har 
per's  Ferry,  290;  engages  Pleason- 
ton's  cavalry  at  Brandy  Station,  338  ; 
orders  to,  from  General  Lee,  for  march 
to  Pennsylvania,  340;  driven  by 
Pleasonton  back  to  Ashby's  Gap, 
341  ;  directions  to,  from  Longstreet, 
for  movements  by  cavalry,  342  ;  late 
arrival  of,  at  Gettysburg,  373 ;  stub 
born  fight  of,  on  third  day,  396; 
covering  Confederate  retreat  from 
Gettysburg,  428;  death  of,  at  Yel 
low  Tavern,  572,  573;  character  of, 
573. 


688 


INDEX. 


Sturgis,  General,  at  Burnside's  Bridge 
(Antietam),  259  ;  operations  against 
Martin's  cavalr}',  521,  522;  occupies 
Dandridge,  526 ;  in  affair  at  Dan- 
dridge,  526  ;  attempts  to  strike  Mar 
tin's  rear,  527. 

Suffolk,  General  Longstreet's  operations 
about,  324. 

Sumner,  General  E.  V.,  in  command 
of  right  on  Chickahominy,  84 ;  or 
dered  by  McClellan  into  battle  at 
Seven  Pines,  97;  reports  of,  98; 
defeats  Magruder  at  Savage  Station, 
132  ;  gallant  covering  of  retreat  from 
Second  Manassas,  196;  Lee's  "lost 
order"  found  in  camp  of,  213;  ad 
vance  of,  at  Sharpsburg,  245 ;  eager 
ness  and  bravery  of,  247;  in  com 
mand  of  Eight  Grand  Division  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  292 ;  calls  for  sur 
render  of  Fredericksburg,  293 ;  troops 
of,  enter  Fredericksburg,  304. 

"Sunrise  order"  for  battle  at  Gettys 
burg,  377  et  seq. 

Surrender.  See  Appomattox,  surrender 
at. 

Sykes,  General,  in  command  of  United 
States  regulars  at  Manassas,  51  ;  at 
Second  Manassas,  189;  at  Fredericks 
burg,  313  ;  corps  of,  at  Little  Hound 
Top,  371. 

T. 

Taliaferro,  General,  wounded  at  Grove- 
ton.  177  ;  at  Fredericksburg,  309. 

Taylor,  Colonel  Erasmus,  on  Lee's  ac 
knowledgment  of  fault  at  Gettys 
burg,  400  ;  takes  guide  to  Longstreet 
in  Wilderness,  557 ;  letter  of,  to 
Longstreet,  on  controversy  as  to 
guide  at  Wilderness,  569. 

Taylor,  General,  mortally  wounded  at 
Manassas  Junction,  170. 

Taylor,  Assistant  Adjutant- General  W. 
H.,  letter  of,  to  General  Longstreet, 
on  order  for  "battle  at  sunrise" 
(Gettysburg),  379  (note)  ;  on  sup 
porting  Longstreet  at  Gettysburg, 
397;  states  strength  of  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  (May,  1864),  553  ; 


letter  to,  from  Longstreet,  574;  re 
ports  Lee's  strength  for  defence  of 
Richmond,  593,  594  ;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  651 ;  letter  to,  from 
Longstreet,  on  policy  towards  new 
organizations,  653. 

Taylor,  General  Zachary,  in  command 
of  "army  of  observation"  in  Louisi 
ana,  18 ;  moves  to  the  Rio  Grande, 
21  ;  calls  for  volunteers,  23 ;  at  Re- 
saca  de  la  Palma,  27. 

Tennessee,  Army  of  the.  See  Army  of 
Tennessee. 

Tennessee  campaign,  438  et  seq.  See 
Chick amauga,  battle  of,  etc. 

Tennessee,  East,  campaign  of.  See  East 
Tennessee  campaign. 

Terry,  Colonel,  48,  596. 

Terry,  General,  before  Richmond,  576  ; 
in  second  expedition  against  Wil 
mington,  582;  at  Five  Forks,  595, 
597,  600. 

Texas  seeks  annexation,  18. 

Thomas,  Colonel,  death  of,  520. 

Thomas,  General  George  H.,  at  West 
Point,  17 ;  commands  four  divisions 
of  Rosecrans's  army  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  441-443  ;  calls  for  reinforce 
ments,  446  ;  supersedes  General  Rose- 
crans  in  command,  472  ;  called  on  by 
General  Foster  for  troops  to  aid  in 
campaign  against  Longstreet,  533 ; 
despatch  from  General  Grant  to,  on 
Longstreet,  534-537 ;  despatch  to, 
from  General  Schofield,  537. 

Thompson,  Major,  killed,  630. 

Thoroughfare  Gap,  Longstreet's  ad 
vance  column  at,  173  ;  description  of, 
174.  See  Manassas,  Second. 

Tidball's  artillery  at  Fort  Steadman, 
594. 

Toombs,  General  Robert,  on  the  Chick 
ahominy,  113  ;  ordered  under  arrest 
by  Longstreet,  161  ;  released,  166  ;  at 
Second  Manassas,  189  ;  gallantly  de 
fends  bridge  against  Burnside,  257 ; 
forced  to  retire,  260. 

Triggs,  General,  at  Chickamauga,  449. 

Trimble.  General,  in  engagement  on 
Rappahannock,  164;  at  Manassas 


INDEX. 


689 


Junction,  167  ;  charge  of,  at  Gettys 
burg  compared  with  that  of  Meade's 
men  at  Fredericksburg,  314  ;  position 
of,  at  Gettysburg,  third  day,  388; 
in  the  famous  charge,  393 ;  wound 
ing  of,  394. 

Turner,  General,  at  Petersburg,  607  ; 
assaults  Fort  Whit  worth,  608. 

Tyler,  General,  reconnoissance  of,  at 
Manassas,  38,  55. 

V. 

Vance,  General,  captured  by  Federals, 
531. 

Van  Cleve,  General  H.  P.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  442. 

Venable,  Colonel  Charles  S.,  men 
tioned,  363,  379 ;  letter  of,  to  General 
Longstreet  on  "battle  at  sunrise" 
order  at  Gettysburg,  379  (note) ;  on 
putting  Heth's  division  in  assaulting 
columns,  398 ;  takes  order  for  change 
of  direction  to  Longstreet  in  Wilder 
ness,  557  ;  letter  of,  to  Longstreet, 
on  movement  of  latter  to  the  Wilder 
ness,  571 ;  gives  account  of  last  scenes 
and  of  General  Lee,  624. 

Vincent,  General,  killed  at  Little 
Bound  Top  (Gettysburg),  372. 

Virginia  "  Foot  Cavalry,"  146. 

Virginia,  "too  much,"  332. 

W. 

WTadsworth,  General  James  S.,  at 
Gettysburg,  374  ;  mortally  wounded 
at  Wilderness,  563. 

Wagner,  Lieutenant,  mortally  wounded 
by  remarkable  cannon-shot.  255. 

Walker,  General  J.  G.,  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  231 ;  at  Sharpsburg,  242,  247. 

Walker,  General  W.  H.  T.,  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  441,  446. 

Walton,  Colonel,  Longstreet's  order  to, 
390. 

War  feeling  in  the  South,  31. 

War,  Mexican.     See  Mexican  war. 

War,  the  general  status  of,  on  Con 
federate  side,  543;  suggestions  for 
conduct  of,  by  Longstreet,  544. 


Warren,  Major-General  G.  K.,  finds 
Little  Kound  Top  the  citadel  of  the 
field  at  Gettysburg,  371 ;  testimony 
as  to  third  day  at  Gettysburg,  398 ; 
in  command  of  Fifth  Corps  (1864), 
552 ;  makes  opening  attack  in  Wil 
derness,  558 ;  at  Five  Forks,  597. 

Washburn,  Colonel,  mortally  wounded, 
615. 

Washington  Artillery,  the,  at  Manas 
sas,  37,  40.  41,  49  ;  at  Second  Manas 
sas,  181,  186;  at  Sharpsburg,  233, 
236,  243,  249,  250,  261,  267;  at 
Fredericksburg,  311  ;  at  Gettysburg, 
390  et  seq. 

Weed,  General,  killed  on  Little  Kound 
Top  (Gettysburg),  372. 

Weitzel,  General,  before  Richmond, 
576,  595,  603,  604. 

West  Point,  distinguished  men  at,  16, 

17. 

Westward  movement,  first  proposed  to 
Secretary  of  War  Seddon  by  Long- 
street,  327,  409  ;  reverted  to  by  Long- 
street,  433,  434 ;  transportation  or 
dered  for,  436;  Longstreet  reaches 
General  Bragg's  head-quarters,  438 
(see  Chickamauga,  battle  of,  etc.)  ; 
difference  between  time  proposed  for 
and  actual  making  of,  478,  479. 

Wey mouth,  Captain,  at  Fredericks 
burg,  303. 

Wharton,  General,  441. 

Wheeler,  General,  makes  cavalry  raid 
on  Tennessee  River,  463;  Long- 
street's  orders  to,  in  East  Tennessee, 
487,  488  ;  in  engagement  on  Little 
Tennessee  River,  490 ;  returns  to  Gen 
eral  Bragg,  500. 

White  House,  McClellan  establishes  his 
permanent  depot  at,  82.  See  Seven 
Pines. 

Whiting,  Major,  at  Manassas,  52  ;  Gen 
eral,  at  Seven  Pines,  105-107;  de 
sires  to  leave  Fair  Oaks,  113;  rein 
forces  Jackson,  115  ;  at  Gaines's  Mill, 
127,  128  ;  mortally  wounded  at  Fort 
Fisher,  582. 

Whittle,  Colonel,  wounded  at  Gettys 
burg,  394. 


44 


690 


INDEX. 


Whitworth,  Fort  (Petersburg),  606- 
608. 

Wilcox,  General,  at  Burnside's  Bridge 
(Antietam),  259  ;  at  Gettysburg,  374; 
at  Wilderness,  556,  558,  560  ;  at  Fort 
Steadman,  594  ;  at  Petersburg,  605, 
606,  608. 

Wilderness,  the,  battle  of,  General 
Grant  with  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
552  ;  strength  of  confronting  armies, 
552-554;  Army  of  the  Potomac 
crosses  the  Kapidan,  555 ;  General 
Grant  had  no  fixed  plan  beyond 
avoiding  Lee's  defensive  line,  555 ; 
Wilderness  described,  555,  556;  march 
of  Longstreet's  command,  556  ;  re 
ceives  a  guide,  557  ;  troops  meet  and 
action  cannot  wait,  558  ;  attack  by 
General  Warren,  558 ;  Confederates 
fail  to  intrench  at  night,  560 ;  Han-  j 
cock's  advance  in  the  morning,  560  ;  I 
Longstreet's  troops  form  line  under 
fire,  560,  and  repulse  Hancock's  ad 
vance,  561  ;  the  Ninth  Corps  ordered 
in  by  General  Grant,  561  ;  Longstreet 
organizes  flanking  movement  against 
Hancock's  left,  562,  563 ;  General 
Jenkins  mortally  and  Longstreet  se 
verely  wounded,  564 ;  General  Lee 
on  the  field  in  command,  565  ;  value 
of  a  ''level  head,"  566  ;  the  failure 
to  intrench  by  Third  Corps,  565- 
567  ;  delay  in  advance  after  Long- 
street  was  disabled,  567  ;  controversy 
as  to  Longstreet's  march  and  guide, 
568,  571. 

Willard,  General,  killed  at  Gettys 
burg,  371. 

Williamsburg,  battle  of,  72  ;  advance 
of  Hooker,  73 ;  Longstreet  orders 
Early  to  support  the  left,  74  ;  Stuart's 
charge,  75;  Anderson's  concentrated 
movement  on,  and  capture  of  guns, 
75  ;  Anderson  driven  back  by  Hook 
er's  reinforcements,  76  ;  Hancock 
takes  two  redoubts,  77 ;  attack  by 
D.  H.  Hill  and  Early,  with  great 


slaughter  of  the  latter's  troops  be 
cause  of  blunder,  78  ;  forces  engaged, 
79  ;  casualties,  79  ;  object  of  the  bat 
tle,  79  ;  Hancock  called  "  the  Su 
perb,"  80. 

Williamsburg,  engagement  near,  68- 
70. 

Williamsburg  road,  affair  on  (1864), 
576-578. 

Williamsport,  Confederates  at,  on  re 
treat  from  Gettysburg,  428,  429. 

Wilmington,  first  move  against,  580; 
second  expedition  against,  582. 

Winchester,  engagement  at,  between 
Ewell  and  Milroy,  339. 

Winder,  General,  mortall}-  wounded  at 
Slaughter  Mountain,  157. 

Winthrop,  Captain,  wounded  at  Knox- 
ville  in  leading  assault,  497. 

Wofford,  General,  Longstreet  rides 
with,  to  Little  Bound  Top,  372;  in 
retreat  from  Gettysburg,  431 ;  in  en 
gagement  on  Little  Tennessee  Kiver, 
490  ;  in  assault  on  Fort  Sanders,  502, 
503,  505;  at  Dandridge,  526;  at 
Wilderness,  562,  563. 

Wood,  General  T.  J.,  at  Chickamauga, 
442,  446. 

Woodhull,  Major  Alfred  A'.,  gives 
account  of  remarkable  cannon-shot, 
255. 

Wool,  General  John  E.,  orders  to  Col 
onel  Miles,  in  command  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  286. 

Worth,  General,  at  Corpus  Christi,  20. 

Wright,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  371 ; 
makes  assault  at  Petersburg,  605. 

Wrightsville,  bridge  at,  burned,  345. 


Y. 


Yellow  Tavern,  engagement  at,  be 
tween  Sheridan  and  Stuart,  573. 

York,  authorities  of,  surrender  to 
General  John  B.  Gordon,  345. 

Yorktown,  Confederates  occupy,  67 ; 
intrenchments  abandoned,  68. 


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